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# A LOST TEXT OF EARLY INDIAN MADHYAMAKA

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## 1.0. INTRODUCTION

In the preface to his *Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Indian Philosophy*, D.S. RUEGG comments in passing on “the remarkable philological and interpretative methods” developed by Tibetan scholars, methods “that could well justify us in regarding them as Indologists *avant la lettre*.”<sup>1</sup> Certainly most of us with an interest in Indian Buddhism would concur with the sentiments expressed by Professor RUEGG. One can not help but appreciate the monumental efforts of those pioneers of Tibetan Buddhology who immersed themselves in the enormous project of collecting, organizing and translating a vast library of Indian texts. It was, after all, not only a matter of painstakingly constructing a hermeneutical approach to translation and exegesis; even before such work could get underway these early scholars had literally to forge a written language suitable for the task. “Indologists *avant la lettre*” – it is a fine compliment, and one that is, no doubt, richly deserved.

And yet, in referring to the Tibetans as Indologists we may all too easily lose touch with the fact that the Tibetan project was from its inception quite different from the project of the modern philologist. A tangential, but nevertheless important, purpose of this paper is to suggest that our admiration for Tibetan scholarship need not blind us to the fundamental disparity between their methodological presuppositions and our own.

Methodological presuppositions are, of course, the indispensable starting point for all scholarly work. Although such presuppositions are not generally the focus for scholarly discussion even among modern Buddhologists, they form the necessary foundation on which all research, translation and exegesis gets underway. This is true because no scholarly question

1 D. Seyfort RUEGG, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden, 1981), p. viii.



can be shaped outside the context provided by a particular set of presuppositions; it is significant because the sorts of questions a scholar poses will determine, to a considerable extent, the nature of the answers he or she receives. So it was for the early Tibetans, so it is for those who even now do their scholarly work within the parameters defined by that tradition, and so it is for us, as well, we who prosecute our interest in Indian Buddhism as philologists and historians working within the intellectual context defined by the modern university. What differentiates us as scholars from our Tibetan counterparts is not the need for presuppositions, but rather the nature of these all but invisible ideas that form the underpinnings of our research work. Perhaps no single idea is more difficult to articulate – and none more characteristic of the gulf that lies between us and the Tibetans – than our idea of history.

Certainly the Tibetans are not without some notion of history; it is equally certain, however, that their concept of history is entirely unlike our own in very specific, and very important, ways. It would be rewarding to discuss the difference between these two concepts of history from a theoretical point of view, but this is not my intention here.<sup>2</sup> Rather in what follows I shall base my discussion on the philological, historical analysis of a relatively obscure Indian Buddhist text, the *Akutobhayā*.

Neglect of the *Akutobhayā* among modern scholars is in part a reflection of its shadowy presence in India. There can be little doubt, however, that we have been influenced in this respect, as in others, by the judgements of our Tibetan predecessors. The methods and goals of Tibetan Indology – grounded in the largely ahistorical doxographic system of *grub mtha'* – served to marginalize the *Akutobhayā* and reduce its significance to the point where, by the first half of the fourteenth century, the text virtually ceased to exist as an object of historical curiosity.<sup>3</sup> The Tibetans' failure to appreciate the importance of the *Akutobhayā* in its unique historical context

2 The literature on philosophy of history is, of course, immense, and we are far from reaching any consensus on the meaning and nature of historiography. For the purposes of this paper, however, see in particular Louis DUMONT, *La civilisation indienne et nous; Esquisse de sociologie comparée* (Paris, 1964), Chapter 2: "Le Problème de l'Histoire". Much of what he has to say there regarding the Indian sense of history is equally applicable to Tibet.

3 *Grub mtha'* literature of this period contains no reference to ABh. See Katsumi MIMAKI, *bLo gsul grub mtha'* (Kyoto, 1982), pp. 27-54.

is the direct result of a methodology that was unequipped to grapple with a phalanx of complex problems that surrounds the text in both India and China. Here, as elsewhere, we can not afford to take for granted either the vocabulary or the conclusions of Tibetan scholars, for if they were methodologically unequipped to deal with historical problems it was, in large part, because they simply were not interested in the sort of historiography that characterizes contemporary European scholarship. At least in the realm of *buddhavacana* (which includes for all practical purposes both *sūtra*-s and the Indian *śāstra*-s) these men were exclusively concerned with what endures through the centuries, not with what Louis DUMONT calls “un ensemble de changements significatifs”,<sup>4</sup> with what is eternal and forever the same, not with what differs from one unique historical period to another, with what is always and forever available, not with what is hidden or lost in the shifting, unpredictable sands of time. History – which meant above all the history of Indian Buddhism – was for the Tibetans a stable, architectonic structure built of texts and schools piled one on top of the other like bricks, each one associated with the name of some Indian master. In Tibet the history of Indian Buddhism became a kind of sprawling Sarvāstivādin mansion through which scholars could wander with impunity, secure in the knowledge that within these rooms past, present and future coexisted in a liaison that both guaranteed and was guaranteed by the Truth and Reality of the Dharma.<sup>5</sup> It was inconceivable that a text could exist without finding its assigned place in the edifice of time, and every place was assigned very strictly on the basis of an author’s name. For the Tibetans, a text without an author could have no historical significance, no meaning, no *raison d’être*.

My comments just above are perhaps so obvious as to be trivial. What is less obvious, however, is the considerable influence Tibetan historiography has exerted behind the scenes in shaping our understanding of Indian texts. This influence is both subtle and profound, and we need to pay much closer attention to the ways in which the principles and presuppositions of a peculiarly Tibetan brand of Indology have infiltrated our work. The expres-

4 DUMONT (1964) *op.cit.*, p. 32.

5 Cf. DUMONT’s remarks on Indian historiography, *ibid.*, p. 44: “Tout d’abord on observe que la culture indienne trahit son histoire dans sa forme même. On a comparé l’Inde à un musée où les formes nouvelles se superposeraient aux anciennes sans les oblitérer, produisant ainsi une sorte d’empilement stratifié où l’on pourrait reconnaître les apports des âges successifs.”

sion “Indo-Tibetan Buddhism”, for example, has recently been incorporated into our vocabulary without adequate consideration of the presuppositions underlying its use or their implications for our research. Without consideration, that is, for how effectively this simple phrase conflates two otherwise distinct historical realms. For what do we mean by *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism* other than a late form of Indian Vajrayāna appropriated *by* and *for* the Tibetan cultural imagination? Should the *karmadhāraya* compound Indo-Tibetan Buddhism have any other meaning for us than as a second name for Tibetan Buddhism itself? On closer inspection this expression turns out to be a neologism coined with veiled reference to one particular Tibetan tradition associated above all with Sa skya pa and dGe lugs pa orthodoxy. Text-critical, historical investigation of Indian Buddhism needs to be self-consciously pruned away from this kind of uncritical vocabulary, a vocabulary contaminated by the influence of Tibetan Indology, not because the Tibetans were wrong about this or that conclusion, but rather because we can not share their methodological presuppositions regarding, among other things, the unquestioned faith in a seamless, unbroken tradition (the antithesis of “un ensemble de changements significatifs”) extending from sixth century B.C.E. India into Tibet and grounded in the Word (or intent) of the Buddha. Use of the expression “Indo-Tibetan Buddhism” is of course only one instance of the problem. The fact that the subject of this study, the *Akutoḥbhayā*, has until now received so little attention from Western scholars is, I believe, another important indication of the degree to which we have compromised our own historical and philological rigor in deferring, unreflectively at times, to the power and elegance of Tibetan scholarship. In working to develop a text-critical, historical understanding of the *Akutoḥbhayā* we stand to learn a great deal about early Indian Madhyamaka – a discrete historical period<sup>6</sup> that was never defined as such in the Tibetan imagination. The balance of this paper will provide, I hope, a broader context in which to appreciate this claim.

According to traditional Indian accounts passed on to us by the Tibetans, Nāgārjuna’s dialectical philosophy was explained in eight Indian commentaries on his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*-s (MMK). Of these eight,

6 “...nous nous voyons avant tout comme des individus, nous voyons le monde autour de nous sous forme d’objets individuels, – l’histoire est aussi une suite d’événements individuels...” (*ibid.*, p. 32)

five are extant in the original Sanskrit, or in Tibetan and Chinese translations. ABh is one of six surviving commentaries, as shown on the following chart.

INDIAN COMMENTARIES ON MMK  
as listed in the colophon to ABh (P 114a)

<i>Author</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Reference</i>
Nāgārjuna (?) (1st-3rd c. C.E.) <sup>7</sup>	<i>Mūlamadhyamakavṛtṭyakutobhayā</i> (ABh)	D 2839, P5229
Buddhapālita (ca. 500 C.E.) <sup>8</sup>	<i>Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamakavṛtṭi</i> (BP)	D 3842, P 5242
Candrakīrti (ca. 600-650) <sup>9</sup>	<i>Mūlamadhyamakavṛtṭiprasannapadā</i> (PSP)	D 3860, P 5260
Devaśarman* <sup>10</sup>	(?)	—
Guṇaśrī <sup>11</sup>	(?)	—
Guṇamati (late 5th century) <sup>12</sup>	(?)	—
Sthīramati (ca. 510-570) <sup>13</sup>	<i>Ta sheng chung kuan shih lun</i>	T 1567
Bhāvaviveka (ca. 500-570) <sup>14</sup>	<i>Prajāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtṭi</i> (PP)	D 3853, P 5253, T1566

7 See below, note 14.

8 RUEGG (1981) *op.cit.*, p. 60.

9 *ibid.*, p. 71.

10 It is not possible to place Devaśarman with certainty any earlier than the 6th century. He must be at least this early, since Avalokitavrata mentions him in his PPT (wa, fol. 225a-226b). The title shown in this chart is supplied in the *Prajñāpradīpāṭikā* (PPT) (*ibid.*), and also in mKhas grub's *sTong thun chen mo* (New Delhi, 1972), fol. 37b. Atiśa writes that Devaśarman's commentary is really on the *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), and that the eighth commentator on MMK is Guṇadatta (*Bodhimārgapradīpa-pañjikā* [P 5344], fol. 324b).

11 Guṇaśrī is at least as early as the 6th century, on the same grounds as stated above with reference to Devaśarman.

12 Guṇamati was Sthīramati's teacher. See RUEGG (1981) *op.cit.*, p. 61.

13 *ibid.*

14 *ibid.*

The Chinese canon contains a sixth Indian commentary, the *Chung lun* (CL),<sup>15</sup> which is not included in the traditional list of eight. This text, however, is closely related to ABh as I expect to show in the course of this paper.

The tradition surrounding ABh is filled with mystery: It is the most ancient commentary on Nāgārjuna's MMK; it was the most authoritative and influential commentary prior to Buddhapālita; it was attributed to Nāgārjuna very early on in its long history and it remained at the focal point of an unconfirmed and apparently widespread traditional belief regarding a supposed auto-commentary on MMK. And yet, despite all this, by the fifth century ABh lay virtually forgotten among a rapidly growing commentarial literature engendered to a great extent by its own early example. The dispute touched off by its entry into the Tibetan tradition did very little to alleviate the air of mystery that had long before settled about this ancient text. ABh was translated into Tibetan during the initial years of the ninth century and may have been studied as an auto-commentary for several hundred years after. By the time of Tsong kha pa in the fifteenth century, however, a growing controversy about its authorship had been once and for all resolved in favor of the dGe lugs pa and Sa skya pa claim that ABh could not possibly be Nāgārjuna's own work.<sup>16</sup> From then on Tibetan scholars lost interest in the commentary and it ceased to play an active role in any curriculum of study. It was during these years that a few questionable opinions solidified into incontestable facts that must now be carefully examined.

The Nāgārjuna whose name is associated with ABh is thought to have lived in Southern India sometime between the first to the third century C.E.<sup>17</sup> The corpus of works attributed to him embodies the earliest known technical treatises expounding the doctrines of emptiness (*śūnyavāda*) and absence of own-being (*niḥsvabhāvavāda*). Because his writings represent the first attempt to ground these radical doctrines in an expanded inter-

15 Taishō 1564, attributed to "Piṅgala". The problems involved in identifying and dating Piṅgala are complex and unresolved. I look forward to treating them in a separate paper.

16 Cf. e.g. *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath, 1973), pp. 108-109 and *rGyud sde spyi'i rnam par gzhaḡ*, fol. 25a.

17 There were apparently several Indian philosophers who used this name (RUEGG [1981] *op.cit.*, p. 8). Also, see *ibid.*, pp. 4-6, n. 11 for a discussion of the problems involved in dating Nāgārjuna.



pretation of the ancient Buddhist teaching of no-self, Nāgārjuna is considered by traditional Buddhists and modern scholars alike to be one of the seminal thinkers of the Mahāyāna. His most famous work, the *Mūla-madhyamakakārikā*-s (MMK), is generally accepted as the fundamental presentation of the Madhyamaka, or the philosophy of the Middle Way (*madhyamā pratipad*). The only extant Sanskrit text of MMK is interwoven into the text of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (PSP), a commentary written several centuries later.<sup>18</sup> The 447 stanzas (*kārikā*-s) of MMK are divided into twenty-seven chapters, each one dealing with a separate topic of particular interest to Buddhist philosophers of the period. In a more general sense, however, the entire work is designed as a detailed technical exposition of the concepts presented in the two introductory stanzas set at the beginning of the treatise: "I pay homage to the best of teachers, the perfectly awakened one who has taught dependent origination, the stilling of conceptual diffusion, utter peace which is without destruction or production, neither annihilated nor eternal, neither undifferentiated nor differentiated, and without both coming and going." The writings of Nāgārjuna's immediate disciple Āryadeva elucidate and expand upon the themes developed in MMK, with particular attention to the Madhyamaka critique of non-Buddhist philosophies. Apart from Āryadeva's work, ABh is the only extant Madhyamaka treatise from this very early period – a fact which alone makes the text crucial to our understanding of early Indian Madhyamaka.<sup>19</sup>

By the middle of the sixth century in India we encounter a burgeoning genre of doxographical literature rooted in the work of the Hindu logician Bhartṛhari.<sup>20</sup> Under the impress of a growing fascination with taxonomy, epistemology and logic, Nāgārjuna's writings were increasingly recognized as the foundation of a *darśana*, or "philosophical school" – a term that

18 MMK was originally edited by Louis de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN in 1903-13 (rep. Ösna-brück, 1970), using three closely related manuscripts of PSP; more recently, it was re-edited in J.W. DE JONG, *Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikāḥ* (Adyar, 1977), on the basis of a fourth manuscript.

19 We have no surviving texts of the other three commentaries from this early period that are mentioned in the colophon to ABh (Guṇamati, Guṇasī and Devaśarman).

20 See Chr. LINDTNER, "Linking Up Bhartṛhari and the Bauddhas", in *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* XLVII.1.1993 (*Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartṛhari*), pp. 195-213.

seems to have been coined during this same fertile period.<sup>21</sup> Later Tibetan scholars took up the idea of a Madhyamaka *darśana* from Bhāvaviveka and went on to identify within this framework two distinct sub-schools of Madhyamaka based on the writings of Bhāvaviveka himself and those of his immediate predecessor, Buddhapālita.

Buddhapālita's *Madhyamakavṛtti* (BP) adopted a version of reductio ad absurdum (*prasaṅgavākya*) as the single viable means for communicating the meaning of Nāgārjuna's legacy. It is important to recognize that *prasaṅgavākya* is not a rhetoric of explanation, but rather an active instantiation – a re-enactment, so to speak – of what was perceived to be Nāgārjuna's own philosophical and soteriological strategy. In direct contrast to this approach, Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP) defended the use of independently valid syllogistic reasoning (*svatantrānumāna*) as a means of *explaining* the Madhyamaka philosophy and its doctrine of emptiness. Candrakīrti argued against Bhāvaviveka and in favor of *prasaṅgavākya* – his commentary was understood by Tibetan scholars to have clearly defined, for the first time, a split between these two approaches that would become crucial to the development of Madhyamaka over the course of the next one thousand years. Operating within the framework of a sophisticated doxographic system refined by Bhāvaviveka, the Tibetans designated Bhāvaviveka and Buddhapālita as the founders of two sub-schools of the Madhyamaka labeled *rang rgyud pa* and *thal 'gyur pa*.

Once in place these two names and the taxonomic scheme associated with them so dominated all subsequent historical understanding of the Madhyamaka that Tibetan scholars never again looked behind or through their doxography to the first few centuries in the interpretive evolution of Nāgārjuna's philosophy, a time when the terms and ideas articulated in MMK were new and revolutionary, less encrusted with scholasticism and perhaps more fluid and alive. The picture of this period reconstructed when we look back through ABh and the tradition around it suggests that MMK was originally understood on the basis of a collection of brief commentarial passages, "notes" that may well have been based on Nāgārjuna's own oral commentary to the *kārikā*-s. My study of the *Akutoḥhayā* indicates that the text most probably existed for a century or more in a number of different

21 See Wilhelm HALBFASS, *India & Europe: An Essay in Understanding* (Albany, 1988), Chapters 15 & 16. (*This is a translation, with expanded material, of Indien und Europa: Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung* [Basel, 1981].)

versions, one of which made its way into China by 402 C.E., while a second turned up in Tibet several hundred years later. Although several MMK commentaries seem to have circulated through the early Madhyamaka community, one of these, the *Akutobhayā*, was clearly considered to be particularly authoritative. The Chinese received their expanded version of the text, translated it and began studying and discussing various interpretations of its contents not more than two hundred years after the original had been written in India. As a result, in China Indian Madhyamaka was immediately associated with the *prasaṅgavākyā* that is central to the *Akutobhayā*'s exposition of Nāgārjuna's stanzas; the influence of *prasaṅgavākyā* extended through the San lun tradition and eventually became an indirect but powerful force in shaping later indigenous developments.<sup>22</sup> In India, Buddhapālita used a recension of the *Akutobhayā* as the model for his own famous commentary on MMK; the text passed through the medium of his writing and once again exerted a significant influence on the history of Buddhist thought and practice, this time in the formation of the indigenous Tibetan concept of a *thal 'gyur pa* school of Madhyamaka. In a final ironic twist dGe lugs pa scholars came to defend the exegetical commentary of Buddhapālita (via his champion, Candrakīrti) as the most profound teaching of the Mahāyāna, without any appreciation of the massive debt this work owed to its predecessor and model, an ancient Indian text that had been translated by their own forebears half a century earlier, a text that could not be authorized because it had no fixed author and therefore no authority to exist.


What is of central importance, from our point of view, is not simply that ABh has no author – or none that we can presently identify with certainty – but rather that it is a text which played a vital role in the development of Indian Buddhism through the influence it exerted at a certain time and place, that is to say, through the influence it exerted at the specific, historically bounded period of early Indian Madhyamaka. Within the parameters of this historical period – parameters which were (and are) themselves defined to a considerable extent by ABh itself – the text existed and had enormous meaning. Eventually it ceased to exist: first to the Indians, then to the Tibetans. Now, some 1,800 years later, it has been retrieved and yields meaning for us because we can locate it within history as the product

22 See Richard ROBINSON, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison, 1967) for a comprehensive presentation of the Chinese San lun tradition.



of a distinct period characterized by a certain complex of events, deeds, and individual choices. For the Tibetans, Abh ceased to exist; for us, it was lost. But here is a difference that makes all the difference in the world, since what is lost may perhaps be found again through the application of historiographic and philological tools. With or without an author and entirely apart from any doxographic template ABh can be made to speak to our historical imagination and so to hint at what else might have been left behind with the passing centuries, lost or altered or, perhaps, simply forgotten in the ceaseless flux of time.

The following chart illustrates the relationship of the various recensions of ABh to each other and to the expanded commentaries (BP and CL) that are directly related to the Indic source of ABh. Extant texts are framed in a double border.



## 2.0. PREVIOUS MODERN STUDIES OF ABh

WALLESER's edition and translation of ABh is the only attempt at a thorough-going study of the text that has yet been published in a European language.<sup>1</sup> Despite its merit as a ground-breaking enterprise, the value of this early work is mitigated by several methodological problems. Working from the Peking version alone, WALLESER published a virtually unannotated German translation of the text. The translation itself is accurate and readable, but the lack of critical apparatus makes it primarily valuable only as a crib to the Tibetan. More important, we are left with a number of unanswered questions regarding the historical and doctrinal context of ABh, and WALLESER's brief introduction barely touches on the complex problems involved. Both there and in the preface to his translation of the Chinese *Chung lun* (CL) he uncritically accepts ABh as Nāgārjuna's own auto-commentary on MMK. This ascription is apparently taken over solely on the basis of evidence provided in the colophon to ABh and in the Chinese biography of Nāgārjuna.<sup>2</sup> In his introduction to the translation of CL he refers in passing to the relationship between ABh and CL, but he does not seem to have placed much importance on the striking similarities in the language of the two texts. For reasons which are not at all clear, he either did not notice or did not choose to comment on the numerous places where ABh and CL directly correspond. The bulk of his introductory discussion is devoted to a short and quite inconclusive investigation into the identity of "Piṅgala", the mysterious author of this commentary. Certainly the most important service provided by WALLESER's work is that it extracted ABh from its previous obscure place in the Tibetan canon and set it before the academic community. Unfortunately, since that time not one extended study of ABh has appeared, while during the same period a good deal of conflicting information has accumulated in isolated footnotes and tangential remarks.

1 M. WALLESER, *Die Mittlere Lehre Nāgārjuna* (Heidelberg, 1911 & 1912) and *Ga las 'jigs med, Die tibetische Version von Nāgārjuna's Kommentar Akutobhayā zur Madhyamaka-kārikā: Nach der Pekinger Ausgabe des Tanjur herausgegeben* (Heidelberg, 1923).

2 WALLESER (1912) *op.cit.*, p. IX. For the Chinese biography, see the relevant passages from the *Lung shu p'u sa chuan* (T 2947, pp. 184c17 & 186b8), and the English translation in ROBINSON (1967) *op. cit.*, p. 26.

Text-critical and historical problems center around two inter-related issues: (1) the nature of the relationship between ABh and CL; and (2) the question of authorship. The major flaw in all previous discussions of ABh is that they invariably failed to appreciate the interdependence of these two issues, especially as regards the relationship between ABh and CL. LAMOTTE, for example, accepts ABh as Nāgārjuna's auto-commentary and attributes CL to Āryadeva, with no awareness of the fact that both texts obviously stem from a single Indic source.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, LINDTNER and others have suggested that Piṅgala is the original author of ABh, though the relevant evidence is extremely ambivalent.<sup>4</sup> Such a hypothesis does not seem plausible in the face of evidence brought together in the present study.<sup>5</sup> The nature of the relationship between ABh and CL, as well as the associated problem of their common relationship to Buddhapālita's commentary, is the primary subject of the balance of this paper.

### 3.0. THE TEXT OF ABh

There are many mysteries surrounding the history of this text, and many questions that remain unsolved, yet one problem is particularly intriguing: For much of the first two or three centuries following the composition of MMK the *Akutobhayā* was almost certainly the most authoritative and very likely the only commentary on Nāgārjuna's *kārikā*-s. Buddhapālita studied it closely and styled his own *vṛtti* on its example. He not only incorporated actual segments of its text into his commentary, but more important, he gave his unqualified acceptance to ABh as the single authoritative approach to the study and interpretation of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakāśāstra*, and in

3 Etienne LAMOTTE, *Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien* (Louvain, 1958), p. 657: "Les vers mémoriaux les plus anciens sont les *Madhyamikakārikā* de Nāgārjuna. Elles étaient accompagnées d'un commentaire de l'auteur, l'*Akutobhayā*, qui n'existe plus qu'en version tibétaine." Elsewhere he attributes CL to Āryadeva: see *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra)* avec une nouvelle introduction, Tome III (Louvain, 1970), p. 1373.

4 Chr. LINDTNER, *Nāgārjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna* (Copenhagen, 1982), p. 16, n. 33.

5 This would mean that virtually all of the differences between CL and ABh are due to Kumārajīva's own revisions, which is highly unlikely. The evidence suggests that the author of CL (Piṅgala?) took the received text of ABh as his model, just as did Buddhapālita.

doing so he insured that this early commentary would exert a decisive influence on the future development of Madhyamaka in India and Tibet, via his own work. Even before Buddhapālita's time, however, the *Akutobhayā* had already been used in exactly the same way, as the literal and methodological basis for a commentary that would eventually be transported into China where it became one of the three fundamental Madhyamaka texts in the Far East. Apart from the question of its authorship, a close study of the relevant texts demonstrates beyond any doubt that the *Akutobhayā* was an immensely influential commentary, and yet, unacknowledged even by those who had relied most heavily upon it, this ancient companion to Nāgārjuna's *kārikās* seems to have fallen into virtually total obscurity by sometime in the fifth century. In this section we shall review the evidence that links ABh to BP and CL as the progenitor and model for these seminal commentaries.

### 3.1. ABh and BP

In arguing against Bhāvaviveka's methodology, Candrakīrti established Buddhapālita's *vr̥tti* (BP) as the source of what was only later given the title *dbu ma thal 'gyur ba*. Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti eventually came to represent the great triumvirate of Mādhyamika commentators; all later Madhyamaka treatises are concerned to some extent with their relationship to the work of these three early philosophers. Candrakīrti freely quotes from both Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka; Bhāvaviveka presents a direct and pointed critique of Buddhapālita, following, in most instances, a summarized or abridged version of BP;<sup>1</sup> Buddhapālita, earliest of the three, refers to no previous commentary. And yet, as shall be documented in what follows, each one of these famous commentators owes a great debt to ABh – a debt that is not at all lessened by the circumstance that it has gone entirely unacknowledged by both the Indian and Tibetan traditions.

In order to appreciate the significance of the correspondences between ABh and BP, which will be discussed below, it is necessary first of all to place the two texts in their relative chronology. Close comparison of the

1 A. SAITO, *Buddhapālita-mūlamadhyamaka-vr̥tti* (Australian National University, 1984 [unpublished dissertation]), p. xxiv. According to Avalokitavrata's PPT, Bhāvaviveka explicitly referred his criticisms to Buddhapālita on more than twenty separate occasions: see Y. EJIMA, *Chūganshō no Tenkai* (Tokyo, 1980), pp. 171-178.

texts of ABh and CL confirms that both commentaries stem from one original Indic source. We know that the Chinese translation of CL was done by Kumārajīva in 402 C.E., which means that the Indic source of CL and ABh goes back at least as far as the fourth century. Buddhapālita was active around 500 C.E.,<sup>2</sup> so that his commentary must have been written some hundred years or more after ABh. Nevertheless, the two texts entered the Tibetan tradition more or less simultaneously. Both ABh and BP were translated sometime around the close of the ninth century by the same team of Jñānagarbha and kLu'i rgyal mtshan.<sup>3</sup> ABh is approximately half the length of BP; it consistently paraphrases or simply restates the *kārikā* content of MMK in prose form, whereas BP regularly expands and analyzes MMK at length. Both commentaries invariably rely on the *prasaṅgavākya*. Despite claims to the contrary by later Tibetan scholars, I find no evidence of any significant philosophical or doctrinal discrepancy between the two. At most one might assert, along with mKhas grub, that the extremely brief prose restatements of ABh tend to over-simplify the subtle message of MMK.<sup>4</sup>

### 3.1.1. Chapter titles

Nāgārjuna's original MMK was written in twenty-seven chapters, and the titles of all of these chapters are identical in ABh and BP.<sup>5</sup> Both of these commentaries differ in the same eight instances from the titles shown in the Sanskrit text of PSP: *viz.*, in Chapters II, III, VII, IX, XI, XIII, XV, and XX.<sup>6</sup>

2 RUEGG (1981) *op.cit.*, p. 60.

3 These same translators also worked on PP, PPT and MMK. Some two hundred fifty years later Hasumati and Nyi ma grags translated PSP and retranslated MMK so as to bring it into accord with the explanations given in PSP (see the colophon of [Prajñā-] MMK, D Tsa 19a5-6).

4 *sTong thun chen mo* (New Delhi, 1972), fol. 76.2; translated into English with critical apparatus in José CABEZON, *A Dose of Emptiness: An annotated translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang* (Albany, 1992).

5 And in Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, as well.

6 See §3.2 for the chapter titles as given in ABh and PSP (Skt.).

3.1.2. *kārikā* texts

There are three distinct types of differences in the *kārikā* texts of ABh and BP, as summarized in the chart that appears below.<sup>7</sup> An asterisk (\*) indicates that the given variant reading is incorrect according to grammatical or syntactic criteria. It is to be noted that out of a total of thirty-one variants, nine may be attributed to grammatical or syntactic error (GS) and another nine to synonymous Tibetan constructions (T) (e.g., *ma yin* for *min*). Only the remaining thirteen would seem to reflect actual alternative readings in the original Sanskrit sources for the *kārikā*-s (K).<sup>8</sup> Given the relative chronology of the two texts, as discussed above, we can reasonably assume that the reading found in ABh represents an earlier form of the *kārikā*-s, or possibly, simply a different recension of MMK.

Chapter	<i>kārikā</i>	ABh	BP	comments
I	8b	te*	no	GS
	9d	lta	ltar	T
	10a	yod	yin*	GS
	14d	ci yi	ci'i	T
III	5c	po	po'ang	K
V	1c	sngar	snga*	GS
	2b	na'ang	na	K
VII	2a	skye la sogs gsum	skye sogs gsum po	T
	19	skyes	skye*	GS
	25d	bzhin	nyid	K
	28c	gnas pa yang	gnas skabs ni	K
XV	11a	yod pa	yod pas	K
XVI	9a	'das	'da'*	GS
XVII	8d	rtaḡ pa min	rtaḡ ma yin	T

7 Differences in *kārikā* texts are noted only where none of the four standard Tibetan editions of ABh and BP correspond.

8 SAITO (1984) *op.cit.*, p. xvii concludes that “except for a few minor differences, Jñānagarbha and kLu'i rgyal mtshan always gave the same translation of [MMK] embedded in ABh, BP, PP and PPT...” This is in accord with my own findings, as even the apparent alternative readings would represent relatively insignificant differences in meaning. SAITO himself has found only five places where ABh and BP present explanations that would seem to differ in such a way as to indicate that they were working from significant variants (*ibid.*, p. xviii).



XVIII	7a	ldog pas*	ldog pa	GS
XXI	18b	dang po	dang por	T
XXII	1b	der de med	de der med	K (?)
	5d	de la*	de las	GS
XXIII	14b	min na	min pa*	GS
	17c	la	la 'ng	K
	18a	la	la 'ang	K
XXIV	6d	la'ang	la	K
	24c	ji ste	ci ste	T
	36d	la'ang	la	K
	38a	na	na 'ang	K
XXV	22c	ji zhig	ci zhig	T
	23a	ji zhig	ci zhig	T
XXVI	12b	mi gyur	mi 'byung	K (?)
	10c	gyur	'gyur	T
XVII	26a	nyer len pa*	nyer len po	GS
	29b	gang dag gis	gang dag ni	K

### 3.1.3. Commentarial text

Examination of the commentarial texts of ABh and BP reveals a number of striking correspondences, outlined in the chart shown at the close of this section.<sup>9</sup> BP has clearly incorporated lines, phrases, lengthy passages and almost entire chapters from the earlier commentary. We know that BP borrowed from ABh, and not the reverse, because of the relative chronology of the two texts. When two translated texts are identical, as are these two in so many places, then we must assume that the original texts were also identical in these same places. In this case, out of a total of 4,399 lines found in the present edition of ABh, fully 1,437 were lifted verbatim and incorporated into the body of BP. This means that almost exactly one third of ABh has been reproduced verbatim in BP. It is difficult to find any pattern to the correspondence between these two texts, although certain general observations can be made.

More often than not BP has borrowed material from the beginning of a commentarial section in ABh, and very frequently entire questions are taken

9 I am presently preparing a critical edition of ABh in which literal correspondences between ABh and BP will be explicitly marked.

over just as they stand in ABh.<sup>10</sup> In the case of chapters twenty-two through twenty-seven, BP has used the full text of ABh, with only a few very significant omissions (to be discussed below). SAITO has noted that Bhāvaviveka gives no criticism of these five chapters of BP, nor does Avalokitavrata's *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (PPT) seem to have incorporated any passages from these particular chapters. Yet both these authors commented heavily on all the preceding chapters of Buddhapālita's commentary. "This fact may suggest", according to SAITO, "that at the time of Bhāvaviveka the original Skt. text of the last five chapters of BP was already borrowed from or supplemented by that of ABh. However, whether this was done by Buddhapālita himself or by someone else in later times is still uncertain."<sup>11</sup> On the basis of present evidence it is impossible to determine just when these five chapters were incorporated into the text of BP, but it is almost certain that Buddhapālita himself borrowed the lines, phrases and passages of ABh scattered throughout the first twenty-two chapters of his commentary, since this information is inextricably woven into the text of BP. He was working at least a century after ABh had been written and we can only conclude that he was quite familiar with the earlier commentary. He must have regarded it as important, and in some sense authoritative. Why he felt free to borrow so liberally from ABh without giving any credit to his source is a mystery that I will attempt to unravel below.

As mentioned already, the text of the last five chapters of BP is almost identical to ABh, but we do find a few very interesting differences. First, in ABh four out of these five chapters close with a short "example" or "illustration", as follows:

XXIII.24 comm. (ABh 101b): *bsam gtan pa'i mgo la thad pa bzhin no//*

XXIV.40 comm. (ABh 105b): *ji ltar skyes bu mig dang ldan pas mar me'i snang ba(s) gsugs kyi rnam pa de dag thams cad mthong ba de bzhin no //*

XXV.22-24 comm. (ABh 108b): *sprul pa bzhin nam sor phreng bzhin no //*

XVII.30 comm. (ABh 113b): *dper na byang chub sems dpa' dga' byed bzhin no//*

10 See §3.2.1.1 (b) for the technical definition of a "question".

11 SAITO (1984) *op.cit.*, p. xxiii.



In every case BP omits these examples and nothing else from the text of ABh. Moreover, in both of the two other places where BP has incorporated verbatim passages from ABh that included such brief closing examples, only the examples themselves are omitted:

IV.9 comm. (ABH 47a): *dri za'i grong khyer stong pa bzhin no //*

XIV.1 comm. (ABh 69b): *mar me dang mun pa bzhin no //*

Short summary illustrations like these are extremely common in ABh, and conspicuously absent from BP and CL.<sup>12</sup> The fact that both BP and CL consistently omit just these examples from passages (or entire chapters) that are otherwise lifted verbatim suggests that the text of ABh was not absolutely fixed during the first several hundred years of its circulation; rather, we may quite reasonably assume that both BP and CL utilized an earlier (or simply different) recension of the Indic source of ABh – one that did not include these illustrations.

The only other place where ABh and BP differ, in the last five chapters, is in Chapter XXVII. Both texts include the controversial stanza from the *Catuhśataka*,<sup>13</sup> but Āryadeva receives two different titles: *btsun pa* (*bhadanta*) in ABh and *slob dpon* (*ācārya*) in BP. Either this too is evidence of an alternative recension, or else the reference to Āryadeva was intentionally changed for some unknown reason when it was taken over into BP. At least one later Tibetan scholar cited this difference as proof that ABh was not composed by Nāgārjuna,<sup>14</sup> but we might just as well take it as evidence that ABh is indeed an auto-commentary: If we assume that Nāgārjuna referred to Āryadeva with the generic honorific used when addressing or referring to any ordained *bhikṣu*, then we may perhaps understand why a later commentator would feel compelled to change this to the more appropriate scholastic title (*ācārya*), a term that Nāgārjuna would probably not have applied to his own disciple.<sup>15</sup>

12 With reference to CL and these “examples”, see §3.2.

13 *Catuhśataka* VII.9 is quoted in the commentary to MMK XXVII.24. This has been taken by a number of Tibetan scholars as the most damaging evidence against the claim that ABh is an authentic auto-commentary. The issue warrants further consideration in light of the present study, but this too will have to wait.

14 Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge: *bKa' 'bum* (Dehra-Dun, 1979), vol. 5, pp. 20-22.

15 This is perhaps also indicated by the fact that the citation closes with *zhes bshad*

The following chart displays the extent of verbatim correspondence between ABh and BP.<sup>16</sup>

Number of lines ...				
Chapter	Total	Shared	% of ABh	Notes
I	425	1	0.2	q.1
II	158	—	—	
III	61	—	—	
IV	70	6	9	BP k.9 comm. omits example
V	88	—	—	
VI	81	13	16	BP & ABh show two <i>kārikā</i> s not found in PSP (see §3.2.2.6)
VII	470	48	10	q.1; q.4; k.7 comm. quote (also in PSP)
VIII	83	3	3	
IX	104	34	33	q.5; q.8
X	157	86	55	q.2
XI	64	26	41	q.2
XII	104	49	47	q.2; q.4; q.5
XIII	66	8	12	quote from <i>sūtra</i>
XIV	98	44	45	q.1; q.2; BP k.2 comm. omits example
XV	84	11	13	all of k.11 comm.
XVI	126	16	13	q.6; q.7; q.8
XVII	317	118	37	q.1; q.9; q.12, q.13; q.14; quote from <i>sūtra</i>
XVIII	225	58	26	q.2; q.4; q.6
XIX	64	32	50	q.3; q.4; q.5
XX	223	67	30	q.1; q.3; q.4; q.6
XXI	295	58	20	q.1; q.8
XXII	276	31	11	q.13

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*do* // in ABh and *zhes gsungs so* // in BP: *gsungs* (present indicative *gsung ba*) is generally reserved for use with quotations from the Buddha and other especially prestigious teachers.

- 16 In the notes to this chart I have included only those features of verbatim correspondence that could easily be isolated from the text: i.e., questions (see above, n. 10), quotations, omitted examples, and extra *kārikā*-s (in the case of Ch. VI). These particular features are often embedded in much longer passages of verbatim correspondence.

XXIII	159	131	82	BP omits example at chapter. close
XXIV	174	172	99	(same as preceding)
XXV	166	165	99	(same as preceding)
XXVI	55	55	100	(no example in ABh)
XXVII	206	205	99	BP omits example at chapter close
Total	4,399	1,437	33	

### 3.2. ABh and CL

Before any meaningful comparison can be made between the text of ABh and the text of CL, we need to put together a set of criteria with which we can isolate those elements of a translated text that would not have been altered in the process of recasting Sanskrit into Tibetan and Chinese. The fact that we are comparing two translations, and not a translation with an original, of course creates that much greater a demand for some sort of rigorous methodological constraints. The task would be much less complicated if the Tibetan or Chinese text were compared directly with an original Sanskrit. The problem would then be a comparatively simple one of determining the extent to which the Tibetan or Chinese translation corresponded to the extant Sanskrit text. When comparing a Tibetan translation with a Chinese translation, on the other hand, we must constantly reconstruct in the imagination a third text – the Sanskrit source – which does not exist. The inherent complications of “re-translating” Tibetan or Chinese into Sanskrit are well-known, and need not be enumerated here. We must always bear in mind that the results of such a tentative philological endeavor are hypothetical at best. And yet, the hypothetical Sanskrit source is fundamental to any comparison of ABh and CL; it is nothing less than the axis on which the value of such a comparison turns. Though nonexistent, the presumed Sanskrit source is the real object of all our inquiry. In order to facilitate the comparison of ABh and CL I have therefore proposed Sanskrit retranslations based on my reading of both the Tibetan and Chinese where they seem to correspond. The ideal would have been to rely entirely on Sanskrit retranslation, in spite of its problems, rather than to impose English onto the investigation as a fourth metalanguage – but this would have brought other difficulties in its wake. In the end I became convinced that the extensive use of English translation was justified primarily because it would insure that the results of my research would be presented in the clearest, most readily appreciated format. When comparing English translations of ABh and CL,

I have worked to overcome the handicap of introducing this fourth language by resorting to frequent annotations in which our hypothetical Sanskrit source is explicitly compared to the Tibetan and Chinese. In certain cases of relatively obvious correspondence I have chosen to circumvent the additional problem of English terminology by including specific Sanskrit words and phrases within the body of the translated text itself. With the same motive I have elected to use the original Sanskrit text of the *kārikā*-s.

### 3.2.1. Criteria of significant textual correspondence

In determining what criteria are to be used for comparison of the two texts, an important general rule can be stated as follows:

*No significant correspondence between the two commentaries can be based on similarities directly tied to the phrasing of the *kārikā* being discussed.*

When explaining a particular *kārikā*, both ABh and CL frequently repeat words or phrases from it, and when both commentaries are explaining the same *kārikā*, they often repeat the same words and phrases found in the text of that *kārikā*. In such cases correspondence between the two commentaries cannot be taken as significant evidence of a common Indic source. For example: ABh, CL, BP, PP and PSP all discuss the analogy of fire in their commentaries on MMK III.3, yet it would be wrong to interpret this as a vestige from a source common to all five commentaries since the analogy of fire also appears in the text of MMK III.3. The rule above may positively stated as well:

*Significant correspondence between the two commentaries can only be based on similarities entirely unrelated to actual words or phrases in the *kārikā* being discussed.<sup>1</sup>*

1 Future research along the methodological lines developed in this paper may reveal significant correspondence between ABh and one or more of the other extant commentaries. There is some indication of such correspondence in sections of PSP: five of the eleven quotations in ABh (nine from *sūtra*-s, one from the *Śūnyatāsaptati* [*kārikā*-s 19-21], and one from Āryadeva's *Catuhśataka* [VII.9]) appear in a corresponding location in PSP.

It is clear that we must examine every commentarial passage of ABh and CL in the context of the *kārikā* being discussed by that passage if we are to check for the repetition of words and phrases. Therefore in the following pages every translation presented as evidence of significant correspondence is presented in conjunction with the text of the appropriate *kārikā*.<sup>2</sup>

There is one possible exception to the above rule:

*If long sections of both ABh and CL consistently repeat the words and phrases of the kārikā-s in prose form, to such an extent that this repetition itself can be taken as a characteristic feature of the commentaries, then we may reasonably take this as evidence of significant correspondence.*

Based on these general criteria, then, any significant correspondence between ABh and CL (i.e., any textual evidence pointing to a common Indic source) must necessarily be defined through reference to one of the following categories.

### 3.2.1.1 Structural correspondence

(a) *kārikā*-s: Significant factors here are (1) the number of *kārikā*-s in a given chapter; and (2) the order of those *kārikā*-s. It is important to note that these two purely structural criteria are not in conflict with the general rule discussed above, as they are not based on the words or phrases of the *kārikā*-s themselves.

(b) Questions: Both ABh and CL are structured in typical śāstric fashion, where an assumed interlocutor is often used either to set up a *kārikā* itself, or else to present a segment of the commentary associated with the *kārikā*. Thus the category I label as “question” is here defined only with reference to specific *kārikā*-s and/or sections of commentary introduced by the stereotyped marker “Question” (Skt. *āha*; ABh: *smras pa*; CL: 問曰) and not to rhetorical questions embedded within sections introduced by the marker “Response” (Skt. *ucyate*; ABh: *bshad pa*; CL: 曰答). Close comparison of the various surviving MMK commentaries clearly indicates that such questions are created entirely at the discretion of the individual author. No *kārikā* need necessarily be presented in this way – even a position

2 I have used the Sanskrit text of MMK as shown in Chr. LINDTNER, *Nāgārjuna's Filosofiske Værker* (Copenhagen, 1982).

obviously intended as a foil for the Mādhyamika is often not explicitly set apart by the use of the “question” device. The use of this śāstric convention is even more idiosyncratic when such a question is embedded in the context of a monologue being delivered by the Mādhyamika himself; and when ABh and CL show the same pattern of alternating question/ response, without any cue from the *kārikā* text, we may certainly posit significant correspondence between the two commentaries. This sort of correspondence can only be accounted for by assuming a single, original source behind the two texts.

### 3.2.1.2. Correspondence in content

(a) *kārikā*-s: Since this is a study of the commentaries themselves, no analysis of *kārikā*-content is provided beyond the point necessary to determine the relation of a given *kārikā* to the commentarial exegesis.<sup>3</sup> This means that our only concern is with whether or not two particular *kārikā*-s in ABh and CL represent two translations of the same (or approximately the same)<sup>4</sup> Sanskrit original. Once this has been determined, the Sanskrit text of the *kārikā* as it appears will be cited directly for the purpose of analyzing corresponding commentarial passages in ABh and CL.<sup>5</sup> The only significant information specifically tied to a given *kārikā* is its attribution in ABh and CL, either to the interlocutor (opponent) or to the Mādhyamika.

(b) Questions: Provided that two questions (one from ABh and one from CL) clearly occupy the same location relative to their respective *kārikā* texts (*i.e.*, when the two questions are embedded in commentarial passages dealing with the same original *kārikā*), they must then be closely compared to determine if there is any further correspondence between them. At this point it is important to bear in mind exactly what is meant by “significant correspondence”.

We know that each commentary was translated from an original Indic source; the purpose of this investigation is to determine if the source texts of

3 See ROBINSON (1967) *op.cit.*, pp. 71-95 for a linguistic analysis of the Chinese translation of MMK, and SAITO (1984) *op.cit.*, Introduction §2.3 for a detailed discussion of the *kārikā* texts included in ABh, BP, PP (PPT) and PSP .

4 Available variant readings shown in J.W. DE JONG (1977) *op.cit.*, have not proven to be significant for the purposes of this study.

5 See note 2, above.



ABh and CL were actually two recensions of the same original commentary. "Significant correspondence" is thus defined as any textual correlation providing reasonable evidence that ABh and CL derive from a common Indic source. Evidence of this sort is distributed along a continuum, from relatively tenuous suggestions of parallel structure to conclusive proof that certain sections of these commentaries were translated from recensions of the same original text. Structural correspondence, as discussed above in §3.2.1.1(b), is only one form of significant correspondence; in practice, we generally find that two questions sharing a common location in their respective commentaries also are related in terms of their content. The strongest evidence of significant correspondence is virtual word for word identity between the text of ABh and CL. Even taking into account all the linguistic provisos outlined above, it is not impossible to demonstrate that certain questions in ABh and CL reflect the same original vocabulary, phrasing and general organization. Such forms of strong correspondence will be discussed as they occur, and, in the case of certain specific examples, demonstrated in more detail through annotated translations. Often where it is not possible to determine this sort of direct correlation, it is nevertheless clear that certain questions in ABh and CL correspond not only in their location, but also in their general purport. Usually in such cases the Chinese seems to have incorporated and expanded on the hypothetical Sanskrit source. In analyzing questions we therefore have a three-tiered hierarchy of significant correspondence, in order of increasing importance: (1) location; (2) location and purport; (3) location, vocabulary and general organization.

(c) Responses: Significant correspondence between responses is determined on the basis of what are essentially the same criteria outlined above. It is important to bear in mind that this is a text-critical study, not a philosophical or doctrinal investigation. Reference to correspondence in content is strictly defined in terms of the vocabulary and general organization of parallel passages in the two commentaries. Of course, close correspondence of this sort virtually insures philosophical and doctrinal correspondence as well, but I have consistently avoided discussing the text in these terms primarily because text-critical evidence alone is entirely sufficient to develop my thesis that ABh and CL derive from a common Indic source.

## 3.2.2. Textual analysis of ABh and CL

The following pattern will be adopted to facilitate analysis and comparison of the two texts:

A. Titles: As shown in PSP, ABh and CL

B. *kārikā*-s: Relevant information is tabulated in a chart according to the criteria presented in §3.2.1.1. Three columns, titled PSP, ABh and CL, are each followed by the total number of *kārikā*-s (shown in parentheses). *Kārikā*-s are numbered according to their sequence in their own respective commentarial text. An asterisk (\*) indicates a missing *kārikā*.

C. Questions: Relevant information is tabulated in a chart according to the criteria presented in §3.2.1.2. Two columns are headed ABh and CL, each followed by the total number of questions (in parentheses). Questions are numbered according to their sequence in the respective text. Only those occurring in corresponding locations are shown across from each other in the chart. Detailed comments are often included in the chart, and in specific cases of particular interest the texts are translated and discussed in sections D and E. The following symbols are used:

symbol	meaning
*	no question in corresponding location
=	correspondence in content (either VO or P)
≠	total lack of correspondence in content
VO	evidence of direct correspondence as regards vocabulary and general organization of the two texts
P	evidence of correspondence in purport only
k.	<i>kārikā</i>
comm.	commentary
tr.	translation

D. Remarks: Relevant information included in questions and responses is discussed according to the criteria presented in 3.2.1.2.

E. Translation: Annotated translations of a limited number of specimens drawn from ABh and CL are accompanied by the Sanskrit text of associated *kārikā*-s. No attempt has been made to translate every passage where ABh and CL correspond. The translations presented here are specifically designed to preserve the phrasing and general organization of the original text; English prose style is necessarily compromised to this end. Also, where two or more alternative translations seemed possible in either



the Tibetan or Chinese, I have selected the one that would establish significant correspondence. Throughout this paper references to ABh are to the Peking edition.<sup>6</sup>

### 3.2.2.1. Chapter I

#### A. Titles

PSP: *pratyaya-parīkṣā*

ABh: *rkyen brtag pa* (= PSP)

(Skt. [*hetu-*]*pratyaya-parīkṣā*)

CL: 觀因緣

#### B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(16)	ABh(16)	CL(16)	comments
2	3	3	
3	2	2	
8	8	9	
9	9	8	

#### C. Questions

ABh(15)		CL(13)	comments
*		1	
1	=	2	P
*	=	3	
*	=	4	
2		*	
3		*	
4		*	
5	=	6	VO (see tr)
6	=	5	VO (see tr)
7	=	7	VO (see tr)
8	=	8	VO (see tr)
9	=	9	VO (see tr)
10	=	10	VO (see tr)
11	≠	10	VO (see tr)

6 In making my own translations I have regularly consulted WALLESER (1912) *op.cit.*, and Brian BOCKING, *An Annotated Translation of the Ch'ung-lun with Nāgārjuna's Middle Stanzas, a Basic Text of Chinese Buddhism* (University of Sterling, 1985 [currently in press with Edwin Mellon]). I am particularly indebted to the second work for help with a number of difficult passages.

12		*	
13	=	12	P; both refer to "Ābhidharmists"
14	=	13	P
15		*	

#### D. Remarks

Both texts follow the *kārikā*-content quite closely in Chapter I. There is a long introductory section in both, however, immediately after the two salutation *kārikā*-s, and the commentary in this section is not directly tied to the content of those salutary stanzas. In PSP Candrakīrti used this portion of Chapter I to attack Bhāvaviveka's methodology, but of course neither ABh nor CL contains any reference to PP or any other *svātantrika* work. As in PSP and other MMK commentaries, both ABh and CL use this space as an introduction to the general themes of MMK. This is one of the longest stretches of uninterrupted commentary in either text, and as such, it is one of the most valuable sections for this study. There is an extremely close correspondence between long parts of the commentary previous to k.l, exhibiting clear evidence that ABh and CL are based on a common source.

#### E. Translation

Both (a) and (b) are associated with the two salutary stanzas found at the beginning of Chapter I.

MMK salutary stanzas:

*anīrodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam /  
 anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam//  
 yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam/  
 deśayāmāsa sambuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam//*

(a)

ABh 34a-34b:

There are untrained beings who hold to causes [like] (1) Almighty God<sup>1</sup> (2) the person<sup>2</sup>; (3) both<sup>3</sup> (4) time<sup>4</sup>; (5) *svabhāva*<sup>7</sup>; (6) stability; (7) *prakṛti*<sup>5</sup> (8) transformation<sup>6</sup>; and (9) atom(s). Thus they settle into *dṛṣṭi*-s regarding

CL 1b18-27:

There are some who say that things arise from (1) Almighty God<sup>1</sup>. There are some who say they arise from (2) Viṣṇu<sup>2</sup>; ... from (3) a combination<sup>3</sup>; ... from (4) time<sup>4</sup>; ... from (5) *prakṛti*<sup>5</sup>; ... from (7) *svabhāva*<sup>7</sup>; [or] ... from (8)

a nonexistent cause, a wrong cause, absolute destruction<sup>11</sup>, or permanence. They lay claim to various *dr̥ṣṭi*-s of “I”, while the *dharmakāya* is hidden from view. In order to terminate<sup>13</sup> these various *dr̥ṣṭi*-s<sup>14</sup> regarding a nonexistent cause, a wrong cause, absolute destruction, or permanence, and to make known the *dharmakaya*, the Perfect Buddha totally cleansed the masses<sup>16</sup>. Then, for those who have a great mind and are capable of receiving the profound teaching<sup>17</sup>, he taught *pratītya-samutpāda*<sup>18</sup> as previously stated: without ceasing, without arising, without permanence, without coming, without going, neither one nor manifold...

atom(s)<sup>8</sup>. Because of these various errors, they settle into<sup>9</sup> various *dr̥ṣṭi*-s<sup>10</sup> regarding a non-existent cause, a wrong cause, absolute destruction<sup>11</sup>, or permanence<sup>12</sup>. They speak in various ways<sup>10</sup> of “I” and “mine”, not knowing the true Dharma. In order to terminate<sup>13</sup> these various *dr̥ṣṭi*-s<sup>14</sup> and to make known<sup>15</sup> the Buddha Dharma, the Buddha first explained the twelve links in the Śrāvaka Dharma.<sup>16</sup> Then, for those who have already practiced, who have a great mind and are capable of receiving the profound Dharma<sup>17</sup>, he taught *pratītyasamutpāda*<sup>18</sup> by way of the Mahāyāna Dharma, as [previously] stated<sup>19</sup>: that all *dharmas* are without arising, without ceasing, neither one nor manifold...

- 1 “Almighty God”: Skt. (*mahā-*)*īśvāra*; ABh: *dbang phyug*; CL: 大自在天
- 2 It is not too far fetched to imagine that the Chinese translators (Kumārajīva himself?) could have confused *puruṣa* with Viṣṇu – the retroflex *ṣ* in such close association with *u* would certainly have sounded very similar – and foreign – to their ears.
- 3 “both”, “combination”: Skt. *ubhaya* / *ubhau*; ABh: *gnyis ga*; CL: 和合
- 4 “time”: Skt. *kāla*; ABh: *dus*; CL: 時
- 5 (Skt.) *prakṛti*; ABh: *ngo bo nyid*; CL: 世性
- 6 “transformation”: Skt. *pariṇāma*; ABh: *’gyur ba*; CL: 變
- 7 (Skt.) *svabhāva*; ABh: *rang bzhin*; CL: 自然
- 8 “atom(s)”: Skt. *paramāṇu*; ABh: *rdul phran*; CL: 微塵
- 9 “settle into”: Skt. *abhiniviśanti*; ABh: *mngon par zhen pa*; CL: 墮
- 10 “various [ways]”: Skt. *tattad[dr̥ṣṭiḥ](?)*; ABh: *de dang de*; CL: 等
- 11 “absolute destruction”: Skt. *uccheda*; ABh: *chad pa*; CL: 斷
- 12 “permanence”: Skt. *śāśvatā*; ABh: *rtaḥ pa*; CL: 常
- 13 “terminate”: Skt. *vinivartana* (?); ABh: *nam par bzlog pa*; CL: 斷
- 14 “various *dr̥ṣṭi*-s”: Skt. and ABh: (see n. 10); CL: 是等諸邪見
- 15 “to make known”: Skt. *utprekṣitavya* (?)(lit. “to be made known”); ABh: *rtog par bya ba*; CL: 令知
- 16 “totally cleansed the masses”, “explained the ... Śrāvaka-Dharma”: Skt. *viśr̥tam aparīśodhayat* (?); ABh: *shas cher yongs su sbyang ba byas pa* (the use of the imperfect parallels CL: 先)

- 17 “capable of receiving the profound teaching/Dharma”: Skt. *gambhīra-śāsana / dharma-bhājanabhūta*; ABh: *zab mo bstan pa'i snod du gyur pa*; CL: 堪受深法
- 18 (Skt.) *pratītyasamutpāda*; ABh: *rten cing 'brel ba 'byung ba*; CL (here): 因緣相 (lit. “cause-condition characteristics”)
- 19 “as [previously] stated”: Skt. *pūrvavadita*;; ABh: *sngar smos pa'i*; CL: 所謂

(b)

ABh 37b-38b

There is no arising. Why?<sup>1</sup> Because of what is seen in the world.<sup>2</sup> It is seen in the world that things do not arise. If rice<sup>3</sup>, etc. appeared at the present time without there having been rice, etc. during the first *kalpa*, then it would be reasonable to speak of arising. But it does not [so] appear, and therefore there is no arising.

[5] Question:<sup>6</sup> There is absolute destruction<sup>7</sup>.

Response: There is no absolute destruction. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not absolutely destroyed. One sees that a rice sprout, etc. comes into existence<sup>8</sup> from a rice seed, etc. If [the seed] were absolutely destroyed, then this coming into existence would not be apprehended. Therefore there is no absolute destruction.

CL 2a8-2b7

Things do not arise. Why?<sup>1</sup> Because of what is seen in the world.<sup>2</sup> It is seen in the world that \*rice<sup>3</sup> does not arise during the first *kalpa*. Why?<sup>4</sup> Without rice during the first *kalpa* the present rice would not be found. If rice existed at the present time without there having been rice during the first *kalpa*, then there would certainly be arising. But in fact it is not so, and therefore there is no arising.

[4] Question: If there is no arising, then certainly there must be ceasing.<sup>5</sup>

Response: There is no ceasing. Why? It is because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that rice which existed during the first *kalpa* has not ceased. If it had ceased there would be no rice at the present time. But in fact there is rice, and therefore there is no ceasing.

[6] Question:<sup>6</sup> If there is no permanence then certainly there must be absolute destruction<sup>7</sup>.

Response: There is no absolute destruction. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not absolutely destroyed. Thus because the sprout comes into existence<sup>8</sup> from the rice seed<sup>9</sup>, therefore there is no absolute destruction. If there were absolute destruction then there would be no such succession.

[6] Question: There is permanence.

Response: There is no permanence. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not found to be permanent. The rice seed is not apprehended. at the time when the sprout [exists]. Thus because the seed is gone at the time when the sprout [exists], therefore there is no permanence.<sup>11</sup>

[7] Question: If this is so, then [all] things are one.

Response: They are not one. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not one. Thus the rice seed is not the sprout. If they were one, the "rice seed" and the "sprout" would not be referred to differently. Because they are referred to differently, so they are not one.

[8] Question: If it is not desired that they be one, then things are different.

Response: They are not different. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not different. Thus one sees the rice seed and the rice sprout and the rice leaf. If it is desired that they be different, then why refer<sup>11</sup> to the rice seed and the rice sprout and the rice leaf? Why not the tree<sup>12</sup> seed and the tree sprout and the tree leaf? But this is not so. Therefore things are not different.

[9] Question: There is coming.

Response: There is no coming. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things do not come from anywhere. Thus although the rice sprout [seems] to come from somewhere, it did not dwell in the rice seed. If it comes from a different place, then it must have dwelled in the seed, appearing like a bird that dwells in a tree. Because it does not so appear, therefore there is no coming.

[5] Question: If there is no ceasing then certainly there must be permanence.

Response: There is no permanence. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not permanent. Thus because the rice seed is gone at the time when the sprout [exists], therefore there is no permanence.

[7] Question: If this is so, then [all] things are one.

Response: They are not one. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not one. Thus the rice seed is not the sprout and the sprout is not the rice seed. If the rice seed were the sprout and the sprout were the rice seed, then they would be one. But in fact this is not so. Therefore things are not one.

[8] Question: If they are not one, then certainly they must be different.

Response: They are not different. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things are not different. If things were different, then why distinguish a rice seed and a rice sprout and a rice leaf? Why not refer<sup>11</sup> to the tree<sup>12</sup> seed and the tree sprout and the tree leaf? Therefore they are not different.

[9] Question: If there is no difference then certainly there must be coming.

Response: There is no coming. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things do not come. Thus the rice inside the seed does not come from anywhere. If it comes, then the sprout must come from a different place, like a bird coming to dwell in a tree. But this is not so. Therefore there is no coming.

[10] Question: There is going.

Response: There is no going. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things do not go. Thus one sees that the rice sprout does not go from the rice seed. If there were going, then it would appear like a snake [going] from its hole.<sup>13</sup> Because it does not so appear, therefore there is no going.

[10] If there is no coming then certainly there must be going.

Response: There is no going. Why? Because of what is seen in the world. It is seen in the world that things do not go. If it were to go, then one would see the sprout going from the rice seed like a snake coming from its hole.<sup>13</sup> But in fact, this is not so. Therefore, there is no going.

- 1 “Why?”: Skt. *kasya hetoh*; ABh: *ci'i phyir zhe na*; CL: 何以故
- 2 “Because of what is seen in the world”: Skt. *lokadr̥ṣṭatvāt*; ABh: *'jig rten na mthong ba'i phyir te*; CL: 世間現見故
- 3 “rice”: Skt. *śāli*; ABh: *'bras sa lu*; CL: 穀
- 4 \*- - -\*: This does not seem to make much sense in context – nor does it parallel anything in ABh. It may be a scribal error duplicating 劫初穀 in place of 萬物.
- 5 “ceasing”: Skt. *nirodha*; CL: 滅 ABh has no parallel to CL question [4]. It is possible that Kumārajīva was working from an earlier recension of the Indic source of both texts.
- 6 CL questions [5] and [6] are reversed in ABh.
- 7 “absolute destruction”: Skt. *uccheda*; ABh: *chad pa*; CL: 斷
- 8 “comes into existence”: Skt. *jayate / utpadyate*; ABh: *'byung ba* (= *skye ba*); CL: 有
- 9 is used generically for “rice” as well as for “rice seed” (= “grain”, “kernel”).
- 10 “...rtag pa ma yin no/”: it. “...it (the seed) is not permanent”.
- 11 “refer”: Skt. *abhidadhāti*; ABh: *brjod par byed pa*; CL: 說
- 12 PCDN all show *ko dā la*, which could possibly be taken in one of two ways: (a) as *ko dā la*, = Skt. *kodāla*: “a kind of tree”; or as (b) *ko tra pa*, = Skt. *kodrava*: “millet”. CL 樹 would indicate that Kumārajīva read it as (a).
- 13 “like a snake (coming) from its hole”: Skt. *parvatād nāga iva*; ABh: *ri las klu la bzhin* (Both the Skt. and the text of ABh would literally translate: “like a snake from a mountain”); CL: 如蛇從穴出

### 3.2.2.2. Chapter II

#### A. Titles

PSP: *gatāgata-parīkṣā*

ABh: *song ba dang ma song ba dang bgom pa brtag pa*

(Skt. *gatāgatagamyamāna-parīkṣā*)

CL: 觀去來 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(25)	ABh(25)	CL(25)	comments
10	10	11	
11	11	10	

## C. Questions

ABh(5)		CL(8)	comments
1	=	1	P
2	=	2	= k.2
*		3	
3	=	4	VO
*		5	
4	=	6	P; introduction to k.15
*		7	
5	=	8	P

## D. Remarks

Both texts follow the *kārikā* content quite closely, and both are virtually identical in many places. To better appreciate this correspondence one might compare PSP, for example, where the commentary is entirely different. As discussed in §3.2.1, repeated restatement of the *kārikā* content can itself constitute a pattern of significant correspondence, as it must in Chapter II. It is also significant that all five questions in ABh are paralleled in CL.

## E. Translation

The commentary on k.22 is typical of both ABh and CL in its simple gloss of *kārikā* content, but it is also noteworthy in its use of an example in no way dictated by the *kārikā*. In cases where ABh and CL correspond so closely in general organization, and at the same time use the same example, there is little doubt that they rely on the same source.

MMK II.22:

*gatyā yayocyate gantā gatim tām sa na gacchati /*  
*yasmān na gatipūrvō'sti kaścit kiṃcid dhi gacchati //*



ABh 37b

Whatever may be the going by which a goer is perceived or exhibited or grasped, that going is not made to go as a goer. Why? Because prior to that going there is no goer. It would be, for example, as if there did not exist some [particular] man or woman going to a village or town, [but simply “going” – devoid of goer]. Moreover:

CL 5bl5-19

Whatever may be the *dharma* of going by which a goer is perceived, that *dharma* of going can not be employed by a goer. Why? Because prior to that *dharma* of going there is no goer. Neither is there going, gone, or not yet gone –as if there were first a person and a village or town to be reached and a place to come from. A *dharma* of going and a goer is not suitable. The goer is established by virtue of the *dharma* of going, and the *dharma* of going is established by virtue of the goer. Moreover:

## 3.2.2.3. Chapter III

## A. Titles

PSP: *cakṣurādīndriya-parīkṣā*ABh: *skye mched brtag pa* (Skt. *āyatana-parīkṣā*)CL: 觀六情 (Skt. *ṣaḍindriya-parīkṣā*)B. *kārikā* s

PSP(9)	ABh(8)	CL(8)	comments
7	*	*	PSP k.7 = <i>Ratnāvali</i> , IV.55
8	7	7	
9	8	8	

## C. Questions

ABh(2)	CL(2)	comments
1 = 1		P; introduction to k.1; CL incorporates and expands on ABh
2 = 2		P; introduction to k.3; both mention “fire” as an example

## D. Remarks

In general both texts follow the *kārikā* content closely. It is significant that both omit PSP III.7. The following example is representative of the way both ABh and CL adhere to *kārikā* content and how, in doing so, both parallel each other.



## E. Translation

MMK III.8:

*draṣṭavyadarśanābhāvād vijñānādicatuṣṭayam /  
nāstīty upādānādīni bhaviṣyanti punaḥ katham //*

ABh 46a

CL 6b11-12

Because seeing and that which is to be seen do not exist, these four – consciousness, contact, sensation and craving – do not exist. Thus how could grasping (*upādāna*) and the other links [in the chain of] becoming still exist?

Because seeing and that which is to be seen do not exist, these four – consciousness, contact, sensation and craving – do not exist. Since these four – craving, etc. – do not exist (?), grasping and the other twelve causal links likewise do not exist.

## 3.2.2.4. Chapter IV

## A. Titles

PSP: *skandha-parīkṣā*ABh: *phung po brtag pa* (= PSP)CL: 觀五陰 (Skt. *pañcaskandha-parīkṣā*)B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(9)	ABh(9)	CL(9)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C. Questions

ABh(3)		CL(7)	comments
1	=	1	P; introduction to k.1
2	=	2	VO; introduction to k.2 (see tr.)
*		3	
*		4	
3	=	5	VO; introduction to k.3
*		6	
*		7	

## D. Remarks

CL contains long sections of commenatary not paralleled in ABh; CL questions 3,4,6 and 7 are all embedded in commentary not found in ABh. Yet all three questions in ABh have counterparts in CL, and ABh nos. 2 and 3 are virtually identical to CL nos. 2 and 5.

## E. Translation

MMK IV.2 follows Question 2 in both ABh and CL

ABh 46b

CL 6b23-24

Question: If *rūpa* is apprehended apart from its cause, what is the erroneous consequence?<sup>1</sup>

Question: If *rūpa* is apprehended apart from its cause, what is the erroneous consequence?<sup>1</sup>

MMK IV.2:

*rūpakāraṇanirmukte rūpe rūpaṃ prasajyate /  
āhetukaṃ na cāsty arthaḥ kaścīd āhetukaḥ kvacit //*

1 “erroneous consequence”: Skt. *doṣaprasaṅga*; ABh: *skyon du thal ba*; CL: 過

## 3.2.2.5. Chapter V

## A. Titles

PSP: *dhātu-parīkṣā*

ABh: *kham s brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL 觀六種 (Skt. *ṣaddhātu-parīkṣā*)

B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(8)	ABh(8)	CL(8)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C. Questions

ABh(3)		CL(6)	comments
1	=	1	P
*		2	
2	=	3	VO
3	=	4	VO; location slightly different
*		5	
*		6	

## D. Remarks

All three questions in ABh correspond almost exactly to three of the six questions in CL, yet the commentary in CL is generally much more extensive, incorporating and expanding upon ABh. The one feature of ABh that is consistently and conspicuously absent from CL is the use of very

short examples at the close of many passages. Like BP, CL as well often replicates extended sections of ABh, yet even when the two texts are virtually identical, CL invariably omits these brief examples most often found at the close of the final commentary of a chapter. In the present chapter, we find e.g. at the end of ABh V.8 comm.: *dmus long bzhin no* (“like a blind man”). One curious feature of both texts, a correspondence of sorts: In V.5 comm. both ABh and CL use the example of an animal “not being separate from its characteristics”. Such an example is not in any way dictated by the content of k.5, and yet, ABh uses an elephant – enumerating ten characteristics, while CL uses a cow – listing only four characteristics.

### 3.2.2.6. Chapter VI

#### A. Titles

PSP: *rāgarakta-parīkṣā*

ABh: 'dod chags dang chags pa brtag pa (= PSP)

CL: 觀染染者 (= PSP)

#### B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(10)	ABh(10)	CL(10)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent
2Aab	2A	*	PSP: 2A followed by <i>ityādi</i>
2Bab	2B	*	PSP: 2B followed by <i>ityādi</i>

2A and 2B may have originally been considered as independent *kārikā*-s. Be that as it may, they were evidently not part of the Indic source translated by Kumārajīva.

#### C. Questions

ABh(3)		CL(3)	comments
1	=	1	P; however CL is much longer
2	=	2	P; wording is quite different
*		3	

#### D. Remarks

Once again, CL seems to have incorporated and expanded upon the text of ABh. Still, in many places both commentaries merely restate the *kārikā* content, as e.g. VI.7 comm. In several places CL has a different example than ABh: e.g. CL VI.2 comm. has “smoke/fire”, where ABh VI.2 has

“father/son”. In other places, one of the two has an example where the other has none at all (e.g. VI.4 comm. and VI.10 comm.). ABh VI.3cd comm. has the same example (“cow horn”) as PSP VI.3cd comm.

### 3.2.2.7. Chapter VII

#### A. Titles

PSP: *saṃskṛta-parīkṣā*

Abh: *skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig pa brtag pa*

(Skt. *utpādashitibhaṅga-parīkṣā*)

CL: 觀三相 (Skt. *trilakṣaṇa-parīkṣā*)

#### B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(34)	Abh(34)	CL(34)	comments
7	7	*	
*	*	7	CL k.7 and k.8 are not found in any other text of MMK
8	8	9	
etc .....			

#### C. Questions

Abh(12)		CL(15)	comments
1	=	1	P; CL incorporates a quotation not found in Abh
2	=	2	VO; Abh precedes k.1, CL follows
3	=	3	VO; (see tr.)
4	=	4	VO
5	=	5	VO
6	=	6	P; CL is slightly longer than Abh
7	=	7	VO. (see tr.)
*		8	
8		9	P; CL is longer than Abh
9		*	
*		10	
10	=	11	VO
*		12	
11	=	13	VO
*		14	
12	=	15	P

## D. Remarks

This is an extremely interesting chapter, showing direct correspondence between Abh, BP and CL (see above, §3.1). There can be no doubt that the author of CL was working from an early recension of the Indic source of Abh. Throughout the chapter we find an almost invariable correspondence in the location and content of the questions. Example (a) below illustrates the sort of correspondence that is repeated in a number of other places, as designated in §C, above. Even more significant, however, is the direct correspondence between long sections of commentary incorporating identical examples and questions within a context where vocabulary, phrasing and general organization of Abh and CL obviously reflect a common source. The location of question 7 in the middle of k.14 comm. in both Abh and CL is particularly conclusive evidence of the close relationship between the two texts.

## E. Translation

## (a) Question 3 (introduction to k.4)

Abh 52a

Question: You state that if arising, enduring and passing away themselves had distinguishing characteristics<sup>1</sup>, then we would have infinite regress. In response to that statement [we say that] even if arising, enduring and passing away are *samskr̥ta*-s, still we do not have infinite regress. Why? –

CL 9b10-12

Question: You state that given the three distinguishing characteristics<sup>1</sup>, we would have infinite regress. This is not so. Arising, enduring and passing away are themselves *samskr̥ta*-s, and therefore we do not have infinite regress. Why? –

MMK VII.4:

*utpādotpāda utpādo mūlotpādasya kevalam /  
utpādotpādam utpādo mauḷo janayate punaḥ //*

- 1 “distinguishing characteristic(s)”: Skt. *lakṣaṇa*; Abh: *mtshan nyid*; CL: 相
- 2 (Skt.) “*samskr̥ta*(-s)”: Abh: ‘*dus byas*; CL: 有為
- 3 雖是 = 惟是 (cf. R. H. MATHEWS, *Mathews’ Chinese-English Dictionary*, Cambridge 1979, #5519 & #7066)

## (b) Abh VII.13 comm./ CL VII.14 comm

MMK VII.13:

*anutpanno 'yam utpādaḥ svātmānaṃ janayet katham /  
athotpanno janayate jāte kiṃ janyate punaḥ //*

Abh 54b

CL 10a14-19

When arising causes itself to arise, it causes arising<sup>1</sup> either [itself] arisen or [itself] unarisen. If itself unarisen, then it does not cause arising, because the unarisen does not exist, and how can the nonexistent cause its own arising? If one thinks<sup>2</sup> that itself arisen it causes arising, then this is unsuitable, for when it is arisen it is completely arisen and what further “causing” to arise “exists in that which is completely arisen? The completely arisen is not to be caused to arise, [just as] what is completely made is not to be made again.<sup>3</sup> Thus either arising – [itself] arisen – causes itself to arise, or else arising – [itself] unarisen – [causes itself to arise: [but] neither one causes arising.<sup>4</sup> Therefore arising does not cause itself to arise, so this statement that “arising causes itself<sup>6</sup> to arise” is unsuitable.<sup>5</sup> Enduring and passing away are similarly examined. Moreover:

When arising causes itself to arise,<sup>1</sup> it causes arising either [itself] arisen or [itself] unarisen. If itself unarisen it is to cause arising, then it is nonexistent and how can the nonexistent cause its own arising? If one says<sup>2</sup> that itself arisen it causes arising, then it is already complete and there is no need for further “causing to arise”, just as what is completely made is not to be made again.<sup>3</sup> Thus it is either already arisen or unarisen, [but] neither one causes arising.<sup>4</sup> Therefore there is no arising, so your earlier statement that “arising, like light, causes itself and another to arise” is unsuitable.<sup>5</sup> Enduring and passing away are similar. Moreover:

- 1 The Chinese 生 is sometimes equivalent to Tibetan intransitive *skye ba* (Skt. passive *janyate*), and other times to the Tibetan transitive *skyed par byed* (Skt. transitive *janayati*) (here translated as “to cause to arise”).
- 2 The correspondence is very close here between Abh *ci ste ... sems na*, and CL: 若謂
- 3 “what is completely made is not to be made again”: Skt. *kṛte punaḥ kartavya nāsti*; Abh: *byas zin pa la yang bya ba med do*; CL: 已作不應更作
- 4 “Thus either ...or ..., [but] neither ...”: Skt. *tathā yā ... yā ... gaṇanāyām, ubāvevamapi na ...*; Abh: *de ltar ... dam / grang na / gnyi ga ltar yang ... mi ...*; CL: 若 ... 若 ... 是二
- 5 “Therefore ...and this statement [of yours] ...is unsuitable”: Skt. *tataḥ ...iti yadāha tanna yujyate*; Abh: *de'i phyir ... zhes gang smras pa de ni mi rigs so/*; CL: 故 ... 汝先說 ... 是事不然
- 6 “its self”: *rang gi dngos po*



(c) Abh VII.14 comm./ CL VII.15 comm.

MMK VII.14:

*notpadyamānaṃ notpannaṃ nānutpannaṃ kathaṃ cana /  
utpadyate tad ākhyātaṃ gamyamānagatāgataiḥ //*

Abh 54b

An entity [already] arisen does not cause arising. Why? Because in consequence it would be endless, and because what is made is not to be made [again]. \*If an entity which had arisen were to cause [itself] to arise again, then it would have to arise a second and third time, and then a fourth would be necessary, for the first arising and the later ones would be similar. Thus arising would be endless, and this is not desired. Therefore an entity [already] arisen does not cause arising.\*<sup>1</sup> If [already] arisen it were to cause [itself] to arise, then what arising would cause a different unarisen arising – said to be caused to arise – to [actually] arise? This contradicts [your own] claim that “what is [already] arisen causes [itself] to arise.”<sup>3</sup> Why? Before the first arising it is unarisen and still has to be caused to arise! Therefore, that something [already] arisen causes [itself] to arise, and that something unarisen causes [itself] to arise are incompatible [claims]. Such a desire remains entirely unresolved.<sup>4</sup> What is made is not to be made [again], what has gone is not to go [again], what has been directly perceived is not to be perceived [again], and what has arisen is not to be caused to arise [again]. Therefore no arisen *dharma* whatsoever causes [itself] to arise.

(55a) Nor does an unarisen *dharma* cause [itself] to arise. Why? Because it

CL 10a25-10c2

A *dharma* already arisen does not cause [itself] to arise. Why? [For] what is arisen were to again cause [itself] to arise, and to continue thus repeatedly,<sup>1</sup> would be endless, like what is made being made again. Moreover, if already arisen it were to cause [itself] to arise, then what arising *dharma* would cause [a different] unarisen (*dharma*) – marked to arise – to [actually] arise?<sup>2</sup> This contradicts [your own] claim that “what is already arisen causes [itself] to arise.”<sup>3</sup> Why? What is marked to arise is unarisen and yet you say that it causes [itself] to arise. If what is unarisen is said to cause [itself] to arise, then either that *dharma* is unarisen and causes [itself] to arise, or else it is arisen and causes [itself] to arise. You previously said that what is already arisen causes [itself] to arise. This is unresolved.<sup>4</sup> What is already burned is not to be burned again, what has gone is not to go again. For the same reasons as apply in these cases, what is already arisen does not cause [itself] to arise again.

(10b4) Nor does an unarisen *dharma* cause [itself] to arise. Why? If a *dharma*

is unassociated with arising<sup>5</sup> and because in consequence everything that is unarise would arise. With respect to its not being associated with arising, here again either an entity associated with arising causes [itself] to arise or an entity unassociated with arising causes [itself] to arise. [The second alternative] is undesirable because it contradicts worldly convention:<sup>6</sup> one without action would act; one without going would go; one not eating would eat; one without attachment would be attached; one without anger would be angry; and one without delusion would be deluded. Therefore an unarisen entity does not cause [itself] to arise. Moreover, if an unarisen entity were to cause [itself] to arise, then in consequence any unarisen object would cause [itself] to arise. In that case, awakening<sup>7</sup> would consequently arise where it had not arisen – in every naive worldly person; and *kleśa*-s<sup>8</sup> would consequently arise where they had not arisen – in all those who had the unshakable *dharma*-s of an *arhat*. Rabbits' and horses' horns, etc. – although unarisen – would in consequence arise. And this is as well undesirable.<sup>9</sup> Therefore neither<sup>10</sup> does what is unarisen cause [itself] to arise. It would be as though incinerated *kleśa*-s were to cause *kleśa*-s to arise.<sup>11</sup>

(55b) [7] Question: The unarisen that causes [itself] to arise is that associated with<sup>12</sup> the aggregate of causes and conditions, with place and time, with actor and means<sup>13</sup>. But not all that is unarisen causes [itself] to arise. Therefore the [presumed] consequence – that “all that is unarisen would arise – is not so.

(55b) Response: That which is associated with the aggregate of causes and conditions, with place and time, with actor and action, that which is said

is unarisen, then it is unassociated with arising.<sup>5</sup> If it is unassociated with arising then no *dharma* arises. If a *dharma* unassociated with arising were nevertheless to cause [itself] to arise, then all worldly *dharma*-s would be contradicted:<sup>6</sup> a *dharma* without action would act; a *dharma* not going would go; a *dharma* without attachment would be attached; a *dharma* without anger would be angry; and a *dharma* without delusion would be deluded. Therefore an unarisen *dharma* does not cause [itself] to arise. Moreover, if an unarisen *dharma* were to cause [itself] to arise, then any unarisen *dharma* in the world would cause [itself] to arise. Every naive worldly person without awakening<sup>7</sup> would cause the imperishable *dharma* of awakening to arise. Every *arhat* without *kleśa*-s<sup>8</sup> would cause *kleśa*-s to arise. Every rabbit without horns would cause horns to arise. But this is not suitable.<sup>9</sup> Therefore neither<sup>10</sup> does what is unarisen cause [itself] to arise.

(10b13) [7] Question: That unarisen *dharma* which does not cause [itself] to arise is without causes, without action<sup>13</sup>, actor, time, place, etc. – thus it does not cause [itself] to arise. If associated with<sup>12</sup> causes, action,<sup>13</sup> time, place, etc., then the unarisen *dharma* causes [itself] to arise.<sup>14</sup> Therefore what has been said – that “all that is unarisen would not arise” – is not so.

(10b17) Response: If a *dharma* is associated with causes, time, place, etc., then it causes [itself] to arise. But that does not cause [itself] to arise when it is

(55b) Response: That which is associated with the aggregate of causes and conditions, with place and time, to cause [itself] to arise – that too does not cause [itself] to arise when it is either existent, nonexistent or existent and nonexistent. As previously discussed, it is unsuitable that any of these three alternatives should cause [itself] to arise, nor does what is unarisen cause [itself] to arise. Likewise, what is in the process of arising does not cause [itself] to arise. Why? Because of the consequence entailing the faults of what is arisen causing [itself] to arise as well as the consequence entailing the faults of what is unarisen causing [itself] to arise.<sup>15</sup> According to the previously discussed reasoning, neither the arisen process of arising nor the unarisen process of arising causes [itself] to arise. Moreover, if<sup>16</sup> there were a process of arising without arising, then this process of arising causes [itself] to arise. Moreover, if<sup>16</sup> there were a process of arising without arising, then this process of arising would cause [itself] to arise. But no such process of arising is perceived, and therefore what is in the process of arising does not cause [itself] to arise. Where what is in the process of arising causes [itself] to arise; there follows the consequence of two arisings: the process of arising by virtue of which<sup>17</sup> there is a process of arising, and the process of arising which causes [itself] to arise. It is untenable<sup>18</sup> to have two arisings, because there are not two entities which are arising.; Therefore, what is in the process of arising does not cause [itself] to arise.

(56a) Moreover, when arising is not actually underway – that is, before arising is actually underway – there is no process of arising. And because there is

either previously existent, previously nonexistent, or both existent and nonexistent. These alternatives were previously refuted. Therefore what is arisen does not cause [itself] to arise, nor does what is unarisen cause [itself] to arise. Neither does what is in the process of arising cause [itself] to arise. Why? [Because] the unarisen part does not cause [itself] to arise and the arisen part does not cause [itself] to arise. This is according to a previous response. Moreover, if there were a process of arising without arising, then it would have to cause the process of arising to arise. But there is no process of arising without arising. Therefore what is in the process of arising does not cause [itself] to arise. Moreover, if<sup>16</sup> you say that what is in the process of arising causes [itself] to arise, then follows the consequence of two arisings: first, the arising by virtue of which<sup>17</sup> there is the process of arising [itself] and second, the arising within the process of arising. It is untenable<sup>18</sup> to have these two arisings – there are not two *dharma*-s. How could there be two arisings? Therefore, what is in the process of arising does not cause [itself] to arise.

(10b26) Moreover, when the *dharma* of arising is not actually underway there is no process of arising. And because there is no process of arising, what

no process of arising before arising is actually underway, that which is in the process of arising does not cause [itself] to arise. Thus neither what is arisen, nor what is unarisen, nor what is in the process of arising causes [itself] to arise, and therefore arising is not established. When arising is not established, enduring and passing away also are not established. When arising, enduring, and passing away are not established, *saṃskṛta*-s also are not established. Thus they are to be understood according to the explanation of what is gone, what is not gone, and what is in the process of going.

could arising depend on? Therefore one can not say that what is in the process of arising causes [itself] to arise. Thus according to this investigation, what is arisen does not cause [itself] to arise, nor does what is unarisen cause [itself] to arise, nor does what is in the process of arising cause [itself] to arise. There is no arising and therefore arising is not established. When arising is not established, enduring and passing away are also not established. When arising, enduring and passing away are not established, *saṃskṛta dharma*-s also are not established. Thus it is said in the *kārikā* that this is already explained in the context of what is gone, what is not gone, and what is in the process of going.

- 1 \* - - \*: CL has compressed the same information shown in Abh.
- 2 This reading of CL does not follow the Taishō punctuation.
- 3 Here I have switched the order of the clauses in CL to illustrate more clearly the parallelism of the two texts, but this in no way alters the meaning.
- 4 “unresolved”: Skt. *aniścitatvāpy asti*; Abh: *ma nges pa nyid kyang yin la*; CL: 不定
- 5 “unassociated with arising”: Skt. *utpādavān nāsti* (?); Abh: *skye ba dang mi ldan pa*; CL: 不應與生緣和合
- 6 “contradicts”, “be contradicted”: Skt. *prasajyate*; Abh: *thal bar ’gyur ba*; CL: 破
- 7 “awakening”: Skt. *bodhi*; Abh: *byang chub*; CL: 菩提
- 8 (Skt.) *kleśa*[-s]; Abh: *nyon mongs pa*; CL: 煩惱
- 9 “undesirable”, “unsuitable”: Skt. *neśyate*; Abh: *mi ’dod de*; CL: 不然
- 10 “neither ...”: Skt. *nāpi*; Abh: *yang ... mi*; CL: 亦不
- 11 See §3.2.2.5 D
- 12 “associated with”: Skt. *-vat*; Abh: *dang ldan pa*; CL: 有 ... 和合
- 13 “means”, “action”: Skt. *upāya* (?), *karma* (?); Abh: *thabs*; CL: 作 (It is possible that the Chinese translators misunderstood Skt. *upāya*)
- 14 The sequence of the two preceding points is interchanged in CL.
- 15 This line of Abh seems to have been combined with the following line.
- 16 “if”: Skt. *yadi*; Abh: *gal te*; CL: 若
- 17 “the [process of] arising by virtue of which ...”: Skt. *yenotpādyamānena utpādyamānatāsti* (?); Abh: *skye bzhin pa gang gis skye bzhin pa nyid du ’gyur ba*; CL: 生故名生時
- 18 “untenable”: Skt. *na yujyate*; Abh: *mi rigs*; CL: 不然

## (d) Abh VII.28 comm./ CL VII.29 comm.

MMK VII.28:

*tayaivāvasthayāvasthā na hi saiva nirudhyate /*  
*anyayāvasthayāvasthā na cānyaiva nirudhyate //*

Abh 58a

CL 11c13-16

An entity which has the mark of ceasing does not cease by virtue of its [present] condition or by virtue of any other. Why? Milk does not cease by virtue of its [present] condition of being milk<sup>1</sup>, because as long as it is milk it does not change. It does not cease under any condition whatsoever to be milk, and when it is not milk, nothing at all ceases. Moreover:

If a *dharma* has the mark of ceasing, then this *dharma* ceases either by virtue of its own mark or by virtue of another's mark. But both are unsuitable. Why? Milk does not cease in its [present] condition of being milk<sup>1</sup>, because as long as it is milk the mark of milk remains. Nor does it cease in the condition of not being milk, because if it is not milk then one can not say "milk" ceases. Moreover:

1 "condition of being milk": Skt. *kṣīrāvasthā*; Abh: 'o ma gnas skabs; CL: 乳時

## 3.2.2.8. Chapter VIII

## A. Titles

PSP: *karmakāraka-parīkṣā*Abh: *byed pa po dang las brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀作作者 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(13)	Abh(13)	CL(12)	comments
11	11	*	
12	12	11	
13	13	12	

## C. Questions

Abh(3)		CL(5)	comments
1	=	1	P
2	=	2	P
*		3	
3	≠	4	
*		5	

## D. Remarks

Abh commentary is essentially a restatement of *kārikā* content; CL seems to have incorporated and expanded on Abh in several places (e.g. k.8 comm. and k.10 comm.). In general, CL is much longer and more analytical (cf. k.11 comm. and k.12 comm. in Abh and CL).

## 3.2.2.9. Chapter IX

## A. Titles

PSP: *pūrva-parīkṣā*

Abh: *nye bar len pa po dang nye bar brlang ba brtag pa*

(Skt. *upadātropadāna-parīkṣā*)

CL: 觀本住 (= PSP?)

B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(12)	Abh(12)	CL(12)	comments
6	6	6	PSP/Abh k.6 attributed to opponent; CL to Mādhyamika
7	7	7	PSP/Abh k.7 attributed to Mādhyamika; CL to opponent

## C. Questions

Abh(8)		CL(5)	comments
1	=	1	P
2	=	2	P
3	=	3	P; both are introductions to k.5, but content differs slightly
4		*	introduction to k.6
*		4	introduction to k.7
5		*	
6		*	
7	=	5	P
8	*		

## D. Remarks

CL has a very complex, lengthy commentary quite unlike Abh (cf. e.g. k.3 comm.). Nevertheless some sections show close correspondence (e.g. k.4 comm.). CL k.12 comm. seems to have incorporated and expanded on Abh k.12 comm. Both begin with the same formula (see tr.).



## E. Translation

First line of IX.12 comm. preceeded by *kārikā*

MMK IX.12:

*prāk ca yo darśanādibhyaḥ sāmpratam cordhvam eva ca /  
na vidyate 'sti nāstīti nivṛttās tatra kalpanāḥ //*

Abh 62a/CL 14b10

“When examined with intelligence...”<sup>1</sup>

1 Skt. *vidyayā parikṣite*; Abh: *rig(s) pas yongs su brtags na*; CL: 思惟推求

## 3.2.2.10. Chapter X

## A. Titles

PSP: *agnīndhana-parīkṣā*

ABh: *me dang bud shing brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀然可然 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(13)	ABh(13)	CL(13)	comments
–	–	–	CL translations seems free in many places

## C. Questions

ABh(4)	CL(6)	comments
1	1	P
*	2	
*	3	ABh embeds question 3 in k.2 comm.
2 =	4	P; before k.6 in ABh, after in CL
3 =	5	P; CL has slightly different wording
*	6	
4	*	

## D. Remarks

The pattern of commentary here is similar to other chapters, almost always either (a) ABh closely corresponds with CL; or (b) CL incorporates and expands on ABh, retaining the same sequence of argumentation, and often preserving the same opening and closing remarks (as discussed above, §3.2.2.9 D).

## 3.2.2.11. Chapter XI

## A. Titles

PSP: *pūrvāparakoṭi-parīkṣā*ABh: *'khor ba brtag pa* (Skt. *saṃsāra-parīkṣā*)CL: 觀本際 (Skt. *pūrvakoṭi-parīkṣā*[[?]])B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(8)	ABh(8)	CL(8)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C. Questions

ABh(3)		CL(3)	comments
1	=	1	P; (see tr.)
2		*	CL incorporates this question into k.4 comm.
3		*	

## D. Remarks

This is one chapter where ABh is actually longer than CL in many places, yet there are still certain parallels, as e.g. in both ABh and CL k.6 comm. (see tr.). Of particular interest is question 1, which incorporates the same quotation in both texts.

## E. Translation

## (a) First line of XI.6 comm

MMK XI.6:

*yatra na prabhavanty ete pūrvāparasahakramāḥ /  
prapañcayanti tāṃ jātiṃ taj jarāmaraṇaṃ ca kim //*

ABh 65b / CL 16b10

“When examined<sup>1</sup>...”1 Skt. *parīkṣite*; ABh: *brtags na*; CL: 思惟(b) Question 1 (not directly associated with a *kārikā*)

ABh 65a

CL 16a5-7

[1] Question: In *The Sūtra of No Beginning or End*<sup>1</sup> the Blessed One declared: “Monks, *saṃsāra* has no

[1] Question: *The Sūtra of Limitless Origins*<sup>1</sup> declares: “Beings come and go in *saṃsāra*; no original limit is concei-

beginning or end, no earlier or later limit is perceived.”<sup>2</sup> Therefore, because he said that no earlier or later limit is perceived, he taught that *samsāra* does exist. It would be appropriate for you to explain the intention<sup>3</sup> of this statement.

vable.”<sup>2</sup> Here it says that beings exist and that *samsāra* exists. What is the intention<sup>3</sup> of this statement?

1 *Anavarāgrasūtra* (?)

2 Cf. PSP (p.95.2-3): *uktaṃ hi bhagavatā anavarāgro hi bhikṣavo jatijarāmarāṇa-samsāraḥ iti*/

3 “intention”: Skt. *abhiprāya*; ABh: *dgongs*; CL: 因緣

### 3.2.2.12. Chapter XII

#### A. Titles

PSP: *duḥkha-parīkṣā*

Abh: *sdug bsngal brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀苦 (= PSP)

#### B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(10)	Abh(9)	CL(10)	comments
6	*	6	
7	6	7	
etc .....			

#### C. Questions

Abh(6)		CL(3)	comments
1	=	1	P
2	=	2	P
3	=	3	P
4		*	
5		*	
6		*	

#### D. Remarks

Abh XII.6 comm. corresponds closely with CL XII.7 comm.; otherwise CL is much longer and quite different.

## 3.2.2.13. Chapter XIII

## A. Titles

PSP: *samskāra-parīkṣā*Abh: *de kho na nyid brtag pa* (Skt. *tattva-parīkṣā*)

CL: 觀行 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(8)	Abh(8)	CL(9)	comments
3	3	3	PSP/Abh attribute k.3 to an opponent; CL to the Mādhyamika
*	*	4	
4	4	5	
etc .....			

## C. Questions

Abh(5)		CL(9)	comments
1	=	1	Abh is independent question; CL = k.1
2		*	introduction to k.2
*		2	incorporated into dialogue after k.2
*		3	
3		*	introduction to k.3
*		4	
*		5	
*		6	
4	=	7	P; CL incorporates and expands on Abh
5	=	8	P
*		9	

## D. Remarks

Certain sections are very similar in both texts, as e.g. Abh XIII.5-7 comm. and CL XIII.6-8 comm. CL has a lengthy dialogue between k.2 and k.3 not found in Abh. There is a problem with the *kārikā-s*: CL has 9 *kārikā-s*, Abh and PSP only eight. CL k.4 seems to be the extra one. And yet, CL might be construed to read something like Abh and PSP, if Taishō 18b9-10 is not read as a *kārikā* but rather as part of the preceeding commentary. Then, the text that follows (18b12-15) could be regrouped as it appears in what follows:

是故有諸法性	(commentary)
若無諸法性	
云何有異相	(revised XIII.4ab)
答曰	
若諸法有性	(revised XIII.4cd)
云何而得異	
若諸法無性	(commentary continues)

In this way CL would have the same number of *kārikā*-s in Chapter XIII as PSP and Abh, and would split the attribution of k.4 exactly as is done in these other commentaries. This would bring CL into accord with PSP and Abh in another way as well: In both Abh and PSP the first alternative presented is, “if there were no own being”; and the second, “if there were own being”. In the Taishō edition of this *kārikā* the alternatives are presented in the opposite order. But the revised edition suggested above would make CL correspond to both other commentaries in this way as well. Compare the text of of PSP 105.18/21:

[āha:]  
*kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvaś cen na vidyate /*  
 [ucyate:]  
*kasya syād anyathābhāvaḥ svabhāvo yadi vidyate //*

This regrouping of CL appears even more interesting when we observe that it would bring the text into perfect agreement with Abh two other places in k.XIII.4 where Abh itself differs from PSP. Abh XIII.4 reads:

[rmas pa:]  
*gal te ngo bo nyid med na /*  
*gzhan du 'gyur ba gang gi yin //*  
 [bshad pa:]  
*gal te ngo bo nyid yod na /*  
*ji lta bur na gzhan du 'gyur //*

In comparing the revised text of CL with PSP and Abh we note the following correspondence among the *pāda*-s of Abh and CL:

PSP		Abh		CL (revised)
a	=	b	=	b
b	=	a	=	a
c	=	d	=	d
d	=	c	=	c

Moreover, it may be seen from examination of the three *kārikā* texts that *pāda*-s *a* and *c* are identical in PSP, whereas in Abh and the revised CL the corresponding *pāda*-s *b* and *d* are slightly different. This could be taken as evidence of a variant reading found in the MMK texts of the Indic sources of Abh and CL. A variant common to both sources must necessarily date back to at least as early as the fourth century C.E.<sup>1</sup>, which would place it in a period that predates all our other extant MMK texts.<sup>2</sup> The editors of the Taishō edition may well have been wrong, at least in the case of XIII.4, to follow the *kārikā* text of PSP – especially when the revised edition of CL 18b9-15 suggested above would bring into perfect agreement both the number and content of the *kārikā*-s in Abh and CL.

- 1 CL was translated by Kumārajīva in 402 A.D. (see sec. 4.3)
- 2 The Tibetan translation of MMK is not useful for text-critical purposes, since, according to its colophon (D tsa l9a5-6), it was first translated by kLu'i rgyal mtshan and Jñānagarbha, but retranslated some 250 years later by Hasumati and Nyi ma grags so as to correspond with the *kārikā* text of PSP. In fact, none of the Tibetan texts of MMK is dependable as it stands, because they were all altered in various ways over the years (see SAITO (1984), pp. xviixviii). This does not necessarily mean, of course, that Abh might not still occasionally preserve the oldest reading available; and if such a reading were preserved, it would most probably be one that corresponded with the text of CL.

### 3.2.2.14. Chapter XIV

#### A. Titles

PSP: *saṃsārga-parīkṣā*  
 ABh: *phrad pa brtag pa* (= PSP)  
 CL: 觀合 (= PSP)

#### B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(8)	ABh(8)	CL(8)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

#### C. Questions

ABh(5)		CL(5)	comments
1	=	1	different content
2		*	
*		2	



3	=	3	VO
4	=	4	VO
5	=	5	P

#### D. Remarks

There is some correspondence between certain questions. XIV.8 comm. is especially interesting, as the reasons given and the general organization of both texts is quite similar (see tr.).

#### E. Translation

XIV.8 comm. MMK XIV.8:

*na tena tasya saṃsārgo nānyenānyasya yujyate /  
saṃsṛjyamānaṃ saṃsṛṣṭaṃ saṃsraṣṭā ca na vidyate //*

ABh 70b

CL 19c8-11

A thing has no contact with itself. Why? because it is one, the same thing is not in contact with itself. Nor is one thing in contact with another. Why? Because they are separate: i.e., both because contact between separate [things] is undesirable, and because there is no necessity<sup>1</sup> [for it]. Upon close examination contact between entities is not found<sup>2</sup>, therefore the process of being in contact, contact, and the contactor all do not exist. As with the sky and the earth.

A *dharma* has no contact with its own substance, because it is one, just as a finger has no contact with itself. Separate *dharma*-s also have no contact, both because they are separate, and because there is no necessity for things previously established as separate to have contact. Upon close examination, a *dharma* of contact is not found, therefore it is said that a contactor, the process of being in contact, and a *dharma* of contact are not found.

1 “no necessity”: Skt. *niṣprajyana* (?); ABh: *dgos pa med pa*; CL: 不須

2 “is not found”: Skt. *na [upa-]labhyate*; ABh: *mi 'thad pa*; CL: 不可得

3 See §3.2.2.5 D.

#### 3.2.2.15. Chapter XV

##### A. Titles

PSP: *svabhāva-parīkṣā*

ABh: *dngos po dang dngos po med pa brtag pa*

(Skt. *bhāvābhāva-parīkṣā*)

CL: 觀有無 (= ABh)

B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(11)	ABh(11)	CL(11)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C. Questions

ABh(7)		CL(6)	comments
1	=	1	VO (see tr.)
2	=	2	VO
3	=	3	VO
4	=	4	P
5	=	5	P
6		*	
7	=	6	VO

## D. Remarks

All questions in CL directly correspond to six out of seven questions in ABh. As is the case with question 1, when two commentaries contain the same example with no cue from the *kārikā* content we have a clear example of significant correspondence. Several other sections in this chapter show close correspondence, as e.g. k.5 comm. and k.8 comm.; k.7 comm. is very similar as well, with both texts closing in an identical way (see tr.).

## E. Translation

## (a) XV.7 comm., closing line

MMK XV.7:

*svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvaṃ eva ca /  
ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane //*

ABh 72a / CL 20b6:

“Therefore you should abandon these views of ‘being’ and ‘nonbeing’.”<sup>1</sup>

- 1 Skt. *tataḥ bhāvābhāvadrṣṭayaḥ prahatavyaḥ*; ABh: *de’i phyir dngos po dang dngos po med par lta ba de dag spang bar bya’o*; CL: 是故汝應捨有無見

## (b) Question 1 (preceding XV.1)

MMK XV.1:

*na sambhāvaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ /  
hetupratyayasambhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet //*

ABh 71a

CL 19c20-21

[1] Question: Every entity definitely has an essence, because the capacity to perform individual functions is evident, and likewise because the essence of a pot and the essence of a cloth also emerges from [specific] causes and conditions.

[1] Question: Every *dharma* has an essence, because it has a function. Thus a pot has the essence of a pot, and a cloth has the essence of a cloth. This essence emerges from a combination of conditions.

### 3.2.2.16. Chapter XVI

#### A. Titles

PSP: *bandhanamokṣa-parīkṣā*

ABh: *bcings pa dang thar pa brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀縛解 (= PSP)

#### B. kārikā-s

PSP(10)	ABh(10)	CL(10)	comments
—	—	—	equivalent

#### C. Questions

ABh(8)		CL(4)	comments
1	=	1	P
2		*	
3	=	2	P; CL has quotation not found in ABh
4	=	3	P
5		*	
6		*	
7	=	4	P
8		*	

#### D. Remarks

The chapter is an interesting combination of close correspondences interspaced among other divergent, interpolated passages. All four questions in CL are paralleled in ABh, and at least six commentarial responses show direct and very close correspondence: XV.1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8. Often both ABh and CL begin with the formula: “You say ...” (see tr. (a)). Several sections of commentary show significant correspondence in their use of similar stylistic devices and parallel vocabulary (as e.g. ABh *'thad pa* / CL 可得 for Skt. [*upa*]labhyate).

## E. Translation

## (a) XVI.4 comm.

MMK XVI.4:

*saṃskārāṇāṃ na nirvāṇaṃ kathaṃ cid upapadyate /  
sattvasyāpi na nirvāṇaṃ kathaṃ cid upapadyate //*

ABh 73b

You say<sup>1</sup> that *saṃskāra*-s<sup>2</sup> and living beings are extinguished<sup>3</sup>, but we have previously taught that *saṃskāra*-s and living beings have no essence. Therefore, their transmigration cannot be found by any alternative . Because transmigration (*saṃsāra*) is not found, by what other alternative<sup>5</sup> would the extinction of *saṃskāra*-s and living beings be found?

CL 21a7-10

You say<sup>1</sup> that *saṃskāra*-s<sup>2</sup> and living beings are extinguished<sup>3</sup>, but [we have] previously responded to these statements. *Saṃskāra*-s have no essence, and living beings also have none. Their transmigration [in] *saṃsāra* cannot be found by any alternative<sup>5</sup> used to investigate. Thus neither are *saṃskāra*-s extinguished nor are living beings extinguished.

- 1 “You say”: Skt. *bhavatā ... iti yad uktam*; ABh: *khyod kyis ... zhes gang smras pa*; CL: 汝謂
- 2 (Skt.) *saṃskāra*(-s): ABh: *'du byed (rnams)*; CL: 諸行
- 3 “extinguished”: Skt. *nirvṛta*; ABh: *mya ngan las 'da 'bar 'gyur ba*; CL: 滅
- 4 Here I have used the variant reading found in note 1 of the Taishō edition.
- 5 “not found by any alternative”: Skt. *sarvākārena ... na labhyate*; ABh: *rnam pa thams cad kyis ... mi 'thad do*; CL: 種種 ... 不可得. Five alternative means of investigation were discussed in the previous (untranslated) section of the commentary.

## (b) XVI.5 comm.

MMK XVI.5:

*na badhyante na mucyanta udayavyayadharminah /  
saṃskārah pūrvavat sattvo badhyate na na mucyate //*

ABh: 73b

With respect to your claim that the *saṃskāra* s and living beings are bound and liberated: The *saṃskāra*-s are not found to be bound and liberated. Why? Because they are arising and ceasing

CL 21a13-15

With respect to your claim that the *saṃskāra*-s and living beings are bound and liberated: this is not suitable. Because *saṃskāra*-s arise and cease from moment to moment, they are

*dharma*-s. Living beings also are not found to be bound or liberated. Why? As before, *skandha*-s, *āyatāna*-s and *dhātu*-s<sup>1</sup> do not exist when searched for by any of the five alternatives [previously discussed].

certainly not bound or liberated. As stated before, living beings are not found when searched for by any of the five alternatives [previously discussed]. How can they be bound or liberated?

- 1 “*skandha*-s, *āyatāna*-s and *dhātu*-s”: Three classifications of the components of a “living being”.

(c) XVI.6 comm.

MMK XVI.6:

*bandhanaṃ ced upādānaṃ sopādāno na badhyate /  
badhyate nānupādānaḥ kimavastho 'tha badhyate //*

ABh 73b

CL 21a18-21

If you think that the *upādāna* [-*skandha*]-s<sup>1</sup> are bound, then one who possesses the *upādāna*-s is not bound. Why? Because in consequence the *upādāna*-s would split in two. Nor is one who does not possess the *upādāna*-s bound. Why? There is no existence without *upādāna*-s: What would be bound? Therefore what third possibility<sup>2</sup> is now considered [as the subject] to be bound?

If you say that the five *skandha* body<sup>1</sup> means to be bound, then a living being already possessing the five *skandha*-s is not bound. Why? Because one person would have to have two bodies. Nor is one who does not possess a body bound. Why? If one does not have a body, then he has no five *skandha*-s, and having no five *skandha*-s he is empty: What would be bound? There is no third third possibility<sup>2</sup> [that could serve as the subject] to be bound.

- 1 (Skt.)“*upādāna*[-*skandha*](*-s*)”, “five *skandha* body”: ABh: *nye bar len pa*; CL: 五陰身. This is the standard Chinese equivalent for the Skt.  
2 “possibility”: Skt. *avasāra*; ABh: *gnas skabs*; CL: 更 (perhaps, “alternative”).

3.2.2.17. Chapter XVII

A. Titles

PSP: *karmaphala-parīkṣā*

ABh: *las dang 'bras bu brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀業 (Skt. *karma-parīkṣā*)

B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(33)	ABh(33)	CL(33)	comments
12	12	12	ABh attributed to opponent; CL to Mādhyamika
20	20	20	ABh attributed to opponent; CL to Mādhyamika

## C. Questions

Questions are very loosely defined in this chapter, many are simply *kārikā*-s, and many others are long sections of commentary interspaced with *kārikā*-s. It is not possible to establish meaningful correspondence.

## D. Remarks

The chapter is organized very fluidly in both ABh and CL, largely due to the great number of *kārikā*-s attributed to the opponent. One particularly interesting point: XVII.28 comm. in ABh, CL and PSP contains a quotation from the *Anavarāgrasūtra* (cf. 3.2.2.11); the text of CL is different from ABh and PSP (see tr.).

## E. Translation

Quotation from XVII.28 comm.

MMK XVII.28:

*avidyānivṛto jantus tṛṣṇāsaṃyojanaś ca saḥ /  
sa bhoktā sa ca na kartur anyo na ca sa eva saḥ //*

ABh 80a

The Blessed One declared in the *Anavarāgrasūtra*: Covered over with ignorance, living beings are bound by thirst ...”; and likewise: “If you yourself created this tainted *karma*, then you yourself have to experience its ripening.”

CL 23b10-15

In the *Sūtra on Beginninglessness* it says: “All living beings are covered over with ignorance and bound by thirst...”<sup>2</sup>

1 Cf. PSP 141.16-17: *yathoktaṃ sūtre – avidyānivṛtāḥ sattvās tṛṣṇāsaṃyojanā iti / atha ca punar idaṃ pāpaṃ karma svayam eva kṛtam, asya svayam eva vipākāḥ pratyānubhavitavya iti vacanāt /*

2 Here follows a second long quotation from the same *sūtra*, with no parallel in either ABh or PSP.



## 3.2.2.18. Chapter XVIII

## A. Titles

PSP: *ātma-parīkṣā*ABh: *bdag dang chos brtag pa* (Skt. *ātmadharma-parīkṣā*)CL: 觀法 (Skt. *dharma-parīkṣā*)B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(12)	ABh(12)	CL(12)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C. Questions

The structure of ABh and CL is radically different in this chapter, so that no meaningful comparison can be made between the questions in each text. It is significant, however, that both begin the chapter with the same question – not in any way dictated by the *kārikā* text (see tr.).

## D. Remarks

The organization of ABh and CL is radically different: CL has all twelve *kārikā*-s together toward the beginning of the chapter, whereas in ABh they are distributed as in other chapters. In CL, a long commentary follows the group of *kārikā*-s, treating various questions raised along the way, as suggested by the *kārikā*-s. It is not possible to uncover any dependable evidence for significant correspondence, except in the first question.

## E. Translation

Question 1 (unassociated with any specific *kārikā*)

ABh 80b

CL 23c16-17

[1] Question: What is the characteristic of reality ? Through what form is reality known?

If *dharma*-s are entirely and utterly empty, with no arising and no ceasing, and this is the characteristic of reality for all *dharma*-s, then how can it be penetrated?

1 “characteristic of Reality”: Skt. *tattvalakṣaṇa*; ABh: *de kho na nyid mtshan nyid*; CL: 實相

## 3.2.2.19. Chapter XIX

## A. Titles

PSP: *kāla-parīkṣā*ABh: *dus brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀時 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(6)	ABh(6)	CL(6)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C. Questions

ABh(5)		CL(3)	comments
1	=	1	VO
2		*	CL embeds this question in k.1
3	=	2	P
4	=	3	P

## D. Remarks

The two texts actually show close correspondence throughout this chapter, but both of them stay close to the *kārikā* content, so it is not possible to establish any clear evidence of significant correspondence. Still, all three questions in CL correspond closely to questions in ABh. Question 1 in both commentaries is virtually identical, and this relationship can not be explained as the result of contamination by any *kārikā*. Ultimately, when two commentaries follow each other this closely it must be acknowledged as significant correspondence to the extent that both chose to restate the *kārikā-s* in prose format (as argued above, sec. 3.2.1). When one takes into account how far the two texts can stray from each other, as in Chapter XVII, for example, then this sort of correspondence may be better appreciated.

## 3.2.2.20. Chapter XX

## A. Titles

PSP: *sāmagri-parīkṣā*ABh: *rgyu dang 'bras bu brtag pa* (Skt. *hetuphala-parīkṣā*)

CL: 觀因果 (= ABh)

B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(24)	ABh(24)	CL(24)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C. Questions

ABh(13)		CL(10)	comments
1	=	1	P; CL omits first line of ABh
2	=	2	P; very close correspondence
3	=	3	V0
4	=	4	V0
5	=	5	P; CL lacks key example in ABh
6	=	6	P
7	=	7	P
*		8	
8	=	9	P
9		*	
10	=	10	P
11		*	
12		*	
13		*	

## D. Remarks

There is extensive correlation between questions. All but one question in CL are paralleled in ABh – several of them are virtually identical in vocabulary and organization. Also, we find very significant correspondence in the responses to all of the following *kārikā-s*: XX.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17 and 18. XX.7 comm. contains the same example in both texts (see tr.). Several other sections show no recognizable correspondence whatsoever (as e.g. commentaries to XX.8, 9 and 12).

## E. Translation

## XX.7 comm.

MMK XX.7:

*phalaṃ sahaiva sāmagryā yadi prādurbhavet punaḥ /  
ekakālau prasajyete janako yaś ca janyate //*

ABh 86b

If the aggregate [of conditions] and the effect arise simultaneously, then in consequence the aggregate [of conditions] that causes arising and the

CL 26c16-18

If the effect arises simultaneously with the aggregate of conditions, then that which causes arising and that which is caused to arise would [come into being]

effect that is caused to arise, which are like a father and a son, would come into being simultaneously. But this is undesirable. Therefore this claim that the effect arises simultaneously with the aggregate [of conditions] is untenable.

simultaneously. But this is not so. Why? It is like a father and a son, who do not arise simultaneously. Therefore your claim that the effect arises simultaneously with the aggregate of conditions is untenable.

### 3.2.2.21. Chapter XXI

#### A. Titles

PSP: *saṃbhāva-vibhāva-parīkṣā*

ABh: 'byung ba dang 'jig pa brtag pa (= PSP)

CL: 觀成壞 (= PSP)

#### B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(21)	ABh(21)	CL(20)	comments
5	5	*	
6	6	5	
etc . . . . .			

#### C. Questions

ABh(9)		CL(8)	comments
1	≠	1	very different content
2		*	
3		*	
4	≠	2	both introduce k.7 very differently
5	=	3	P
*		4	
*		5	
6	=	6	both = k.15
7		*	
8	=	7	P
9	=	8	P

#### D. Remarks

There is not a great deal of correspondence between questions. In several places ABh is actually longer and more analytical than CL (e.g. k.13 comm.). There is little indication that CL is at all related to ABh in these places. Yet there are many areas of striking similarity, as e.g. ABh k.8 comm./ CL k.7 comm., or the following sequence of question / response:

ABh		CL	
q. 8	=	7	
k. 19	=	18	
r. -		-	
q. 9	=	8	(see tr.)
k. 20	=	19	(see tr.)
r. -		-	(see tr.)

Also, there are two places in this chapter where both commentaries use the same example to illustrate the same *kārikā*: ABh k.7 comm./ CL k.6 comm. (see tr.); and ABh k.17 comm./ CL k.16 comm. (both use the example of a “pot”).

### E. Translation

#### (a) ABh XXI.7 comm./ CL XXI.6 comm.

MMK XXI.7:

*kṣayasya sambhavo nāsti nākṣayasyāpi sambhavaḥ /*  
*kṣayasya vibhavo nāsti vibhavo nākṣayasya ca //*

ABh 91a

That which is continually destroyed<sup>1</sup>, day by day and moment by moment becoming exhausted<sup>2</sup> and passing away<sup>3</sup>, is called “exhaustion”. It is like flowing water which never stands still; no essence<sup>5</sup> is gotten hold of<sup>4</sup>, and one can not attribute coming into being<sup>6</sup> to it. Therefore exhaustion has no arising. That which never changes, forever unexhausted and not passing away, that is called “nonexhaustion”. Permanent, fixed and abiding in this or that form, never halting<sup>8</sup>; no coming into being is appropriately attributed to it. Therefore nonexhaustion also has no coming into being. Destruction is not found in exhaustion, where there is no coming into being, and therefore exhaustion has no destruction. Nor does nonexhaustion have destruction, where there is also no coming into being; and

CL 28a20-28b1

All *dharma*-s, day and night, moment by moment, are continually dissolved<sup>1</sup>, exhausted<sup>2</sup> and passing away<sup>3</sup>, like flowing water which never stands still. This is called “exhaustion”. This is not gotten hold of<sup>4</sup>, it can not be explained. Like a mirage with no fixed essence<sup>5</sup> to be found, so exhaustion has no fixed essence to be found. How could one find it, divide it and attribute coming into being<sup>6</sup> to it? This is why it is said that exhaustion also does not arise. Since coming into being does not exist, neither can there be destruction<sup>7</sup>. Thus it is said that exhaustion has no destruction either. That which is moment by moment arising and being eradicated in constant succession with no breaking away, that is called “nonexhaustion”: permanent, fixed and abiding *dharma*-s, never breaking away<sup>8</sup>. How can one

therefore nonexhaustion also does not have destruction. Thus an entity characterized by destruction is [an entity] whose nature is exhaustion, and because its nature is exhaustion, so it does not have coming into being. As what is arisen is immediately destroyed, so its nature is not exhaustion, and because of this it also does not have coming into being. Likewise an entity possessing an identity of destruction has a nature of exhaustion and it does not have destruction. As what is arisen is immediately destroyed, its nature is not exhaustion, and because of this it also does not have destruction. An entity possessing an identity of destruction also is destroyed immediately after arising. Therefore this claim – that “immediately after [the entity] has arisen, enduring comes into being, and after that it is destroyed, and that therefore destruction does not have coming into being and coming into being does not have destruction” – is untenable.

find it, divide it and attribute “now it is coming into being” to it? This is why it is said that nonexhaustion also has no coming into being. Since coming into being does not exist, neither can there be breaking away<sup>7</sup>, and thus it is said that exhaustion has no destruction. And so through investigation no real thing is found, and therefore there is no coming into being and no dissolution.

- 1 “destroyed”: Skt. *vibhāva*; ABh: *'jig pa*; CL: 壞; “dissolved”: Skt. & ABh: –; CL: 滅 (used synonymously with 壞 throughout this passage).
- 2 “exhausted”: Skt. *kṣīṇa*; ABh: *zad pa*; CL: 盡
- 3 “passing away”: Skt. *vigacchati*; ABh: *'bral bar 'gyur ba*; CL: 過去
- 4 “gotten hold of”: Skt. *pratilabhyate*; ABh: *mngon par thob pa*; CL: 取
- 5 “essence”: Skt. [*sva*]*bhāva*; ABh: *ngo bo nyid*; CL: 性
- 6 “attribute coming into being [to it]”: Skt. [*tat*] *saṃbhāvaṃ kalpayati/e*; ABh: [*de la*] *'byung bar brtag pa*; CL: 說有成
- 7 “breaking away”: 斷, synonymous throughout for 過去 (see n.3)
- 8 “permanent, fixed and abiding in this or that form, never halting”: Skt. *nityastattadākārenāvasthito 'nivr̥ttaḥ*; ABh: *rtag pa rnam pa de dang des nges par gnas pa mi ldog pa* “permanent, fixed and abiding *dharma*-s, never breaking away”: CL: 是法決定常住不斷



(b) ABh question 9 - k.20 - k.20 comm./ CL question 8 - k.19 - k.19 comm.

ABh 94a

CL 29b6-15

[9] Question: It is not that “the process of dying” and “the process of arising” both exist simultaneously [but discretely]; rather, as the final [moment of the previous existence is dying, the first [moment of the next] existence arises. Response:

MMK XXI.20:

*na cen nirudhyamānaś ca jāyamānaś ca yujyate /  
sārdham ca mriyate yeṣu teṣu skandheṣu jāyate //*

ABh MMK XXI.20

If ceasing and arising are not joined together  
[as discrete phenomena];  
then in these *skandha*-s where there is dying,  
arising as well will come into being.<sup>2</sup>

CL MMK XXI.19:

If you speak of “arising” and “ceasing”  
but you say that they are simultaneous;  
then in these *skandha*-s where there is dying  
there is also arising.<sup>2</sup>

If “the process of ceasing” and “the process of arising” do not both exist simultaneously and discretely; [but rather as the final moment of the previous] existence is ceasing the first [moment of the next] existence arises, then in consequence arising would come into being in those very *skandha*-s where there is dying. Why? Because you desire that the one who is arising exist in those very *skandha*-s where exists the one who is ceasing. Thus dying and arising, two opposites<sup>3</sup>, would simultaneously come into being in the same *skandha*-s<sup>4</sup>. This is not desired. Therefore this claim – “It is not that ‘the process of ceasing’ and ‘the

[8] Question: It is not that “the process of dying” and “the process of arising” both exist together<sup>1</sup>; rather, we manifestly perceive that while the first existence is ceasing the next existence arises. Response:

If “the process of arising” and “the process of ceasing” do not both exist simultaneously; but rather, you say that while the first existence is ceasing the next existence arises, then arising would take place in those very *skandha*-s where there was dying – there would be no arising in different *skandha*-s. Why? Because the one who is dying would be the same as the one who is arising. Yet dying and arising, opposing *dharma*-s<sup>3</sup>, so not simultaneously [come into being] in the same place<sup>4</sup>. Therefore your previous claim – “It is not that...” – is untenable.<sup>5</sup>

process of arising' both exist simultaneously [and discretely]; but rather, as the final [moment of the previous] existence is ceasing the first [moment of the next] existence arises" – is untenable.<sup>5</sup>

- 1 "both exist together": 二有俱
- 2 The difference between ABh and CL and their respective translations of MMK XXI.20ab does not necessarily indicate that they were working from a different source – such "interpretive" translations are not at all unusual in CL.
- 3 "opposites", "opposing *dharma*-s": Skt. *viruddha* (?); ABh: *mi mthun pa*; CL: 相違法
- 4 "simultaneously [come into being] in the same *skandha*-s/place": Skt. *ekaskandhe ekakāle jāyete*; ABh: *phung po gcig la dus gcig tu 'byung bar 'gyur ba*; CL: 是 ... 一時一處
- 5 "untenable": Skt. *na yujyate*; ABh: *rigs pa ma yin*; CL: 不然

### 3.2.2.22. Chapter XXII

#### A. Titles

PSP: *tathāgata-parīkṣā*

ABh: *de bzhin gshegs pa brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀如來 (= PSP)

#### B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(16)	ABh(16)	CL(16)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

(ABh contains six additional *kārikā*-s between XXII.9 and 10)

#### C. Questions

ABh(14)		CL(5)	comments
1	=	1	P
2	=	2	VO
3	=	3	VO
4		*	
etc. ....			
11		*	
12	=	4	VO
13		*	
14	=	5	P

## D. Remarks

All five questions in CL correspond closely to questions in ABh. In both texts questions 2 and 3 and the associated commentary are related to k.2 in exactly the same way. Phrasing and vocabulary also are very similar in places, as e.g. in ABh question 12 / CL question 4 (see tr.). The commentaries to XXII.1 are also similar in organization: both texts contain seven corresponding arguments (yet only one out of the six examples provided is identical to both).

## E. Translation

ABh question 12 / CL question 4 (preceding MMK XXII.11)

MMK XXII.11:

*śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet /  
ubhayaṃ nobhayaṃ ceti prajñaptiyartham tu kathyate //*

ABh 97b

CL 30b21

Is “emptiness” not then fixed?<sup>1</sup>

Does emptiness have a fixed existence?<sup>1</sup>

1 “fixed [existence]”: Skt. *niścitam*; ABh: *nges pa*; CL: 定有

## 3.2.2.23. Chapter XXIII

## A. Titles

PSP: *viparyāsa-parīkṣā*

ABh: *phyin ci log brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀顛倒 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā-s*

PSP(25)	ABh(24)	CL(24)	comments
20	*	*	
21	20	20	
etc. ....			

MMK XXIII.20:

*na svato jāyate bhāvaḥ parato naiva jāyate /  
na svataḥ parataś ceti viparyayagataḥ kutaḥ //*

## C. Questions

ABh(5)		CL(3)	comments
1	=	1	VO (see tr.)
2	=	2	VO
3	=	3	VO
5		*	

## D. Remarks

It is significant that both ABh and CL lack XXIII.20, yet they do not always show identical *kārikā*-s. Questions 1 - 3 are virtually identical in both texts as regards location and content, and k.2 comm., which they frame, also corresponds closely in ABh and CL. Other sections are also extremely similar, as e.g. the commentaries to k.3, 5 and 6. In both ABh and CL, k.15 comm. closes with a reference to Chapter XXII. In general, the commentaries in both texts stay close to the *kārikā* content.

## E. Translation

## (a) Question 1

ABh 98b

CL 31a12-16

[1] Question:

[1] Question:

MMK XXIII.1:

*saṃkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaś ca kathyate /  
śubhāśubhaviṣyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya hi //*

The *sūtra*-s explain at length that *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*<sup>1</sup> come into being from *saṃkalpa*-s<sup>4</sup>, they also arise in dependence<sup>2</sup> on the *viparyāsa*-s of impurity and purity. Therefore *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* do exist.

The *sūtra*-s explain that *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* arise in dependence<sup>2</sup> on the *viparyāsa*-s<sup>3</sup> of purity and impurity, and [also in dependence on] *saṃkalpa*-s<sup>4</sup>. Therefore one knows that *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha* do exist.

1 (Skt.) *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *moha*: ABh: 'dod chags, zhe sdang, gti mug; CL: 貪恚癡

2 "in dependence": Skt. *pratītya*; ABh: *brten pa nyid las*; CL: 因

3 (Skt.) *viparyāsa*(-s): ABh: *phyin ci log*; CL: 顛倒

4 (Skt.) *saṃkalpa*(-s): ABh: *kun tu rtog pa*; CL: 憶想分別

## (b) XXIII.2 comm.

MMK XXIII.2:

*śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṁbhavanti pratītya ye /  
te svabhāvān na vidyante tasmāt kleśā na tattvataḥ //*

ABh 99a

CL 31a19-20

The *kleśa*-s<sup>1</sup> of *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *moha*, which arise in dependence on the *viparyāsa*-s of purity and impurity, are without any *svabhāva*<sup>3</sup>. Therefore the *kleśa*-s do not actually exist.<sup>4</sup>

If the *kleśa*-s<sup>1</sup> arise in dependence on the *viparyāsa-saṁkalpa*-s<sup>2</sup> of purity and impurity, then they are without any *svabhāva*<sup>3</sup>. Therefore the *kleśa*-s do not actually exist<sup>4</sup>.

1 (Skt.) [*saṁ*]*kleśa*(-s): ABh: *myon mongs*; CL: 諸煩惱

2 Or perhaps: "... in dependence on the *viparyāsa*-s and the *saṁkalpa*-s of..."

3 (Skt.) [*sva*]*bhāva*: ABh: *ngo bo nyid*; CL: 自性

4 "do not actually exist": Skt. *tattvataḥ na santi*; ABh: *yang dag par yod pa ma yin*; CL: 無實

## 3.2.2.24. Chapter XXIV

## A. Titles

PSP: *āryasatya-parīkṣā*ABh: *'phags pa'i bden pa brtag pa* (= PSP)CL: 觀四諦 (Skt. *caturāryasatya-parīkṣā*)B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(40)	ABh(40)	CL(40)	comments
—	—	—	equivalent

## C. Questions

ABh(1)		CL(3)	comments
1	=	1	P
*		2	
*		3	

## D. Remarks

In both texts we find the following sequence: k.1-5 (= question) / text of question / k.6 / question continued / k.7 (= response). And in both cases question 1 is organized in very much the same manner (see tr.). There is a great deal of correspondence in this chapter:

<i>commentary</i>	<i>comments</i>
k.1-15	virtually identical in both texts
k.16-19	different
k.20-27	virtually identical
k.28-29	different
k.30-37	(comm. lost in ABh?)
k.38-39	similar
k.40	different

Several stylistic details are significant, as e.g. k.8-9 comm. ends with the same question in both texts (see tr.). Examples of other specific correspondences are translated below.

### E. Translation

#### (a) XXIV.6 comm.

MMK XXIV.6:

*śūnyatām phalasadbhāvam adharmaṃ dharmam eva ca /  
sarvasaṃvyavahārāṃś ca laukikān pratibādhase //*

ABh 102a

If emptiness is accepted<sup>1</sup>, then [you] destroy<sup>2</sup> evil and good and the fruits made by them, and all all worldly conventions as well. Thus all things<sup>3</sup> are not empty.

CL 32c8-9

If emptiness is accepted<sup>1</sup>, then [you] destroy<sup>2</sup> evil and good and the fruits of evil and good, as well as all worldly *dharm*-s. Since these kinds of things would come to pass, thus all *dharm*-s<sup>3</sup> are not empty.

1 “accepted”: Skt. *grhyate*; ABh: *bzung*; CL: 受

2 “destroy”: Skt. [*prati-*]*bādhase*; ABh: *gnod pa byed pa*; CL: 破

3 “thing(s)”, *dharm*-(s): ABh: *dngos po*; CL: 法

#### (b) XXIV.7 comm.

MMK XXIV.7:

*atra brūmaḥ śūnyatāyām na tvaṃ vetsy prajñānam /  
śūnyatām śūnyatārtham ca tata evaṃ viḥvāyase //*

ABh 102b

You do not understand the need for teaching emptiness, the characteristics of emptiness, or the the meaning of emptiness as they actually are<sup>1</sup>. Therefore you bring about this destruction.<sup>2</sup>

CL 32c13-14

You do not understand the characteristics of emptiness, the need for teaching emptiness, or its meaning as they actually are<sup>1</sup>, and [therefore you] bring about these doubts and difficulties.<sup>2</sup>



- 1 “as they actually are”: Skt. *samyakyathāvasthitam* (?); ABh: *yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du*; CL: 如實
- 2 These last lines seem to reflect a difference between the *kārikā* texts of XXIV.7d in PSP, CL and ABh:  
 PSP: *vihanyase*  
 CL: 自生惱 (= PSP)  
 ABh: *gnod pa byed* (Skt. *pratibādhase*; = XXIV.6d in PSP, ABh and CL)

(c) The commentaries to k.8-9 are very similar, merely restating and expanding *kārikā*-content; both finish with the same question:

ABh 102b

CL 32c25-33a

If one thinks: “‘*Dharma*-s do not arise’ is the truth of the ultimate meaning, so what is the necessity for this second conventional truth?” – Here is the explanation:

One might say: “‘*Dharma*-s do not arise’ is the truth of the ultimate meaning, so this second conventional truth is not necessary.” – Why is this not correct?:

(d) XXIV.21 comm.

MMK XXIV.21:

*apratītya samutpannam kuto duḥkham bhaviṣyati /*  
*anityam uktaṁ duḥkham hi tatsvābhāvyē na vidyate //*

ABh 103b\

CL 33b29-33c3

If it were not *pratītyasamutpanna*<sup>1</sup> there would be no *duḥkha*. Why? Because the *sūtra*-s declare that *anitya* is *duḥkha* – [*duḥkha*] is not present in a [fixed] nature<sup>2</sup>. Moreover:

If it were not *pratītyasamutpanna* there would be no *duḥkha*. Why? Because the *sūtra*-s declare that *anitya* is the meaning of *duḥkha*. If *duḥkha* had a fixed nature<sup>2</sup> then how would it have *anityata*? It would not abandon its own nature<sup>2</sup>. Moreover:

- 1 (Skt.) *pratītyasamutpanna*; ABh: *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba ...yin pa*; CL: 從緣生
- 2 “[fixed] nature”: Skt. *svabhāva* (?); ABh: *ngo bo nyid*; CL: 定性 (33cl), which is here used as a synonym for 自性 (33c2).

### 3.2.2.25. Chapter XXV

#### A. Titles

PSP: *nirvāṇa-parīkṣā*

ABh: *mya ngan las 'das pa brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀涅槃 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(24)	ABh(24)	CL(24)	comments
–	–	–	equivalent

## C Questions

ABh(6)		CL(5)	comments
1	=	1	VO
2	=	2	VO
3	=	3	P
4	=	4	P
5		*	
6	=	5	

## D. Remarks

It is significant that both texts alternate *kārikā* with commentary throughout, except where k.17-18 and k.22-23-24 are grouped together without intervening commentary. There is apparently nothing in the *kārikā* content that would dictate this particular organization. Another organizational feature of both texts is the following sequence of questions alternating with *kārikā*-s and responses: q.1 (= k.1) / k.2-6 / q.2 / k.7-8 / q.3 / k.9-10 / q.4 / k.11-13 [/ABh q.5/] k.14 / ABh q.6, CL q.5 / k.15-24. Once again, nothing in the content of the *kārikā*-s themselves would necessarily determine this sequence. There is also a great deal of close correspondence between the texts of the responses – so much so, in fact, that only the following sections do not correspond very closely: k.3, 4, 5, 15-18, 20, 21cd, 22-24. Many of these commentaries merely restate the *kārikā*-content; but after paraphrasing the *kārikā* they very often include a single extra comment – identical in both ABh and CL (see e.g. examples (a) and (b) below).

## E. Translation

(a) XXV.2 comm.: A restatement of k.2, followed by the single line shown here –

MMK XXV.2:

*yady aśūnyam idaṃ sarvaṃ udayo nāsti na vyayaḥ /  
prahāṇād vā nirodhād vā kasya nirvāṇam iṣyate //*

ABh 105b

CL 34c23-25

Thus one should understand that *nirvāṇa* is not reached by this method<sup>1</sup>.

Thus *nirvāṇa* is not reached through the two gates<sup>1</sup> of being and nonbeing.

- 1 “method”, “gate(s)”: Skt. *krama* (?); ABh: *rim pa*; CL: 門 . Both *krama* and *rim pa* are literally “a way of moving along”, which is probably what prompted the Chinese translation, as a “way through which one moves”.

(b) XXV.11 comm.: A restatement of k.11, followed by the single line shown here –

MMK XXV.11:

*bhaved abhāvo bhāvaś ca nirvāṇam ubhayam yadi /*  
*bhaved abhāvo bhavaś ca mokṣas tac ca na yujyate //*

ABh 106b

Because the two are mutually contradictory and do not exist at the same time.

CL 35b22-23

Because the two things “being” and “nonbeing” are mutually contradictory – How could they exist at the same place?

(c) XXV.19 comm.

MMK XXV.19:

*na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam /*  
*na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam //*

ABh 108a

*Saṃsāra*<sup>1</sup> is designated in dependence<sup>2</sup> on the continuum<sup>3</sup> of the [five] *skandha*-s, but the *skandha*-s are by nature empty. Therefore we already explained at the very first<sup>4</sup> just how they just how they are always without arising and ceasing. Because all *dharma*-s are equally<sup>5</sup> without arising and ceasing, so there is not the slightest difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. And just as there is not the slightest difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, so there is not the slightest difference between *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*.

CL 36a6-9

*Saṃsāra*<sup>1</sup> is designated in dependence<sup>2</sup> on the continuum<sup>3</sup> of the five *skandha*-s, but the five *skandha*-s are by nature utterly empty, unappropriated and tranquil. Therefore this idea was already explained at the very first<sup>4</sup>. Because all *dharma*-s are equally<sup>5</sup> without arising and ceasing, so there is not any difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, nor is there any difference between *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*.

- 1 (Skt.) *saṃsāra*: ABh: 'khor ba; CL: (here following the tr. of k 19): 世間
- 2 “designated in dependence”: Skt. *upādāya prajñāpta*; ABh: *brten nas ...gdags [pa]*; CL: 因緣故說
- 3 “continuum”: Skt. *saṃtāna*; ABh: *rgyun*; CL: 相續往來 (lit. “successive going and coming”)
- 4 “at the very first”: Skt. *prathamataḥ*; ABh: *dang po kho nar*; CL: 先
- 5 “all *dharma*-s ...equally”: Skt. *sarvadharmāḥ ...samatayā*; ABh: *chos thams cad ...mnyam pa nyid kyis*; CL: 一切法

## 3.2.2.26. Chapter XXVI

## A. Titles

PSP: *dvadaśāṅga-parīkṣā*ABh: *srid pa'i yan lag bcu gnyis brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀十二因緣 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā-s*

The *kārikā-s* in CL are very different from both PSP and ABh. Taishō 1564 shows nine *kārikā-s*, but close examination of all three texts suggests the following tentative correspondence:

PSP/ABh(12)		CL(9)	<i>comments</i>
1	=	1	
2	=	2	
3		*	
*		3	
4		*	
*		4	
5		*	
6ab		*	
6c	=	5a(?)	
6d		*	
7	=	5bcd(?)	
8a		*	
8b	=	6a(?)	
8cd		*	
9	=	6bcd(&7?)	
10	=	8	
11		*	
12	=	9	

It is as difficult to account for the discrepancies as for the apparent correspondences. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that all the *kārikā-s* in CL correspond to something in the text of the other two commentaries.

## C. Questions

ABh(1)		CL(10)	<i>comments</i>
1	=	1	VO(see tr.)

## D. Remarks

Both ABh and CL (and BP) group all the *kārikā*-s together at the beginning of the chapter, which is in itself a sign of significant correspondence. They are preceded by one question and followed by one extended segment of commentarial response. The single question is virtually identical in both texts (see tr.); and the organization of the response is, on the whole, quite similar and quite strikingly idiosyncratic, but because it stays very close to the *kārikā*-content no clear evidence of significant correspondence can be established.

## E. Translation

Question 1 (unassociated with any particular *kārikā*)

ABh 108b

CL 36b18-19

[1] Question: You have explained the entrance to *paramārtha*<sup>1</sup> according to the way<sup>2</sup> of the Mahāyāna. Now<sup>3</sup> please explain<sup>4</sup> the entrance<sup>5</sup> to *paramārtha* according to the way of the Śrāvaka.

[1] Question: You have explained *paramārtha*<sup>1</sup> according to the way<sup>2</sup> of the Mahāyāna. Now<sup>3</sup> we want to hear [you] explain<sup>4</sup> the entrance<sup>5</sup> to *paramārtha* according to the way of the Śrāvaka-Dharma.

- 1 (Skt.) *paramārtha*: ABh: *don dam pa*; CL: 第一義
- 2 “way”: Skt. *mata*, *samaya*; ABh: *gzhung lugs*; CL: 道
- 3 “now”: Skt. *adya*; ABh: *da*; CL: 今
- 4 “please explain”, “we want to hear [you] explain”: Skt. *deśaya* (imperative)(?); ABh: *ston cig*; CL: 我欲聞說. It is interesting that PSP shows a desiderative gerund in the commentary introducing XXVI.1 (238.8): *atas tadaṅgaprabhedavivakṣayedam ucyate*. ABh and CL both may reflect an original imperative or desiderative construction.
- 5 “entrance”: Skt. *praveśa*; ABh: *’jug pa*; CL: 入

## 3.2.2.27. Chapter XXVII

## A. Titles

PSP: *drṣṭi-parīkṣā*ABh: *lta ba brtag pa* (= PSP)

CL: 觀邪見 (= PSP)

B. *kārikā*-s

PSP(30)

ABh(30)

CL(30)

*comments*

\*

11

11

Mss damaged

## C. Questions

ABh(1)		CL(3)	comments
1	=	1	P; slightly different phrasing, both used to open ch.XXVII
*		2	
*		3	

## D. Remarks

Commentary in both texts follows *kārikā*-content very closely. The arrangement of the *kārikā*-s is identical: k.1-2 / comm. / k.3-8 / comm. / k.9-12 / comm. / [alternating k. / comm.] k.23-24 / comm./ k.25 / comm./ k.25 / comm. / k.26-27 / comm. / k.28 / comm. / k.29 / comm. / k.30 / comm. Despite the tight adherence to *kārikā*-content, it is also significant that certain identical phrases appear in the same location in both texts (see tr.).

## E. Translation

(a) XXVII.13 comm.: A restatement of k.13, preceded by the stereotyped opening –

MMK XXVII.13:

*evam dṛṣṭir atīte yā nābhūm aham abhūm aham /  
ubhayam nobhayam ceti naiṣā samupapadyate //*

ABh 111a

CL 38b9

Thus, when closely investigated...<sup>1</sup>

Thus, when closely investigated...<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Skt. *tathā parīkṣite*... ; ABh: *de ltar yongs su brtags na*; CL: 如是推

(b) XXVII.19 comm.: A restatement of k.19, incorporating one identical line not dictated by *kārikā*-content –

MMK XXVII.19:

*kutaścid āgataḥ kaścit kiṃcid gacchet punaḥ kvacit /  
yadi tasmād anādis tu saṃsāraḥ syān na cāsti saḥ //*

ABh 112a

CL 38c10-11

If we search with *prajñā*,<sup>1</sup> then what entity comes from anywhere, and similarly, what goes anywhere?

If we search for these *dharma*-s with *prajñā*,<sup>1</sup> we do not find a place from which they come or a place to which they go.

<sup>1</sup> “If (or “when”) we search . . . with *prajñā*”: Skt. *prajñayā mṛgyamāne*; ABh: *shes rab kyis btsal na*; CL: 以智慧推求. Also cf XXVII.20 comm., ABh 27.11.3/CL 38c15, where the same phrase occurs in both commentaries (with the minor variant in ABh *btsal* becomes *brtags*).

