

# English summaries

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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES

M. TÉTAZ-GRAMEGNA, *The Correspondance between Frank Martin and J.-Claude Piguet (1965-1974)*, RThPh 2001/II, p. 115-120.

*Frank Martin's (1890-1974) creative work and J.-Claude Piguet's quest for a philosophical language able to deal with music both emerge in this exchange of letters between composer and philosopher. The common background is constituted by the debate within the musical world in the second half of the XX<sup>th</sup> century, a time of crisis for the musical language. Piguet focusses his perception of the musical art on the question of the sublime, while F. Martin, insisting on the claims of sensibility, favors the dimension of the beautiful. Both share the idea of the preeminence of the ethical over the esthetical.*

GERHARD EBELING, *To answer for one's faith in the encounter with M. Heidegger's thought. Theses concerning the relation between philosophy and theology*, RThPh 2001/II, p. 121-131.

*Written in preparation of a dialogue with M. Heidegger, these theses by Gerhard Ebeling are translated here in French for the first time. They initially state some general perspectives on the relation between philosophy and theology. They further show in several ways how Heidegger's philosophy constitutes a particularly stimulating dialogue partner for theology.*

ADÈLE THORENS, *Ecocentrism and the test of anthropology in the philosophy of Hans Jonas*, RThPh 2000/II, p. 131-147.

*The aim of this paper is to answer to a critique that has been raised against Hans Jonas by several French philosophers. The critique is that his "ecocentrist" view of nature and of ethics threatens the foundations of humanism. It is confronted here with Jonas's philosophical work, and more particularly with his claims about life, human nature and moral choice. The result is that far from opposing the humanist cause, Hans Jonas makes an original contribution to it, through his anthropological views and his answer to the ethical challenges of the environmental crisis.*

MARKUS HALLER, *Rationality without morality*, RThPh 2001/II, p. 149-165.

*According to David Hume, our reason cannot indicate us the ends that we are to pursue. The "Anti-Humeans" among philosophers try to refute him and to propose a conception of rationality based on practical values one could not fail to take account of without contradiction. The "Neo-Humeans" try instead to supplement his conception of rationality in order for it to be compatible with our common intuitions. The present paper is written in defence of the "Neo-Humean" position. In a first step, it shows that on the two most significant "Anti-Humean" positions, standards of rationality and standards of morality cannot be distinguished. In a second step, it explains why and how the criterion of the consistency of preferences supplements the Humean position in the appropriate way and allows the proper development of a conception of rationality without morality.*