

Bhartrhari's definition of kriy

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BHARTRHARI'S DEFINITION OF *KRIYĀ*

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0. General Introduction

In this paper I will treat Bhartrhari's and Patañjali's definition of *kriyā* as interpreted by Helārāja in the *Kriyāsamuddēśa* of the *Vākyapadīya*.

In his *Kriyāsamuddēśa*, Bhartrhari deals with *kriyā* from two different points of view, from that of those who hold that a word denotes the particular (*vyaktivādin*) and that of those who hold that the word denotes the universal (*jātivādin*).¹ It seems that *kriyā* as understood by the *jātivādin* is more interesting than that of the *vyaktivādin*, but here I will limit the discussion to the *vyaktivādin*'s understanding of *kriyā*.

1. Bhartrhari's Definition of *kriyā*.

1.0. Introduction

It is from the author of the *Nirukta* that Bhartrhari inherits the idea that an act, which Yāska calls *bhāva*, is continuous (*pūrvāparībhūta*)². And he introduces that idea into the field of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*). And, keeping it in his mind, he gives his definition of *kriyā* 'act' as denoted by *śabda* 'a word' in his *Kriyāsamuddēśa*'s first *kārikā*. It reads

*yāvat siddham asiddham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate /
āśritakramarūpatvāt tat kriyety abhidhīyate // (VP.3.8.k.1)*³

According to Helārāja, this *kārikā* gives a scientific definition (*śāstrīyam lakṣaṇam*) of *kriyā* 'act'.⁴ We may exemplify the definition briefly as fol-

- 1 Helārāja on KSk.20 (VPI, page 18, lines 14-15): *evam tāvat padārthānām apoddhāre jātir vā vyaktir eva vā/ iti vyaktivādimatena kriyālakṣaṇo 'poddhārapadārtho nirṇītaḥ/ idānīm jātivādimatenāha/*
- 2 Nirukta 1.1.: *pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaste vrajati pacaṭīti upakrama-prabhṛtyapavargaparyantam/* See Helārāja on KSk.11 (VPI., page 12, line 14).
- 3 VPR reads *prāṇīyate* for *abhidhīyate*.
- 4 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 1, lines 2-3): *idānīm sādhyāpekṣatvāt sādhanasya sādhanānantaram uddiṣṭyāḥ kriyāyāḥ śāstrīyam lakṣaṇam āha/*

lows.⁵ In the case of {*apāksīt* ‘[he] cooked’}, something is *siddha*. On the other hand, in the case of {*pacati* ‘[he] is cooking’} and {*paksyati* ‘[he] will cook’}, something is *asiddha*. In both cases, in so far as something is denoted by a word as *sādhya*, that something is called *kriyā*.

1.1 General conception of the act as *sādhya*.

A general account of *kriyā* as *sādhya* can be found in Helārāja’s commentary on this *kārikā*.⁶

Let us observe the process of making a pot of clay, on the level of the actual world. First, there is a lump of clay. Then out of this, a potter makes several parts which will become a body or an ear and so on. Then the parts are united and baked by the potter. After that a pot appears in the actual world.

Now let us leave the actual world and turn to the level of the word. We will examine the expression {*ghataḥ kriyate* ‘the pot is being made’}. From this expression we understand the process of a pot being made just in the same way as it happened in the actual world.

Then, what kind of notion does the expression {*ghataḥ*} alone bring about in our mind? The notion which is brought about by {*ghataḥ*} in our mind is not the process of a pot being made, but it is only ‘pot’.

Therefore, the process of a pot being made is to be understood from the verb {*kriyate*}. And such a process in temporal sequence is what the word *sādhya* means. In this way, a *kriyā* has many component acts, which have a temporal order and constitute a series.

1.2 The mentally unified whole is the act.

Then, how can a *kriyā* be regarded as a whole such as “the act of cooking”? Bhartrhari gives an answer to this question in the fourth *kārikā* of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*. It reads

5 VSM, page 45, lines 23-24: ‘*pacati*’ ‘*paksyati*’ *ityādāv asiddham*, ‘*apāksīt*’ *ityādaḥ siddham vā sādhyaṭvenābhīdhīyamānam kriyā/*

6 Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 5, lines 11-15): *tathā hi – dravyaśabdāḥ pravartamānāḥ ghataḥ kriyate, pataḥ kriyate ityādisādhyaṃnāvastheṣv api sanmātrākārāvalambanam pratyayam janayanti/ ghataḥ hi bhāvyaṃnāvasthā śivakastūpakādīnām avasthānām kramena prādurbhāvah/ na cāsau ghataśabdāt praṭīyate, kriyā itī kriyāśabdaprayogād eva tadavagateh/*

*gunabhūtaiḥ avayavaiḥ samūhah kramajanmanām /
buddhyā prakalpitābhedah kriyeti vyapadiśyate // (VP 3.8.k.4)*

According to Helārāja, this *kārikā* can be interpreted as follows. As mentioned above, *kriyā* is a mere continuous series of its component acts. But they aim at a single result (*ekaphaloddeśa*).⁷ And on the basis of this singleness of result the component parts can be regarded as a collection (*samudāya*) whose nature is single and total, thanks to the intellectual function of joining.

Therefore, when we pay attention to a collection, we can say that a *kriyā* is single; and on the other hand, when we fix our eyes upon its component parts, we can speak of it as having an order (*krama*) or sequence (*paurvāparya*).

However, this singleness with regard to a collection is nothing but a mental construction (*adhyāropita*), because each component part disappears immediately after it originates and all the parts cannot exist simultaneously to constitute a real collection.

To Bhartrhari, *kriyā* is a collection conceived as a whole. And it is such a collection that brings about a result.

1.3 Any component part of a composite action is also an act (*kriyā*).

Here there arises a problem. If a process as a whole is *kriyā*, a part of it, for instance, *adhiśrayaṇa* 'putting [a pot] on a fire', could not be called *kriyā*. If so, we could not apply the expression {*pacati*} to a part such as *adhiśrayaṇa*.

Bhartrhari gives an answer to this question in the fifth *kārikā* of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*:

*samūhah sa tathābhūtaḥ pratibhedam samūhiṣu/
samāpyate tato bhede kālabhedasya sambhavaḥ // (VP 3.8.k.5)*

According to Helārāja, a man who is beginning to cook aims at eating as the result of cooking from the very beginning. Therefore the whole process

7 Bhartrhari and Helārāja mention another reason for regarding a *kriyā* as a whole. See Helārāja on *Kālasamuddeśa* k. 90 (VPI, page 78, lines 17-18): *pūrvam kṣanasa-mūhasyaikatvam ekaphaloddeśena samarthitam/ idānīm saṅkalanābuddhyupārūdhasya buddhyākārārūpatvena bhāvikam ekatvam ucyate/*. Here the reason why a *kriyā* is regarded as a whole is singleness of intellect.

is conceptually fixed on each part of cooking such as *adhiśrayana*. In other words, a part (*samūhin*) is regarded as the whole or collection (*samūha*). In this case, we can apply the expression {*pacati*} to a component part, such as *adhiśrayana*, on which the whole process of cooking is superimposed. And when *adhiśrayana*, is finished, we can apply the expression {*apāksīt*} to it. And with reference to a component part which will happen in the future, we can say {*pakṣyati*}. Helārāja says that this mental construction (*adhyāsa*) occurs, because the notion of cooking continues (*anuvartate*) in each component part.⁸

Then, another problem arises. From the discussion above, it will follow that a component part, such as *adhiśrayana*, is not *sādhya*, though the expression {*pacati*} can be applied to it, because a component part has the concept of the whole fixed on it and therefore it does not have its own parts.

Helārāja gives an answer to this problem in his commentary.⁹ He says that a part is constructed conceptually as having the same nature as the whole. In other words, a part is exactly the same as the whole. Accordingly, any component part, having its own component parts in temporal sequence, is *sādhya*.

1.4 The act is not perceptible.

Incidentally it may be remarked that, according to Patañjali, a *kriyā* cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred.¹⁰ However, if the whole is conceived in each part, as I mentioned above, a *kriyā* would be perceptible, because its very last atomic moment is perceptible.¹¹

8 Helārāja on KSk.5 (VPI, page 9, lines 22-23): *adhyāsaś ca sarvatra pacāṭi pratyaya-syānuvrtter eva jñāyate/*

9 Helārāja on KSk.5 (VPI, page 9, line 25-page 10, line 2): *atrocitate/ na samudāya-buddhyaikatvena, nāpy avayavabuddhyā ayam cāyam ceti samuccayena pratyekam samudā-yasyāvayavesv āropo 'tra/ kim tarhi? pūrvāparībhūtāvayavatvenaiva/*

10 MBh on P. 1.3.1 (MBh I vol. 1, page 254, lines 15-17): *kriyā nāmeyam atyantāparidrṣtā 'śakyā pindībhūtā nidarśayitum/ yathā garbho nirlūthitah/ sāsāv anumānagamyā/*. See Cardona 1991, page 453-454 (Sec. 5.1.5.).

11 Helārāja holds that the very last atomic moment, which is no longer called *kriyā*, is perceptible. See Helārāja on KSk. 11 (VPI, page 12, lines 18-19): *bhāgaśah pratyakṣatvāc ca na śakyā pindībhūtā pāmsurāśivat kriyā nidarśayitum ity uktam/*. Cf. Cardona 1991, footnote 54.

Bhartrhari discusses this problem in the sixth kārīkā of the *Kriyāsa-muddeśa*.

*kramāt sadasatām teṣām ātmāno na samūhinām /
sadvastuviśayair yānti sambandham cakṣurādibhiḥ// (VP 3.8.k.6).*

The first part of a composite act, for instance, *adhiśrayana* 'putting [a pot] on a fire', has already finished when the second part, namely, *udakāsecana* 'pouring the water [into the pot]', begins. In other words, the first part is non-existent (*asat*) and the second part is existent (*sat*). That is to say, the composite act is both existent and non-existent. And the objects of sense-organs such as the eye are existent things. Accordingly, the composite act, which is both existent and non-existent, cannot be the object of sense-organs. In other words, the composite act is not perceptible. Nor can the component parts of the composite act be perceived. As I mentioned above, the component parts are perfectly equivalent to the composite act and each component part is both existent and non-existent. Therefore they are in the same situation as the composite act, and cannot be perceived either.

Next, *adhiśrayana*, which is a component part of the composite act of cooking, has its own component parts such as *iṣṭakāviniyojana* 'laying out of bricks', *hastaprasāraṇa* 'stretching out the hands', *sthātivinyāsa* 'putting down the pot' and so on. In this case, the whole is denoted by the verb "adhiśrayati".

Now, let us move to the next problem. Each component act is further divided into subdivisions. For example, *hastaprasāraṇa* is further divided. Bhartrhari speaks of this division in the ninth kārīkā of the *Kriyāsa-muddeśa*.

*yathā ca bhāgāḥ pacater udakāsecanādayaḥ /
udakāsecanādīnām jñeyā bhāgās tathāpare // (VP 3.8.k.9)*

The question which we must consider next concerns further subdivisions of the component act. For example, *hastaprasāraṇa* has further subdivisions. And these further subdivisions have their component parts. Finally, the composite act will be divided into atomic moments. Can such minute moments have their own component parts in a temporal sequence? And can the minute moment, too, be *sādhyā*? And would it be perceptible?

Bhartrhari gives the following answer to this question:

*yaś cāpakarṣaparyantam anuprāptāḥ praṭīyate /
tatraikasmīn kriyāśabdaḥ kevale na prayujyate // (VP 3.8. k.10)*

That is, a minute moment which has no parts is not called *kriyā*. This means that what is denoted by a word, namely, a verbal act, involves a process.

Here it is important to say that Bhartrhari approaches the problem of *kriyā* from the viewpoint of a grammarian. He is concerned with what is denoted by the word, not with the actual world, because he is a *śabdapramānaka*.¹²

2. Patañjali's definition of *kriyā* as interpreted by Helārāja

2.0 Introduction

Let us now turn to Patañjali's definition of *kriyā*. Patañjali, too, gives a definition of *kriyā* in his *Mahābhāṣya*. It reads "*kāraṅānām pravṛtṭiviśeṣaḥ kriyā*"¹³

Since it is difficult to give a definitive interpretation of the definition, Helārāja presents six interpretations.

When interpreting this definition, we are confronted with two difficulties.

The first difficulty is how to understand the meaning of the word '*kāraṅānām*'. As is well known, Paṇini introduces in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* six *kāraṅas* 'act-participants': namely, *apādāna* 'starting point', *sampradāna* 'beneficiary', *karana* 'instrument', *adhikaraṅa* 'locus', *karman* 'object' and *kartr* 'agent'.¹⁴ The point here is to know what Patañjali means by this plural *kāraṅānām*.

12 Helārāja remarks frequently that *iha vyākaraṅe na vastvartho 'rthah, api tu śabdārtho 'rthah*. For instance, VPI, page 5, lines 6-7.

13 This definition appears twice in MBh. on P.1.3.1. (MBh I., vol. 1, page 258, line 11) and on P.5.3.42. (MBh I., vol. 2, page 410, lines 13-14). This definition is argued originally in a context with reference to *as*, *bhū* and *vid*, which express mere existence in the *Mahābhāṣya* and Helārāja's commentary on KS. See Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 1, lines 7-14): "*astibhavatividyafīnām dhātutvam vaktavyam*" (MBh I., vol. 1, page 255, line 2) *iti coditam/ tathā hi yathā kim karoti? pacati, iti pacādīnām karotīnā sāmānādhikaranyāt kriyāviśeṣavācakatvādhyavasāyah, na tathā bhavatyādīnām/ na hi bhavati kim karoti? bhavati, ityādīti na te kriyāvacaṅāḥ syuh/ kim ca paṅspandasvabhāvo loka kriyā prasiddhā/ astibhavatividyafīnām ca na paṅspandasvabhāvo 'rtha iti sakaladhātuvyāpakam kriyālakṣaṅam bhāṣye praṅitam "kāraṅānām pravṛtṭiviśeṣaḥ kriyā" iti/*. See 6th view below.

14 The general rules for these act-participants are P.1.4.24. *dhruvam apāye 'pādānam/*, P.1.4.32. *karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam/*, P.1.4.42. *sādhakatamam karanam/*, P.1.4.54. *ādhāro 'dhikaraṅam/*, P.1.4.49. *kartr ipśitatamam karma/* and P.1.4.54. *svatantraḥ kartā/*.

The second difficulty is how to understand the compound *pravṛttiviśeṣa*. In this respect, Helārāja presents two alternatives, as follows:¹⁵

1) *sarveśāṃ kārakānām ekah pravṛttiviśeṣah*

2) *pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛttih*

In the case of the former alternative, the point is how to interpret the compound *pravṛttiviśeṣa*. In the case of the latter, the word *viśeṣa* is explained as *bhinnā* 'split or different'. The question here is what the word *pratikārakam* means.¹⁶ Helārāja presents six kinds of interpretation based on these two alternatives. Let us examine them one by one.

2.1 The First View.¹⁷

The first view is based on the second alternative. In this view, the word "*kārakānām*" points to all the act-participants (*kāraka*).

Helārāja quotes Patañjali who says "A root is what denotes an act (*kriyāvacaṇo dhātuh*)".¹⁸ If so, a root should denote the different activities (*pravṛtti*) of all the act-participants, because an act is {*pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛttih*} in this view.¹⁹

Next, the question arises: If *Lakāra*, which is introduced after a root (*dhātu*), denotes a *sādhana* 'means of accomplishing' the act, which is denoted by the root, *Lakāra* will also denote all the act-participants. But Pāṇini limits the function of *Lakāra* to *kartr*, *karman* or *bhāva*.²⁰ Thus, it seems that Helārāja's first interpretation contradicts Pāṇini's prescription.

And this contradiction is due to a difference of approach. I take the word "*svikāra*" in Helārāja's commentary as a synonym of "*abhyupagama*" "hypothesis", according to the *Nyāyasūtra*.²¹ Now, in a sentence such as

15 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 1, lines 14-16): *tatra vicāryate sarveśāṃ vā kārakānām ekah pravṛttiviśeṣah, praktikārakam bhinnā vā pravṛttir iti/*

16 For a discussion of the compound *pratikārakam*, see Joshi, S.D. & Roodbergen, J.A.F. [1975], page 27, footnote 93.

17 VPI, page 1, line 16-page 2, line 4.

18 MBh on P.1.3.1. (MBh I., vol. 1, page 254, line 13).

19 Because we can put {*pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛttih*} in the place of the "*kriyā*" in Patañjali's expression {*kriyāvacaṇo dhātuh*}. Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 1, lines 18-19): *ittham ca kriyāvācī dhātur iti sakalakārakavyāpārābhidhāyī dhātuh prāptah/*

20 P.3.4.69. *laḥ karmani ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ/[P.3.4.68. kartari]*

21 a) VPŚ. page 402, lines 3-5: *.../ satyam etat/ kin tu 'devadattah kāsthah sthālyām odanam pacati' ityātau viśeṣena* pacater dhātoḥ sarvakārakavyāpārasvikāropalabdher akhilakāra-kavyāpārābhidhāyī dhātur ity upagamāt/ *VPI: ityādāv aviśeṣena.*

{*devadattah kāsthaiḥ sthālyām odanam pacati*}, we observe that many act-participants are involved in different activities. Therefore, we can hypothesize that different activities are denoted by a verb. However, the activities of an agent (*kartr*) and an object (*karman*) gain predominance (*prādhānya*) over those of other act-participants. Therefore, the function of *Lakāra* is to point to an agent and an object, as we can deduce by means of the logical method based on positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), and as Pāṇini teaches in the rule P.3.4.69.

2.2 The Second View.²²

The second view is also based on the second alternative {*pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛtīḥ*}. This view says that the definition “*kāraṅnām pravṛtīviśeṣaḥ kriyā*” is concerned with the nature of the act (*kriyā*) and not with the meaning of the root (*dhātu*).²³ Here the activities of the *apādāna* and the *sampradāna* are also *kriyā*. But the root does not denote them.²⁴ This view differs from the first view in that it limits the number of act-participants whose activities are denoted by the root to four, namely, *kartr*, *karman*, *adhikarāna*, and *karāna*, all of which may be considered to have *svātantrya*. But, in that case, in order to express their independence, *karāna* and *adhikarāna* have to be transformed into a *kartr*.²⁵

2.3 The Third View.²⁶

Unlike the previous two, the third view is based on the first alternative {*sarveṣām kāraṅnām ekaḥ pravṛtīviśeṣaḥ*}. The compound *pravṛtīviśeṣa* is

b) NS 1.1.31. (page 266): *apaṅkṣitābhyupagamāt tadviśeṣapaṅkṣanam abhyupagamasiddhāntah*/. See NKs.v. “*abhyupagama*”, 2. *svīkārah/ astu dravyam śabda iti*/

22 VPI, page 2, lines 4-13: *anye manyante.../.../...dhātunābhīdhānāt/*

23 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 8-10): *ataś ca kāraṅnām pravṛtīviśeṣaḥ kriyeti kriyāsvārūpamātram kathitam, na tu dhātuvācyatvam/*

24 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 4-5): *...sampradānādivyāpāre dhātor na vṛtīḥ/ karānādivyāpāra eva tu vṛtīḥ/*

25 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 11-13): *kācid eva tu dhātunābhīdhīyate karmagatā kartrgatā vā pacyate pacatīti/ ata eva kartrkarmanor evotpadyate lakārah tadvyāpārasyaiva dhātunābhīdhānāt/*

26 VPI, page 2, lines 13-15: *anye tu viśeṣapade.../.../...kriyeti vyācakṣate/*

taken as a genitive tatpuruṣa, that is {*pravṛtīnām viśeṣaḥ*}²⁷ and “*viśeṣa*” means ‘distinguishing feature’.

In this view, *kriyā* is regarded as a result (*phala*) brought about by the activities of all the act-participants. For example, the activities of all the act-participants in the act of ‘cooking’ bring about a single specific result, namely, ‘softening of rice (*viklitti*)’.

2.4 The Fourth View.²⁸

The fourth view is based on the second alternative, {*pratikāraṅgam bhinnā pravṛtīḥ*}. In this view, the predominant act-participant in the form of *kartr* is intended by the word ‘*kāraḥ*’. And the plural ending in ‘*kāraṅgam*’ does not point to the plurality of the act-participants, but only to that of the *kartr*.²⁹ However, we observe that *Lakāra* can also denote a *karman*. In such cases, the activity of the *karman* is also *kriyā*.

Here an objection is raised. The plural number of *kāraṅgam* could be explained with reference to *karman* only. Because activity is that of which the *karman* constitutes a purpose (*artha*) and the *karman* could also be the predominant *kāraḥ*. Why should the *kartr* be the only predominant *kāraḥ*?³⁰

To this objection, the fourth view answers as follows. The *kriyā* of all roots has a *kartr*, but it does not always have a *karman*. In other words, the *kartr* pervades all roots. That is the reason why this view considers that the *kartr* is the predominant *kāraḥ*.³¹ Here this view quotes a *Mahābhāṣya* passage as a means of proof which says “*anyathā śuśkaudane kāraṅgaṇi pravartante/anyathā māmsaudane*”.³² This view interprets this passage as follows. Many act-participants act impetuously towards rice with meat, and slowly towards dried rice. And acting impetuously or slowly is possible only

27 The *ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti* in *pravṛtīnām* denotes *janyajanakabhāva*.

28 VPI, page 2, line 15-page 3, line 18: *apare punaḥ kāraṅgam atra pradhānam.../.../...iḍdam darśanam/*

29 *Kāraḥ* other than the main agent (*pradhānakartr*) also function as agents (*gunakartr*) of their own minor acts (*gunakriyā*).

30 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 18-19).

31 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 19-20): *naitad asti, karmaṇo 'sarvaviśayatvāt/ kartā punaḥ sarvatra sthita iti vyāpakatvāt sa evātra pradhānaṁ kāraṅgam vivakṣitam/*

32 VPI, page 2, line 21. But the original text reads *anyathā ca kāraṅgaṇi śuśkaudane pravartante, anyathā ca māmsaudane* (MBh I, vol. 1, page 258, lines 11-12). This passage is also quoted by the fifth view below.

for a *kartr* that is animate (*cetana*). Therefore *kāraka* in the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* stands only for *kartr*.

Now, two questions arise. First, if *kāraka* in this definition stands only for an animate *kartr*, then an inanimate *kartr* will not be included and the activities of an inanimate *kartr* will not be called *kriyā*. But in the sentence {*khatvā kampate* ‘a bed is shaking’}, the activity of the bed, which is an inanimate *kartr*, should also be called *kriyā*.³³ Second, in the sentence {*pāninā māmsaudanam bhuñkte* ‘he is eating rice mixed with meat with his hand’}, a hand, which is *karana* and not *kartr*, can act impetuously or slowly towards rice with meat.³⁴ How can you say that the *Bhāṣyakāra* intends only *kartr*?

It is somewhat difficult to understand the answer to this question. This view says that *pravṛtṭiviśeṣa* is accidentally distinguished (*upalakṣita*) by *saṃrambha* and *mandatā* in the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya*, and general activities other than those distinguished by *saṃrambha* and *mandatā* of *kartr* are not excluded by *saṃrambha* and *mandatā*. And we have to probably interpret the word *kartr* in the answer as that which is in the form of *kartr* in actual expression without reference to whether it is animate or not and whether it is the agent of the main act (*pradhānakartr*) or that of a subordinate act (*gunakartr*). This fourth view analyses the compound *pravṛtṭi-viśeṣa* as *pravṛtṭir eva viśeṣaḥ* ‘speciality in the form of activity’.³⁵ In this view, the argument concerning *karman* is rather obscure. This view says that the fact that Patañjali states *kārakānām* and not *kartrānām*, shows that the word *kāraka* in this definition intimates (*sūcita*) *karman* also.³⁶ The most likely explanation is that the activities of *kartr* are predominant over those of *karman*.

Now the following question arises. The *Mahābhāṣya* says “*atha kaḥ paceḥ pradhāno ’rthah/ yā ’sau tandulānām viklittih*”.³⁷ In short, this statement means that the main meaning of the root *pac* is softening (*viklitti*)

33 Ambākartrī (VPŚ, page 404, lines 18-19): *atra kecid vadanti - cetanasyaiva sasamrambhā mandā vā pravṛtṭih sambhavati ity acetanaḥ kartā na grhītaḥ syāt iti tatpravṛtṭih kriyeti noktam syād khatvā kampate ityādau/*

34 Ambākartrī (VPŚ, page 405, lines 1-2): *kiñ ca pāninā māmsaudanam bhuñkte ityādithale māmsaudanau pānyādirūpānām karanādinām api saṃrambhavattvāt tat katham kartaivātra nirdista iti /*

35 VPŚ (page 405, line 8) reads *pravṛtṭer eva viśeṣaḥ* for *pravṛtṭir eva viśeṣaḥ* in VPI. This reading intends to exclude activities of *kāraḥ* other than *kartr*.

36 VPI, page 3, line 10.

37 VPI, page 3, line 12. But original text reads “*iha paceḥ kaḥ pradhānārthah*”/ See MBh on P.3.1.26. (MBh I., vol. 2, page 32, lines 24-25).

of rice grains. And this softening of rice grains is an activity of *karman* and not that of *kartr*. And the activity of *kartr* is *vikledana* 'making [rice grain] soft'. Does this *Bhāṣya* passage conflict with the fourth view?

This view answers as follows. In this passage Patañjali investigates the problem from an objective (*vastvartha*) point of view and not from a *śabda* point of view. From an objective point of view, the main meaning of the root *pac* is *viklitti*. But from the *śabda* point of view, *vikledana* is the main meaning of the root *pac*.

As regards the case that *Lakāra* is introduced in the sense of *karman* after the root, some think that only *viklitti*, which is the activity of *karman*, is the meaning of the root *pac*, and others think *viklitti* to which *vikledana* is subordinated is the meaning of *pac*.

2.5 The Fifth View³⁸

The fifth view is based on the first alternative {*sarveṣāṃ kārakānām ekah pravṛttiviśeṣah*}, and rests on the authority of the *Mahābhāṣya*.³⁹ There are some variant readings, and I adopt the reading "*pravṛttimātram agrhūta-viśeṣam sakalakārakānuyāyi*".⁴⁰

This view establishes a single *pravṛttiviśeṣa* as a characteristic common to all the *kāraḥ*. They all produce a single result. It is true that all the *kāraḥ* have their own activities.⁴¹ But these activities produce one result. Therefore, so far as the result is concerned, there is no difference between them.

In this view, the compound "*pravṛttiviśeṣa*" is a *karmadhāraya*, as is shown by the paraphrase {*pravṛttiś cāyam viśeṣaś ca*}.⁴² And the meaning of the whole expression is "[*kriyā* is] a special function [which is called *jananā* 'producing',] common to all the *kāraḥ*".

38 I may divide this view and the next view at VPI, page 4, line 4, *pravṛttir ity.../* for convenience' sake. See the next view.

39 MBh on P.1.4.23. (MBh I, vol. 1, page 326, line 15): *...sāmānyabhūtā kriyā vartate.../*. For a discussion of this passage, see Joshi, S.D. & Roodbergen, J.A.F. 1975, page 44.

40 VPS, page 403, lines 5-6: *pravṛttimātram agrhūta-viśeṣam* sakalakārakānuyāyi** kriyeti manyante/* *VPS reads *pravṛttimātragrhūta-viśeṣam* for VPI *pravṛttimātram agrhūta-viśeṣam*. **VPI reads *sakalakārakānuyāyinī* for VPS *sakalakārakānuyāyi*.

41 Namely, *avāntaravyāpāra* of each *kāraḥ*.

42 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 3, line 2).

2.6 The Sixth View

There is a difference of viewpoint between the preceding five views and this sixth view. The former five are concerned with the relation between *kāraka* and *kriyā* with respect to one *kriyā*. On the other hand, the sixth view is concerned with the difference between two *kriyās*.

This sixth view, which seems to be adopted by Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa,⁴³ is also based on the first alternative, that is {*sarvesām kārakānām ekah pravṛttiviśeṣah*}. In this view, the compound *pravṛttiviśeṣa* means ‘difference from another activity’. And this difference is of two kinds. The one is *sajātīya* ‘of same kind’ and the other is *viśātīya* ‘of a different kind’. In order to illustrate the former (*sajātīya*), this view quotes the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* which is also quoted by the fourth view above, namely, “*anyathā kārakāni śuṣkaudane pravartante anyathā māmsaudane.*”⁴⁴ This quotation means that act-participants act impetuously towards rice with meat, and do so indifferently towards dried rice. The purpose of this is to show that, for example, the act of eating (*bhujikriyā*) rice with meat is different from the act of eating dried rice.⁴⁵ This is the difference from an activity ‘of the same kind’.

Next, we will take up the difference from a different kind of activity. It is clear that the act of cooking is different from the act of reciting (*pathikriyā*). There is no need for further explanation.

Here, it may be worth pointing out that Helārāja does not draw a sharp line between the fifth view and the sixth view, although he does so elsewhere. And this sixth view is not contradictory to the fifth view above. In this connection, we may say that this view provides additional information to or constitutes a more elaborate interpretation of, the fifth view.⁴⁶

43 Pradīpa on P.1.3.1. (MBh II., vol. 2, page 123, col. 2, lines 10-11, 25-26): *pravṛttiviśeṣa iti/sarvā pravṛtṭiḥ pravṛtṭyantarād bhidyate ity asty eva sarvasyāḥ kriyātvam/.../yady evam iti/atrāpi pravṛtṭyantarāpekṣasāsty eva pravṛttiviśeṣarūpatvam ity arthah/*
Uddyota on P.1.3.1. (MBh II, vol. 2, page 123, col. 2, lines 17-19): *nanu pravṛttiviśeṣasya kriyāve pravartata ity atra kriyātvānāpattir ata āha – sarveti/pacyādyapekṣayā sāpi viśeṣa eveti bhāvah/*

44 VPI, page 4, line 8.

45 *bhujikriyā* means *kriyā* which is expressed by the verbal root *bhuj* ‘to eat’.

46 It seems that the meaning of *as*, *bhū* or *vid* is called *kriyā* on the basis of this sixth view. See Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 6, line 1-page 7, line 10). But these arguments are not clear for me at present.

3. Conclusion

It is not easy to decide which view is adopted by Helārāja himself. And from Bhartrhari's and Helārāja's standpoint of *sarvapārsada* we need not decide which one is their own. But when we remember Bhartrhari's definition which we referred to in the first half of this paper, it seems that the fifth view that '*kriyā*' is defined as a special function (*pravṛttiviśeṣa*) found in all the act-participants, is adoptable. The sixth view, in which '*kriyā*' is defined as that which is differentiated from other activities, and which is not clearly separated from the fifth view by Helārāja, cannot be excluded.

It is to be regretted that Helārāja's work *Kriyāviveka*, in which he dealt with *kriyā* in detail, is not available.⁴⁷

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A. Primary Sources and Abbreviations.

- Ambākartrī: Raghunātha Śarma's commentary. See VP.
 KS: Bhartrhari's *Kriyāsamuddeśa*. See VP.
 VSM: *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhānta-mañjūṣā* by Nāgeśa Bhatta. Edited by K.P. Sukla, Varanasi, 1977: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya.
 MBh I.: *The Vyākaraṇa = Mahābhāṣya*. Edited by F. Kielhorn, Third edition revised and furnished with additional readings, references, and select critical notes by K.V. Abhyankar. 3 volumes, Poona, 1962-1972: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
 II.: *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya*. Edited with Kaiyata's *Pradīpa* and Nāgeśa's *Uddyota* by Bhargavasastri Joshi, Sivadatta D. Kudala, and Raghunathasastri. 6 parts, Nirnaya Sagar Press. Reprinted, 1982-91, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan.
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 NK: *Nyāyakośa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy* by Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar, Poona, 1978: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
 NS: *Nyāyadarśana*. Edited by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta, 1936-44. Reprinted, 1985, New Delhi: Munshiram.
 Pradīpa: Kaiyata's *Pradīpa*. See MBh II.
 Uddyota: Nāgeśa's *Uddyota*. See MBh II.

47 See Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 7, line 20).

- VP: Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*.
 VPI: Edited with Helārāja's commentary by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Kānda III, part ii. Poona, 1973: Deccan College.
 VPŚ: Edited with Helārāja's commentary and Raghunātha Śarma's Ambākartrī by Raghunātha Śarma. Part III, vol. II (Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamalā 91) Varanasi, 1979: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya.
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B. Others

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