THE PURITAN PATTERN
IN ISLAMIC REVIVAL MOVEMENTS

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1. INTRODUCTION

Present-day developments in Muslim regions call for a reappraisal of existing methods and techniques of research. Most scholars of contemporary Islam grew up in the aftermath of a period of lethargy in Muslim societies and they were inclined, in their study of Islam, to employ methods stressing its immobility or at least its permanent features. In order to offer an adequate interpretation of what may be called the dynamics of Islam, a reassessment of approaches in Islamic studies has to be made and this applies in particular to the study of current Islamic revitalization.

Attention is now being directed less to interpreting Islamic data in the light of their implications for the West than to studying them in the context of what is happening in Islamic societies themselves. As a consequence a great number of studies dealing with regional developments and the situations of particular countries are appearing. Equally, the different forms and functions of Islamic elements and the different political uses made of them are receiving attention. Both historical continuity and change have come into focus in this way.

Given this abundance of studies dealing with the particular cases and developments in which Islam plays a role, the question arises whether anything can be said on a more general level with respect to the Muslim world as a whole. Here data arrived at by sociological and historical research, and parallel developments in the Islamic culture area and culture areas where other religions and ideologies are dominant need to be taken into account.

2. REVITALIZATION OF ISLAM AND ISLAMIC REVIVAL MOVEMENTS

One way to study the current revitalization of Islam in its general aspects, taking into account its own dynamism, is to delineate different kinds of movements which have manifested themselves in the last two centuries and distinguish them according to their basic intentions and the way in which they have articulated Islam in their own words. In this way at least three kinds of movements can be broadly distinguished: movements of *islāh* (reform) directly appealing to the Qur'ān and Sunna; movements of *tajdīd* (modernization) blending universal values not specific to Islam's historical development (e. g. socialism, liberalism) with values derived from Scripture; and movements of *tasawwuf* (mysticism) stressing the inner path of the soul towards God, mostly within the framework of a brotherhood *(tarīqa)*. Movements which do not appeal directly to Islam, like marxist socialism and secular nationalism, are here disregarded.

Of the three types of movement mentioned, those of *islāh* or reform are now preponderant, although the modernization movements had considerable force during the period of Western hegemony. In fact, the modernization movements tend to stress values common to Islam and the rest of mankind, including the West, whereas the reform movements tend to take a stand over against the West. These latter movements, considered here together as Islamic movements of revival of religion *(ihyā al-dīn)*, are the substance of what follows. It is these movements which have played an important political role in fomenting Muslim solidarity, in encouraging the struggle for independence, and lately in urging greater islamization of society, stricter application of the Shari^{C}a, and the establishment of Islamic states. It should be kept in mind that the aforementioned movements have arisen in a world where the majority of Muslims, *ahl al-sunna wa 'l-jamā^{C}a*, adhere to the norms of what may be called traditional Islam, the "orthodoxy" represented on an intellectual level by the ^{C}ulamā who uphold the ideals of the Shari^{C}a. On a popular level, however, this traditional orthodoxy or traditionalism has often been mixed with beliefs and practices which the ^{C}ulamā scorn as "superstitions", and to which the revival movements have always been strongly opposed.

All revival movements have recourse to Scripture, bypassing to a great extent the scholastic development of Muslim religious thought after the fixation of the text of the Qur'ān, the canonization of the great collections of traditions, and the fundamental handbooks of the founders of the four great legal schools. Among these revival movements, however, a distinction has to be made according to whether greater stress is placed on thought and education, or on action. This is not an absolute difference, since thought and action are always combined, but a matter of emphasis.

a)

Among those revival movements in which thought is stressed are the reform movements of Muhammad ᶜAbduh (1849–1905) and Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) which developed at the beginning of the period of foreign rule. These provide a more or less complete and coherent rational construct of reality and the predicament and task of man in the light of Qur'anic revelation. The reform movements opened the door to *ijtihad* (immediate study of Scripture) and desired the purification of Islam from all those elements which could not legitimately be deduced from Scripture. They paid much attention to a renewal of Islamic education and the development of society in accordance with what in their view were the basic principles of Islam. The concept of Islam as developed by the reformists is perhaps to be seen as a realization in the conditions of modern times of the classical orthodoxy of the *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jamaᶜa*.

b)

An example of those revival movements where much stress has been put on action is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded by Hasan al Banna (1903–1949) and which developed at the end of the period of foreign rule in Egypt. Here a more or less direct implementation of the commands of the Shariᶜa is aimed at, often through the immediate application of Qur'anic prescriptions. Education and the study of Scripture are pursued with a view to the further islamization of society and the establishment of an Islamic state in the near or distant future. This type of revival movement naturally becomes involved in political activities and may well generate pressure groups and revolutionary actions.

The fact must be stressed that revival movements of both types, stressing either thought or action, have occurred throughout the history of Islam and as such represent no new phenomenon. From the very beginning there have been movements which sought inspiration from Qur'an and Sunna as the only sources of religion and were wary of interpretations and systematizations which increased the remoteness of the sources and tended to close the door to fresh interpretation. Movements of *islah* often combined an intellectual with a practical bent, thought with action. An outstanding example is the movement of the reformer Ibn Taimiya (1263–1328) which later gave rise to the Wahhabi movement in Arabia in the 18/19th century and again in the 20th century. In connection with the revival movements which stress thought one may think of the impact of al-Ghazzali (1058–1111), although here mysticism plays a role, and the idea of the rise of one great "reviver of religion" each century. Examples in earlier times of revival movements stressing action include the Kharijites since the early period of Islam, and the Almohads and Almoravids in Morocco and Spain (11th – 13th centuries), other movements inspired by the Mahdi ideal, and popular movements often inspired

by ^Culamā calling for implementation of the Shari^Ca, for instance against non-Muslim minorities.

The present time furnishes the following examples of revival movements stressing either thought or action. Those that stress thought include the reform movements of ^CAbduh and Ahmad Khan which have resulted in a number of organizations. One can think of the Muhammadiya in Indonesia; the Salafiya movement of Muhammad Rashid Ridā (1865–1935) in Egypt and similar "Sunniya" movements in Morocco and other Arab countries nowadays; the Nurculuk and Suleymanli movements in Turkey; the movement around Shari' ati (1933–1977) in Pahlevi Iran; a number of Muslim associations in Western or Eastern block countries insofar as they are not strictly traditional.

Those which place the accent on action include the Wahhābi movement out of which the state of Saudi Arabia emerged; the political activists inspired by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāni (1838–1897); the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and other Arab countries; the Jama'at-i Islami and similar activist groups in Pakistan; Khomeinism in Iran.

3. COMMON FEATURES OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL MOVEMENTS

Several features are common to the different revival movements; they fall into the following groups:

a)
There is an explicit call to go back to the Qur'ān and Sunna as a source of truth offering guidance for man's personal and social life. Interpretation of the Qur'ān can employ *ijtihād*. By implication the results of later scholastic scholarship in the sciences of religion are put into abeyance and a critical attitude to what happened to Islam in the course of history is adopted. All religious legitimation is clearly restricted to Scripture alone, "innovations" *(bid^Ca)* being implicitly criticized either as survivals from the old local tradition or as borrowings from outside. Consequently war is waged on forms of popular religion and mysticism, and a critical stand is adopted toward the penetration of values from Western culture and religion to the extent that they are out of harmony with the sources of Islamic religion. In thought and action only what can be deduced directly or indirectly from the Qur'ān is valid.

b)

This critical stand towards views and behavior can be observed in the personal life style of individuals where dressing (veil) and hairstyle indicate the new Islamic allegiance and where a number of actions are examined as to whether they are in conformity with Islam or not. More important, the new orientation makes clear social claims: individual and group have a great sense of responsibility toward society at large. This implies first of all bidding farewell to concentration on the hereafter and instead concerning oneself with this world though not without reference to the other world. It also implies an interest in society as it really is and, more important still, views society as open to reform and management by man. The traditional authorities are criticized and a more egalitarian mutual encouragement and stimulus and also mutual control develop. In order to bring about a new social order, an appeal is often made for the Shari^{c}a to be applied according to literal details or to principles contained in the Qur'ān. Just as Qur'ān and Sunna are used as means of religious legitimation, so the Shari^{c}a is appealed to as a source of religious guidelines for the social order.

c)

The Islamic revival movements consist of new generations or even groups distinct from the older traditional adherents of the *ahl al-sunna wa 'l-jamā^{c}a* and also different from the modernists. This implies an emancipation of groups until now concealed which can articulate themselves, develop their own leadership and gain access to power or develop new power structures. These new groups are held together, however, not by formal organizational patterns but by what may perhaps be called a new Islamic ethos, features of which include a departure from the old with criticism of the current state of religion and society, an active involvement in shaping the future, willingness to work and a remarkable discipline of both individual and group in striving for their goals, sometimes by extremely militant means.

d)

The revival movements are distinguished by their awareness that they are fulfilling a divinely ordered task under supreme guidance from on high. Although their activities may be of a practical, social and political nature, the religious motivation behind them, and behind work in general, is strong. The consultation of Scripture accompanies them, as does the awareness of eschatological realities; the aim is to bring about the social order prefigured in the Qur'ān. The religious longing for the new order may lead to a fierce rejection of the existing one, or to revolutionary action.

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e)

The element of protest in Islamic revival movements is not only directed against outside influences or the existing social order. In fact these movements imply an inner revolt within religion in the name of a newly discovered transcendence. They distinguish themselves from other groups in Islam not only by their ideas on law and theology but still more by new forms of action with continuous reference to Scripture and by their willingness to engage in debate with those traditionalists, mystics, syncretists, modernists and secularists who draw less rigorous conclusions from their study of Scripture and Law.

Behind the Islamic revival movements there also lies a vindication of the integrity of Islam over against foreign domination and an urge to purify Islam as it exists from the accretions and corruptions which account for the present state of belief and practice. The pristine faith and practice of true Islam are explicitly sought after.

4.   THE PURITAN PATTERN

This review has established some striking surface features which most Islamic revival movements share, and our understanding of these common features will be deepened with the recognition that they constitute a real, coherent pattern based on a particular ethos. This pattern is much more than the sum of individual features. It is a configuration of behavior in the widest sense of the word, it has its own presuppositions and logic, and it has marked religious aspects. We propose to call this a *puritan* pattern, since the ethos behind it shows great concern for a radical purification of self and society and for the establishment of the right sort of personal conduct and the right social order, which is achieved by means of an extreme criticism of fundamental beliefs, views and practices. The puritan pattern can be discerned in the way of life of the English Puritans – the best-known example – but is not identical with it. On the contrary, it is of a universal nature and can occur in different religions and ideologies.

In Islam the puritan pattern comprises the following elements:

4.1. IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS (THOUGHT)

a)   Direct recourse by the faithful to *Scripture* as a unique authoritative source of guidance (scripturalism);

b)   *Purification* of current religious tradition and purification of self and society with a strong sense of evil, pollution and sin, through selfcontrol and criticism according to criteria derived from Scripture;

c)   Stress on the Islamic *ethos* as a way of life, including a sense of duty. Life is seen as a calling and mission to follow the commands of God with a strongly communal concern. There is the desire to realize true Islam and this may lead to the wish to implement the *Law* (Shari^{c}a) in Muslim society, with a legalistic bent;

d)   Claims of *exclusiveness* are developed as to the truth and efficiency of one's own form of Islam with its particular kind of transcendentalization;

e)   There is a latent or explicit *eschatological* dimension in the idea of the Islamic society and state as a religious ideal attainable within history.

4.2. ACTIVE ASPECTS (ACTION)

a)   Stress on the *community* as a self-contained and privileged but relatively closed entity;

b)   A professed *egalitarianism* among the members of the community, with a strong leadership and great social control;

c)   Efficient use of *organizational tools* in organizations, parties, schools, groups in the neighbourhood or at work, in order to enlarge social and political power to arrive at a further islamization of society;

d)   Great concern about *social action* which always has both a religious and a political side.

In a sociological perspective, the puritan pattern corresponds to Max Weber's view of the Puritans but without the Christian contents. It brings about a rationalization of conduct in this world under the stimulus of some-

thing beyond it. It implies a rationalization of life which is stripped of structures which in view of the desired goal are irrational, be they ritual, esthetic, cosmological or social. Those moving within the puritan pattern are purists, in the sense of their possessing an ascetic attitude within the everyday world, and purifiers of action in the sense of purging it of anything unconductive to the goal which has been set. What the Protestant Ethic was for the Puritans, may be called more generally the *Puritan Ethos* within any puritan pattern. If the Puritans' rationalization of meaning was unique to them, their rationalization of action corresponds to that of the Muslim revivalists.

The puritan *pattern* may be called an ideal type. It does not occur in its pure form anywhere, even among the Puritans, but it furthers understanding of a number of historical and social realities not only in Islam but elsewhere too. Equally, the puritan *ethos* is an ideal type of a particular cultural orientation often with strongly religious aspects which stress transcendence. James Peacock, in his description of what he calls the "reformist configuration", observes that the reformists in Islam have a kind of "Protestant Ethos" and concludes his study to which we owe much, by linking Reformism to Puritanism (Peacock 1978, 199, 204, 205). We would like to start where Peacock finishes. The puritan pattern supposes reform in thought and action and it distinguishes itself from reform in the broader sense of the word through its striving after reform in very specific ways and with a characteristic tendency toward purification. The puritan pattern, before anything else, implies a particular life style. In Islam, for instance, there have been Muslims with a recognizable traditionalist "purist" life style since the beginning. The reform movements have allowed a more activist variety of purist life style to be developed but there is no fundamental conflict between this and the traditionalist purist life styles. The puritan ethos is an extreme form (ideal type) of this purist life style.

The puritan pattern has many aspects: social, psychological, ideological, political. In history the puritan pattern tends to take shape through disaffection with regard to the established order, a particular recourse to the fundamental values of that order, the further development of a life style according to these fundamentals, and possibly also a reversal of the established order in a "puritan revolt" which seeks to realize the puritan pattern fully. The contents of a puritan pattern vary with the religious and ideological tradition in which it occurs.

5. THE INTEREST OF THE PURITAN PATTERN FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The puritan pattern is a recognizable structure in a number of societies and groups in the history and contemporary scene of Islam, such as the Islamic revival movements, and it is possible to study the various ways in which this pattern has been given substance in Islam. It is distinctive of societies where great emphasis is put on keeping God's commands, preserving one's own purity in a world fraught with ambivalence and avoiding sins and faults. It manifests itself in the life of a society by the rise of movements and organizations which strive actively towards implementing the presciptions of religious Law (Sha-ri^{c}a) in order to further an Islamic society and state. It develops its distinctive ideologies of which general access to the Qur'an and purification of life and society are prominent features. It is true that similar traits can be found in other, non specifically puritanical Muslim societies — like the mystical brother-hoods and the Shi^{c}a — but here they are associated with charismatic persona-lities possessing a spiritual authority which falls outside the puritan pattern and is lacking in puritan societies.

The puritan pattern is always combined with a particular kind of Islamic *ethos* which varies according to the context but seems to be the result of what we would like to call a puritan *impulse*. This impulse in Islam has a particularly marked religious quality and is highly critical, intent on eliminating anything that finds no legitimation in Scripture. In its earliest stage it can have a destruc-tive effect on existing religious, cultural and social structures. But later it tends to evolve a less revolutionary attitude and may even stabilize and start to protect itself against attacks from outside or its own attenuation by developing a closed intellectual system. There are particular "puritan" ways of reading the Qur'an and of selecting and interpreting particular elements of the total sign and symbol system of Islam.

It can be rewarding to study the contexts in which variations of the puri-tan pattern have arisen, with different cultural orientations at different times and places. Such a study not only concerns the contents of these variations but also the specific context in which the puritan impulse, ethos and pattern have made themselves felt. Are there perhaps particular conditions of stress which favor the awakening of puritan Islam? Under which conditions may a puritan ethos not only receive the adherence of a particular group but be impo-sed on a whole society? What consequences does its occurrence have, and in which ways does the puritan impulse loose its initial revolutionary force and lead to a more continuous ethos and life style?

The concept of a puritan pattern seems, however, to be valid for more than Islam and Islamic studies alone. We have already mentioned the English Puritans and in fact there were and still are typically "puritan" revival move-

ments both in Christianity and in Judaism, with important social and political implications. It seems indeed that at the present time a puritan impulse can be found in most religions and ideologies under stress wanting to preserve or go back to their particular truth, faced as they are by processes of syncretism, secularization, loss of purity and change in general.

Paradoxically, Max Weber himself seems to have regarded Islam as the polar opposite of Puritanism (Turner 1974, 12). Over against this, our contention is precisely that the puritan pattern — as a pattern — has a much wider validity and application also at the present time than seems to have been thought until now. The puritan pattern — just like patterns of protest, millenarism and acculturation — may throw new light on present-day movements of revitalization of societies. Often an appeal is made to elements of a given religious-cultural tradition and such elements are then restructured according to puritan patterns.

The puritan pattern, however, seems to have a particularly strong potential in Muslim societies where an appeal to a return to Scripture is always possible. In Europe, perhaps more than America, the puritan impulse is associated with iconoclasm, cultural barbarism, destruction of the earth in the name of heaven. Within the Muslim world occurrence of the puritan impulse may also cause fright and horror, as is shown by Muslim reactions to Wahhabi behavior in the Shi^{c}ite shrines in Irak and the graveyards of Mecca and Medina. But Islam itself has been a reform movement from its very beginning, exhibiting unmistakably puritan features when it faced Meccan paganism, Judaism and Christianity in Muhammad's lifetime. And throughout Islamic history the puritan reform impulse over against idolatry and violations of God's unity and universality has remained alive, leading to a number of movements which show the characteristic puritan pattern. Reform according to a puritan pattern seems to be part of Islam itself.

In the turbulence through which the present-day Muslim world is going, a clear appeal is being made to the Islamic ethos, and there is a manifest search for true Islam and its application in daily life and in new social and political structures. It is not so much that politics are behind the Islamic revival movements but that these movements carry within them a puritan pattern which has a powerful social and political appeal. This becomes particularly evident in present-day Muslim thought about the Islamic state. The concept of the Islamic state, linking the critical concept of *islāh* (reform) with a puritan impulse and the longing for a just society, has striking puritanical features. Where an Islamic state has been declared, a puritan way of life imposes itself, as if the puritan pattern could here be realized.

6.   THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE PURITAN PATTERN

Although current ideals of the Islamic state, as distinct from society, are often discussed, they are seldom the subject of scholarly studies. Research has been carried out into the organization of Muslim societies before and during the penetration of the West. We also have studies of the legal prescriptions of religious Law with regard to Islamic society and a number of studies about the use of Islam by governments and political and other interested parties and movements. The Islamic state, however, has been studied more as an ideal from classical times than in its political, religious and other aspects since the colonial period. One complicating factor is that the Muslim concept of the "state" itself, in Muslim tradition and in the living reality of Muslim societies, differs considerably from the usual Western concepts and models of the state.

From the very inception of Islam and its first realization in Medina when the community had political power, and subsequently throughout the history of Islam there have been underlying trends seeking to establish the ideal Islamic social order as it had been worked out by the ^culamā on the basis of directives contained in the Qur'ān and ancient Sunna. Some rules indeed can be found in the Qur'ān and Muhammad had established a state of a unique kind which, however, could not remain the same after the prophet's death.

Apart from its political development, the concept of an autonomous *umma* (community) living according to God's will and commands can be traced back to the Meccan period, and it underlies later developments of thought on social order in Islam, often as an ideal over against current realities. It seems that the ideal of a truly Islamic society developed largely among groups opposed to the existing political leadership and realities. The idealized image of the early community, which included equality among the companions of the prophet, has strikingly puritan features. In the circles of the political leaders themselves, the idea of an Islamic society has largely served to legitimize the existing order or shore up policies dictated by practical necessities. This dual use of the concept of an Islamic order, both for protest and for legitimation, has always existed. In the course of history the ideal of an Islamic order of society has been sustained intellectually by the ^culamā who also developed the Shari^ca in this direction. It has also been alive in mystical brotherhoods, as manifested in the community of faithful brethren obeying a religious leader and following a common life along the religious path. Interestingly enough, among the Muslim masses adhering to tradition and strongly imbued with a communal sense the idea that society should be based on Qur'ān and Sunna has always remained alive. This idea too has puritan features and any appeal to it has always found a ready response, as expressed at times in demonstrations.

In practice this ideal Islamic society has not taken shape; attempts to realize it have not been able to endure the test of time. This has been felt as a basic fault and frustration and it has led to very different reactions: in the first place *islāh* (reform) movements, but also sectarian activities, mahdist movements, alternative solutions in the mystical brotherhoods, and ever repeated criticism by the ^culamā of the existing state of affairs. The general idea has been that a society living according to the Shari^ca would be the just Islamic society. It seems that although the idea of an Islamic social *order* and *society* has always been alive, the problem of an Islamic *state* has only become urgent when sectarian leadership has managed to obtain political power. Within the orthodox Sunni community itself, the problem of the state has rather been the problem of the right leader, and this problem was in the medieval period part of the wider problem of a truly Islamic society.

It seems that the concept of an Islamic state (*dawla*) took a new form when a central authority developed in later times, and when the idea of the state became distinct from the idea of society or particular political leaders. A feature of the Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul empires for instance, is their legitimation as Islamic "states", although they still cannot be called states in a Western sense but rather empires under powerful rulers. There are several reasons for the development of new thought on an Islamic state as an ideal in modern times. It seems to have started at the time when the great empires just mentioned were suffering visible decline, and when the true Islamic state was projected as the right alternative to sad realities. It developed further during the period of resistance to Western domination over Muslim territories, when Western states imposed a political order of a clearly non-Islamic nature. The most forceful incentive, however, to reformulate the old ideal of an Islamic order and society in terms of a more modern Islamic state must have come from the explicit reintroduction by the reformers and their pupils of the notion of *islāh* (reform) through a return to Qur'an and Sunna. This *islāh* was to lead to a purification of all Muslim societies through the application of true Islam. Interestingly enough, when the nationalist movements developed and largely succeeded in establishing states on Western models, the idea of establishing an "Islamic" state was hardly mentioned by the nationalist leaders and only had any influence among a minority of the people. Our contention is that the problem of an Islamic state presented itself explicitly in a new, unprecedented form only after politically independent national states with a Muslim majority had been established.

It was only after independence that the idea of an Islamic society and an Islamic state on a puritan pattern could start to function as a critical norm by which to judge the existing state of affairs, the responsibility for which was borne no longer by foreigners but by Muslims. These ideas increased in ideological and political importance when opposition groups could express their protest, resistance, and even revolutionary tendencies in opposition

to the nationalist leadership more or less freely in terms of Islam and in particular the idea of an Islamic — as opposed to secular — state. This polemical context explains in part why the idea of the Islamic state has remained so vague but also so attractive to Muslims. In part also the vagueness of this concept is due to the fact that it is essentially a "religious" notion and reflects a longing with religious aspects. The notion of an Islamic state implies a reference to an absolute Reality which is formulated in religious Law and which the Muslim community is somehow expected to realize on earth. A shortcoming in most studies of the Islamic state which have been carried out until now is that no real attention has been paid to the religious and even eschatological dimension of an Islamic state. Its puritan features have not seriously been considered either.

The notion of the "Islamic state" may be said to function as a religious sign referring to an ideal state of affairs: communal life according to God's will, realization on earth of a divinely prescribed and guaranteed social order, realization of justice according to divine Law. It should be understood that the notion of the Islamic state is always associated with other notions of a religious nature, mostly contained in the Qur'ân. What has been said in recent times about the Islamic state by particular Muslim religious and political leaders should be taken notice of but never identified with actual realities, even if it is inadvertently claimed that the Islamic state has been realized. The desire to realize this state, however, is typically part of the puritan pattern which we described. The nostalgia, longing and active striving for an alternative social order, a state of affairs different from that given here and now, are the essence of the intention in all discussions about the Islamic state as an ideal and as a reality. The Islamic state for Muslims is essentially less a political than a religious phenomenon with eschatological dimensions; nevertheless it leads to political action.

Most of the current Muslim writings on the Islamic state can be seen as a stage in the long line of calls for *islâh* of Islam. From Ibn Taimiya to the Wahhâbis and then to the Muslim Brotherhood and other societies with militant attitudes toward the existing social order is not too big a step. And from *islâh* thinking to *islâh* action is not a big step either.

Our contention is that in the present circumstances it is precisely the combination of the religious idea of the Islamic state with the trend of *islâh* thinking and acting within Islam which gives the ideal of the Islamic state its strikingly puritanical shape. Even in Shi^cite Iran where charismatic leadership of a different kind prevails, puritan features can be observed. This combination also endows so many expressions and symptoms of the current Islamic revival movements, insofar as they have religious aspects, with such a characteristically puritanical flavor.

This revival, of course, is much more than a political reaction to the West. It has its own dynamics and possesses specific religious aspects. It should

be noted, moreover, that although the puritan pattern is the most important form which revival is taking it is not the only form. There are also pietistic and mystical forms, besides interesting blendings with other cultures and cultural elements, both "modern" and "traditional". But among the signs of present-day Islamic revival beyond a political level, the variety of puritanical forms and the "puritan pattern" predominate, certainly in the specific organized Islamic revival movements. One reason may be that it offers the most efficient rationalization of action within the Islamic framework. Besides the individual, it is the socio-political order which needs to be purified and this purification is seen as a necessary stage on the way to the perfect society where true Law will be applied. This calls for further study by both islamicists and sociologists.

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