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Editors' Introduction

## DIALOGUE, ARGUMENT, CONTROVERSY

The present special issue of *Studies in Communication Sciences* originates from the conference "Argumentation in Dialogic Interaction", which was held in Lugano on July 1-4 2002. The conference, hosted by the Faculty of Communication Sciences of the University of Lugano, was jointly organized by three scholarly associations: the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), the International Association for Dialogue Analysis (IADA), and the International Association for the Study of Controversies (IASC).

The conference's chief aim was to explore the relationships between the objects of study of these three associations, as well as the differences and complementarities in the approaches adopted by the different research traditions these associations represent. We can say that the conference was a remarkable success, not only regarding the number of attendants and the quantity and quality of paper presented, but also for the quality of the scientific dialogues (arguments/ controversies) it originated. The present volume includes a selection of seventeen papers from the communications presented at the conference, which appear here in a revised form.

We believe that the resulting selection<sup>1</sup> offers a vivid and representative picture of the conference's main themes and of the issues that emerge

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<sup>1</sup> Certainly it was a tough choice – and a number of quality papers presented at the conference that were more loosely related to its main theme have already been deservedly published elsewhere. In fact, some of the articles have appeared as full papers in the regular issues of *Studies in Communication Sciences* (van Eemeren 2003 and Cole 2004) as well as in the pages of the *IADA Forum* (Silver 2004).

at the crossroads of the analysis of dialogic interaction, the theory of argumentation and the interdisciplinary study of controversy in science, in the humanities and in social life.

There is, in fact, a striking complementarity in the goals and in the approaches of the three associations involved.

Modern argumentation theory – for which ISSA has acted as an international scientific forum since its first Amsterdam conference in 1986 – has been deeply characterized, since its inception in the late 1950s, by the need of finding soundness criteria for an argumentation to be called *reasonable*. The perceived insufficiency of logical validity as defined in modern (formal) logic as the sole criterion of soundness for the arguments that are used in most arenas of human activity led Toulmin (1958) to propose a “procedural” alternative to the way arguments are laid out in formal logic and to put forth the idea of the *field dependence* of the criteria defining reasonable argumentation. For similar reasons, Perelman & Obrechts-Tyteca (1958) situated the measure of the soundness of argumentation in the effect on the *target audience*. Both proposals can be considered as *alternative* to the logical analysis of arguments, and both make standards of reasonableness “relative” to an *audience* or to a *field*. Other argumentation theorists tried to answer to the need for more comprehensive criteria of reasonableness by developing the idea of “argumentation as a procedure” in a different direction, which one would call complementary, rather than alternative to logic, by developing a *formal dialectics* (Hamblin 1970; Barth & Krabbe 1982), conceived as a system of rules defining a “sound” *procedure for resolving a dispute by means of a dialogue*. However, in order to serve as a tool for analysing, evaluating and perhaps also *designing* actual arguments a dialectical model needs to move beyond limited regimented forms of interaction defined by the simplest formal dialectical systems in order to embrace – to some extent – the complexities of real world natural language interaction<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Hamblin (1970: 256) distinguishes between a *descriptive* and a *formal* study of dialectic: “The study of dialectical systems can be pursued *descriptively* or *formally*. In the first case, we should look at the rules and conventions that operate in actual discussions: parliamentary debates, juridical examination and cross-examination, stylized communication systems and other kinds of identifiable special context, beside the world of linguistic interchange at large. A formal approach on the other hand consists in the setting up of simple systems of precise but not necessarily realistic rules, and the plotting of the properties of the dialogues that might be played out in accordance with them. Neither approach is of any importance on its own; for descriptions of actual case must aim to

The Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992, 2004) aims precisely at developing dialectics as a theory of ordinary argumentative discourse without abandoning its normative orientation. In this respect Pragma-Dialectics develops a complex research strategy aimed at bridging the gap between the descriptive analysis of arguments occurring in ordinary texts and conversation and the development of an ideal dialectical model for the resolution of a difference of opinion (the ideal model of *critical discussion*).

A central role in this strategy is played by conceptual tools derived from philosophical and linguistic pragmatics – hence the prefix *pragma(tic)* – and, in particular, by speech act theory (cf. Austin 1962 and Searle 1969) and conversational inference (Grice 1989). Pragma-Dialectical scholars aim at taking into account the full range of speech acts relevant to the resolution of a dispute in a dialogue and evaluating all discourse moves that have this kind of argumentative relevance with respect to the ideal model of critical discussion. Much of the empirical research done in Pragma-Dialectics puts insights from pragmatics, discourse and conversation analysis to work (cf. van Rees 1992) with the aim of properly *reconstructing* (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs 1993) conversational arguments as attempts to resolve a difference of opinion by means of a critical discussion, so that they can be evaluated with respect to the ideal model.

In the last decades, a “pragmatic turn” was taken also by other scholars that were involved in formal dialectic approaches. Developing ideas from Hamblin, Walton & Krabbe (1995) define the dynamics of *commitment* as dependent on the *type of dialogue* in which the participants are engaged. The idea of types of dialogue as particular frameworks of Gricean cooperation between the participants, each characterized by specific goals and rules is further expanded in Walton (1998), which outlines a more “informal” method for evaluating the relevance of an argument as relative to the goals of the dialogue in which it is put forth. These proposals are partly influenced by and partly alternative to the Pragma-Dialectical approach.

bring out formalizable features, and formal systems must aim to throw light on actual describable phenomena.” In fact, as we say below, the successive development of argumentation theory seems to suggest that in order to bridge the gap between a normative and a descriptive study of dialectic, it is necessary to develop normative models which are richer than the “simple systems of rules” evoked by Hamblin and take into account the pragmatic dimension of human communication.

The tendency we just described also manifests itself in the *Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation* (van Eemeren, Blair, Willard & Snoeck Henkemans 2002a) and the two accompanying volumes (van Eemeren, Blair, Willard & Snoeck Henkemans 2003b and van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2005). Considering these recent developments of argumentation studies, it is not difficult to envisage the terrain where scholars of argumentation theory meet researchers that approach the study of dialogue from a pragma-linguistic point of view.

Dialogue analysis, as practised by the growing community of scholars participating in the IADA meetings since the first *Dialogue Analysis* conference in Münster in 1986, has its roots in linguistics.

In this tradition Dialogue Analysis represents an extension of concepts and methods developed in linguistics to units, relations and strategies of communication beyond the sentence as well as a deep rethinking of these same methods and concepts in the light of a proper consideration of dialogue as the primary and natural context in which a functional study of language must be carried out. While the idea that dialogue makes up the proper object of study in the language sciences was held by authoritative figures such as Bakhtin and Benveniste, it did not significantly influence the development of linguistics during the XX<sup>th</sup> century until recent years. One of the guiding ideas of the dialogue analysis tradition is to fully work out the consequences of a dialogic starting point for the study of language as a whole. Unlike the primarily descriptive and exclusively empirical tradition of *conversation analysis*, dialogue analysis does neither eschew the formulation of broad hypotheses on the non directly observable aspects of dialogic interaction nor the development of theoretical models of linguistic communication and dialogue.

This common goal and orientation shared by dialogue analysts did not lead to anything like a common theory of dialogue shared by all or by most researchers, rather we have a flourishing of approaches and a lively debate. There are however certain assumptions, concerns and trends which are prominent among dialogue analysts that are worth mentioning in this context. Firstly, dialogue analysis takes a *pragmatic* orientation in the strongest sense: an adequate *theory of action* is seen as the basis for understanding the functioning of language (Hundsnurscher 1995). This leads dialogue analysts to absorb and integrate the contribution of classic speech act theory (Austin 1962; Searle 1969) into their models, but also to go beyond its fundamentally monological and sen-

tence based orientation by taking into account verbal actions that emerge only through a sequence of utterances or in a sequence of alternating contributions of the participants (such as *objection*, *denial*, *concession*, and *protestation*).

Some of these *relational* verbal actions are clearly argumentative in nature. In Stati (1990) *argumentative roles* are hypothesized as a further layer (*couche*) of the pragmatic meaning of an utterance beyond its illocutionary function. Argumentative roles are seen as *relational* concepts, which define the supporting (*Assent*, *Justification*, *Proof*, *Example*, *Analogy*) or polemical (*Disagreement*, *Objection*, *Criticism*) function of an utterance with respect of another *target* utterance in a discourse or dialogue (cf. Stati 2002).

Many dialogue analysts share a concern for the explanation of dialogue *coherence*, that is, for the principles or rules that account for the well-formedness and meaningfulness of naturally occurring dialogues. This preoccupation with *coherence* led, for instance, to the development of *dialogue grammars* conceived as formal systems of rules that govern the coherence of specific types of dialogic exchanges (cf. for instance Hundsnurscher 2001 on the *grammar of bargaining*) predicting the legitimate sequencing of speech acts within the interaction. This same concern, however, also led to more open ended characterizations of *dialogue games* as sets of shared goals and assumptions of the participants, seen as a specification of the Gricean cooperative principle (cf. Weigand, this volume, and Rocci, this volume).

It should be clear at this point in which respects the ongoing debate within dialogue analysis mirrors certain features of the development of formal and pragmatic dialectical models in argumentation theory. To these resemblances one has to add the fact that during the last decade many dialogue analysts have increasingly devoted their attention to argumentation and to types of dialogic interactions, such as *negotiation*, where argumentation plays an important role.

This growing interest is witnessed by the proceedings of the conferences sponsored by IADA: from the rich session on argumentation within *Dialogue Analysis VI*, held in Prague in 1996 (Čmejrková, Hoffmannová, Müllerová & Světlá 1998) to the conference on rhetoric and argumentation held in Lugano in 1997 (Rigotti & Cigada 1999) and the workshop on *Negotiation as a Dialogic Concept* held in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem in 1999 as part of the International Conference on Pragmatics and Negotiation (Weigand & Dascal 2001).

We can say that this trend culminated in the joint conference of 2002 in Lugano, where scholars from ISSA and IADA were able to compare their perspectives on *argumentation* and *dialogue* in a close interdisciplinary exchange.

This conference, as mentioned above, benefited of the contribution of a third, young, markedly interdisciplinary, community of scholars, whose interests lie at the very crossroads of argumentation and dialogue.

The challenge that prompted scholars in 1996 to create IASC was the realization that *controversies* in philosophy, religion, science and public life are not a peripheral disturbance nor an obstacle to progress. Controversies are, rather, the engine of intellectual progress. It is in controversies that the human powers of criticism are put into actions. It is by confronting actual – rather than imaginary – opponents that theories are tested against the strongest and most unexpected objections. It is in discussing with others that we form, sharpen, and assess our own ideas. The realization of the significance of controversies led members of IASC to study the full range of kinds of polemical exchanges both empirically and systematically.

Controversies have also a special theoretical significance both for argumentation theory and for dialogue analysis.

As pointed out in (Dascal 2003), from the point of view of dialogue analysis controversies exhibit a series of interesting properties that make them borderline objects. Learned controversies in science and philosophy consist of extended written dialogical exchanges where each move consists of an elaborated and lengthy text with a complex internal structure. Nevertheless in order to understand their dynamics we need to approach them with the same pragmatic tools that have been developed for the analysis of face to face conversations. In a sense, controversies oblige us to regard as dialogues a kind of texts which have been traditionally studied with the analytical tools typical of monological discourse. However, they are not purely dialogical as they always involve a public dimension. While ostensibly trying to convince their opponent, participants in a controversy always address a third party, some sort of concrete public. For this reason Dascal (2003) ranges controversies among quasi-dialogues, alongside courtroom interrogations and television interviews and debates.

From the point of view of argumentation theory controversies are of special interest due to the type of disagreement they involve. Simple differences of opinion are not enough to give rise to a controversy. Typically, controversies are complex and comprise a range of topics which are perceived to be related to a central divergence between two polarized points of view<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> One aspect of this complexity of controversies can be captured in terms of the prag-

Moreover controversies tend to involve not only the object level of the difference of opinion but also the meta-level of what counts as a good argument and what is the right method of adjudicating the difference of opinion.

This meta-level disagreement on the procedural aspects of the dispute resolution and the even deeper epistemological disagreements on what counts as evidence represents an interesting challenge for normative dialectical models based on the implicit shared commitment of the participants to a notion of *reasonableness*. It seems that, even in the presence of this meta-level disagreement, participants in the controversies do presuppose some sort of shared commitment to the reasonable resolution of the dispute, even though they often cast doubts on the sincerity and consistency of the interlocutor in upholding this commitment. A typology of polemical exchanges and polemical moves, such as the one proposed by Dascal (1998), highlights the different levels and extension of disagreement – hence, of assumptions of what counts as 'reasonable' in argumentation – that participants in different types of polemics act upon.

At another level, scholars who work on real episodes in science, philosophy or religion, emphasize that in real world controversies, despite the declared intentions and the commitment to reasonableness, the existentially primary objective of the discussants is simply to *win*. Controversies tend to be charged with serious existential (social, psychological, economic, etc.) implications for the lives of the contestants. From the point of view of argumentation theory, it seems possible to capture the interplay of these potentially conflicting aims with concepts such as *strategic manoeuvring* (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, this volume), which are aimed precisely at modelling the interaction of the dialectical commitments and the rhetorical aims of arguers.

These remarks on the research goals and the theoretical approaches which are prominent in the three associations already give an idea of the key theoretical issues that emerged during the conference and are addressed in the present collection of papers.

ma-dialectical treatment of differences of opinion by saying that controversies tend to be multiple mixed disputes, rather than single non-mixed ones: "If there is disagreement about a single proposition, the difference of opinion is single; if there is disagreement about more than one proposition the difference of opinion is multiple. If only one (positive or negative) standpoint is adopted with regard to a proposition, the difference of opinion is non-mixed; if both a positive and a negative standpoint are adopted with regard to the same proposition, the difference of opinion is mixed" (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 119-120).

It is not by chance, however, that the meeting of these three research communities took place at the Faculty of Communication Sciences in Lugano, where the teaching of verbal communication and argumentation is seen as a fundamental tool for the analysis of communication processes in different social, institutional, and organizational contexts, by means of different media and in different technological communication environments.

There are two features of the overall approach to communication adopted by the Lugano school in teaching and research which are particularly relevant in this context. Firstly, teaching and research in Lugano combine the analysis of the core dynamics of communication processes with the analysis of the broader contexts in which communication acquires social and economic significance (for instance, argumentation theory in the master's programs is taught in specific courses such as *argumentation in the media*, *argumentation in institutional contexts* and *argumentation in financial communication*). Secondly, a faculty aiming at educating communication professionals is interested not only in describing and understanding communication, but also in fostering good practice. If such a good practice is to be grounded in theory and research and not – as it is too often the case – based only on anecdotal evidence and *ad hoc* recipes, one has to take on the challenge of developing *normative models* of communication, applying them to different concrete situations and communication practices and confronting them with a variety of data.

We think that the papers collected in this volume also show that many researchers within the ISSA, IADA and IASC communities have taken this kind of challenge very seriously both at the level of theory development and at the level of the fine description and analysis of interaction in different contexts.

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The present volume is divided into five thematic sections. Roughly speaking, the first two sections include papers that are more general and theoretical in nature, addressing the methods for the analysis and evaluation of arguments, the principles of dialogic interaction and the nature of controversies, while the following three sections present a series of analyses of argumentation and controversies in different social contexts of interaction (from courtroom interaction to broadcast political debate) and in different speech genres and media, both spoken and written.

In fact, this division between *theory* and *analysis* is not clear cut. Theory is grounded in the analysis of actual interactions and provides

conceptual tools for it. The practice of analysis is imbued with theory and represents its test-bed. There is a continuum of shades between the effort of establishing general categories and generic conceptual tools for understanding dialogue, argumentation and controversies, and the effort of understanding specific instances of discourse situated within particular social practices and interaction settings.

### *1. Theoretical perspectives on argumentation in dialogic interaction*

The first section contains papers aimed at fleshing out an integrated *theoretical perspective on argumentation in dialogic interaction*. The papers included in this sections offer theoretical insights into the pragmatic, dialectical and rhetorical dimensions of argumentative dialogical interactions and provide conceptual tools for their analysis.

The first contribution, by **Frans H. van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser** (*Strategic manoeuvring*), concerns the notion of *strategic manoeuvring*, which we have already mentioned above with respect to the potentially conflicting aims and obligations arising in the context of controversies.

In an effort to overrule the ideological separation of dialectical and rhetorical approaches to argumentation, van Eemeren and Houtlosser present an integrated Pragma-Dialectical perspective for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse. They start from the ideal model of *critical discussion* as a theoretical device to define a procedure for testing standpoints critically in the light of commitments assumed in the empirical reality of argumentative discourse. The model provides an overview of what argumentative discourse would be like if it were optimally and solely aimed at methodically resolving a difference of opinion about the tenability of a standpoint. After having explained how strategic manoeuvring can be viewed as an attempt to reconcile dialectical obligations and rhetorical ambitions, van Eemeren und Houtlosser focus on the demarcation point between sound and derailed strategic manoeuvring and the conditions under which particular types of strategic manoeuvring must be considered an offence against the rules for critical discussion. Thus strategic manoeuvring provides a new dialectical and rhetorical framework to better understand the nature of *fallacies*, one in which both the fallaciousness and the deceptively apparent reasonableness of the move can be accounted for.

Within the same theoretical framework of Pragma-Dialectics, **Agnès van Rees** deals in her paper (*Dissociation: a dialogue technique*) with the

argumentative technique of *dissociation*, one of the two main categories of argument schemes described by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in the *New Rhetoric*. While the treatment of dissociation provided by these authors is firmly based on monologue, van Rees explores the *dialogue* contexts in which dissociation is used discussing its use in the various stages of a *critical discussion*, and the consequences of that use for the resolution of the conflict of opinion around which the discussion revolves. Conclusions are drawn with regard to the nature and the use of the technique of dissociation and to the dialectical and rhetorical effects of its use in the various contexts in which it occurs. The investigation is empirically grounded in a varied corpus of spoken and written discourse: newspaper and radio interviews, discussions, parliamentary debates, argumentative newspaper articles, and newspaper articles in which discussions are rendered or reported upon.

The contribution of **Douglas Walton** (*How to evaluate argumentation using schemes, diagrams, critical questions and dialogues*) can be seen as the presentation of a theoretically motivated toolkit for the identification, the analysis and the evaluation of argumentation. The key conceptual tools that Walton puts to work for these tasks are — as suggested also by the title of the paper: the *argument schemes*, the *diagramming* of arguments, the use of *critical questions* and *dialogue types*. This method of analysis and evaluation is illustrated through the case of the argument scheme of the *appeal to expert opinion*, along with its set of matching critical questions. Walton shows how arguments can be *diagrammed* to identify missing premises and to exhibit the role of the scheme in the argumentation. According to Walton, the asking of a *critical question* shifts the weight of presumption back to the arguer so that her argument is defeated unless the question is answered. Critical questions and their responses can give rise to dialogues, and different *dialogue types* impose different constraints on the critical questioning of argument schemes and on the type of admissible responses to criticism.

The two following papers, by **Eddo Rigotti** and **Andrea Rocci** respectively, are closely connected as they share the same semantic-pragmatic approach to discourse and dialogue based on Congruity Theory and present two contiguous instalments of a joint research project.

The aim of **Rigotti's** paper (*Congruity theory and argumentation*) is twofold. Firstly, it shows how Congruity Theory, as a theory providing the necessary conceptual instruments for simultaneously tackling the logical-semantic and pragmatic levels of discourse, can be used fruitfully

to analyse argumentative discourse. Rigotti introduces the notion of an abstract *connective predicate* in order to analyse intuitions of meaningfulness or nonsense at the pragmatic and discourse levels in terms of *semantic congruity*: that is as the respect of the presuppositional requirements the connective predicate imposes upon the utterances in the discourse. With respect to argumentative discourse Rigotti emphasizes that the logical requirements of the particular argument scheme employed are part of the presuppositions of the specific connective predicates used in argumentation. Secondly, Rigotti tries to develop a principled distinction between *dialogue* and *monologue*. Having dealt with the varied figurative uses of *dialogue* and *dialogic*, Rigotti establishes a double distinction between an interactive *dialogue* and a *monologue* (one-speaker discourse) and, within the latter, between *monological discourse* (one's discourse to someone else) and *soliloquy* (one's discourse to him/herself).

The two theoretical points made by Rigotti are brought together in Rocci's paper (*Connective predicates in monologic and dialogic argumentation*). Rocci distinguishes two types of "dialogical" argumentation: one in relation to *dialogue* and *monological* discourse, where the decision process operates at the interpersonal level, the other, occurring in *soliloquy*. Rocci argues that all persuasive processes do contain, in order to succeed, an element of *soliloquial argumentation*: because to persuade through argumentation means to induce somebody else to let him/herself be convinced by the argument. The extension of the semantic notion of reflexive predicate to connective predicates allows Rocci to interpret the individual decision making as a *sui generis* mental interaction between two argumentative roles: the *arguer* and the *decider* (i.e. the Aristotelian *kritès*). This establishes a strong, constitutive, link between arguing and deciding. The same notion of connective predicate shows its usefulness in addressing the issues of dialogue coherence and relevance. The approach to argumentative relevance in dialogue proposed by Rocci combines the *dialogue games* – seen as predicates corresponding to sets of goals and commitments shared by the participants – with the *connective predicates* corresponding to individual moves – which are similar to *argumentative roles* (Stati 1990 and 2002) – in order to capture the level of dialogical cooperation and account, at the same time, for the largely unpredictable character of the concomitant moves by the dialogue participants.

The contribution of J. Francisco Alvarez (*Bounded rationality in dialogic interaction*) addresses the question of the model of human rationality that is required to understand how dialogic interaction really works. According to

Alvarez, the majority of the models of dialogic interaction put forth within pragmatics are built upon a very special model of the human being: *the rational optimizing decision maker*. This is basically the case with Grice's *cooperative principle* and its four maxims, but it is even more so with those accounts which try to collapse the Gricean maxims into a single or a twofold principle (such as the Relevance Principle or the principles Q and R).

In his paper Alvarez argues that a more realistic picture of dialogic interaction could be gained from the adoption of other notions of rationality less abstract than the means-ends optimising model and closer to bounded rationality: *procedural rationality* and the related conception of *axiological cognitivist rationality* appear promising for understanding a series of problematic dialogue phenomena (such as intentional silence) and for fruitfully addressing the study of controversies in the history of science by defining the *set of values* that the participants try to satisfy, rather than focussing exclusively on the optimisation of a single variable. Several recent proposals are reviewed with a concern for the model of rationality underlying them and a word of caution is issued as regards the adoption in the study of dialogic interaction of models of rationality borrowed from economics – where they have shown their force but also their limits – as happens in the recent trend of *game theoretic* accounts of pragmatic inference.

While Alvarez's paper discussed the requirements of a theory of dialogue from a philosophical point of view, **Liana Pop**, in the last paper of the section (*Mémoire discursive et pertinence argumentative/ Discursive memory and argumentative relevance*), demonstrates the usefulness of theoretical notions such as *discursive memory* and *discursive spaces*, developed within discourse linguistics proper, to address certain ways of presenting arguments in planned and unplanned speeches. Pop's article deals with parenthetical discursive sequences, which are distinct from the main discourse track and whose main function is to interact with *discursive memory* and explicitly address the state of the background knowledge which is supposed shared by the interlocutor and/or is presupposed by the main track of the discourse. Pop shows that some of these operations have a purely informative relevance, while other operation have an argumentative force of their own, often appearing discretely as a sidetrack in discourses whose main function and relevance is not argumentative. A series of specific act types (*new information, reminder, topos, justification*) are singled out in the analysis of a series of textual excerpts in French and Rumanian, together with a number of their associated linguistic markers.

## 2. On controversy

The second section includes two papers that focus more closely on the notion of *controversy*.

Gerd Fritz's paper (*On answering accusations in controversies*) provides an analysis both of the speech act of *accusation* – which is common in everyday life as well as in formal controversies – and of the sophisticated practice of *answering* to accusations. The paper first describes some basic properties of accusations and some characteristic types of reactions to accusations (denying the alleged fact, making excuses, and giving justifications). Then it describes some fundamental functions of accusations in controversies. Using the basic patterns of accusations and reactions to accusations as an object of comparison, Fritz analyses some relevant exchanges from historical controversies (from the 16th to 18th century), including famous polemical interactions like the Hobbes-Bramhall controversy, but also less well-known debates from the fields of medicine and theology. Thus, the paper is both a contribution to the *theory* of controversy and to the pragmatic *history* of controversies.

Adelino Cattani, in the second contribution of the section ( "*Vir bene disputandi peritus*": *pro and against a "controversial paideia"*) provides a rather different take on the subject of controversy by looking at the opposite metaphors and educational values associated with the words *dialogue* and *polemic*. Cattani situates *dialogue* and *polemic* within a *typology of debates* by examining them in relation to a series of *metaphorical fields* – or conceptual metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), namely: *war*, *sporting*, *trade*, *exploration*, *building*. This metaphorical approach is integrated with other considerations concerning the initial situation, the main goal of the debate, the participants' aims, the degree of legitimisation of the interlocutor, the agreement and disagreement over rules and facts, the possible outcome of the debates, and, finally the argument schemes and fallacies typically connected with such a debate. Having reconstructed the opposite metaphorical poles of the edifying-dialogical debate and the fighting-polemical one, Cattani discusses the "controversial" issue of the educational value of a controversy-based pedagogy suggesting that it is possible and desirable to pursue a controversy-oriented approach, in order to restore rhetorical creativity and skill in debating on either side of any proposed argument. An approach – Cattani says – practised by Cicero and Quintilian, advocated by Erasmus, exemplified by Francis Bacon, inspired by Vico, and supported by Mill, Toulmin, Perelman, Habermas.

### 3. *Argumentation and controversy in courtroom dialogue*

The third section of the volume addresses the forms of dialogue that emerge in a specific, highly regulated and institutionalised setting of interaction: the courtroom.

**Barbara Emmel**, in her paper (*Some dialogic aspects of monologic argumentation in the courtroom*) explores the projected internalised “dialogical” elements of the summation phase of courtroom argumentation. Summation, while fully monologic in nature, has important dialogic implications for how well a jury will adhere to a given point of view during the deliberation phase. The most successful summations would seem to be those that invite the jury members to play an unspoken role (through their internalized responses) in the creation of a narrative that provides not only a credible *explanation* of events, but also and more importantly *emotional coherence*. According to Emmel, narratives that are emotio-explanatory in nature induce better jury adherence to their version of events, because they draw on the values, beliefs, and experiences of the jury and thus involve the jury more fully in their construction. Using data from different courtroom transcripts – including the well-known O.J. Simpson murder and civil trials – Emmel explores the linguistic and textual strategies used in summation – paying special attention to the “inclusive” use of the personal pronouns. Such strategies, aimed at creating an effect of inclusion in the whole courtroom experience for the jury, give a “dialogic” feel to monologic discourse and thus help to shape the truly dialogic discourse that will follow during deliberation.

The second paper of the section, by **Edda Weigand** (*Conflict resolution in court*), approaches courtroom argumentation as a “representative” *dialogic action game* arising from controversial claims to truth that need to be settled. In accordance with the declared epistemological choice of starting by examining the “object-of-study” in its complexity rather than by developing a full-fledged conceptual framework, Weigand offers a textual analysis of an authentic case of trial focussing on the relationship between expert reports and the verdict. Weigand examines in detail how expert reports, which are *constative* speech acts, become arguments for the final judgement and are connected with the *declarative* speech act of the verdict, which decides the issue to be dealt with juridically and thus changes reality.

The notion of *dialogic action game* provides the theoretical backdrop also for **Zohar Livnat**’s contribution to the analysis of courtroom inter-

action (*Argumentation in a complex action game: a court judgment as a dialogic suasive text*). Livnat's paper closely examines a court judgement in order to show its dialogic nature and to analyse it as a complex action game: court judgments emerge as dialogic texts created by the interaction between judges. Livnat argues that the dialogic nature of the text taken as a case study can be clearly illustrated by underscoring the many cases of *quotation* included in it. Within this analysis of quotations, the paper focuses in particular on one type of quotation that served the purpose of *refutation* and on the complex role played by quotations in the discourse structure of *concession*. In this structure, the speaker uses the quotation in a complex way: After quoting her interlocutor's opinion, she expresses agreement with one part of it and then expresses disagreement with another part. The consequence is a rejection of the other participant's stance, a rejection that may be explicit or implicit. According to Livnat, this type of structure has at the same time a *rational* function, a *rhetorical* function, and one or more *social* functions.

#### 4. *Argumentation and dialogue in narrative*

This section contains two papers which focus on represented dialogues in narratives and their argumentative analysis. The two papers, however, differ widely as regards the social setting of communicative interaction and the speech genre considered.

Tying in to the papers in the previous section, the contribution of Renata Galatolo and Marina Mizzau (*Quoting dialogues and the construction of narrative point of view in legal testimony: the role of prosody and gestures*) approaches the argumentative device of testimony in court with a strongly empirical orientation drawing from the resources of spoken discourse analysis to show how some aspects of quoting dialogues, i. e. prosody and gestures, can recall a larger scene from a specific point of view. From the point of view of argumentation theory we could say that Galatolo and Mizzau focus on the *rhetorical* dimension of testimony. Starting from the assumption that the quotation of dialogues in the form of direct reported speech is a creative act (a *creation of voices*), which nevertheless retains a *convention of authenticity*, they observe that, in the context of the trial, the use of direct reported speech for *objectifying* evaluations and opinions acquires a special importance because of the legal constraint which prevents lay witnesses from expressing personal opinions.

The second paper also deals with argumentation in narrative and represented dialogues, this time in the Biblical genre. Adina Abadi's paper (*Argumentation in Biblical Narrative*) opens with some considerations on what type of theory of argumentation is suitable for addressing argumentation in biblical genres: whereas a theory of formal dialectic is not considered capable of handling biblical arguments satisfactorily, the Pragma-Dialectical theory put forth by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) supplemented by its empirical and analytical developments in van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993) offers a better adapted tool to address biblical argumentation, and the argumentative aspects of biblical narratives in particular. Many of the arguments found in the biblical narratives are *action-directed* and Pragma-Dialectics offers an extension of Speech Act Theory, aiming to address the full range of communicative acts found in a discourse that are potentially relevant from an argumentative point of view, both in their *communicative* aspects and in their *interactional* aspects.

The story of Joseph and his Brothers (Genesis 37, 39-45) is chosen as an example of biblical narrative. The arguments in this narrative may be compared to argumentation in real life situations, since they are based not only on rationality, but also motivated by strong emotions, and frequently culminate in settlements of conflicts, affected by human needs, especially by the survival instinct. The analysis shows that all categories of speech acts appear in the text, and in each category various types of speech acts. Abadi also points out that in order to analyse indirectly expressed argumentation in biblical narrative one has to proceed backwards in the analysis: from the perlocutionary effects and consequences of the speech act to its illocution. This reverse analysis often reveals a divergence between the *inherent*, intended, perlocutionary effect and the attested *consecutive perlocutionary consequence*.

### 5. *Argumentation in mediated dialogue contexts*

The final section of the volume collects papers that deal with argumentation taking places within different *mediated contexts* of dialogue, where the *mediation* due to its technological constraints, but also, and most importantly, due to the social and interactional complications it brings about, affects the very nature of the dialogical interaction, setting these interactions quite apart from the prototypical face-to-face dialogues. Two mediated contexts from traditional and "new" media are examined. The

first consists in the genre of the broadcast political debates, which, as we noted above, behave quite similarly to controversies and courtroom interrogations, by addressing a third party (the audience) while to a certain extent keeping up the appearance of a persuasive dialogue, or critical discussion, between two parties. The second context of mediated interaction examined are bulletin board Internet forum exchanges, which are now established, together with e-mail and IRC, as one of the major *dialogical genres* of the Internet. While in Internet fora there is no clear-cut distinction between *participants* and *audience*, the “dialogues” taking place in such a setting have nevertheless a prominent *public* dimension, tightly connected with the notion of *community*, which deeply affects the interplay of “reputation” and “refutation” in argumentative exchanges.

Marcel Burger’s paper (*Argumentative and hierarchical dimensions of a broadcast debate sequence: a micro analysis*) – which employs the analytical tools of the *Geneva School* of dialogue analysis within a theoretical framework inspired by *social interactionism* – discusses the argumentative and hierarchical properties of a broadcast debate sequence in order to account for the participants’ strategies used to create a highly polemic atmosphere. The data examined consist of a French broadcast debate involving the well-known right wing politician Jean-Marie Le Pen, on the most sensitive topic of the opportuneness of debating with right wing organisations in the media – and therefore giving media exposure to morally condemnable (e.g. racist) ideologies. In dealing with argumentation, Burger’s paper relies on the recent developments of the Geneva discourse analytical model. According to Burger, this model allows the analyst to consider, at a global level, “debates” as a discursive genre organized by argumentative and /or polemic sentences and, at the same time, requires a micro-analysis of discursive strategies which combines a semantic theory of argumentation with a pragmatic account of argumentation and/or polemic based on conversation and dialogue analysis, and focusing, in particular, on the hierarchical organization of discourse. The paper pays attention to the local and global functioning of verbal markers of argumentation and/or polemic in the excerpt under analysis and to the hierarchical structure, which manifests how the dialogue is organized in order to promote hierarchically salient positive self-images of the current speaker and at the same time negative self-images of the other debater.

Světa Čmejrková contribution (*Argumentation and its acceptance in political debates*) addresses the analysis of polemical exchanges on political issues staged on TV. These exchanges are considered as controversies ac-

cording to the definition in Dascal (1998) and thus as occupying an intermediate position between *discussions* and *disputes*: controversies are neither *solved* as discussions nor *dissolved* as disputes: they are, at best, *resolved*. Čmejrková maintains that, viewed in this way, media debates can be considered as a powerful instrument in shaping public opinions, presenting a multiplicity of arguments and standpoints. The paper focuses on one prominent feature of media debates, which sets them apart from many other types of discussions and persuasive dialogues: while argumentation appears to be prominent in media debates, one of the goals of argumentation is lost in these interactions, namely the ultimate goal of persuading the opponent. Media dialogues lack the willingness of those entering a media debate to resolve their disputes, and particularly the willingness to be persuaded by the force of a better argument. In such a particular setting it becomes quite interesting to look at the functions of the expression of *agreement*. The article addresses, in particular, three functionally different forms of agreement, which are found in a corpus of political debates staged on Czech TV. The results of the analysis provide fresh insights for the study of the rhetorical, social and psychological dimensions of argumentative dialogue which are largely consistent with the analysis of *concession* presented in Livnat's paper and complement it in certain respects.

The final piece of the volume, **Stefano Tardini's** *Endoxa and communities: grounding enthymematic arguments*, applies two key concepts of the ancient rhetorical theory of argumentation (*endoxon* and *enthymeme*) to argumentation within Internet based "virtual" communities taking place over a bulletin board forum, and connects these concepts to the pragmatic and sociolinguistic key notion of *grounding* (cf. Clark 1996). According to Tardini, arguments taking place among the members of a community are deeply rooted in the *endoxa* of the community itself, i.e. in the set of values, rules, knowledge and beliefs that are assumed to be shared within its boundaries. Thus, in a community enthymematic arguments assume a very important role, since, according to Aristotle, the *endoxa* are the very core of the enthymemes. *Endoxa* may be considered as the relevant elements of the *common ground* of a community; they are activated and selected through the reference to specific *keywords*, which are of particular significance within the community. The paper analyses some examples of enthymematic arguments both from the Aristotelian *Rhetoric* and in a real interaction that took place within an online community in order to show the role of the community keywords and of the *endoxa* in enthymematic arguments.

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