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REPORT ON THE IADA 2004 COLLOQUIUM
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Confidence/Dévoilemnet de soi dans l'interaction. (Confiding/Self-Disclosing in interaction)

Organized by Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Véronique Traverso and the ICAR (Interactions, Corpus, Apprentissages, Représentations) Laboratory, at the École Normale Supérieure, Lettres et Sciences Humaines in Lyon, the colloquium had as an object a precisely delimited type of discursive activity: confiding/self-disclosing.

In the opening session, after the inaugural speeches of Edda Weigand, vice-president of the IADA, and Chr. Plantin, director of the ICAR Laboratory, Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni and Véronique Traverso outlined a general framework of the topic. They brought forward some of the main features of confiding / self-disclosing as a self-centered activity. Despite the appearances of a pretty restricted interactional form, self-disclosure is present not only in the conversation between intimates, but also in the media (reality shows, for example), and is even obligatory in some institutional settings or situations (courtroom, church, medical consultations, job interviews). It characterizes both authentic interactions and secondary elaborations as literature, music, cinema, comics, and even painting. A main point of interest for the researcher is to find out how this basically unique activity is modulated according to the communicative context and the semiotic system that shapes it.

The 82 papers presented in three parallel sessions and the discussions proved how challenging the topic of the colloquium was considered by the participants.

The first session grouped together papers dealing mainly with the problems of confiding/self-disclosing in literature. Some papers were more theory oriented, providing arguments in favor of the idea that literary confidence is a valuable source of information for the analyst (I. Daussaint-Doueux). It gives him / her the possibility of being present in the situation – as an outsider -, without breaking the rule of the diadic role structure of this activity. At the same time, even if the reader seems to have a similar position, (s)he is more than a recipient, becoming an accomplice or even a (co-)confidant, due to the specific features of the text construction in literature (F. Cicourel).

Most of the papers configured a true rhetoric of fictional confiding/self-disclosing (theatre and prose), on the basis of a thorough analysis of particular texts from different cultural spaces and epochs. French writers occupied a special place, but Latin as well as Portuguese, Russian, English, German and Israeli authors provided relevant data for a better understanding of the confiding activity. Some papers described its specific transactional patterns (A. Rabatel) and strategies (E. Weizman, O. Tschesnokova, L. Kastler, L. Ionescu-Ruxandoiu, A. Orlandini, A. Abadi), others were focused on the complex functions of the confiding activity in literature (Em. Morin, S. Roesch, V. Fayolle, I. Mateiu). The analysis of some literary texts pointed out the difficulties of confiding, its illusionary character in certain situations (M.D. Vivero-Garcia) and even the denial of its pos-

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sibility and legitimacy (L. Gaudin). Sometimes confidence could even represent involuntary testimony (E. M. Rollinat-Levasseur).

A number of papers (I. Seara, A. Radulescu, L. Angard) were devoted to the problems of confiding in literary or writers' personal letters.

The papers in the other two sessions were based on different types of corpora, mainly oral: informal conversations, as well as interactions in institutional settings, face-to-face, as well as TV and radio mediated encounters, but also written: literature, newspapers. The detailed examination of the data brought forward the specific way in which each component of the communicative situation influences the structure of the confiding activity, both at its macro- and micro- structural levels.

The diversity of corpora made possible a relevant description of a large number of types of direct self-disclosures: within the family (A. Ciliberti), among friends (A. Zuczkowski and I. Riccioni, R. Lorenzetti), colleagues (L. Granato) or co-workers (D. Pellicer), between employers and employees (T. Heinemann) or professionals and clients (M. Laforest and D. Vincent), in court (R. Galatolo) and even in academic settings (L. Anderson) or in the service encounters (L. Filliettaz, I. Dumas and L. Vosghanian). Some particular cases, when more than two persons participate in the confiding (V. Guarniero, S. Bouzounita), as well as the cases of self-disclosing among children (A. Morgenstern, R. Delamotte-Legrand) were also taken into account.

Many papers dealt with the particular aspects of self-disclosing in some kinds of media programs: TV and radio interviews (M. Johanson and A. Fetzer, N. Pepin, L. Florea and I. Mateiu, M. Burger) or political dialogues (Fr. Erlich), TV debates (Fr. Cabasino) or reality shows (J. Durand).

The contrastive perspective was also illustrated by the analysis of the relationship between self-disclosure and small talk in German and French (A. Kotsch-Smith).

All these case studies provide enough information for meaningful comparisons, enabling generalizations about the distinctive features and the specific means of the confiding / self-disclosing, as well as an adequate positioning of this form of communicative activity in relation to some other closely connected activities, like gossip or personal experience narratives. There were also some attempts at drawing the attention of the participants towards this more theoretical topic area (M. Poix-Tétu, P. Anderson, V. Demjankov, A. Koselak and C. Masseron, L. Pop, E. Weigand).

In the first and third session a number of papers approached the problems of confiding / self-disclosing in other arts than literature: music (opera – H. Constantin de Chanay, and songs – M. Groccia), painting (O. Le Guern) and film (A. Strambi and C. Mrowa-Hopkins).

One can say that the colloquium in Lyon was a true success, not only for the high quality of the papers and of the discussions, but also for the fact that it represented a convincing demonstration of the complexity of every interactional form. I suppose that its results will stimulate in depth study of a great number of still overlooked types of communicative activity.

Last, but not least, without any doubt, the success of the colloquium was also due to its excellent organization. The social activities, that included a cocktail at the City Hall of Lyon and a cocktail offered by the director of the École Normale Supérieure, as well as a visit of the Old Town, were also a good opportunity for the participants to better know each other and to consolidate the unity of the IADA.

MARC S. SILVER*

SITUATING SPEECH AND DIALOGUE IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SETTING

1. The Problem

This study aims to identify a theory of dialogue underpinning orthodox clinical psychoanalysis and to pose a number of hypotheses about the relationship between dialogue, as it can be defined in this context, and epistemological suppositions of the analytic field.[1] The importance of establishing and specifying such a relationship is twofold. For one, it offers an interpretative key for understanding major differences between this form of psychoanalysis and almost all other forms of psychotherapeutic treatment. Secondly, given the exceptional nature of the communicative exchange between analyst and analysand[2], it offers the occasion to evaluate the compatibility of such an exchange with linguistic theories of dialogue and eventually to adumbrate a terrain for better accommodating aspects of the psychoanalytic subject and analytic dialogue within linguistics.

2. Psychoanalysis as the "talking cure"

One of the complexities of a project of this sort derives from the difficulties in identifying a homogeneous analytic procedure from which a notion of dialogue can be extrapolated. Given the hundreds of different schools of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, not to mention the semantic slipping and sliding of what is actually meant when one speaks of this practice across doctrinary and cultural lines, the hope to sketch an adequate representation of little and large clinical differences in the field would take us well beyond the scope of such a short piece. For this reason, we have chosen to look exclusively at those clinical approaches today which trace their roots directly back to Sigmund Freud and his theories. One of the fundamental points of Freudian theory - which distinguishes it, for example, from psychiatric (or psychiatrically-inspired) practice - is that in psychoanalysis you work with what the analysand says and make no attempt to relate what is said to some objective description - to what 'is'.[3] (Miller 1996:17) It was this insistence on the centrality of language, for example, which spawned Jacques Lacan's theoretical 'return to Freud',[4] and which, as a result, place most present-day French Freudians and Lacanians as perhaps the best representatives of the orthodox model. In Lacan's words: "Whether it sees itself as an instrument of healing, of training, or of exploration in depth, psychoanalysis has only a single medium: the patient's speech. [...] And all speech calls for a reply." (Lacan 1977: 40)

Inversely, although we are prepared to affirm that those forms of therapy which differ from orthodox analytic theory necessarily manifest this difference within the analytic setting as well (i.e. in the analytic dialogue), no specific, detailed reading will be offered of these other schools. Limitations of time and space force us to operate an extreme simplification, placing all of these other forms of psychotherapy together in a 'default' category.[5]

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Perhaps the one structural element common to all forms of analysis/therapy is the concept of the 'cure'. Although there is little agreement on what constitutes a 'cure' or how 'it' may be attained, and even whether the term 'cure' is acceptable given its heavily normalizing overtones,[6] there is no getting around the fact that the analytic/therapeutic project is founded on a promise to effectuate some alteration in the subject's subjective posture. This point is crucial both from an epistemological and an ethical point of view because it radically distinguishes the *raison d'être* of analytic practice from exclusively theoretical fields of knowledge such as philosophy, which limit themselves to hypothesizing conditions of truth or postulating interpretative constructions. As we shall see, this investment in practical effects shapes the structure of analytic dialogue.[7]

It is precisely this double condition of the centrality of speech *in* analysis and the centrality of the 'cure' *for* analysis that makes an investigation of the form and structure of analytic dialogue so important. In this sense, the term coined by Breuer with Freud in 1895 to indicate what was to become the field of psychoanalysis – the "talking cure"[8] – is significant. It allows us to see the extent to which, therapeutically speaking, the psychoanalytic project revolves around an effect of speech. For psychoanalysis, one just doesn't speak to one's analyst, something happens through this speech which alters the subject's psychic condition.

3. The Analytic Setting as Dialogical Frame

But if we accept the idea that psychoanalysis is centered in/on language and the effect speech has on the speaking subject, we certainly cannot help asking ourselves why dialogue in analysis seems so unbalanced, so one-sided. The analyst rarely intervenes directly in the analysand's narrative and when s/he does, there often isn't a simple or direct correspondence between the two on the level of the utterance. How is it possible that a communicative form based almost exclusively on what appears to be the verbal absence of one of the two parties, is said to bear such important fruit? In what way can we speak about what happens in analysis as a form of dialogue?

In order to comprehend the type of dialogue which takes place within the analytic session, we first have to focus our attention on what situates or frames the session – what we will call the analytic 'setting'. The function and importance of the setting for the French Freudian and Lacanian schools is emblematic. For them, for example, the start of any analysis is preconditioned on the demand for analysis. The individual seeking help has to formalize a request, and hence show that her/his position is characterized by desire. And yet, this necessary condition isn't in itself sufficient to begin an analysis; the final decision as to accepting or rejecting a demand for analysis rests in the analyst's hands.

These contextual coordinates are significant because, from the outset, they create a division between what is perceivable phenomenologically in the dialogue proper and what sustains the dialogue structurally. On the phenomenological level, what appears as the analysand addressing the analyst – what we usually find at the level of an initial utterance – on the structural level is inverted; the position of just such a request always already falls within the structural confines laid out by the analyst. Having the full faculty or power to accept or refuse the subject seeking analysis, retroactively affects the position the analysand will have assumed once s/he is accepted in analysis.

Scheme 1

Scheme #1

Phenomenologically: Analysand → Analyst

Structurally: Analyst → Analysand

Structurally

Analysand   Analyst

Phenomenologically

There are, of course, other phenomena – not on the order of speech – that act to frame the analytic session. The question of the price fixed per session and the number of times per week one is expected to go are also established by the analyst and can only be altered by him or negotiated with his consent. Structural constraints such as these, although agreed to by the analysand before beginning analysis, operate actively throughout an analysis - during each session - contributing to what we might term the restrictive economy of speaking-time as well as the situation of unequal communicative exchange. Psychoanalytic theory draws a strict link between the structure of speech, the time of the subject and the intervention of the listener. For Lacan, the temporality of speech, what he calls "reversible time", is a twofold temporality between anticipation and retroaction. It is

> [...] a time shared between the anticipation, while you are speaking, of the moment of conclusion (the moment at which you can grasp what you meant), and retroaction, for when you arrive at the anticipated end point, all previous speech takes on new meaning, that is to say, new meaning emerges retroactively. It is a time split between 'I don't know yet' and 'Oh yes, I already knew that.' The time of the subject is the time linked in the first definition with the problem of the temporality of signification, engendered by the signifier. The time of the session is the time of the scansion of speech, and the analyst, as listener, determines what the subject said. (Soler 1996: 64)

One of the analyst's problems is getting the analysand to speak. And yet, not just any speech is useful in/for analysis. It is not from a position of complacency, for example, that the analysand will change her/his subject position. The analyst, therefore, is not necessarily adverse to provoking frustration or indignation, and will often intervene to accentuate a sense of lack or decompletion on the part of the analysand. (Soler 1996: 65) An example of this is the use made by Lacanian analysts of the variable length session – the termination of the session at any moment by the analyst. It is a way of tightening the analyst's non-verbal control on what the analysand says. The analysand, cognizant of the analyst's power to end her/his discourse at any moment, on the one hand attempts to preempt and falstall the interruption while on the other hand s/he retroactively enshrouds the moment of termination in interpretation.

It is clear from these preliminary structural mechanisms essential to the psychoanalytic setting that the listener – and the listener's reaction – is in a position of control; in a certain sense, s/he is the 'master' of meaning. The analytic frame is set in such a way that the analysand, by opting to participate in the analytic 'game', is forced to follow a path which will work against her/his attempt to reaffirm her/his symptomology.

On a general level, there is nowhere where this is more true than in the idea the analysand has and the attribution s/he gives to the analyst. The idea is that the analyst knows something s/he doesn't about her/his own (symptom / problem / suffering) and that the analyst will therefore help her/him 'get better'. This puts the analyst in the position of 'supposed-knowledge-subject' (*sujet-supposé-savoir*) (Lacan 1977b: 23) and it is in reaction to just such an attribution or supposition of knowledge that s/he will formulate her/his response. Rather than speaking from the role s/he has been attributed, the analyst denies and confounds just such a role. The function of the analyst's utterance is not to speak or indicate the truth, and certainly not to second the analysand's construction; it is rather to allow the analysand's own discourse to return to her/him in such a way that s/he listens to it differently than was previously the case and initiates a new construction based on a different way of hearing and a different function of truth.

The radical denial of the role the analyst has been assigned by the analysand, is perhaps the key distinction between orthodox analysis and other forms of therapeutic treatment. For any number of therapies when the analysand asks to be told the truth about her/himself, the therapist accepts the challenge and responds, either by suggesting alternative ways of looking at her/his problem, or by interpreting the analysand's 'real' intention. It is taken as being more important to reinforce analysand-analyst identification and sustain the analysand's desire than to respond in silence or enigmatically in the hopes of provoking interpretation on the part of the analysand.

4. Characteristics of the Analyst's Speech

Once we pass from the structured, but largely non-linguistic mechanisms which help to determine the path of analytic speech, we need to ask how the analyst intervenes in the speech of the analysand, how s/he dialogues. According to Colette Soler, there are essentially three ways this occurs:

> In the first place s/he intervenes through her/his highlightings, which can be either verbal or non verbal. To punctuate means signifying to someone that s/he said something; it's realizing. *C'est ca.* It's like that. That's it.
> Secondly, s/he interprets. Interpretation is a revelation. There are many ways of interpreting, but in every case, we are dealing with a revelation which goes from the true to the real.[9] [...]
> Thirdly, s/he intervenes in the analysand's speech with her/his silence, a silence which naturally shouldn't be just any old silence. It is often said that you shouldn't just talk for talk's sake, but you shouldn't be quiet for silence's sake either, because the silence of the analyst is a "saying" (*dire*). Her/His silence brings about significations: [...] Therefore, silence brings about the fact that the analyst has nothing specific to object to, or more radically, her/his silence reveals the divergence between everything which gets said and all which should be said to arrive at the real. The silence highlights the incommensurability of the symbolic nature of speech with the real. If I had to give a formula I would say that the analyst's silence says: *c'est pas tout.* That's not all. (Soler 1990: 73-74)

To briefly return over the first of Soler's three categories, highlighting an aspect of the other's speech can be done in numerous ways, from the reiteration or repetition of a word or series of words the analysand has uttered to the use of interruptive mechanisms to make her/him notice a particular interest or disinterest on the part of the hearer. This can both be done verbally (e.g. through short interjections or sounds) and non-verbally (e.g. by rustling paper, coughing, dropping objects). The ambiguity often remains for the analysand as to whether the analyst is a) trying to reinforce a certain line of thought, b) getting her/him to reflect more on what s/he is saying or c) underlining the emptiness of the analysand's discourse at that moment. The point is that the analysand's lack of certainty and understanding spurs her/him to interpret or elaborate. The analyst's intervention therefore always aims to provoke a reflective, interpretative position in the analysand manifesting itself in/through her/his speech.

The third form of intervention mentioned – silence – plays a key role in analysis. It both marks the impossibility of the analysand's narrative ever arriving at "the real" – articulating her/his 'truth' as subject[10] – and indirectly invokes the proximity of a possible interpretation to come. Silence here is only silence inasmuch as it is pregnant with the imminence of a possible speech that will precipitate its meaning. The mute saying of the analyst implies another saying, the always potentially present saying of interpretation.[11]

Although it is the general understanding that psychoanalysis involves digging up the truth of one's past or revealing facts about one's life, this is in reality of little interest to a field which takes the unconscious and not the conscious self to be the real subject. Above all for the analytic schools we are considering, the unconscious is looked upon as an infinite process of production and not the container of fixed preexisting 'contents'. This is crucial for an understanding of what is meant by 'interpretation'. The very notion of a good or bad, right or wrong interpretation is misguided; interpretation isn't based on a presumed truth to be uncovered and "the analyst's interpretative utterance does not lend itself, or should not lend itself, to an analysis that would define it as true or false." (Braunstein 1994: 151) Interpretation will be effective to the extent it makes the unconscious 'speak' and provides a way for a retroactive constitution of the subject's 'truth'.

Even within the limited sample of psychoanalytic schools we are considering here, there is a some divergence about how to intend this position. Within the Lacanian school, the dominant attitude is one which reduces to a minimum the propositional content of the analyst's intervention. In order to do this the analyst is supposed to remove the markers of her/his imaginary identifications [the "I" of the utterance] and eliminate all trace of her/his subjective position; any shifter that would allow the subject of the enunciation to be recognized in her/him. No judgment of either attribution or existence should be expressed. In order to get the subject's 'truth' to speak – her/his unconscious –, the analyst has to refrain from speech acts which would inevitably play the role of a semblance of truth. S/he must orchestrate her/his own utterances so that they can be breaks and punctuations in the analysand's discourse. Since the analyst aims at having the other produce the signification, her/his saying must be in itself as devoid as possible of signification. This restriction quite obviously disappears when one has recourse to quoting what the analysand has said, because in this case, the analysand is not asked to sanction the analyst's utterance as true or false, but rather to respond to what informs the conditions of her/his enunciation, which is independent of the grammatical structure of her/his discourse. (Braunstein 1994: 155)

5. Towards an assessment of analytic dialogue

From the theoretical work evaluated, it appears that the linguistic and non-linguistic mechanisms normally used to sustain the analytic setting and dialogue are in fact extremely limited, even though the variations within each mechanism are potentially unlimited. This panorama seems largely to be confirmed by the clinical reports and papers analyzed (see Table #1). From a logical point of view, a basic division can be drawn between those structural conditions which found and situate the general agreement or 'game' between the two actors, and the forms of analytic intervention aimed at provoking the analysand's responses.[12]

Table 1: Identifying Mechanisms of Analytic Dialogue

Psychoanalytic Practice	Pragmatic Labeling
	CONSTRUCTING CONVENTIONAL RULES – OPENING THE GAME
▪ initial evaluation of the demand for analysis ▪ preliminary arrangement ▪ defining and explaining the analytic setting (use of the couch / variable length session / modality of payment / etc)	▪ criteria for initiating game ▪ articulating construction of setting or game ▪ explaining the rules of the game
	FORMS OF INTERCHANGE
▪ intervening in formal aspects of the setting: (change disposition of furniture / order - disorder room / expose analysand to other analysands	▪ playing with consensual or contextual rules of the game ▪ modifying frame or routine
▪ using reported – mimetic – forms of speech	▪ quoting ▪ reformulating ▪ echoing
▪ punctuating the subject's speech: coughing / making sounds / rustling paper / etc.	▪ using evaluative non -verbal indicators ▪ punctuating and using discourse markers
▪ decontextualizing speech (e.g. posing questions which are 'tangential' to analysand's discourse at that moment)	▪ confounding principle of releva nce or inference system ▪ confounding Gricean Maxims
▪ using enigmatic speech	▪ using indirect speech acts ▪ using *double sens* ▪ disengaging subject from verb
▪ interrupting and terminating the analytic session	▪ ending the game ▪ intervening in the frame or routine

An interesting example of the simultaneous use of the analysand's own utterance with an intervention of verbal interruption or closure, can be found in the unpublished analytic notes of a male analyst (Lacanian) from Italy. A woman analysand is recounting one of her dreams to the analyst. She mentions that at a certain point in her dream her analyst spoke and said "I'm Sicilian" (*Sono Siciliano*). She admits that she has always been curious about the color of people's skin – above all Italian men – because her father was of a dark skin complexion, even though he came from Northern Italy. The verbal sequence continues as follows:

> **Analysand: (recalling oniric dialogue - in dream, analyst says:)**
> "Non sapevi, sono siciliano" ["Didn't you know, I'm Sicilian"]
> **(recalling oniric dialogue - in dream, she says:)**
> "Siciliano, ma di dov'è lei esattamente?" ["Sicilian, But exactly where do you come from?]"
> **(recalling oniric dialogue - in dream, analyst says:)**
> "Di Avola"["From Avola" (a city in Sicily)]
> **Analyst: (to analysand)**
> "Bene, Di Avola / Bene diavola" ["Good, from Avola / Good devil"]
> **Analyst:** stands up and ends analytic session

This example, which opens with an imagined dialogue within the dialogue, poses from the outset the question of how the dialogic is to be defined and why. For if we accept psychoanalytic theory which postulates a radically split subject, a subject who is forever seeking to come to terms with her/himself *as other*, then the real other of normal conversational exchange may not represent such a radically different condition.[13] The analyst's response, instead, intervenes through a destabilizing return to the analysand's own last words. The purposefully slurred pronunciation of "di Avola" is calculated to suspend her understanding. The analysand's need to understand acts as catalyst for what the analyst hopes will announce itself as interpretation - as 'revelation.'

A somewhat different analytic position is voiced by a number of French Freudians who seem to assume a looser reading of how the analyst may intervene. Reference is made to Freud's own technique for responding to his analysands' constructions.

> Experience soon showed that the attitude which the analytic physician could most advantageously adopt was to surrender himself to his own unconscious mental activity, in a state of evenly suspended attention, to avoid so far as possible reflection and the construction of conscious expectations, not to try to fix anything that he heard particularly in his memory, and by these means to catch the drift of the patient's unconscious with his own unconscious. (Freud 1986: 239)

The analyst, Rene Major, takes this example of Freud's as a model for interchange in the analytic session. He offers the following example from one of his clinical case studies (1980: 398):

> A young woman named Marie-Thérèse, suffering from clonic convulsions, had for some time, due to the transference relationship, remained silent. She said "I shut up (je me tais) [...] and despite the fact that I do not know what I want to say, I know that if I could say it you would say *no*". I thought at the same time that she was very nice and that I did like her, but also that I would say 'no' to any wishes underlying such thoughts. Listening to the word *non* (this was

in French), I asked her, without knowing why exactly, 'de quel *nom* son pérè l'appelait? (What name did your father used to call you by?) In French, there is a homophony between *no* and *name*. Then, she remembered her father calling her by the affectionate contraction of Marie-Thérèse: Maité. This forgotton nickname is an anagram of *t'aime* (I love you – without the I) that she could never pronounce in any circumstance. It is also an anagram of (je) me tais, (I) shut up, becoming an equivalent of (I) love you. But the symptom was expressing the oedipal drive in motricity the same alliterative way as the verbal Maité t'aime (Maité loves you).

Analysand: [...] I shut up [Je me tais] [...] and despite the fact that I do not know what I want to say, I know that if I could say it you would say *no*.
Analyst: What name did your father used to call you by? [De quel *nom* son pérè l'appellait?]
Analysand: Maité [contraction of Marie-Thérèse]
Analyst interrupts session
Next session: analysand realizes that Maité is an anagram of "t'aime" ["love you"], an expression she normally couldn't pronounce under any circumstance. She also realizes it's an homophony of "(je) me tais" [(I) shut up], which brings about a realisation on her part that for her, shut up is equivalent to love you.

In this example, the analyst's play on the homophony between "no" and "name" in French opens a rift between the expectation on the hearer's part of an elaboration on the "no" (the analyst's not ceding on the level of desire) – the normal conversational turn - and the retroactive realization that the speaker has 'discarded' the analysand's discourse to pose another question (alluding to the hidden link between desire and her being – one's *nom propre*). But what in other contexts would seem to indicate a form of miscommunication or misunderstanding, can in no way be taken as such from the analytic perspective. (cf. Dascal 1999) Not only does the analyst show that he has followed the analysand's earlier declaration by playing with the homophony and by interrupting the session immediately after the analysand's response, but the analysand too unravels the existential enigma "Maité" conceals by returning to the "no" which never appeared in the analyst's utterance.

5. Coming to terms with psychoanalytic dialogue

From the brief description we have thus far made, there are a number of ways in which the analytic setting seems to revolve around dialogue, even in its most traditionally defined forms. Perhaps the most general and most evident, phenomenologically speaking, is that the setting always only regards two people operating in a structured environment, which rests entirely on speech and the effects of speech. To be more precise, the very episteme of the psychoanalytic project depends on the perlocutionary effects of what is said.

But many linguistic theories of dialogue have essentially been interested in communication as the creation of meanings by rational subjects. Theorists still look for conventional patterns and attempt to develop general models around the predictability in locutor and allocutor behavior. What doesn't fall into established categories is often designated as "non-conventional" (Weigand 1998: 35-36) or "non-standard" (Dascal 1999: 757). This designation is often even given where the same speaker is seen as producing multiple effects in different hearers, or where it is difficult to trace a cause-effect relationship between locutor and allocutor.[14] Furthermore, it is clear that models which pre-

sume essential equality between speaker and hearer and which are predicated on the
notion of total understanding, can in no way account for the workings of psychoana-
lytic dialogue.

On one level, the different object of psychoanalysis and the different goal between
analysis and linguistics has to be kept in mind. Psychoanalysis is founded on the con-
viction that each subject is unique, that every subject is a singularity. This is why the
analytic setting always only involves an exchange between two people – the analyst and
the analysand – and why psychoanalytic theory can never be transmitted through the
application of generalized principles or techniques. And yet, this singular subject at the
center of the psychoanalytic project is not necessarily coextensive with the speaking sub-
ject of linguistics. The real subject for psychoanalysis is the subject of the unconscious
or "that part of the concrete discourse, in so far as it is transindividual, that is not at the
disposal of the subject in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse."
(Lacan, 1977: 49)[15] This means that although there are only ever two actors who par-
take in the psychoanalytic dialogue, in reality there are never fewer than four terms that
have to be taken into consideration: an ego and an unconscious for each of the two
actors. This presents a paradoxical situation for most theories of communication,
which, from Saussure onwards, have privileged simple sender-receiver models.[16]

In reality, it is perhaps less a question of challenging what is meant by standard def-
initions of communication, than it is the belief in psychoanalysis that the workings of
language are far from exhausted in/through the content of what is uttered and/or
received. Successful communication may well depend on the hearer's ability to infer the
speaker's communicative intent and in turn to offer a response which can be identified
by the speaker as logically and/or emotionally plausible; but successful communication,
which regards the social function of language, prevents the subject's singularity from
appearing. Although psychoanalysis recognizes the importance of this mediating func-
tion of speech between subject and other – because it is through it that the other comes
into being for the subject – there is nonetheless another side of speech which analytic
discourse seeks to privilege. Speech for the ego assumes the function of mediator, while
speech for the unconscious announces itself as revelatory.

As can be noted in the two examples of analytic dialogue reported, a distinction has
to be made between interlocution at the content or message level (signified) and that at
the level of the signifier (e.g. phonemic slippages, *double entendre*, punctuations, inter-
ruptions, silence, etc.). It is on and through the latter level that the hearer is asked to
respond. The essential dissymmetry between analyst and analysand is not only due to
the structural confines of the dialogical setting – the fact that the analyst sets the rules
– but above all to the fact that for the analyst communication always invokes miscom-
munication – because the 'speaker' of the utterance (the ego) is never coextensive with
the subject of the enunciation (the unconscious) – while, at least at the early stages of
analysis, this is rarely accepted by the analysand. What is really being asked of the
analysand, to use the well-known expression coined by Otto Rank, is to learn to hear
with her/his "third ear".

Although the peculiarity of the analytic context makes it a limit case for linguistics,
it is noteworthy that a few pragmatic theories have been able to accommodate at least
the general structure of analytic dialogue. One of these is Edda Weigand's formulation
of "dialogic action games". In contrast with much of speech act theory, the concept of
the action game has the double advantage of opening up the communicational setting

to non-expressly linguistic mechanisms, and of seeking to elaborate a series of principles which are not dependent on conventional or rational linguistic behavior. (Weigand 1998: 36-39) The two major axes of the action game are the "Action Principle" and the "Dialogic Principle".

The Action Principle assumes that there is a general communicative purpose from which all specific purposes can be derived, what is termed "coming to an understanding." (Weigand 1999) The innovative element in such a purpose is that it refrains from presupposing the need for 'understanding' to take place within any finite discourse unit, and therefore shifts the emphasis away from abstract, empirical notions of just what this understanding would be. 'Coming to an understanding' not only invokes a temporal sliding, but seems to place all communication within an implicitly dialogical structure. Interaction becomes key, but there is no need for it to be based on a presumed homogeneity between speaker and hearer. What Weigand terms the "Principle of Different Worlds" justifies this notion of non-identity between communicative actors in the following terms:

> We have to liberate ourselves from the idealistic view that the side of the speaker and of his interlocutor are the same. [...] We have to recognize that it is constitutive for dialogic interaction to start from two different sides. Human beings are in the middle of the action game, and they naturally bring with them different cognitive worlds, different abilities and emotional states which interact in the action game. Therefore it cannot be presupposed that the meaning of an utterance will be understood. (Weigand 1998: 38)

The Action Principle therefore moves in the direction of our description of psychoanalytic dialogue in a number of ways. For one, by expanding the perimeter of human exchange to include "different cognitive worlds, different abilities and emotional states" the door is opened to a vision of the subject which no longer precludes the irruption of the unconscious in/through a person's speech. The very notion of 'purpose' in the general sense can be likened to psychoanalytic definitions of desire, even though 'purpose' has a resonance of conscious intention while 'desire' is by definition, unconscious. Since 'purpose' manifests itself along the lines of a becoming (i.e. "*coming to* an understanding"), and thus outside of any pre-constituted knowledge on the subject's part, the unexpected or revelatory in speech can be accommodated.

The second of the two major principles, the Dialogic Principle,

> [...] means that communicative actions are not independent but are dialogic actions, i.e. they are mutually dependent on each other. There is not only one action function which might be called the illocutionary function as it is assumed in orthodox speech act theory. There are initiave actions and reactive actions which are different not only with respect to their position in the sequence but with respect to their action function." (Weigand 1998: 37)

The idea that communicative actions are by their very nature dialogical is essential for accomodating for psychoanalytic dialogue. There can be no doubt, from the psychoanalytic point of view, that all communication is dialogical, because every individual, being born into language, experiences her/his own unconscious linguistically as other. And yet, not everything which can be observed in psychoanalytic dialogue is accounted for here. Dialogic Action Game theory situates all forms of expression as evidencing

a communicational purpose. It therefore sets up a series of phenomenologically-based principles which attempt to explain how and why a certain behavior is dialogical. But since it makes no recourse to an organic theory of the subject, important areas such as the expression of emotions are left to a common sense approach, which cannot help but fall back on the setting up of vague emotion typologies and extrapolating generalized dialogical scenarios. (Weigand 1998: 40-46).

If we are to accept the fact that clinical psychoanalytic exchange is indeed a form of dialogue, then it is incumbent on pragmatic linguistic theories to account for such dialogue. Whether this involves abandoning long-held theories of communication, or adapting new criteria for what 'correct understanding' may entail is as yet unclear.

Endnotes

[1] The choice to investigate the orthodox form of psychoanalysis may at first glance seem contradictory or counterproductive, given that it is above all characterized by the analyst's silence or by typologies of response which seem largely disjoined from the analysand's utterances. And yet, it is precisely this limit condition which offers us the occasion to question standard models and make inroads into how dialogue may be understood.

[2] The use of the term 'analysand', as opposed to 'patient', is coined by Jacques Lacan in the course of his career. Its use is meant to underline the structural affinity of the analysand with the analyst, as well as to treat the individual in analysis as an active agent, as opposed to the passive connotation 'patient' has.

[3] Psychiatric practice, from this point of view, bases its intervention on detailed, general descriptions of subjective symptomologies and works to 'correct' or 'modify' these for the suffering subject.

[4] For one of the first interesting analyses of Lacan's "return to Freud" outside France, see Weber 1991.

[5] The purpose in doing so is clearly more instrumental to our need to isolate out what we are referring to as 'orthodox', than it is an attempt to offer an adequate portrayal of the rest of the field. From this point of view, we are really establishing the specific qualities of but one category, and identifying anything which doesn't belong to it oppositionally, as 'its' other.

[6] The definitions of 'cure' appearing in most non-technical dictionaries center around the idea of "a restoration to health or to a sound condition." This notion of a restoration or return to a healthy condition can easily be read as a condition of normality.

[7] For more on this point, see Juranville 1984.

[8] Breuer and Freud 1895; Muller 1996:168. The term came as a recognition by the two men that there was often a direct correlation between changes in a patient's symptomatic condition and changes in her/his speech.

[9] The notion of 'revelation' invoked here implies "that truth is not known by the subject who speaks, nor by the subject who listens. Truth is produced, it emerges as something new between the two subjects. And what proves that truth emerges as something new? The subject's own surprise. When s/he speaks truly in an analysis, the surprise when s/he hears what s/he has said constitutes the proof we are seeking. And what has been said depends on what the analyst has interpreted."

[10] See also, Braunstein, 1994: 152.

[11] For more on the role of silence, see Nasio 2001.

[12] On the basis of the dialogic mechanisms found, an attempt has been made to assign tentative labels from pragmatics and speech act theory so as to permit an initial basis for comparison of this form of dialogue.

[13] Perhaps the most vivid way of representing this question of the essential dialogicity of the human subject can be found in the speech of certain psychotics who are perfectly capable of assuming dual personalities and arguing with 'each other'.

[14] For more on this point, see discussion in Marcu 2000.
[15] It should be remembered that from a logical point of view, according to Freud, the unconscious is not subject to the law of non-contradiction.
[16] For more on this point, see Harris 1991.

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