

English summaries

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES

C. PAGÈS, Hegel and Levinas: a different alterity, a different danger, RThPh 2011/I, p. 1-18.

Where is the danger? Who is at risk and who is a menace to whom? This article presents two opposite analyses of the notion of danger. Their originality lies in the fact that there seems to be no fairness or reciprocity in danger: the threat comes exclusively from one side of the relationship. For Hegel, oneself is always the object of threats. The source of these threats is always the other person, the one I am not, and it is precisely the other's alterity which is a force whose violence I should fear. That is why truth - and security - are always to be found in reducing the transcendence of the other. For this reason, Levinas claims that there is not an other in the philosophy of Hegel, an absence which he analyses as a danger; it's the other who is at risk, and the threat comes from me. The threat no longer emanates from the strangeness of the other, but, on the contrary, from the suppression of this strangeness. What is to be feared, for Hegel, is that the other lays a hand on me, whereas for Levinas, it's that I lay a hand on the other person.

Y. BURRI, Speaking of time: the Bergsonian use of metaphor, RThPh 2011/I, p. 19-34.

In all his writings, Henri Bergson sought to define worked the notion of time lived, which he called duration. In the enunciation of his thought, emerges a difficulty: how to put words to a notion which characteristically escapes habitual schemas of thought and logical traps? If, as he claims, «thought remains immeasurable by language», we need, nevertheless, a new way to formulate his thought by calling upon unusual or even un-philosophical linguistic resources. In order to speak of time, the philosopher must expand the framework of conceptual thought. Thus, the use of metaphor, normally a poetical resource, becomes in the writing of the French philosopher an excellent tool for philosophy, going beyond the concepts in order to reach what he calls the immanent intuition of duration which each one of us has.

H. WYKRETOWICZ, The discreet contribution of Gadamer to a phenomenology of the social world, RThPh 2011/I, p. 35-49.

In this study three objectives converge: from the point of view of the history of philosophy, the social world first allows us to measure the distance between Heidegger and Gadamer; secondly, it serves as a guide for exploring the ethical and social resources of hermeneutical philosophy. And in conclusion, from a phenomenological viewpoint, we show how, with the help of these resources, the anonymity and the indeterminateness of the social world form the necessary conditions for subjective and personal life.

N. MAILLARD ROMAGNOLI, The notion of duty towards one's self, is it logically incoherent?, RThPh 2011/I, p. 51-66.

For diverse reasons, the idea that we could have duties towards ourselves is no longer very popular in moral philosophy today. Some authors, notably, have said that the very

concept of self-duty poses problems of logic and should be abandoned. In this article, we come back to the formal arguments against the plausibility of self-duty. We confront these arguments with the paradigm of Kant's doctrine of self-duties. Our objective is to show that the notion of duty towards one's self, once one has understood in what sense it should be understood, is neither incoherent nor particularly vague.

H. TAIEB, Critical study. From substrate to subjectivity: The archaeology of the subject, by Alain de Libera, RThPh 2011/I, p. 67-75.

Without pretending to be exhaustive, this article introduces a reading of the first two volumes of the *Archéologie du sujet* by Alain de Libera, a history of the modern idea of subjectiveness since its origins in antiquity up until the present understanding of the term. These volumes can be approached via some of the principal notions they evoke: subjectivity, attributivism, extrinsic denomination, notions which permit the reader to navigate in works already published as well as those not yet published.