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ENGLISH SUMMARIES

- D. MOYAL-SHARROCK, Words as deeds: Wittgenstein's 'spontaneous' utterances and the dissolution of the problem of the mind-body gap, RThPh 2005/I, p. 1-17.

According to Wittgenstein, our spontaneous utterances are not descriptions, but expressions more akin to behaviour than to language: a new sort of speech-act. Rather than conventional, performatory words, spontaneous utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language a new dimension of reflex, which, as I argue against Peter Hacker, makes the boundary porous between the categories of language and of action, thus dissolving the gap between mind and body.

- I. VEZEANU, The absurdity of identity, according to Wittgenstein, RThPh 2005/I, p. 19-34.

Ludwig Wittgenstein challenged the idea of identity for philosophical reasons. We show that these reasons are to be found on two different and complementary philosophical levels: a) the first is logical-semantic and corresponds to the time of the Tractatus, when he rejected identity in accordance with his theory of signs; b) the second is of a gnosiological order and defined by the appreciation of the status of primitive propositions and logical axioms (the certainty and evidence of identity).

- I. VEZEANU, Personal identity, according to Wittgenstein. A pragmatic approach, RThPh 2005/I, p. 35-48.

Here we show that Wittgenstein's dismissal of identity is dependent on the disputing of the principle of causality, reinforced by a pragmatic concept of personhood. In his rejection of causality, the position of Wittgenstein resembles that of David Hume. In order to get to a pragmatic idea of personhood, linguistic and grammatical usage of the terms defining personal identity is analysed. For Wittgenstein, the idea of personhood is defined in relation to the actual context.