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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES

R. TRIGG, Faith warranted, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 117-129.

*This article defends a rationalist concept of the justification of religious belief: faith can and even must be well-founded. The criticism that the Enlightenment made of this concept does not hold as strongly as has been thought. The contemporary theory of Reformed epistemology, defended by Alvin Plantinga, that religious beliefs need not be warranted because they are properly basic, is also questionable. The externalism of that theory would make of religious belief a simple causal effect, to the detriment of reasons for believing, which alone can justify a belief.*

C. MICHON, The preambles to faith, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 131-143.

*I consider the traditional (Thomist) notion of preambles to faith not as preliminary to the act of faith, neither as incompatible with it, but as the whole reasoning which serves as a framework to justify what revelation proposes. I defend the idea that everything that can be an object of faith, in the sense of adherence motivated by a supernatural cause, should be believable in the natural sense, and so be the object of reasons justifying such a belief.*

P. CLAVIER, Natural Theology, the source of norms for religious belief, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 145-149.

*Natural theology, i.e. the inquiry of the existence and attributes of God not based on revelation, can provide norms for religious belief without, however, taking the place of the act of faith or of any other form of religious experience. It claims that what is revealed can always be coordinated with natural reason, and calls for a reexamination of the theory of a created world, holding its existence from a cause separate from itself, the suspicion in which this theory is held not being a sufficient argument against it.*

R. POUIVET, Religious belief, credulity and virtue, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 161-173.

*Religious beliefs are often acquired in early childhood and in a basically uncritical way. They are governed by what Thomas Reid calls the "Principle of credulity". The article tries to show that to hold religious beliefs on the basis of confidence in one's educators is in no way an epistemic error, unjustifiable by an ethic of belief. It contests the influence in modern philosophy of an epistemological model in which a belief is not rational unless based on critical examination. It upholds the idea of the epistemic value of credulity.*

D. HEDLEY, William Alston's perception of God and his vision of the invisible, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 175-185.

*This is an exposition and discussion of one of the most important of recent books in the area of philosophy of religion : Perceiving God : The Epistemology of Religious*

*Experience, by William Alston. Among the principal problems he brings up in his "analytic" defence of the mystical experience of the perception of God, the question of knowing whether the notion of perception should be taken literally or in a metaphoric sense is fundamental. On this point, the article insists on the ambiguous nature of Alston's concept. In that Alston thinks of perception as established practice, is it not possible to show that his analysis of divine perception corresponds rather imperfectly to the historic moments in which it has played an important theological role, particularly in the line of Platonism ?*

J.-M. VIENNE, Belief and knowledge (Spinoza and Empiricism), RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 187-198.

*Belief is the passive synthesis that goes on inside us through education, habit, suggestion; and the source of the active syntheses which we do consciously. This theory, found in reductionist and/or empiricist types of thought (cf. Hume but also Berkely and Locke), is also to be found, which seems surprising, in Spinoza. A study of belief in classical thought leads one to ask if the empiricists didn't use Spinoza more than they dared say.*

J. LAGRÉE, The status of belief in Socinianism, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 199-215.

*Socinianism, the ultra-rationalist current of the Reformation, thrust away all belief in the great Christian mysteries and held to the strict requirements of a rationalist religion. For the disciples of Socin, what is most essential in religion is more practice and promise than knowledge. Thus Socianism sought to draw out the conditions for reasonable belief, while insisting on the role of criteria played by common notions. The article tries to show, by analysing the Socinianist conditions for belief, that this religious current presents all the traits of a set of beliefs for intellectuals.*

R. GLAUSER, Shaftesbury: enthusiasm and religious experience, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 217-234.

*This is a study of the religious dimension of enthusiasm in Shaftesbury. After distinguishing between a negative and a positive sense of the term, one should distinguish between two positive forms of enthusiasm. The first is based on a religious experience of God, the second concerns the religious experience of the world. We study the relationships between the two, as well as between these two and aesthetic experience, drawing out the underlying connection between aesthetic experience and religion in the philosophy of Shaftesbury.*

J. JANIAUD, Kierkegaard, Belief in a God who contradicts himself ?, RThPh 2002/II-III, p. 235-246.

*The Kierkegaardian idea of religious belief brings out the contrast between faith and reason. Reading the biblical episode of the sacrifice of Isaac, as interpreted by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling, one can understand how the refusal to doubt God, even when it would seem logical and morally normal to doubt, exposes this contrast to a high degree. So what's left is to evaluate the philosophical consequences of this test between contradiction and absurdity, which Kierkegaard uses to underline the temporel and existential contours of faith.*