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## ENGLISH SUMMARIES

R. GLAUSER, Ressentiment and moral values : Max Scheler, a critic of Nietzsche,  
RThPh 1996/III, p. 209-228.

*Nietzsche's theory of the origin of Christian moral values is based on the psychological phenomenon of ressentiment. Refuting Nietzsche, Scheler asserts a realist theory of axiological hierarchy ; but his epistemology of values demands a central role for ressentiment, comparable in importance (but for different reasons) to the role which Nietzsche gives it. This article elucidates Scheler's analysis of ressentiment and its role in his epistemology. Scheler makes important concessions to Nietzsche concerning the necessity of the ressentiment interpretation of certain concrete morals and modern ideologies. These concessions place him on sufficiently similar terrain to explain Nietzsche's erroneous conclusions concerning the real meaning of Christian moral values.*

B. BAERTSCHI, Ethics and stress, RThPh 1996/III, p. 229-252.

*The two great ethical traditions, kantianism and utilitarianism have at least one common feature : for both, when we take a decision or evaluate behaviour, it is necessary and sufficient to invoke a single general principle – the categorical imperative or the maximisation of utility –, valid for any situation. For us, this view is too schematic and idealizing, because there are situations which change the ethical position of the agent. The situation of stress, such as when the agent or his kin are in direct danger, shows this, as we can see in cases of poulation pressure.*

J. COTTIN, Theology of the cross and contemporary aesthetics, RThPh 1996/III, p. 253-272.

*The theology of the cross formulated by Luther and rediscovered in contemporary theology could be understood to condemn all attempts to think faith aesthetically. However, the cross is not fundamentally opposed to beauty but to power. It is possible therefore to articulate the cross with aesthetics, especially since contemporary artistic research stands as a radical challenge to human endeavour akin, on the level of meaning, to the paradoxical message of the cross.*

J.-L. LEUBA, Why do we still need a pope?, RThPh 1996/III, p. 273-282.

*One bishop, two theologians and a journalist, all German catholics, seek out the legitimate purpose of the definitions of vatican I, picked up by Vatican II, concerning the jurisdictional and magisterial primacy of the pope. To do this, they must overcome the difficulties of the formulation of these definitions. Could official Rome enter into their line of thought? Several recent signs invite us to remain hopeful.*