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# Antiintellektualismus in der deutschen Volksschullehrerbildung

• Margarete Götz

Für das 21. Jahrhundert prognostiziert Ladwig für die Lehrerbildung diesseits wie jenseits des Atlantiks einen Antiintellektualismus, dessen befürchtete gesellschaftliche Folgewirkungen den Autor an den Antiintellektualismus der McCharthy-Jahre in den USA erinnern. Ob eine solche Zukunftsentwicklung angesichts der aktuell diskutierten Reforminitiativen für die Lehrerbildung in Deutschland zu erwarten ist, soll hier nicht überprüft werden, zumal ein solches Vorhaben mit Wirkungsanahmen voller Unsicherheitsfaktoren belastet wäre.

Die nachfolgenden Ausführungen schliessen stattdessen an die historisch ausgerichtete Analyse von Ladwig an, mit der er im Ergebnis einen historischen Entstehungs- und Erklärungsgrund für den konstatierten Antiintellektualismus aufdeckt. Dieser liegt nach Ansicht des Autors in der institutionellen Abtrennung der Lehrerbildung vom Universitätsstudium, wie sie sich für den Bereich der Massenbeschulung im späten 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert im angelsächsischen Raum und weit darüber hinaus ausgebreitet hat. Folgt man der Argumentation von Ladwig, dann erscheint die Universität als der einzige Ausbildungsort, der historisch wie aktuell eine vom Antiintellektualismus befreite Lehrerbildung garantieren kann. Inwieweit das mit Blick auf die deutsche Lehrerbildung zutrifft, soll im folgenden historischen Rückblick geklärt werden, der sich aus Platzgründen auf die Ausbildung der Volksschullehrer in der Weimarer Zeit konzentriert, wie sie für die Pädagogischen Akademien in Preussen konzipiert wurde.

Auch für Deutschland ist die universitätsferne Ausbildung der Elementarschullehrer im 19. Jahrhundert und später der Volksschullehrer – abgesehen von zeitlich und regional begrenzten Ausnahmen – eine bis weit ins 20. Jahrhundert hinein andauernde historische Realität. Sie vollzieht sich im Kaiserreich in einem seminaristischen System, das nach dem 1918/19 erfolgten politischen Systemwechsel zunächst in Preussen durch die Errichtung Pädagogischer Akademien abgelöst wird. Diese werden nach einer kurzzeitigen Zwischenlösung im Dritten Reich nach 1945 als Pädagogische Hochschulen zur Standardinstitution der westdeutschen Volksschullehrerausbildung bis zu deren Integration in die Universität, die etwa Mitte der 1970er-Jahre beginnt.

Den 1926 in Preussen erstmals gegründeten Pädagogischen Akademien gingen heftige Debatten zur Reform der Volksschullehrerbildung voraus, die durch eine Kontroverse über den Ort der Ausbil-

dung gekennzeichnet waren (vgl. Die Reichsschulkonferenz 1921). Im Ergebnis durchgesetzt haben sich nicht die Befürworter einer Universitätslösung, sondern die Verfechter einer speziell mit der Volksschullehrerausbildung beauftragten Sonderhochschule, wie sie die Pädagogischen Akademien in Preussen darstellen. Zu deren prominentesten Anhängern gehörten in den 1920er-Jahren auf bildungspolitischer Seite Carl Heinrich Becker und auf Seiten der Universitätspädagogik Eduard Spranger, dessen Konzept der Bildnerhochschule zum einflussreichen Musterfall für die Profilierung der Pädagogischen Akademien in Preussen und später der Pädagogischen Hochschulen wurde (vgl. Spranger 1920/1970).

Auch wenn die Pädagogischen Akademien die lang gehegten Hoffnungen der Volksschullehrerschaft auf ein Universitätsstudium enttäuschten, so ist mit ihrer Einrichtung doch im Vergleich zur seminaristischen Tradition ein Statusgewinn für den Beruf wie ein Qualitätsanstieg der Ausbildung zu verzeichnen, da nunmehr das Abitur einheitlich als Zugangsvoraussetzung verlangt wurde. Trotz der erzielten Fortschritte bewegt sich die Ausbildung in Pädagogischen Akademien weiterhin unterhalb des universitären wissenschaftlichen Anspruchsniveaus in spezialisierten Institutionen, was nach der Argumentation von Ladwig die Verbreitung antiintellektueller Tendenzen in der Lehrerbildung begünstigt.

Solche lassen sich auch tatsächlich im Falle der Pädagogischen Akademien in Preussen nachweisen, nicht nur allein auf der Analysebasis der für ihre Gründung beanspruchten Legitimationsmuster und der ihr zugewiesenen Aufgaben. Bereits die staatlich verordnete Gliederung der Pädagogischen Akademien nach dem Konfessionsprinzip spricht für eine Einflussnahme auf die Ausbildung, die nicht von wissenschaftlicher Rationalität, sondern von religiösen Glaubensüberzeugungen gesteuert wurde.

Weitaus offensichtlicher tritt der Antiintellektualismus im Bildungsdenken von Carl Heinrich Becker zutage, der als preussischer Kultusminister die Einführung der Pädagogischen Akademien programmatisch und bildungspolitisch initiiert hat. Danach liegt in der Abkehr vom Intellektualismus geradezu das zentrale Begründungsmotiv für die Etablierung von Sonderhochschulen für die Volksschullehrerbildung. Ihre Existenz rechtfertigt Becker im Verbund mit der zeittypischen Klage über die «Kulturkrise der Gegenwart» im Jahre 1930 mit den Worten: «Die alte rein intellektuelle Bildung hatte ihre Pflegstätte auf rein intellektualistisch gerichteten Forschungs- und Pflegstätten. Die Gesamtbildung des neuen Menschen fordert einen neuen Typ von

Hochschulen. Hier liegt der tiefste Grund dafür, dass wir in Preussen die neue Lehrerbildung mit ihrer Aufgabe der Menschenbildung nicht an Stätten verankern durften, die ihrer ganzen Tradition nach ausschliesslich der Intellectbildung gewidmet sind. In ferner Zukunft ist ein Ausgleich unerlässlich, im Augenblick wäre eine Konzentrierung der Lehrerbildung auf den Universitäten der Tod des neuen Geistes und damit der Ruin der Volksschule geworden. Wir wollen nicht nur Bildung des Verstandes, sondern Formung des Menschen» (Becker 1930, S. 27).

Was Becker zur Legitimation der Pädagogischen Akademien anführt, repräsentiert ein von vielen pädagogischen Zeitgenossen geteiltes Bildungscredo. Mit ihm wird dem Volksschullehrer eine Berufsaufgabe zugeschrieben, die in ihrer Ausrichtung auf die Gesamtbildung des Menschen die Grenzen reiner Kenntnisvermittlung überschreitet. Folglich braucht man für ihre Realisierung nach der festen Überzeugung der Befürworter der Pädagogischen Akademien keine wissenschaftlichen Köpfe, die wegen ihrer einseitigen Qualifikation für die geforderte Ganzheitlichkeit der Bildung ungenügende Voraussetzungen mitbringen. «Wir wollen nicht mehr bloss theoretische Menschen, wir wollen ganze Menschen mit geschulten Willen, sicherem praktischen Blick, gewandter Hand und gesundem Geschmack» (Spranger 1920/1970, S. 65f.).

Für die Umsetzung dieses Bildungsanspruches in der Volksschule bedarf es nach der offiziellen Gründungsdenkschrift der Pädagogischen Akademien einer Ausbildung, mit deren Absolvierung der angehende Volksschullehrer zur Lehrerpersönlichkeit wird (vgl. Kittel 1957, S. 84). Wie diese beschaffen sein soll, wird in der einschlägigen Publizistik in variationsreichen Auflistungen als eine Bündelung erwünschter Einstellungen, Haltungen, Charaktereigenschaften, Berufskennnisse und Überzeugungen beschrieben, die als unabdingbare Voraussetzung für bildungsmächtige Wirkungseffekte gelten. Die Ausbildung von Lehrerpersönlichkeiten macht den spezifischen Auftrag der Pädagogischen Akademien aus. Sie markiert zugleich die Differenz zur Universität und darin einbeschlossen die Distanz zu den dort abverlangten intellektuellen Leistungen, deren noch so erfolgreiche Erfüllung keinen Sicherungsgrund für das gewünschte Persönlichkeitsprofil des Volksschullehrers bietet. Dass dafür rein intellektuelle Ansprüche nicht ausreichen, verdeutlicht die von Spranger unter den Positionsannahmen der geisteswissenschaftlichen Pädagogik favorisierte Version der Lehrerpersönlichkeit. Sie wird repräsentiert durch «Qualitätsmenschen», die sich auszeichnen, durch «den Geist des individuellen Verstehens, der liebevollen Versenkung in die einzelne Seele, den einzelnen Stoff, die einzelne Situation» (Spranger 1920/1970, S. 66).

In einer solchen Charakterisierung erscheint die Lehrerpersönlichkeit als eine auf Innerlichkeit zentrierte Berufsausstattung, die mehr an emotions-

an kognitionsbasierten Fähigkeiten festgemacht wird. Angesichts einer solchen Qualität bietet ein auf die Schaffung der Lehrerpersönlichkeit fixiertes Studium an den Pädagogischen Akademien einen günstigen Nährboden für die Verbreitung antiintellektualistischer Positionen, seien es Gesinnungen, Dogmen oder Ideologien.

Dass der Antiintellektualismus nicht nur im offiziellen Auftrag der Pädagogischen Akademien, sondern auch in deren Ausbildungsprogramm präsent war, lässt sich an standardmässigen Ausbildungsinhalten und -formen beispielhaft belegen. Zu letzteren gehören die Gemeinschaft stiftenden Veranstaltungen, die ihr Vorbild in den von der Jugendbewegung gepflegten Gesellschaftsformen besaßen. Mit ihrer Durchführung sollten die Akademiestudenten als einübende Vorwegnahme in die spätere Berufsaufgabe eine als konfliktfrei gedachte Gemeinschaft erlebnisintensiv erfahren, aber nicht erkenntnismässig durchdringen. Es ging dabei vorrangig um die ausgiebige Pflege eines Gemeinschaftsgeistes, der in den Worten Sprangers «ein reges Spiel von Geben und Empfangen» erzeugt und darin mit emotional eingefärbten Wirkungserwartungen korrespondiert (ebd., S. 65).

Was die Ausbildungsinhalte anbelangt, so unterbieten diese in Umfang und Niveau in aller Regel die Standards wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis, bedingt durch ihre Anpassung an das bildungsbeschränkende Anspruchsniveau der volkstümlichen Bildung, einer spezifisch der Volksschule in Opposition zur Gelehrtenbildung zugeschriebenen Aufgabe (vgl. Glöckel 1964). Die Berufsvorbereitung in den Pädagogischen Akademien geht nahezu zwangsläufig mit der Mobilisierung einer antiintellektuellen Berufseinstellung einher, entstammt doch die Theorie der volkstümlichen Bildung ihrer Herkunft nach einer Abwehrhaltung gegenüber dem Intellektualismus. Unter ihren Positionsannahmen wurde der zukünftige Volksschullehrer auf eine Berufsaufgabe verpflichtet, die sich unter Ignorierung demokratischer Erfordernisse in aufklärungsfeindlicher Manier darauf zu konzentrierten hatte, den einfachen, schlicht denkenden Menschen zu bilden, der sich widerstandslos in die bestehenden Lebens-, Verhaltens- und Glaubensgewohnheiten seiner Heimat einfügt. Diese Intention setzte ein Ausbildungsprogramm der Volksschullehrer voraus, dessen Inhalte nicht wissenschafts-, sondern heimatnah waren. Nur sie waren geeignet für die in der Gründungsdenkschrift der Pädagogischen Akademien geforderte Ausbildungsleistung, die neben einer pädagogischen Schulung und der Ausprägung einer Berufsgesinnung «die Vertrautheit mit den zu vermittelnden geistigen, religiösen, sittlichen, technischen und künstlerischen Bildungswerten und ihrer Verwurzelung im heimatlichen Volkstum» umfasste (zit. in: Kittel 1957, S. 84). In der verlangten Herkunft der Lehrinhalte aus dem heimatlichen Volkstum wird auf der Ebene der den Volksschulfächern entsprechenden Ausbildungsfächer der Pädä-

gogischen Akademien nochmals deren Distanz zum intellektuell anspruchsvollen Referenzsystem der Wissenschaft sichtbar.

In der historischen Rückschau lassen sich sowohl in der Gründungsidee der Pädagogischen Akademie wie in deren Ausbildungsprogramm verschiedene Varianten des Antiintellektualismus identifizieren. Wäre er vermeidbar gewesen, wenn sich in den 1920er-Jahren jene bildungspolitischen und pädagogischen Akteure durchgesetzt hätten, die für eine Universitätslösung der Volksschullehrerbildung plädierten?

Zumindest wenn man sich auf historische Argumente stützt, ist die Bejahung der Frage für die deutsche Lehrerbildung ausgesprochen problematisch. Diese verlief entsprechend der Unterscheidung eines niederen und höheren Bildungswesens bis in die 1960er-Jahre hinein institutionell zweigeteilt und fand für die Gymnasiallehrer an der Universität statt und losgelöst davon für die Volksschullehrer an Sonderhochschulen. Im historischen Prozess betrachtet, waren nachweislich beide Ausbildungsgänge anschluss- und allianzfähig für die Ideologie des Nationalsozialismus. Das legt die Schlussfolgerung nahe, dass die Universität als Stätte der reinen Wissenschaft und Rationalität keine verlässliche Garantie für eine von Antiintellektualismen befreite Lehrerbildung bietet. Ihre Geschichte in Deutschland widersetzt sich der Annahme, wonach die Wahl des Ausbildungsortes für das Eindringen antiintellektueller Tendenzen in die Lehrerbildung entscheidend ist. Erklärungskraftiger für eine Ursachensuche scheinen für die deutschen Verhält-

nisse Theorieannahmen über das Gegenstands- und Aufgabenfeld der angehenden Lehrer zu sein. Mit Nachwirkungen bis in die Gegenwart hinein resultierten diese Annahmen zu Zeiten der Pädagogischen Akademien aus dem speziell in der deutschen Tradition gepflegten Bildungsbegriff. Unter seinen Prämissen zogen in die deutsche Lehrerbildung die Denkfigur der Ganzheit ebenso ein wie die im Bildungsbegriff enthaltenen Idealisierungen von Gemeinschaft, Kultur, Volkstum und Heimat, die Koppelung der Bildung an Innerlichkeit bei gleichzeitiger Distanz zu Gesellschaft und Demokratie. Es handelt sich also um eine Gemengelage von Ansprüchen, von denen – jeder für sich genommen – antiintellektuelles Potenzial enthält, das unabhängig vom institutionellen Ort der Lehrerbildung abgerufen werden konnte.

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## Rethinking the terms of the debate: On the many faces of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism

• Inés Dussel

I believe it was Deborah Britzman who said, in a conference at AERA several years ago, that what was most urgent in teacher education was to give student teachers «the time to think». It seems a very simple statement, yet in all the current paraphernalia of competences and curricular innovations, «the time to stop and think» is becoming a rare event. Therefore, it is difficult not to agree with James Ladwig's concern about the intellectual mediocrity that has been gliding over teacher education, not only recently but probably in the last 150 years. His argument tries to understand historically the basis for a sustained anti-intellectualism in teacher education. He claims that this anti-intellectualism is evident in the institutional segregation of teacher education in tertiary institutions that separated them from university life (including its consid-

eration as teacher «training», an action apparently devoid of intellectual weight). Moreover, his remarks on the hostility toward thought and reflection that pervades most of the rhetoric of teacher education reform, almost exclusively worried about standards and competences, are central for any politics that wants to promote an intellectual focus for the education professions.

While I concur with this concern and would support a politics for teacher education that fosters its intellectual life, the main structure of the argument is not so easy to go along with, at least not without qualifying its terms and unpacking some of its rhetorical equivalences. And I believe this weakness is important, because it defines the type of politics for teacher education that should be promoted.

The question that kept coming back while reading the paper was: What counts as intellectualism? As in Britzman's saying, Ladwig seems to think that

it is self-evident. Intellectual life is equaled to academic focus, reason, and good judgement. I wonder why the author has chosen not to «unpack» this construction. In other works of his, it is palpable that Ladwig has read (and used extensively) Bourdieu, Foucault, and many others who claim that knowledge is not neutral and that intellectual dispositions have social and cultural hierarchies embedded. Following them, it can be said that «intellectual» is a particular kind of social activity that is performed through reflection, detachment, abstraction, and cross-referencing with other texts (locating oneself in a web of cultural references). Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that intellectual practice has been constructed historically; as Ian Hunter has shown in *Rethinking the school* (1994), these dispositions were legitimated by mass schooling as universal tools or ways of thinking and acting, but were deeply grounded in social institutions and power/knowledge relations prevailing in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. Also, Jacques Rancière's critique in *The ignorant schoolmaster* has attacked «the art of distance» of the teacher/intellectual as part of the «explicative order» that stultifies the unprivileged (1991, p. 5f.). From my point of view, then, the argument would have benefited from a deeper understanding of the dynamics that have shaped intellectualism and that have constructed these social dispositions (and by «deeper» I mean historical and political referencing).

The problem with Ladwig's argument is that not only intellectualism is taken for granted but, as part of the same movement, its political and social implications are assumed to be good. It is clear throughout the article that the author believes that anti-intellectualism leads to terrible things in our societies. He even suggests that the support to «questionable foreign and domestic policies» is rooted in the anti-intellectual dispositions in Anglophone countries. Apparently the «enlightened people» are not misled by weak arguments or unreasonable ideals. Yet it is difficult to ignore that «good judgement and reason» have been used for sinister politics as well (to take just one extreme case, let's remember the support that many renowned European intellectuals gave to the Nazi regime. But also, I wonder which kind of support did Bush and Blair had in «enlightened circles» for the war in Iraq. I doubt it was null). By forcing the argument to put intellectualism on the «good side» and anti-intellectualism on the «bad» one, the author misses the opportunity to understand the reasonings that are involved in both sides, which make it more difficult to say that «reason» is only on one part.

There is an example in Argentinean educational history that comes to my mind in relation to the reasonings involved in anti-intellectualism. During the first Peronist government (1945–1955), a technical education subsystem was created that was addressed at workers. From primary schools to the Workers' University, there was an opportunity for

working people to get access to school credentials. The Workers' University was long thought of as a second-class university that was anti-intellectual and that tried to divert workers from «the real, good university» that was the humanist one (University of Buenos Aires). But research conducted in the early 90s showed that there was a strong professional and academic support to the Workers' University, particularly from a group of engineers who thought that the balance between theoretical and practical training had to be changed (Dussell/Pineau 1995). Underneath the rhetoric of anti-intellectualism, this group promoted a different kind of education that opposed the «abstractions» of civil engineers and advocated for a «field engineer» that knew how to do things and work with real people. The curriculum had «intellectual subjects» such as history and calculus; but it also had new topics such as unionism, factory organization, human resources, and else. It is difficult, if not impossible, to say that there were no intellectual activities involved in this curriculum.

Coming back to Ladwig's argument, I certainly side with his defense of «intellectual activities» as central to democratic life, provided that we agree on its problematic qualities and subject ourselves to the challenge of other points of view, and that we stop seeing them as equal to «academic subjects». Also, as much as I believe that an «unpacking» of intellectualism should be made, a similar move should be performed on «anti-intellectualism» and the dynamics and forces that have shaped it in the past and are shaping it at present. A wonderful quote by Walter Benjamin comes to my help, which speaks about the decline of the critical point of view of the intellectual and the coming of advertisement as the new «guru» that seduces the masses. This is what Benjamin said: «Fools lament the decay of criticism. For its day is long past. Criticism is a matter of correct distancing. It was at home in a world where perspectives and prospects counted and where it was still possible to take a standpoint. Now things press too closely on human society. The «unclouded,» «innocent» eye has become a lie, perhaps the whole naïve mode of expression sheer incompetence. Today the most real, the mercantile gaze into the heart of things is the advertisement. It abolishes the space where contemplation moved and all but hits us between the eyes with things as a car, growing to gigantic proportions, careens at us out of a film screen. [...] What, in the end, makes advertisement so superior to criticism? Not what the moving red neon sign says – but the fiery pool reflecting in the asphalt» (Benjamin 1978, p. 85f.).

For it is the anti-intellectualism of the spectacle of the media that should be looked at as the most important «dissolving» force of the social dispositions that we have come to know as «intellectual life». A French philosopher speaks about the «fusalional and confusional effects of the screens» in contemporary life (Mondzain 2002). Can we equal

this kind of interpellation and reasoning produced by the media and the «practical stance» that prevails in teacher education? This would certainly need much more research and thought, but I suspect that they are not as close as the moral and epistemological links that still tie together the theory/practice divide in the educational field. In other words: the education intellectuals still have much more in common with the also declining anti-theoretical teachers than with the pervasive seductive screens.

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## Ladwig's Lament

- William F. Pinar

*To what extent able students stayed out of teaching because of its poor rewards and to what extent because of the nonsense that figured so prominently in teacher education, it is difficult to say.*

Richard Hofstadter (1962, p. 318)

James G. Ladwig reconceives the Hofstadter argument<sup>1</sup> to be one of «insufficient political will to invest» in schools and teacher education, resulting in the calamity that has been the Bush Administration. While the paranoia (see Hofstadter 1965) characterizing the years following 9/11 was reminiscent of Soviet-focused (and McCarthy-fueled) hysteria during the Cold War, Ladwig's use of «cyclical» seems overstated. Certainly the U.S. population's susceptibility to the Bush Administration's manipulation underlined the failures of many American schools to educate the public politically. However, it is necessary to note that friends of «reason» and «good judgment» (the words are Ladwig's and their absence after 9/11 represent, presumably, the failure of schools) like Hofstadter helped undermine teachers' capacity to contest conservative conceptions of American exceptionalism.<sup>2</sup>

Americans have hardly been the only population duped by politicians, of course, and political authoritarianism has proved to be an enduring if frustratingly complex topic for scholars and intellectuals from Arendt to Adorno and others (for a review: see Young-Bruehl 1996). Ladwig's assumption that schools play a key role in political socialization has common sense on its side, but empirical verification might complicate the claim. Surely the school is no substitute for religion; if churches and synagogues faced the same measures of «accountability» schools face under Bush's *No Child Left Behind*, many would be closed. While moral education is admirable, its record supplies no basis for optimism (see, for instance, Yu 2003),

Teacher training's institutional segregation con-

tributed to its intellectual underdevelopment and political vulnerability, no doubt. Regarding the former (but illustrating the latter), Hofstadter makes statements less diplomatic but not unlike the Dewey statement Ladwig quotes (see 1962, p. 318, p. 340). In intellectual terms, the field's extraction of «teaching» from «curriculum» inflated the role of the teacher while devaluing the significance of the intellectual content of the curriculum. The political problem is not «status» (Pinar 2006, p. 135ff.): that, after all, is a symptom. Ladwig laments the absence of any concepts of «intellectuality» in recent teacher education pronouncements, but these statements merely reproduce past politicians' willingness – indeed, their felt obligation – to tell teachers (and those who prepare them) what to do. To an extent suffered by no other major profession, public education in the United States has been at the whim – the political opportunism – of politicians who mistake education as a business designed to support business (and protect religion, consonant with Hofstadter's analysis). As Hofstadter notes, with understatement: «No doubt there is a certain measure of inherent dissonance between business enterprise and intellectual enterprise» (1962, p. 233).

To decipher teachers' «gracious submission» (Pinar 2004, p. 24), gender (and in the U.S., race: see Pinar 2004, p. 6) is key. While Hofstadter's criticism of teacher education was animated by Cold War politics and the Sputnik incident specifically<sup>3</sup>, that anxiety was gendered (see Griswold 1998). The subsequent compulsion to reform the schools is gendered as well. By 1870, Richard Hofstadter reports, women comprised approximately sixty per cent of the U.S. teaching force, a percentage that increased in the decades following. By 1900, over seventy per cent of teachers were women, and in another quarter of a century the percentage peaked at over eight-three percent (see Hofstadter 1962, p. 317). The gender politics of Hofstadter's critique of public education becomes clear when he imagines the

problem male public-school teachers face from other (presumably more masculine) men: «But in America, where teaching has been identified as a feminine profession, it does not offer men the stature of a fully legitimate male role ... The boys grow up thinking of men teachers as somewhat effeminate and treat them with a curious mixture of genteel deference (of the sort due to women) and hearty male condescension» (Hofstadter 1962, p. 320).

So feminized, male teachers – intellectuality itself – require «real» men's close supervision. Until the gender politics of teacher education are understood and contested, Ladwig's lament seems the only conclusion.

#### Footnotes

- 1 Hofstadter's main target is life adjustment education, that post-World-War II amalgamation of earlier progressive and social efficiency movements in U.S. education. Hofstadter (1962, p. 343) declared that the life-adjustment movement «was an attempt on the part of educational leaders and the United States Office of Education to make completely dominant the values of the crusade against intellectualism that had been going on since 1910,» a «crusade» he associated with the child-centered wing of progressivism (see *ibid.*, p. 369). Drawing on Lawrence Cremin (1961), Hofstadter drew a through-line from Dewey's *Democracy and Education* to life adjustment education (see Hofstadter 1962, p. 361). While he focused on «the limitations and the misuse of these [Dewey's] ideas,» Hofstadter asked readers not to interpret his account as a «blanket condemnation of progressive education.» «Although its reputation suffered unwarranted damage from extremists on its periphery,» he judged, «progressivism had at its core something sound and important» (*ibid.*, p. 359). Hofstadter makes a list: «The value of progressivism rested on its experimentalism and in its work with younger children; its weakness lay in its effects to promulgate doctrine, to generalize, in its inability to assess the practical limits of its own program, above all in its tendency to dissolve the curriculum. This tendency became most serious in the education of older children, and especially at the secondary level, where, as the need arises to pursue a complex, organized program of studies, *the question of the curriculum becomes acute*» (*ibid.*, p. 360, emphasis added). Curriculum development focused on scholarship in the arts, humanities, social and natural sciences re-expresses progressive commitments in intellectual, not bureaucratic, terms (see Pinar 2006).

- 2 Hofstadter's attack on public education did not occur in a vacuum, of course; it appeared near the end of a decade of attacks, including those by historian Arthur Bestor (1953) and Vice-Admiral Hyman Rickover (1959, 1963). While Bestor had been critical of schools of education, it would be Harvard's former president, James B. Conant, who published *The Education of American Teachers* in 1963 and James D. Koerner, who published *The Miseducation of American Teachers* the same year, who focused on that subject.
- 3 Early on in the book, Hofstadter (1962, p. 5f.) observed: «The Sputnik was more than a shock to American national vanity: it brought an immense amount of attention to bear on the consequences of anti-intellectualism in the school system.» Near the end of his study Hofstadter (1962, p. 358) asserts: «The post-Sputnik educational atmosphere has quickened the activities of those who demand more educational rigor, who can now argue that we are engaged in mortal educational combat with the Soviet Union.» Note the military metaphor underscoring the projection of political anxiety onto the U.S. public schools (see Pinar 2004, p. 65ff.).

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## Complementing Ladwig: Extending Notions of Anti-intellectualism in Education

• Lynda Stone

The purpose of this response is to complement the elegant, insightful essay on anti-intellectualism in education from James Ladwig. The author brings to bear not only his theoretical acumen generally but also particularly with roots, experience and knowledge of educational institutions and practices in the USA, UK and Australia. His focus

is historic and contemporary considerations of teacher education. As extension, the primary focus herein moves to current day educational research, following brief attention to four supplementary points. In these and the rest of the essay, I too reference Hofstadter (1964) and as well Jacoby Russell's classic analysis, *The Last Intellectuals* (1987). My central issue becomes this: «Research-based» improvement in education is itself anti-intellectual.

## Supplementary Points

Ladwig is surely correct that anti-intellectualism is alive and well today among the general populous in the western world, and this is most particularly so in the American context that is my home. A first supplementary point is that anti-intellectualism has a long history in the USA, certainly across the twentieth century, at least back into the nineteenth and probably earlier. For instance, consider evidence in the «catchpenny maxims» of Benjamin Franklin (Hofstadter 1964, p. 254), the range of writings from Alexis de Tocqueville and Frederick Jackson Turner, and put succinctly the sentiment from the undistinguished President, Calvin Coolidge, that «the business of America is business» (ibid., p. 237).

For a second point, here is Hofstadter: «The greater part of the public ... is simply non-intellectual; it is infused with enough ambivalence about intellect and intellectuals to be swayed now this way and now that ... [There exists respect mixed] with awe and with suspicion and resentment» (ibid., p. 19, p. 21). Related is an initial understanding about the meaning of intellectual – taken up next. Indeed Americans admire intelligence and its distinction from intellect. The former is «excellence of mind ... [employed for its] unflinching practical quality» (ibid., p. 25). Its aims are clearly stated, limited in scope; its use daily and obvious to all.

A traditional meaning of intellect and those who possess it is seen in distinction to intelligence. Meanings constitute the third point. Intellectuals are those who live the life of the mind rather than «merely» utilize it. Their own use is «critical, creative, and contemplative» (ibid.). They value and focus on ideas rather than «commonsense» as central to life experience. Asserts Hofstadter, they are both pious and playful: with thinking as work, with skepticism as attitude, with passion for a world made better from engagement with ideas. At times in history, they have been «accused» of many wrongdoings, of being obsessive, zealous, fanatic and dangerous (ibid., p. 29).

A final pre-point is this. In earlier periods intellectualism lost societal value with rise of expertise in business and government, and then, according to Jacoby (1987), to changes in intellectuals' own residence. They moved into colleges and universities. With this, the meaning of «intellectual» changed too. The result in education has been the rise of the «researcher,» and connecting to Ladwig – to dominance of a reductive narrowly practical, instrumental mentality in education and teacher education.

Jacoby's analysis is insightful as he describes the emergence of an age of «academization» of intellectuals (ibid., p. 17). Prior to the sixties, independent minded writers took up wide-ranging topics for a general audience; their focus was a broadly defined public good. For him «intellectuals disappeared.» This occurred as society and culture were

altered; universities flourished and specialists developed tied to campuses, to tenure and other manifestations of livelihood and respectability (see ibid., pp. 14–17). The preoccupation of professors, even in the best sense, became scholarly and researchable instrumentality rather than public reform.

## Central Thesis

Borrowing a term from Jacoby (ibid., p. 221), the central thesis of this response is that a particular form of research instrumentality dominates the education academy – and by extension teacher education – today. Taken in order here are a set of claims; these are not new but have particular salience herein (see two recent texts taking up similar points from Smeyers and Depaepe, 2006 and Bridges and Smith, 2007).<sup>1</sup> First, instrumentality per se is not the problem rather is its particular formulation. Second, this formulation posits educational research in narrow «scientific terms». Third, it not only influences research but extends into educational policy and recommendations for educational practice. Fourth, quick graduate training focusing largely on methodology contributes to and continues this research orientation. Fifth, «what works» characterizes what is valued as research results. Sixth, the authoritative status of «research-based» applications to practice comprises a professional curriculum for teachers and others.

First, research in education, in a now-arcane term, is nearly always «applied» and thus instrumental to a greater end. This is improvements of student learning, of school and classroom organization, of teaching and the like. The general enterprise is normative and highly value-laden; indeed its improvement could well be the vocation of an important group of public-minded intellectuals. But it is not. There are, however, «professors» of education who are recognized as «scholars» or intellectuals by a small group of peers. They understand a different conception of instrumentality from many others. Second, predominant forms of education research still reside within a relatively narrow conception of science. Its root model in the USA is accretive natural science research taken up from a narrow band of work in the social and behavioral sciences. And this receives funding! Even recent efforts by the National Research Council (2002) and the American Educational Research Association (2006, 2008) to reform education research do not take adequate account of several decades of developments in science and social-human science theory and philosophy, let alone other domains of human inquiry. Even the playfulness of Kuhn's normal scientists as puzzle-solvers seems absent. Third, one reason for a limiting vision of science is that relatively simple studies and results are more easily translated into policy and practice. The «research-base» for America's No Child Left Behind federal legislation, and all of its state and local implemen-



tations, are surely indicative. Even more telling, as greater criticism from increasingly different constituencies is being levied against such strict standardization and accountability, no turn to education intellectuals is itself manifest. Instead if history continues, some new short-sighted panacea – perhaps tinkering of reform – (Tyack/Cuban 1995) will appear again.

Fourth and fifth, the education academy perpetuates anti-intellectualism in two ways directly. One is in graduate school training of future researchers and the other is in «what works» studies themselves. In graduate training in the USA, for example, student coursework focuses initially and largely on methodology (Stone 2006, 2007). One becomes a quantitative or a qualitative researcher (hardly a philosopher or historian): the method often determines the topic of study and not the other way around. Additionally there is a push to undertake research practice immediately and «to get in and get out» with one's degree in as few years as possible. The latter relates to the quality of studies, to short periods of dissertation proposal preparation, quickly and narrowly conceived literature reviews, and, overall, research designs for studies finished «in a timely manner». Try as they might, theoretically thoughtful professors have difficulty fighting this institutionalized research culture.

Sixth, results of studies have come to comprise what is now called «research» or «evidence» based professional knowledge. Given its citation in brief journal articles and course textbooks for practitioners, its scientific, authoritative and truthful status is assumed – and the longer the string of research citations the better. Often there is no criticism of the research, more seldom of the larger research enterprise. Readers who engage in reflection generally do so with anecdotal narratives seeking whether the results fit or do not fit their own experiences. Ironically such discussion continues a «theory-practice» divide, and as Ladwig knows, of the devaluation of professional education within the academy itself.

## Conclusion

Ladwig's essay takes up the history and present condition of anti-intellectualism in teacher education, particularly in its institutional relationship to the rest of the academy and its resulting curricular focus. Intellectualism for him takes on various meanings, from a general denial of the value of intellectuals in western society to specifics in

subject matter content for teachers. Overall his meanings and that of this response overlap, especially when in conclusion he writes this: «[Today] it is safe to question ... any commitment to truly understanding the need for teachers to be intellectuals and to promote the virtues and rigours of intellectual life».

These remarks have been intended to complement and extend Ladwig's focus in education, not only in elaborating on a largely US context but also in attention to a current state of education research. The definition of intellectualism promoted herein is «classic,» in advocating a life of the mind and interest in ideas. Instrumentality in education under this description takes on new meaning, significantly different from what often seems a narrow form of scientific, «what works» research now being advocated as teacher education reform. From Jacoby's lead, the implication of these remarks is that there ought to be a renewed «intellectualism» across the academy. Finally, where else but in and for education could the pursuit of ideas, whose purpose is an instrumentality of the public good, be more valuable.

## Footnote

- 1 In making these claims I point to a general climate of research and do not deny that specific, thoughtful research has had important results for education practice.

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# Anti-intellectualism or reaction to deprofessionalization?

• Antonio Viñao

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century a retired Spanish primary school teacher, Simón López y Anguta, made the distinction in his memories between «art» and «science». Placing «art» within the field of practices, he wrote that it is composed of «a set of precise rules for doing something well», while «science» consisted of «a series or chain of principles which were joined by the double link of the principle on which they were founded and of the end which they proposed». Likewise, he explained that in the *Escuelas Normales* (Teacher Training Schools), where the teachers were trained, what they learned was the «science of the schoolmaster, known as Pedagogy» (López y Anguta 1907, p. 157).

His statements reflected a disappearing world, a world into which pedagogical science had been born in the 19<sup>th</sup> century as the science which upheld the professional training for primary school teaching. Yet, by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this science, as a professional area, was already being taken over and seized both by the universities (the first university professorships of pedagogy came into being at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century – in Spain in 1904 –), and by the worlds of experimental psychology and pedagogy, when not by that of the emerging sociology. Even in the *Escuelas Normales*, it was during this period that pedagogy would take on a scientific stamp under the ever stronger influence of quantitativism proper to experimental psychology and pedagogy, or child science, from which it would turn into a practical or applied science, i.e. a science-art of a theoretical and practical nature.

As António Nóvoa (1998) showed, this whole series of processes which reinforced each other – university appropriation of pedagogy, growing experimentalization of the same and the gestation of the education sciences as one more field of social and human sciences – would suppose another step in the related processes of deprofessionalization of primary school teaching and the correlative separation or divorce of two worlds: that of the practice of an office or art – primary school teaching with its own empirical and artisan culture – and that of pedagogy as a university science cultivated by experts and researchers and with an academic culture that had become estranged from the former.

The development over time of the training of teachers revealed a paradox. In contrast to the traditional and corporate training in the classroom as an apprentice or assistant to another teacher (at times complemented by the schoolteacher acade-

mies which were set up in some countries at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century) or in the model schools (as occurred with the Pestalozzian method, the «infant schools» or the Lancasterian «monitorial system»), the training received in the *Escuelas Normales* with annexed primary schools would lead to guaranteeing in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, to those cultural intermediaries between the world of science and high culture and that of elementary learning (i.e. the teachers), the possession of their own science, pedagogy, which gave new value to their professional status. By the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, the situation had undergone substantial changes. The teachers had gone from being intermediaries with the capacity to produce knowledge, or at least practices that were elevated to the level of techniques or ways of classroom organization, and who performed their tasks themselves, to being considered as mere tools whose only function was to apply in the classroom what was indicated to them from the spheres of scientific psychopedagogy or from the world of education sciences. Especially so, when that world was working in contact with laboratory-schools where new methods and experiments were being tested. Thus, classroom practice ceased to be considered a field of science from which to extract theoretical principles or ways of thinking and acting which could be generalized to other classrooms, unless such principles or ways of thinking and acting were the product of those, who from the «true» science had made education their field of professional scientific research, away from the classroom in universities or institutes of education research.

The separation between education as a science and education as an art widened over the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In the early decades of that century the overriding criteria was that imposed by, among others, Dewey in 1896 to which Ladwig alludes in his text: the university study of pedagogy as a science was recommended for «leaders of education and larger schools»; i.e. for administrators of education, inspectors, teachers of pedagogy in Teacher Training Schools and school heads. These would, or were to be, the intermediaries between university education science and the teachers in the classrooms; between who decided how the schools were to be organized and what syllabuses were to be taught or which methods were to be used in the classrooms, and who was to put their proposals into practice (or, in the case of the proposals being accepted by the administration, the legal prescriptions therewith). With this aim, university studies in pedagogy came into being, at least in Spain, through the creation of the *Escuela de Estudios Superiores del Magisterio* (Higher Teacher Training

School) in 1902, and, in 1932, of the degree in Pedagogy through the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts. One way or another, in the eyes of primary school teachers, these intermediaries represented pedagogical science and knowledge. This representation was also favoured by the fact that, in many cases, the intermediaries were responsible for educational journals or were authors of books and articles dealing with any educational issues. For the teaching world, they were the experts.

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially after the sixties, the situation was somewhat similar yet different. Similar, because the divorce or separation to which we alluded above persisted, and different because it would grow to include new actors and new ways of acting as regards the science of pedagogy, and also because this would be played out against a different backdrop – that of the successive educational reforms launched through administrations by university trained experts in educational issues.

Indeed, as Nóvoa points out (1998, p. 423), a characteristic feature of the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the field of education was the «extraordinary spread of groups of experts» and «university specialists (in curriculum, assessment, teaching, methodology, school organization)» who, in alliance with politicians and reformists, (sometimes the experts themselves) have built up «their own community» with its own particular ways of expression and channels of communication (associations, journals, etc.). The teachers (barring exceptions) for their part do not form part of this community nor are they in contact with it (Weiss 1995, pp. 583ff.). Their sources of information and reflections do not proceed from expert journals and publications but from their own experience or, in the best cases, the experiences of other teachers and schools through the collaborative networks set up by centres and teachers for the purposes of innovation and improvement. In general, both professional fields, that of the experts and that of the teachers, ignore the other, when they are not distrusting or scorning each other. In the final analysis, however, it all comes down to a question of power and shaping of professional fields. If a rationality which is outside educational practice is to be founded which legitimises the controlling power of the experts of the same, then it is necessary to control and master the scientific field from which periodically flow the con-

cepts, the jargon used to understand and conceive the training of the teachers and which, through successive reforms, has sought to regulate their professional practices.

The final turn of the screw in this process of control and power over the teaching profession comes, at least in Europe and, in particular, in Spain from those «Common European Principles for Teacher Competences and Qualifications» to which the final lines of Ladwig's text allude. Here it is because the rhetorical references to the need, in teacher training, to take into account «life-long learning», «professional mobility», or the capacities to work «with communities» in «partnerships» harbour educational policies which apply criteria and standardization norms from the curriculum and assessment methods of the teaching profession and of the performance of the relevant educational institutions. These have been designed and put into practice in each country by the relevant experts, who in general have a university training in pedagogy or psychology, and they serve to reinforce the power these experts wield over teachers at all levels of education, now including universities, and lead, therefore, to the deprofessionalization of their knowledge and practices; in other words, of their academic and professional culture. It is from this perspective – as a reaction against the deprofessionalization of knowledge and of specific practices – that we should view, as one possibility among others, not only the traditional anti-intellectualism of primary school teachers but also the negative reaction of a good part of the secondary education academic world since the eighties, and more recently on the part of the universities, to the psychopedagogical, curricular and standardization proposals and impositions coming from a certain part of the world of experts and scientists in education.

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# Anti-intellectualism and Teacher Education in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Is there any way out?

• Antonio Novoa

The essay by James Ladwig rightly points the problem of anti-intellectualism, both in education and teacher education. As the author explains, it is a long-standing issue that invades historical and contemporary discourses. I will not deepen the arguments raised by James Ladwig, but I will add my own perspective to this debate, and I will ask if there is any way out.

Recently, in preparing a keynote address on *Teacher professional development for the quality and equity of lifelong learning* upon invitation from the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union, I collected a wide range of documentation: international reports, scientific articles, political speeches, documents about teacher education, books and PhD theses, etc. When reading this material over a few days one can see the recurrent use of the same concepts and language, of the same ways of speaking and thinking about the problems of the teaching profession.

We are looking at a type of discursive consensus, rather redundant and verbose, which expands into references about teachers' professional development, the coordination of initial training, induction and in-service training from a lifelong learning perspective, the focus on the first years of professional practice and the placement of young teachers in schools, the idea of the reflective teacher and research-based teacher education, the new competencies for teachers in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the importance of collaborative cultures, teamwork, monitoring, supervision and assessment of teachers and so on.

All of this is part of a discourse that has become dominant and one that we all have contributed to. We are not just talking about words, but also about the practices and policies that they transport and suggest.

Two major groups have contributed to the dissemination and vulgarization of this discourse, here understood in the sense of *discourse-practice* that Cleo Cherryholmes gave it: «the intertextuality of discourses and practices constitutes and structures our social and educational worlds» (Cherryholmes 1988, p. 8).

In the first place, there is the group commonly known as the *teacher education community*, which includes researchers in subject areas, in education and didactics, networks and institutions. In the last fifteen years, this community has produced a number of impressive texts, which include the concept of the reflective teacher, changing how teachers and teacher education are viewed.

The second group is made up of *international ex-*

*perts* that act as consultants or are part of major international organizations (OECD, UNESCO, the European Union, etc.). Despite their heterogeneous nature, they have created and disseminated, on a global scale, discursive practices that are strongly grounded on comparative arguments. Their legitimacy is essentially based on the knowledge of international networks and comparative data and less on the theoretical expertise of a scientific or professional area.

My point is that these two groups, more than teachers themselves, have contributed to the renovation of studies on the teaching profession. While making this statement, I cannot help but remember David Labaree's warning: The current movement to professionalize teaching reflects two key factors: (1) efforts by teacher educators to raise their own professional status, and (2) their efforts to develop a science of teaching. Proposed reforms may promote the rationalization of instruction through an authoritative, research driven, standardized vision of teaching practice (Labaree 1992, p. 123).

It is important to understand the paradox which gives rise to important contradictions in the history of the teaching profession: the rhetoric about the mission of teachers implies giving them greater social visibility, which consolidates their prestige but provokes stricter state and/or scientific control, leading to a devaluing of their own competencies and their professional autonomy.

In my opinion, this situation is at the root of the «problem» raised by James Ladwig. Creating a divide between theory and practice, between professors/experts and teachers, inevitably draws a frontier that renders the emergence of a professional practice that is intellectually enriched impossible.

Let me go a little further in my argument. One of the most long-standing debates on education and Teacher Education concerns the relationship between theory and practice. Pedagogical literature is filled with references to this discussion, at least since the consolidation of the first teacher training schools (mid-19<sup>th</sup> century) and the development of university chairs in Pedagogy or Educational Science (second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century). The most influential authors, on both sides of the Atlantic, from Gabriel Compayré (1843–1913) to Stanley Hall (1844–1924), from Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) to John Dewey (1859–1952), dedicate an important part of their work to the discussion of this issue.

Even if they adopt different perspectives, their conclusions always stress the impossibility of solving the problem. That is why, explains Émile Durkheim, one should talk about a *theory practice*, uniting instead of opposing these two terms (Durkheim 1911). Yes, but ... This operation is purely rhetorical

if teachers don't consolidate their knowledge and their fields of intervention, ones which improve teaching cultures and do not transform teachers into a profession dominated by university professors, experts or by the «education industry».

What needs to be done? Perhaps it is possible to highlight two ideas, which are far from exhaustive but may help to overcome the anti-intellectualism trends in education and teacher education.

First, *it is necessary for teacher education to come from within the profession*. The phrase sounds odd. By using this expression, I wish to underline the need for teachers to have a predominant place in training their peers. There will be no significant change if the «teacher education community» and the «community of teachers» do not become more permeable and overlapping. The example of doctors and training hospitals and the way they are prepared in the initial stages of training, induction and in-service training can perhaps serve as inspiration.

In truth, it is not possible to write text after text about *praxis* and *practicum*, about *phronesis* and *prudentia* as references of teaching knowledge, about reflective teachers, if teachers do not achieve a greater presence in the training of their own profession. It is important to invite the richness, complexity and beauty of teaching out of the closet by making it visible and accessible, as is the case with other scholarly and creative work, as advocated by Lee Shulman (2007).

These proposals cannot be mere rhetorical declarations. They only make sense if they are constructed *within* the profession, if they are appropriated from the reflection of teachers about their own work. While they are only injunctions from the outside, the changes within the teaching profession will be rather poor.

Second, *it is necessary to promote new ways of organizing the profession*. Most of the discourse becomes unrealistic and unworkable if the profession continues to be distinguished by ingrained individualist traditions or by rigid external regulations, particularly bureaucratic ones that have become more obvious in recent years. This paradox is well known among historians: the more one talks of teacher autonomy, the more teachers are controlled, in various ways, leading to a reduction in the margins for freedom and independence.

Professional collegiality, sharing and collaborative cultures cannot be imposed through administrative means or decisions from above. It is not possible to bridge the gap between discourse and practice if there is no autonomous professional field that is sufficiently rich and open. Pat Hutchings and Mary Taylor Huber are right when they refer to the importance of consolidating the teaching commons – «a conceptual space in which communities of edu-

cators committed to inquiry and innovation come together to exchange ideas about teaching and learning, and use them to meet the challenges of educating students for personal, professional, and civic life» (Hutchings/Taylor 2006).

Pedagogic movements or communities of practice consolidate a feeling of belonging and professional identity that is essential for teachers to appropriate processes of change and transform them into concrete practice. It is useless to appeal for reflection if there is no organization in school that facilitates it. It is useless to call for mutual, inter-peer, and collaborative training if the definition of teaching careers is not coherent within this aim.

In my view, it will be impossible to overcome anti-intellectualism without capturing the sense of a profession that does not simply fit into a technical or scientific conception. At the same time, it is necessary to consolidate the presence of teachers in the public space of education. I turn to Jürgen Habermas and his concept of «public sphere of action». In the case of education, this sphere has expanded considerably in recent years. However, paradoxically, teachers' presence here has also been reduced. There is a lot of talk about schools and teachers. Talk from journalists, columnists, university professors, experts. Teachers don't talk. There is an absence of teachers, a kind of silence from a profession that has lost visibility in the public arena.

In a word, it is pointless to discuss anti-intellectualism if one doesn't discuss the condition of teachers, the organization of the profession and its capacity to intervene and participate in public debates about education. What I want to say, as stressed by James Ladwig, is that the debate is not only an epistemological debate, but it implies important ideological and political dimensions.

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# The ethos of the intellectual and its public meaning

• Jan Masschelein

Although I would not like to argue against the idea that the university as a place of intellectual life would be an adequate place for (parts of) teacher education and that teachers should be seen as «intellectuals», I have a lot of difficulties with the text, with the overall argument and the way it is presented.

The most important difficulty relates to what is meant by the intellectual and by «intellectual life», the ethos it implies and the political meaning that is related to it. In fact it is not really elaborated, but at some point we can read that intellectual life includes «a disposition to persistently pursue reason and good judgment», and we can assume that it is about «justification of claims» of reason, «disciplined scientific work» and «extensive subject knowledge». This intellectual disposition, then, would have made, if it would have been more present in the population i.e. in teachers and through teaching, that «the willingness to support governments embarking on highly questionable foreign and domestic policies» would have been far less spread. Implying also that, in that case, a far better policy would be made, without «the grave consequences» of today's policy.

So it seems that the intellectual is the one who disposes of extensive knowledge, is concerned about the justification of claims and persistently pursues reason i.e. subjugates herself to the tribunal of reason and judges what is presented to her accordingly (as Kant required of his enlightened readers). And it seems that good policy itself has to be rational in that sense i.e. that the civil kingdom should be subjugated under the kingdom of reason. The teacher, then, as intellectual, would act in name of this kingdom. This is, however, a very particular way of looking at politics and at the intellectual and her ethos and activities. The main activity seems to be judging implying a subjugation under principles of a tribunal in whose name one operates and to which one claims to have a (privileged) access, addressing an audience (the polis/public) as in need of (intellectual, rational) guidance, guidance by the principles or claims of reason. This critical intellectual, thus, would continue a pastoral attitude as the gate keeper of the kingdom of reason and as the one who guides people towards this kingdom and who equips people with the necessary subjectivity in order to pass the gate. Many remarks could be made here, but I confine myself to two.

One should, first, point to the fact that this intellectual ethos implies the instauration of a fundamental division (or inequality) between intellectu-

als and non-intellectuals, those who are (already) subjects (of reason) and those who are not, a division which is itself not rational, and implies to consider oneself, as intellectual, to be better, and to be more able for good politics. This is in fact the (political) ethos of aristocracy (the aristocracy of the intellect e.g. of those who, as Platon tells us, either where blessed by the Gods since they were blended with gold, or where educated to take part in the kingdom of reason) rejecting democracy and its hypothesis of equality of all (voices).

Secondly, there are good reasons to wonder whether these intellectual dispositions and ethos are really working in the way Ladwig suggests. Indeed, many have pointed to the at least ambivalent political role of intellectuals (and of some of the greatest of them) throughout history, one of the most troubling examples being the very educated and highly intellectual elite that supported and enabled fascist policy in Germany. But it was Hannah Arendt who analyzed first and in detail how precisely the attitude to subjugate under «principles», which are in this case the principles or claims of reason, and to judge accordingly, did not prevent at all from being involved in atrocities, rather the contrary seems to be true.

However, at the same time, Arendt maintained that what could help us refrain from politics with «grave consequences» was the activity of the mind called «thinking». Thinking not being about pursuing reason or logical argument, not being about being very intelligent or having elaborated an extensive knowledge, but about the preparedness to live explicitly together with oneself, i.e. to deliver oneself to that «silent intercourse (in which we examine what we say and what we do)», in which one knows oneself as being confronted with an invisible partner or witness with whom one has to live together and to whom one has to respond. This we could use as a totally different way of looking at the intellectual disposition. This disposition would be the disposition to think for oneself i.e. to take care of oneself, which does not require a particular intelligence and which is not the privilege of those who know, but is open for all and implies that one confirms one's own capacity i.e. that one starts from the (democratic) hypothesis of equality (that we are all equally rational beings i.e. that we all can think, and therefore also I can think). Arendt writes: «Thinking ... as ... the actualization of the difference given in consciousness, is not a prerogative of the few but an ever-present faculty in everybody; by the same token, inability to think is not a failing of the many who lack brain power but an ever-present possibility in everybody – scientists, scholars, and other specialists in mental enterprises not

excluded» (Arendt 1978, p. 191).

If we follow Arendt (and others) here, this means that there is no difference between people qua intelligence (as capacity to think), but only between those who deliver themselves to (or embark in) thinking and those who don't. And the political task of teachers, then, is not to transmit knowledge or to propagate subjugation to (the tribunal of) reason, but, as Jacques Rancière's ignorant schoolmaster, to support the will to think, not by judging, but by exposing one's own thinking. In this context it would be worthwhile to explore the idea that the possible political role of the teacher has to do with

his/her «public» appearance i.e. with the remarkable circumstance that teachers, still up today, are willing to expose themselves (i.e. the part of the world that masters them, that they «love», to continue with Arendt) individually to a group of a younger generation. Taking care of this ethos of exposition is most certainly not the privilege of the university (although it can be one of the places where it is cultivated).

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## Teacher Education and Teachers as Intellectuals: Comments concerning recent policy discourses in Sweden

• Sverker Lindblad

James Ladwig is dealing with highly important aspects of teacher education discourses as well as teachers' work and life in his text on anti-intellectualism. I will not deal with the concept of anti-intellectualism and its specific problems as such. And I will not deal with explanations of war with reference to schooling characteristics. Instead I will focus on communicative qualities in current policy discourses on teacher education and how teachers' work and life is communicated in Sweden. Based on this I will discuss some notions on the making of an intellectual stance in teacher education and in teachers' work and life.

On the Swedish context: As in other national contexts teacher education programmes in Sweden have had somewhat of a complicated history in Academia (Skog-Östlin 1984). It is of vital importance to capture the historically and culturally based distinctions in Sweden between schoolteachers and preschool-teachers on one side and subject-matter teachers in secondary schools on the other side, where the former side entered into a university education some thirty years ago, while the latter was established since long as academic career related to the formation and reproduction of university disciplines.

Compared to most other higher education programmes teacher education is most explicitly governed by political decisions. Teacher education is a visible field for policy communication and translation of policy discourses into higher education activities, such as selection of content and structuring teacher education programmes. When the current liberal-conservative government came into power in Sweden the education minister repeatedly proclaimed that reforming teacher education was a most prioritized target. Competent teachers are

needed in producing equal life chances for all children and in dealing with globalisation challenges in a better way than is shown in international comparisons by TIMSS and PISA. We need teachers that are focussing on learning and are making children interested in knowledge. Given this framing by the Education minister big problems are the quality of teacher education and that teaching is not an attractive vocation any more, as shown in the decreasing number of qualified students to the teacher education programmes.

From this policy position teachers are constructed as omnipotent professionals that will confront social inequalities as well as globalisation in a successful way. Needed is a qualifying education of teachers that will make them competent and accountable professionals that will focus learning and increase student motivation and agency (see here e.g. Lindblad/Lundahl 2001; Lindgren/Zackari 2001). In that sense this predominant policy position is taking a futuristic and instrumental stance, leaving little room for reflections on the preconditions for teachers' work or questioning the conceived omnipotence of teachers.

Thus, the prioritized policy problem is teacher education. According to a matrix of agencies – producing different measurements on teacher education – a number of statements are communicated about Swedish schooling and teacher education programmes – their recruitment, scientific qualities and outcomes in general and at specific universities and programmes. This communication is *asymmetric* – the magic of comparisons can be used by system agents such as national agency and ministries but is of less use to different teacher education programmes. It can also be regarded as *simplistic* – the statements are based on what is easy to measure and communicable to policy makers, e.g. numbers of teacher educators that has got a PhD or the ratio

of passing and failing students. Such asymmetric and simplistic communication is not produced by accident or lack of competence. It is part of the working of a restructured welfare state using a number of tools and techniques for policy communication and for governing the public sector under a performative turn.

However, using such tools has some major intellectual drawbacks. Little of a social and historical understanding of schooling or of teacher education is dealt with – for instance ongoing expansion of higher education producing an increasing number of alternative careers to teaching (Askling et al. 2007) or changes in middle class positions and orientations (Lindblad/Sohlberg 2003) of importance for the recruitment to teacher education as well as for schooling. Furthermore, there are little of analyses of why large shares of a cohort of students seem to avoid a career as a teacher compared to other alternatives. What impact does e.g. these students' observations of their own teachers' work in primary and secondary education have here? And how is teachers' work and life conceptualised in the public discourse – what are the cultural and social challenges here? From my point of view qualities of teachers as intellectuals – given even the broadest definition of the concept – are absent in current communication on teacher education. Instead teachers are configured as accountable semi-professionals in a restructured market informed system.

Not surprisingly, this predominating policy discourse is positioning teacher education as a professional education subordinated to policy decisions and evaluations. Excluded are historical and social understandings of the teaching professions as well as teachers' professional work and life. There is a lack of analysis in this information, which makes it almost non-intellectual – leaving no room for considerations of alternative understandings of teacher education issues or spaces for analyses of teacher education in historical or cultural analyses as well as for potential strategies to deal with such issues. This does not mean that there is a lack of theoretical and empirical analyses concerning teacher education of today, but that such studies are outside current predominating policy positions. This is further emphasized by the fact that chosen political narratives on educational restructuring has the characteristics of no alternatives in economy-driven education policies (c.f. Lindblad/Popkewitz 2001).

In sum, current predominating teacher education policy communication is based on what can be regarded as a-social (not dealing with analyses of social and historical contexts) and un-intellectual (not discussing different ways of understanding and dealing with) teacher education issues a-social information driven by simplistic understandings of teacher education. To me, this is not by accident – it is part of dominating political positions as well as instruments for description and analysis. Given such discourses teacher education and teachers' work and life is presented as almost non-intellectual activities governed by trivialities. From this point of view current education policy discourses are actually part of major problems for recruitment to teacher education. From these positions there is little of ambitions to improve intellectual qualities in teachers' work and life. This does not mean that such statements are monolithically translated into the work of teacher education. There are alternative understandings available underlining professional and intellectual characteristics of teacher education and teachers' work and public life. Of vital importance here is to capture the construction of teachers and schooling as well as teacher education by current tools and technologies as well as to frame the complex realities of education of contemporary societies.

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