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II

CHRISTOS KREMMYDAS

DEMOSTHENES' *PHILIPPICS* AND THE ART OF CHARACTERISATION FOR THE ASSEMBLY

The projection of the speaker's character (*ethos*) is of paramount importance in oratory. This is acknowledged by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* where *ethos* is singled out as one of the three 'artistic' means of persuasion (1356a) and key issues regarding the perception of a speaker's character and its role in persuasion are identified:

"[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for it is not the case, as some of the handbook writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness [*epieikeia*] on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the most authoritative form of persuasion." (1356a, trans. Kennedy)¹

¹ διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἥθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γάρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβές μὴ ἔστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων, <οὐ> τίθεμεν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἥθος.

Later on in the same work, Aristotle stresses that “there are three reasons that make speakers persuasive … besides logical argument”, and cites two character traits and an emotional response: “practical wisdom and virtue and goodwill” (*Rhet.* 1378a).²

Anaximenes, too, is aware of the importance of *ethos*, and whilst he generally avoids theorising in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*,³ he makes a few practical recommendations on how to project the speaker’s *ethos* in the most positive way.⁴ However, it is probably fair to say that these theoretical works of the second half of the 4th century BC lend more emphasis to their treatment of emotions and logical arguments⁵ than to the projection of character.⁶

A key question remains: To what extent does rhetorical theory reflect oratorical practice? It is doubtful whether Aristotle, in particular, took into account the Attic orations that have come down to us.⁷ A similar question has recently been addressed by Christopher Pelling, who compared speeches in Herodotus and Thucydides with the rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Anaximenes and concluded that despite the methodological difficulties posed by them, 4th-century rhetorical

² τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αἰτιατοσαῦτα γάρ ἐστι δὶ’ ἀ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια.

³ Note, however, 35, 17-18 (οἵ δὲ λόγοι τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ τῶν τρόπων εἰσὶν οἶνοι εἰκόνες, “reports are in a way reflections of character and personality”, trans. MIRHADY), where he talks about narratives regarding an opponent’s life in a forensic setting.

⁴ E.g. 35, 18: φυλάττου δὲ καὶ τὰς αἰσχρὰς πράξεις μὴ αἰσχροῖς ὀνόμασι λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ διαβάλῃς τὸ ἡθος, ἀλλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰνιγματωδῶς ἐρμηνεύειν καὶ ἔτερων πραγμάτων ὀνόμασι χρώμενος δηλοῦν τὸ πρᾶγμα.

⁵ Aristotle explicitly mentions the neglect of enthymemes in contemporary rhetorical treatises (1354a-b).

⁶ Anaximenes cites now-lost rhetorical handbooks by himself and Corax, and alludes to the existence of others whose authors he does not name who had also provided “political and forensic precepts” (*Rhet. ad Alex. Ep.* 16-17). It is unknown whether the construction of *ethos* in the Assembly would have received greater attention in those works.

⁷ TREVETT (1996) argues that Aristotle does not quote from Athenian deliberative or forensic orations because they did not reflect his pupils’ interests and were not widely circulated anyway.

theory can still shed light on speeches embedded in 5th-century historiography.⁸

Modern scholarship has generally sought to identify direct links between theory and oratorical practice (e.g. types of arguments or emotions described in rhetorical theory and also occurring in extant Attic oratory).⁹ However, most of the time, the relationships and interplays are far subtler and more complex than one might expect. And whilst techniques of characterisation in Attic oratory have attracted attention with regard to the forensic context,¹⁰ the deliberative context has not been explored in depth.

In this paper I hope to shed some light on characterisation as an integral part of rhetorical strategies in deliberative oratory in the setting of the Assembly. Since the overwhelming majority of our surviving deliberative orations date to the 4th century BC and are found in the *corpus Demosthenicum*, I shall examine Demosthenes' Assembly speeches as evidence for the presentation of character as a means of persuasion. In particular, I shall focus on speeches of the so-called 'Philippic cycle', which date to the heyday of his political career (351-341). First, I shall make some preliminary methodological observations in relation to the portrayal of *ethos* in a deliberative context. I shall then consider how Demosthenes makes his *ethos* central to his endeavour to assert his leadership credentials in the Assembly, and briefly examine the range of rhetorical strategies he employs in order to project his character in his deliberative speeches. I shall explore how some of the techniques of characterisation he uses evolved over time in response to the changing political context and conclude that Demosthenes' *ethos* in the speeches of the Philippic cycle was flexible, adaptable, and carefully crafted in order to persuade the audience of his trustworthiness.

⁸ PELLING (2012).

⁹ A few recent works on *ethos* in Greek rhetoric and oratory: GILL (1984); WISSE (1989); RUSSELL (1990); FORTENBAUGH (1992); CAREY (1994); WOERTHER (2005).

¹⁰ E.g. CAREY (1994) 34-43; DE BRAUW (2002); KREMMYDAS (2013).

The orator's *ethos* and the Assembly

Given the importance of the projection of character in all genres of oratory, it is worth reflecting briefly on its rhetorical constitution. Three questions need to be considered: first, is the *ethos* of an individual speaker essentially the same at any given time, yet what varies is its perception by diverse audiences, whilst different character traits are projected in different rhetorical contexts? This would mean that some members of the audience in an Assembly might perceive certain aspects of a speaker's character through his speech, while others may take in different traits. At the same time, a speaker might choose to focus on a core set of traits (e.g. reliability, experience, knowledge, and foresight) in the context of the Assembly,¹¹ while promoting his non-litigiousness, his *metriotes*, civic-spiritedness, and unimpeachable public life in the law-courts. The *ethos* of the individual is thus the same and internally consistent, and the projection of different traits reflects the different contextual rhetorical needs of the speaker.

Second, to what extent does prior familiarity with a person's life and character affect the perception of his character in a rhetorical context? And to what extent does the rhetorical construction of a speaker's *ethos* depend on the audience's familiarity with his personality, and his public and private life?

Third, should a distinction be drawn between real and rhetorical *ethos*? Real *ethos* emanates from an individual's life, social interactions, interpersonal relationships, political position and general standing in the community, personal successes and failures. However, is it independent from any rhetorical representations thereof in the public *fora* of the city? Many members of the audience might have already formed a positive or negative view of an individual's *ethos* based on their

¹¹ Cf. the triptych of traits in ARIST. *Rhet.* 1378a (φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὐνοία; see n. 2 above). On foresight (*προορᾶν*) in political-deliberative contexts see, e.g., DEM. 4, 41; 6, 6, 8; 18, 27.

established public *persona*. The rhetorically skilled speaker (or a logographer employed by a speaker in a forensic setting) may portray his *ethos* in such a way as to maximise the positive and minimise or conceal any negative traits.¹² This rhetorically crafted presentation of *ethos* (rhetorical *ethos*) helps bolster the prior positive views among the audience and seeks to sway those who hold no or negative views. This rhetorical *ethos* is the orator's (or logographer's) 'artistic' creation, but the exact relation it bears to the real *ethos* is subject to negotiation and manipulation. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle seems to suggest that one can draw a distinction between these two kinds of *ethos*, but a firm distinction cannot be substantiated.¹³ There are clearly smaller or larger overlaps between the real and the artistic *ethos*, otherwise the latter would not have been either credible or effective as a tool of persuasion; the gulf between the real and the constructed would have been apparent to many in the audience.

Further issues relating to the presentation of the orator's *ethos* in the Assembly should be considered before proceeding to a discussion of techniques of self-presentation: first, since Assembly debates were meant to consider questions of expediency for the polis in terms of future policy,¹⁴ while questions of justice¹⁵ and legal, personal liability of politicians were mostly

¹² E.g. the self-presentation of Nicias and Alcibiades in Thucydides' *Redetrias* (6, 9-23); see further KREMMYDAS (2016a).

¹³ *Rhet.* 1356a (contrast ISOC. 15, 278); Aristotle's distinction between *ethos* emanating from and enhanced by people's position and rhetorically constructed *ethos* is too firm.

¹⁴ Anaximenes' *Rhet. ad Alex.* highlights "concord, military forces, money and good supply of revenues, good and plentiful allies" (δόμονοια, δυνάμεις πρὸς πόλεμον, χρήματα καὶ προσόδων εὐπορία, συμμάχων ἀρετὴ καὶ πλῆθος; 1, 1) as advantageous for a city (πόλει δὲ συμφέροντα).

¹⁵ Aristotle's *Rhetoric* probably overstresses the dominance of *sypheron*-related themes and arguments in deliberative oratory, while Thucydides' speeches suggest the importance of arguments from justice in Assembly debates: e.g. ARIST. *Rhet.* 1358b22; 1362a18-20; 1365b25; cf., e.g., THUC. 3, 38, 1; 3, 40 (Cleon); note Diodotus' contestation of the blurring of the lines between *sypheron* and *dikaion* in Cleon's speech: 3, 44, 4; 47, 5; cf. 3, 56, 3 (the Plataeans' speech before a 'court' of Spartan judges); 3, 59, 3.

delegated to the *dikasteria* in the second half of the 4th century,¹⁶ one does not encounter strong vituperation in deliberative orations of the kind encountered in forensic speeches where acquittal of the speaker (or of an individual for whom the speaker acted as a *synegoros*) and conviction of an opponent (and a penalty) are at stake.¹⁷ Thus not only the etiquette but also techniques of self-characterisation in the *ekklesia* are different from those used in the courts.¹⁸ And so, the role of the speaker's *ethos* in deliberative oratory is different from the role it performs in a forensic context.¹⁹

Second, one should not rush into the hasty conclusion that all speakers taking the speakers' *bema* would have been well-known to the Assembly-going public. Hansen's work on the prosopography of 4th-century Athenian politicians has highlighted 373 individuals attested as *rhetores* and *strategoi* for the period 403-322.²⁰ Athenian proposers of decrees would have delivered shorter or longer speeches to introduce their draft proposals to the assembly (epigraphic formula τάδε εἰπεν), while others would have spoken up to introduce riders to the draft proposal. How important was the perception of their *ethos* by the audience in the Assembly? To what extent did the projection of their *ethos* matter in terms of persuading their audience or did other considerations, such as the political group they belonged to at the time and their association with widely known politicians, weigh more heavily when it came to voting for or against a proposal? Was it a case of *ethos*

¹⁶ In the 5th century (and the first-half of the 4th) the Assembly maintained a large role in judging political trials. Cases of *eisangeliai* were still tried in the *ekklesia* until 362. HANSEN (1991) 158-159, and in greater detail HANSEN (1975).

¹⁷ E.g. the different uses of language denoting deception in the Assembly and the law-courts: KREMMYDAS (2013) esp. 52.

¹⁸ Note DEM. 18, 143, which suggests that the Assembly would not tolerate accusations of a personal character.

¹⁹ In this paper, I shall focus primarily on the speaker's self-presentation; I shall consider the way in which the *ethos* of opponents is presented only where it is relevant to the projection of the speaker's own *ethos*.

²⁰ HANSEN (1989a); (1989b).

by association, i.e. the projection of the character traits of an individual onto a political associate? The benefits for a leading politician in such a case would be obvious, while the risks would be minimised. If this was indeed the case, then an awareness of the politician/speaker's *ethos* would have been central to success in the Assembly.

Third, one should also take into account the rhetorical tactics in the Assembly and the possibility that some speakers representing a political group or advocating a specific position would have put forward specific proposals (thus also assuming the legal responsibility for them), while key political figure(s) might have confined themselves to cameo appearances, lending their ethical and political support to the case made by their associates.²¹

Projecting *ethos* in the Assembly: techniques of self-presentation

Since rhetorical theory is not too helpful in terms of elucidating the construction and projection of rhetorical *ethos* in deliberative oratory, it is worth considering different means through which a speaker could portray his *ethos* in the Assembly in order to project authority and engender trust in the audience. The rhetorical techniques of characterisation highlighted below do not represent an exhaustive checklist,²² yet they might facilitate the discussion of *ethos* in deliberative oratory as we navigate through the deliberative speeches of the Demosthenic corpus. Some of these techniques shed light on the orator's *ethos* explicitly (nos. 1 and 2), while others (nos. 3-6) do so implicitly.

²¹ I am considering team-speaking in the Athenian Assembly as well as the possibility of logographic speeches delivered in the Assembly in KREMMYDAS (2017a). See also RUBINSTEIN (2017).

²² Assembly speakers in Thucydides do not use explicit self-characterisation to the same extent as Demosthenes; e.g. Pericles uses self-referential passages in 2, 60, 1, 5; 61, 2 (in response to personal criticism), Cleon employs meta-rhetorical passages to lament the state of deliberative oratory (3, 38, 2-7); Alcibiades is the most explicit of all speakers in his self-promotion (6, 16, 1, 3-6).

1) **Meta-rhetorical passages:** generic passages regarding the role and failures of rhetoric in deliberation, criticising the tendency to prioritise what is pleasant to the ears over what is expedient (e.g. Dem. 3, 18, 22; 9, 2; *Ex.* 44, 1).

2) **Self-referential passages** and *topoi* (e.g. the speaker's inability to do justice to a topic):²³ while the speaker's *ethos* is important in persuasion, the promotion of his personal rhetorical skills and ethical qualities tends to take place indirectly (see n. 15 above with references to Assembly speakers in Thucydides; cf. *Andoc.* 4). But is this reticence to engage in direct, explicit self-characterisation simply a feature of oratorical etiquette in the Assembly? Demosthenes states (5, 4) that he does not wish to talk about himself and, although this was a profitable exercise for some, he considers it "vulgar and offensive" (φορτικὸν καὶ ἐπαχθὲς). Had standards really slipped by Demosthenes' time and speakers simply did not pay attention to oratorical etiquette anymore? How can we account for the growing prominence of direct means of promoting the speaker's *ethos* in the corpus of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches? Can it be attributed to contextual factors (the speaker's age, experience, and responses to specific criticisms)?

What is of greater interest in terms of the projection of a speaker's *ethos* is not the mere rehashing of *topoi* and meta-rhetorical passages that represented stock material of deliberative oratory. Instead, one should examine how such material is combined as part of wider rhetorical strategies and adapted to the different oratorical contexts,²⁴ what is the likely effect of such adaptations, and what the latter may reveal about the development/change in the projection of the orator's *ethos*.

3) **The use of praise and criticism:** as part of the projection of his *ethos*, the orator *qua* teacher and adviser of the people, may praise the audience for their past successes and criticise

²³ This *topos* is attested in *prooemia* of deliberative speeches and forms part of the speaker's *captatio benevolentiae* (e.g. 3, 1; 5, 1; 15, 32; 16, 2; cf. *Ex.* 4; 8, 2).

²⁴ On Demosthenes' tailoring of arguments to fit the context, see YUNIS (1996) 237.

their past failures or errors of judgment. He may also wish to castigate the actions and *ethos* of rival politicians, thus implicitly promoting his reliability and integrity. However, both praise and criticism carry potential pitfalls for the orator. Even though one might think that by lavishing praise on the audience the orator can hardly go wrong, the orator has to be cautious lest he come across as sycophantic. Praise of the people (mostly the Athenian ancestors) has to be balanced with the need to criticise the audience without alienating it. Finally, by castigating the decisions or harmful advice given by rival politicians the orator promotes his own wisdom and reliability, although excessive criticism of rivals also risks alienating the audience.

4) **Types of logical argument (especially *gnomai*):** logical argumentation (*enthymemes*) and especially *gnomai* help project an air of authority and credibility by appealing to a sense of shared presuppositions.²⁵ Anaximenes offers quite a helpful categorisation of *gnomai* into 'conventional' and 'paradoxical' and provides a few examples (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 11, 1-6), while Aristotle identifies four species (*Rhet.* 1394a-1395b) and stresses the fact that they make a speech 'ethical', i.e. they demonstrate the good character of an individual.

5) **The knowledge and use of past history:** the orator's demonstration of knowledge and his use of past Athenian (and Greek) history help to enhance his authority and, ultimately, reliability in the eyes of the audience.

6) **The speaker's adherence to communal values and ideals:** as in forensic oratory, the speaker in a deliberative context needs to persuade the audience that he espouses the same set of values and ideals and therefore can be trusted.

Since it is not possible to do justice here to all the different ways in which this wide range of techniques is being used, I shall focus my attention in the rest of this paper on nos. 1, 2, and 3.

²⁵ I develop this point further in KREMMYDAS (2017a).

Demosthenes and the limits of deliberative *ethos*: the early Assembly speeches

Demosthenes' Assembly speeches are central to our appreciation of Demosthenes as an orator and leading Athenian politician.²⁶ The speeches in which he is dealing with the threat of Philip of Macedon played a significant role in cementing his fame as a politician fighting for Greek freedom. However, before examining the Philippic speeches, it is worth considering the creation of Demosthenes' *ethos* in his early Assembly speeches (354-351). After all, in 354, when he delivered his first recorded deliberative oration *On the Symmories*, he would have been just over thirty.

Although the age limit for attending Assembly proceedings was twenty (*Ath. Pol.* 42, 5),²⁷ it would have probably taken promising young Athenians a while before they could make their mark on the *bema* of the Assembly (cf. Dem. 4, 1). Demosthenes, of course, did not wait to make his name in the Assembly, as he had already been active in the law-courts since his well-known dispute with his guardians between 364 and 362. Even if one assumes that he had refrained from or had been unsuccessful at making a break into the Assembly, he would have been fairly well-known to the wider public as a logographer and *synegoros*.²⁸ His first two trierarchies (363, 360/59)²⁹ and the speeches delivered in connection with trierarchic affairs suggest that he was very much active in the public sphere.³⁰ The absence of recorded Assembly speeches from the period 362-354 suggests either that he did not deliver any

²⁶ DEM. 1-6, 8-10, 14-16 are genuine; [DEM.] 7 should be attributed to Hegesippus, [DEM.] 13 may be an early Demosthenic speech, but there are some doubts; [DEM.] 17 is probably a rhetorical exercise.

²⁷ Perhaps since the early 4th century: HANSEN (1991) 89.

²⁸ Note his participation as logographer or supporting speaker in public suits (*graphai paranomôn* and *nomon mē epitedeion theinai*) between 356 and 354: DEM. 47 (in 356/5), 20, 22 (both dated in 355/4).

²⁹ Demosthenes' trierarchies: DEM. 51; DEM. 21, 154; AESCHIN. 3, 173.

³⁰ See also DAVIES (1971) 135-137.

formal speeches or that he did not wish to preserve any of these early specimens of his deliberative oratory. This would make sense, if this eight-year period was seen as a formative period during which Demosthenes was busy networking and preparing for his later political career.³¹ In the retrospective on his career, the speech *On the Crown*, Demosthenes chooses to emphasise the fact that he made a late entry into Athenian politics (18, 18, 60). This is roughly consistent with the publication dates of his earliest extant speeches, although Demosthenes fails to specify the exact point of his first intervention in Athenian politics.

One should also bear in mind that the three earliest (genuine) Demosthenic speeches deal with internal Athenian affairs (the organisation of the navy), the situation in mainland Greece (Thebes vs. Sparta) and the possibility of a fall-out with the Persian King. Conversely, in the *Philippics* the focus shifts to Northern Greece and an enemy that had not attracted attention before. This new reality and the growing realisation of the danger posed by Philip may have also affected the tenor of Demosthenes' rhetoric and, ultimately, the way in which he portrayed himself as an adviser of the city.

Demosthenes 14 (*On the Symmories*), his first surviving Assembly oration, sheds some light on the precocity of his rhetorical endeavour. It is a tentative attempt to promote his *ethos* as an orator and politician to a demanding Athenian audience. An attempt to engage with well-known rhetorical *topoi* and other (unidentified) Athenian speakers and thus demonstrate knowledge, good understanding of foreign relations and internal affairs, and foresight helps establish his *ethos* in the Assembly. He commences his speech with a meta-rhetorical *prooemium* criticising rhetorical commonplaces ('the praise of the Athenian ancestors') used by other orators (1). This is indeed a *topos* occurring in extant specimens of deliberative (and epideictic)

³¹ For a reconstruction of Demosthenes' political connections early in his career, see BURKE (2002) 176-183.

oratory,³² but the way it is being used demonstrates the failure of the present orators properly to extol the virtues of the ancestors. Demosthenes employs *praeteritio* while seeking to refocus this *topos* and his speech as a whole towards what is useful under the current circumstances (2).

Demosthenes' censure of orators (1) echoes Cleon's castigation of the culture of deliberative debate for pleasure and intellectual stimulation (Thuc. 3, 38, 7) and suggests a continued distortion of the objective of deliberative oratory in the Athenian Assembly in the 4th century.³³ Demosthenes thus seeks to project his *ethos* in contrast to that of other (established?) orators. He downplays his rhetorical skill, while foregrounding his ability to offer advice. He is circumspect: he presents himself as one of potentially many speakers (*εἰς ὁστισοῦν*) who can benefit the city through their advice (note the use of the hypothetical syllogism *εἰ μὲν...* *εἰ δὲ...*):

“If someone, whoever he may be, who comes up to speak, could teach and persuade you what kind of preparations and what size of force will be required and how it should be paid for, all our present fears would be relieved” (14, 2).³⁴

This is capped by the *topos* of the speaker's inability (*ώς ἀν ἄρ' οἶός τ' ὁ*), the use of the conative verb (*πειράσομαι* ...) and the expression *ώς ἔχω γνώμης* (“what I think about ...”) instead of a more assertive and confident verbal expression.³⁵

This apparent reticence or lack of confidence recurs throughout the speech: e.g. at 14 he draws attention away from his rhetorical skill and to his practical proposals for preparation, while later he introduces a suggestion about Athenian finances

³² E.g. 3, 36; 9, 74; 10, 46; 60, 4-5; THUC. 2, 36; LYS. 2, 3, 6, 17.

³³ One cannot help wondering whether this reflected 4th century realities or had become a *topos* in deliberative oratory. Cf. the discussion of meta-rhetorical passages below.

³⁴ *εἰ δὲ παρελθών εῖς ὁστισοῦν δύναιτο διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι, τίς παρασκευὴ καὶ πόση καὶ πόθεν πορισθεῖσα χρήσιμος ἔσται τῇ πόλει, πᾶς ὁ παρὼν φόβος λελύσεται.*

³⁵ Such as *ὑπολαμβάνω* or *δοκῶ*, DEM. 4, 1 (*ἄν ... ἐπειρώμην ἀ γιγνώσκω λέγειν ...*); 5, 3 (... *οἴομαι καὶ πεπεικώς ἐμαυτὸν ἀνέστηκα*); 5, 4 (*ἀκριβῶς εἰδώς ...*).

(24ff.) and suggests that what he is going to say will come across as a paradox (*αἰνίγματι γὰρ ὅμοιον ...*: “it is like a riddle ...”). This is followed by a more assertive expression of his foresight (24: “My view is that we do not need to talk about money now ... for this sounds like a riddle”).³⁶ The presentation of his *ethos* is rounded off (it is possible that ring-composition is being employed here) in the conclusion, where he stresses the importance of action over fruitless rhetoric (41).

In *On the Megalopolitans*, which was delivered just one year later, Demosthenes advances his quest to establish his *ethos* in the Assembly as he presents himself as the middle-of-the-road politician who will be attacked by opponents on both sides, those who advocate supporting the Arcadians and those who are in favour of lending a hand to the Spartans (1-3).³⁷ He thus seeks to create political space for himself as the city’s adviser by opposition to those who slander and accuse each other. His *ethos* as an honest adviser is also shaped through the use of an anti-deception *topos* (3).³⁸ Throughout the speech he presents himself in opposition to other politicians but conforming with what is expedient for the city. The characterisation by means of antithesis to the (unnamed) opponents when the latter are collectively denounced is a useful, indirect means of self-characterisation.

In the third of his early deliberative speeches, *On the Freedom of the Rhodians*, Demosthenes seems to have grown in confidence. One can only speculate on the possible effect that his earlier interventions may have had on the perception of his *ethos* by the public, but his tone in this speech is markedly different. He is prepared to criticise the Athenians right from

³⁶ ἐγώ φημι χρῆναι μὴ λέγειν νυνὶ περὶ χρημάτων ... αἰνίγματι γὰρ ὅμοιον τοῦτο γε.

³⁷ According to BLASS (Abt. III.i) 308, the language, metaphors, rhetorical devices, and style become more forceful in later speeches whereas in this speech “im allgemeinen der Ton ruhig und gemessen bleibt, wie es dem verständigen Rathgeber zukommt”.

³⁸ οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ αἱρήσομαι μᾶλλον αὐτός, ἀν ἄρα τοῦτο πάθω, δοκεῖν φλυαρεῖν, ή παρ’ ἀ βέλτιστα νομίζω τῇ πόλει, προέσθαι τισὶν ὑμᾶς ἔξαπατῆσαι (16, 3). On anti-deception *topoi* in Attic Oratory, see KREMMYDAS (2013) 65-80, 87.

the outset for not acting on the decisions they take in the Assembly. His criticism is mild but unambiguous:

“Until now I have never thought it was difficult to teach you what the best policy is, for, to put it simply, I believe you all seem to know what it is, but to persuade you to implement it. For when a decision has been approved and voted on, it is no closer to being implemented than it was before it was approved” (15, 1).³⁹

Later in the speech he hints at a growing relationship between Demosthenes as orator and adviser and the Athenian audience; he has advised them in the past to prepare their military to face the Persian King (he stresses that he was the first to take to the speakers’ platform) and “his advice was pleasing to them” (15, 6).⁴⁰

His deliberative *ethos* is also enhanced by his emphasis on the constancy and correctness of his advice: he would have said the same thing to the Persian King if he took him on as his adviser (7); what he says is nothing new (9).

A final touch to Demosthenes’ Assembly *ethos* in this speech is added through the (apparent) self-contradiction between the *Schadenfreude* (at the deserved suffering of the Rhodians) and the pity (at the suffering of an equal) he expresses at the misfortune of the Rhodians; it is likely that he is trying to address and reconcile the mixed emotional responses of the audience towards the plight of the Rhodians (15, 15).⁴¹ Demosthenes addresses the potentially mixed emotional responses of the audience by reducing the distance between them and the Rhodians; he claims that the Athenians, like the Rhodians, have been deceived by schemers (15, 16).⁴²

³⁹ ἐγὼ δ' οὐδεπώποθ' ἡγησάμην χαλεπὸν τὸ διδάξαι τὰ βέλτισθ' ὑμᾶς (ώς γάρ εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς, ἀπαντεῖς ὑπάρχειν ἐγνωκότες μοι δοκεῖτε), ἀλλὰ τὸ πεῖσαι πράττειν ταῦτα: ἐπειδάν γάρ τι δόξῃ καὶ ψηφισθῆ, τότε' ἵσον τοῦ πραγμάτηναι ἀπέχει ὅσονπερ πρὶν δόξαι.

⁴⁰ ... καὶ ὑμῖν ἥρεσκε ταῦτα.

⁴¹ But contrast his comments at 15, 21, where he demonstrates a sound understanding of mass psychology and an ability to give moral guidance to the people.

⁴² φημὶ δὴ χρῆναι πειρᾶσθαι σώζειν τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ μὴ μνησικακεῖν, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ὑμεῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων ἐξηπάτησθε, ὃν οὐδενὸς αὐτοὶ δοῦναι δίκαιον ἀν εἶναι φήσαιτε (15, 16).

Thus, one notices development and flexibility in the construction of Demosthenes' deliberative *ethos* as the young orator and politician seeks to define his role in Athenian politics. He emerges as a politician who demonstrates confidence in the correctness of his advice, awareness of and careful handling of the audience's emotions, and seeks to carve out his own space as a reliable alternative to Athenian politicians who prioritise their skill in rhetoric over much-needed action.

Demosthenic *ethos* in the *Philippic* cycle: increasing confidence and sophistication in the use of tools of self-characterisation

In this section, I shall argue that Demosthenes' projection of his own *ethos* becomes more direct and assertive in the speeches of the *Philippic* cycle as he uses techniques of self-characterisation more frequently, directly, and in more sophisticated ways. However, one should not attribute this only to his growing experience as a statesman and orator. One should also take into account the changing landscape of political affairs in the Greek world with the emergence of Philip as a direct threat to Athenian interests. The city needed strong leaders to lead it through a crisis that magnified the tensions and led to polarisation among Athenian political groups. One might claim, on the evidence of Demosthenic oratory, that Athenian politics had become increasingly toxic.⁴³ It is impossible, of course, to gauge levels of toxicity in default of satisfactory evidence, but there are signs of convergence between the deliberative and forensic discourse especially after the Peace of Philocrates in 346.

The newfound confidence exhibited by Demosthenes in *On the freedom of the Rhodians* reappears in the (almost contemporary) *First Philippic* (Dem. 4; date: 351). One might be justified

⁴³ This is not to say that Athenian politics and political discourse were not toxic before this time. One would have to look at forensic speeches originating in the first decade of the 4th century for parallels, but there are no parallels from the Assembly.

in claiming that once Demosthenes had emerged as an important player on the Athenian political scene, his *ethos* had become better known, and although it was still malleable and subject to rhetorical manipulation, it had to be recognisable and credible.

In the introduction to his first speech of the *Philippic* cycle, he suggests that this was going to be the first time he was going to speak first in an Assembly debate; he explains that he is forced to do so due to the fact that the usual speakers have failed to give good advice to the people (1). He thus clearly sets himself apart from other, possibly better-established speakers. This demonstration of confidence appears alongside old (e.g. an ability to make a diagnosis of the problem, familiarity with history, knowledge of the financial affairs of the city, prognosis and proposed cure of the problem at hand) and new techniques of self-presentation of his *ethos*. He now expresses belief in the Athenian people and injects confidence in them at a time when they were dispirited. This demonstrates a deepening relationship of trust between the orator and the people, while playing to the audience's deepest felt emotions and enhancing the possibility of a positive response on the part of the audience.

Demosthenes' confidence in his ability to advise them on what is expedient for the city reaches a peak in the conclusion of the speech. The verbal forms in the text below highlighted in bold typescript underscore his boldness and confidence in full knowledge of possible consequences, while the underlined words stress the centrality of *συμφέρον* in his peroration:⁴⁴

“As for me, I have never yet chosen to please you by saying anything that I was not **convinced** would be beneficial to you; and now, I **have said freely** everything that I know **without holding anything back**. However, just as I **know** what is most beneficial for you to hear, I wish that the person who gave the best speech would also benefit. For I should have felt happier, if that were the case. Now, however, because what is going to happen to me as a result of having given this advice is uncertain, I still choose

⁴⁴ Five attestations in a single section. Note also the contrast between *χάριν* and *τὰ βέλτιστα*.

to speak because I am convinced that what I will say will benefit you if you also implement it. Whatever is going to benefit all, may that prevail" (4, 51).⁴⁵

On the face of it, this is a variation of the meta-rhetorical passages relating to the role of rhetoric. Here, however, the meta-rhetorical passage develops into a self-referential passage asserting Demosthenes' constancy as an adviser, his confidence, boldness, and knowledge of what is expedient for the city. And while this passage rounds off the speech, he goes one step further by expressing his confidence in the way that events will develop.

But Demosthenes' growing confidence as an adviser is also evident in his criticism of Athenian passivity in relation to specific failures of foreign policy. Whereas in earlier speeches he had confined himself to generalising criticisms of Athenian decision-making and policy (e.g. 14, 15) or brief criticisms in passing (e.g. 15, 1), here he points to Athenian slowness as a reason for Philip's success (4, 5-6) and criticises their lethargy and inaction in the past (4, 10-11), whilst pointing to concrete examples from recent Athenian history when they managed to overcome it:

"For you must put the thought in his mind that you may get rid of apathy and attack, as you did at Euboea and, as it is reported, also at Haliartus and more recently at Thermopylae ..." (4, 17).⁴⁶

However, in this speech he does not confine himself to castigating Athenian passivity, and inaction. His detailed analysis and logical presentation of the concrete proposals he puts forward serve to enhance his *ethos* as a man of action rather than

⁴⁵ ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὔτ' ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν ὃ τι ἀν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ἐ, νῦν τε ἀ γιγνώσκω πάνθ' ἀπλῶς, οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαρρησίασμα. ἐβουλόμην δ' ἄν, ὕσπερ ὅτι ὑμῖν συμφέρει τὰ βέλτιστ' ἀκούειν οἶδα, οὔτως εἰδέναι συνοῦσον καὶ τῷ τὰ βέλτιστ' εἰπόντι πολλῷ γάρ ἄν ἥδιον εῖχον. νῦν δ' ἐπ' ἀδήλοις οὖσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τούτων ἐμαυτῷ γενησομένοις, δρως ἐπὶ τῷ συνοίσειν ὑμῖν, ἄν πράξητε, ταῦτα πεπεῖσθαι λέγειν αἱροῦμαι. νικώη δ' ὃ τι πᾶσιν μέλλει συνοίσειν.

⁴⁶ δεῖ γάρ ἐκείνῳ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ γνώμῃ παραστῆσαι, ὡς ὑμεῖς ἐκ τῆς ἀμελείας ταύτης τῆς ἄγαν, ὕσπερ εἰς Εύβοιαν καὶ πρότερόν ποτέ φασιν εἰς Ἀλίαρτον καὶ τὰ τελευταῖα πρώην εἰς Πύλας, οἵσως ἀν ὁρμήσαιτε ...

words. This is the only extant speech that probably accompanied a draft proposal by Demosthenes himself.⁴⁷ Thus, the *topos* of fruitless deliberation ('fighting with decrees': e.g. 4, 30)⁴⁸ is addressed and refuted as he pledges his willingness to take part in the expedition. Demosthenes thus portrays himself as a man of action, not just words.

Demosthenes, Philip, and Athenian politicians: a triptych of *ethe* in the *Olynthiacs*

In the three *Olynthiacs* (delivered in 349/8), *ethos* plays an even more prominent role than in the earlier deliberative speeches. Demosthenes draws on his arsenal of techniques of characterisation in order to promote the *ethos* of three categories of individuals (or groups of politicians/orators), a triptych of *ethe*: his *ethos*, that of other Athenian politicians/orators, and that of Philip. The promotion of his own *ethos* takes place in the *First Olynthiac* through passages of self-characterisation and meta-rhetoric in the middle of the speech (e.g. 1, 14-16), before he makes concrete proposals to address the current crisis (17-20). Note how he combines meta-rhetoric with criticism of the audience and promotion of his boldness as an adviser:

“Now, someone may say that it is easy to be critical and anyone can do it, but that to give an opinion regarding what should be done about the current situation is an adviser’s task. As for me, men of Athens, I am aware that many times, when things go against your plans, you are angry not at those responsible but at the orators who happen to have spoken last. I, however, do not think I should hold back from saying what I think will benefit you out of concern for my own safety” (1, 16).⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Cf. criticism by his opponents alluded to by DEM. in 8, 68, 73.

⁴⁸ MADER (2006).

⁴⁹ τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπιτιμᾶν ἵσως φήσαι τις ἀν ῥέδιον καὶ παντὸς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ οὐ πέρ τῶν παρόντων ὅ τι δεῖ πράττειν ἀποφαίνεσθαι, τοῦτο εἶναι συμβούλου. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἀγνοῶ μέν, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦθον ὅτι πολλάκις οὐ τοὺς αἰτίους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑστάτους περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰπόντας ἐν ὀργῇ ποιεῖσθε, ἃν

The extended presentation of Philip's character dominates the *Second Olynthiac* (2, 5-10, 14-20), familiarises the audience with their great adversary, and implicitly draws a contrast with their collective Athenian *ethos*. Philip represents an antithesis to the democratic Athenian *ethos*, which Demosthenes endorsed and promoted. He reminds the audience that Philip's success is due to the failures (2, 3-4) and inaction (2, 27-30) of the Athenians and pleads with them to take action (2, 30-31). Thus, the promotion of Demosthenes' *ethos* is only implicit and oblique in this speech.

Finally, in the *Third Olynthiac* the orator's role and responsibility take a more central role again: in the *prooemium*, a variation of the *topos* of the speaker's inability to address a topic (ἐγὼ δ' οὐχ ὅ τι χρὴ ... πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν) and a *captatio benevolentiae* are combined with a brief meta-rhetorical passage on how the current state of affairs is due to the fact that orators tend to gratify the audience rather than benefit the city (note the use of verbs expressing knowledge and confidence):

“Now, the current situation, more than ever before, requires great care and deliberation. I, for one, do not think that the hardest thing is to give advice regarding the current circumstances; I am at a loss, however, men of Athens, as to how I should best speak to you about them. For, I am convinced from what I have seen and heard that we have missed more opportunities because of our reluctance to do our duty rather than because of our failure to understand it. I expect you to bear with me if I speak frankly and to examine whether what I am saying is true, but also for this additional reason, namely, so that things might improve in the future. For you see how our current situation has reached this level of wickedness due to the fact that public speakers seek to please their audience in the Assembly” (3, 3).⁵⁰

τι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην ἐκβῆ. οὐ μὴν οἶμαι δεῖν τὴν ιδίαν ἀσφάλειαν σκοποῦνθ' ὑποστείλασθαι περὶ ὧν ὑμῖν συμφέρειν ἡγοῦμαι.

⁵⁰ ὁ μὲν οὖν παρὼν καιρός, εἴπερ ποτέ, πολλῆς φροντίδος καὶ βουλῆς δεῖται. ἐγὼ δ' οὐχ ὅ τι χρὴ περὶ τῶν παρόντων συμβουλεῦσαι χαλεπώτατον ἡγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖν' ἀπορῶ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον, ὡς ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς ὑμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν. **πέπεισμαι** γάρ ἐξ ὧν παρὼν καὶ ἀκούων **σύνοιδα**, τὰ πλείω τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμᾶς ἐκπεφευγέναι τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἢ τῷ μὴ συνιέναι.

A more extended meta-rhetorical passage follows passages containing concrete proposals (3, 10-13), a passage criticising the Athenians once again for their idleness and stressing the importance of action (3, 14-15), and a brief, memorable passage castigating Philip's *ethos* (3, 16: "Is he not our enemy? Does he not possess our lands? Is he not a barbarian? Is any description too bad for him?").⁵¹ Demosthenes comments on the culture of deliberation in the Assembly and stresses the need to choose what is best rather than what is pleasant, thus criticising the Athenians, albeit obliquely (3, 18). Mild censure of the Athenians is expressed in the following couple of sections (3, 19-20) before Demosthenes finally focuses on his *ethos* in what is a masterful, extended passage of self-characterisation (3, 21-27) combining a number of different techniques:

- i) an elaborate *captatio benevolentiae* dealing with the possibility of adverse audience reactions against him. His credentials as a speaker are stressed through a statement of opinion (21: "I believe that it is a mark of a good citizen to consider the city's safety more important than his own popularity as a speaker"),⁵² which essentially glosses the recurrent criticism of the Athenians who preferred what was pleasant over what was expedient;
- ii) a reference to past history and illustrious examples of orators and politicians (e.g. Nicias, Pericles, Aristides, and Miltiades: 3, 21, 26). The two comparisons with 5th-century Athenian politicians echo moralising passages in forensic oratory,⁵³ which

ἀξιῶ δ' ὑμᾶς, ἂν μετὰ παρρησίας ποιῶμαι τοὺς λόγους, ὑπομένειν, τοῦτο θεωροῦντας, εἰ τάληθη λέγω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ίνα τὰ λοιπὰ βελτίω γένηται· ὅρατε γὰρ ὃς ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν ἐνίους εἰς πᾶν προελήλυθε μοχθηρίας τὰ παρόντα.

⁵¹ οὐκ ἔχθρός; οὐκ ἔχων τὰ ἡμέτερα; οὐ βάρβαρος; οὐχ ὅ τι ἂν εἴποι τις;

⁵² ἀλλὰ δικαίου πολίτου κρίνω τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων σωτηρίαν ἀντὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν χάριτος αἰρεῖσθαι.

⁵³ [DEM.] 13, 29 is a close parallel, although the order and contents of the list have been changed. Themistocles and Cimon are mentioned in 3, 24 instead of Miltiades.

stress the simplicity (and exemplary behaviour) of politicians of old;⁵⁴

iii) a contrast to the orators and politicians of the present time (3, 22);

iv) an amplification of the previous contrasts through a reference to the effects that the conduct of politicians of old had on the position of the city in the Greek world and its visible affluence during the days of the Athenian Empire as opposed to the current predicament of the city (3, 24-27).

This sophisticated combination of the different techniques of self-characterisation in an extended passage towards the conclusion of the speech clearly serves to enhance Demosthenes' *ethos* as an orator and politician and impress it on his Athenian audience.

In the three *Olynthiacs*, Demosthenes demonstrates a more sophisticated command of diverse techniques of self-characterisation. His approach in the three speeches is joined-up and sensitive to the needs of the wider political context. It is no coincidence that his *ethos* receives more attention in the third speech and accompanies the presentation of proposals in response to the deteriorating situation in Northern Greece. The stress on his reliability as an adviser is intended to counteract the potentially hostile reaction to the proposal for the transfer of money from the Theoric to the military fund (e.g. 3, 11, 34). At the same time, the comparison between the politicians of an Athenian 'golden age' and contemporary politicians implies that Demosthenes stands out as a politician who can be trusted. Thus, the *Olynthiacs* can be seen as a milestone in the rhetorical portrayal of Demosthenes' *ethos*.

⁵⁴ Cf. DEM. 23, 209 (Aristides), 196 (Miltiades), 198 (Themistocles and Miltiades compared with 4th-century generals, Iphicrates, Timotheus and Chabrias who are being identified with their military victories), 207.

Demosthenes' *ethos* after 346

Thereafter the presentation of his *ethos* becomes even more assertive in tone. The self-referential passages become longer and more direct. The reasons for this change might be identified in the heated Athenian political context after 346. The discussion of the merits of peace with Philip (Demosthenes recommends the acceptance of the peace)⁵⁵ gives Demosthenes an opportunity to talk up his credentials as a reliable adviser with an excellent track record. In the *prooemium* of the speech *On the Peace*, after a variation of the *topos* of the speaker's inability (5, 1) and a passing criticism of the Athenian culture of deliberation (5, 2),⁵⁶ Demosthenes launches into an extended presentation of his *ethos* and past successes, and stresses the correctness of his advice (e.g. 5, 9). After all, a successful politician can be trusted to lead the people. Demosthenes uses *praeteritio* to lay even more emphasis on a self-referential excursus (5, 4-12). However, this long self-referential passage reveals that Demosthenes now adopts a radically different strategy of self-presentation. He claims that he is not used to self-promotion, although this practice is expedient for speakers engaging in it (4). Demosthenes was aware of the fact that he was pushing the boundaries of his own deliberative *ethos* and had to account for this departure: he justifies his self-referential excursus by claiming that it would enable the audience to make up their minds about his current speech. There is no doubt that Demosthenes was crafting his public *persona* and cultivating his Assembly *ethos* during the years he hogged the limelight. He even argues

⁵⁵ On the problems of accepting the notion that Demosthenes was in favour of the peace when in DEM. 19, 113 it is claimed that only Aeschines had spoken in support of the peace treaty, see BLASS (1893) 342-343, MACDOWELL (2009) 327.

⁵⁶ 5, 2: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πάντες ἀνθρωποι πρὸ τῶν πραγμάτων εἰώθασι χρῆσθαι τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα. BLASS (1893) 343-344 argues that this *prooemium* does not belong organically to the rest of the speech. He identifies "ein zweites Prooemium" in 5, 4 and avers that, due to the absence of *pathos*, this speech is closer to the 'not Philippic' speeches.

that his *ethos* was challenging norms of contemporary deliberative oratory:

“Although I am well aware, men of Athens, that it is always very profitable for a bold speaker to talk to you about himself and his own speeches, if one is bold enough to do so, I believe it is such a vulgar and offensive practice that I shrink from it, even though I see that it is necessary. However, I think that you will be better placed to make a judgement about what I am going to say, if I remind you briefly of what I told you before” (5, 4).⁵⁷

And Demosthenes does not only claim to breach the norms of deliberative *ethos*; at the same time, he also engages in the agonistic culture of the Assembly. He needs to compare himself with other advisers/politicians and persuade the audience of the superiority of his advice and judgment. However, even when drawing such comparisons, he is mindful of the boundaries of deliberative *ethos* and the pitfalls of boasting and, therefore, stresses the fact that he does not possess any negative ethical/intellectual qualities. One of the reasons he identifies is his good luck (which demonstrates his piety) and the fact that he does not receive bribes (contrast 5, 5):⁵⁸

“Now, if I have been more successful than others to foresee what was going to happen, I do not attribute this to my cleverness or any other charisma I might have, nor do I pretend to have any special knowledge or understanding, except these two: first, men of Athens, my good luck, which from what I can see is more

⁵⁷ ἀκριβῶς δ' εἰδώς, ὃ ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸ λέγειν περὶ ὃν αὐτὸς εἶπε τις καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ παρ' ὑμῖν ἀεὶ τῶν πάνυ λυσιτελούντων τοῖς τολμῶσιν ὅν, οὕτως ἡγοῦμαι φορτικὸν καὶ ἐπαχθὲς ὅστ' ἀνάγκην οὖσαν ὅρῶν ὅμως ἀποκνῶ. νομίζω δ' ἄμεινον ὃν ὑμᾶς περὶ ὃν νῦν ἐρῶ κρῖναι, μικρὰ τῶν πρότερόν ποτε ὥρθέντων ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μνημονεύσαντας.

⁵⁸ This passage looks forward to his disclaimer of bribery in the speech *On the Crown* (18, 298); bribery was one of the major political offences covered by the *nomos eisangeltikos*; on venality as a standard accusation against Athenian politicians/orators, especially after the Peace of Philocrates, see, e.g., DEM. 19, 127; DIN. 4, 1, 3, 13, 29, 103; 6, 6, 22; HYP. 1 (*Dem.*), fr. 8, col. 35, l. 25 (λημμα, λήμματα); 1 (*Dem.*) fr. 62, col. 25, l. 25; 1 (*Dem.*) fr. 9, col. 40, l. 1; 3 (*Eux.*) col. 39, l. 25 (δῶρον, δῶρα); DIN. 4, 11, 26, 45, 93, 98; HYP. 1 (*Dem.*) fr. 3, col. 15, l. 2; fr. 8, col. 34, l. 9; *Epitaph.* col. 5, l. 2 (δωροδοκία, δωροδοκήσας).

powerful than any cleverness or wisdom. [12] Second, I reach my judgements and decisions without receiving gifts and no one can ever show that I have made any profit from my policies and speeches" (5, 11-12).⁵⁹

How can this change of tone and the emphasis on Demosthenes' self-presentation be explained? One possible explanation is that the speech was used as a tool of 'propaganda' to promote Demosthenes' political role in Athens. This would be consistent with the view expressed by Libanius that the speech was prepared but not delivered at the assembly meeting where Aeschines spoke in favour of the peace. Similarly, MacDowell suggests that Demosthenes' speech might have been delivered at a different, subsequent meeting from the one tasked with responding to the Amphictyons.⁶⁰ Although these explanations do carry weight, I believe one should attribute the changes in Demosthenes' self-presentation to his different needs in a tense political situation. His closer engagement with active Athenian politics and the deterioration in Athens' relationship with Philip had increased the hostility against him (the theme of anger and hostility against orators appears more frequently now),⁶¹ and this did not leave his position as an Assembly speaker unaffected. And while he could shelter himself from the threat of litigation by using a network of friends and associates in order to pass any concrete proposals and drafts, he felt an increasing need to defend his reputation in the Assembly.

⁵⁹ ταῦτα τοίνυν ἀπανθ', ὅσα φαίνομαι βέλτιον τῶν ἄλλων προορῶν, οὐδ' εἰς μίαν, ὡς ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὕτε δεινότητ' οὕτ' ἀλαζονείαν ἐπανοίσω, οὐδὲ προσποιήσομαι δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο γιγνώσκειν καὶ προαισθάνεσθαι πλὴν δι' ἀν οὐδὲν εἴπω, δύο. ἐν μέν, ὡς ἀνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δι' εὐτυχίαν, ἣν συμπάσης ἐγώ τῆς ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐσης δεινότητος καὶ σοφίας ὅρῳ κρατοῦσαν. [12] ἔτερον δέ, προῖκα τὰ πράγματα κρίνω καὶ λογίζομαι, καὶ οὐδὲν λῆμμα' ἀν οὐδεὶς ἔχοι πρὸς οἵς ἐγώ πεπολίτευμαι καὶ λέγω δεῖξαι προσηρτημένον.

⁶⁰ MACDOSELL (2009) 327. But even if one were to suppose that Demosthenes did not deliver this speech, it might still have contributed to the enhancement of his public *persona*.

⁶¹ ὀργή, ὀργίζεσθαι, and their cognates occur six times in speeches delivered post-346 (three times in speeches before that).

The *Second Philippic* (Dem. 6) builds on strategies of projecting *ethos* deployed in earlier speeches, especially in the *Olynthiacs* and the speech *On the Peace*. I shall briefly identify a couple of features that create a sense of continuity in terms of the speaker's *ethos*, whilst also developing his strategies of characterisation.

The standard meta-rhetorical passage in the *prooemium* regarding the responsibility of the orators for giving sound advice now involves censure of the Athenian public for their idleness. Demosthenes then joins audience and orators together in a call to reform the culture of deliberation and decision-making (6, 5). He also claims that the fear of stirring enmity in the audience had prevented politicians from making proposals that would actually stop Philip in his tracks (4). Philip's appearance in this speech recalls the dominance of his *ethos* in the *Second Olynthiac*; here, the dangerous villain and arch-enemy of Athens is the figure of authority who praises the Athenian *ethos* (9-11) and even mentions Philip's ancestor Alexander I (11).

The reporting of Demosthenes' speech to the Messenians ('speech in speech': 6, 20-25) is a new device employed in order to enhance authority (cf. 5, 5: his advice proved unpopular, he was isolated and suffered abuse by his venal opponents), an interesting development on the self-referential excursus of the speech *On the Peace* (5, 4-12). If the Messenians thought that he was correct yet in the end chose not to act on his recommendations, the Athenians who are more intelligent ought to listen more carefully and act on his advice.

Demosthenes defends his *ethos* against the calumnies of those who disparaged him from the speakers' platform (30) and his tone now recalls forensic discourse (31-34).⁶² The political temperature in Athens had risen significantly by the time of this speech (344/3), and this is also reflected in the way that Demosthenes talks about his *ethos* and that of his unnamed

⁶² Note the use of nouns and adjectives frequently attested in forensic orations of the Demosthenic corpus: λοιδορία, δργή, αἰτίους, αἰσχιστον, δργίλους.

political opponents.⁶³ The polarisation of Athenian political life in response to the deepening crisis in Athens' relations with Philip ultimately helps Demosthenes promote his own role in the city as a standout politician and his *ethos* as a trustworthy adviser.

That the wider political context has affected the tone of political discourse can be seen in the last three speeches of the *Philippic* cycle (Dem. 8, 9, 10), all of which were delivered in the same year (341). Take, for example, the development of the meta-rhetorical passage criticising politicians and orators (Dem. 8, 23; cf. 38). Demosthenes now turns it on its head and he is asking the people (in an *apostrophe*) to instruct him what to say (cf. 10, 11). A little later, another extended meta-rhetorical passage criticises the current culture of deliberation, while offering practical examples from recent history through a hypothetical speech in the Assembly by the Greeks (35-37).

Finally, as he edges towards the end of the speech *On the Chersonese*, he produces an extended passage of masterful characterisation, once again combining different techniques of characterisation (8, 67-76): i) a self-referential passage in response to criticism by political opponents of his reluctance to propose decrees and expose himself to risk (68); ii) criticism of the prevalent litigious culture and extensive overlaps between the forensic and deliberative sphere (69), which favour his opponents; iii) a self-referential passage on his contributions to the city, including his benefactions (69-70); iv) self-referential response to criticism of his reluctance to propose (decrees leading to) action (73); v) the example of Timotheus' proposals in the Athenian Assembly (74-75); v) Demosthenes' own proposals (76).⁶⁴

It is also worth noting the emphasis on the need to punish bribe-receiving politicians and the stirring of hostile emotions

⁶³ Cf. the use of a verb relating to deception in 36: *παρεκρούσθητε*. For the use of language of deception in deliberative speeches, see KREMMYDAS (2013) 80-82, 88.

⁶⁴ Note the rhetorical device of *kyklos* in this passage of self-characterisation.

against them (9, 77; cf. 10, 7). This recalls strategies also attested in forensic oratory and confirms the idea of the toxicity of contemporary political life, which also emerges from the *prooemium* of the *Third Philippic* (cf. also 10, 35-36 before the introduction of the Theoric Fund issue). Demosthenes goes beyond the criticism of political opponents (9, 2) and claims that the Athenians have “banished freedom of speech” (trans. Trevett) from the Assembly as far as giving advice is concerned (9, 3: ὑμεῖς τὴν παρρησίαν ἐκ δὲ τοῦ συμβουλεύειν παντάπασιν ἔξεληλάκατε). He confirms this toxic political context at 9, 7 and 9, 53 (punishment of Philip’s fifth column in Athens; cf. 10, 57), while he showcases the *ethos* of Euphraeus of Oreus (9, 59-64) as a moral paradigm that parallels his own role in Athens (implicit characterisation).

The *ethos* of the Athenians also receives coverage (9, 36-37) as it is contrasted with the *ethos* of the ancestors (42-46: the decree of Arthmius of Zelea) and that of citizens in other cities (49-50) who have been taken advantage of by Philip (see also 9, 65).

By contrast, most of the *Fourth Philippic* seems to focus on what the Athenians need to do in the current circumstances.⁶⁵ Demosthenes’ *ethos* surfaces towards the end of the speech (76), following up on a section criticising rival politicians (10, 70-74). In the middle of that section (71-73), Aristomedes is singled out and seems to embody the harmful tendency of politicians to prioritise their own interests over the interests of the city.⁶⁶ Having deplored the practices of rival politicians

⁶⁵ The *prooemium* combines meta-rhetoric and criticism of the Athenians (1-5); 46-47 comment on the decline of Athens from a position of hegemony in the Greek world. At 68 the *ethos* and actions of Philip’s Athenian associates are being castigated.

⁶⁶ VINCE (1930) *ad loc.* suggested that this was probably a fictional character, but that does not have to be the case. Conversely, Didymus argued that Aristomedes was a contemporary politician. Although this name was not uncommon in the 4th century and features on contemporary decrees (see *LGPN* ii.A *s.v.* [3]), it is a speaking name (‘the one who has the best plans’) and Demosthenes may be being ironical here.

(70-74) and the contemporary culture of deliberation in the city, Demosthenes has one final chance to justify the advice he has offered in the Assembly (76). The contrast between the abusive behaviour, the deceptive words of his opponents and his truth-telling, integrity, and good-will is marked as he brings the speech to a close:

“That is the whole truth. I have said what is best for the city out of goodwill, not what is harmful in order to flatter you, nor what is full of deceit so that the speaker can make money, while the affairs of the city are handed over to our enemies. Therefore, you must either put a stop to these habits or you will not have anyone else to blame for the terrible state of our city’s affairs but yourselves” (10, 76).⁶⁷

Conclusion

It is clear that Demosthenes paid great attention to the creation and projection of his *ethos* in the Athenian assembly between 354 and 341. The close reading of his deliberative speeches suggests that he sought to find his own ‘voice’ in the din of Athenian politics and to project his unique *ethos*, his own ‘brand’ of adviser of the people. His early deliberative speeches testify to his experimentation with stock themes and techniques of self-characterisation peculiar to Assembly oratory and to his growing confidence as a politician: self-referential, meta-rhetorical passages and passages praising or blaming the Athenian people are just three of the techniques of projecting *ethos*, which can be traced throughout his assembly speeches. Demosthenes had to rely more on the projection of his *ethos* as he became more established in the personality-driven politics of Athens. He demonstrated flexibility at combining these techniques as he responded to challenges in the contemporary

⁶⁷ ταῦτ’ ἔστι τάληθῆ, μετὰ πάσης παρρησίας, ἀπλῶς εύνοία τὰ βέλτιστ’ εἰρημένα, οὐ κολακείᾳ βλάβης καὶ ἀπάτης λόγος μεστός, ἀργύριον τῷ λέγοντι ποιήσων, τὰ δὲ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἐγγειριῶν.

political context. The increasingly personal, direct tone he adopted and the progressively more hostile tone of his criticism of other politicians seems to suggest that the deliberative discourse was not immune from the toxicity of Athenian politics of the late 340's. It should be noted that the projection of his deliberative *ethos* in the forensic sphere (e.g. the review of his career in *On the Crown*) is consistent with his self-presentation in speeches of the *Philippic* cycle, and this suggests the great care with which he moulded and promoted his political *ethos* over time. The study of Demosthenes' *ethos* in the speeches of the *Philippic* cycle demonstrates his skill at projecting a compelling image as an adviser in the Athenian Assembly.

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DISCUSSION

M. Edwards: You did not use term *ethopoia* in your paper – was there a reason for that?

C. Kremmydas: Thank you for your question, Mike. I intentionally avoided the term because it is a Hellenistic coinage and I felt that its application to 4th-century deliberative oratory would be anachronistic. The term was also used later to denote one particular type of advanced rhetorical exercises (e.g. Theon's *progymnasmata*; cf. the term *prosopopoia*) whereby students had to create a speech demonstrating a speaker's *ethos*. I prefer to use terminology used by contemporary rhetorical theorists (i.e. Aristotle and Anaximenes) in my analysis of 4th-century oratory.

M. Edwards: Yes, of course. More substantively, I have questions on two different paths, the first of which is to follow up our discussion of this morning: how far does the lack of comparanda make a difference to what we can infer from Demosthenes' deliberative speeches? For example, you very correctly draw attention in your paper to the relative lack of invective against Demosthenes' opponents, at least in the earlier speeches, and in contrast to forensic speeches; but might Aeschines and his followers have nevertheless attacked Demosthenes personally?

C. Kremmydas: This is a valid point. We are very much limited by the absence of other 4th-century deliberative orations. Naturally, it is impossible to rule out that Demosthenes' opponents were a lot more virulent and personal in their attacks on him in the Assembly. However, I do not believe that this would have been the case at least before the mid-340's. First, there is

some evidence suggesting that the absence of invective was probably not peculiar to Demosthenic Assembly oratory but was rather a question of rhetorical etiquette that was largely adhered to. Speakers in the Athenian Assembly speeches reported by Thucydides (no matter what one thinks of their historical reliability) also avoid direct personal attacks against their opponents, while the speaker/author of *On the treaty with Sparta* (attributed to Andocides but almost certainly spurious) also eschews personal invective. Second, early on in Demosthenes' public career, when he was still trying to carve out his own place on Athens' political landscape, it is unlikely that he would have represented a target worth attacking personally and directly.

M. Edwards: It is interesting that you think Andocides 3 is very likely spurious. But secondly, again following on from earlier discussion, how far should we be drawing a firm distinction between deliberative and forensic rhetoric in the sphere of *ethos*? See, for example, the concluding paragraph of your paper, where you say 'the projection of his deliberative *ethos* in the forensic sphere ... is consistent with his self-presentation in the Assembly speeches of the *Philippic* cycle'. And additionally, acting as *aduocatus diaboli*, does *ethos* really matter?

C. Kremmydas: I have tried to argue that the requirements in terms of presentation of a speaker's *ethos* are slightly different in a deliberative setting from what they are in a forensic context. Of course, one should allow for a certain degree of plasticity in the construction and projection of a speaker's *ethos* in order to adapt to the rhetorical needs of the different contexts. But Demosthenes' speeches *On the Crown* and *On the Embassy* are interesting cases in so far as he had to demonstrate that his character and track record as advisor of the city had been irreproachable throughout his public career (in the speech *On the Crown*) and in the particular affair debated in Aeschines' and Demosthenes' speeches on the Embassy. Therefore, the recognisability and consistency of his *ethos* was of paramount

importance, especially since his opponent was alleging that he was merely an opportunist. And to respond to your concluding question, a well-known political figure could neglect *ethos* at his peril, whether in the Assembly or the Courts.

A. Chaniotis: You have clearly shown both the importance of *ethos* in Demosthenes' orations and the various layers of the subject. Apart from the *ethos* of an individual, the collective *ethos* of a community plays an important part in deliberative oratory, for instance in the speech of the Corinthians in Thucydides (Book 1) and in speeches in Polybius (e.g. 9, 28-39). Unlike reported speeches in historiography, in Athenian oratory we usually only have the speech of one orator, not his opponents' arguments. Of course, even one speech may provide allusions to what the opponent had said or was planning to say, or to street gossip. It is harder to assess what was exchanged during the meeting of the assembly or how the audience responded to the speeches, e.g. by interrupting the speaker or shouting in approval or disagreement. E.g., while an assembly for an *epidosis* was in process in Athens, Phokion's son, Phokos, notorious for having spent his father's fortune, came forward and said: "I am giving a contribution, too". The Athenians allegedly responded in one voice "Yes, to obscenity!" (this anecdote is narrated by Athenaios). We see again the object of the audience's criticism was *ethos*.

With such audience responses in mind but also considering the fact that the opponent of an orator would probably focus on *ethos* (praising his own and castigating that of the opponent), the self-representation of an orator's *ethos* serves a preemptive function as much as it is a persuasion strategy. So, Demosthenes' growing interest in *ethos* may not reflect growing confidence but growing hostility against him.

C. Kremmydas: Thank you for your insightful comments. It is important to bear in mind the role of the collective *ethos* ("national character" as some scholars have called it) which also

appears in passing in Demosthenes' deliberative oratory but is most prominent in representations of ambassadorial speeches, as you point out. This *ethos* appears to have a cohesive effect and helps promote a single identity and a single voice when teams of envoys represent a given community. However, even these representations of community *ethos* are not immune from opponents' attacks, as can be seen in Thucydidean speeches.

Your reference to the reception of orators' characters by contemporary Assembly audiences is very instructive. It is indeed unfortunate that we do not have more evidence on this apart from those occasions when orators allege that the Assembly shouted down their opponents (as in the *Embassy* speeches), but this is not always related to the latter's *ethos*.

I totally agree that Demosthenes' changing tactics as time goes by may also reflect his need to respond to the increasing attacks on him, and this is supported by the growing frequency of vocabulary denoting "anger" in post-346 speeches. Giving an impression of growing confidence in his own abilities as advisor and a need to combat hostility are probably two sides of the same coin.

L. Pernot: Les mots φορτικὸν καὶ ἐπαγθόες employés dans le passage de Démosthène 5, 4 sont des termes caractéristiques, presque des termes techniques, de l'éloge de soi-même (cf. *REG* 111, 1998, p. 108, n. 22-23). Pourquoi l'éloge de soi-même est-il déplaisant ? Dans le contexte athénien, la réponse à cette question a certainement à voir avec l'idéal démocratique d'égalité et d'appartenance à une collectivité. Le traité de Plutarque *De laude ipsius* analyse ces problèmes, en faisant notamment référence à Démosthène. Le *locus classicus* sur le sujet, chez Démosthène, est le début du discours *Sur la couronne* : le rapprochement avec le présent passage du discours 5 jette un pont entre genre délibératif et genre judiciaire.

C. Kremmydas: Many thanks for your observations and helpful references, Laurent. You are right to question the reasons for considering self-praise counter-normative in the context of

a democracy. However, the boundaries of what is acceptable in terms of talking about oneself are not always easily clear and are therefore prone to rhetorical manipulation. As the passage you cite from Demosthenes' *On the Crown* suggests, the key here might be the question of an individual's public conduct in so far as it affects the outcome of a court case on the one hand and decision-making in the Assembly on the other. But the issue of *metron* is also crucial, and Demosthenes in *On the Crown* stresses the fact that he is going to talk about himself *hōs metriôtata* (18, 4: ὡς μετριώτατα). It is therefore the perception of the extent to which a speaker's reference to his own actions and/or life adhere to the *metron* that is going to determine the reactions of an audience, whether in a court or in the Assembly.

L. Pernot: Sur l'*éthos*, Aristote a été prolongé, en un sens, par Théophraste dans les *Caractères*. L'influence de la comédie est également importante.

C. Kremmydas: Thank you for this additional remark. Theophrastus' treatise is certainly valuable, especially since his examination is not restricted to the contrived characters of the court but also covers the wider perception of an individual's character as represented by their conduct in everyday life. Comedy, too, reflects individual character, but also exaggerates and distorts and therefore has to be treated with caution.

M. Kraus: Auch in diesem Zusammenhang ist zu bedauern, dass es uns, worauf Mike Edwards bereits verwiesen hat, für das 5. und 4. Jahrhundert an geeigneten Vergleichstexten für die *Ethos*-Gestaltung des Demosthenes fehlt. Gerade deshalb scheint es notwendig, die Reden im Werk des Thukydides, auch wenn sie vom Autor literarisch nachgestaltet sind, mit heranzuziehen, da sie oft exemplarische und instruktive Beispiele für gelungene (oder misslungene) *Ethos*-Konstitutionen bieten. Es fehlt aber auch an ausreichenden theoretischen Grundlagen. Selbst Aristoteles, der doch in Buch I der *Rhetorik*

das *ethos* zunächst eindeutig der Person des Redners zuordnet (*Rhet.* 1, 2, 1356a2), gibt in Buch II dann überraschenderweise lediglich eine – allerdings ausführliche – Typologie des *ethos* der Zuhörerschaft (2, 12-17, 1388b31-1391b6). Erst über den Zwischenschritt der Analyse des Zuhörer-*Ethos* durch den Redner zum Zwecke der entsprechenden Anpassung des eigenen *ethos* gelingt der Übergang zum Redner-*Ethos*. Somit stellt sich aber das Problem des Verhältnisses der artifiziell konstruierten *ethopoia* zum „echten“, quasi naturgegebenen Redner-*Ethos*. In diesem Zusammenhang scheint wichtig, dass die *Rhetorik an Alexander*, falls man den dort verwendeten hochproblematischen Terminus der δόξα τοῦ λέγοντος (14, 1431b9-19) als „Ansehen des Redners“ (und nicht als „persönliche Meinung des Redners“) und somit als Vorstufe des rednerischen *ethos* deuten darf, diesen tatsächlich noch eindeutig den ‚äusserlichen‘ oder untechnischen, dem Zugriff des Redners entzogenen *pisteis* zuordnet. Das ist besonders wichtig in unserem Zusammenhang, eben weil die *Rhetorik an Alexander* die deliberative Rede als Muster in den Mittelpunkt stellt. Erst Aristoteles also vollzieht den Schritt zum vom Redner selbst bewusst gestalteten *ethos* als Überzeugungsmittel.

C. Kremmydas: Thank you for your observations, Manfred. It is true that Aristotle is not always satisfactory in his treatment of rhetorical issues. It is indeed surprising that on this specific issue of *ethos* he prefers to focus on the character and the likely emotional responses of the audience members rather than on the ways in which character of the speaker might be shaped rhetorically in order to render it more persuasive. As you say, Anaximenes often offers us helpful insights where Aristotle is not satisfactory and these two rhetorical treatises have to be read in conjunction with each other.

A. Chaniotis: A final remark. Individual *ethos* is the background of speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenika* (e.g. in Book 6), whose significance for the study of oratory is rather understudied.

C. Kremmydas: Thank you. You are certainly right that Xenophon's works represent snippets of contemporary oratory and offer a complementary and profitable avenue of further exploration. In the last decade or so, there has been growing scholarly interest in Xenophon and his rhetoric. When it comes to broad rhetorical strategies, the speeches he records are probably accurate reflections of contemporary oratory. However, with the exception of his own speeches and those of his fellow commanders as recorded in the *Anabasis*, I am not sure whether the speeches are more faithful as records of the real speeches than Thucydides' speeches. But Lene Rubinstein will have more to say on Xenophon.

L. Pernot: Voir *Xénophon et la rhétorique* par Pierre Pontier (Paris, 2014).

C. Kremmydas: Thank you, Laurent, for this bibliographical suggestion.

J.-L. Ferrary: Cette reconstitution très convaincante de l'évolution de l'art de l'auto-caractérisation dans les discours politiques de Démosthène suggère que les discours qui nous ont été transmis reflètent assez exactement les discours prononcés. Nous savons que la réalité est plus complexe dans le cas des discours cicéniens, non seulement pour les discours judiciaires, bien éloignés d'une sténographie des débats, mais aussi pour un certain nombre au moins des discours politiques : ainsi les discours consulaires de 63, 'édités' en 60 seulement, et partiellement révisés compte tenu d'un contexte politique nouveau (voir P. Moreau, "Cicéron, Clodius et la publication du *Pro Murena*", *REL* 58, 1980, 220-237). Pour les harangues politiques de Démosthène, doit-on supposer des 'éditions' séparées suivant immédiatement les interventions de l'orateur devant l'Assemblée ?

C. Kremmydas: Thank you, Jean-Louis, for raising the important issue of revision and publication of speeches. The revision

of Cicero's speeches demonstrates the increasing importance of careful 'impression management' on the part of politicians who used their published speeches in order to advance their political careers and ultimately to leave behind a favourable impression of their careers for posterity. It is likely that such a 'trend' of post-delivery editing and publication of revised versions of speeches had already started well before Demosthenes' time. However, the existing evidence is not at all straightforward. In Demosthenes' case, things are complicated even further by the fact that he is known to have written drafts of Assembly speeches before delivery (as reported by the biographical tradition). Was he unique? Possibly not. We do not have much information on what exactly happened post-delivery. It is very likely that Demosthenes was unusual in writing out draft sections of his Assembly speeches (perhaps only introductory passages, hence the collection of *Prooemia* in the corpus). However, this does not tell us much about what happened after delivery and there is no consensus among scholars as to whether Demosthenes published his deliberative speeches during his lifetime or not. There is some evidence of post-delivery revision of Demosthenes' speech *On the Crown* (and Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon*), although in the trial on the *False Embassy* Demosthenes seems not to have revised his speech after delivery. But even if one were to admit that Demosthenes consistently revised and published his Assembly speeches, this would probably not have involved such systematic and large-scale 'moulding' of his *ethos* across all these speeches. Rather, it might have concerned the interpretation of controversial historical points or might have involved his responses to criticism or to specific arguments used by opponents in the 'real time' Assembly debates. As far as rhetorical strategies of representing the orator's *ethos* are concerned, I doubt we should expect significant divergences between the speech as delivered and the text put together and edited post-delivery with a view to wider circulation.