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### III

ANGELOS CHANIOTIS

## POLICING THE HELLENISTIC COUNTRYSIDE: REALITIES AND IDEOLOGIES

### 1. *Phylake tes choras*: the ideology

“All this shall be for the guarding of the territory” ( $\tauαῦτα δ'$  εῖναι ἄπαντα εἰς φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας). This phrase closes an Athenian decree of the year 325 BC. If the rest of the decree had been lost, the editor of this inscription might have speculated that it contained measures for the protection of Attika from foreign invasions, raiders, or other threats. The decree is, however, preserved. Its content consists of regulations concerning the foundation of a colony on the Adriatic Sea.<sup>1</sup> Neither the colony in the Adriatic Sea nor anything in the decree has even the most remote relevance for the Attic countryside and its protection. Fritz Gschnitzer, who studied this and similar formulae in Greek decrees, plausibly concluded that this formula was used in order to give a decree of the assembly a higher status over other decrees or norms that might collide with its content, thus protecting its future validity.<sup>2</sup> As a decree from Kyme (second century) puts it: “this decree shall remain

\* If not otherwise stated, all dates are BC. For epigraphic publications we use the abbreviations of *SEG*.

<sup>1</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1629.

<sup>2</sup> F. GSCHNITZER, “Zur Nomenhierarchie im öffentlichen Recht der Griechen”, in *Symposion 1979. Actes du IV<sup>e</sup> colloque international de droit grec et hellénistique, Égine 3–7 Septembre 1979*, ed. P.D. DIMAKIS (Athènes 1981), 141–164.

valid for all time for the guarding and the safety of the city and the territory".<sup>3</sup>

Similar formulae are known from about thirty decrees. These formulae designate the decrees in which they occur as pertaining to the "guarding of the territory" (εἰς φυλακήν τῆς χώρας) or simply to "the guarding" (εἰς φυλακήν), the "guarding and salvation of the city (or the people)" (εἰς φυλακήν καὶ σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως / τοῦ δήμου), the "guarding of the people and the territory" (εἰς φυλακήν τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς χώρας), and the "salvation of the people (or of the city and the citizens)" (εἰς σωτηρίαν τοῦ δήμου / τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν). Most decrees concern matters with no direct bearing on the protection of the city, its land, or its population (e.g., honours for foreign judges). In several cases the matter in hand was fiscal or financial, in only two cases directly connected with military matters.<sup>4</sup>

Although these formulaic expressions are not found in decrees directly related to the security of the city or its territory, they still clearly express one of the primary concerns of Greek communities in the Hellenistic period: the protection of city and countryside. The "guarding of the territory" (φυλακή τῆς χώρας) was a permanent concern of a community.<sup>5</sup> As soon as a decree was declared as "pertaining to the

<sup>3</sup> *I.Kyme* 12 lines 9-10: ἔμμεναι δὲ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦτο εἰς φυλακὰν καὶ σωτηρίαν τᾶς πόλιος καὶ τᾶς χώρας κύριον εἰς πάντα τὸν χρόνον.

<sup>4</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 791 (Athens, 247 BC): τὸ δὲ ψῆφισμα τόδε, ἐπειδὴ περὶ πόρου χρημάτων ἔστιν στρατιωτικῶν, εἶναι ἀπαν εἰς φυλακήν τῆς χώρας; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 742 (Ephesos, c. 85 BC): τοῦ πράγματος [ἀ]νήκοντος εἰς τε τὸν πόλεμον καὶ εἰς τὴν φυλακήν καὶ ἀσφάλειαν καὶ σωτηρίαν τοῦ τε ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας.

<sup>5</sup> E.g., *I.Erythrai* 28 line 9: ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακήν τῆς χώρας τὴγ κατὰ θάλασσαν [ἀ]ποδειχθείς; *IOSPE* I<sup>2</sup> 355 line 22: [περὶ τ]ὰν χώραν ἀσφαλείας; cf. φυλακή/ἀσφάλεια κατὰ τὴν χώραν: V.C. PETRAKOS, *Ο δῆμος τοῦ Ραμυοῦντος. Σύνοψη τῶν ἀνασκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἐρευνῶν (1813-1998). II. Οἱ ἐπιγραφές* (Athens 1999), nos. 20, 32, 38, 43, 46, 49-50. On law enforcement in the city see most recently E. HARRIS, "Who enforced the law in Classical Athens?", in *Symposium 2005. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte* (Salerno, 14.-18. September 2005), hrsg. von E. CANTARELLA (Wien 2007), 159-76.

guarding of the territory”, it overrode all other legal norms – perhaps with the exception of sacred regulations. In Athens, one of the items on the agenda of every main assembly was “the guarding of the territory”.<sup>6</sup>

These formulae also sporadically appear in decrees of the Imperial period, as survivals. For instance, the posthumous honorary decree for Apollonis in Kyzikos in the first century AD is declared to be *περὶ φυλακῆς*.<sup>7</sup> The times in which the inhabitants of Kyzikos had to bring their flocks into the territory of Pergamon for security and to organise a cavalry unit to guard the countryside (*εἰς φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας*) from Galatian incursions were gone and forgotten.<sup>8</sup> But the ideology of ‘guarding the territory’ had remained alive, despite the fact that the *pax Romana* in Asia Minor had eliminated most of the threats which this formula originally implied.<sup>9</sup>

The *chora* which had to be guarded and protected was not the imaginary countryside of ancient poets and modern anthropologists. It was the economic backbone of the cities, their most important source of revenue, food, and resources.<sup>10</sup> One of the functions of patrollers (*peripoloi*) envisaged by Xenophon is the protection of the silver-mines;<sup>11</sup> Athenian inscriptions, which praise military commanders for their service in the countryside, highlight the protection of farmers and

<sup>6</sup> *Ath. Pol.* 43.4: *περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας*.

<sup>7</sup> *SEG* 28, 953,88.

<sup>8</sup> C. CHANDEZON, *L'élevage en Grèce (fin V<sup>e</sup>-fin I<sup>er</sup> s. a.C.). L'apport des sources épigraphiques* (Bordeaux 2003), 183-6 (c. 280-275); *OGIS* 748 (c. 279).

<sup>9</sup> For insecurity in Roman Asia Minor see C. BRÉLAZ, *La sécurité publique en Asie Mineure sous le Principat (Ier-III<sup>ème</sup> s. ap. J.-C.). Institutions municipales et institutions impériales dans l'Orient romain* (Basel 2005).

<sup>10</sup> J. MA, “Fighting poleis of the Hellenistic World”, in *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, ed. by H. VAN WEES (London 2000), 342 with n.23; A. CHANIOTIS, *War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History* (Oxford 2005), 28, 121-129.

<sup>11</sup> XEN. *Vect.* 4,43-48. See P. GAUTHIER, *Un commentaire historique des “Poroi” de Xénophon* (Genève-Paris 1976), 185; J.-Chr. COUVENHES, “La réponse athénienne à la violence territoriale aux IV<sup>e</sup> et III<sup>e</sup> siècles av. J.-C.”, in *CCG* 10 (1999), 196-201.

of agricultural production;<sup>12</sup> a fragmentary decree honouring a citizen of Chersonesos in Tauris (early first century AD) mentions the security of the countryside in close connection with public revenues;<sup>13</sup> and the Erythraean honorary decree for Polykritos, responsible for the guarding of the countryside, does not neglect to mention that he ensured the safety of traders.<sup>14</sup> With the exception of bucolic poetry – composed by poets living in cities or royal courts – references to the Hellenistic countryside are usually found in dispassionate documents concerning its economic exploitation, protection, and control, its measurement, delimitation, and division, its legal structure and status, and disputes arising from compering individuals' and groups' insatiable wish to own it.

The relationship between the population of the urban centre and the population of the countryside was not free of tensions. The causes of these tensions varied; in some areas they were connected with the inferior legal status – and sometimes also the different ethnic origin – of the population of the countryside (Sparta, Thessaly, Crete, colonies of the Black Sea, Asia Minor); in other cases they were related to the different lifestyles of the city-dwellers and the peasants;<sup>15</sup> often they originated in conflicting economic interests. It was exactly because of the inequalities and the tensions between urban and rural

<sup>12</sup> E.g., J.-Chr. COUVENHES, *art.cit.*, 203-206; V.C. PETRAKOS, *op.cit.*, nos. 3, 38, 43, 46; K. CLINTON, *Eleusis. The Inscriptions on Stone* (Athens 2005), I 100f. no. 95.

<sup>13</sup> IOSPE I<sup>2</sup> 355 lines 21f.: [τᾶν κ]οινᾶν προσόδων πλείσταν ἐπιμ[έλε]ιαν ἐποι[ήσατο -- τᾶς περὶ τ]ὰν χώραν ἀσφαλείας.

<sup>14</sup> I.Erythrai 28 lines 11-12; A. BIELMAN, *Retour à la liberté. Libération et sauvetage des prisonniers en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1994), 80-85 no. 21.

<sup>15</sup> For Hellenistic Athens, see e.g., THEOPHR. *Char.* 4 (ἀγροῖχος); HERACLIDES CRITICUS 4: τῶν δ' ἐνοικούντων οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν Ἀττικοὶ οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι. οἱ μὲν Ἀττικοὶ περίεργοι ταῖς λαλιαῖς, ὑπουλοι, συκοφαντώδεις παρατηρηταὶ τῶν ξενικῶν βίων. οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι μεγαλόψυχοι, ἀπλοὶ τοῖς τρόποις, φιλίας γνήσιοι φύλακες; MEN. *Georg.* fr. 5 Sandbach: εἰμὶ μὲν ἀγροίκος ... | καὶ τῶν κατ' ἀστυ πραγμάτων οὐ παντελῶς | ἔμπειρος; *Dysc.* 41: ἀστικὸν τὴν διατριβήν. See also H. CULLYER, "Agroikia and Pleasure in Aristotle", in *City, Countryside, and the Spatial Organization of Value in Classical Antiquity*, ed. by R.M. ROSEN - I. SLUITER (Leiden 2006), 181-217.

population that Hellenistic documents sometimes emphatically refer to the entire population,<sup>16</sup> attempting to bridge the gap between the city-dwellers and the population of the countryside at least ideologically.

If the population of the Hellenistic countryside often was of inferior legal or social status, the countryside was the economic basis of every polis. A stereotypical clause in Cretan treaties of alliance explicitly included the countryside and its non-citizen population to the provisions for the defence of a city. For example, a treaty between Eleutherna and Lato in the early second century states: “If an enemy invades the territory of the Eleutherneans or cuts off parts thereof, or occupies forts or harbours, or destroys the lots or the serfs, or wages war, the Latian shall help in land and on sea without any pretext with all his might”.<sup>17</sup>

The land and its inhabitants were to be defended with the same zeal as the town, and many honorary decrees for members of the elite concern persons who exposed themselves to dangers in order to defend the countryside. Apollodoros of Berenike is a good example. When king Ptolemy (IX?) died (80 BC) and the repeated attacks of bandits (*κακοῦργοι*) were threatening the countryside of Berenike in Kyrenaika, Apollodoros, offspring of a good family, was asked to command the ‘young men’ (*νεανίσκοι*), probably men between twenty and thirty years, in order to avert this danger. With this unit,

<sup>16</sup> E.g., *I.Magnesia* 98, lines 26-29: ὑπέρ τε σωτηρίας τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατοικούντων ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τῇ χώρᾳ; cf. *I.Priene* 46 lines 13-15: [είστιασε] τούς τε πολίτας καὶ τὰ τέκνα[α] α[ὔτῶν, τούς τε κατοικοῦν]τας τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώρα[ν]; L. MIGEOTTE, *Les souscriptions publiques dans les cités grecques* (Québec-Genève 1992), 147-160 no. 50 (*PH* 10) lines 7-11: ἐ[π]αγγέλλεσθαι τὸς δηλομένος τῶν τε πολιτῶν καὶ πολιτίδων καὶ νόθων καὶ πα[ρ]οίκων καὶ ξένων.

<sup>17</sup> *I.Cret.* I, xvi, 17 = A. CHANIOTIS, *Die Verträge zwischen kretischen Poleis in der hellenistischen Zeit* (Stuttgart 1996), 276-78 no. 37 lines 14-16; cf. *I.Cret.* 186 B = A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.*, 265-267 no. 31 lines 6-10: “if someone wages war against the Gortynians or occupies a fort or harbours or cuts off part of the territory, the Lappaians shall help the Gortynians on land and on sea, with all their might, to the best of their abilities”.

Apollodoros “established the greatest peace, taking upon himself every danger”.<sup>18</sup> The city had been without a city wall and had already twice been the victim of pirates. In this critical situation, the city entrusted him with full authority over the city and the countryside, a unique position which he held with such prudence that his fellow citizens praised him for safeguarding concord in the city and demonstrating just judgement.

Those who could not or would not fight could still contribute to the protection of the countryside through voluntary money donations. But although we have ten subscriptions concerning the building or restoration of a city-wall, only two concern the protection of the countryside.<sup>19</sup> The inequality between city and countryside reflected in these numbers is also evident in one of these latter subscriptions: its aim was not primarily the protection of the countryside but the exploitation of its resources.<sup>20</sup> Most of the evidence concerning the protection of the countryside reveals the concern of the urban population for the food supply and the economic resources of the *chora*.<sup>21</sup>

Whereas a Hellenistic polis usually had a city-wall, which not only offered effective protection but was also a visible source of pride – and a cause of high expenditure –<sup>22</sup> and presented a focal point of political, economic, religious, and cultural activities, the countryside was usually hard to define, to

<sup>18</sup> SEG 28,1540, 62/61 BC.

<sup>19</sup> City-wall: L. MIGEOTTE, *op.cit.*, nos. 18, 21, 23-24, 37, 54, 56, 60, 68-69. Countryside: no. 16 = *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 798 lines 19-20 (Athens, mid-second century): τῆς ἐπιδόσεω[ς γεγενημένης εἰς τὴν φυλακὴν τ]ῆς χώρας; no. 17 = *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 791 lines 16-17 (Athens, 243 BC?): ἐπιδιδό[να]ι εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας.

<sup>20</sup> L. MIGEOTTE, *op.cit.*, no. 17 = *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 791 lines 10-12 (Athens, 243 BC?): οὐα ... συνκ[ομισθῶσιν οἱ ἐκ γῆς κ]αρποὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας.

<sup>21</sup> See the sources discussed below: *IG XII* 8, 156 B; *IOSPE I<sup>2</sup>* 32 B, 401; *I.Histria* 15.

<sup>22</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 26-28, 116-118. On the expenses for fortifications, see more recently H. TRÉZINY, “Le prix des murailles”, in *Téχναι. Techniques et sociétés en Méditerranée. Hommage à Marie-Claire Amouretti*, éd. par J.-P. BRUN - P. JOCKEY (Paris 2001), 367-380 (Classical period).

guard, and to control. Its borders were products of nature and not of human hands. It was exposed to attacks by 'outsiders' – invasions by the armies of foreign communities, raids by people living outside organised civic life or even outside Greek culture. It offered shelter to those who fled from the polis community and its laws – runaway slaves, political groups defeated in civic strife.<sup>23</sup> Some of its deities were associated with untamed and wild powers (Pan, Nymphs, Artemis). Guarding the Hellenistic countryside involved not only protecting its population, but also (at least in some cases) imposing the control and the norms of an urban centre.

## 2. *Phylake tes choras: six different perspectives*

### 2.1. *The perspective of the traveller: Herakleides*

If a Pausanias had lived five centuries earlier, the only bandits he would have mentioned would most likely have been those killed by Theseus on his way to Athens. What a traveller describes is idiosyncratic and ideological. His portrayal of a landscape is the result of selection, omission, and emphasis, and, therefore, constructed; nevertheless, it reflects contemporary trends, as has been observed in the case of Pausanias.

The only relatively coherent account of a Hellenistic landscape which has survived the selection of time is a work under the title *Concerning the cities in Greece* (Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἑλλάδι πόλεων). It is attributed to a certain Herakleides, about whom nothing is known.<sup>24</sup> His Greek landscape is not free of clichés, e.g., concerning the superiority of the urban population over the peasants (§4)

<sup>23</sup> See the examples mentioned by Hans van Wees in this volume (p. 15): *Ath. Pol.* 19.3 (Leipshydrion); HDT. 4.164 (Kyrene); 6.90 (Aigina).

<sup>24</sup> See more recently A. ARENZ, *Herakleides Kritikos "Über die Städte in Hellas". Eine Periegese Griechenlands am Vorabend des Chremonideischen Krieges* (München 2005), who dates this work to ca. 271-267 BC. As far as I can see, there are no unequivocal arguments for this date, and I would not exclude a date between c. 229 and 200 BC.

or ethnic stereotypes (e.g., §§7, 14, 25). In the chapter dedicated to Boiotia, we find *en passant* the following remark (§8): “From here (Oropos) to Tanagra, 130 stadia. The road goes through a countryside full of olive trees and thickly wooded, entirely clean from the fear of theft” (*παντὸς καθαρεύουσα τοῦ ἀπὸ τῶν κλωπῶν φόβου*). Tanagra itself is described as “the safest of all the cities in Boiotia for a foreigner to stay in there” (§9: *καὶ ἐνδιατρῖψαι δὲ ξένοις ἀσφαλεστάτη πόλις τῶν κατὰ Βοιωτίαν*), because of the honest character of its inhabitants. Still in Boiotia, the road from Plataia to Mt. Kithairon is characterised as deserted and full of stones (*ἔρημος καὶ λιθώδης*), but not very insecure (*οὐ λίαν δὲ ἐπισφαλής*) – possibly a reference to the dangers caused by a bad road rather than by evil men (§11).

Unfortunately, from Herakleides’ account only the sections concerning Attika and Boiotia as well as the mythical narratives on Thessaly have been preserved. However, even as casual and brief an observation as the one concerning the safety of the road from Oropos to Tanagra, admittedly a very short distance of c. 20 km, it presupposes a fear of thieves on other roads. The Hellenistic countryside was sometimes a challenge for the travellers – traders, athletes, entertainers, pilgrims, envoys –, and this explains the intensive efforts of cities to have an *ekecheiria* recognised during the celebration of festivals and contests.<sup>25</sup>

## 2.2. *The perspective of the inhabitant of the countryside: Nikostratos*

Let us now change perspective, and move from that of the foreign traveller to that of an inhabitant of a district on the

<sup>25</sup> K.J. RIGSBY, *Asylia. Territorial Inviolability in the Hellenistic World* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1996), 11-12 and nos. 3 (Akraiphia), 4 (Thebes), 14, 16-18, 20, 23, 25-28, 32, 35, 39, 50 (Kos), 73, 79, 81, 83, 85, 88-89, 91-93, 95-96, 100-103, 105-108, 111-112, 125-127, 131 (Magnesia on the Maeander), 168 (Kyzikos). Measures for the safe journey of foreign envoys and judges: e.g., *I. Magnesia* 15; security of actors and entertainers: S. ANEZIRI, *Die Vereine der dionysischen Techniten im Kontext der hellenistischen Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart 2003), 35, 45, 73, 243, 246, 248, 250f. with note 240, 300, and documents A3a (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1330), A5 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1132; *CID* IV 12, 115, 116), D1 (*IG IX<sup>2</sup>* 1.175; *FDelphes* III.3.218 B).

periphery of Athenian territory, Nikostratos, son of Epiteles, a man from Rhamnous. His text is the famous honorary decree for the general Epichares, whom he praises for his services during the Chremonidean War. Many studies have been dedicated to Epichares; here, I am concerned with the perspective of Nikostratos, the personal voice and the persuasion strategies of a man living on the outskirts of Attika, whose security depended on effective protection by an Athenian officer.

“Nikostratos, son of Epiteles of Rhamnous, moved. Since Epichares, when elected commander of the cavalry in the archonship of Lysithides (272/1 BC), looked after the cavalry force well and in accordance with the laws, and was crowned by the council, the people, and the cavalry; and again in the archonship of Pithidemos, when the people elected him general and placed him in charge of the coastal region, carried out [his defensive role] well and with zeal, and saved the fort for the people during the war, and gathered in [the crops] and fruits within a range of thirty stadia, while the enemy troops were in the countryside, and set up a troop of *kryptoi*<sup>26</sup> at the look-outs, keeping guard himself with the soldiers (καταστησάμενος κρυπτοὺς εἰς τὰς σκοπιάς, παρεφεδρεύων αὐτὸς μετὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν), in order to enable the farmers [to gather in their] crops safely; and also protected the vines as far as he [was master] of the land; and constructed at his private expense a portico to provide shelter for all in any emergency, and to make it possible for help to come [quickly]; and also built two watch towers and provided guard dogs in addition to the existing ones, supplying their food himself, to ensure fuller protection;... and also punished those who had introduced the pirates into the land, men from the city, arresting and interrogating them [in a way that was fitting] for what they did; and also provided to the troops, which had come from Patroklos to help, camp installations so that they should have sufficient [---] causing none of the citizens to have troops billeted on them”.<sup>27</sup>

Praise for a magistrate, who achieved and went beyond what was formally required is implicit criticism for those who did

<sup>26</sup> See below note 84.

<sup>27</sup> SEG 24,154; D. KNOEPFLER, “Les *kryptoi* du stratège Epicharès à Rhamnonte et le début de la guerre de Chrémonidès”, in *BCH* 117 (1993), 327-341; A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.*, 95-100 no. 24; V.C. PETRAKOS, *op.cit.* (n.5), 6-9 no. 3.

not. Behind Nikostratos' rhetoric of praise it is not hard to detect the past experiences and resulting insecurity of the population which lived in the countryside: the destruction of crops during an enemy attack because of generals who lacked foresight, zeal, and initiative; defenceless areas without watch towers and patrol troops; pirates; or the billeting of troops, which were remembered as a burden and not as a source of protection.<sup>28</sup>

If we forget for a moment the man who is being honoured, and concentrate instead on the man who gratefully acknowledges an exceptional service, we will not fail also to recognise a latent opposition between the inhabitants of the city and those of the countryside: "he also punished those who had introduced the pirates into the land, men from the city". At first sight, the addition "men from the city" (lines 22f.: ὅν[τα]ς εἰς τὴς πόλεως) seems superfluous, since it does not identify those who collaborated with the pirates by number, name, or function. If it is not superfluous, it is because it is contemptuous, the more so when said by a man who is not from the city and who is not addressing the popular assembly in the city, but the assembly of his own district. Nikostratos' decree, as all Hellenistic honorary decrees, constructs an ideal: a general of the countryside in the coastal areas, who effectively offers protection. Epichares was honoured not only out of gratitude but also in order to present an exemplum for future generals. The Hellenistic countryside depended on the good-will and the efficacy of civic magistrates.

### 2.3. *The perspective of the manipulative king: Philip V*

A third perspective is offered by a report by a historian. Polybius gives the following account of the negotiations between Philip V and the Aitolian Alexandros, during the Second Macedonian War (198 BC):<sup>29</sup> "You ask me", he said, "Alexandros,

<sup>28</sup> See A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 124f.

<sup>29</sup> PLB. 18, 4, 5-6.

why I added Lysimacheia to my realm (προσέλαβον). So that it would not be depopulated by the Thracians (ἀνάστατος ὅπο Θρακῶν γένηται) because of your neglect, as has now happened, when I have withdrawn my soldiers for this war, soldiers who were there not to garrison the city (οὐ τοὺς φρουροῦντας αὐτήν), as you claim, but to guard it (ἀλλὰ τοὺς παραφυλάττοντας)".

This may be a faithful version of the negotiations.<sup>30</sup> A fragmentary treaty between Philip and Lysimacheia (c. 202-197) refers to the forts (φρούρια) of Lysimacheia; the plural form suggests forts in the territory.<sup>31</sup> In his speech, Philip made a distinction between *phrourein* ('to garrison') – regarded by the Greek poleis as a sign of dependence and subordination to foreign rule<sup>32</sup> – and *paraphylattein* ('to guard, to protect'). His troops were there in order to protect the countryside from the raids of the Thracians, the archetypical barbarian raiders.<sup>33</sup> In this context, Polybios uses the verb *παραφυλάττειν*, which is connected with the name of the Hellenistic units known as *παραφυλακῖται* attested in the Seleucid and the Attalid kingdoms (see below) and responsible for guarding the countryside.<sup>34</sup>

Philip's emphasis on *phylattein* is consistent with the Hellenistic ideal of *phylake tes choras*. He was not the only Hellenistic king to present his garrison as a source of protection. Similarly, the Ptolemaic garrison at Itanos on Crete, possibly established at the initiative of the Itanians but certainly very advantageous to the Ptolemies for control of sea routes in the Southern Aegean, was officially represented as protecting the Itanian territory from Itanos' neighbours, the Praisians.<sup>35</sup> I suspect that Timaios, an officer of Ptolemy VI sent to garrison

<sup>30</sup> F.W. WALBANK, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius. Volume II: Commentary on Books VII-XVIII* (Oxford 1967), 556.

<sup>31</sup> *Staatsverträge* III, 549 A 11; *SEG* 31,628; 38,603.

<sup>32</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 19.

<sup>33</sup> On the reputation of the Thracians and their raids, see C. WOLFF, *Les brigands en Orient sous le Haut-Empire romain* (Rome 2003), 69-76.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *SEG* 26,1817 lines 22f.: εἰς τὰν παραφυλακὰν τῆς πόλιος.

<sup>35</sup> *I.Cret.* III, iv, 9 line 40: χάριν βοηθείας καὶ φυλακῆς; line 97: εἰς προστασίαν καὶ φυλακήν.

Methana (mid-second century), intentionally used the neutral verb *παρεφεδρεύειν* ("to remain as guard") in order to describe his role, avoiding the verb *φρουρέω*.<sup>36</sup>

The guarding of an island, a city, a harbour, or a polis territory from the attacks of neighbours, pirates, or barbarians was a service that could increase the popularity of a king or make his rule tolerable.<sup>37</sup>

#### 2.4. *The perspective of the magistrates: Crete*

Let us change perspective for a fourth time, moving from the political rhetoric in the assembly and royal propaganda to the dispassionate language of magistrates negotiating an agreement. A clause contained in interstate agreements of Cretan cities in the late second century BC concerns the problems of security connected with seasonal shepherding:<sup>38</sup> "If someone takes something from a Latian or an Oluntian, the elders who are responsible for the *eunomiai* and investigate and regulate in each of these cities, shall intervene; and they shall have the right [to reconcile the parties (?)] and to undertake everything, as it seems proper. And the *xenikai hodoi* ('roads of the aliens' or the 'roads leading to foreign territory') shall be inviolable; and if someone does wrong on these roads, he shall pay the fine sixfold, if he is defeated in a lawsuit".

In this case, the 'routes of the aliens' (*ξενικαὶ ὁδοί*) can be located near the border between these cities, i.e., on Mt. Kadiston between Olous and Lato and on the mountains of Lasithi between Lyttos and Olous; the term is found usually in connection with mountainous regions, in Crete, in the

<sup>36</sup> *IG IV* 864: οἱ συναπο[στα]λέντες α[ὐ]τῷ παρεφεδρε[ῦ]σαι For *φρουρέω* in connection with garrisons, see M. LAUNAY, *Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques*. Réimpression avec addenda et mise à jour en postface par Y. GARLAN, P. GAUTHIER and C. ORRIEUX (Paris 1987), 694 n.1, 917 n.6, 975, and 924.

<sup>37</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 270.

<sup>38</sup> Lato and Olous: *I.Cret. I*, xvi, 5 = A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.17), 358-376 no. 61 A lines 34-8. Cf. Lyttos and Olous: *I.Cret. I*, xviii, 9 = A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.17), 352-358 no. 60 B 5-8.

Peloponnese, in Phokis, and in Sicily.<sup>39</sup> The use of a distinctive attribute (*xenikos*) for these routes clearly shows that a sharp distinction was necessary between these *specific* routes and other roads. They must either be routes leading beyond the border, to foreign territory or *xene*, or routes *regularly* used by foreigners (*xenoi*). If we take into account the social and economic conditions of Hellenistic Crete, we may suppose that transhumant shepherds made regular use of these routes and that the relevant Cretan treaties concern primarily this group.<sup>40</sup> The officials responsible for security on these routes were called *πρείγιστοι οἱ ἐπὶ ταῖς εὐνομίαις*. They are known, with similar designations (*εὐνομία, εὐνομιῶται, συνευνομιῶται*) from several Cretan cities: Lato, Olous, Aptera, and Polyrrhenia. They are usually mentioned in inscriptions referring to dedications or building works carried out in sanctuaries, but this does not necessarily mean that the primary function of this board was the restoration or supervision of sanctuaries. The decisive source for the duties of these magistrates is the aforementioned treaty between Lato and Olous, from which we can infer that the members of this board intervened in cases of abduction and theft (*αἱ δέ τι καὶ ἔληγται*) on the 'routes of the aliens', undertook a judicial investigation of the case (*ἐρευνίοντες*), put things in order (*ὅρθυμίττοντες*), and arbitrated between the disputing parties (*χρῆσθαι καθώς καὶ ἐπιεικὲς ἦ*). The board of *eunomia* was responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the mountainous border areas and on the 'routes of the aliens'. In Hellenistic Crete, where transhumance is attested and transhumant shepherds crossed the border regularly, one of the primary duties of the *eunomiotai* must have been to resolve conflicts arising between

<sup>39</sup> On the evidence for *xenikai hodoi* see A. CHANIOTIS, "Milking the Mountain: Economic Activities on the Cretan Uplands in the Classical and Hellenistic Period", in *From Minoan Farmers to Roman Traders. Sidelights on the Economy of Ancient Crete*, ed. by A. CHANIOTIS (Stuttgart 1999), 201; Y. LOLOS, "Greek roads: a commentary on the ancient terms", in *Glotta* 79 (2003) [2005], 145f.

<sup>40</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, "Milking the Mountain" (art.cit. n.39), 203f.

shepherds: animal theft, disputes about the ownership of runaway animals, etc.<sup>41</sup>

The Hellenistic countryside was an area threatened by acts of injustice, conflicts, and lack of order.

### 2.5. *The perspective of a political group: Chersonesos in Tauris*

The oath of the citizens of Chersonesos in Tauris (early third century) – rather, the oath of the political group, which claimed to represent the entire citizen body of Chersonesos –<sup>42</sup> gives us yet another perspective: the attitude of the regime in the city towards the countryside during a civil war:<sup>43</sup> “I shall maintain concord for the salvation and the freedom of the polis and the citizens; I shall not betray to anyone, either Greek or barbarian, Chersonesos or Kerkinitis or Kalos Limen or other forts or any other part of the territory occupied now or in the past by the Chersonesitai, but I shall preserve them for the people of Chersonesos; and I shall not overthrow the democracy. I shall not allow any one to betray or to overthrow and I shall not keep it secret, but I shall denounce this to the demiourgoi, who are in the city. I shall be an enemy of any one who plots against Chersonesos or Kerkinitis or Kalos Limen or the forts or the territory of the Chersonesitai or betrays them or causes them to revolt.... I shall neither shell corn from the plain, which can be carried away, nor export anything else from the plain, except to Chersonesos”.

This text reflects the anxieties of a government in control of the city (cf. δαμιουργοῖς τοῖς κατὰ πόλιν) during a civil war, anticipating that their opponents would occupy parts of the

<sup>41</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, *art.cit.*, 201f.

<sup>42</sup> A. DÖSSEL, *Die Beilegung innerstaatlicher Konflikte in den griechischen Poleis vom 5.-3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Frankfurt/M. 2003), 179-196.

<sup>43</sup> IOSPE I<sup>2</sup> 401; cf. V.F. STOLBA, “The Oath of Chersonesos and the Chersonesean Economy in the Early Hellenistic Period”, in *Making, Moving and Managing. The New World of Ancient Economies, 323-31 BC*, ed. by Z.H. ARCHIBALD, J.K. DAVIES, and V. GABRIELSEN (Oxford 2005), 298-321. SEG 52,733 for further bibliography.

countryside and fearing the loss of the resources of the countryside.

The first fear was realistic, as we know from many instances in the history of Athens (see n. 23). The Eretrian law against tyranny and oligarchy (c. 340 BC) urges the citizens to occupy forts in the countryside and make them strongholds of resistance against the tyrant.<sup>44</sup> This is exactly what the citizens of Priene, who opposed the tyrant Hieron, did in the late fourth century. They attacked the fort Karion, killed the commander of the garrison and the soldiers, because they supported the tyrant, and used this fort as their base, ravaging the countryside for three years and attacking the supporters of the tyrant (ἐξ οὗ ὁρμουμένους κατατρέχειν καὶ κακοποιεῖν τόν τε Ἰέρωνα καὶ τοὺς τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἰέρωνι αἴρε[υμένους]).<sup>45</sup>

The Hellenistic countryside could easily become a locus of political conflict.

## 2.6. *The perspective of the elite?: Hyettos*

Finally, let us see the perspective of the author of a decree of Hyettos, who describes the situation in Boiotia in the mid-second century:<sup>46</sup> “(Decree) concerning the guarding of the city.

<sup>44</sup> SEG 51,1105 lines 24-30: ἀν δέ τι συμβαίνει ἀδυνατί[τέον κατασχεῖν? τὸ Ἀγ[οραῖον παραχρῆμα ὥστ' ἐξεῖναι τεῖ βουλεῖ | καθίσαι κατὰ νόμον ἢ ἀν] ἀποκλεισθεῖ ὁ δῆμος τῶν τειχέων, καταλ[αμβάνειν χωρίον τι τῆς Ἐρετρίαδος ὁ τι ἀν δοκεῖ σύνφορον εἶνα[ι πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ συνελθεῖ]ν τοὺς βοηθούσας πάντας· καταλαβόντα[ις δὲ ὑποδέχεσθαι τὸν ἐλθόντα καὶ βολόμενον τῶν Ἐλλήνων βοηθεί[αν τοῖ δήμοι τοῖ Ἐρετριῶν]. See the comments of D. KNOEPFLER, “Loi d’Érétrie contre la tyrannie et l’oligarchie”, in *BCH* 126 (2002), 171-184.

<sup>45</sup> *I.Priene* 37 lines 66-68 and 109-112.

<sup>46</sup> R. ÉTIENNE - D. KNOEPFLER, *Hyettos de Béotie et la chronologie des archontes fédéraux entre 250 et 171 av. J.-C.* (Paris 1976), 163-166, 244f.; A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 174-177 no. 49:.... [περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ γινομένων ἀδικημάτων μετέχοντων κατὰ τὴν χώραν διὰ τὸ παραγινόμενον [οὐχιον ἐπὶ ληστείας] καὶ ἀρπαγῆς τῶν ἀλλοτρίων [αὐλάς] τε ἐκκόπτειν καὶ φόνους ἐπιτελεῖσθαι καὶ αὐλάς ἀρπαγάς [σωμάτων τε καὶ θρεμμάτων, [άν]ανκαῖον δέ [εἰ]στιν ἐν τοιούτοις [καιροῖς] ἀντέχεσθαι μάλιστα τῶν δυναμένων] βοηθεῖν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἀναστέζειν [τὰ ἀπολλύμενα] καὶ παραφυλάττειν καὶ κωλύειν τοὺς [τὰ] ἀδικήματα συντελουμένους; C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 21.

Since great deeds of injustice occur in the countryside, because, due to the arrival of a crowd which has come with the purpose of stealing and seizing the property of others, farms are devastated, and murders take place as well as seizures of men and animals; and since in such difficult times it is necessary that mostly those men offer resistance who are in a position to help the city and recover what was lost and guard (*παραφυλάττειν*) and hinder those who commit the deeds of injustice...”.

The decree honours two men from Hypate, who looked for (*ἀνεζητήκ[ασιν]*) citizens captured by the ‘crowd’ and contributed to their liberation. Unlike a certain Aischron, who liberated Athenian citizens captured on their way to the Pythian festival (c. 284 BC) applying violence,<sup>47</sup> nothing in this decree suggests that the men of Hypate liberated the Hyetians by force. They may have known the persons who held them captive and negotiated with them;<sup>48</sup> from this we may infer that the ‘mob’ had identifiable leaders and an organisation of some kind.

The ‘bad guys’ are not identified as enemies, barbarians, or bandits, but simply designated as a ‘crowd’ (*ὄχλος*; the word is only restored, but plausibly restored). D. Knoepfler and R. Étienne are certainly right in their assumption that Hyettos did not face attacks by brigands; instead, they assumed that the *ochlos* were soldiers participating in the campaign of the Achaian League against Herakleia Trachinia and pillaging the territory of Hyettos.<sup>49</sup> The word *ὄχλος* is used in a variety of contexts, e.g., referring to the crowd in a sanctuary,<sup>50</sup> the

<sup>47</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 309 lines 10–12: [ἐ]βιάσατο τοὺς παραν[ομήσαντας καὶ τοῦ τοὺς συλληγ]φθέντας σωθῆναι καὶ [λυθῆναι? αἴτιος γενόμενος; A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 65–69 no. 18.

<sup>48</sup> For such cases of negotiations, see A. CHANIOTIS, “Mobility of Persons during the Hellenistic Wars: State Control and Personal Relations”, in *La mobilité des personnes en Méditerranée, de l’Antiquité à l’époque moderne. II. La mobilité négociée. Procédures de contrôle et documents d’identification*, éd. sous la direction de Cl. MOATTI (Rome 2004), 491–494; cf., e.g., A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 119–125 no. 31 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 844).

<sup>49</sup> R. ÉTIENNE – D. KNOEPFLER, *op.cit.* (n.46), 244f.

<sup>50</sup> *IG IV 1<sup>2</sup>* 123 lines 25f. (*SEG* 42,293): ὄχλου δὲ πολλοῦ περι[στάντος].

multitude,<sup>51</sup> pirates,<sup>52</sup> rebels,<sup>53</sup> and the ‘mob’ during civil strife.<sup>54</sup> Given the evidence for social unrest in this period – alluded to in the Roman accusations against Perseus<sup>55</sup> and in the senatus consultum concerning Thisbe in 170 BC,<sup>56</sup> we should not exclude the possibility that the ‘crowd’ (or ‘mob’) consisted of dispossessed individuals, exiles, or representatives of the lower social strata of other cities, wandering through Greece (cf. *παραγινόμενον*).

Insecurity in the countryside may have originated in social conflicts – or it may have been a social construct.<sup>57</sup>

### 3. *Phylake tes choras: the threats*

The six perspectives which I have briefly presented reveal a variety of dangers threatening the countryside: enemy invasions – of a neighbour or of the army of a Hellenistic king; brigands threatening travellers, pilgrims, traders, and

<sup>51</sup> SEG 26,1817 lines 53f.: τὰι τῶν ὄχλων σωτηρίαι. A. LARONDE, *Cyrène et la Libye hellénistique. Libykai Historiai de l'époque républicaine au principat d'Augustus* (Paris 1987), 472-479, interprets the ὄχλοι as displaced farmers of the countryside during a war.

<sup>52</sup> SEG 41,1411: ἀνάρσιον ὄχλον.

<sup>53</sup> PDryt. 36 (U. WILCKEN, *Chrestomathia*, 10); R.S. BAGNALL - P. DEROW, *Historical Sources in Translation: The Hellenistic Period* (Oxford <sup>2</sup>2004), no. 53: πρὸς τὸ καταστεῖσαι τοὺς ἐν Ἐρμώνθει ὄχλους, χρήσασθαι δ' αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀποστάταις (130 BC).

<sup>54</sup> E.g., IOSPE I<sup>2</sup> 355: [ἐμφυλί]ου? ταραχῆς καὶ φόνου διὰ τὰν ὄργὰν τῶν ὄχλων.

<sup>55</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 643; M. AUSTIN, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest. A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation* (Cambridge <sup>2</sup>2006), 185f. no. 93: “In Aitolia he [Perseus] planned war and massacres and threw the whole people into a state of confusion and strife. And in the whole of Greece he constantly acted in the most detrimental way, planning various other crimes including giving refuge to exiles from the cities. And he corrupted the leading statesmen, courted at the same time the favour of the masses, promised cancellation of debts and caused revolutions”.

<sup>56</sup> Syll.<sup>3</sup> 646.

<sup>57</sup> For the Imperial period. cf. C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 44-50.

transhumant shepherds;<sup>58</sup> incursions of barbarian ethnic groups (Thracians, Galatians, etc.), living from raids;<sup>59</sup> people who illegally exploited the natural resources of the countryside (especially pastureland); raids, such as those organised by communities (especially by the Aitolians) for the collection of booty<sup>60</sup> and the raids of pirates (Cretans, Kilikians, Illyrians);<sup>61</sup> civil strife;<sup>62</sup> revolts of garrisons in forts and occupation of forts by exiles.<sup>63</sup> Runaway slaves presented a danger

<sup>58</sup> See also *IOSPE* I<sup>2</sup> 344 (attack against the participants in a procession to an extra-urban sanctuary) and G. DAVERIO ROCCHI, *Frontiera e confini nella Grecia antica* (Roma 1988), 87 with n.98; A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 65-69 no. 18 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 652), 177-180 no. 50 (*EDelphes* III 1, 457), 180-184 no. 51 (*IG* XII 3, 171; *I.Ephesos* 5).

<sup>59</sup> Galatians: A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 86-94 nos. 22-23. Thracians or other barbarians: E.g., A. BIELMAN, 189-193 no. 53 (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 708; *I.Histria* 54); *I.Histria* 15. For the cities of the Black Sea (and these texts) see A. AVRAM, "La défense des cités en mer Noire à la basse époque hellénistique", in *Citoyenneté et participation à la basse époque hellénistique*, éd. par P. FRÖHLICH - Chr. MÜLLER (Paris 2005), 163-182.

<sup>60</sup> J.B. SCHOLTEN, *The Politics of Plunder: Aitolians and Their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279-217 B.C.* (Berkeley 2000); A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 129-137. Cf. DURIS, *FGrHist* 76 F 13: Αἰτωλικὸν γὰρ ἀρπάσαι τὰ τῶν πέλαξ, νῦν δὲ καὶ τὰ πόρρω; "for it is an Aitolian custom to seize the property of neighbours and now even what is afar"; PLB. 4, 3, 1: the Aitolians "are accustomed to live by exploiting their neighbours and require many funds because of their inherent greed, enslaved by which they always lead a life of insatiability resembling wild beasts, regarding no one as a friend and everyone as their enemy".

<sup>61</sup> P. BRULÉ, *La piraterie crétoise hellénistique* (Paris 1978); A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 18-22 no. 6 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 399 + add.), 100-104 no. 25 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1225), 104-106 no. 26 (*IG* XII 5, 36), 119-125 no. 31 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 844), 125-128 no. 32 (*IG* XI 4, 1054-1054a), 141-144 no. 38 (*IG* XII 7, 386); Ph. DE SOUZA, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge 1999); L. BRACCESI (ed.), *La pirateria nell'Adriatico antico* (Roma 2005). On the close connection of piracy and trade, see V. GABRIELSEN, "Economic Activiy, Maritime Trade, and Piracy in the Hellenistic Aegean", in *REA* 103 (2001), 219-240.

<sup>62</sup> E.g., *IOSPE* I<sup>2</sup> 401 (Chersonesos in Tauris).

<sup>63</sup> The Teians were concerned that the garrison in the fort at Kyrbissos might revolt against the polis; for this fear in general, see J. ROBERT-L. ROBERT, "Une inscription grecque de Téos en Ionie. L'union de Téos et de Kyrbissos", in *Journal des Savants* 1976, 199 and 210-214 (with further parallels, e.g., PLUT. *Arat.* 5.3); exiles from Priene occupied a fort at Charax (*Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 363); cf. D. KNOEPFLER, *art.cit.* (n.44), 177f.; A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 93; see also notes 23 and 44.

only in exceptional situations (e.g. during the war against Aristonikos), but their very existence defied authority and law, and could not be tolerated. Measures were taken both concerning their presence as suppliants in sanctuaries and their capture.<sup>64</sup>

The greatest and most common danger facing the Hellenistic countryside was that of an invading army. Despite the exaggerations in our sources, there can be no doubt concerning the negative effects of an invasion on the economy of the countryside.<sup>65</sup> Enemies destroyed crops, burned fields and farms, stole the gathered surplus, took fodder for their horses and draught animals. Allied troops who had come to defend the territory needed billeting and were fed on the surplus of the invaded state. A contract for the leasing of a piece of land in Attika mentions “an invasion of enemies or the camping of friendly troops” as possible troubles in its exploitation.<sup>66</sup> Manpower was lost, the invasion disrupted regular cultivation, slaves found an opportunity to run away, and shepherds sought refuge with their livestock in the territory of a friendly neighbour.

Attacks by pirates in the Adriatic Sea, on the coasts of mainland Greece and Asia Minor, and in the Aegean, as well as raids by barbarian tribes in Thrace, in the Black Sea, and in Asia Minor, were also very common. An Athenian decree, for example, refers to the plundering of Attika by Boukris and the

<sup>64</sup> Suppliant slaves: A. CHANIOTIS, “Conflicting Authorities: Greek Asylia between Secular and Divine Law in the Classical and Hellenistic Poleis”, in *Kernos* 9 (1996), 79-83; G. THÜR, “Gerichtliche Kontrolle des Asylanspruchs”, in *Das antike Asyl. Kultische Grundlagen, rechtliche Ausgestaltung und politische Funktion*, hrsg. von M. DREHER (Köln-Weimar-Wien 2003), 31-34. Capture: *Milet I*, 3, 150 (see below).

<sup>65</sup> J.-Chr. COUVENHES, *art.cit.* (n.11), 202f.; A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 121-129. See, e.g., MEN. *Aspis* 30-33: πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐκλελοιπότες | τὸν χάρακα τὰς κώμας ἐπόρθουν, τοὺς ἀγροὺς | ἔκοπτον, αἰχμάλωτ’ ἐπώλουν, χρήματα | ἔκαστος εἴχε πόλλ’ ἀπελθών (plundering of the area around Xanthos in Lycia by the troops, which fought against the barbarians); *I.Priene* 15 lines 13f. (c. 286 BC): [πορθου]μένης τῆς [χ]ώρας ὑπό τε Μαγνήτω[ν καὶ Πεδιέων]; perhaps we should restore [φθειρο]μένης (as in *I.Priene* 16 line 16).

<sup>66</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1241 lines 15f.: πολεμίων εἰσβολῆς καὶ φιλίου στρατοπέδου.

capture of citizens.<sup>67</sup> A decree of Aigiale on Amorgos gives a dramatic narrative of such an attack (late second century):<sup>68</sup> “During the night pirates invaded the countryside ( $\varepsilon i \varsigma [\tau] \dot{\eta} \nu \chi \omega \rho \alpha \nu \ \dot{\epsilon} \mu \beta \alpha \lambda \dot{\o} \nu \tau \omega \nu \ \nu \kappa \tau \o \varsigma$ ) and virgins and (married) women and other people, both free and slave, were captured – a total of more than thirty people. And (the pirates) destroyed the ships in the harbour and captured the ship of Dorieus, with which they departed carrying away both the people and the rest of the booty”.<sup>69</sup> In the colonies of the Black Sea area, the danger primarily came from barbarians.<sup>70</sup> In Asia Minor the raids of the Galatians in the third century came in addition to the already existing dangers of endemic brigandage, especially in mountainous areas.<sup>71</sup>

Since all these forms of violence have been studied recently,<sup>72</sup> I will refrain from a detailed discussion. I shall only stress the fact that the raids were often well organised military enterprises, e.g. the raids by the young men of Termessos under the command of Alketas<sup>73</sup> or the raids of Cretan pirates.<sup>74</sup> A treaty between Lyttos

<sup>67</sup> A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 119-125 no. 31 lines 5-6: καταδραμόντα τὴν χώραν.

<sup>68</sup> A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.*, 141-144 no. 38.

<sup>70</sup> E.g., *IOSPE* I<sup>2</sup> 32 B lines 13-17: καὶ ἄλλα γεγενῆσθαι ἐλαττώματα πολλὰ κατὰ τὴν χώραν, ἐφθάρθαι μὲν τὴν οἰκετείαν ἄπασαν καὶ τοὺς τὴν παρώρειαν οἰκοῦντας Μιξέλληνας (attacks of barbarian tribes and Galatians); *I. Histriae* 15: πειρατεύοντας τῶν Θραικῶν οὐκ [δόλοι] γων τὴν [τε χ]ώραν καὶ τὴν [πόλι] ι[ν].

<sup>71</sup> Brigandage: P. BRIANT, "Brigandage", dissidence et conquête en Asie achéménide et hellénistique", in *DHA* 2 (1976), 163-258; C. WOLFF, *op.cit.* (n.33); C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 52-56.

<sup>72</sup> See the bibliography in notes 58 and 63.

<sup>73</sup> P. BRIANT, *art.cit.* (n.71), 182f.

<sup>74</sup> P. BRULÉ, *op.cit.* (n.61); A. PETROPOULOU, *Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte Kretas in hellenistischer Zeit* (Frankfurt/M. 1985); A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.17), 93f.; A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 134-136.

and Malla (late third century) provides a characteristic example for the latter:<sup>75</sup> “If the Lyttians and the Mallaians start a campaign (ἐξοδουσάντων) and if we, with the will of the gods, capture something from our enemies in a joint military action (κοινᾶι στρατουόμενοι), let each party receive by lot a part that corresponds to the number of the men that had come (i.e., had participated in the campaign)”. The verb *ἐξοδεύω* (‘to march out’) makes clear that this clause did not concern booty made during a defensive war, but campaigns initiated by the two cities (and, as the word *ἐκαστος* suggests, by other partners as well). Such a clause encouraged campaigns, aimed precisely at the capture of movables: slaves, money, livestock, and other valuables.<sup>76</sup>

#### 4. *Phylake tes choras: measures for protection*

An inscription from the Pamphylian city of Syedra preserves an oracle given by Apollo of Klaros in the first century, in

<sup>75</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.17), 208-213 no. 11 (*I.Cret.* I, xix 1; *Staatsverträge* III, 511): Αἱ δέ τ[ι] κοινᾶι στρατουόμεν[οι θιῶν] θελόντων ἔλοιμεν τῶν πολεμίων ἐ[ξοδουσάν]των τῶν Λυττίων καὶ Μαλλαίων, λ[αγχανόν]των ἐκαστοι τὰ μέρια κατὰ τὸς ἀ[νδρας] τὸς ἔρποντας.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.17), 255-264 no. 28 (*I.Cret.* III, iii, 4): Αἱ δέ τι θεῶν βωλομένων ἔλοιμεν ἀγαθὸν ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἡ κοινᾶι ἐξοδούσαντες ἡ ἴδιαι τινὲς παρ' ἐκατέρων ἡ κατὰ γῆν ἡ κατὰ θάλασσαν, λανχανόντων ἐκάτεροι κατὰ τὸς ἀνδρας τὸς ἔρποντας καὶ τὰς δεκάτας λαμβανόντων ἐκάτεροι ἐς τὰν ἴδιαν πόλιν (“if with the will of the gods we capture something good from the enemies, marching out either jointly (the two poleis) or privately some individuals from each city, either by land or by sea, let them divide the booty by lot proportionally to the men that had come and let each part bring the tithes to its own city”). The most recent discussion of the division of booty and the controversial question, whether there were privately organised campaigns, is by F.J. FERNÁNDEZ NIETO, “El derecho privado sobre el botín de guerra en el ámbito dorio (s. V-II a.C.)”, in *Symposion 1999. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Pazo de Mariñán, La Coruña, 6.-9. September 1999)*, hrsg. von G. THÜR und F.J. FERNÁNDEZ NIETO (Köln-Weimar-Wiem 2003), 355-370. I think that the opposition *κοινᾶ/ἴδια τινές* allows only one interpretation: campaigns organised by the two cities/campaigns organised by individuals (citizens) from both cities. Both military enterprises were *joint* enterprises, otherwise they would not have been treated by the treaty. If *κοινᾶ/ἴδια* cannot be an opposition between ‘joint’ and ‘separate’, it can only be an opposition between ‘public’ and ‘private’.

response to an enquiry of the city, continually plagued by Kilikian pirates:<sup>77</sup> “Pamphylians of Syedra, who inhabit a common land of mixed races of mortals, erect in the middle of your town an image of Ares, the blood-stained slayer of men, and perform sacrifices; Hermes should hold him captured in iron chains; on the other side Justice (Dike), who declares wrong and right, will judge him; he should look like someone who pleads (for mercy). For thus he will be peacefully disposed towards you, having driven the hostile mob far away from your fatherland he will raise up the much-prayed-for prosperity. But also you yourselves jointly put your hands to hard toil, and either chase these men away or bind them in unloosable bonds; do not delay the terrible vengeance on the plunderers, for thus you will escape harm”. Even a god, or those who spoke on his behalf, realised that more than prayers and rituals were needed to protect the country from the raids of pirates. The Syedrians should fight.

The measures taken for the protection of the countryside depended on the nature of the danger (e.g., an evil neighbour, pirates, or barbarian tribes), the geographical structure of the territory and the nature of its frontiers (e.g., island, mountain, plain, Peraia, etc.), its extension, settlement structure (e.g., the existence of military colonies), the political status of the relevant community (whether it was a member of an alliance or a federation, whether it was under the control of a king, whether a foreign garrison was present), and of course the resources available (manpower, financial resources). It was the combina-

<sup>77</sup> SEG 41,1411; *Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten*, Band IV: *Die Südküste Kleinasiens, Syrien und Palaestina*, hrsg. von R. MERKELBACH und J. STAUBER (München 2002), 168f. 18/19/01; C.A. FARAONE, “Binding and Burying the Forces of Evil: The Defensive Use of ‘Voodoo Dolls’ in Ancient Greece”, in *Classical Antiquity* 10 (1991), 168-169 and C.A. FARAONE, *Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardian Statues in Ancient Greek Myth and Ritual* (New York-Oxford 1992), 75. Unlike Merkelbach and Stauber, I take ἔρδετε θύσθλα to mean ‘perform sacrifices’ (not ‘flog’), because of the use of the verb ἔρδω (cf. *IG XII* 6, 577: δεκάτην ἔρδοντες). For θύσθλα in the meaning ‘sacrifice’, cf. *SEG* 28,839 (ἐπιβάμια θύσθλα).

tion of all these factors that made a community decide whether to entrust the policing of the countryside to foreign military settlers,<sup>78</sup> to the population of a fortified settlement manned with a garrison;<sup>79</sup> to the troops of a foreign king;<sup>80</sup> to regular troops stationed in the countryside (*ὕπαιθροι*);<sup>81</sup> or to citizen militias, usually consisting of young men, who patrolled the countryside and manned the forts (see below).

We should also distinguish between regular patrolling of the countryside, which could effectively deal only with small numbers of raiders, brigands, or invaders and otherwise could only warn the authorities, and measures taken in exceptional situations (wars, extensive raids), when the 'regular army' and/or mercenaries had to be mobilised.<sup>82</sup> For example, Kallias of Sphettos "lead out into the countryside the soldiers under his command and protected the gathering of the grain, making every effort to ensure that as much grain as possible should be brought into the city" (270 BC).<sup>83</sup> During the Chremonidean War, the Athenian general Epichares used a unit of *κρυπτοί* ('secret ones') in order to protect fertile countryside in Rhamnous.<sup>84</sup> These troops were specialised in ambush and surveillance.<sup>85</sup> In a second document,

<sup>78</sup> The recruitment of military settlers from Crete was a measure taken by Miletos (late third century BC) in order to defend a newly occupied territory (*Milet I*, 3, 33-38).

<sup>79</sup> This was one of the functions of the fort at Kyrbissos, in the territory of Teos (third century): *SEG* 26,1306; J. ROBERT-L. ROBERT, *art.cit.* (n.63), 188-228.

<sup>80</sup> Ptolemaic troops in Samothrake: R.S. BAGNALL, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions outside Egypt* (Leiden 1976), 160 and 221. 100 cavalrymen of king Rhemaxos protected the countryside in Histria: *I. Histria* 15.

<sup>81</sup> M. LAUNAY, *op.cit.* (n.36), 693f.

<sup>82</sup> E.g., A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 86-90 no. 22 (*I. Priene* 17) and 100-104 no. 25 (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1225).

<sup>83</sup> *SEG* 28,60 lines 23-27.

<sup>84</sup> V.C. PETRAKOS, *op.cit.* (n.5), 6-7 no. 3 (*SEG* 44,59), 26-28 no. 20 (*SEG* 41,87). For the function and historical developments of these troops (*peripoloi*, *kryptoi*, *hypaithroi*) see J.-Chr. COUVENHES, "Péripoloi, kryptoi et hypaithroi dans la défense de l'Attique: permanence civique, influence royale", in *Acts of the 13th International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy, Oxford, 2-7 September 2007. Summary Papers* (Oxford 2007), 23.

<sup>85</sup> D. KNOEPFLER, *art.cit.* (n.27).

again from Rhamnous, their commander was Athenian and the soldiers were a mixture of Athenians and foreigners (from Megara, Sinope, and Plataiai), probably mercenaries;<sup>86</sup> there is no unequivocal evidence for Athenian ephebes serving as *kryptoi*.

In the first years of the Galatian incursions in Asia Minor, the defence of the countryside of Priene was assigned to a military unit of infantry and cavalry prepared for this purpose. It consisted of citizens who received a stipend for their service (ἐκπέμψας μισθοφό[ρους] τῶν πολιτῶν πεζοὺς κ[αὶ] ἄλλους? ἵππο]τρόφους) and of volunteers, recruited by Sotas among the citizens and the dependent population of the countryside (Σωτᾶς δὲ συνα[γαγὼν τῷ πο]λιτῶν τοὺς [έθέλοντας καὶ τῶν] ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας [τοὺς ἐπιθυμήσα]ντας αὐτο[ῖς συγκινδυνεύειν πρὸς] τοὺς βαρ[βάρους]).<sup>87</sup> The troops of Sotas liberated captives and helped the citizens who lived in the countryside find rescue behind the city-walls. When Histria faced Thracian attacks, just before the harvest, Agathokles, the elected *toxarches*, protected the harvest with mercenary soldiers.<sup>88</sup> Some time later, when resistance seemed pointless, Agathokles bribed the Thracian raiders with 600 gold coins not to invade the countryside. When the Thracian raids continued, Agathokles was elected *στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῆς χώρας αὐτοκράτωρ*.<sup>89</sup> He succeeded in saving the livestock and the crops in the countryside with the help of volunteers, consisting of citizens and barbarians who had sought rescue in the city (lines 42f.: λαβὼν τ[ῶν τε π]ολιτῶν ἐ[θελ]οντὰς στρατιώτας καὶ τῶν συμφευγόν[των

<sup>86</sup> SEG 41,87; V.C. PETRAKOS, *op.cit.* (n.5), 26-28 no. 20.

<sup>87</sup> A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 86-90 no. 22 (*I.Priene* 17).

<sup>88</sup> *I.Histriae* 15 lines 11-13: α[ἱρεθ]εὶς τοξάρχης καὶ λαβὼν στρατιώτας μισθοφόρους [δι]ε[φύ]λαξε τὴν τε χώραν καὶ τὰ θέρη ἐποίησε[ν] τοὺς πολίτ[ας ἀ]βλαβῶς συναγαγεῖν. Cf. H. BENGTSON, “Neues zur Geschichte des Hellenismus in Thrakien und in der Dobrudscha”, in *Historia* 11 (1962), 18-28. On this text see more recently A. AVRAM, *art.cit.* (n.59), 165.

<sup>89</sup> The appointment of an officer with unlimited powers (αὐτοκράτωρ) was also a measure taken by Berenike (first century) during a war against pirates (SEG 28,1540: αὐτοκρατεῖν ὑπὲρ τᾶς πόλιος καὶ τᾶς χώρας ἐπιτεταγμένος περὶ τῶν καθόλω πραγμάτων).

β]αρβάρων ε[ις τὴν] πόλιν). These were temporary measures, in force until the arrival of king Rhemaxos, to whom the Histrians paid tribute. However, the 100 cavalrymen left by the king for the defence of the countryside (εἰς προφύλαξιν) ran away, and finally Agathokles persuaded the son of the king to send 600 cavalrymen (προφυλ[ακή]ν ἵπ[πε]ων ἔξακοσίων). This unit seems to have been successful, but the rest of the story was told on the missing part of the stone.

In some cities, especially those with large territories, there were permanent or temporary officials exclusively responsible for the protection of the countryside, such as the *στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν* ('general of the territory / the countryside') and the *στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν / ἐπὶ τὴν παραλίαν* ('general of the coastal territory') in Athens<sup>90</sup> and a similar officer in Hellenistic Rhodes (*στρατηγὸς (ἐπὶ) τῆς χώρας*).<sup>91</sup> From Rhodes, this office was imported to Karia.<sup>92</sup> In Erythrai Polyktitos served as *ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν* (responsible for the protection of the coastal countryside, perhaps a temporary assignment during a critical period (third century BC).<sup>93</sup>

<sup>90</sup> Στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν e.g., V.C. PETRAKOS, *op.cit.* (n.5), nos. 38, 39, 45. Στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν παραλίαν / ἐπὶ τὴν παραλίαν: *ibid.*, nos. 8, 10, 16, 18, 20, 32, 46, 48-51, 129, 136, 145; cf. ἐπὶ Ραμνοῦντα καὶ τὴν παραλίαν χώραν: *ibid.*, nos. 148-152. Στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν τὴν ἐπ' Ἐλευσῖνος: K. CLINTON, *op.cit.* (n.12), no. 180, 186-187, 194, 211.

<sup>91</sup> E.g., *στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τᾶς χώρας*: G. JACOPI, "Nuove epigrafi dalle Sporadi meridionali", *Clara Rhodos* 2 (Rodi 1932), 195 no. 22; *I.Lindos* 153 and 172; *στραταγὸς ἐπὶ τὰν χώραν*: *IG XII 1*, 49 line 25; *στραταγήσας ἐπὶ τᾶς χώρας*: *IG XII 1*, 701; G. JACOPI, *ibid.*, 199 no. 31; *SEG 39,750*; *στραταγήσας ἐπὶ τᾶς χώρας τᾶς ἐν ταῖ νάσ(σ)ωι*: *IG XII 1*, 701; *I.Lindos* 325. Cf. G. REGER, "The Relations Between Rhodes and Caria from 246 to 167 BC", in *Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture, and Society*, ed. by V. GABRIELSEN *et al.* (Aarhus 1999), 80f. I take *νᾶσος* in the phrase *χώρα ἐν ταῖ νάσωι* to be the island of Rhodes; cf. H. VAN GELDER, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier* (Den Haag 1900), 254.

<sup>92</sup> For the evidence see C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 75-77. For Aphrodisias see A. CHANIOTIS, "New Inscriptions from Aphrodisias (1995-2001)", in *AJA* 108 (2004), 381 with n.8.

<sup>93</sup> A. BIELMAN, *op.cit* (n.14), 80-85 no. 21: ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακ[ὴν] τῆς χώρας τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν [ἀ]ποδειχθείς.

Similar offices existed in Magnesia on the Maeander and in Miletos.<sup>94</sup>

Depending on the structure and extent of the territory, small frontier forts (φρούριον, οὔριον, περιπόλιον), fortified enclosures (όχυρωμα), fortified settlements (χωρίον) and watch towers (σκοπή) served as additional forms of defence and provided a retreat not only for the patrollers but also for farmers in times of danger. The forts (περιπόλια) of Kos offer a good example.<sup>95</sup> A recent find, an honorary inscription for one of the most influential statesmen of Kos in the late third century, Diokles, son of Leodamas, gives a very vivid picture of the dangers facing the countryside and the measures which were taken for its protection (Halasarna, c. 200):<sup>96</sup> “Diokles, son of Leodamas, acting in accordance with the virtue which has been handed down to him by his ancestors, has continually shown every zeal and care for the district of the Halasarnitai; and, during the wars, he aimed at safeguarding the fort and those who inhabit the territory (τὸ περιπόλιον καὶ τὸς κατοικεῦ<ν>τας τὰν χώραμ), showing the greatest consideration and engaging himself in every danger for its sake. For, during the Cretan War, when it was announced that the site was threatened, he arrived with many men and, making inspections together with those who had been assigned to guard (the fort) (συνεφώδευε μετὰ τῶν τεταγμένων ἐπὶ τᾶς φυλακᾶς), he asked the inhabitants to come together to the fort and to join in its defence, until it transpired that the enemies abandoned their plan to attack.

<sup>94</sup> Magnesia: *I.Magnesia* 15 lines 25f.: τὸμ [φρούραρχον] | τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας. The restoration [φρούραρχον] is unlikely; perhaps [στρατηγόν]. Miletos: οἱ ηρημένοι ἐπὶ τῆς φυλακῆς (sc. τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας): *I.Milet* 1039, 1053, 1054; H. MÜLLER, *Milesische Volksbeschlüsse* (Göttingen 1976), 39-57.

<sup>95</sup> *Iscr.Cos* ED 201 and *SEG* 48,1104; cf. P. BAKER, *Cos et Calymna*, 205-200 a.C. *Esprit civique et défense nationale* (Québec 1991) and “Remarques sur la défense à Cos à l'époque hellénistique”, in *REA* 103 (2001), 183-195.

<sup>96</sup> *SEG* 48,1104 + 51,1049; L. HALLOF-K. HALLOF-C. HABICHT, “Aus der Arbeit der ‘Inscriptiones Graecae’, II. Ehrendekrete aus dem Asklepieion von Kos”, in *Chiron* 28 (1998), 116-121.

And in the present war, in order to keep the fort safe, since our enemies were often threatening it, many naval and land forces being gathered in Astypalaia, he brought weapons and missiles for catapults and bows; in accordance with a decree, he chose those who would be most capable of taking charge of guarding, and placed under their command enough (or capable) men who would keep guard by day [--]; he also arrived in order to protect the site [--]; when he anticipated the enemy threat and the size of the dangers [-- the most suitable?] place of the fort, when the attack occurred, he followed the enemy and confined them under the fort; he instructed Nikostratos, son of Nikostratos, to take the light-armed among those who had come out with him and to come to assist; when due to this foresight the latter arrived zealously, it so occurred that the site was not occupied and the invaders left without doing any injustice against the territory".

The events narrated in this text occurred in the district of Halasarna during the military activities of Philip V in the Aegean and in Karia and during the First Cretan War (c. 209-200). A fortified place (*peripolion*) already existed, unfortunately in an unknown location (probably near the coast), presumably at some distance from the main settlement of Halasarna; we may infer this from the fact that Diokles' services are described as connected with "the fort and the inhabitants of the countryside" ( $\tauὸ\ \piεριπόλιον\ καὶ\ τὸ\ κατοικεῖν>τας\ τὰν\ χώραμ$ ). The regular troops were not sufficient for its defence, and it was only thanks to the initiative of Diokles to arm the inhabitants of the countryside and bring them to the fort that the enemy abandoned their plan to occupy it. Diokles improved the defence of the site by bringing weapons, appointing officers, manning the fort, and organising day guards. When an attack occurred, Diokles and a unit of light-armed men succeeded in stopping the enemies under the fort, i.e. at the place where they had landed, and driving them away. In this case, it was the tactical thinking and the foresight of Diokles that brought the inhabitants to the fort for its defence, thus preventing the enemy from

establishing a base in the territory of Halasarna. In other cases, the population of the countryside came to forts in order to find rescue. One of the healing miracles of Athena Lindia, of doubtful historicity, narrates that when the Persian fleet approached Rhodes in 490 BC, the population of the countryside fled in panic and sought refuge in the fortified places.<sup>97</sup> In an unpublished study, Sylvian Fachard has plausibly argued that this was the primary function of forts in the territory of Eretria. Here, a system of forts could offer protection within a radius of c. five kilometres, i.e. a distance that can be covered in an hour. In other areas, forts were located near strategic routes, natural harbours, roads, on the top of hills and mountains, near the natural frontiers, near agricultural settlements. The smaller forts were usually manned with young men,<sup>98</sup> the larger (e.g., Rhamnous, Eleusis, Kyrbissos) with soldiers from their environs, sometimes also with mercenaries.<sup>99</sup>

The forts, regardless of their size, imposed unity within the territory of a city, linking its most remote sites with the centre.<sup>100</sup> Forts were a visible proof of the integrity, independence and identity of a community. They also made the boundary between a community and its nearest neighbour, and potential enemy, visible. Sometimes they also expressed hierarchical relationships, as when a dependent community served as a fort of a sovereign city and had to accept a garrison. We know of such dependent forts, e.g. in Crete, where the island of Kaudos was a dependent community of Gortyn and the Artemitai a dependent community of Eleutherna; Teos in Asia Minor

<sup>97</sup> *I.Lindos* 2 D 5-7: καταπλαγέντων δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν τὰν ἔφοδον τῶν Περσῶν καὶ συνφυγόντων μὲν ἐς πάντα τὰ ὀχυρώματα. Cf. J.-Chr. COUVENHES, *art.cit.* (n.65), 198, as regards Attika.

<sup>98</sup> *Ath.Pol.* 42,1.

<sup>99</sup> Rhamnous: R. OETJEN, *Die Garnisonsinschriften als Quelle für die Geschichte Athens im dritten Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (PhD dissertation, Heidelberg 2004). Eleusis: K. CLINTON, *op.cit.* (n.12), nos. 180-184, 186-187, 190, 193-198, 200, 203-205, 207, 210-211, 214, 217 (Athenians and mercenaries). Kyrbissos: see n.63.

<sup>100</sup> J. MA, *art.cit.* (n.10), 341f. with n.24; A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 28f.

annexed the territory of Kyrbissos, preserving the citadels of this former city as a fort, and Miletos did the same with Pidasa.<sup>101</sup> But, above all, forts provided the security necessary for the economic exploitation of the countryside. In the late third century, part of the territory of Samothrake on the Thracian coast remained uncultivated, clearly because of the attacks of Thracian tribes; the Samothrakians asked a Ptolemaic commander to assist them in the construction of a fort (*ochyroma*), so that the citizens would be able to receive land-lots there and cultivate it.<sup>102</sup>

Military units of φρουροί under the command of a φρούραρχος (in Thessaly under an ἀρχίφρουρος) are attested in many Greek cities – very often as garrisons of a foreign king.<sup>103</sup> Bruno Helly has interpreted the *phrouroi* in Gonnoi (Thessaly) as patrollers responsible for surveillance of the countryside, similar to the Athenian *peripoloi* (see below).<sup>104</sup> In theory, this is possible, but the fact that we know these *phrouroi* only from dedications to Athena Polias, i.e. the patron of the citadel of Gonnoi,<sup>105</sup> points to the conclusion that we are dealing with guards of the akropolis.<sup>106</sup> Similarly, the dedications in Mikro Kerseli in Thessaly made by ἀρχίφρουροι and σύμφρουροι were dedications by garrisons of the citadel.<sup>107</sup> By contrast, the Koan citizens who served as φύλακες on a semi-annual basis (cf. B 1: χειμερινάν) may have been garrison soldiers in the forts in the countryside of Kos.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Crete: A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.17), 404-406 and 413. Kyrbissos: n.63. Pidasa: *Milet* I 3, 149 (German translation and recent bibliography in *I.Milet* VI 1, 149); cf. I. PIMOUGUET, “Défense et territoire: l'exemple milésien”, in *DHA* 21 (1995), 99-102, 108-109. Cf. J. MA, *art.cit.* (n.10), 341.

<sup>102</sup> *IG* XII 8, 156 B lines 17-23.

<sup>103</sup> E.g., M. LAUNAY, *op.cit.* (n.36), 1010f.

<sup>104</sup> B. HELLY, *Gonnoi* (Amsterdam 1973), I 145f.

<sup>105</sup> B. HELLY, *op.cit.*, II nos. 147-150; *SEG* 51,710.

<sup>106</sup> Cf. P. BAKER, “Quelques remarques sur des institutions militaires dans les cités de Thessalie à l'époque hellénistique”, in *AncW* 32 (2001), 194-195.

<sup>107</sup> *IG* IX 2, 1057-1058, 1060-1064; *SEG* 17,299-300; 23,443-445; 51,725-726. M. LAUNAY, *op.cit.* (n.36), 1011 with n.4.

<sup>108</sup> *Iscr.Cos* ED 84 (second century); P. BAKER, *art.cit.* (n.92), 191f.

The regular control of the countryside and the frontier was usually assigned to *περίπολοι* ('patrollers') under the command of a *περιπόλαρχος*.<sup>109</sup> This is a relatively early institution. Leaving aside a reference to *peripoloi* in Sikyon in the seventh century, which probably reflects the situation in the Classical period,<sup>110</sup> Thucydides often mentions *peripolarchoi* and *peripoloi*.<sup>111</sup> In Athens, the *peripolarchos* was an elected officer responsible for guarding the *chora*.<sup>112</sup> A famous passage in Aischines shows that the *peripoloi* were recruited from young Athenians (18-20 years), who patrolled the countryside for two years.<sup>113</sup> Survivals of this duty are attested until the late Hellenistic period.<sup>114</sup>

Units of *peripoloi*, perhaps created under the influence of the Athenian model, are attested in the third and second centuries in many places north of Attica: in Ambryssos in Phokis, in Medion in Akarnania, possibly in Krannon in Thessaly, in Ithaka, in Illyria (Apollonia, Byllis, Koinon of the Balaiitai), and in Perast.<sup>115</sup> In Boiotia, *peripoloi* are not attested, but

<sup>109</sup> L. ROBERT, "Péripolarques", in *Hellenica* X (Paris 1955), 283-292; P. CABANES, "Recherches épigraphiques en Albanie: péripolarques et peripoloi en Grèce du Nord-Ouest et en Illyrie à la période hellénistique", in *CRAI* 1991, 197-216.

<sup>110</sup> *FGrHist* 105 F 2 (= *POxy.* XI 1365); cf. A.S. CHANKOWSKI, "L'entraînement militaire des éphèbes dans les cités grecques d'Asie Mineure à l'époque hellénistique: nécessité pratique ou tradition atrophie?", in *Les cités grecques et la guerre en Asie Mineure à l'époque hellénistique*, éd. par J.-Chr. COUVENHES et H.-L. FERNOUX (Tours 2004), 67.

<sup>111</sup> M.V. TAYLOR, *Salamis and the Salaminioi. The History of an Unofficial Athenian Demos* (Amsterdam 1997), 236 n.66.

<sup>112</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1260 lines 9f.; cf. K. CLINTON, *op.cit.* (n.12), 86-88 nos. 80-81. See also note 83.

<sup>113</sup> AESCHIN. 2, 167: "as soon as I passed out of boyhood I became *περίπολος* τῆς χώρας ταύτης for two years; I will call my συνέφηβοι and our commanders as witnesses to this statement". Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 42,4: περιπολοῦσι τὴν χώραν καὶ διατρίβουσιν ἐν τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις. φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη χλαμύδας ἔχοντες.

<sup>114</sup> E.g., *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1028 lines 22f. (100 BC): ἐξῆλθον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φρούρια καὶ τὰ ὄρια γῆς Ἀττικῆς πλεονάκις ἐν ὅπλοις καθὼς ἐπέταττον αὐτοῖς τὰ ψηφίσματα τῆς τε βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου; cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1006 and 1011.

<sup>115</sup> Ambryssos: L. ROBERT, *Études anatoliennes. Recherches sur les inscriptions grecques de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris 1937), 108f.; P. CABANES, *art.cit.* (n.109), 218 no. 2. Medion: *ibid.*, 218 no. 3. Krannon: POLYAIEN. *Strateg.* 2, 34. Ithaka: *IG*

patrol duty in the frontier seems to have been assigned to mounted guards (*ἱππόται*).<sup>116</sup> Unfortunately, information about recruitment, training, and numbers of patrollers is very limited. When lists of names survive, usually in dedications, they never include more than a dozen men (in Perast). M. Launey is probably right in his assumption that generalisations should be avoided: the *peripoloi* could have been ephebes in some places (as in Athens), mercenaries in others, or a combination of the two.<sup>117</sup>

A decree of the *koinon* of the Balaiitai (see n. 112) has been regarded as evidence for mercenaries serving as *peripoloi*, but this is far from certain. The Balaiitai honoured with this decree a commander of *peripoloi*, the *peripolarchos* Aristen. Because of the expression *μετέχειν δὲ καὶ τῶν κοινῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκγόνους*, which resembles the formula for the grant of citizenship, A. Chankowski argued that Aristen, a foreigner, was awarded citizenship by the *koinon* of the Balaiitai in reward for his service; on this basis, he concluded that Aristen must have been a mercenary.<sup>118</sup> From this, A. Chankowski inferred that all the patrollers were mercenaries. But even if the commander of patrollers had been a mercenary, this does not exclude the possibility that the unit under his command consisted of ephebes. Things are, however, more complex. The formula *μετέχειν δὲ καὶ τῶν κοινῶν* only makes Aristen a member of the *koinon*; it cannot be equated with award of citizenship, and as a matter of fact we do not even know if the Balaiitai had a legal status of

IX<sup>21</sup>,1614. Apollonia: L. ROBERT, *art.cit.* (n.109); P. CABANES, *ibid.*, 219 no. 4. Byllis: *SEG* 32,626; P. CABANES, *ibid.*, 219 no. 5. Balaiitai: *ibid.*, 220 no. 7. Perast: *ibid.*, 220 no. 6. Cf. the term *περιπόλιον* which in the Dodekanese designates a fortified site, but in Lykia it may designate, more generally, a rural settlement; on this question see M. DOMINGO GYGAX, *Untersuchungen zu den lykischen Gemeinwesen in klassischer und hellenistischer Zeit* (Bonn 2001), 134-138.

<sup>116</sup> *SEG* 28,461; R. ÉTIENNE-P. ROESCH, “Convention militaire entre les cavaliers d’Orchomène et ceux de Chéronée”, in *BCH* 102 (1978), 363.

<sup>117</sup> M. LAUNHEY, *op.cit.* (n.36), 834 n.1.

<sup>118</sup> A.S. CHANKOWSKI, *art.cit.* (n.110), 66f. with n.33; cf. hesitantly, P. CABANES, *art.cit.* (n.109), 221.

citizenship. It is possible that they were not a citizen community but a subdivision, a local district, of Apollonia, on the fringes of its territory. There is nothing in the text that supports the assumption that the *koinon* of the Balaitai was an independent polis. They had magistrates (*tamias, presbyteroi*) and an assembly, but they are not designated as *demos* or *polis* (Βαλαΐταις, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Βαλαιειτῶν, ἔδοξε τοῖς Βαλαιείταις). The document is dated with reference to an eponymous prytanis (πρυτανεύοντος Βίωνος τοῦ Κλειγένεος). But why should we assume that he was the eponymous prytanis of the Bylaiitai and not of Apollonia, where we know of three eponymous prytaneis by this name?<sup>119</sup> 'Scribes' of *peripolarchoi* are attested in Apollonia.<sup>120</sup> Finally, neither Aristen, son of Parmen, nor his 'scribes' Parmen, son of Teisarchos, and Boulos, son of Abaios, have an ethnic, as we would expect, if they had been foreigners. This endorses the assumption that the Balaiitai did not honour a foreigner but a citizen of the same community: Aristen, son of Parmen, is most likely a citizen of Apollonia, where these names are well attested.<sup>121</sup> For all these reasons, I assume that Aristen and his unit were citizens of Apollonia patrolling its territory and honoured by a local community, which had been incorporated into the polis of Apollonia and inhabited the fringes of Apollonia's territory.

There is, therefore, limited evidence that mercenaries served as *peripoloi*. On the contrary, there is enough evidence for the assumption that patrolling the territory was primarily assigned to young men. If the citadel was the place where old men, children, and women retreated, the frontier and the countryside were regarded as the realm of the young men, who proved their suitability to become citizens through military service. The regular patrol service of ephebes is securely attested in Athens (above) and Crete (below). In Eresos (Lesbos), the young men

<sup>119</sup> *LGPN* III A, s.v.

<sup>120</sup> L. ROBERT, *art.cit.* (n.109).

<sup>121</sup> *LGPN* III A, ss.vv.

were led by the gymnasiarchos to the frontier.<sup>122</sup> The young could also be assigned such duties in an emergency,<sup>123</sup> as we learn from a decree of Syros (early first century).<sup>124</sup> Syros was informed that pirate ships were preparing a raid against the countryside and the city (ἀνγελίας γενηθείσης διότι κακοῦργα πλοῖα καὶ πλείονα ἐπιβάλλειν ἥμῶν ἥμελλεν ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν κατὰ ῥύσιον). When the Syrians were informed that the ships were anchoring near Siphnos (ἀπηγέλη προσωρικέναι πρὸς τὴν Σιφνίων χώραν), still during the night, they sent a certain Ktesikles to Siphnos, and he immediately informed a friendly Siphnian, Onesandros: “When he (Onesandros) learned this from Ktesikles, he received him in a friendly manner and calling his sons Boulon and Nikon (known in Siphnos also by the name Ekphantos) together with some other young men he sent them to the countryside in order to investigate this (πυθόμενος παρὰ τοῦ Κτησικλέους τὰ προδεδηλωμένα, αὐτὸν τε φιλοφρόνως ὑπεδέξατο τούς τε υἱοὺς Βούλωνα καὶ Νίκωνα, ἐν Σίφνῳ δὲ χρηματίζοντα “Ἐκφαντον, καὶ τινας μεθ’ ἔχυτῶν νεωτέρους παρακαλέσας ἐξαπέστειλεν ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐξεραυνησομένους”). Onesandros did not have an official position, but his spontaneous reaction is significant: he immediately called together a group of young men and sent them out to collect information.

In Crete, young men (*neoi*) were assigned military and para-military duties after the end of a period of military training, between the ages of 18 and 20. In Gortyn, the board of *neotas* ('the youth') exercised 'police' duties, especially in the countryside, and controlled the frontier of the city; in other cities young men manned the forts on the frontier.<sup>125</sup> This service is

<sup>122</sup> *IG XII Suppl.* 122: ἐξαγάγ[ων] δὲ τοὺς νέοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς θέλοντας ἐπὶ τ[ὰ δρι]α τῆς χώρας; L. ROBERT, *art.cit.* (n.109), 287 n.2.

<sup>123</sup> See e.g. the aforementioned decree for Apollodoros (*SEG* 28,1540).

<sup>124</sup> A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 184-189 no. 52 (*IG XII* 5, 653).

<sup>125</sup> *Neotas*: *SEG* 48,1209; A. MAGNELLI, “Una nuova iscrizione da Gortyna (Creta). Qualche considerazione sulla neotas”, in *ASAA* 70/71 (1992/93), 291-305. Dreros and Olous: *I.Cret.* I, ix, 1; H. VAN EFFENTERRE, “Fortins crétois”, in *Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire offerts à Charles Picard à l’occasion de son 65e anniversaire* (Paris 1949), II 1033-1046; G. DAVERIO ROCCHI, *op.cit.* (n.58), 86.

alluded to in the oath of the young men of Dreros (c. 220 BC), taken during a war against Lyttos:<sup>126</sup> "... I will never be benevolent towards the Lyttians, in no way and through no pretension, neither by day nor by night; and I will try, to the best of my capacity, to harm the city of the Lyttians.... And I will be friendly towards the Drerians and the Knossians; and I will neither betray the city or the forts (*οὐραῖα*) of the Drerians nor the forts of the Knossians; and I will betray no men to the enemies, neither men of Dreros, nor men of Knossos. ... I will not start a revolt, and I will always be an opponent of those who do; I will not participate in the organisation of a conspiracy, neither in the city nor outside of the city, nor will I help someone else...".

This oath was taken under exceptional circumstances: Knossos and her allies were in war against Lyttos. The young Drerians were to serve in the frontier forts (*οὐραῖα*), possibly together with their Knossian allies, and this is why their oath includes a clause forbidding them to betray these forts to the enemy. This fear was realistic. As we may infer from several sources, this war had caused desertions and civil strife among the allies of Knossos.<sup>127</sup> During such a civil war in Gortyn, the young men occupied the harbour towns of Lebena and Matalon.<sup>128</sup> This incident shows the dangers involved in entrusting young men with important military responsibilities: under certain conditions the 'police' force needed policing. If the Athenian ephебes of 107/6 BC were honoured for patrolling the Athenian border without causing any harm to the farmers, this means that damage to the fields by the city's own patrollers was not unusual.<sup>129</sup>

Patrol duty by the young sons of citizens was valued more than any other measure. Not only did this type of police service

<sup>126</sup> *I.Cret.* I, ix, 1; A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.17), 198-201.

<sup>127</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, "The Epigraphy of Hellenistic Crete. The Cretan Koinon: New and Old Evidence", in *Atti del XI Congresso Internazionale di Epigrafia Greca e Latina* (Roma 1999), I 287-300.

<sup>128</sup> PLB. 4, 55, 6.

<sup>129</sup> *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1011 lines 15f.

expressed the independence of a community, but it also served educational purposes – the training of young men as soldiers and citizens (see below).<sup>130</sup> Whether it was effective is of course another matter, as the Cretan incidents show. A decree of Mycene (early second century) refers to the liberation of ephebes who had been abducted by Nabis of Sparta.<sup>131</sup> Various interpretations have been suggested: the ephebes had been recruited by Nabis; or they were hostages; or they were the victims of pirates or brigands.<sup>132</sup> Since the group consisted exclusively of ephebes and the abduction could not have possibly taken place in Mycene itself, this incident must concern a group of ephebes captured by Nabis' troops while somewhere in the countryside. The most plausible explanation is that they were patrollers on the border of Argive territory. If they are not explicitly designated as *peripoloi*, it is probably because this would have increased the embarrassment of their abduction. An analogous incident is reported in Delphi (100 BC), where young men were captured by brigands; A. Bielman plausibly suspects that they were patrollers.<sup>133</sup>

The evidence for *peripoloi* is limited to mainland Greece. In Asia Minor we may infer measures for the protection of the countryside from the existence of a 'general of the countryside/ the territory' in Karia, who was assigned the duty of defending the territory.<sup>134</sup> The countryside of Kyzikos was patrolled by mounted guards in the early third century BC. Philetairos of Pergamon provided the city with fifty horses for this task; the unit must have been larger.<sup>135</sup> The units of (*h*)orophylakes will be discussed in the next section.

<sup>130</sup> A. CHANIOTIS, *op.cit.* (n.10), 46-56.

<sup>131</sup> *IG IV* 497; *Syll.*<sup>3</sup> 594; A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 159-162 no. 44 (with the earlier bibliography): ἐπειδὴ ἀπ[αχ]θέντων [ἐφή]βων τῶν Μυκανέων ὑπὸ Νάβιος ἐς Λ[ακ]εδαιμονα.

<sup>132</sup> A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.* (n.14), 161.

<sup>133</sup> A. BIELMAN, *op.cit.*, 177-180 no. 50 (*EDelphes* III 1, 457), c. 100 BC: νεανίσκους ἐλευθέρους τῶν ἐκ [γυμνασίου? τοὺς ἀπαχθέντας ή] πὸ ραιδιούργῶν καὶ κρυπτομέ[νους ἐν τοῖς ὅρεσιν?].

<sup>134</sup> C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 75-77. For this office in Rhodes, see n.91.

<sup>135</sup> *OGIS* 748; C. CHANDEZON, *op.cit.* (n.8), 183-186 (c. 280-275 BC).

In the late second century the protection of the countryside of Pergamon was assigned to mobile troops (*paraphylakitai*). As we may infer from the fact that they were awarded citizenship in 133 BC, they must have consisted of mercenaries.<sup>136</sup> C. Brélaz, who has most recently collected the evidence for *paraphylakitai* in Asia Minor, has plausibly argued that they represent a military institution of the Seleucid and Attalid kingdom, which is probably not related to the *phylakes* of the Imperial period.<sup>137</sup>

#### 4. *Phylake tes choras: measures for control*

Polyainos (second century AD) narrates an anecdote concerning Deinias, a tyrant of Krannon in Thessaly. The Krannonians farmed out by contract the guarding of the city (*οἱ Κραννώνιοι τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως ἀπεμίσθουν*). Deinias, the contractor, exploited his success in providing security, and gradually increased the size of his force, ultimately becoming tyrant of the city (fourth century). A passage in this anecdote is of some interest in this context:<sup>138</sup> “When the city was farming out the tithe of the corn, Deinias succeeded in having a younger brother farm the taxes, by overshooting with his bid the (expected) revenue. In this way, he had his brother appointed ‘tithe collector’ of the countryside and placed under his command many young men at their prime, as patrollers of the villages and collectors of the crops subject to the tithe”.

<sup>136</sup> *I.Pergamon* 249 = *OGIS* 338; M. LAUNAY, *op.cit.* (n.36), 664-669; C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 125-127. Cf. the *phylakes* in Ptolemaic Egypt: C. HOMOTH-KUHS, *Phylakes und Phylakon-Steuer im griechisch-römischen Ägypten: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des antiken Sicherheitswesens* (München 2005).

<sup>137</sup> C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.*, 127-129.

<sup>138</sup> POLYAIEN. *Strateg.* 2, 34: *τῆς δὲ πόλεως τὴν τοῦ σίτου δεκάτην ἀπομισθούσης ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ νεώτερον τὰ τέλη καθῆκε μισθωσάμενον ὑπεράρας εἰς πολὺ τὴν πρόσοδον. οὕτω δὴ τὸν ἀδελφὸν δεκατηλόγον τῆς χώρας ἀποδείξας καὶ πολλοὺς νεανίσκους ἀκμάζοντας ἐγχειρίσας αὐτῷ, περιπόλους τῶν χωρίων καὶ συλλογέας τῶν δεκατευομένων καρπῶν.*

The historicity of this anecdote is questionable, but it combines four elements, each of which, taken individually, is attested: (a) One of the city's revenues was a tithe on corn; this can easily be identified with the tithe (*dekate*) which the Thessalian serfs had to deliver. (b) The collection of this tax was assigned through public auction to the entrepreneur who offered the highest bid. There is nothing unusual in this procedure, although tax farming is not attested in Classical Thessaly. (c) Units of young men patrolled the territory: this, as we have seen, is very common. (d) Patrollers of the countryside made sure that the serfs paid their tribute. This is not attested in Greek areas with an extensive serf population (Thessaly, Crete, Lakedaimon-Messenia), but one of the primary duties of the Spartan *kryptoi* consisted in preventing revolts by the helots – and consequently safeguarding Spartan revenues.<sup>139</sup> The anecdote seems, therefore, to be a melange of authentic practices attested, if not in fourth-century Thessaly, at least in other areas of the Greek world.

With this anecdote in mind, let us approach one of the thorniest questions concerning police duties in the countryside: the service of the ὁροφύλακες or ὁροφύλαχες in Hellenistic Asia Minor. In the most recent study of this institution, C. Brélaz plausibly stressed a lack of homogeneity and suggested distinguishing between various categories of (h)orophylakes.<sup>140</sup>

The best source of information is the treaty between Miletos and Herakleia under Latmos (c. 185 BC). The (h)orophylakes are mentioned in the clause concerning runaway slaves:<sup>141</sup> “If

<sup>139</sup> D. KNOEPFLER, *art.cit.* (n.27), 334f.

<sup>140</sup> C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 157-171, prudently leaves the question of the word's accent open. ὁροφύλακες (“guardians of the frontiers”): D. ROUSSET, “Les frontières des cités grecques. Premières réflexions à partir du recueil des documents épigraphiques”, in *CCG* 5 (1994), 97-126; A.S. CHANKOWSKI, *art.cit.* (n.110), 67-69; ὁροφύλαχες (“guardians of the mountains”): L. ROBERT, *op.cit.* (n.115), 106-108. See also D. HENNIG, “Oreophylakes in Ägypten”, in *Chiron* 36 (2006), 1-5, with a useful overview of the evidence.

<sup>141</sup> *Milet* I.3, 150. On the date see most recently C. HABICHT, “Datum und Umstände der rhodischen Schlichtung zwischen Samos und Priene”, in *Chiron* 35 (2005), 137-146 (with the earlier bibliography).

slaves who have run away from Miletos to Herakleia and from Herakleia to Miletos, have been brought to the (h)orophylakes in service in the respective cities ( $\tauοὺς\ \overset{\text{έν}}{\text{ἐκατέραι}}\ \tauῶν\ \piόλεων\ οροφύλακας$ ), beginning with the year after the stephanephorate of Menandros, those who have undertaken this *telos* through purchase in Miletos ( $\tauοὺς\ \muέν\ \overset{\text{έμ}}{\text{Μιλήτωι}}\ \tauὴν\ \overset{\text{ών}}{\text{ωνήν}}\ \overset{\text{έχοντας}}{\text{ἔχοντας}}\ \tauού\ \tauέλους$ ) shall report to the prytaneis and the men elected for the guarding ( $\tauοῖς\ \varepsilonίρημένοις\ \overset{\text{έπ}}{\text{ἐπὶ}}\ \tauῆι\ \phiύλακῆι$ ) about the slaves within ten days from the day of the delivery. The latter shall send to the magistrates in Herakleia a letter with a detailed list (of the slaves). Those who have undertaken the *telos* of (h)orophylakia in Herakleia ( $\tauοὺς\ \deltaέ\ \overset{\text{έν}}{\text{'Ηρακλείαι}}\ \tauὸ\ \overset{\text{οροφυλακικὸν}}{\text{οροφυλακικὸν}}\ \tauέλος\ \overset{\text{έχοντας}}{\text{ἔχοντας}}$ ) shall report to the magistrates within the same deadline, and, similarly, the latter shall send a letter to the prytaneis and the men elected for the guard duty. The owners of the slaves from the respective cities shall have the right to have their slaves returned, after they have paid a return fee of 12 old Rhodian drachmas per person and, for food, one obolos per day, within four months from the day the letter has been sent to the magistrates. Otherwise, the slaves shall belong to the (h)orophylakes".

Both cities had (h)orophylakes with similar duties and a similar mode of appointment. In Miletos, this position was subject to sale at auction – exactly as priesthoods were. In Herakleia, the contract may have been awarded in the same way as building contracts were. The plural form *(h)orophylakes*, which is used in connection with the capture of slaves in the near future (realistically, within a year), implies that each city had more than one (h)orophylax at a time, but this is far from certain. The word *telos* is usually translated in this context as 'service',<sup>142</sup> but this is questionable.

The (h)orophylakes purchased this position (cf. ὡνή); they paid money in expectation of profit. Their expectations must have gone beyond the hope of the occasional arrest of a

<sup>142</sup> C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.*, 162f. with n.410 and with the earlier bibliography.

runaway slave.<sup>143</sup> I suspect that an important element of their service (and also the major source of profit) consisted in guarding the frontier and making sure that those who entered the territory of either city or used it (e.g., for pasture) paid the required import taxes and dues. This would explain the use of the word *telos*, not in the sense of 'office' or the rather rare sense of 'service', but with its common meaning 'customs, dues, tax'. According to this interpretation, the main responsibility of the (h)orophylakes consisted in collecting a particular category of city revenues ( $\tauὴν ὠνὴν ἔχοντας τοῦ τέλους$ ), namely those that were expected to be raised on the mountainous frontier of the cities: customs for the import and export of goods, dues for the use of pastureland, etc. For this task, the (h)orophylakes may have organised their own troops (as in Polyainos' anecdote). Their profit depended on their efficiency.

In Telmessos the οροφυλακία was a service, which could be undertaken on a voluntary basis in exchange for exemption from taxes.<sup>144</sup> Here, the service was voluntary, but the task similar: not simply policing the countryside, but primarily safeguarding the revenues expected from the countryside. In Amyzon, the function of the οροφύλακος (*sic!*) was different.<sup>145</sup> He is attested in the late fourth century, as a civic magistrate. He must have been responsible for guarding the frontier,<sup>146</sup> possibly in command of a unit of patrollers. The lack of uniformity in this system is confirmed by the (h)orophylakes in the plain

<sup>143</sup> For οροφύλακες going after runaway slaves, see D. HENNIG, *art.cit.*, 2-5. He refers to a document in Zenon's archive (*PSI* IV 406) referring to a female slave delivered to an οροφύλακος, and to a mime (*POxy.* III 413), which mentions θρεοφύλακες looking for runaway slaves.

<sup>144</sup> *SEG* 29,1516 (early second century):  $\tauοῦ \chiειρωναξίου παρεθήσονται οἱ μεταπορευ[όμε]νοι τεχνῖται τὴν οροφυλακίαν αἰρόμενοι$  ("the craftsmen, who come/immigrate, will be exempted from the tax on craftsmen if they undertake the (h)orophylakia").

<sup>145</sup> J. ROBERT-L. ROBERT, *Fouilles d'Amyzon en Carie. Tome I: Exploration, histoire, monnaies et inscriptions* (Paris 1983), 97-118.

<sup>146</sup> C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.*, 161.

of Tabai (Karia) in the second century AD. Here, a group of 15 *neaniskoi*, probably from Apollonia Salbake, served as a “patrol of the frontier/the mountains” (*orophylakesantes*) under the command of a *παραφύλαξ*. As we may infer from the reference to *ἱπποκόμοι*, the *neaniskoi* were a mounted guard.<sup>147</sup>

### 6. *Phylake tes choras: dedications and provocations*

Among the activities of patrollers of the countryside only one is well attested: dedications.<sup>148</sup> They are usually, and naturally, addressed to divinities worshipped in the countryside: Pan and the Nymphs, Artemis, Dionysos, Meter Oreia.<sup>149</sup> Joint dedications were a form of communal activity and an expression of respect towards traditions. The religious activities of the patrollers also had, however, another dimension.

An example is provided by the dedication of Eustratos in the Korykean Cave (third century):<sup>150</sup> Εὔστρατος Ἀλκιδάμου Ἀμβρύσιος, συμπερίπολοι, Πανί, Νύμφαις. The inscription is engraved on the rock, at the entrance of the cave, with fine lettering of the third century. It was not a spontaneous act of devotion. Eustratos and his *sympereipoloi* must have planned the dedication. They had placed an order for the dedicatory object, probably a statuette; they had transported it to the cave on Mt. Parnassos; and they had engaged a professional stone-cutter.<sup>151</sup> Can we infer from this that this unit regularly visited the cave?

<sup>147</sup> C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.*, 167-171.

<sup>148</sup> L. ROBERT, *art.cit.* (n.109), 287f.; P. BAKER, *art.cit.* (n.106), 191-206. Cf. C. BRÉLAZ, *op.cit.* (n.9), 106 (for Roman Asia Minor).

<sup>149</sup> L. ROBERT, *op.cit.* (n.115), 102-110; P. CABANES, *art.cit.* (n.109), 218f. nos. 2-3.

<sup>150</sup> L. ROBERT, *op.cit.* (n.115), 108f.; P. CABANES, *art.cit.* (n.109), 218 no. 2; D. ROUSSET, *Le territoire de Delphes et la terre d'Apollon* (Paris 2002), 160f. no. 26.

<sup>151</sup> D. ROUSSET, *op.cit.*, 160, quoting P. Amandry: “un projet élaboré à l'avance, dont la réalisation prenait quelque temps”.

A striking feature of this inscription is the use of an ethnic. If Eustratos had made a dedication in the city of Ambrysos, he would not have used an ethnic. Ethnics are used by those who set up an inscription in a foreign city or a foreign sanctuary. We know that Ambrysos was involved in a territorial dispute with Delphi;<sup>152</sup> it acquired territory in the area of Mt. Parnassos in the first half of the second century. Consequently, it is quite probable that Eustratos and his unit made a dedication in a sanctuary on Delphic territory.<sup>153</sup> In that case, their dedication was as much an act of provocation and demonstration of territorial claims as it was an act of devotion.

An act of provocation can certainly be observed in one of the activities of the Athenian ephebes of the year 122 BC:<sup>154</sup> “they made an excursion to the border of Attika carrying their weapons, acquiring knowledge of the territory and the roads [lacuna] and they visited the sanctuaries in the countryside, offering sacrifices on behalf of the people. When they arrived at the grave at Marathon, they offered a wreath and a sacrifice to those who died in war in defence of freedom; they also came to the sanctuary of Amphiaraos. And there they made clare our legitimate possession of the sanctuary, which had been occupied by the ancestors in old times. And after they had offered a sacrifice, they returned on the same day to our own territory”.

What at first sight seems a harmless excursion acquires another dimension when we take into consideration the fact that in this period the sanctuary of Amphiaraos was *not* part of Athenian territory, but belonged to the city of Oropos. In 156 BC the Athenians had attacked Oropos and temporarily occupied the sanctuary and the surrounding territory (until c. 150 BC).<sup>155</sup> One generation later, the Athenian ephebes marched under arms into foreign territory, provocatively reminding the pilgrims present in the sanctuary (and themselves) through

<sup>152</sup> Most recent discussion by D. ROUSSET, *op.cit.*, 28f., 126-128, 155-161.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. D. ROUSSET, *op.cit.*, 161.

<sup>154</sup> *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1006 lines 65-71.

<sup>155</sup> PAUS. 7, 11, 4-12, 3; cf. PLUT. *Cato maior* 22.

speeches that the Athenians had been the legitimate owners of the sanctuary; then they withdrew behind the Athenian frontier. Whether one still accepts the tripartite structure of rites of transition established by A. van Gennep and modified by V. Turner (rites of separation, rites of marginality, rites of reintegration) or not, this provocative and aggressive action looks very much like a survival from a rite of passage. The young Athenians were separated from urban life, they lived in the marginal area on the edge of the Athenian territory, they exposed themselves to danger by intruding into contested territory bearing arms, achieved an important deed by provocatively asserting the claim of their city to contested territory, and finally returned to Athens and were incorporated into the citizen body. It has often been observed that the presence of young men on the periphery of organised urban space, in the usually mountainous *eschatia* ('edge of the land'), in the realm of wild animals and forests, reflects to the conception of young persons – not yet citizens — as belonging to the world of unrestrained natural powers and to the periphery of the citizen-body, together with other liminal groups, such as foreign mercenaries. The act of provocation by the Athenian ephebes may be a survival from this concept.

Finally, the Athenian ephebes' respect towards tradition may be recognised in a dedication made by ephebes to Pan and the Nymphs in the cave of Pan at Marathon (61/60 BC).<sup>156</sup> The last lines are a sacred law, which regulates entrance to the cult cave by listing items not allowed inside: "The god forbids one to carry in either coloured garments (*χρωμάτινον*) or dyed garments (*βαπτόν*) or garments with coloured borders (*?λ[εγ]νωτόν*) or to enter [--]".

As Eran Lupu suggested, this regulation could not have been formulated by the ephebes themselves, who were probably quoting an already existing sacred law, allegedly originating

<sup>156</sup> SEG 36,267; E. LUPU (ed.), *Greek Sacred Law. A Collection of New Documents* (Leiden 2005), 171-175 no. 4.

from the god (through an oracle). The law seems to have allowed only persons with white clothes to enter the sacred cave. But why? And why did ephebes set up this inscription? The Athenian ephebes are known to have worn a particular ephebic garment, the black *chlamys*.<sup>157</sup> The dedicants of this inscription warned their fellow ephebes who would patrol the countryside not to enter the cave with their ephebic cloak. A still unpublished inscription from Pherai in Thessaly reports that king Philip V had carried out historical inquiry (*ἱστορία*) in order to determine the appropriate colour for the uniforms of the royal hunters of Herakles.<sup>158</sup>

The Athenian ephebes were no less conscious of the importance of historical traditions than the Macedonian king. In a period of Roman rule, if there was not much to defend in the countryside, at least they could defend norms and traditions.

<sup>157</sup> C. PÉLÉKIDIS, *Histoire de l'éphébie attique des origines à 31 avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris 1962), 15f.

<sup>158</sup> M. HATZOPoulos, "Polis, Ethnos and Kinship in Northern Greece", in *The Idea of European Community in History II*, ed. by K. BURASELIS-K. ZOUMBOULAKIS (Athens 2003), 61f.

## DISCUSSION

*P. Ducrey:* Certains épisodes antiques célèbres rappellent des faits divers contemporains: on songe aux enlèvements suivis de demandes de rançons, aux saisies d'otages et à d'autres violences qui ont défrayé la chronique dans les années 1980. Les événements qui se sont déroulés à Aigialé, dans la petite île d'Amorgos, à l'époque hellénistique, sont exemplaires à cet égard: des pirates débarquent de nuit dans le territoire, enlèvent des jeunes filles, des femmes et d'autres personnes, libres et esclaves, au nombre de plus de trente, embarquent de force leurs proies dans un bateau après avoir détruit toutes les autres embarcations ancrées dans le port. Deux des prisonniers, Hégésippos et Antipappos, fils d'Hégésistratos, persuadent le chef des pirates de relâcher les personnes de condition libre, ainsi que certains des affranchis et des esclaves, et acceptent de se constituer comme otages. Grâce au dévouement des deux hommes, les prisonniers sont sauvés et rentrent sains et saufs au pays. Hégésippos et Antipappos sont couronnés par la cité. Leurs exploits sont immortalisés dans les considérants d'un décret aujourd'hui parfaitement conservé sur une plaque de marbre (*IG XII 7, 386; Syll.<sup>3</sup> 521; A. Bielman, Retour à la liberté* [Paris 1994], 141-144, no. 38).

Dans une intervention publique, mais inédite, un jeune historien japonais, Taisuke Okada, spécialiste de la piraterie grecque antique, a mis en doute la version des faits telle qu'elle est rapportée par le décret d'Aigialé. Il estime qu'à l'instar d'événements comparables survenus récemment au Japon, les 'sauveurs' ne sont pas des bienfaiteurs, mais des intermédiaires, peut-être rémunérés, entre les deux parties, ou même les complices des malfaiteurs. D'autres épisodes rapportés par des inscriptions ou d'autres sources ne devraient-ils pas être réinterprétés ainsi?

*A. Chaniotis*: This is quite possible in the case of the Cretan Eumaridas, who had information concerning the place where Athenian captives were kept.

*A. Lintott*: I am struck with the parallels with other societies. The talk of *eunomia* looks like Roman talk of *ius*. The *neoi* have an equivalent in the Roman world in the *collegia iuvenum*. How far they acted as a security force has been debated, but the inscription from Mactar in the province of Africa (see G. Charles-Picard's "Civitas Mactaritana") shows them honoured for ensuring that the harvest came in. As for the *eirenarchos*, he looks very much like the original English village constable, a task which people used to evade by paying substitutes.

*H. van Wees*: You adduce an impressive range of evidence for a (relatively) insecure countryside in the Hellenistic period, and show that this was a matter of concern to communities. Yet I wonder whether we can infer this also, as you suggest, from the decree-formula "for the protection and security of the polis and the *chora*". The various terms for 'security' have connotations which extend beyond guaranteeing safety through armed force: they may surely include, say, legal or constitutional measure to ensure internal stability. The term *chora* can mean the entire 'territory' of a state (including the city) rather than 'the countryside' alone. It is notable that the formula does not always mention the *chora* specifically. So is it possible that from the start the formula meant in effect 'the safety of the community' (not unlike the concept of 'national security' often invoked by modern states) and that it did not imply either a sharp distinction between city and countryside or a perceived threat to the countryside in particular?

*A. Chaniotis*: You are right in your observation that in some cases *phylake tes choras* may mean the defence of the entire community and not the countryside specifically, although there are also cases in which an unequivocal distinction is made

between the security of the *polis* = city and that of the *chora* = countryside. I have the impression that the expression *phylakes tes poleos/tou demou* and not *phylake tes choras* more closely corresponds to our notion of 'national security'. *Chora* is more often used in conscious and clear opposition to the urban centre (e.g., in the designation of officers responsible specifically for the defence of the *chora* = countryside and in most of the material which I have collected) than in a more general sense ('the entire territory of a community'). We should certainly allow for regional or chronological differentiations.

*H. van Wees*: In Archaic and Classical sources from Homer onwards, it is the *eschatia* ('borderland'), rather than the *agroi* ('farmland'), in general which is placed in opposition to the city and seen as a potentially dangerous and comparatively 'wild' area. Given the involvement of even the elite in agriculture, as landowners exercising supervision, this is not surprising. But it seems worth considering the implications for modern ideas about the countryside as a 'liminal' place. Would the Athenians, for example, really have regarded the ephebes' tour of sanctuaries around Attica as an excursion into a liminal zone and thus as part of a rite of segregation?

*A. Chaniotis*: The perception of the *eschatia* is a subject in itself, quite separate from the perception of the countryside, but also from the perception of the frontier (*horia*). In many parts of the Hellenistic world the *eschatia* had ceased to be a 'wild' area and had come under cultivation (e.g., in late Hellenistic Crete); and in many parts of the Hellenistic world valuable land was 'borderland', not 'borderland' between a wild and a tame world, but 'borderland' between two communities. It would be wrong to consider all countryside as a 'liminal' place. In this respect, the ephebes's tour of sanctuaries is one thing – part of their patriotic training –, there acquaintance with the borders of the Athenian territory another. In the case of the Amphiareion of Oropos, they were not visiting

any sanctuary but a sanctuary on contested borderland. Although this was certainly not intended as a rite of segregation, I believe that reminiscences of such rites – very often found as subtext in historiographical narratives (Xenophon, Plutarch) – played some role in this particular incident and its representation in the honorary decree.

*W. Riess:* You emphasize the economic dependence of the city on the hinterland. It is certainly right that the city exploited the *chora*. But I wonder to what extent the countryside could also profit from the city. What traces do you see of a mutual dependence, of a constant interchange that might even have led to a symbiosis between town and countryside?

*A. Chaniotis:* There can be no doubt that urban centres and countryside were part of a complex network of economic exchange, from which the countryside could also profit. Besides the economic factors we should also consider the cultic and social interaction between town and countryside. But political initiatives came from the city, and the population of the countryside – with the exception of the landlords – was usually of inferior status.

*C. Brélaz:* Vous avez montré que les troupes responsables de la surveillance du territoire rural des cités, y compris lorsque ces troupes sont composées de citoyens, pouvaient se rendre coupables de violences envers la population des campagnes. Cette mise au point pour l'époque hellénistique me semble importante, dans la mesure où les abus des soldats romains durant la période impériale en Lydie et en Phrygie, que l'on connaît par les plaintes de communautés rurales au gouverneur ou à l'empereur, sont souvent considérés comme caractéristiques de la tyrannie militaire impériale et symptomatiques de la 'crise' du III<sup>e</sup> s. ap. J.-C. Au contraire, votre communication a contribué à prouver que ces frictions entre forces de l'ordre et habitants des campagnes constituent un phénomène structurel

dans le monde antique, voire plus généralement dans tout État pré-moderne. À propos du rôle des troupes militaires dans la surveillance de la *chôra*, concevez-vous qu'à l'époque hellénistique, les troupes, civiques ou royales, qui stationnaient dans les fortins disposés sur le territoire des cités aient été utilisées, non seulement pour repousser des attaques ennemis, mais également, en temps de paix, pour maintenir l'ordre public et combattre les brigands?

*A. Chaniotis:* As regards your first remark, one of the most characteristic *testimonia* for the burden imposed by 'friendly' troops is a passage in Menander's *Aspis*, where it is described how the troops, which had come to Xanthos to fight against the barbarians, plundered the countryside. We do not have a lot of evidence for the use of regular troops stationed in forts against brigands or pirates, but it is occasionally attested – e.g., the Macedonian garrison in Piraeus defended the Salaminians from pirates.

*R. MacMullen:* I find myself trying to visualize the scenes of action that your inscriptions describe. I do notice among them Athens and Miletus, but the majority of sites, or at least so it seems, are quite insignificant – meaning, I've never heard of them. I picture them as having a population clustered in houses as a 'conurbation' (fancy new term!) of not more than five or six thousand, or ten, maximum. A good number of the inhabitants would go out to the adjacent fields on most days, to a distance of an hour's walk, perhaps. Beyond that were larger properties, the owners of which could afford a house, and come frequently into the city, and there constituted much or most of its directorship and elite. So there is no very real distinction between city and country in human terms at the high level of these gentlemen on horseback. Of course, their tenants, and some of rural slaves, and the big population of village dwellers who never left the rural scene, were a different matter. Large cities like Ephesos and Apamea I think your evidence

doesn't illuminate, but here I would expect an urban directorship of far greater wealth, living always in big town houses – urban villas, as known through excavation – as rentiers of large and numerous estates. A question then: would the handling of these problems you discuss be fundamentally different between these two scenes of different scale?

*A. Chaniotis:* Among the communities, which I discussed, there were certainly several small island communities, which controlled quite small territories. In their case, the primary danger was that of pirates' attacks. Their defense problems were of an entire different nature than those of communities with extensive territories (including a *peraia*) and long frontiers in mountainous areas. Most of the evidence comes from this kind of cities, especially in Asia Minor and in the Black Sea regions.

*C. Brélaz:* Votre interprétation du mot *telos* dans le traité entre Milet et Héraclée me convainc, bien évidemment, d'autant que cela permet de donner un sens plus satisfaisant à l'expression (cf. déjà F. Piejko, in *C&M* 39 [1988], 107 n.34, qui contestait l'*opinio communis*). On comprend ainsi mieux l'intérêt que des gens avaient à prendre à ferme la surveillance du territoire, puisque cette *phylakè* produisait des revenus. Je voudrais vous faire part cependant de quelques réflexions. Je trouve toujours surprenant que les (h)orophylaques, qui sont nommés par ce titre aux l. 89, 97 et 99, soient désignés par une périphrase aux l. 90 et 93-94. Quel est le but de cette précision sur la nature de leur charge, qui a été attribuée par adjudication? Est-ce pour justifier ou expliquer pourquoi leur revient de droit un dédommagement financier suite à la capture d'un esclave? La périphrase expliquant la nature de la charge diffère: dans un cas, on parle de "ceux qui, à Milet, ont la ferme de l'impôt (douanier)"; dans l'autre, de "ceux qui, à Héraclée, ont/perçoivent l'impôt *des (h)orophylaques / qui revient aux (h)orophylaques*". Ou faudrait-il comprendre la tournure *(h)orophylakikon telos* comme les expressions qui se rencontrent en

Egypte, où une taxe prend le nom du service auquel son revenu est affecté? Il s'agirait donc, dans ce cas, de la *taxe qui permet de financer le service d'(h)orophylaque*. Mais, sauf erreur, on ne connaît pas d'attestation égyptienne pour le cas précis de l'(h)orophylakikon (cf. D. Hennig, in *Chiron* 36 [2006], 1-10). Dans *SEG* 29, 1516, à Telmessos, il n'est pas directement question de collecte de taxes douanières, mais seulement d'exemption fiscale octroyée aux artisans qui viendront s'installer dans le lieu en question et se chargeront de sa protection en s'acquittant du service de l'(h)orophylaquie. Le roi aurait-il offert à ces artisans, en plus de l'exemption de leur impôt professionnel, le revenu des douanes pour le service qu'ils rendaient?

*A. Chaniotis:* Your observation that the treaty uses two different expressions – the term *(h)orophylakes* and a periphrasis (“those who have undertaken this *telos*”) – is very important. The *(h)orophylakes*, i.e., those who actively guarded the territory, should be distinguished from “those who purchased the *telos*”. As you suggest, the “purchasers of the *telos*” may be those responsible for the collection of a tax of *(h)orophylakia*; with this money they then employed the guards. Since we lack evidence for such a tax, we could envisage a second possibility: the “purchasers of the *telos*” were entitled to revenues (taxes for imports, fines, etc.), and recruited guards. In the case of Telmessos, I am afraid that the fragmentary character of the text does not allow clarity on the organisation of *(h)orophylakia*.

*C. Brélaz:* Dans Polyen 2,34, il me semble que l'adjudication de la défense du territoire et celle de l'impôt sur le grain dans le territoire sont distinguées: on procède à deux adjudications séparées. Ce parce que deux membres d'une même famille ont obtenu la ferme de l'une (Dinias, la *phylakè*) et l'autre (son frère, la *dékatè*) que gardes du territoire et percepteurs d'impôt travaillent de concert. Cela n'empêche pourtant pas qu'en temps ordinaire, gardes et percepteurs aient pu collaborer, ni que les gardes aient aussi eu à percevoir des taxes, j'en conviens.

*A. Chaniotis:* As I have argued, the anecdote in Polyainos is a *mélange* of authentic practices. The defence and the collection of the *dekte* are indeed two different duties; but those entrusted with the collection of the *dekte* were also responsible for patrolling the territory (*peripolous*).

