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## V

HEINRICH VON STADEN

CHARACTER AND COMPETENCE.  
PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT  
IN GREEK MEDICINE

The nature of the relation between professional competence and moral character is one of the enduring issues raised in Greco-Roman antiquity, as has often been recognised. Modern scholars have not achieved agreement, however, on when, to what extent, and in what ways it became articulated as an explicit issue for ancient physicians. Among the questions still awaiting satisfactory answers are, for example: if a practitioner of medicine displayed superb skill and exemplary devotion in the performance of all professional duties, did the Greeks consider the moral qualities exhibited in his non-professional or private life relevant to evaluating whether he was a good doctor? Did they think that character, morality, and general conduct outside the professional sphere stand in a direct relation to professional competence? And, in particular, are there significant differences between the classical, Hellenistic, and Roman responses to such questions?

The present contribution will explore these and related issues in three steps, proceeding in reverse chronological sequence for reasons that will become evident: 1) a brief examination of Greek and Latin evidence from the Roman empire which, according to some scholars, displays a distinctive Roman sensibility in these matters; 2) an exploration of evidence from the Hellenistic period, to try to determine whether and how this 'Roman sensibility' differs from its Hellenistic precursors; 3) a scrutiny of

the central section of the Hippocratic *Oath*, with a view to clarifying whether or not there is any continuity between the *Oath* and Hellenistic or Roman views on the relation of moral character to professional competence.

## I

At the sanctuary of Asclepius on the southern slope of the Athenian acropolis a verse inscription, probably from the time of Plutarch, included among the tasks of a physician (έργα ιατροῦ) the following: καὶ δ' ἀρετᾶι ἀκέο[ι]το καὶ ἥθεσι, “and he should heal [his patients] with excellence and with moral character”<sup>1</sup>. Even if *arete* here, as in some inscriptions concerning physicians, refers to professional or technical rather than moral

<sup>1</sup> SEG XXVIII 225 (front side), 12-17: “Ἐργα τάδε ιατρ[οῦ· Παι]ώνια πρᾶτον ε[---] / καὶ νόνοι ἵησθαι καὶ οἱ πρόπαρ τῷ τῷ ἀ[ρήγην] / μηδ' ἐσιδῆν θιγένην τε παρεξ καὶ θεσμὰ καὶ δρκ[ον]. / καὶ δ' ἀρετᾶι ἀκέο[ι]το καὶ ἥθεσι, μὴ μὲν ἀτ[ε]υχή[ι] / κούρας τ' ἡδ' ἀλόχους ἐρατὰ[ι]ς ἀτ' ἀρηγός ἀφάσ[σων] / στέρνα πόθωι χλιάοι ἐτε[---]ς ι[η]τῆρος. These verses, attributed to Sarapion, who perhaps is identical with the Stoic poet who was an acquaintance of Plutarch (*Moralia* 384D, 396D-402F, 628A; cf. STOB. 3, 10, 2), appear on the front side (Face A) of a commemorative monument (erected by one of the poet's descendants, probably by his grandson Quintus Statius Sarapion of Cholleidae); to the front and sides further inscriptions were later added. For an edition with photographs see J.H. OLIVER, “The Sarapion Monument and the Paean of Sophocles”, in *Hesperia* 5 (1936), 91-122 (text on 95). See also J.H. OLIVER and P.L. MAAS, “An ancient poem on the duties of a physician”, in *BHM* 7 (1939), 315-323; J. and L. ROBERT, “Bulletin épigraphique”, in *REG* 51 (1938), no. 98; 52 (1939), no. 96; and 63 (1950), no. 82; R. KEYDELL, “Zum Carmen de officiis medici moralibus”, in *Hermes* 76 (1941), 320; J.H. OLIVER, “Two Athenian poets”, in *Hesperia* Suppl. 8 (1949), 243-258 (text on 246); R. FLACELIÈRE, “Le poète stoïcien Sarapion d'Athènes, ami de Plutarque”, in *REG* 64 (1951), 325-327; C.P. JONES, “Three foreigners in Attica”, in *Phoenix* 32 (1978), 222-234 (on 228-231); D. GOUREVITCH, *Le triangle hippocratique dans le monde gréco-romain*, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 251 (Rome 1984), 278-280; S.B. ALESHIRE, *The Athenian Asklepieion: the people, their dedications, and the inventories* (Amsterdam 1989), 17, 63-64; id., *Asklepios at Athens: epigraphic and prosopographic essays on Athenian healing cults* (Amsterdam 1991), 49-74; D.J. GEAGAN, “The Sarapion Monument and the quest for status in Roman Athens”, in *ZPE* 85 (1991), 145-165 (text on 147); SEG XXXIX 209.

excellence, *êthos* appears to refer to a virtuous character or, as James Oliver suggested, to “blameless character”<sup>2</sup>. The Athenian inscription thus suggests that, at least at the time of the Roman empire, some Greeks thought that a physician should be attentive both to his professional skills and to his moral character. The inscription, in fact, brings character into a direct relation to professional practice: ἀκέοιτο ... ἥθεσι. Such links between competence and character are, of course, well known from the writings of physicians of the Roman empire who were attuned to philosophy (notably from Galen’s oeuvre), but the Roman epigraphic evidence, both Latin and Greek, suggests that this dual emphasis, on professional character and moral competence, was widely diffused, shared by lay persons and professional physicians alike. I offer only a few select examples from a rich, complex body of evidence.

A first-century A.D. decree at Delphi honoured the physician Metrophanes of Sardis not only for his medical knowledge (τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐπιστήμην) but also for his character (διὰ τὸ ἥθος), bestowing upon him all the honours given to τοῖς κ[αλοῖς] κἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν, thus valorising him as morally praiseworthy while honouring his scientific expertise<sup>3</sup>. Another Delphic honorary decree of the early Roman empire, apparently belonging to the same monument, ranks the physician Dion, too, among τοῖς καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἀν[δρά]σι<sup>4</sup>, and, in the second century, the

<sup>2</sup> J.H. OLIVER, “Two Athenian poets” (see n.1), 246: “Let him cure not only with (professional) skill but also with blameless character”. (The parenthetical addition of ‘professional’ is Oliver’s.)

<sup>3</sup> *Fouilles de Delphes* [hereafter = *F. Delphes*] III 4, 2, 108, 2-13 (and plate XIX 2): ἐπε[ι]δ[η] [Μητ]ροφάνης Σαρδιαν[ὸς] ἐπιδημήσας τῇ πόλει ἐ[αυτὸν ἀδ]κνως τοῖς ἐντυγχ[άνουσιν] παρέσχεν κατὰ τὴν ἰατ[ρικὴν] ἐπιστήμην καὶ διὰ τὸ ἥθο[ς, δε] δόσθαι αὐτῷ καὶ τέκνο[ις αὐ]τοῦ πολιτείαν, προεδρίαν, π[ρο]μαντίαν, ἔνκτησιν γᾶς καὶ [οἰκίας] καὶ τᾶλλα τίμια δσα τοῖς κ[αλοῖς] κἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν [ἔθος ἐσ]τὶν δίδοσ[θαι]... See L. ROBERT, “Notes d’épigraphie hellénistique”, in *BCH* 52 (1928), 158-178 (on 172-173). This inscription probably was written in the mid-first century of our era. On relations between Delphi and Sardis see also *F. Delphes* III 4, 2, 241 (with commentary).

<sup>4</sup> *F. Delphes* III 4, 2, 87, 2-8: ...Δελφοὶ ἔδωκαν Δίωνι [.....] κ[...] ἰατρῷ πολιτείαν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐγγόνοις αὐτοῦ, προμαντείαν, προξενί[αν, προ]εδρίαν, ἀσυλίαν, προδικίαν, ἀτέλεια[ν], γᾶς καὶ οἰκίας ἔνκτησιν, καὶ [τᾶλλα τ]είμι[α] δσα τοῖς

doctor Ortesei[a]nos (Hortensianus?) is posthumously characterised by his wife, Flavia Festa, and by his daughters as an ἀνὴρ ἄριστος, both recognised for his *techne* and admired for his *êthos*<sup>5</sup>. Similarly, in the first century of our era the Magnesians praised the freedman-physician Tiberius Claudius Tyrannus for being held in high repute, even by the high standards of the emperors, with reference both to his medical *techne* and to the decorousness of his character: ἀνὴρ δεδοκιμασμένος τοῖς θείοις κριτηρίοις τῶν Σεβαστῶν ἐπί τε τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῇ κοσμιότητι τῶν ἥθων<sup>6</sup>. And in second-century elegiac couplets from Pergamon, Glycon praises his wife and fellow-physician Pantheia not only for her professional skill (τέχνη) — which, he says in a revealing but far from unique example of gender-oriented praise, is the equal of his own “although she is a woman” — but also for her virtues, which include temperance (σαοφροσύνη) and prudence (πινυτή)<sup>7</sup>.

καλοῖς καγαθοῖς ἀν[δρά]σι δίδοται ... See J. and L. ROBERT, “Bull. épigr.”, in *REG* 64 (1951), no. 122, who suggest that Dion may have been a Coan physician (Κ[ῶος]); R. FLACELIÈRE, “Inscriptions de Delphes de l’époque impériale”, in *BCH* 73 (1949), 464-475 (on 467-468). Another Delphic inscription, probably of the first century, honouring the physician Philotas of Amphissa, son of Nicon, perhaps also praises the physician both for his *eutechnia* and for his moral qualities, but its restoration is uncertain: *F. Delphes* III 4, 1, 58; for divergent readings cf. *SEG* I 181; C. VATIN, “Notes d’épigraphie delphique”, in *BCH* 94 (1970), 675-697 (on 680-681); L. ROBERT, in *BCH* 52 (1978), 178. In the late second century A.D. the physician Marcus Aurelius Dionysiacus of Minoa on Amorgos likewise is honored at Delphi for being worthy of the honours that belong to τοῖς καλοῖς καὶ ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι. (*FDelphes* III 3, 2, 298).

<sup>5</sup> *IG* XIV 1900 (=IGRR I 319):.... Ὁρησεῖνος ἐνθάδε κεῖται, γενόμενος μὲν ἀνὴρ ἄριστος, ἰατρὸς δὲ τὴν τέχνην, ἐν λόγοις φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἥθει θαυμαστός ... See H. GUMMERUS, *Der Ärztestand im römischen Reiche nach den Inschriften*, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, *Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum* III 6 (Helsingfors 1932), 44-45 (no. 153).

<sup>6</sup> *Inscr. Magnesia* 113, 8-11; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 807, 10-11. On κοσμιότης of ἥθος see L. ROBERT, “ἄρχαιόλογος”, in *REG* 49 (1936), 235-254, on 245. See also M. KAPLAN, *Greeks and the Imperial Court from Tiberius to Nero* (New York 1990), 90-91; *SEG* XL 1670; XLII 1068; V. NUTTON, “Healers in the medical market place: towards a social history of Graeco-Roman medicine”, in A. WEAR (ed.), *Medicine in Society: Historical Essays* (Cambridge 1992), 15-58 (on 46).

<sup>7</sup> *Inscr. Perg.* = *Epigrammata Graeca ex lapidibus collecta*, ed. G. KAIBEL (Berlin 1878), no. 243, 20-28: χαῖρε, γύναι Πάνθεια, παρ' ἀνέρος, δς μετὰ μοῖραν / σὴν δλόου θανάτου πένθος ἀλαστὸν ἔχω· / οὐ γάρ πω τοίη[ν] ἀλοχὸν Ζυγίη ἔδειν “Ηρη / εῖδος καὶ πινυτὴν ἡδὲ σαοφροσύνην. / ... οὐδὲ γυνή περ ἔοῦσα ἐμῆς ἀπελείπεο τέχνης.

So too on the island of Cos, perhaps in the early first century, the public physician Isidorus, son of Nicarchus, is praised “on account of his excellence with reference to his *techne* and to the rest of his life (βίος)<sup>8</sup>. While some Greek inscriptions of the Roman empire, like many medical treatises, display admiration only for a physician’s professional skill, i.e., without making any reference to his or her character or moral qualities, and while others praise a physician’s character without explicitly referring to his professional competence, the dual evaluative emphasis traced above, even if it deploys topoi well known from honorary decrees and funerary inscriptions for non-physicians, too, is sufficiently widespread to suggest that many Greeks of the Roman period, including non-physicians, would have agreed with Galen that moral virtue and medical competence should go hand in hand. Galen, of course, sees himself as the instantiation of such a union of high moral character and outstanding professional skill, characterising himself, for example, as “admired both for the dignity of my life (βίος) and for my deeds in accordance with the *techne*<sup>9</sup>. That this recurrent emphasis on both professional expertise and moral character — expressed through contrasts such as τέχνη vs. ἡθος, ἐπιστήμη vs. ἡθος, τέχνη vs. κοσμιότης τῶν ἡθῶν, τέχνη vs. βίος — might in part be a response to the continuing distrust of physicians (a distrust reflected in Roman literature of several genres from the time of Cato the Elder to late antiquity)<sup>10</sup> perhaps goes without saying,

<sup>8</sup> *Inscr. Cos* 344, 8-14 (=SGDI 3698, 8-14):... ἐτείμασαν στεφάνω χρυσέωι Ἰσίδωρον Νεικάρχο[υ] ἱατρὸν δαμοσιεύοντα ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκα τᾶς περὶ τὰν τέχναν καὶ τὸν ἄλλον αὐτοῦ βίο[ν]... This honorary decree is from the Coan deme Haleis.

<sup>9</sup> GAL. *De praecognitione* 3, 4 (XIV p.614 Kühn = CMG V 8,1, p. 82, 24-25 Nutton): ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀρχὴ φθόνου τότε πρῶτον ἐγένετο, θαυμαζομένῳ ἐπὶ τε βίου σεμνότητι καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἔργοις. On σεμνότης see also V. NUTTON, *ad loc.*, and *Inscr. Magnesia* 113 (cf. n. 6 above). See also J. JOUANNA’s contribution to this volume.

<sup>10</sup> See, e.g., D. GOUREVITCH, *Le triangle* (n. 1 above), 347-414; H. VON STADEN, “Liminal perils: early Roman receptions of Greek medicine”, in *Tradition, Transmission, Transformation*, ed. by F.J. RAGEP, S.P. RAGEP, S. LIVESEY (Leiden 1996), 369-418; D.W. AMUNDSEN, “Images of physicians in classical times”, in *Journal of Popular Culture* 11 (1977), 643-655; R.W. DAVIES, “Medicine in

but this would not render the evidence cited above any less informative from an axiological point of view.

Latin inscriptions and legal texts of the Empire confirm that this dual emphasis — on character and on competence — was widespread among Latin-speaking subjects of the Roman empire too. I offer only a few examples. At the time of the emperor Trajan, C. Calpurnius Asclepiades of Prusa met with approval in the highest circles both for his professional expertise and because of his moral character: *studiorum et morum causa probatus a uiris clarissimis*<sup>11</sup>. Marcus Cosinius Eutychianus and Soteris likewise render tribute to their father for having been both a *medicus peritissimus* and a *homo benignissimus*<sup>12</sup>. Similarly, in the second century Cominia Faustina of Mogontiacum praises her young son Peregrinus Heliodorus, a *medicus*, not only for his *consummata peritia* but also for his *mira pietas*<sup>13</sup> and, in a funerary inscription from Spain, Cassius Philippus honours his

Ancient Rome", in *History Today* 21 (1971), 770-778; A. GERVAIS, "Que pensait-on des médecins dans l'ancienne Rome?", in *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*, 4e série, 1964, 197-231; H.H. HUXLEY, "Greek doctor and Roman patient", in *G & R S.S.* 4 (1957), 132-138. Medicine is of course a target of parody as early as Attic comedy; see Bernhard ZIMMERMANN, "Hippokratisches in den Komödien des Aristophanes", in *Tratados Hipocráticos: Actas del VIIº Colloque International Hippocratique* (Madrid 1992), 513-525. Cf. also M.I. RODRÍGUEZ ALFAGEME, *La medicina en la comedia ática* (Madrid 1981); L.E. ROSSI, "Un nuovo papiro epicarmeo e il tipo del medico in commedia", in *A & R* 22 (1977), 81-84; P. EHRHARDT, *Satirische Epigramme auf Ärzte. Eine medizinhistorische Studie auf der Grundlage des XI. Buches der Anthologia Palatina* (Diss. Erlangen 1974); K.B.C. RANKIN, *The physician in ancient comedy* (Diss. University of North Carolina 1972); L. GIL and I.R. ALFAGEME, "La figura del médico en la comedia Atica", in *Cuadernos de Filología Clásica* 3 (1972), 35-91; A. SPALLICCI, *I medici e la medicina in Persio* (Milano 1941).

<sup>11</sup> *CIL XI* 3943 = *ILS* 7789. This physician (A.D. 87-157) obtained Roman citizenship for himself, his parents and his four brothers from Trajan. See H. GUMMERUS, *op.cit.* (above n.5), no. 242.

<sup>12</sup> P. CAVUOTO, "Le epigrafi del teatro romano di Benevento", in *Rendiconti Accad. Lincei* 24 (1969), 87-99 (on 98) = *Ann. Épigr.* 1969-1970, no. 170 = Robert J. ROWLAND, Jr., "Some new *medici* in the Roman Empire", in *Epi-graphica* 39 (1977), 174-179, no. 432 (p.178).

<sup>13</sup> *CIL XIII* 7094 = H. GUMMERUS, no. 368 = A. RIESE, *Das Rheinische Germanien in den antiken Inschriften* (Leipzig/Berlin 1914), no. 2147.

“incomparable wife” Iulia Saturnina both as a *medica optima* and as a *mulier sanctissima*<sup>14</sup>.

Many of the terms of praise in Latin inscriptions honouring physicians are, once again, topoi that recur in inscriptions concerning non-physicians; not only *medici* are praised, for example, for having been a good father, husband, wife, son or brother, nor are doctors the only ones commended for displaying goodwill toward a city or thanked for having benefitted a community through munificence. Topoi tend, however, to reflect not only generic conventions but also popular values, and the value terms repeatedly used to express moral and professional approbation — as well as the rhetorical structures through which such terms often become linked to one another (notably syntactic parallelism, antithesis, and chiasm) — suggest that both character and professional competence were often, though far from invariably, seen by Romans, including non-physicians, as closely associated prerequisites for being a praiseworthy physician.

Latin legal texts also display this double emphasis. The third book of the *Opiniones* often ascribed to one of Galen’s younger contemporaries, the jurist Ulpian, for example, specifies that both *peritia artis* and *probitas morum* be considered in the selection of physicians: “The judgment on the physicians that are to be included within a predetermined number is not to be entrusted to the governor of a province but to the *ordo* and to the landowners of each community, so that, being certain about the *uprightness of character* and about the *professional skill* of the physicians, they themselves may choose [doctors] to whom they may entrust themselves and their children in physical illness”<sup>15</sup>. Many other Greek and Latin texts of the Roman empire

<sup>14</sup> CIL II 492 = ILS 7802 = H. GUMMERUS, no. 323. The date of the inscription is uncertain, but it probably belongs to the second century.

<sup>15</sup> In Justinian’s DIG. 50, 9, 1 (p. 852 Mommsen = p.924 Watson): *Ulpianus libro tertio opinionum. Medicorum intra numerum praefinitum constituendorum arbitrium non praesidi prouinciae commissum est, sed ordini et possessoribus cuiusque ciuitatis, ut certi de probitate morum et peritia artis eligant ipsi, quibus se liberosque suos in aegritudine corporum committant.* On the authorship of the *Libri opinionum* see T. HONORÉ, *Ulpian* (Oxford 1982), 120-128.

confirm that character and competence often were linked as twin factors in the evaluation of a physician — and not only by those who, like Galen, brought philosophical perspectives to bear upon medicine. Cato's *uir bonus, dicendi peritus*, in other words, has a medical counterpart, at least under the Roman empire.

The apparent contrast between (a) this repeated emphasis, at the time of the Roman empire, on professional competence as well as personal character, and (b) the relative absence of ἀρετή and of the cardinal virtues from the ranks of the forces identified as motivating physicians in Hippocratic treatises of the classical epoch, has prompted some scholars to conclude that the personal morality of the physician does not become a distinctly, consistently raised issue until the Roman empire<sup>16</sup>. According to this view, Hippocratic medicine and its immediate successors have much to say about the professional conduct of the physician, about the importance of his professional reputation (δόξα), and about his responsibilities to his *techne* (or to his patients or his public), but little about the issue of personal moral character or private conduct. Before asking whether the canonical version of the Hippocratic *Oath* confirms this modern view, it might be useful to examine whether the Hellenistic evidence supports the conclusion that a new, distinctively Roman, 'moralising sensibility' is brought to bear upon the relation of moral character to professional competence in post-Hellenistic medicine.

<sup>16</sup> E.g., Ludwig EDELSTEIN, "The professional ethics of the Greek physician", in *BHM* 19 (1956), 391-419, reprinted in *Ancient Medicine: Selected papers of Ludwig Edelstein*, edited by O. and C.L. TEMKIN (Baltimore 1967), 319-348, on 323-324: "The early Hippocratic books are concerned exclusively with a body of rules prescribing a certain behavior during the physician's working hours, with medical etiquette, one might say... Such injunctions... are dictated by the wish to uphold certain standards of performance and serve to distinguish the expert from the charlatan... Yet at no point does the Hippocratic physician aim farther... As for the physician's motives in practising medicine, he was engaged in it in order to make a living"; D. GOUREVITCH, *op.cit.*, 436: "Le monde grec considère surtout le médecin ès-qualité; le monde romain, hellénophone ou latinophone, est très sensible aussi à ses vertus privées".

## II

The fragments of Hellenistic medical ‘schools’ offer scant evidence concerning ethics and deontology. Extant reports about the Empiricist school, for example, do not reveal whether — and, if so, how — the Empiricists worked out the ethical consequences of the epistemological foundations of their theory of scientific method. Karl Deichgräber boldly tried to sketch “die empirische Lebens- und Berufsauffassung”<sup>17</sup>, but he could cite no firm evidence other than (a) a second-century Roman Empiricist’s view that becoming wealthy is the main purpose of practising medicine and (b) another Empiricist’s claim that loquacity and vanity are to be avoided<sup>18</sup>. And while members of Herophilus’ school may have had more to say about professional deontology<sup>19</sup>, the extant testimonia and fragments do not reveal whether they had a strong interest in the relation of private morality to professional conduct. A number of Hellenistic inscriptions concerning physicians show little if any interest in this relation. A characteristic honorary decree from the third century before our era honours the Coan physician Philistus, son of Nicarchus, for having “rendered services” to very many citizens of Iasos or Samos “in accordance with the medical *techne*” (κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν τέχνην), for having “saved patients attacked by dangerous diseases” (τοὺς … ἐμπεσόντας [εἰς ἀρρωστίας ἐπικινδύνους διέσωισεν]), and, in another recurrent honorific formula, for having rendered this professional aid both “with every ready willingness (μετὰ πάσης προθυμίας) and with an unstinting eagerness for distinction

<sup>17</sup> K. DEICHGRÄBER (ed.), *Die griechische Empirikerschule* (Berlin/Zürich 1965), 322-323.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, fr. 293 (= GAL. *De placitis Hp. et Plat.* 9, 5, 4-6, *CMG* V 4, 1, 2, p. 564,22-30 De Lacy), on Menodotus, and p. 82,21 ff. (= GAL. *Subfiguratio empirica*): *neque multiloquus neque longiloquus erit empericus... neque superbus existens et uir non plasmatus et absque uana gloria*. Cf. GAL. *Quod optimus medicus sit quoque philosophus* 2 (I p. 57 K. = *Scripta minora* II p. 4 Mueller).

<sup>19</sup> E.g., fr. 51 in H. VON STADEN (ed.), *Herophilus. The art of medicine in early Alexandria* (Cambridge 1989, repr. 1994), 125-126 (but see also 478-479 on Callianax).

(φιλοτιμίας οὐθὲν ἐλλείπων)”<sup>20</sup>. But about Philistus' private conduct or moral character as manifested outside the professional sphere the inscription reveals little (in this respect, as indicated above in Part I, the inscription is no different from some Roman inscriptions).

At times, however, Hellenistic inscriptions harbour allusions to, or expressions of, a larger moral vision of the values that make a physician worthy of being honoured. A second-century B.C. inscription from Aptera on the northwest coast of Crete, honouring the Coan physician Callippus, son of Aristocritus, not only uses formulaic expressions similar to those applied to Philistus (“an unstinting eager willingness” and “saving many citizens”) but also three further phrases of considerable significance for present purposes<sup>21</sup>. First, Callippus is praised for his

<sup>20</sup> J. BENEDUM, “Griechische Arztinschriften aus Kos”, in *ZPE* 25 (1977), 265-276, no. 1, 11-25 (=SEG XXVII 510). Benedum assigns the decree to Iasos, whereas L. ROBERT, “Décret pour un médecin de Cos”, in *RPh* 52 (1978), 242-251, attributes it to Samos. See also J. et L. ROBERT, “Bull. épigr.”, in *REG* 71 (1958), no. 85 (p. 202), and 91 (1978), no. 357; S.M. SHERWIN-WHITE, *Ancient Cos* (Göttingen 1978), 270; J. BENEDUM, “Inscriptions grecques de Cos relatives à des médecins hippocratiques et Cos Astypalaia”, in M.D. GRMEK (ed.), *Hippocratica. Actes du Colloque hippocratique de Paris* (Paris 1980), 35-43. The names Philistos and Nicarchus are not uncommon on Cos; see P.M. FRASER and E. MATTHEWS (eds.), *A lexicon of Greek personal names I* (Oxford 1987), 330, 464. A number of words and phrases in this inscription recur with some frequency in decrees honouring physicians, as J. BENEDUM, in *ZPE* 25 (1977), 267-269, points out; see also *ibid.*, p. 274, no. 4, 2-7 (=SEG XXVII 515), from the third or second century B.C.: [... μετ]ὰ πά[σ]ας εὐταξίας [πολλοῖς] τε ἐς ἀρωστίας ἐπικιν[δύν]ους ἐμπεσόντων ἐβοάθησε κατὰ τὰν τέχναν καλῶς καὶ συμφερόντως μετὰ πάσας προθυμίας ὑπακούων εἰς τὰν ἐκάστου σωτηρίαν. Characterisation of a physician in terms of *techne* (*iatrike*) is quite common; see, e.g., *IG* V 1, 1145, 22-24; *IG* XI 4, 633; 693; 775, 10; *DGE* (Schwyzer) 369; *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 620, 5-6; 620, 36; 943, 2; 943, 25; *SGDI* 3557, 5104 c25.

<sup>21</sup> *Inscr. Cret.* II no 3,3 (pp.16-17). See M.E. DETORAKIS, “ΜΕΤΑΚΛΗΣΗ ΚΩΩΝ ΓΙΑΤΡΩΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΚΡΗΤΗ ΤΟΝ 2<sup>ο</sup> αι. π.Χ.”, in *KΡΗΤΙΚΑ ΧΡΟΝΙΚΑ* 30 (1990), 51-61, on this inscription and on two third-century B.C. (221-219), Cretan honorary decrees for the Coan physician Hermias (see below, nn. 24-25). Detorakis (p. 56) recognizes the similarity between κατά τε τὸν βίον καὶ τὰν τέχναν and the central sentence of the *Hippocratic Oath* (see below, Part III). On the diaspora of Coan physicians in the Hellenistic period — many were sent by Cos to serve other cities — and on the relation of these activities to certain features of the *Hippocratic Oath* see G. PUGLIESE CARRATELLI, “La norma etica degli Asklepiadi di Cos”, in *PP* 46 (1991), 81-94 (87 on Callippus).

conduct “both with reference to his *life* and with reference to his *techne*”: *κατά τε τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν τέχναν*. I shall attempt below (Part III) to clarify in greater detail what ‘life’ means in this recurrent coupling of *bios* and *techne*, but for now it should be noted that the *τε ... καὶ* construction suggests that this is not a case of hendiadys but that the author wishes to draw attention, with equal emphasis, to the physician’s conduct of his life as well as his practice of his *techne*. Secondly, the inscription ranks Callippus among “the good [virtuous] men” (*τῶς ἀγαθῶς ἄνδρας*, in this Doric inscription) worthy of being honoured (*τιμῶν*). *Ἀγαθός* is, of course, the adjective that corresponds to *ἀρετή* and, qualifying *ἄνδρας* (rather than *ἰατρούς*), it suggests that the ‘virtuousness’ to which *ἀγαθούς* here refers is not confined to the technical excellence of a physician but includes the moral character of the whole person: an *ἀγαθός ἀνὴρ* (like Cato’s *uir bonus*) is not a mere technical expert<sup>22</sup>. Third, this impression is reinforced by the decree’s specification that it is, in part at least, “because of his *arete* and goodwill” that Callippus is to be praised, crowned with a gold crown, and given 300 staters<sup>23</sup>. Although the latter, too, is a recurrent honorific topos, and although each of these expressions (*κατὰ τὸν βίον*, *ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός*, and *ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας*) is, of course,

<sup>22</sup> See also the honorary decree of Iasos praising the Coan doctor Teleutias for his *kalokagathía*: *SEG* XXVII 517 (lines 35, 38). Cf. *IG* XI 4, 775, 4-5 (*ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός*, of a *ἰατρός*) and nn. 23-27 below.

<sup>23</sup> *Ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας* (*τῆς εἰς [or πρὸς] τὴν πόλιν [or τὸν δῆμον]*) is, of course, a very common formula of praise in honorary decrees; see, e.g., *IG*<sup>2</sup> II/III 1, 127, c30; 212,32; 233, a7-8, b25-26; 309,3-5; 342,8-9; 343,9-10; 364, a5-6; 431,3-4; 448,13; 448,23; 456, b9-10; 466, b31; 467,25-26. So too *IG* XII 5, 824, 27-28 (see note 26 below); *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 805,11; *SEG* XIV 131,3-4; XV 111,12; XIX 72,4-5; XXI 310,32-33; 319,7-8; XXVII 511,11; 514,10-11; cf. *SEG* XXVII 517,39,41. A fragmentary Hellenistic inscription from Cos, which appears to contain the introduction to a decree honouring a public physician of the late third century before our era, likewise includes in its encomiastic repertory not only that “he came to the aid of many attacked by dangerous diseases”, that “[he acted] in accordance with his *techne*” and “with every willing eagerness, answering each call to rescue”, but also the award of a gold wreath and of public praise *ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας*: J. BENEDUM, in *ZPE* 25 (1977), 274 no. 4 = *SEG* XXVII 515. See also nn. 20, 25.

open to several interpretations, collectively they seem to point to a popular conception — not unlike the later Roman conception traced above — of the good physician as worthy of being honoured both because of his professional competence and because of his mode of life or character.

At Cnossus, the third-century B.C. Coan physician Hermias likewise was honoured by the Cretans not only for the skill with which he rescued wounded patients from grave danger but also for being an ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ<sup>24</sup>. The same Hermias was honoured by the Cretans of Gortyn for being both (*καὶ ... καὶ*) a *ἰατρὸς ἀγαθός* and an *ἀνήρ ἀξιόλογος* (and hence being worthy of praise *ἀρετᾶς ἐνεκα*), again suggesting the author's capacity and desire to distinguish between the kind of *ἰατρός* one is and the kind of *ἀνήρ* one is<sup>25</sup>.

A third- or early second-century B.C. honorary decree from the deme of the Aegelioi on the north coast of Cos similarly includes among the formulaic terms of professional praise for a public physician, Anaxippus, son of Alexander, that “with an unstinting eagerness for distinction, he saved many citizens attacked by serious diseases and extreme dangers”, and he displayed “zeal and care” in the execution of his professional duties<sup>26</sup>. But this inscription, too, goes on to emphasise that the physician spent many years in a laudable manner “with reference both to his *techne* and to his life”: *κατά τε τὰν τέχναν καὶ τὸμ βίον*. Here, again, the *τε ... καὶ* construction is noteworthy (although the

<sup>24</sup> *Inscr.Cret.* I n° 8,7,11: ‘Ἐρμίας ὑπάρχων ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ (=SIG<sup>3</sup> 528). See nn. 21-22 above; G. PUGLIESE CARRATELLI, *art.cit.*, 87; M.E. DETORAKIS, *art.cit.*, 53-54.

<sup>25</sup> *Inscr.Cret.* IV n° 168,21-24: ἔδοξέ τε ἀμῦν ἐπαινέσαι ‘Ἐρμίαν ἀρε[τᾶς ἐγεκα καὶ εὔνοίας τᾶς ἐς τὰν πόλιν, ἐπαινέ[σαι δὲ καὶ] Κ[ώ]ιονς ὅτι καὶ ιατρὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄνδρα ἀξ[ιόλογον ἀμῦν ἀπέ[στηλαν. Cf. M.E. DETORAKIS, *art.cit.*, 51-53; L. LAURENZI, “Iscrizioni dell'Asclepieo di Coo”, in *Clara Rhodos* 10 (1941), 25-38, on 34-36.

<sup>26</sup> J. BENEDUM, in *ZPE* 25 (1977), 270-272, no. 2 = *SEG* XXVII 513. See S.M. SHERWIN-WHITE, *op.cit.* (n. 20 above), 60 n. 163, 265 n. 51, 266, 272-273; G. PUGLIESE CARRATELLI, *art.cit.*, 86-88. Cf. *IG* XII 5, 824 = *SIG<sup>3</sup>* 620 (Tenos, early second century B.C.): in this honorary decree for a physician from Miletus, Apollonius, son of Hierocles, the phrase *καὶ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καὶ κατὰ τὴν λοιπὴν εὔνοιαν* recurs four times (lines 5, 8-9, 36, 41-42). See n. 23 above.

word order, *τέχναν* ... *βίον*, is the reverse of that in the above-mentioned Cretan inscription from Aptera).

An early first-century B.C. decree from Gytheion in the southern Peloponnesus praises the Spartan physician Damiadas, “a servant of Asclepius”, not only for being *σώφρων* (l. 27) and for his *καλοκαγαθία* (32, 48), *εύνοια* (33, 48), and *φιλοστοργία* (33), but also for being “*both* second to none in his *techne* and best in his life” (*ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις οὐθενὸς δεύτερον, καὶ τὸν βίον τε ἀριστον*)<sup>27</sup>. Here, too, a clear distinction is drawn between the doctor’s professional skill and his ‘life’, and here, too, the importance of both is explicitly recognised. A similar concern both with the physician’s professional competence and with the rest of his ‘life’ is visible in a second-century B.C. honorary decree from Halasarna on Cos for the physician Onasandros, son of Onesimus and pupil of Antipatros, son of Dioscurides<sup>28</sup>: *τὰς τε κατὰ τὰν τέχναν ἐμπειρίας καὶ τὰς κατὰ τὸν βίον εὐταξίας* (lines 11-12), and subsequently, with a slight variation, *τὰν ... κατά τε τὰν τέχναν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναστροφάν* (19-20). A decree of Amphissa, honouring the physician Menophantus, son of Artemidorus, of Hyrkanis, likewise praises not only his professional medical accomplishments, his *φιλοτεχνία*, and his *εύνοια*, but also *τάν τε κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναστροφάν παρὰ πάντα τὸν τὰς ἐπιδαιμίας χρόνον εὔτακτον καὶ σώφρονα ...*, and a second-century B.C. honorary decree

<sup>27</sup> *IGV* 1, 1145,12-13 (=SGDI 4566). So too lines 37-39:... *καὶ διὰ π[αντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τι]νος παραίτιον γινόμενον ἐν τε τ[ὰι τέχναι καὶ] ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ ...* Not all editors agree on this restoration, however. See H.F.J. HORSTMANSHOFF, “The ancient physician: craftsman or scientist?”, in *JHM* 45 (1990), 176-197 = id., “De antieke arts, ambachtsman of man van wetenschap?”, in *Lampas* 20 (1987), 340-355; G. PUGLIESE CARRATELLI, *art.cit.*, 91. See also *SEG* XLI 1782. Cf. *F. Delphes* III 1, 551,29-30... *διὰ τε τὴν τῆς τέχνης ἀκρίβειαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ βίου κόσμο[ιον ἀναστροφήν* (honouring the tragic actor Tib. Iulius Apolaustos).

<sup>28</sup> G. PUGLIESE CARRATELLI (and R. HERZOG), “Decreto del damos coo di Halasarna in onore del medico Onasandros”, in *PP* 46 (1991), 135-140; *SEG* XLI 680. On this inscription see also A. BARIGAZZI, “Su una inscrizione di Cos”, in *Prometheus* 18 (1992), 216; P. GAUTHIER, “Bull. épigr.”, in *REG* 105 (1992), no. 341, and 106 (1993), no. 384; J. JOUANNA, *Hippocrate* (Paris 1992), 524-526 (who detects in this decree a relation between pupils and masters that is reminiscent of the *Hippocratic Oath*).

from the island Carpathus similarly rewards the Samian doctor Menocritus, son of Metrodorus, with a gold crown both for his professional knowledge and for his character: ἐμπειρίας ἔνεκα καὶ καλοκαγαθίας (lines 26-27) and κατά τε τὰν ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὰν ἄλλαν ἀναστροφάν (5-6)<sup>29</sup>.

The Hellenistic epigraphic evidence — notably the recurrent contrasts τέχνη vs. βίος, ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός vs. ἰατρὸς ἀγαθός, ἐμπειρία κατὰ τὴν τέχνην vs. εὐταξία κατὰ τὸν βίον, and ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐμπειρία vs. ἡ κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναστροφή — thus confirms that, well before the Roman empire, a view had taken hold in Greece according to which a physician should be judged by his or her character or 'life', too, professional competence or expertise alone not being a sufficient source of public approbation.

A problematic sentence that might be a relevant testimonium concerning the Hellenistic physician Erasistratus (ca. 320-240 B.C.E.?) is preserved in the *Medical Questions* attributed to Soranus: "According to Erasistratus the most felicitous [circumstance] is in fact whenever each of two things has come about, that [the physician] is both perfect in his professional expertise (*in arte perfectus*) and best in his character (*moribus optimus*). If, however, one of the two were to be missing, it is better to be a good man who is lacking in learning than to be a perfect expert practitioner who has a bad character and is lacking in virtue"<sup>30</sup>. Doubt has been expressed by some scholars that Erasistratus is the author of this view, on the grounds that the Hellenistic

<sup>29</sup> Ed. SCHWYZER (Hg.), *DGE*, no. 369 (Amphissa); *IG XII* 1,1032 (Carpathus); here, as in the decree honouring Onasandros, the "both... and" (τε ... καὶ) construction once again is suggestive. The epigraphic evidence presented here (Part II) suggests that the conclusions of M.N. TOD, "Laudatory epithets in Greek epitaphs", in *ABSA* 46 (1951), 182-190, are in need of modification. Cf. R. LATTIMORE, *Themes in Greek and Latin epitaphs* (Urbana, Illinois 1962), 285-299.

<sup>30</sup> Ps. SORAN. *Quaest.med.*, Introd., in V. ROSE (ed.), *Anecdota Graeca et Graecolatina* II (Berlin 1870, repr. 1963), p. 244,17-21 = I. GAROFALO (ed.), *Erasistrati fragmenta* (Pisa 1988), fr. 31 p. 70: *Disciplinarum autem ceterarum minime sit expers, sed et circa mores habeat diligentiam. iuxta enim Erasistratum felicissimum quidem est ubi utraeque res fuerint, uti et in arte sit perfectus et moribus sit optimus. si autem unum de duobus defuerit, melius est virum esse bonum absque doctrina quam artificem perfectum mores habentem malos et improbum esse.*

physician's physiology is not reconcilable with any appreciation of a physician who is "lacking in learning" (*absque doctrina*)<sup>31</sup>. Ludwig Edelstein, by contrast, claims that this text "is based on good sources" and that "there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the quotation from Erasistratus"<sup>32</sup>. Danielle Gourevitch, who in principle finds this testimony trustworthy ("il n'y a pas raison de suspecter ce témoignage"), offers an intermediate solution: only the sentence beginning with *iuxta enim Erasistratum* (see note 30), not the subsequent adversative conditional sentence (*si autem unum de duobus defuerit*), represents Erasistratus' view<sup>33</sup>. Edelstein in all likelihood is too uncritical, and the context, content, and structure of the passage lend Gourevitch's solution considerable plausibility. If one viewed the testimonium concerning Erasistratus as beginning with *iuxta enim Erasistratum* and ending with *et moribus sit optimus*, this would answer the objection raised on the basis of *absque doctrina*.

It might be objected that this testimonium, with its moralising emphasis on excellence both in *mores* and in *ars*, appears to be a product of a Roman rather than a Hellenistic milieu. But the rich Hellenistic epigraphic evidence discussed above suggests that, as far as the characterisation of the good physician in terms of both professional competence and moral character is concerned, there was substantial continuity between the Hellenistic epoch and the Roman empire. The dual emphasis on *ars* and *mores* attributed to Erasistratus has many counterparts (notably  $\tau\acute{e}χνη$ - $\beta\acute{ο}ς$ ) in the Hellenistic texts explored above (and, of course, in Latin evidence pre-dating pseudo-Soranus, as shown in Part I). On grounds of content alone, pseudo-Soranus' evidence concerning Erasistratus therefore is not implausible. Whatever its provenance, date, and trustworthiness might be, the text offers clear evidence that its author believed, first, that both (a) the distinction between professional expertise and personal

<sup>31</sup> E.g., I. GAROFALO, *op.cit.*, p. 70: "non mi pare conciliabile con la figura del fisiologo E. che egli apprezzi un medico *absque doctrina*".

<sup>32</sup> L. EDELSTEIN, *art.cit.*, 334 n. 27.

<sup>33</sup> D. GOUREVITCH, *op.cit.*, 268.

morality and (b) their inseparability had been recognised by a leading physician of the early Hellenistic period — a plausible belief, as the evidence presented here (Part II) suggests — and, secondly, that the relation between character and competence should remain an issue under discussion in later antiquity.

Even if the evidence concerning Erasistratus is not accepted as authentic, the inscriptions introduced above confirm that Hellenistic authors, too, on the one hand recognised the distinction between a physician's professional scientific expertise or skill and his moral character or way of life and, on the other hand, endorsed the notion that a physician should excel in both. A question urged upon us by the substantial continuity detected between the Roman and Hellenistic evidence, is whether this link between character and professional competence could be traced further back, into the classical epoch.

### III

A sentence that functions as the structural pivot of the *Hippocratic Oath* offers a sworn promise that contains striking resonances with some of the Hellenistic texts explored above: ἀγνῶς δὲ καὶ ὁσίως διατηρήσω βίον τὸν ἔμὸν καὶ τέχνην τὴν ἔμήν, “and in a pure and holy way, I shall guard my life and my *techne*”<sup>34</sup>. Almost every word in this sentence, which stands at the centre of the *Oath*, is not only richly provocative but also fraught with interpretive challenges. I therefore offer a few reflections on each.

Διατηρήσω: this verb, which does not appear in any other Hippocratic treatise of the classical period<sup>35</sup>, here seems to

<sup>34</sup> Hp. *Iusi.*, IV p. 630,10-11 Littré (henceforth = L.) = *CMG* I 1, ed. J.L. HEIBERG (henceforth = Heib.), p. 4,18 = L. EDELSTEIN, *op.cit.*, 5, 15-16. *POxy.* 2547, 14 appears to read εύσεβῶς for ὁσίως; all MSS have ὁσίως. For a less technical version of my interpretation of this sentence see the forthcoming article “In a pure and holy way”, in *JHM* 51, 404-437.

<sup>35</sup> The verb appears in two later texts that also became part of the *Hippocratic Corpus*: *Epist.* 24 and *Decorum* 18 (IX p. 244,4 L.). Cf. *IG<sup>2</sup>* II/III 1, 1028, 88-89 =

mean “to watch or observe closely and continuously”, and hence “to maintain” or “preserve” or “guard”. The commitment it expresses is neither to a passing nor to an intermittent realization of aspirations but to a constant, steady one (*dia-*). What the speaker swears to maintain and to watch over is, of course, twofold: “my life and my *technē*”.

Ἐμόν, ἐμήν: the emphatic repetition of the first-person singular possessive pronoun<sup>36</sup> underscores the deeply personal nature of the *Oath*. While the *Oath* is a binding statement of professional intent, covering the oath-taker’s relations to his patients, to his teacher, to his teacher’s offspring, and to his students, it is also, in a sense, the most personal of Hippocratic texts of the classical epoch. Thrice in this compact sentence the first-person singular appears: “*I shall guard my life and my technē*”. Nowhere else in the more than fifty extant Hippocratic works of the classical period does the possessive adjective “my” or “mine” appear as often as in the *Oath*: κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κρίσιν ἐμήν (twice), γενέτησιν ἐμοῖσι, υἱοῖσι ἐμοῖσι, βίον τὸν ἐμόν, τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν. In fact, there are only three other occurrences of ἐμός in Hippocratic works of this period<sup>37</sup> (even though

SIG<sup>3</sup> 717,88-89: ἐφρόντισεν ... μετὰ πάσης ὁσιότητος καὶ διετήρησεν πάντας ὑγιαίνοντας ... (Athens, ca. 100 B.C.). The Hippocratic expression ‘to guard one’s life’ (διατηρεῖν βίον) in a certain way is not common in the classical period; for Hellenistic and later parallels see, for example, DIOD. 5, 21, 5 (from the historian Timaeus), PLB. 36, 16, 6 (a passage quoted in the tenth century by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, *Excerpta de virtutibus* 2, 203, and by the *Suda*, s.v. Μασσανάσσης [= M 245]), and JOSEPHUS AJ 10, 42.

<sup>36</sup> Most manuscripts read βίον τὸν ἐμόν, which is perhaps more emphatic than the minority reading βίον ἐμόν. In the case of “my *technē*” the vast majority of manuscripts likewise transmits τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν, while a small minority reads τέχνην ἐμήν. I am grateful to Thomas Rütten for generously having shared the results of his unpublished collations of the manuscripts with me. A textual critical resolution of the problems posed by these and other variants will have to await a new evaluation both of all relevant manuscripts and of the indirect transmission.

<sup>37</sup> *De arte* 6,1 (VI p. 10,2 L. = Hippocrate, V 1, éd. par J. JOUANNA [CUF, Paris 1988], 230); *Nat.puer.* 13,4 and 29,2 (VII p. 492,4; p. 530,14 L. = Hippocrate, XI, éd. par R. JOLY [CUF, Paris 1970], 56,9; 78,3). All three occurrences are in the phrase ἐμὸς λόγος. The adjective also occurs in some Hellenistic works within the *Hippocratic Corpus*, notably in *Cord.* 11 (IX p. 90,10 L.) and in the *Letters*.

some Hippocratic writers make heavy use of a first-person singular rhetoric, notably in polemical contexts<sup>38</sup>). The three-fold repetition, “*I... my... my*”, within the space of this single short sentence represents an intensification of the focus on the speaker — significantly, at the very center of the *Oath* — perhaps unmatched in any other Hippocratic work of the classical epoch. Furthermore, no other classical Hippocratic text has as dense a first-person singular presence as the *Oath* as a whole. The author repeatedly makes every reciter of his text enter into complicity in the first-person singular; to the instances noted above one could add ὅμνυμι, με, ἐμέ, χρήσομαι, οὐ δώσω (twice), οὐδὲ ὑφηγήσομαι, οὐ τεμέω, ἐκχωρήσω, ἐσίω, ἐσελεύσομαι, ἵδω, ἀκούσω, σιγήσομαι, μοι.

This accumulation of formulations employing the first-person singular cannot be dismissed as merely genre-specific or as mere convention. While oaths naturally are spoken in the first person, few, if any, extant Greek oaths draw attention to the speaker so repeatedly and emphatically<sup>39</sup>. Nor does the prominence of the first-person singular in the *Oath* belong to the context of the rhetoric of ‘egotism’ traced by G.E.R. Lloyd and often, though not always, associated with claims of innovation<sup>40</sup>. Rather, this intensive and extensive ‘personalisation’ of the *Oath* seems to be a way of underscoring the oath-taker’s profound, constant, binding personal responsibility for his every professional commitment. The commitments might largely concern professional conduct, but the amassing of first-person forms ensures that they are never separated from an individual, personal responsibility. “*I shall guard my life and my techne*” thus belongs in this intensely personal dimension.

<sup>38</sup> See G.E.R. LLOYD, *The Revolutions of Wisdom* (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1987), 58-70.

<sup>39</sup> Some oaths, for example, simply use the future infinitive or a series of infinitives after ‘I swear’, without any re-introduction of the first person. See Rudolph HIRZEL, *Der Eid* (Leipzig 1902).

<sup>40</sup> G.E.R. LLOYD, *op.cit.*, 58-70.

The coupling of 'life' and *techne*, which is reinforced by the repetition not only of ἐμός but also of καὶ βίου καὶ τέχνης in the last sentence of the *Oath*, represents a significant precursor of the Hellenistic inscriptions from Crete, Cos, and the Peloponnesus examined above (Part II). And, as we saw in Part I, such a use of *techne* and *bios*, with reference to physicians, can be traced in Roman imperial times, too. We still need to clarify, however, what 'life' means in such contexts.

Βίος (like ἐμός) appears more often in the *Oath* than in any other Hippocratic treatise of the classical epoch<sup>41</sup>. Hippocratics, not unlike other Greeks, use the word in a wide range of senses, including 'life' as opposed to 'death'<sup>42</sup>, 'duration of life' or 'life-time'<sup>43</sup>, 'means of living' or 'livelihood'<sup>44</sup>, and 'mode or manner of living' or 'lifestyle' (see note 58 below). The possibility that 'life' here means 'livelihood' or 'means of making a living', as it apparently does earlier in the *Oath* ("I swear... to share my life", βίου κοινώσασθαι, with my teacher), cannot be excluded. One might therefore be tempted to read "my life and my *techne*" as a hendiadys (i.e., 'my *techne*-livelihood') or, closely related, to take καὶ to have an epexegetical function: "my livelihood, that is, my *techne*". Neither of these two readings is implausible, but there are also grounds for reticence, the most significant being that both readings have the consequence of reducing the medical *techne* to a mere means of making a living, a trade, and this does not seem consistent with the valorisations of *techne* elsewhere in the *Oath* (or, for that matter, in the *Hippocratic Corpus*).

<sup>41</sup> Βίος appears in only six other pre-Hellenistic Hippocratic works (*Regimen*, *Breaths/Winds*, *Epidemics V* and *VII*, *Ancient Medicine*, *Sacred Disease*, and in the famous first *Aphorism*), and in none with as great a relative frequency as in the *Oath*. See notes 42-44, 58.

<sup>42</sup> E.g. *Epid.* 5, 84; 7, 89 (V p. 252-53, p. 446-47 L. = Hippocrates [Loeb], ed. by W.D. SMITH, VII 208-209, 388-389 Smith); *Flat.* 4 (VI p. 96-97 L. = Hippocrate, V 1, éd. par J. JOUANNA [CUF], 107).

<sup>43</sup> E.g. *Aph.* 1, 1 (IV p. 458-59 L. = Hippocrates [Loeb], ed. by W.H.S. JONES, IV 98-99).

<sup>44</sup> E.g. *Morb.sacr.* 1, 32 (VI p. 360,10 L. = H. GRENSEMAN [Hrsg.], *Die hippokratische Schrift "Über die heilige Krankheit"*, Ars Medica II 1 [Berlin 1968], 64); *Vict.* 3,68 (VI p. 594,7 L. = CMG I 2,4, p. 194,20 Joly/Byl).

It seems more likely that in the phrase  $\betaίον τὸν ἔμον$  “life” is used in the primary classical sense of  $\betaίος$ , i.e., to signify a ‘habitual mode of life’ or the ‘manner of living one’s life’ or ‘a fully formed life style’, i.e., the ways in which a person shapes the series of voluntary activities or responses to involuntary experiences which make up his or her history, or the totality of actions and occurrences that constitute a given human being’s consistent manner of living. If this is what ‘life’ means here, the speaker or reciter undertakes to guard and maintain continuously a certain consistent, individual (“my”) mode of living, one that depends in great measure upon his own actions and hence upon his deliberate choices.

Internal support for such an interpretation of ‘life’ comes, first, from the fact that it is not subject to the reservations expressed above concerning ‘livelihood’, and, secondly, from its compatibility with every other part both of this sentence and of the *Oath* as a whole. Reading ‘my life’ as ‘my habitual manner of living’ is compatible with the stability, constancy and consistency expressed by “I shall guard” ( $\deltaιατηρήσω$ ), with the comprehensive responsibility expressed by the emphatic repetition of “my” with the non-clinical interactions evoked in the *Oath*<sup>45</sup>, and, as will be suggested below, with the momentous modifiers “in a pure and holy way”. This reading therefore meets the criterion of internal coherence (an oft suspect criterion, which, however, seems apt in this case, given the meticulous rhetorical structure of the text as a whole). If this interpretation is correct, “my life” — an expression unique within the *Hippocratic Corpus*, like many words and phrases in the *Oath* — refers to a totality that might include one’s habitual way of making a living but comprises much more.

<sup>45</sup> E.g., “whatever I may see or hear in treatment or *even without treatment* ( $\epsilonν θεραπείη ... \eta καὶ ἀνευ θεραπηής$ ) *in the life of human beings*” (IV p. 630,16-17 L. = p. 5,5-6 Heib.). So too the reference to “sexual acts *both* upon women’s bodies *and* upon men’s, *both* of the free *and* of slaves” ( $\epsilonπι τε γυναικείων σωμάτων καὶ ἀνδρείων ἐλευθέρων τε καὶ δούλων$ , p. 630,14-15 L. = p. 5,3-4 Heib.) seems to be a comprehensive statement extending beyond patients, as does the concluding prayer for a good reputation “among *all* human beings ( $\deltaοξαζομένω παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις$ ) in eternity” (p. 632,2-3 L. = p. 5,9-10 Heib.).

Ample external support for this interpretation comes from uses of 'life' and, in particular, of the expression 'my life' (ὁ ἐμὸς βίος, ὁ βίος ὁ ἐμός, ὁ βίος ὁ ἐμαυτοῦ, and similar phrases) in Greek literature of the classical period, to refer to a consistent manner of living one's life or to the series of coherently related and consistently shaped habitual activities and experiences that constitute a person's 'life' and hence provide him or her with a distinct moral character and identity. While ancient Greek authors do occasionally use 'my life' to refer to 'my livelihood'<sup>46</sup> or to 'my life-time' ('the duration of my life')<sup>47</sup> or to 'my life' as opposed to 'my death'<sup>48</sup>, it is used more often in the sense I have proposed, frequently with the implication of 'my character' as it is manifested in 'my way of living'. Aeschines, for example, in his oration *On the Embassy* (343 B.C.) appeals to his audience on the basis of his character: "Of my life (τοῦ ἐμοῦ βίου) and my daily way of living (τῆς καθ' ἡμέραν διαίτης) I think you are competent judges"<sup>49</sup>. Similarly, Isocrates, looking back at the age of eighty-two, says in his oration *Antidosis* (354/353 B.C.) that he discovered to his surprise in his recent trial that his 'life', which explicitly includes his character, was badly misunderstood by many. He therefore sets out to "show clearly, to them and to posterity, the character I have and the life I live and the educational culture to which I am devoted"<sup>50</sup>. And referring to his accusers, he alludes to "many differences I could mention between my life (τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐμοῦ) and theirs"<sup>51</sup>, observing that "when I was indicted, I scrutinized these very things, as each of you would have done, and examined my life (τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ) and my actions"<sup>52</sup>. So too Plato's Socrates

<sup>46</sup> E.g., LYS. 24, 5; AR. *Pax* 1212 (*bios* is linked with *techne* in both passages).

<sup>47</sup> E.g., PLAT. *Phd.* 108 d 7-8.

<sup>48</sup> E.g., SOPH. *El.* 207, 768. Cf. EUR. *Hec.* 213 (but Wilamowitz athetised this passage).

<sup>49</sup> AESCHIN. 2, 146.

<sup>50</sup> ISOC. 15 (*Antid.*), 6.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 42 (see also 44).

<sup>52</sup> ISOC. 15 (*Antid.*), 141. In Aristophanes' *Plutus* βίος might be used in a similar sense in Poverty's response to the chorus' description of a life lived in poverty: "You have not described my life (τὸν ἐμὸν βίον) but hammered on the

observes in the *Gorgias*: “The enquiry about those things, Callicles, with which you have reproached me, is the most beautiful: what kind of person a man should be, and what he should pursue, and up to what point... For I want you to know that, if in my own life (κατὰ τὸν βίον τὸν ἐμαυτοῦ) I act in a way that is not right in any respect, I do not err (ἐξαμαρτάνω) willingly but due to my ignorance...”<sup>53</sup>

Also when not qualified by the possessive pronoun ‘my’, *bios* is well attested in the meaning ‘manner of life’, ‘mode of living’. Perhaps the best known examples occur in Plato and in Aristotle. In Plato’s *Laws* the Athenian stranger puts the question, “What, and how many, are the lives (βίοι, ‘ways of life’) with reference to which a person [by making the right choices] must... live as happily as a human being possibly can?”<sup>54</sup> His answer includes: “The temperate life is one, and so is the wise life, and the courageous life and... the healthy life”<sup>55</sup>. Aristotle’s use of *bios* in his famous threefold division of “lives” — there are two versions: (a) the life of enjoyment, the political life, and the theoretical life<sup>56</sup> or (b) the practical, political, and theoretical lives<sup>57</sup> — belongs to the same band of the semantic spectrum of *bios*. Hippocratic authors, too, seem to use ‘life’ in this sense, for example: “Among epileptics, changes effect relief for the young, especially changes of age, of places, and of [ways of] life (βίων)”<sup>58</sup>. There is, therefore, ample evidence for the use both of ‘my life’ and of ‘life’ in the sense proposed above.

Τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν: if the above interpretation of “my life” is accepted, “my *techne*” — which, like the expression “my life”, occurs nowhere else in the classical treatises of the *Hippocratic*

life of beggars” (548); a scholiast already explained “my life” in this verse as “my way of living” (τὴν ἐμήν διαγωγήν, p. 354 a 18-19 Dübner).

<sup>53</sup> PLAT. *Grg.* 487 e 7-488 a 4.

<sup>54</sup> PLAT. *Lg.* 5, 733 d 6-e 3.

<sup>55</sup> *Lg.* 5, 733 e 3-5.

<sup>56</sup> ARIST. *EN* 1, 3, 1095 b 14-19; cf. *EE* 1, 4, 1215 a 35-b 5.

<sup>57</sup> ARIST. *Pol.* 7, 2, 1324 a 25-32.

<sup>58</sup> HP. *Aph.* 2, 45 (IV p. 482 L.). Cf. *Vict.* 3, 69 (VI p. 604, 20-22 L. = *CMG* I 2,4, p. 200,23-25 Joly/Byl).

*Corpus* — clarifies that not only the oath-taker's general mode of living, as a whole, but also his manner of practising his professional expertise will come under the continuously watchful care expressed by "I shall guard" (διατηρήσω). In the *Hippocratic Corpus* *techne* tends to refer to a result-oriented professional expertise ('Sachverstand') and a practice in accordance with such expertise. The speaker solemnly promises to make his 'guarding' of this professional knowledge and practice subject to the same guiding principles and constraining qualifications as his mode of living, viz. "in a pure and holy way".

Ἄγνῶς καὶ ὁσίως: this phrase gives rise to two difficult questions: (a) what does it mean to guard something "in a pure and holy way"?, and (b) what, if any, are the implications of ἄγνῶς and ὁσίως for the relation between the physician's professional competence and his personal conduct? When applied to a person, ἄγνός usually means 'pure' in the sense of 'fit to approach the gods by virtue of being uncontaminated or unpolluted'<sup>59</sup>.

<sup>59</sup> See R. PARKER, *Miasma. Pollution and Purification in early Greek Religion* (Oxford 1983), 6, 147-51, 328-31; Ed. WILLIGER, *Hagios. Untersuchungen zur Terminologie des Heiligen in den hellenisch-hellenistischen Religionen*, RGVV 19, 1 (Giessen 1922), 37-72; L. MOULINIER, *Le pur et l'impur dans la pensée des Grecs d'Homère à Aristote*, Études et commentaires 12 (Paris 1952), 270-281; E. BENVENISTE, *Indo-European Language and Society* (London 1973), 465-69; W. FERRARI, "Due note su ἄγνός", in *SIFC* 17 (1940), 33-53; P. CHANTRAINE and O. MASSON, "Sur quelques termes du vocabulaire religieux des Grecs", in *Sprachgeschichte und Wortbedeutung. Festschrift Albert Debrunner* (Bern 1954), 80-107; J.P. VERNANT, *Mythe et société en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1974), 121-40; E. FEHRLE, *Die kultische Keuschheit im Altertum*, RGVV 6 (Giessen 1910), especially 42-54; J. RUDHARDT, *Notions fondamentales de la pensée religieuse et actes constitutifs du culte dans la Grèce classique* (Paris 1992), 38-41, 51; T. WÄCHTER, *Reinheitsvorschriften im griechischen Kult*, RGVV 9,1 (Giessen 1910), *passim*. F. KUDLIEN, "Zwei Interpretationen zum hippokratischen Eid", in *Gesnerus* 35 (1978) 253-63, argues for a non-religious, "popular profane-moral" use of ἄγνῶς in the *Oath* (254-255); previously, however, the same author, "Der hippokratische Eid", in *Aerztliche Ethik. Documenta Geigy* (Basel 1967), 1-2, had depicted "a deeply religious tone" (p. 1) as the most striking feature of the *Oath* and as a feature that "must be taken seriously". Among those who have raised significant objections to Kudlien's later (1978) view are H.M. KOELBING, "Zu Fridolf Kudliens 'Zwei Interpretationen zum hippokratischen Eid'", in *Gesnerus* 36 (1979), 156-158, and K. DEICHGRÄBER, *Der hippokratische Eid* (Stuttgart 1983), 89 n.14.

As Robert Parker, Eduard Williger, Louis Moulinier, Jean Rudhardt, and others have pointed out, in key respects ἄγνος is a negative term, inasmuch as it signifies freedom from any pollution that might preclude entering a god's sanctuary or temple. Being 'pure', in this sense, is also the necessary minimal requirement for a human, if a god is to heed one's prayers (and it should not be overlooked that the *Oath*, significantly, concludes with a prayer:... εἴη ἐπαύρασθαι ...). Ἅγνος thus often denotes an undefiled state which, as such, shows respect for the gods and hence ensures an unruptured relation with them. But if being pure or acting in a pure way is defined negatively as not being polluted or as not committing defiling acts, the question arises, what are such defiling acts, and what are the polluted conditions from which the physician solemnly swears to keep his life (βίος) and his professional expertise (τέχνη) free?

As is well known, Greek sacred laws inscribed at the entrances to religious sanctuaries and temples regulated purity and, in so doing, specified the sources of pollution in considerable detail. Most sacred laws define being 'pure' as being uncontaminated not only by blood-guilt but also by death, birth, sexual intercourse or menstruation and other largely physical, indeed, mostly naturally occurring events<sup>60</sup>. If the Hippocratic *Oath* preserves the traditional religious sense of ἄγνος — as is suggested *prima facie* not only by the *Oath*'s opening invocation of all the gods and goddesses and, as first among them, the purifying god Apollo<sup>61</sup>, but

<sup>60</sup> See, e.g., *LSCG* (Sokolowski), nos. 55, 57, 67, 91, 95, 97, 116, 124, 139, 151, 154, 156, 171; *LSS* nos. 24, 53, 54, 91, 115, 119; *LSA* 12, 51, 84. See also R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, *passim*, especially 176-79, 224-34, 370-74.

<sup>61</sup> Ὁμνύω Ἀπόλλωνα ἵητρὸν καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸν καὶ Τγεταν καὶ Πανάκειαν καὶ θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάσας ἵστορας ποιεύμενος ... (IV p. 628,2-3 L. = p. 4,2-3 Heib.). Apollo is, of course, both healer and purifier, and these two activities stand in a close relation to each other: diseases often were seen as forms of pollution requiring purification, and Apollo thus heals by purifying and purifies by healing. R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 139, aptly comments on these functions of Apollo: "This cleansing function is obviously an aspect of Apollo's healing function, and is therefore likely to be very ancient"; cf. W. BURKERT, *Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche* (Stuttgart 1977), 232. But Apollo not only heals humans from diseases, plagues, etc. (e.g., PAUS. 8, 41, 7-9; 2, 32, 5-6); he

also by its closing prayer<sup>62</sup> — the question arises, exactly what promise does the adverb ἀγνῶς entail? Two primary alternatives, neither entirely satisfactory, suggest themselves: (a) continuously and watchfully to preserve (διατηρήσω) his life and the practice of his professional expertise in such a way as to keep them free of pollution by any contact whatsoever, direct or indirect, with death, blood-guilt, birth, sexual intercourse, and other sources of ritual impurity; or (b) duly to observe obligatory periods of religious and civic exclusion as well as the laws concerning repurification after each involuntary, temporary pollution that might arise through contact with a source of pollution.

The former alternative seems implausible, at least inasmuch as it is wellnigh impossible for a physician to lead such a perfectly 'pure', isolated life. The socio-professional group to which the *Oath* binds its reciter is, after all, not a group of celibate, chaste healing priests living in isolation from normal family life. Rather, he belongs to a group of teacher-practitioners who have families (the offspring of the oath-taker's teacher is emphatically introduced more than once), who visit the homes of patients and others (ἐς οἰκίας δὲ ὄκόσας ἀν ἐσίω), and who encounter the temptation of sexual acts (ἀφροδισίων ἔργα) with both genders and with all social classes, as the *Oath* explicitly acknowledges. The second alternative seems unsatisfactory as well, inasmuch as it would not valorise the oath-taker as different from other members of Greek society, all of whom also are subject to local laws governing pollution, exclusion, and purity at each

also is a dangerous, even lethal, opponent, inflicting diseases and plagues upon humans as vengeance or punishment, and an oath sworn by Apollo therefore is perilous if not fulfilled: the τἀναντία that would result from perjury (ἐπιορκοῦντι, παραβαίνοντι, IV p. 632,4 L. = p. 5,10 Heib.) could well include, paradoxically, the diseased healer. For this 'destructive' side of Apollo see, e.g., HOM. *Il.* 1, 93-100; APOLLOD. *Bibl.* 2, 5, 9. Cf. also AESCHYL. *Eu.* 60-84; SOPH. *OT* 68-72; PLAT. *Cra.* 405 a 6-c 1; *LSS* (Sokolowski), 115 A 1-7; AR. *Av.* 584, *Pl.* 11, *Ach.* 1212; ALEXIS comicus, fr. 129, *ap.* ATH. 9, 383 d-e = *PCG II* pp. 92-93; CALL. *Ap.* 42-46; PLAT. *Symp.* 197 a 6-b 2; *Inscr. Cret.* II xix 7, 1; PAUS. 1, 3, 4.

<sup>62</sup> Ὁρκον μὲν οὖν μοι τόνδε ἐπιτελέα ποιέοντι, καὶ μὴ ξυγχέοντι, εἴη ἐπαύρασθαι καὶ βίου καὶ τέχνης δοξαζομένω παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον (IV p. 632,1-2 L. = p. 5,8-10 Heib.).

sanctuary. A third, related possibility has been suggested to me, namely to ascribe conative force to the verb: “I will *try* to guard...” (i.e., ‘knowing full well that I shall occasionally be living in an involuntary, temporary state of not being pure’). This is, however, not an adequate solution either, first, because of the binding nature of oaths, which do not simply ‘promise to *try*’ but rather ‘swear to *do*’ (or not to do) something. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the future tense (*διατηρήσω*) here imposes a different level or degree of constraint upon the oath-taker than the future tense in several other sections of the *Oath*, which all seem to offer absolute, strong, unqualified sworn commitments. The dominant, traditional uses of *ἄγνος* therefore yield difficulties when applied to the *Oath*. A satisfactory solution might be beyond the reach of a modern reader, but some interpretive progress can be made, first, by exploring the other adverb in this central sentence, *ὅσιως*, “in a holy way”, and then by examining the relation between ‘pure’ and ‘holy’.

“In a holy way” is a customary yet problematic and, also given the polysemous nature of the English word ‘holy’, even evasive translation of *ὅσιως*. In classical Greek *ὅσιος* has the basic sense of ‘permitted or enjoined or sanctioned by the gods’, ‘not forbidden by divine law’, or ‘inoffensive to the gods’<sup>63</sup>. It hence often is used of profane things which may be done, said, dwelt in, associated with, or used freely without offense to the gods. In these uses its sense is clarified, as several scholars have recognized, by its recurrent opposition to *ἱερός* (‘sacred’) and to *δίκαιος* (‘just’)<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> On *ὅσιος* see J. RUDHARDT, *op.cit.* (n. 59 *supra*), 30-37, 43-44, 167-68, 234-235; M.H.A.L.H. VAN DER VALK, “Zum Worte *ὅσιος*”, in *Mnemosyne* 10 (1942), 113-40; W.J. TERSTEGEN, *Εὐσεβής en ὅσιος in het grieksche taalgebruik na de IVe eeuw* (Diss. Utrecht, 1941); J.C. BOLKESTEIN, “Οσιος en εὐσεβής” (Diss. Utrecht, 1936); E. BENVENISTE, *op.cit.* (n. 59 *supra*), 461-65; R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 330; A.D. NOCK, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World*, ed. by Zeph STEWART (Oxford 1986), I 420 n. 43, 427, 485; L. MOULINIER, *op.cit.*, 285-95; Ed. WILLIGER, *op.cit.*, 52-61, especially 58 n. 2; Sir Kenneth DOVER, *Greek Popular Morality in the time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford/Berkeley 1974), 248, 252-53.

<sup>64</sup> For the contrast *ὅσιος-ἱερός* see, e.g., THUC. 2, 52; PLAT. *Resp.* 1, 344 a 6-b 7, *Lg.* 9, 857 b 5; ISOC. 7, 66; DEM. 24,9; 24,120; HYP. fr. 32. (For *ὅσιος* vs. *δίκαιος*

‘Ιερός, often also translated ‘holy’ but perhaps better rendered by ‘sacred’, refers to divine ownership or origin, and it hence often entails restrictions in the use of, or association with, an object or a person<sup>65</sup>. Whereas τὸ ὅσιον is divinely sanctioned but profane and can be used freely and with impunity, a wholly free use of, or association with, τὰ ιερά or οἱ ιεροί, with ‘sacred’ things or persons or places, is not permitted to humans by gods. The ‘sacred’, ιερόν, includes consecrated objects (altars, statues, votive offerings), temples, sacrifices or sacrificial victims, taboo animals, things manifesting supernatural or divine power (including natural phenomena such as rivers, springs or the ocean), rites, and places under divine protection<sup>66</sup>. The ‘holy’, ὅσιον, by contrast, includes non-sacred or secular public and private buildings, the divinely permitted but not sacred material possessions of a city or of an individual, a lawful place for giving birth or for dying (both of which were forbidden on ‘sacred’ ground), and things which one may say or think without arousing the resentment or anger of the gods<sup>67</sup>.

see below, notes 68, 69). See also J. RUDHARDT, *op.cit.*, 7, 21, 30, 32-33, 34-36, 41, 51; J.C. BOLKESTEIN, *op.cit.*, 168-178; K. LATTE, *Heiliges Recht* (Tübingen 1920), 55 n. 16, 75 n. 40, 114; R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 151-52. H. JEANMAIRE, “Le substantif *hosia* et sa signification comme terme technique dans le vocabulaire religieux”, in *REG* 58 (1945), 66-89, argues that, in addition to the senses traced above, the noun ὅσια is also a technical term for a divinely sanctioned rite of desacralisation (a meaning compatible with the interpretation of ὅσιως offered here).

<sup>65</sup> See E. BENVENISTE, *op.cit.*, 456-61; J. RUDHARDT, *op.cit.*, 7, 12, 13, 16-17, 21-30, 32-39, 41, 43-45, 53, 136-37, 141-42, 148, 169-70, 172-73, 211, 215, 217-18, 223-31, 290-300; W. BURKERT, *op.cit.*, 402-403.

<sup>66</sup> See J. RUDHARDT, *op.cit.*, 12, 13, 16-17, 23-24, 26-28, 34-36, 39, 50, 141-42, 160, 172-73, 189, 203, 211, 214, 231, 264, 268, 271-75, 283, 288, 292-96; R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 151-52.

<sup>67</sup> E.g., ISOC. 7, 66 (buildings?); AR. *Lys.* 743 (a place for giving birth); HDT. 9, 79 (contents of speaking); EMPEDOCLES, *Vorsokr.* 31 B 3,2 (of mouths out of which utterances are poured; transmitted by S.E. *Adv. log.* 1, 125); SOPH. *Ph.* 662 (contents of an utterance); EUR. *El.* 1203 (objects of thought). “Οσιος can also be applied to a person who is religious or devout or pious and hence does not give offense to the gods; in this application to persons, ‘holy’ often is very close to ‘pure’ (ἀγνός), since pollution is offensive to the gods while purity is pleasing to them. See nn. 78, 92 below.

A second recurrent contrast, between ὅσιος and δίκαιος, makes a further useful contribution to the semantic delimitation of ὅσιος. In this contrast, δίκαιος tends to denote that which it is permissible, lawful, and right to do in relation to other human beings, whereas ὅσιος refers to that which it is allowable to do in relation to divinities. At times, the two words appear together in formulations strikingly similar to the one used in the *Oath*. In Plato's eschatological myth about the final judgment in his *Gorgias*, for example, Socrates remarks to Callicles: "There was, then, the following law (νόμος) concerning human beings at the time of Cronus, and to this day it still exists among the gods: that, among humans, the one who passes through his life (βίον) in a just and holy way (δίκαιώς . . . καὶ ὁσίως) goes away, when he has died, to the islands of the blessed and lives there in complete happiness free from evils, whereas the one who did so in an unjust and godless way (ἀδίκως καὶ ἀθέως), goes into the prison of punishment and of justice which they call Tartarus"<sup>68</sup>; the oppositions δίκαιώς — ἀδίκως and ὁσίως — ἀθέως seem to confirm the suggestion made above. Similarly, in Plato's *Laws* the Athenian stranger says that, until they breed children, the citizens of the good state, like "birds and many other animals", should live "unmated, undefiled, unpolluted (ἀγνοί) by marriage, but when they have come to the age for this, when male has coupled with female according to their pleasure, and female with male, they live the rest of the time in a holy and just way (ὁσίως καὶ δίκαιώς), remaining firmly steadfast in their initial agreement of love"<sup>69</sup>. In both these Platonic examples, ὁσίως seems to refer to the conduct of human life in relation to divinities, while δίκαιώς refers to human conduct in relation to other humans

<sup>68</sup> PLAT. *Grg.* 523 a 5-b 4. See also ANTIPO 1, 25; PLAT. *Politic.* 301 d 2, *Euthphr.* 6 e 10-7 a 3 (vs. 12 c 10-e 8); DEM. 43, 65; THUC. 5, 104; PLB. 22, 10, 8. But cf. D.L. 7, 119 (on the Stoics). See J. RUDHARDT, *op.cit.*, 30, 32, 36; A.D. NOCK, *op.cit.*, I 420 n. 43; 427.

<sup>69</sup> PLAT. *Lg.* 6, 777 d 7-e 2; 8, 840 d 4-e 2; *Resp.* 6, 496 d 9-e 1.

(the second passage, furthermore, confirms the traditional use of ἀγνός traced above)<sup>70</sup>.

These distinctions between ὅσιος and δίκαιος might be at work in the *Oath* too. If so, the oath-taker's promise to watch over his life and profession ὅσιως, "in a holy way", refers to his interaction with the secular and profane domain as it affects his relation to the gods, whereas his subsequent undertaking to remain "far from all voluntary, destructive injustice" (ἐκτὸς ἐών πάσης ἀδικίης ἔκουσης καὶ φθορίης) focuses on his relation to humans. This interpretation is supported by a vivid social contrast between the sections of the *Oath* in which ὅσιως and ἐκτὸς ἀδικίης, respectively, appear. Where 'injustice' or 'justice' is at stake in the *Oath*, numerous other human beings are introduced to evoke the human sphere in its motley fullness: houses, the ill, women's bodies, men's bodies, the free, and slaves<sup>71</sup>. By contrast, where holiness and purity are at issue, a lone human individual appears, his solitary agency in the face of divine expectations underscored by his emphatically reflexive ("my life, my techne") sworn promise in the first-person singular ("I will guard"). A person who is ὅσιος or acts ὅσιως accordingly does not give offense to the gods, thereby pleasing them and thus being 'pious' or 'devout', even as he or she deals with the profane and the secular, whether in private life or in professional activity. But this still leaves the relation of ὅσιως to ἀγνῶς unresolved.

While purity and holiness are not unrelated, we have seen that they cover partly unrelated, even dissimilar semantic fields.

<sup>70</sup> The antithesis 'holy'-'lawful' (ὅσιος-νόμιμος) functions in a closely similar way: things sanctioned by divine law, including profane objects or places and secular actions, are ὅσια, whereas things conforming to human custom or law are νόμιμα ('lawful', 'legitimate', or 'legal'); e.g., AR. *Thesm.* 675-76; PLAT. *Lg.* 7, 799 b 4-8; 9, 861 d 4; cf. EUR. *Supp.* 40, *Hipp.* 1081. The distinction is still used in later antiquity, e.g., IAMB. *VP* 32, 232.

<sup>71</sup> E.g., ἐς οἰκίας δὲ ὄκόσας ἀν ἐσίω, ἐσελεύσομαι ἐπ' ὀφελείη καμνόντων, ἐκτὸς ἐών πάσης ἀδικίης ἔκουσης καὶ φθορίης τῆς τε ἄλλης καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἔργων ἐπὶ τε γυναικείων σωμάτων καὶ ἀνδρείων, ἐλευθέρων τε καὶ δούλων (IV p. 630, 12-15 L. = p. 5, 1-4 Heib.).

It is perhaps for this reason that, contrary to the claims of Karl Deichgräber and others, ἀγνός and ὅσιος only very rarely appear coupled in the archaic and classical periods<sup>72</sup>. A particularly striking and possibly pertinent instance occurs in an elegiac couplet inscribed over the entrance to the temple of Asclepius at Epidaurus: “Pure (ἀγνός) must be the person who goes inside the fragrant temple/ And purity (ἀγνεία) is to think holy thoughts (ὅσια φρονεῖν)”<sup>73</sup>.

These verses were cited approvingly by Theophrastus in his lost treatise *On Piety*<sup>74</sup>, and they therefore were composed no later than the early fourth century B.C. or, as Theodor Preger suggested<sup>75</sup>, perhaps as early as 420 B.C. Although the second line, in particular, lends itself to appropriation both by philosophical ethics (hence its transmission by Theophrastus and Porphyry) and to Christian morality (hence Clement of Alexandria's interpretation of the verses as a Christian riddle<sup>76</sup>), it should be kept in mind that the couplet originated in a classical Greek

<sup>72</sup> On the ‘opposition’ between ‘pure’ (ἀγνός) and ‘holy’ (ὅσιος) see also J. RUDHARDT, *op.cit.*, 41, 51 (and on the relation of ‘holy’ to pollution and impurity see 42-43, 48); R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 12, 151, 323; L. MOULINIER, *op.cit.*, 270-294, especially 285-294.

<sup>73</sup> Ἀγνὸν χρή ναοῖ θυωδέος ἐντὸς ιόντα / ἔμμεναι· ἀγνεία δ' ἐστὶ φρονεῖν ὅσια. The couplet is cited by CLEM.AL. *Strom.* 5, 1, 13, 3 (GCS 52,2, p. 334,24-25 Stählin-Früchtel), and by PORPH. *Abst.* 2, 19, 5. Throughout this part of *On abstinence* Porphyry draws on Theophrastus' *On Piety*; see W.W. FORTENBAUGH, P.M. HUBY, R.W. SHARPLES, D. GUTAS (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1992), Part II, 404-433 (texts 584 A-D), with the Epidaurian couplet on 414-415. CLEM.AL. *Strom.* 4, 22, 142, 1 (p. 311,2 Stählin-Früchtel) also quotes the second line of the couplet. See also CYRILL. *Contra Julianum* 9, 310 (PG 76, 977 B-C), from Porphyry. Theodor PREGER (ed.), *Inscriptiones Graecae metricae* (Leipzig 1891), no. 207 (p. 164), dates the inscription to 420 B.C., whereas J. BOUFFARTIGUE (ed.), *Porphyre. De l'abstinence* II (CUF, Paris 1979), 206, apparently accepts 370 B.C. as a plausible date. See also E.J. and L. EDELSTEIN, *Asclepius* (Baltimore 1945), I 163-64 (T318), 177-78 (7336), and II 118, 126-27, 137-38, 149, 242; R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 322-27.

<sup>74</sup> See W.W. FORTENBAUGH *et al.* (eds.), *op.cit.*, text 584; J. BERNAYS, *Theophrastos' Schrift über Frömmigkeit* (Berlin 1866; repr. Hildesheim 1979), 62-78; W. PÖTSCHER, Theophrastos. ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑΣ, *Philosophia Antiqua*, 11 (Leiden 1964), fr. 9 (pp. 162-64), and p. 104.

<sup>75</sup> See n. 73 above.

<sup>76</sup> See n. 73.

religious context — the context in which ἀγνός and ὁσιος initially were most at home. In key respects their use at Epidaurus is consistent with the classical meanings sketched above: after all, being pure (ἀγνός, i.e., free from pollution) is a common requirement for entry into sacred places, and interacting with profane things in a ‘holy’ way (i.e., in a way that is sanctioned by the gods) is essential for one’s unruptured relation to the gods.

However, the second line of the Epidaurian couplet restricts purity to the realm of thought, whereas most Greek sanctuaries define being ‘pure’ as being uncontaminated by largely physical events, as indicated above. At Epidaurus, to be pure is to think holy things (ὁσια), that is, to fill one’s mind and one’s understanding with thoughts that are not offensive to Asclepius (or pleasing to him or allowed and expected by him). While the application of ὁσιος to the content of one’s thoughts is not unique — as pointed out above, ‘holy’ can qualify not only objects, places, and actions but also thought and speech<sup>77</sup> — the Epidaurian couplet’s restriction of purity to thought (φρονεῖν) and its integral fusion of the realm of the holy (ὁσια) with that of purity (ἀγνεία) are as unusual as is the close association of ἀγνῶς and ὁσιῶς in the *Oath*.

The verses at Epidaurus thus not only link two concepts that traditionally covered quite different domains but, in a striking innovation, also define the one in terms of the other. This move represents what Robert Parker has aptly characterised as the “moralisation of ritual purity”<sup>78</sup> — and, one might add, the

<sup>77</sup> See, for example, EUR. *El.* 1203, where the same expression — “to think holy thoughts” (ὁσια φρονεῖν) — is used. See also nn. 67, 78.

<sup>78</sup> R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 323; similarly, E. FEHRLE, *op.cit.* (n. 59 above), 50-51. Parker points out that another Greek word for ‘pure’, καθαρός, begins to be used with moral, and not only ritual, implications, much earlier than ἀγνός. This is amply documented by Moulinier’s earlier examination (*op.cit.*, 168-176) of “la pureté intellectuelle” or “la pureté de l’intelligence”, notably in Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Euripides, where καθαρός, not ἀγνός, is by far the more common term. On ‘pure/impure’ in thought or in mind or in soul see also AR. *Ra.* 355 (pure in γνώμη); EUR. *Hipp.* 317 (pure hands vs. a polluted mind, φρήν, as in *Or.* 1604); PLAT. *Cra.* 404 a 1 (ψυχὴ καθαρά); *Resp.* 10, 496 d, 611 c 3

internalisation and intellectualisation of purity. Here purity and impurity are no longer dependent upon external physical events and circumstances (such as birth, death, homicide, sexual intercourse, ritual washing, and clothing), over some of which human beings exercise little or no control. Rather, purity here — as in philosophical traditions — is internalised as a condition characterised by a certain kind of mental life over which one has some control and for which one consequently is responsible. The Epidaurian inscription seems to have become known quite widely, since it appears in various refractions at other cult sites. An inscription from Mytilene on Lesbos, for example, prescribes: “Pure (ἀγνόν) one should approach the sanctuary, thinking holy thoughts (ὅσια φρονέοντα)”, and at Rhodes “he who goes inside the fragrant temple must be pure (ἀγνόν), pure not through a bath but in mind (νόω καθαρόν)”<sup>79</sup>. But does the Epidaurian inscription, which apparently confronted everyone who wished to enter Asclepius’ most popular and influential sanctuary, have any implications for the central section of the *Hippocratic Oath*?

The resonances between the inscription and the *Oath* are evident and conceivably significant. They extend beyond the unusual coupling of ἀγνός and ὁσιος. Both texts belong to a healing tradition. Both have a strong religious dimension: the inscription

(καθαρόν); *Lg.* 4, 716 e 2-3 (καθαρός in soul), *Politic.* 227 c 2-6, 230 c 3-d 4; *XEN. Symp.* 1, 4 (purified in soul); *LSS* (Sokolowski), nos. 91, 5; 59, 13; 82; 86, 3; 108, 6-7; id., *LSCG* 139, 3-7 (καθαρός in hands and in thought, γνώμη); *Ps. PHOCYL. Sent.* 228, in D. YOUNG (ed.), *Theognis* (BT, Leipzig 1961), p. 112; *Anthologia Graeca (Palatina)* 14, 71; 14, 74. See also T. WÄCHTER, *op.cit.* (n. 59 above), 8. *DIOD.SIC.* 10, 9, 6, ascribes to Pythagoras the idea that those who go to sacrifice should have not only a body that is pure (καθαρόν) of every unjust deed but also a soul that is pure (ἀγνεύουσαν). On the importance of such a ‘moralised’ and ‘intellectualised’ version of purity within Plato’s thought see L. MOULINIER, *op.cit.*, 323-410; A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris 1950), 123-156 (“*La κάθαρσις*”).

<sup>79</sup> *IG XII Suppl.* no. 23 (Mytilene): ἀγνὸν πρὸς τέμενος στείχειν ὁσια φρονέοντα. *LSS* no. 108, 4-6 (Rhodes, first century A.D.): ἀγνὸν χρὴ ναοῖο θ[υ]άδεος ἐντὸς ἴοντ[α] ἔνμεναι· οὐ λοιποι ἀλλὰ νόωι καθαρόν (F. SOKOLOWSKI, *LSS*, p. 177, suggests that the cult regulated by this sacred law may have been a joint cult of Asclepius and Sarapis).

describes a condition for participating in the religious life of a cult, while the *Oath* is witnessed by all the gods and all the goddesses (θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάσας ἴστορας ποιεύμενος), upon whom the blessings that flow from fulfilling the oath (ὅρκον μὲν τόνδε ἐπιτελέα ποιέοντι ... εἴη ἐπαύρασθαι ...) or the curse entailed by perjury (παραβάνοντι δὲ καὶ ἐπιορκοῦντι τάναντία τουτέων) depends. Moreover, for their authority both texts depend in great measure on the god Asclepius: through the inscription at Epidaurus, Asclepius admits or excludes humans from his temple, and in the *Oath* Asclepius stands as a central judge, flanked by his father Apollo on one side and his daughters Health and Panacea on the other (in a striking parallel to the oath-taker at the human level, who stands as the generational center-piece between teacher-parents and pupil-sons)<sup>80</sup>.

Furthermore, both the inscription and the *Oath* make human cognitive activity central to their expectations (this, too, is a point neglected in modern scholarship). The Hippocratic oath-taker's promissory self-vision prominently includes numerous cognitive acts, such as making distinctions and passing judgments<sup>81</sup>, engaging in analogical reasoning<sup>82</sup>, teaching and learning<sup>83</sup>, lecturing and sharing precepts with students<sup>84</sup>, avoiding giving certain kinds of advice<sup>85</sup>, being alert and continuously

<sup>80</sup> Cf. the three generations of gods in the opening sentence (see n. 61 above) and the subsequent introduction of three human generations (τὸν διδάξαντά με .... ἵσα γενέτησιν ἐμοῖσιν.... καὶ γένος τὸ ἔξ αὐτοῦ.... νιοῖσι τε ἐμοῖσι καὶ τοῖσι τοῦ ἐμὲ διδάξαντος (HP. IV p. 628, 2-630, 4 L. = p. 4, 1-11 Heib.).

<sup>81</sup> E.g., "my judgment" (χρίσιν ἐμήν) significantly occurs twice in the *Oath* (IV p. 628, 4; p. 630, 7 L. = p. 4, 4; p. 4, 14 Heib.). See also n. 82 (ἐπικρινέειν).

<sup>82</sup> E.g., drawing an analogy between teacher and parents (ἥγήσασθαι ... ἵσα γενέτησιν, IV p. 628, 5-6 L. = p. 4, 5 Heib.) and between the teacher's children and one's own brothers (ἀδελφοῖς ἵσον ἐπικρινέειν ἄρρεσι, p. 630, 1 L. = p. 4, 7 Heib.).

<sup>83</sup> Τὸν διδάξαντά με, διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην, μανθάνειν, τοῦ ἐμὲ διδάξαντος, μαθηταῖσι (p. 628, 5; p. 630, 1,2,4 L. = p. 4, 5,8,10-11 Heib.).

<sup>84</sup> Ἀκρόησις (p. 630, 3 L. = p. 4, 9 Heib.) seems to refer to lectures, as it does in *Praec.* 12 (IX p. 266, 16 L.), while μάθησις (p. 630, 3 L. = p. 4, 9-10 Heib.) could refer to 'lessons' or forms of learning that consist neither of lectures nor of the transmission of rules or precepts.

<sup>85</sup> Οὐδὲ ὑφηγήσομαι ξυμβουλίην τοιήνδε (p. 630, 8-9 L. = p. 4, 15-16 Heib.).

watchful<sup>86</sup>, distinguishing between intentional or voluntary and unintentional or involuntary injustice<sup>87</sup>, hearing and seeing things and deciding about which of these he should remain silent<sup>88</sup>, reflecting on the consequences of either fulfilling his oath or committing perjury<sup>89</sup>, and so on. In short, the oath-taker envisions himself not only as an agent (or a potential agent) performing deeds<sup>90</sup> or refraining from acting<sup>91</sup>, but also as a cognitive being, reasoning, discerning, hearing, seeing, differentiating, deciding, judging, comparing, anticipating, and so on. His *techne* depends decisively on these cognitive activities; indeed, in great measure they are constitutive of his expertise, and they too therefore must be covered by the pledge to guard his *techne* “in a pure and holy way” — just as the participant in Asclepius’ cult must be ‘pure’ by keeping his cognitive life ‘holy’.

The many resonances between the Epidaurian couplet and the Hippocratic *Oath* therefore suggest that the two texts might

<sup>86</sup> Διατηρήσω (p. 630, 10 L. = p. 4, 18 Heib.) refers above all to a mental activity (whether such mental activity is applied to a physical, material, moral, religious or other sphere).

<sup>87</sup> Ἐκτὸς ἐών πάσης ἀδικίης ἔκουσίης (p. 630, 13 L. = p. 5, 2 Heib.).

<sup>88</sup> Α δ’ ἀν ἐν θεραπείη ἡ ἵδω ἡ ἀκούσω ἡ καὶ ἀνευ θεραπηίης κατὰ βίου ἀνθρώπων, ἀ μὴ χρή ποτε ἐκλαλέεσθαι ἔξω, σιγήσομαι, ἀρρητα ἡγεύμενος εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα (p. 630,15 — p. 632,1 L. = p. 5, 5-7 Heib.).

<sup>89</sup> Ορκον μὲν οὖν μοι τόνδε ἐπιτελέα ποιέοντι, καὶ μὴ ξυγχέοντι, εἴη ἐπαύρασθαι καὶ βίου καὶ τέχνης δοξαζομένω παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον παραβαίνοντι δὲ καὶ ἐπιορκοῦντι, τάνατία τουτέων (p. 632, 1-4 L. = p. 5, 8-10 Heib.).

<sup>90</sup> E.g., as a therapeutic agent: διαιτήμασί τε χρήσομαι ἐπ’ ὠφελείη καμνόντων (p. 630, 6 L. = p. 4, 13 Heib.), ἐσελεύσομαι ἐπ’ ὠφελείη καμνόντων (p. 630, 12-13 L. = p. 5, 1 Heib.), ἀ δ’ ἀν ἐν θεραπείη ἡ ἵδω ἡ ἀκούσω ... (p. 630, 15-16 L. = p. 5, 5-6 Heib.); and as a pedagogic agent: διδάξειν τὴν τέχνην ταύτην (p. 630, 1 L. = p. 4, 8 Heib.), παραγγελίης τε καὶ ἀκροήσιος καὶ τῆς λοιπῆς ἀπάσης μαθήσιος μετάδοσιν ποιήσασθαι υἱοῖσι τε ἐμοῖσι καὶ τοῖσι τοῦ ἐμὲ διδάξαντος καὶ μαθηταῖσι συγγεγραμμένοις τε καὶ ὀρκισμένοις νόμῳ ἱητρικῷ (p. 630, 2-5 L. = p. 4, 9-11 Heib.).

<sup>91</sup> E.g., ἐπὶ δηλήσει δὲ καὶ ἀδικίῃ εἰρῆσεν (p. 630, 7 L. = p. 4, 14 Heib.), οὐ δώσω ... οὐδὲ ὑφηγήσομαι ..., οὐδὲ ... δώσω (p. 630, 7-10 L. = p. 4, 15-17 Heib.), οὐ τεμέω (p. 630, 11 L. = p. 4, 19 Heib.), ἐκτὸς ἐών πάσης ἀδικίης ἔκουσίης καὶ φθορίης τῆς τε ἀλλῆς καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἔργων ... (p. 630, 13-14 L. = p. 5, 2-3 Heib.), ἀ μὴ χρή ποτε ἐκλαλέεσθαι ἔξω, σιγήσομαι ... (p. 630, 17 L. = p. 5, 6 Heib.).

be deploying ἀγνός and ὅσιος in similar ways. Indeed, this close association of these two oft divergent concepts — achieved in the *Oath* by introducing them as terms with parallel functions and values, at Asclepius' temple by the startling definition of the one in terms of the other — is so rare in the classical period that modern scholars inevitably have speculated that one influenced the other. At the very least, the inscription seems to offer invaluable confirmation, first, that ἀγνός in the *Oath* need not be understood in terms of traditional forms of ritual purity; secondly, that ἀγνός — and not only the more popular καθαρός — can cover mental activity and cognitive conditions (φρονεῖν); third, that ἀγνός can be used in a moral, and not only in a physical, ritual sense; and, finally, that purity (ἀγνεία), in this new sense, and holiness (ὅσια), in its traditional sense, were significant concepts in the most influential of classical Greek healing cults. While ἀγνός and ὅσιος also appear in proximity to one another in a few other Greek texts of the classical epoch<sup>92</sup>, these tend to confirm the traditional uses of the words and not to contribute as much as the verses from Asclepius' cult to a plausible understanding of the sentence in the *Oath*.

These explorations of the words that constitute the structural centre of the Hippocratic *Oath* suggest that the oath-taker offers a profoundly moral pledge which covers not only his professional conduct but also his life as a whole, and hence his private,

<sup>92</sup> E.g., AR. *Ra.* 325-36; Aristotle's epigram for a Delphic statue of Hermias (the philosopher-tyrant of Atarneus), DIOG.LAERT. 5, 6; CRATES THEB. fr. 1, 10-11 Diehl; EUR. *IT* 1036-1040 (ὅσιον, ἀγνίσται), 1191-94; *Hyps.* fr. 60, 28-35 (p. 41 Bond); PLAT. *Lg.* 6, 782 c 1-d 1; 8, 840 d 5-e 1; XEN. *Ages.* 11, 2: Agesilaus never ceased to chant the refrain that he thought the gods take pleasure no less in 'holy' (ὅσιοις) deeds than in 'pure' (ἀγνοῖς) temples; LSS 154 A 21-25 (on which see R. PARKER, *op.cit.*, 336-38). Although some authors tried to do away with the traditional meanings of these and related terms (see, e.g., DIOG.LAERT. 7, 119 on Stoics), the traditional usage survived throughout the Hellenistic period and until later antiquity; see, e.g., *Anthologia Graeca* 16, 272: a certain Iamblichus (a physician?) reached old age 'pure' of (ἀγνός, i.e., unpolluted by) sexual exchanges, and not even 'holy' profits (ὅσιοις, i.e., divinely permitted profits that are inoffensive to the gods) did he spread over his hands. See also nn. 67, 78, 79 above.

personal conduct. He commits himself under oath to a way of life ('my *βίος*') free of any personal moral defilement (*άγνωσ*) that might cause a rupture in his relation with the gods, and, at the same time, a way of life free of offense to the gods in his interactions with the profane sphere (*δσίως*). And the same commitment explicitly covers his practice of his professional expertise ('my *τέχνη*'). Both 'life' and *techne* here thus seem to designate referents much larger than the domains covered by the controversial negative promises concerning "deadly drugs", a "destructive pessary", and "cutting" that immediately precede and follow this central section (i.e., larger than the relatively narrow spheres to which some interpreters have tried to restrict the central pledge offered in this sentence<sup>93</sup>). As in the Hellenistic and Roman inscriptions cited above (Parts I and II), neither 'life' nor '*techne*' here is limited to such strictly specified activities; each is used with no qualifier other than the profoundly personal yet comprehensively inclusive 'my'.

<sup>93</sup> L. EDELSTEIN, *op.cit.*, 5-6, 15-20, for example, interprets the sentence ("In a pure and holy way I will guard my life and my *techne*") only as an explanatory elaboration upon what he calls the "regulations" or "interdictions" or "rules concerning poison and abortion" (p. 9) or the "prohibition" (p. 10) or "pharmacological rules" (p. 13); all of these terms ("regulations, interdictions, prohibitions, rules") are quite misleading, as pointed out above. Furthermore, Edelstein (15-20) makes this narrow interpretation of the central sentence a cornerstone of his controversial and now largely discredited hypothesis that the *Oath* is imbued with Pythagorean philosophy. K. DEICHGRÄBER, *Der hippokratische Eid*, 14-15, 31, likewise presents "In a pure and holy way..." as the concluding sentence of the immediately preceding section (i.e., of "I will not give a drug that is deadly... and... I will not give a woman a destructive pessary"); *ibid.*, 38 Deichgräber says of the *άγνωσ* δὲ καὶ δσίως ... sentence: "Was er aussagt, ist aber eine Begründung der beiden ersten Versprechen" (sc. a statement of the reasons for οὐ δώσω δὲ οὐδὲ φάρμακον οὐδενὶ αἰτηθεὶς θανάσιμον ... and of δμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ γυναικὶ πεσσὸν φθόριον δώσω, p. 630, 7-10 L. = p. 4, 15-17 Heib.). Georg STICKER, "Moraltheologie bei den Asklepiaden", in *Aus Ethik und Leben. Festschrift für Joseph Mausbach* (Münster 1931), 8-20 (on 17), seems to offer an even narrower reading, interpreting "In a pure and holy way..." as relevant only to the promise concerning a pessary: "Ebensowenig werde ich einem Weibe ein fruchtabreibendes Zäpfchen geben, sondern rein und fromm werde ich mein Leben und meine Kunst bewahren." By contrast, C. LICHTENTHAELER, *Der Eid des Hippokrates* (Köln 1984), 18-19, 153-163, recognizes not only the structural centrality of the

Here, at the core of a text that both invokes all the gods (θεοὺς πάντας τε καὶ πάσας<sup>94</sup>) and evokes all human beings (παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις<sup>95</sup>), the professional and the personal, the public and the private, the religious and the secular are, it seems, comprehensively covered by the same sworn commitment to preserve them all unremittingly “in a pure and holy way”. This human commitment, in turn, is watched closely and continuously by divinities: “in a holy way” (δσίως), emphasising the impact of human secular activity on one’s relation to the divine, also serves as a reminder that an extraordinary divine panoply is witnessing this comprehensive pledge, even as it is being sworn. Only at the centre of the *Oath* and in the two framing sections is the gods’ presence evoked. As elsewhere, structure here too is a bearer of meaning: present at the beginning, middle, and end of the *Oath*, the gods guarantee the binding force and hence the efficacy of the oath. Furthermore, at the centre of the *Oath* they also establish their relation to the oath-taker as a relation that is much more comprehensive than that of witnesses (ἴστορας<sup>96</sup>) and enforcers: the relation in effect covers all of his life and all of his professional expertise and practice. If he is to guard all these “in a holy way”, no aspect of

ἄγνῶς δὲ καὶ δσίως ... sentence but also its relative independence from the immediately preceding and following sections (i.e., its applicability to much more than just the promise not to dispense “a deadly drug” or “a destructive pessary” and not to “cut”). E.L. MINAR, “Purity and holiness in the Hippocratic *Oath*”, in *Classical Weekly* 40 (1947), 151-152, recognizes that problems arise from reading ἄγνῶς δὲ καὶ δσίως διατηρήσω ... only as an explanatory or justificatory elaboration upon “a deadly drug” and “a destructive pessary”, but he proposes an even more problematic and implausible solution, viz. to transpose ἄγνῶς δὲ καὶ δσίως διατηρήσω βίον τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν after the sentence on cutting (i.e., after οὐ τεμέω δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν λιθιῶντας, ἐκχωρήσω δὲ ἐργάτησιν ἀνδράσιν πρήξιος τῆσδε, p. 630, 11-12 L. = p. 4, 19-20 Heib.) — a radical modern intervention for which the manuscript tradition offers no support — and then to read “In a pure and holy way...” even more narrowly as offering the grounds only for not “cutting”.

<sup>94</sup> P. 628, 3 L. = p. 4, 3 Heib.

<sup>95</sup> P. 632, 3 L. = p. 5, 9 Heib.

<sup>96</sup> P. 628, 3 L. = p. 4, 3 Heib.

his life, and so too no aspect of his secular, professional activity, may give offense to the gods.

To the classical sensibilities and values visible in the *Oath*, the modern question whether only professional expertise and competence or also moral character and private conduct are addressed in the *Oath*, would have been comprehensible and even familiar, especially after the rise of the sophists and after *techne* had become a central, controversial term within Greek culture<sup>97</sup>. In fact, the nascent distinction between professional and non-professional, between expert and lay person, which soon became richly visible in fourth-century representations, uses, and criticisms of *techne*, might have prompted the *Oath's*

<sup>97</sup> O. TEMKIN, "Greek medicine as science and craft", in *Isis* 44 (1953), 213-225; H.W. MILLER, "Technê and discovery in *On Ancient Medicine*", in *TAPhA* 86 (1955), 51-62; G.H. KNUTZEN, *Technologie in den hippokratischen Schriften* Περὶ διαίτης δέξεων, περὶ ἀγμῶν, περὶ ἀρθρῶν ἐμβολῆς, Abh. Mainz, 1963, 14 (Mainz 1964); F. HEINIMANN, "Eine vorplatonische Theorie der Techne", in *MH* 18 (1961), 105-130; H. HERTER, "Die Treffkunst des Arztes in hippokratischer und platonischer Sicht", in *Sudhoffs Archiv* 47 (1963), 247-290; M. VEGETTI, "Technai e filosofia nel Peri technes pseudo-ippocratico", in *Atti della Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*, Cl. di sc.mor., stor., filol. 98 (1963-1964), 308-380; F. HEINIMANN, "Die geistigen Voraussetzungen der hippokratischen Medizin", in *Fundamente moderner Medizin. Documenta Geigy* (Basel 1964); M. ISNARDI PARENTE, *Techne* (Firenze 1966), especially on the fourth century B.C.; J. KUBE, *TEXNH und APETH*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, 12 (Berlin 1969), 48-121; W.K.C. GUTHRIE, *The Sophists* (Cambridge 1971), 35-39 ("Professionalism"); G. CAMBIANO, *Platone e le tecniche* (Torino 1971); H. DILLER, "Das Selbstverständnis der griechischen Medizin in der Zeit des Hippokrates", in L. BOURGEY and J. JOUANNA (eds.), *La Collection hippocratique et son rôle dans l'histoire de la médecine* (Leiden 1975), 77-93; H.M. KOELBING, *Arzt und Patient in der antiken Welt* (Zürich/München 1977), 96-104; M. KATO, *Techne und Philosophie bei Platon* (Frankfurt a.M. 1988); J. JOUANNA (ed.), *Hippocrate*, V 1: *Des vents, De l'art* (CUF, Paris 1988), 102 n. 1, 167-190 (also on the relation of *De arte* to the sophistic movement and to philosophy); E. WARREN, "The craft argument: an analogy?", in J.P. ANTON and A. PREUS (eds.), *Essays in ancient Greek philosophy* III (Albany 1989), 101-115; H. SCHNEIDER, *Das griechische Technikverständnis* (Darmstadt 1989); H.F.J. HORSTMANSHOFF, *art.cit.* (n. 27 above); D. THOMSEN, 'Techne' als Metapher und als Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht (Freiburg/München 1990); J. JOUANNA (ed.), *Hippocrate*, II 1: *De l'ancienne médecine* (Paris 1990), 74-81, 118-23, 132-33, 156 n. 5; G. CAMBIANO, "Remarques sur Platon et la 'technè'", in *Revue philosophique* 4 (1991), 407-416; J. JOUANNA, *Hippocrate* (Paris 1992), 344-359.

two emphatic uses of the expression “life and *techne*”. But while acknowledging this distinction, the *Oath* pledges to submit both “life” and profession to the same moral and religious restraints.

If these readings are plausible, the Hippocratic *Oath* not only recognised the distinction between professional competence, on the one hand, and, on the other, the moral qualities displayed in the physician’s habitual conduct in all areas of his life, but also stressed the moral inseparability of the professional and the personal, of one’s *techne* and one’s *bios*. If this is so, the close link between character and competence that has been said to belong to a distinctively moralising Roman sensibility (see Part I above), but which we also traced in Hellenistic texts concerning physicians (Part II), already took root in medicine of the classical period and found concise yet profound expression at the very centre of the *Hippocratic Oath*.

## DISCUSSION

*V. Nutton:* It is good to be asked to think about a text (the *Oath*) one believes one knows well. If I follow your argument correctly, are you suggesting that the phrase ἀγνῶς δὲ καὶ ὁσίως is much more than a rhetorical duplication for effect, but rather offers two complementary ways of acting with regard to the gods, one, the first, more negative, the other more positive, but together reinforcing one another? And if, as you have shown, one should set the *Oath* in a context of subtly changing religious values, akin to the change from a family to a quasi-familial system of education, I am reminded of the situation at Elea, in southern Italy, where doctors were associated as an original family group, a φώλεον, a word that otherwise occurs only in religious contexts.

*H. von Staden:* Thank you very much for your helpful remarks. I find the thought that the situation at Elea may represent a contextual parallel to the Hippocratic *Oath* suggestive, especially in light of the fact that the first section of the *Oath* introduces both family members and the non-family in such a way as to suggest a transitional phase in which the family or clan, though it no longer constitutes the social boundaries of medical apprenticeship, remains the unavoidable socio-professional model. Even in this changing social context of the transmission of professional expertise, the oath-taker's teacher is characterised as “equal (*ἴσα*) to my parents”, and the teacher's offspring as “equal (*ἴσον*) to my male siblings”. Relations among professionals and would-be professionals who are not blood relations are, in other words, still defined and clarified in terms of traditional family relations.

As far as the first part of your question is concerned, yes, I do believe that ἀγνῶς and ὁσίως are distinct, complementary terms,

each of which refers to central aspects of one's relations to the gods (but not only to the gods). (1) Because ὅσιος has the basic sense of 'permitted or sanctioned by the gods', 'not forbidden by the gods', particularly with reference to profane or secular things that may be done, said, dwelt in (e.g., non-sacred buildings), thought, or used without offense to the gods, it refers both to one's relation to the gods and to one's behaviour in the secular world. Aristophanes (*Lysistrata* 743), for example, uses ὅσιος of a place where one can give birth (an act which is forbidden in a 'sacred' or ἱερός place, such as a sanctuary or temple): the place is 'holy' (ὅσιος), because giving birth in it is permitted by gods, and therefore no offense to the gods will arise from giving birth in a 'holy' place (whereas birth — a source of religious pollution, according to many Greek sacred laws — in a sanctuary or ἱερόν would be ἀνόσιον). By promising to guard his life and his techne ὁσίως, the oath-taker hence, to put it in a perilously reductive way, obliges himself to deal with secular things and to act in the profane sphere (both in his professional and in his non-professional life) in a manner that will not give offense to the gods; (2) ἀγνῶς I find more difficult, but that it is not co-extensive semantically with ὁσίως is, I believe, clear from the evidence cited in my paper. Ἀγνῶς also implies a relation to the gods (and let us not forget the gods' presence both at the beginning of the *Oath* and in the concluding prayer/implication), but it does not refer primarily to how one's relation to secular objects, places, etc. affect one's relation to the gods. Rather, it refers in the first instance to one's own purity or freedom from pollution — originally to one's ritual purity but, by the time of the *Oath*, also to one's moral-intellectual purity or, perhaps more precisely, to one's moral and intellectual freedom from pollution, as the inscription from Epidaurus suggests.

*A. Garzya:* L'interprétation du passage du *Iusiurandum*, ἀγνῶς δὲ καὶ ὁσίως διατηρήσω βίον τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν, peut à mon avis être favorisée par la considération de sa structure

rhétorique évidente et sûrement non fortuite. Il s'agit de deux membres principaux ayant comme pivot au centre le verbe διατηρήσω: le premier est bâti sur deux unités de trois syllabes chacune divisée par καὶ; le second est bâti sur deux unités de cinq syllabes chacune divisée encore par καὶ; le parallélisme numérique est souligné à son tour dans le premier cas par l'homéoptote (-ῶς ... -ῶς), dans le second par la suite substantif + article + possessif (βίον τὸν ἐμὸν ... τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν, deux fois 2 syll. + 1 + 2). La position des deux καὶ ne peut donc que relever d'une intention emphatique ("et aussi") et les deux adverbes dans le premier membre, les deux mots-clés dans le second ont eux aussi une prégnance dans le sens d'une *klimax*, ἀγνῶς se rapportant à l'homme, ὅσιως à la divinité, βίος à la vie en tant que telle, τέχνη à ce qui la caractérise sur un plan plus élevé.

La structure rhétorique en question n'a évidemment rien de scolaire ni d'ornemental: elle ne fait que démontrer chez l'auteur un souci de précision expressive parfaitement dans l'esprit de la langue grecque.

Quant à l'hexamètre de *IG XII Suppl. 23*, il me rappelle de près les *incipit* de certaines *lamellae aureae Orphicae* (où toutefois il est souvent question de *katharós* plutôt que de *hagnós*). Je ne saurais dire si la chose peut éclairer de quelque façon la nature de notre vers.

*H. von Staden*: Je vous remercie de vos remarques. Comme je l'ai signalé, je suis tout à fait d'accord sur le fait que la structure de la phrase que vous avez citée n'est pas seulement un phénomène rhétorique. Il faut pourtant ajouter que l'ensemble du texte est, lui aussi, moulé dans une forme littéraire raffinée, et que cependant, comme cela arrive fréquemment, la forme et la structure sont elles aussi porteuses de signification. Chaque partie de la phrase citée est mise en valeur par une structure très précise; en outre, dans la structure de l'ensemble du *Serment*, cette phrase se trouve justement au centre. Ainsi, aussi bien la structure du *Serment* que celle de cette phrase centrale

accentue l'importance fondamentale de ἀγνῶς δὲ καὶ ὄσιως, de διατηρήσω, et de βίον τὸν ἐμὸν καὶ τέχνην τὴν ἐμήν.

En ce qui concerne l'hexamètre de Mytilène (Lesbos), je vous remercie de la référence aux *lamellae*. Il faut cependant souligner, premièrement, que *καθαρός* est beaucoup plus commun que *ἀγνός* aux époques classique et hellénistique, et s'utilise aussi pour désigner la pureté mentale, la pureté de la pensée, etc. Par ailleurs, les Grecs ont commencé à utiliser *καθαρός* avec des implications morales (et non seulement rituelles) plus tôt que *ἀγνός* (là-dessus voir R. Parker, *Miasma*). Déjà Anaxagore, Empédocle et Euripide préféraient *καθαρός* à *ἀγνός* pour se référer à la "pureté intellectuelle" (voir L. Moulinier, *Le pur et l'impur*). Deuxièmement, la datation de cette inscription (*IG XII Suppl. 23*) n'est pas assurée, fait qui entraîne des complications considérables pour la question d'influence que vous avez soulevée.

*J. Pigeaud*: Votre exposé a suscité toute mon admiration. Deux questions: l'une concerne le sens de φρονεῖν, dans le fragment: ἀγνεία δ' ἔστι φρονεῖν ὄσια. Peut-on essayer de donner un convenu à φρονεῖν, comme vous l'avez fait pour βίος, du *Serment*? Autrement dit, peut-on donner un sens plus précis que 'penser', donner une valeur active: 'avoir des intentions pures', par exemple? Ce qui serait plus intéressant pour l'analogie avec le passage du *Serment*. On n'est pas responsable de ses 'pensées' mais de ses intentions.

*H. von Staden*: Oui, l'on pourrait, et l'on devrait, faire de φρονεῖν une analyse sémantique du même type que celle que j'ai faite pour βίος. Mais φρονεῖν n'apparaît jamais dans le *Serment* hippocratique (la phrase que vous citez appartient, bien sûr, au distique élégiaque d'Épidaure). Φρονεῖν pourrait cependant être significatif pour mon hypothèse, vu l'existence des autres parallèles entre l'inscription et le *Serment*. Pour ce qui est "des intentions pures", je suis bien convaincu que nous en avons, vous et moi, mais je ne suis pas aussi certain que ce soit ce qu'il faut entendre ici sous φρονεῖν ὄσια, bien que φρονεῖν, en

d'autres passages, contienne la notion d'intention. Un parallèle approchant, auquel j'ai déjà fait allusion, se trouve dans l'*Électre* d'Euripide, là où le chœur dit à Électre: φρονεῖς γὰρ ὅσια νῦν, τότ' οὐ / φρονοῦσα, δεινὰ δ' εἰργάσω (1203-1204). Ces vers font écho au vers 1170, où le chœur dit à Clytemnestre mourante: σχέτλια μὲν ἐπαθεῖς, ἀνόσια δ' εἰργάσω (1170 comme 1203-1204 pourraient aussi faire référence aux emplois d'ἀνόσιος aux vers 600, 645, 677, 683, et 926 de l'*Électre*). Le contraste, chez Euripide, entre φρονεῖν et ἐργάζεσθαι pourrait étayer votre lecture de φρονεῖν (d'autant plus que ce contraste est lié aux vers précédents, πάλιν πάλιν φρόνημα σὸν / μεταστάθη πρὸς αὔραν). Un certain nombre d'autres passages suggèrent eux aussi que φρονεῖν peut parfois contenir l'idée de but ou d'intention ou de disposition: 'être disposé ou enclin' à accomplir des actes de telle ou telle sorte, par ex. φρονῶν τυραννικά (Aristophane, *Vesp.* 507), κακὰ φρονέουσι ... ἀλλήλοισιν (*Il.* 22, 264), φρονοῦντας ἀριστα αὐτοῖς (Aristophane *Pl.* 577). Mais par ailleurs, φρονεῖν veut souvent dire 'avoir des pensées' d'un type particulier, usage dans lequel le mot 'pensées' fait référence au contenu de l'esprit, sans implications explicites d'une intention d'agir, par ex. φρονεῖς ἀρχαῖκά (Aristoph., *Nub.* 821), "tu as des idées démodées", ou bien εἰσὶν δὲ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐ μόνον ἄνδρες ἐπὶ παιδεύσει μέγα φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκες (Platon, *Prt.* 342 d 2-4), "et dans ces cités, ce ne sont pas seulement les hommes, mais aussi les femmes qui s'enorgueillissent de [litt. qui ont des pensées orgueilleuses à propos de] leur éducation". Une utilisation de ce type, c'est-à-dire sans connotation de finalité, m'apparaît comme une alternative sémantique plausible pour φρονεῖν dans l'inscription d'Épidaure.

*V. Nutton:* On the (minor) point of the Erasistratus (?) fragment, I have some strong doubts about authenticity, not least because such a comment by a well-known physician appears nowhere else, even though the similar definition of the good doctor by Herophilus does, and even though it would fit perfectly with Galen's conception of the moral physician. The final

part in its language reminds me more of Latin inscriptions and, especially, *Digesta* 27, 1, 6 and 50, 9, 1, although there could be Greek precedents also. But even if this passage is not genuinely Erasistratean, it does not detract from the other epigraphic indications that show a concern in the Hellenistic period both with  $\tau\acute{e}χνη$  and with personal morality.

*H. von Staden*: As I indicated in my paper (perhaps too briefly and hence inadequately), in part I share these reservations, but my reservations may not be as strong as yours. For the sake of clarity let me underscore that I refrained from referring to the sentence concerning Erasistratus in ps.-Soranus' *Quaestiones medicinales*, p. 244 Rose, as a 'fragment', characterising it instead as 'a problematic sentence' that "might be a testimonium concerning Erasistratus". Furthermore, I questioned Ludwig Edelstein's overbold claim that this text "is based on good sources" and that "there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the quotation from Erasistratus". On the other hand, as editors of fragmentary evidence (and, for that matter, of relatively intact, complete texts transmitted in manuscripts) have long recognised, uniqueness — whether it is a unique testimony, a unique fragment, or a unique variant in a manuscript — does not in and of itself constitute necessary or sufficient grounds for rejecting evidence as spurious. Take an example you cited. Your reference to Herophilus' definition of the good doctor is, I assume, a reference to fr. 51 in my edition (p. 126): "When someone asked the physician Herophilus, 'Who would be a perfect physician?', he said: 'He who is capable of knowing the possible from the impossible'". But this evidence, too, is, I believe, unique (to my knowledge, it is reported only by Stobaeus, 4, 38, 9, V p. 901 Hense), and it rests on an even flimsier textual basis than the text concerning Erasistratus: 'Ηρόφιλος does not appear in the MSS but is G. Roeper's conjecture for Τρόφιμος. Yet this unique testimonium is widely accepted as authentic evidence concerning Herophilus. More significantly, as I pointed out, a tradition well attested not only by Galen and in Greek

and Latin inscriptions from the Roman empire, but also in Hellenistic inscriptions and in the Hippocratic *Oath*, confirms that personal character or morality, too, and not only professional competence, are yardsticks by which the ancient Greek physician at times was judged in all epochs of Greco-Roman antiquity. As I tried to show, this tradition extended from the classical period of Greek culture at least to late antiquity. From the point of view of this long, richly attested tradition, the view unequivocally attributed to Erasistratus by pseudo-Soranus (in the sentence beginning with *iuxta enim Erasistratum...*) therefore does not appear to be particularly suspect, although, as Danielle Gourevitch has suggested (*Le triangle hippocratique*), the subsequent sentences might represent a later ancient elaboration.

I am also grateful for your mention of similar language in the *Digest* as grounds for doubting the authenticity of this testimonium; but given the fact that Erasistratus stood and worked in a Greek tradition, not in a late Roman tradition, the transepochal Greek tradition traced in my paper could be read as constituting at least as significant a parallel to the view attributed to Erasistratus as the passages from the *Digest*. Finally, even if the *iuxta enim Erasistratum...* sentence in ps.-Soranus does not authentically represent Erasistratus' view, the overall argument presented in this paper remains unaffected.

*J. Pigeaud:* Même si l'on peut douter que le pseudo-Soranus s'inspire d'Érasistrate, ou que la citation d'Érasistrate soit recevable, il n'en reste pas moins, pour l'histoire de la médecine, que ce texte existe et qu'il est un témoignage sur l'éthique médicale.

*H. von Staden:* Je suis tout à fait d'accord. Que le texte de latin tardif attribué à Soranus dérive, directement ou indirectement, d'une tradition médicale grecque, ou d'une tradition rhétorique grecque ou romaine (peut-être de la tradition des *controversiae*?), ou d'un contexte juridique romain (ou d'une combinaison de plusieurs de ces éléments), son contenu, même au-delà de la

phrase *iuxta enim Erasistratum...*, demeure une preuve inestimable d'une manière de penser la relation entre le caractère et la compétence. Il vaut la peine de garder à l'esprit que la question de la portée éventuelle du caractère moral sur la compétence ou la performance professionnelle — et, plus généralement, la question de la relation entre éthique et technè (*ars*) — apparaît sous une grande variété de points de vue dans l'histoire de la philosophie, de l'éloquence et de la médecine grecques. Qui plus est, si mon interprétation est plausible, elle apparaît dans l'histoire de la médecine au moins aussi tôt que le *Serment d'Hippocrate*.

*Ph. Mudry:* Je voudrais revenir sur le problème de l'authenticité érasistratienne du texte du Ps.-Soranus. Je suis tenté de rappeler l'idée attribuée à Érasistrate, selon laquelle la qualité professionnelle du praticien résulte de la présence chez lui à la fois de qualités morales et de qualités techniques, de la fameuse définition de l'orateur chez Caton (Sénèque le Rhéteur, *contr. 1* pr. 9), *uir bonus dicendi peritus*. Même si le sens de *bonus* doit être compris dans une acception beaucoup plus large qu'une morale du comportement privé, il n'en demeure pas moins que cette dimension morale est présente dans la définition de Caton. Un autre fragment de Caton (commentaire de Servius à Virgile, *georg. 1, 46*) dit d'ailleurs la même chose à propos de l'agriculteur (*uir bonus...colendi peritus*). Cette association de la qualité morale et des connaissances techniques comme gage de la qualité du praticien me paraît ainsi présente dans la tradition romaine. L'est-elle, en dehors de cette référence problématique à Érasistrate, dans la tradition grecque?

*H. von Staden:* Comme le montrent les inscriptions hellénistiques citées dans ma communication, la qualité morale ainsi que la compétence technique sont déjà des critères d'évaluation du médecin dans la tradition grecque. Chez Galien, cette tradition est réaffirmée, approfondie et élaborée au moyen de la philosophie (par exemple dans le traité *Quod optimus medicus sit quoque*

*philosophus*, dans lequel Galien associe le bon médecin avec la vertu et explique la décadence de l'art médical au moyen d'arguments relevant du domaine moral). La tradition à laquelle Philippe Mudry fait allusion est donc bien attestée dans la culture grecque aussi, bien qu'elle soit peut-être articulée d'une façon sensiblement différente par les Romains et que des modulations romaines de cette association de la qualité morale et de la compétence technique se reflètent dans le texte du pseudo-Soranus après son témoignage sur Érasistrate. À mon avis cette association remonte à l'époque classique, du moins si l'on accepte mon interprétation de l'expression "ma vie et mon art" dans le *Serment hippocratique*.

*A. Garzya*: Je voudrais toucher à un point de détail, sur lequel j'aimerais connaître votre opinion. Dans le passage du ps.-Soranos il me semble que la structure de l'ensemble peut jouer un rôle supplémentaire dans l'interprétation. Les deux *autem*, le second relevé par *si*, introduisant la première et la troisième période indiquent à coup sûr la continuation unitaire du discours et l'identité de l'auteur. Ce qui se trouve entre les deux blocs a rapport, lui seul, à la pensée d'Érasistrate et rend à mon avis impossible qu'on lui attribue aussi le contenu de la troisième période.

*H. von Staden*: Je suis tout à fait d'accord. Votre interprétation est aussi pour l'essentiel celle de Danielle Gourevitch (*Le triangle hippocratique*, 268). Cependant, une question connexe est celle soulevée par Vivian Nutton, à savoir si le passage qui se trouve entre les deux phrases marquées par *autem* — c'est-à-dire *iuxta enim Erasistratum felicissimum quidem est ubi utraeque res fuerint, uti et in arte sit perfectus et moribus optimus* — bien qu'il soit explicitement attribué à Érasistrate, reflète la pensée authentique d'Érasistrate. Comme je l'ai signalé, il n'est pas sûr qu'il s'agisse d'un témoignage fiable, mais la démonstration de son inauthenticité incombe à ceux qui refusent de l'admettre, surtout étant donné l'existence des inscriptions hellénistiques

citées dans la deuxième partie de ma communication, qui ont une portée tout à fait comparable à celle du témoignage sur Érasistrate.

*Th. Rütten:* Ihr wunderbarer Vortrag hat mir gezeigt, Welch perspektivische Verkürzung darin besteht, das sogenannte Reinheits- und Lauterkeitsgebot des *hippokratischen Eides* lediglich unter dem Begriffspaar Berufs- oder Ressortmoral auf der einen und Privatmoral auf der anderen Seite zu diskutieren, wie es in weiten Kreisen moderner Medizinethiker geschieht (etwa durch E.D. Pellegrino in einem Aufsatz aus dem Jahre 1988, wo es heißt: "Today, we tend increasingly to separate personal morals from professional behavior, sometimes to an unfortunate degree. Yet, realistically, were we to apply such a precept, we would face the impracticality of regulating private morals — a dubious and impossible undertaking in a morally pluralistic society"). Nun habe ich aber durchaus den Eindruck, daß sich große Teile der Öffentlichkeit noch nicht mit der in der Medizin beschlossenen Trennung dieser beiden Sphären abgefunden haben und weiterhin bei den Ärzten genau das einklagen, wovon Sie gesprochen haben. Sie haben erstmalig meines Wissens Ehrendekrete im Zusammenhang mit der Deutung des Reinheitsgebots erwähnt, in denen sich eine der Eidaussage durchaus ähnliche Grundhaltung und Wertvorstellung abzeichnet. Da es sich nun um öffentliche Bekundungen handelt, läßt sich daraus der Schluß ziehen, daß es im Hellenismus eine Öffentlichkeit gegeben hat, die die im Reinheitsgebot formulierte Einstellung bei Ärzten einklagte, so daß der Sittenkodex des *Eides* nicht nur ein Selbstgespräch des sich selbstverpflichtenden Arztes oder ein Zwiegespräch mit den Göttern darstellt, sondern als Antwort auf gesellschaftlicherseits erhobene Forderungen und Erwartungen aufgefaßt werden kann?

*H. von Staden:* Ob der Satz "Mit Reinheit und Heiligkeit werde ich mein Leben und meine Kunst bewahren" tatsächlich als 'Antwort' auf von der 'Öffentlichkeit' oder von der 'Gesellschaft'

erhobene Erwartungen bzw. Forderungen verstanden werden darf, läßt sich schwer feststellen. Wohl aber läßt sich nicht nur durch kritische Anspielungen auf die Medizin und auf Mediziner in der Komödie, sondern auch durch den apologetisch-defensiven Ton mancher hippokratischen Schriften (z.B. *De arte*) sowie durch die hippokratische Polemik gegen die ärztliche Inkompetenz und gegen Schwinderei, Aufspielerei und Quacksalberei zeigen, daß die Medizin nicht nur 'wissenschaftlich' und therapeutisch sondern in einem gewissen Sinne auch 'moralisch' für suspekt gehalten wurde. Es ist durchaus denkbar, daß dieser Tatbestand und die damit eng verwandte unsichere Stellung der Medizin innerhalb der sozialen Ordnung indirekt nicht nur zu dem ἀγνῶς δὲ καὶ ὄσιως ... Versprechen sondern auch zu anderen Formulierungen im *hippokratischen Eide*, z.B. zu οὐ δῶσω δὲ οὐδὲ φάρμακον οὐδενὶ αἰτηθεὶς θανάσιμον, οὐδὲ ὑφηγήσομαι ξυμβουλίην τοιήνδε oder zu ἐκτὸς ἐών πάσης ἀδικίης ἔκουσίης καὶ φθορίης, τῆς τε ἄλλης καὶ ἀφροδισίων ἔργων beigetragen haben. Für diese Selbstverpflichtungen gab es wahrscheinlich sowohl innere (ethische) wie äußere (gesellschaftliche) Beweggründe, die wiederum eine kulturbedingte Motivationsdynamik aufzeigen. Dabei darf man die wichtige Rolle der δόξα im *Eide* (δοξαζομένω παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον), wie in vielen anderen hippokratischen Schriften, natürlich nicht übersehen. Wichtig scheint mir ferner, daß manche hellenistische Ehrendekrete, genau wie der *hippokratische Eid*, einerseits die Unterscheidung zwischen βίος und τέχνη anerkennen, andererseits aber auf die Untrennbarkeit von βίος und τέχνη als Kriterien für die Bewertung des Arztes bestehen.

Es wird Ihnen übrigens aufgefallen sein, daß ich die üblichen Begriffe "Sittenkodex" und "Lauterkeitsgebot" vermieden habe — Begriffe, die sich, wie Sie wissen, seit langem in der modernen Interpretation des *Eides* fest eingebürgert haben. Der *hippokratische Eid* enthält jedoch m.E. keinen Sittenkodex, außerdem enthält er weder *Gebote* (oder 'injunctions' oder 'commandments') noch *Verbote* (oder 'interdictions' oder 'prohibitions'), sondern freiwillige eidliche Selbstverpflichtungen.

*H. Flashar:* Es scheint mir in der Tat, daß der *Eid* im Vergleich zum *Corpus Hippocraticum* im Vokabular ein Unicum darstellt, in der inhaltlichen Problematik aber doch eng mit den vergleichbaren Schriften bzw. Stellen des *Corpus* übereinstimmt und von den hippokratischen Schriften nicht getrennt werden darf.

Wenn *bίος* "geformtes Leben" bedeutet, so leuchtet schon von der Sache her ein, daß dieses Wort im *Corpus Hippocraticum* in nosologischem Zusammenhang seltener vorkommt. Bei all diesen Vergleichen wird man auf die Gattung des *Eides* stärker zu achten haben und hier darauf, daß der *Eid* zugleich ein Vertrag (Ξυγγραφή) ist. Diese Seite des Dokumentes ermöglicht es, die scheinbar rein ethischen Aussagen auch also Absicherung des Arztes zu lesen, der bei Beachtung der Selbstverpflichtung auch bei ärztlichem Mißerfolg salviert ist.

*H. von Staden:* In welchem Maße der *Eid* innerhalb des *Corpus Hippocraticum* ein lexikalisches Unicum darstellt, ist von der Forschung bisher nicht erkannt worden. In diesem verhältnismäßig kurzen Text gibt es ca. 25 Wörter, die sonst nicht in den hippokratischen Schriften vorkommen, ferner ca. 28 Ausdrücke und syntaktische Erscheinungen, die innerhalb des *Corpus* einmalig sind, und weitere 15 Wörter, die sonst nur ganz selten (ein- bis viermal) im *Corpus* erscheinen. Sie haben aber vollkommen recht, daß lexikalische Einzigartigkeit (und ich würde hinzufügen, Eigentümlichkeit der literarischen Form) nicht unbedingt inhaltliche oder thematische Inkompatibilität mit anderen hippokratischen Schriften zu Folge hat. Im Gegenteil, Nutzen (ἐπ' ὀφελείη καμνόντων, zweimal), nicht Schaden (Verhütung von δήλησις oder φθορά), die Betonung der Diätetik (διαιτήμασι τε χρήσομαι), die Betreuung von sowohl Freien wie Sklaven, die Bedeutung der Doxa — diese sind all Begriffe oder Themenbereiche, die den *Eid* mit anderen hippokratischen Schriften stark verbinden, und die von einer gewissen inhaltlichen Kohärenz (trotz aller formaler, stilistischer, gattungsmäßiger und theoretischer Heterogenität) im *Corpus* zeugen.

Was Ihre sich auf meine Auslegung von  $\betaίος$  beziehenden Bemerkungen betrifft, so bin ich im Prinzip einverstanden. Daß es dem Autor des *Eides* auch auf  $\betaίος$  im Sinne der "dauerhaften, gewohnten Lebensweise" und daher, wie Sie sagten, auf  $\betaίος$  als "geformtes Leben", und nicht nur auf  $\betaίος$  im Sinne von "Lebensunterhalt" (wie im zweiten Absatz des *Eides*,  $\betaίου κοινώσασθαι$ ) ankommt, scheint auch aus der Wiederholung, von  $καὶ \betaίου καὶ τέχνης$  im letzten Satz des *Eides* hervorzugehen. Ferner ist Ihr Hinweis auf den Vertragscharakter des *Eides* m.E. ganz angebracht: der Autor betont zweimal, daß es sich nicht nur um einen *Eid* sondern auch um einen Vertrag handelt ( $\xi\gamma\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\eta\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$ ,  $\mu\alpha\theta\eta\tau\alpha\tilde{\iota}\sigma\iota\ \sigma\gamma\gamma\epsilon\gamma\theta\alpha\mu\mu\epsilon\nu\iota\varsigma$ ). Allerdings verpflichtet sich der Sprecher des *Eides*, in manchen wichtigen Fällen auch ohne einen Vertrag und ohne Entgelt ( $\ddot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\ \mu\iota\sigma\theta\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\tilde{\iota}\ \xi\gamma\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\eta\varsigma$ ) sein Versprechen einzuhalten. Der *Eid* bezieht sich also nicht nur auf vertragsmäßige Verhältnisse. Ferner ist erwähnenswert, daß sich die Erwähnungen eines Vertrages ausschließlich auf den ersten Teil des *Eides* beschränken, d.h., auf den Abschnitt, in dem es um eidliche Verpflichtungen dem Lehrer und gewissen Schülern gegenüber geht. Dagegen befindet sich kein einziger ausdrücklicher Hinweis auf einen Vertrag in der darauffolgenden Aufzählung der Verpflichtungen des Arztes den Patienten und der Gesellschaft gegenüber. Fünfmal wird betont, daß es sich um einen Eid handelt ( $\delta\mu\eta\eta\omega$ ,  $\delta\eta\chi\eta\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$ ,  $\delta\omega\eta\iota\mu\mu\epsilon\nu\iota\varsigma$ , nochmals  $\delta\eta\chi\eta\eta\ldots\tau\eta\delta\epsilon$  und schließlich im Hinweis auf die Folgen des Meineides,  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\eta\eta\chi\eta\eta\eta\tau\iota$ ). Es darf nicht übersehen werden, daß der hippokratische *Eid* auch mit der reichlich bezeugten 'Gattung' des griechischen Eides (vgl. z.B. R. Hirzel, *Der Eid* [Leipzig 1902]; J. Plescia, *The Oath and Perjury in Ancient Greece* [Tallahassee, Florida 1970]; E. Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society* [London 1973], 432-442) vieles gemeinsam hat, und trotzdem, wie oben angedeutet, ein *Unicum* bleibt.

*Charlotte Schubert:* Angesichts der von Ihnen herausgearbeiteten lexikalischen Singularität des *Eides* möchte ich fragen, ob

man sich dieses hochstilisierte, mit ausgefeilten Querbezügen durchstrukturierte Dokument tatsächlich als einen gesprochenen Eid aus dem Alltagsleben eines Arztes vorstellen kann, der sich zu einem der üblichen Vertrags- und Ausbildungsverhältnisse verpflichtete?

*H. von Staden:* I am grateful for your question, which touches on one of the most difficult problems concerning the *Oath*: its 'Sitz im Leben'. While I agree with some of the formulations used in the question, others stir reticence on my part. First of all, I do not believe the Hippocratic *Oath* should be characterised as belonging to the 'Alltagsleben eines Arztes'. Rather, as the analysis presented in Part III of my paper attempts to show, it evokes a highly solemn context and it deploys religious and moral sanctions and value terms. But these dimensions do not entail that it was not actually sworn by some physicians (as your question — which I take to be sceptical — appears to suggest): it may, for example, have been sworn only *once* in a lifetime by each newly apprenticed physician in a certain circle. If so, it would hardly have belonged to a physician's 'quotidian experiences'; yet even if lacking a 'quotidian' quality, it nevertheless could be evidence of an historical practice. Secondly, it is not uncharacteristic of texts recited on solemn occasions, and especially of those that evoke religious legitimation and sanction, to be carefully structured, highly stylised, and marked by lexical singularity. In other words, it would not be surprising if a text that marks a solemn sworn commitment, probably recited on a once-in-a-lifetime occasion, displayed unique lexical features that set it apart from other medical writings. Third, I would not be comfortable characterising the *Hippocratic Oath* as a document that pledges the physicians to "die üblichen Vertrags- und Ausbildungsverhältnisse". Because of the relative lack of comparative material from Greek medicine, especially of the classical period, it is far from clear that the relations depicted in the *Oath* represent "übliche" medical contractual and educational practice. We do, of course, have papyrological evidence of medical contracts

from the Hellenistic period (e.g., *PHeid.* 226 of 215-213 B.C.), but the integral relation between oath, contract, and prayer in the *Oath*, and likewise the relations between gods, the human healer, human patients, and human society, do not strike me as representing “one of the usual contractual and educational relations”. Finally, in response to the question, “ob man sich dieses hochstilisierte... Dokument tatsächlich als einen gesprochenen Eid vorstellen kann”: given the rhetorically attuned quality of much of Greek culture (also of many medical treatises, from Hippocratic texts to Galen and beyond), and hence of most Greek audiences, the rhetorically efficacious composition of the Hippocratic *Oath* neither *a priori* precludes its use on solemn ‘initiatory’ occasions by at least some ancient physicians, nor necessarily raises doubts about its oral recitation. Texts of far greater formal, thematic, and stylistic complexity, and of much greater length were, after all, recited repeatedly in classical antiquity, as they were in subsequent epochs and cultures.