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VI

D.M. SCHENKEVELD

SCHOLARSHIP AND GRAMMAR

I

1. In the fourth century B.C. γραμματικός has the general sense of "literate, knowing and skilled in letters or literature" and τέχνη γραμματική that of "the expertise of putting sounds and letters together", whereas γραμματιστής is used to designate "the man who teaches the letters"¹. About 250 B.C. the Alexandrian scholar Eratosthenes defines γραμματική as "the complete skill in literature" and at the end of the second century Dionysius Thrax formulates it as "the practical study of the normal usages of poets and prose writers"². He distinguishes six parts in this discipline, 'skill in reading, interpretation, explanation of obscure words and historical references, discovery of the

¹ Xen. *Mem.* IV 2,20; *Symp.* 4,27; Pl. *Crat.* 431 e-432 a; *Sph.* 253 a.

² Eratosthenes: Εξις παντελής ἐν γράμμασι *ap. Schol. ad D.T.* p. 160, 10-11 Hilgard (GG I/3). Dionysius, *GG* I/1 p. 5, 2-3 Uhlig, cp. S.E. M. I 57 γραμματική ἐστιν ἐμπειρία... τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ λεγομένων.

origin of words, account of analogy' and 'critical judgment of poems', the noblest part of all the art includes³. Several parts look like belonging to linguistics but others do not. Dionysius' definition forms the basis for those of others, who now substitute *τέχνη* (art, expertise) for Dionysius' *ἐμπειρία*, thereby stressing the epistemological status of *γραμματική* rather than its methodological basis⁴. Asclepiades of Myrlea rearranges Dionysius' list into three main parts, the historical, technical and the more specific parts (*μέρος ιστορικόν, τεχνικόν, ίδιαίτερον*, Sextus *M. I* 252-253; 91-94). In the historical part the grammarian deals with *realia* such as persons, geographical data, myths, but also with obscure words; the more specific part is reserved for exegesis, textual criticism and judgment on authenticity or inauthenticity of texts. The technical part, finally, systematically treats letters, word classes, orthography and *hellēnismos*, correct Greek, which includes the treatment of analogy. Here we have for the first time an apparently autonomous grammar, at least the technical part can be seen as such. At the end of the first century grammatical theory, not just how to learn writing and reading, is now also a part of the curriculum at school: Dionysius of Halicarnassus speaks about 'learning what is called *grammatikē*' listing as its components lessons on the elements of sound and the syllables, then word classes

³ D.T. 1, cp. S.E. *M. I* 250. Translation of KEMP, 304. Critical judgment concerns matters of authenticity, not literary criticism, as is proven by S.E. *M. I* 93.

⁴ SLUITER, 59. Sextus mentions definitions of Ptolemy the Peripatetic (*M. I* 60), Asclepiades of Myrlea (72), Chairis (76) and Demetrius Chlorus (84). Their dates are a matter of conjecture, all four probably belong to the first decades of the first century B.C.

and their accidentia; in the next century Philo Judaeus has a similar list⁵.

From this survey it appears that γραμματική is a term denoting a wide range of activities. Taken together these activities would nowadays appear to cover those of the scholar rather than of the linguist, and most scholars are actually inclined to explain ancient *grammatikē* as being scholarship (*filologia*) with *diorthōsis* (textual criticism) and *exēgēsis* as its main domains of activity⁶. But the Greek term φιλολογία and its cognate forms have a wider sense than the modern term 'philology', for the first word indicates 'interest in philosophical-literary discussions or activities of learned men', whereas a learned man, a scholar or someone interested in general education is called φιλόλογος. The latter term, moreover, is not a professional title but functions as an epithet or name⁷. Thus, when discussing ancient grammar in the sense of the study of language (linguistics) in antiquity we are dealing with the technical part of ancient *grammatikē* in the sense of scholarship⁸.

Apart from the changes in usage of the word γραμματική and its cognates we noted a definite modification of the contents of this expertise and so it is legitimate to ask how this change has come about and what stages, if any, we can observe. Further questions should be: "Is 'grammar' a product of philology only and what is the role of philosophy, and rhetoric?" In view,

⁵ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 52,2, cf. *Comp.* 25; Philo Al. *De congr. erud. gratia* 146-150.

⁶ Ax (1991), 277.

⁷ R.A. KASTER, *Guardians of Language* (Berkeley 1988), 453. Eratosthenes is the first Greek to call himself φιλόλογος (Suet. *De gramm. et rhet.* 10,3).

⁸ Cf. the use of τεχνολογία γραμματική for 'the study of language' in S.E. M. I 98 and A.D. *Conj.* p. 213, 10 Schneider (GG II/1,1).

however, of the main theme of these Entretiens I shall focus on the contributions made by scholars. I do not intend, therefore, to give a history of the study of language in antiquity, although a new one is sorely needed⁹. It is also evident that in focusing on the achievements of philologists I use those of the philosophers and others as background to the main subject¹⁰. I have selected for discussion firstly the theory of the parts of speech (part II) and that on *hellénismos* (III). These are central issues and correspond to two types of treatises, *τέχναι γραμματικαῖ* and *τέχναι περὶ Ἑλληνισμοῦ*, respectively¹¹. In each part of my paper I shall focus on two periods, that between 250 and 150 B.C. when Aristophanes and Aristarchus are active, and the first century B.C. The reasons for this selection will become evident later on¹². In part IV some words will be said on Apollonius' syntactical theory and its relationship to Stoic studies of syntax.

2. Without any doubt the matter of the *Technē*'s authenticity and that of its authority are crucial in the whole debate on the

⁹ STEINTHAL and ROBINS, 9-44 may stand as examples of the now outdated older histories, PINBORG and TAYLOR for first attempts at a novel approach.

¹⁰ This distinction is here a practical one and does not imply a supposedly basic difference between philosophical and technical grammar, a difference very much *en vogue* some fifty years ago. See on this subject BLANK, 1-5. Grammarians were also interested in 'philosophical' subjects, see e.g. S.E. M. I 142-153.

¹¹ See Ax (1982), 97-98. For ancient theory on letters and sounds see W. Ax, *Laut, Stimme und Sprache* (Göttingen 1986), and for that on orthography SIEBENBORN.

¹² In order to avoid confusion, from now on I use the words *grammatikē* and *grammatikos* (-*oi*) in the sense of 'scholarship, scholar (philology, philologist)' only.

development of Greek linguistics¹³. For if, at the end of the second century B.C., Dionysius wrote his *Technē* in the form as we now have it or in a slightly but not basically different one, there is every reason to think that already his teacher Aristarchus and his forerunner Aristophanes of Byzantium had taken significant steps in linguistic studies — so much so that the available fragments of their works have very often been looked at from the perspective of the *Technē*. Moreover, what was done after Dionysius would have been no more than ‘adding footnotes’, i.e. making minor adjustments and corrections to his system (Robins, 36). But if one takes away the *Technē* (§§ 6 ff.) from Dionysius¹⁴, one’s views on both the quality and the factuality of language science before and after him will change considerably. Accordingly, some preliminary remarks on this moot point are not out of place. Any discussion of this matter, however, can only be fruitful if the topics of the authenticity and the authority of the work are kept apart, a distinction too often neglected in the debate of the last four decades¹⁵.

The *Technē* did not become an authoritative textbook before about the fifth century A.D. Recent research on the fragments of grammatical papyri from the first century B.C. up till the fourth century A.D. shows that the τέχναι therein included are often divergent from the *Technē* in the number of word classes,

¹³ The issue of the *Technē*’s authenticity concerns the sections 6 ff. The authenticity of the first section (definition and division of the parts of γραμματική) is guaranteed by being quoted by Sextus (*M. I* 57 and 250); the next three sections develop the first part of *anagnōsis*. The position of § 5 remains an enigma.

¹⁴ DI BENEDETTO is the first to do so in modern times. See KEMP, 307-315 for a history of the debate since.

¹⁵ Already DI BENEDETTO used arguments *ex silentio* as proving *Technē*’s inauthenticity and on this point at least, PFEIFFER, 270 was right in criticizing his reasoning.

treatment of individual parts of speech and that there was no standard text¹⁶. Other sources provide the same picture. Thus, in his account of the development of theory of parts of speech, Dionysius of Halicarnassus arrives at a total of nine parts and in his analysis of lines of Pindar he sharply distinguishes between δνομα and προσηγορία as separate parts¹⁷, whereas if the *Technē* had been authoritative one would expect to see here the number of eight parts and the subordination of *prosēgoria* under *onoma*. Sextus' analysis of *Iliad* A 1 still keeps to the same juxtaposition of these parts of speech (M. I 132-133)¹⁸. Moreover, to Sextus Dionysius Thrax is no more than the man who formulated the first definition of *grammatikē* and its parts. Asclepiades of Myrlea is more important to him and he follows his division of the art¹⁹. In his extant works Apollonius Dyscolus refers once only to Dionysius Thrax by name (Pron. p. 5, 18-9), Trypho (1st cent. B.C.) being much more of an authority to him. All these data prove that the *Technē* can no longer be seen as having had a decisive influence on the rest of Greek linguistic studies and having been the authoritative text for grammar.

As to the other matter, that of the *Technē*'s authenticity, independent sources tell us that Dionysius Thrax separates the proper noun from the appellative, joins the article and the

¹⁶ Cf. WOUTERS' study. Wouters will publish new grammatical papyri in a forthcoming volume of *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*.

¹⁷ SCHENKEVELD (1983), 67-94.

¹⁸ Cf. 236-239. According to Ammonius (*In int.* p. 13, 19-14, 16 Busse) Alexander of Aphrodisias (2./3. cent. A.D.) thought that under Aristotle's δνομα were to be ranged adverbs, pronouns and ἡ παρὰ τοῖς γραμματικοῖς καλούμενη προσηγορία.

¹⁹ The reason why Sextus (2nd half 2nd cent.) bases his attack on the grammarians on a book written two centuries earlier is surprising in itself.

pronoun as a single part of speech and defines the verb as a word signifying the predicate (*Schol. ad D.T.* p. 160, 24-161, 18). These texts probably go back to Apollonius Dyscolus. At any rate, Apollonius' only reference to Dionysius concerns his classification of pronouns as 'deictic articles'²⁰. On all these four points the *Technē* gives divergent information. Scholars like Pfeiffer and Erbse have suggested that Dionysius changed his mind or presented these points in different ways in different contexts. But such suppositions are less acceptable from a methodological point of view than the more simple one that the *Technē* §§ 6 ff. is unauthentic and a product of the third century A.D. or later. Henceforth this is my position.

Of course, on this supposition the question now is: "what did Dionysius write?" For from the quotes in Sextus (I 57 and 250) it follows that Dionysius wrote something on the activities of the grammarian. The manner in which Dionysius starts, viz. by giving a definition of *grammatikē* and a distinction of its parts, followed by an explanation of the first part, that on reading, suggests that the continuation after section four²¹ was a systematic one as well, and we have no indication that it was not. As to possible contents of his work it is preferable to discuss these in a wider context. For suppositions on this point depend on one's views about the activities of Dionysius' fore-runners.

II

3. It has since long been recognized that Greek and Roman linguistics are based on the distinction of 'parts of speech'. The *μέρη λόγου* or *partes orationis* are the primary elements around which this grammar is built. It is true, in *artes grammaticae* first

²⁰ Cf. SCHENKEVELD (1983), 74-76.

²¹ Suggestions about section 5 in PFEIFFER, 269 and ERBSE, 247.

comes a treatment of individual, articulated sounds, which in combination produce syllables, and these make words. But the main interest is on the words, how they are to be ordered in word classes and how they are put together to make sentences. The classification by word classes is done by means of various morphological, syntactical and semantic categories and paradigms of associated forms are set up. For these reasons this word based grammar has been called a "word and paradigm model" (Robins, 25).

The distinction of word classes is traditionally seen as a cumulative process: Plato has two classes, *δνομα* and *φημα*, to which Aristotle adds *σύνδεσμος* and *ἀρθρον*, which number the Stoics increase first to five by differentiating between *δνομα* (proper noun) and *προσηγορία* (common noun), and later to six, when they split *μεσότης* (adverb) from the verb. Finally, the Alexandrian scholars, specifically Aristarchus, distinguish between verb and participle (*μετοχή*), conjunction and preposition (*πρόθεσις*), between article and pronoun (*ἀντωνυμία*), but put *προσηγορία* as a species under the noun and call the adverb *ἐπίρρημα*. In this way they get eight parts of speech and notwithstanding some endeavours to raise the number to nine, ten or eleven classes this number of eight classes becomes the standard one.

To look at the development of the theory of the parts of speech in this way, or a similar one, is traditional from the first century B.C. onwards²². But such a reconstruction neglects

²² D. H. *Comp.* 2 and *Dem.* 48, who ends with nine parts and has no stage of eight parts; Quint. *Inst.* I 4, 18-21, who ends with eight parts as the established number, though he casually refers to higher numbers. Other surveys, such as *Schol. ad D.T.* p. 515, 19-521, 37, p. 356, 7-358, 9 (printed as one text under the fragments of Apollonius Dyscolus, *GG* II/3 p. 31, 26-36, 24) and Prisc. *Inst.* II 15-17, *GL* II p. 54, 5-55, 3, inform us that the Peripatetics distinguish two classes only and the Stoics five, mention their arguments and refute these

basic differences between the approaches of the various persons and groups to language. Plato's terms *onoma* and *rhēma* have their origin in his interest in dialectic aspects of language. Aristotle avails himself of two kinds of parts. When looking at sentences as bearers of truth/falsity he recognizes only the 'statement-making sentence' (*λόγος ἀποφαντικός*) as such a bearer. It consists of two *μέρη λόγου* only, the *δνομα* and the *ρῆμα*. They have meaning, and a third category, the *σύνδεσμος*, is just mentioned. The logician's viewpoint is also evident when forms other than nominative and third person present indicative are called 'falls' (*πτώσεις*) of the two 'parts of the statement-making sentence' (*Int.* 2-4, 16 a 19 – 17 a 7). But when Aristotle looks at language as expression (*λέξις*) he distinguishes many *μέρη λέξεως*, of which some have no meaning (sound, syllable, *σύνδεσμος*, *ἄρθρον*), while others do (*δνομα*, *ρῆμα*, *λόγος*). He discusses these 'parts of the expression' in his *Poetics* ch. 20 and uses them in the *Rhetoric*, too. The conclusion is therefore that Aristotle uses the terms *μέρος λόγου* and *μέρος λέξεως* in different context and e.g. a *ρῆμα* in a *logos* is looked at in a different way from that in the *lexis*.

This distinction is already troubling to Theophrastus, who (fr.683 Fortenbaugh *et alii*) discusses the problem of the status of the *σύνδεσμος* and the *ἄρθρον* in relation to the *λόγος* and this discussion is picked up and continued by Aristotle's commentators of the first century A.D. and later.

The Stoics have a different theory of meaning and of logic and they distinguish five *μέρη λόγου*, 'parts of the proposition', all of which are meaningful. Later, a sixth part is added to this number. Although first and foremost these distinctions play a role at the level of meaning, their terminology is based on that

in order to defend the number of eight parts.

of the wording, the signifiers. They separate ὄνομα (proper name) from προσηγορία (appellative) because they correspond to an ontological difference. Next to ὅντα they also have σύνδεσμος and ὅρθρον as meaningful parts. The latter parts include prepositions and conjunctions, articles and pronouns respectively, and according to Apollonius qualifying adjectives, such as προθετικοὶ σύνδεσμοι, show what kind of σύνδεσμος is meant. The adverb is recognized as an independent class (μεσότης). Like Aristotle, Stoics distinguish between λόγος and λέξις, be it differently, and στοιχεῖα λέξεως (elements of the expression) are to them the individual letters (D.L. VII 56-58).

Within their parts of the proposition Stoics distinguish several constant attributes, perhaps called συμβεβηκότα. They develop a refined system of tense and diathesis, case, gender and number. All this is done, as I said above, in the framework of their study of logic and thus we find their theory of the verb in their discussion of meaning. The distinctions made at that level correspond, but not always unequivocally, to those in the physical world of words. Many of their terms and concepts have been taken over and adapted by grammarians and thus have become common stock of our linguistic knowledge²³. This contribution of the Stoics to the development of ancient grammar was decisive and is rightly recognized in the title of Max Pohlenz' article, "Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa"²⁴.

From our primary source on Stoic logic, the survey of Diocles of Magnesia in Diogenes Laertius VII 49 ff., we learn that they discuss points of grammar both in the *topos* on sound (φωνή) and in that of πράγματα, which distinction correspond to that

²³ Cf. FREDE (1978), and D.M. SCHENKEVELD, section 'Grammar' in *Cambridge Hist. of Hellenistic Philosophy* (to be published).

²⁴ NGG 1939, I 3, 6, 151-198 (*Kl. Schr.* I [Hildesheim 1965], 39-86).

of signifiers and signified. We also learn about a *τέχνη περὶ φωνῆς* written by Diogenes of Babylon (ab. 240-150) but such a treatise does not cover the whole of their logico-grammatical studies as is proven by Dionysius' remark about the contents of Chrysippus' *περὶ τῆς συντάξεως τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν* (*Comp.* 4).

4. This exposition on the early theory of word classes and accidentia is necessary in order to grasp the dimensions of the work of the Alexandrian scholars before Dionysius Thrax in this field. Unfortunately, what is left of the works, both of Aristophanes of Byzantium (± 257-180 B.C.)²⁵ and of Aristarchus of Samothrace (± 217-145 B.C.)²⁶, consists of fragments only; it does not establish unequivocally the contribution of these scholars to linguistic studies. We now know that their literary theory shows a strong influence of that of the Peripatos²⁷. Their use of linguistic terms points, however, to Stoic influence and this is what we may expect.

The first concern of these scholars is explaining texts. They do so by means of *μετάληψις*, substitution and paraphrase, i.e. they put a well known word for a less known word, or for one used in a less known or peculiar way, because their meanings

²⁵ Edited by W. SLATER, *Aristophanis Byzantii Fragmenta*, SGLG 6 (Berlin-New York 1986).

²⁶ No edition of his fragments exists. The *Aristonicus scholia* on Homer's *Iliad* explain Aristarchus' critical signs (ed. L. FRIEDLÄNDER [Göttingen 1853; repr. Amsterdam 1965]). They and the *Didymus scholia* (ed. M. SCHMIDT [Leipzig 1854; repr. 1964]) are our main source. New edition of all *scholia vetera* on the *Iliad* by H. ERBSE, 7 vols (Berlin 1969-1988). Supplementary information is given by other authors.

²⁷ Cf. Roos MEIJERING, *Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia* (Groningen 1987), and the contribution of N.J. Richardson to this volume.

are the same²⁸. The remark known to every student, ὁ δέ ἀντὶ τοῦ γάρ (*Schol. A* 200), is a good example of this method, another is that on A 173-175 (Ἐμοιγε καὶ ἄλλοι, οἱ κέ με τιμήσουσι), διτὶ περισσός δὲ κε σύνδεσμος; ἢ τὸ τιμήσουσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμήσειαν. Such annotations do not betray any concern for trying to generalize one's observations, which is a prerequisite for making a grammar. We find such remarks everywhere in our scholia, and what they show is an awareness on the side of these scholars that Homer's diction is quite different from that of his readers. Often Aristonicus' scholia offer grammatical terms, which points to a knowledge of such terms and their applicability, not yet necessarily to a wider interest. However, the scholia also display a great tendency on the side of scholars to establish the right text of Homer where choices can be made. Then we meet with generalizing observations on Homer's diction, such as διτὶ ἔθος αὐτῷ πληθυντικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνικῶς λέγειν or διτὶ οὐ γραπτέον, ὡς τινες, γένηται. 'Ομηρικώτερον γάρ οὖτως λέγειν, γένωνται τὰ κύματα, ὡς σπάρτα λέλυνται (*Schol. A* 14a; *B* 397a). These observations concern the poetic plural and the Homeric syntax of neuter plural nouns being combined with plural verb forms, and do more than only explaining the text *ad locum*. Here we detect a beginning of systematization, of making a grammar. This impression is strengthened by Apollonius' remark that Aristarchus called the pronouns λέξεις κατὰ πρόσωπα συζύγους, 'words grouped together according to person' (*Pron.* p. 3, 12-3 [GG II/1, 1]; *Synt.* II 15, p. 137, 10 [GG II/2]). The context of this remark is unknown and we do not know whether it is a kind of definition nor whether Aristarchus used the term

²⁸ This method is a kind of translation but, of course, translation from Greek into another language was out of the question. For this method in general see SLUITER, 111-7.

ἀντωνυμία. At any rate, we have traces of a deeper reflection on language and further concern for the technical, theoretical part, but still in the context of exegesis and diorthosis of texts. So far the general picture.

As to the details²⁹, Aristophanes edited many texts and provided these with critical signs. He is also credited with having put accents in the texts. Next to the scholia on Homer the fragments of his lexicographical studies are a primary source for our subject. From all these and other testimonies Callanan concludes that Aristophanes probably employs the notion of τὸ ίδιον τῆς προθέσεως (the characteristic property of the preposition) and sees this in the capacity of ἀναστροφή (fr. 382 Sl.). He uses παράγειν (to form by derivation) also for the case of compounds and makes a descriptive rule on the accentuation of comparatives in -ίων. Aristophanes also consciously applies rules of analogy and sets up conditions under which these can work.

A survey of Aristarchus' use of technical terms primarily based on the Aristonicus scholia is given by Ax: Aristarchus uses the names of eight word classes, ὄνομα ῥῆμα, μετοχή, ἀρθρον, ἀντωνυμία, πρόθεσις, μεσότης (not ἐπίρρημα) and σύνδεσμος and treats the appellative as an ὄνομα³⁰. His 'definition' of pronouns has been reported above. He calls αὐτός an ἀντωνυμία ἐπιταγματική because it can be added to any orthotonic pronoun (A.D. *Pron.* p.62, 16-7). The later traditional terminology for the accidentia is already present giving us, among other things, the names for the five cases and the three genders of nouns. Among the accidentia of the verb the scholia have only ἀπαρέμφατον, προστακτικόν as the

²⁹ CALLANAN and Ax (1991). General information in PFEIFFER, chh. V and VI.

³⁰ Προσηγορία is not used in the Stoic sense but only for 'greeting, address'.

names of moods, while the diatheses *παθητικόν* and *ἐνεργήτικόν*, but not the medium, occur, as do the tenses *παρατατικός*, *μέλλων* and the distinction *παρατατικώς* v. *συντελικώς*. Aristarchus, too, applies rules of analogy and adds a further condition. Many of the terms mentioned are found in the context of a typically Aristarchean approach, viz. observations on Homeric divergences from ordinary usage. He calls these phenomena *σχήματα* and discusses them with the help of the categories of ellipse, addition and transposition.

Are these representations, especially those regarding Aristarchus, reliable? Every scholar working on these materials acknowledges that one has to take into account the possibility that technical terms have been introduced by later grammarians, e.g. Aristonicus. Where Aristarchus, to give one example, says on B 242 *λωβήσαιο* no more than: *πρὸς τὸ σχῆμα, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐλωβήσω δὲν, ἔβλαψας ή λωβητὸς ἐγένου*, Aristonicus reformulates this thus: A 232 *δτι τὸ εὔκτικὸν ἀντὶ παρεληλυθότος ὀριστικοῦ τοῦ ἐλωβήσω παρείληπται*³¹. Because the adverb is called *μεσότης*, not *ἐπίρρημα*, and the terms *ἀπαρέμφατον* and *προστακτικόν* sc. *φῆμα* appear instead of the later usual ones *ἀπαρέμφατος* and *προστακτική* sc. *ἔγκλισις* it has been argued that Aristonicus reproduces an older terminology. I grant that the use of *μεσότης* is the most stringent argument of all for Ax's view that Aristonicus' terminology here represents that of Aristarchus³². Moreover, we have in sch. Ω 8 *verba ipsissima* of Aristarchus, quoted by Herodian, *τὸ πεῖρε διδάσκει ήμᾶς καὶ τὴν πείρων μετοχὴν βαρύνειν* [...]. εἰ

³¹ Cf. *Schol.* A 11, 340 with Φ 317 (*ἀρθρον*); B 576, K 322 with K 321 (*ἀντωνυμία*) etc.

³² This meaning not in LSJ. Apart from D.L. VII 57 and the Aristonicus scholia I found this use in Simplicius, *In Cat.* p. 388, 26 Kalbfleisch (CAG VIII).

γὰρ περιεσπάτο, ἢν ὃν ὁ παρατατικός ἔπειρα. This quote shows Aristarchus using *μετοχή* as a technical term. But the argument based on the form of the mood terms is not valid because Dionysius of Halicarnassus is still using the neuter forms of moods, though he knows of ἐγκλίσεις³³.

Now, as far as we know, Aristonicus does not profess to reproduce Aristarchus' wording in its original form. But when Apollonius tells us that Aristarchus calls αὐτοῦ an ἀντωνυμία ἐπιταγματική (see above), he suggests, to say the least, that Aristarchus uses this term. The word ἀντωνυμία occurs in the Aristonicus' scholia in *schol.* B 576, K 322, Λ 201 and Ψ 403. But the *scholion* K 204 gives a different picture. It ends thus: τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῶν κοινὸν ἔστι ἐπίταγμα τῶν τριῶν προσώπων. Aristonicus offers the term ἐπίταγμα twice, once in *schol.* K 204, and once in *schol.* M 350a in the sense of 'order, command'. The sense of 'addition' in connection with words is very rare — it is not in LSJ — and it looks as if Aristonicus preserves an Aristarchean term. At the same time, however, we have in the form of κοινὸν ἐπίταγμα an indication that Aristarchus does not yet use the term ἀντωνυμία. This explanation is also probable in view of the misunderstanding displayed by Apollonius in his survey of names previous scholars have given to this word class (*Pron.* p. 3, 9-5, 19). Therefore, I assume that Aristonicus *sometimes* perpetuates Aristarchus' terminology but is also likely to introduce that of his own time.

I wonder whether we can be sure that Aristarchus deliberately includes the appellative under the δνομα, as is done in the *Technē* and as Quintilian (*Inst.* I 4, 20) testifies for Aristarchus, and not just neglects the distinction because there is no need to apply it. A different tradition on this point has it that Trypho

³³ See SCHENKEVELD (1983), 83-85.

(first cent. B.C.) puts *προσηγορία* under *δνομα* (*Schol. ad D.T.* p. 356, 16-21) and we have seen that Dionysius Thrax is said to keep these apart. It may well be that the use of *προσηγορία* in the sense of 'greeting' in the Aristonicus scholia later led scholars to the conclusion that Aristarchus did what Trypho also did.

5. From this picture of the linguistic work of Aristophanes and Aristarchus one may conclude that they have an impressive apparatus of linguistic distinctions at their disposal, although some doubts remain regarding the provenance of several terms in our sources. For much of the nomenclature they use is of Stoic origin. While these descriptive tools are used primarily in the framework of their philological pursuits, we observe at the same time — and this may even be more important — that they develop this apparatus and thus make a first contribution of philology towards the emancipation of the technical part of their discipline. We do not know of any theoretical work in which they systematize their knowledge. All we know is their grammatical competence³⁴. But it would appear that, at least orally, they discuss theoretical aspects of their skill. It is also a plausible hypothesis that they not merely apply what others had thought out but make some contributions of their own. At least, we have no indication at all that the Stoics distinguished, e.g., *μετοχή* as a separate word class, while *μεσότης* may also be seen as an Alexandrian invention.

6. The state of linguistics in the first century B.C., although much more elaborate than before, has not yet become fixed. We have already seen that a nine part system of word classes is still present, and that both *δνομα* and *προσηγορία* continue to be

³⁴ "Grammatik im Kopf", Ax (1991), 288.

distinguished as separate items³⁵. The *accidentia* are called συμβεβηκότα, not yet παρεπόμενα, and the lists vary. Thus Dionysius of Halicarnassus has συστολαί, ἐκτάσεις, δέξιτητες, βαρύτητες, γένη, πτώσεις, ἀριθμοί, ἐγκλίσεις καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις and in the fragments of the first book of Philodemus' *On Poems* συστολή, ἐκτασίς and terms for accentuation are regarded as belonging to the συμβεβηκότα. In other words, there is not yet a clear distinction between the *accidentia* of word classes and the πάθη λέξεων. Dionysius even has a separate category of πάθη συλλαβῶν and among the adverbs he mentions a species, ἐπίρρημα τρόπου, a term unique in ancient theory³⁶. The system is still fluent. But considerable progress has been made. This also appears from the separation of the τεχνικὸν μέρος from other parts of *grammatikē*, referred to in § 1. We now also hear of titles of treatises, or parts thereof, that focus on particular word classes and other linguistic subjects, e.g. by Trypho³⁷. Other signs of further development we shall encounter in part III.

In section 3 I raised an objection against the notion of a simple growth in the number of classes as if there were no different principles involved. Now that the efforts of the scholars have been reviewed we can put these in a better perspective. Aristophanes and Aristarchus are no philosophers and logic is not their concern. They can therefore neglect differences between parts of the proposition and those of expression and conceive of distinctions made there as all being basically on the same level of λέξις, expression. Thus they can take over from

³⁵ This distinction also in later papyri, see WOUTERS, 179-180.

³⁶ SCHENKEVELD (1983), 81-3. The information on Philodemus was orally given by R. Janko, who is preparing an edition of Philodemus' treatise.

³⁷ He probably lived ab. 50 B.C. (FEHLING [1979], 489). List of his works is given by C. WENDEL, in *RE* VII A 1 (1939), s.v. "Tryphon", 726-744.

the Stoics their parts of the proposition and treat these as *μέρη λέξεως* in the Aristotelian sense. They now separate preposition from conjunction, pronoun from article, treat the participle as a class of its own and probably do the same for *μεσότης*. I am not sure about the exact nomenclature they used but think that the distinctions are made.

This process of transforming Stoic categories into grammatical word classes may be seen as a great achievement, or as a failure to understand the Stoic approach. Still it is an important contribution towards linguistic science.

This evaluation is based on the hypothesis that *λέξις*, 'expression' is the starting-point for the distinctions of the Alexandrians. But the usual term for word classes is *μέρη λόγου*, one might object, and this fact may be thought to invalidate my supposition. However, Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses indiscriminately *μέρος λόγου*, *μέρη λέξεως*, *μόρια φράσεως*, *στοιχεία λέξεως* and his nomenclature looks *au courant des faits*³⁸. Even the famous definition of *ἀναλογία*, which we shall consider in the next part, *συμπλοκή λόγων ἀκολούθων ἐν κλίσεσι μερῶν λέξεως* (*GL VI* p. 276, 3-4), has *μέρη λέξεως*, not *μέρη λόγου*. In the context of this definition Aristophanes and Aristarchus are mentioned³⁹. A consequence of my view is to posit that in the next generation, that of Dionysius Thrax, Stoic influence becomes more pronounced. This supposition is supported by the testimonies about his separating *προσηγορία* from *δνομα* and his view that pronouns are *ἄρθρα δεικτικά*. It has been suggested by other scholars, indeed, that Apollodorus of Athens, a pupil of both

³⁸ SCHENKEVELD (1983), 70 and 92-93.

³⁹ The Aristonicus *scholia* have neither terms.

Aristarchus and Diogenes of Babylon, transferred Stoic linguistic knowledge to Alexandria⁴⁰.

After the efforts of Aristophanes and Aristarchus systematization of the material sets in. Dionysius Thrax takes a first step in defining and describing the art of scholarship but genuine systematization of the technical part of *grammatikē* does not come before the next generation. Asclepiades of Myrlaea must have been important in this respect, whereas further ordering was undertaken by Trypho. The system of ancient grammar with its parts of sounds, word classes, orthography and *hellēnismos* is now complete and ready for further refinement.

III

7. My second topic concerns the theory of ἔλληνισμός. Here again Aristotle leads the way⁴¹. In *Rhet.* III 5, 1407 a 19 ff. ἔλληνίζειν as the start of a good and lucid style includes both grammatical and stylistic requirements. In *Soph. El.* Aristotle discusses ἔλληνίζειν from the point of view of correctness only. He produces several instances of σολοικισμός in which one 'does not speak Greek' and these have to do with lack of concord. He does not yet differentiate between σολοικίζειν and βαρβαρίζειν. In his rhetorical theory of *virtutes dicendi* Theophrastus separates ἔλληνισμός from σαφῆνεια and thus restricts the range of the word to speaking correct Greek. The Stoics take over from Theophrastus his concept of *virtutes* and adapt it. To them ἔλληνισμός is faultless expression in accord-

⁴⁰ E.g. FREDE (1977), 52.

⁴¹ For earlier views on δρθοέπεια see Donatella DI CESARE "Die Geschmeidigkeit der Sprache", in SCHMITTER, ed. (1991), 87-118.

ance with the technical and non-arbitrary usage (συνήθεια)⁴². This avoidance of everyday usage also appears in the definition of βαρβαρισμός as 'expression in conflict with the usage of the Greeks of high repute'. This *vitium* apparently concerns the level of pronunciation, rather than syntactic correctness, where meaning plays a role. The latter is meant in the definition of σολοικισμός: 'logos which is composed without concord' (D.L. VII 59). In the Stoic system, as we shall see in the next part, the agreement between meanings determines the correct agreement at the level of expression.

In his attack on the *grammatikoi* Sextus spends much attention on their views on ἔλληνισμός (M. I 176-240). He distinguishes two kinds of *hellénismos*, one which "stands apart from our common usage (συνήθεια) and seems to proceed in accordance with γραμματική ἀναλογία; the other conforms to the common usage of each of the Greeks and is derived from framing (new) words and from observation in ordinary converse" (I 176). From the sequence to this section it appears that according to Sextus, at least, ἀναλογία is the pivotal notion of the views of the *grammatici* on *hellénismos*. Analogy is defined as "juxtaposition of many similar words" (δύοισιν πολλῶν δύνομάτων παράθεσις, 199). A somewhat similar definition is quoted in later works and there it is said that Aristophanes and Aristarchus formulated criteria of analogy⁴³. And we remember that 'detailed account of analogy' is one of Dionysius' parts of γραμματική. Let us therefore first look at the use the Alexandrian scholars make of analogy.

⁴² D.L. VII 59. Cf. C. ATHERTON, "Hand over Fist. The failure of Stoic rhetoric", in *CQ* N.S. 38 (1988), 412-3.

⁴³ Charisius, *Artis grammaticae libri V*, ed. C. BARWICK (Leipzig 1964), p. 149, 21-150, 2 and *Fragm. Donatiani*, *GL* VI p. 275, 13-276, 9.

8. Originally the main purpose of the application of the method of analogy is to establish the correct forms of words in literary texts. Then it is employed as an heuristic tool. Afterwards analogy is a criterion for settling disputes about the correctness of forms in actual language. In that case analogy is one of the norms, or the only one, applied within the framework of *hellénismos*⁴⁴. In the former stage one compares a form which is being discussed with one which is established (*x* ως *y*, bipartite proportion) or in order to establish an unknown form, e.g. the accentuation of a participle in the plural, one takes both another form and this form of the verb and compares these to the same forms of a similar word (ώς ξειρε κείρων, οὗτως ξπειρε πείρων, quadripartite proportion). The method applies not only to flexion (both inflection and conjugation) but also to derivative forms. An extension of the method is the construction of κανόνες, rules about accentuation, quantity of syllables, flexion of nouns and verbs etc. These rules are connected with the paradigms of declension and conjugation. Later grammarians decide upon the correct form by quoting the rule which applies⁴⁵. Thus there is a simple kind of analogy of comparing individual forms and a more complex one of assigning a controversial form to a κανών. The fundament of this method may well be the idea that language is basically regular and that reason helps to detect this regularity⁴⁶ but we cannot deduce this from the *scholia*.

⁴⁴ FEHLING (1956/1958), 214-270; 48-100 (survey of definitions on pp. 219 and 229), SIEBENBORN, 56-84 with some corrections made by BLANK, 24-27 and SLUITER, 56-61.

⁴⁵ SIEBENBORN, 63-67 and CALLANAN, 113-117. An early instance is Sext. Emp. *M. I* 221-224.

⁴⁶ Cf. BLANK, 11-12.

As to the details, both Aristophanes and Aristarchus apply the simple kind of analogy.

For Aristophanes one may point to *schol.* O 606, where Herodian refers to Aristophanes' discussion of the correct accent of *ταρφεσιν*. He puts up two analogies, one based on similarity of nouns *βέλος* : *τάρφος* = *βέλεσι* : *τάρφεσι* (1) and the other on adjectives: *όξυς* : *ταρφύς* = *όξεσι* : *ταρφέσι* (2)⁴⁷. For Aristarchus the *scholion* Ω 8a, quoted above (§ 4), suffices. From the many instances, especially of Aristarchus' application of analogy, it appears that this use primarily concerns matters of accentuation of all kinds of words.

We have a late but trustworthy testimony saying that Aristophanes and Aristarchus put up several conditions of analogy⁴⁸. The presupposition is that superficial similarity in form is not enough to make an acceptable proportion. There are conditions to be fulfilled to get such a proportion. Aristophanes' conditions are similarity in gender, case, ending, number of syllables and accent, to which Aristarchus adds similarity in *figura*, i.e. whether a word is simple or compound. It has been shown from the *scholia* that these conditions are applied by the two Alexandrians and that Aristarchus' addition is still ignored by Aristophanes⁴⁹. It may well be, therefore, that intelligent readers distilled these conditions from the works of the two men but an

⁴⁷ CALLANAN, 117-119, who, however, constructs a hexapartite proportion. The *scholion* says: "If *ταρφεσι* means *τοῖς δᾶσεσιν* ['the coves', note the article as a sign of an *interpretamentum*], then it goes like *βέλεσι*, but if it is an adjective, then the accent is *ταρφέσιν*, like in *όξεσιν*". I owe this interpretation to Dr. Sluiter.

⁴⁸ *GL* VI p. 275, 13-276, 9, which *Fragmentum Donatiani* is fuller than Charisius p. 149, 22-150, 2 Barw. See BLANK, 26-27 for a discussion of the definitions of analogy given there. These are not by Aristarchus.

⁴⁹ SIEBENBORN, 75-78 and CALLANAN, esp. 26-27 and 43-44.

oral instruction, transmitted and put down in writing later on, is also possible.

It has been claimed that the application of the simple kind presupposes an extensive knowledge of paradigms, an elaborate system of declension and conjugation⁵⁰. But especially the conditions of case and number have no point in a fully elaborated theory with κανόνες, as known from later grammatical handbooks⁵¹. Aristarchus' method of σχήματα (see above section 4) by which he annotates observations of Homeric divergences from ordinary usage implies no more than a deviation, which for this reason must be annotated. In other words, the fragments of Aristophanes and Aristarchus cannot be used as a proof for these Alexandrians already availing themselves of a more or less complete theory of flexion. On the other hand, to deny them any tendency of classifying grammatical items would seem wrong. Aristophanes is known as a great classifier of poetical genres and metres. Long before him Aristotle already ordered related words, like τὰ δίκαια, ὁ δίκαιος, ἡ δικαιοσύνη into σύστοιχα and related these to their *ptôseis*, the adverbs (δικαίως)⁵². A first step towards setting up lists of flexion is, therefore, not improbable or impossible. All this does not yet go to say, however, that the two men ever used their tools or reflected upon these outside the framework of their philological activities. For such an assumption we need other information.

This information cannot be found in *schol.* A 68, where Aristonicus-Aristarchus states that Zenodotus writes ἐκαθέζετο

⁵⁰ ERBSE, 237-244: "Die Paradigmata für Deklination und Konjugation mussten in allen Einzelheiten bekannt sein" (p. 244). This in reaction to Siebenborn (next note).

⁵¹ SIEBENBORN, 75-78.

⁵² *Top.* II 9, 114 a 26-b 5.

instead of *κατ' ἄρ' ξέτο* — the statement is problematic and may be explained thus that Zenodotus refers to cases such as *ἐκάθευδε* (A 611), a reading Aristarchus also rejects⁵³. The rest of the scholion is relevant here: *οὐκ ἔἄ δὲ ἐλληνίζειν τὸν Ὀμηρον. ὅσπερ γάρ οὐδὲ λέγει ἐκατέβαινεν, οὗτος οὐδὲ ἐκαθέξετο*⁵⁴. The view that Homer not always wrote faultless Greek is sometimes articulated, e.g. by Zoilus and Chrysippus (*schol. A 129a*). Aristarchus opposes this view and according to Apollonius he thinks that Homer's Greek is exact (*παρ' Φ τὰ τοῦ Ἐλληνισμοῦ ἡκρίβωται*). Accordingly, Aristarchus quotes Homeric forms *σφάς αὐτούς* as proving that the modern one *ἐαυτούς* is incorrect (A.D. *Pron.* p. 71, 21-29 [GG II/1, 1]). These passages only prove that Aristarchus has some interest in correct Greek, like so many other Greeks before him, but nothing more.

However, there is the testimony of Varro (*Ling.* VIII 23 and IX 1) that Aristarchus maintains that *ἀναλογία* is the norm for correct Greek both in matters of flexion and those of derivation, whereas he is opposed by Crates of Mallos, who views *ἀνωμαλία* as the leading principle and, therefore, takes the everyday usage (*συνήθεια*) as the norm of *hellénismos*. According to Varro Greeks and Romans have written many books on this subject but it started from a misunderstanding on the side of Crates, who wrongly extended the range of anomaly in deriva-

⁵³ See on Zenodotus' method of referring to parallel lines, often misunderstood by later commentators as a wish to change the text, H. van THIEL, "Zenodot, Aristarch und andere", in *ZPE* 90 (1992), 1-32.

⁵⁴ Cf. *schol. O 716* δτι Ζηνδοτος γράφει οὐκ ἔμεθει *ώστε βαρβαρίζειν τὸν Ὀμηρον*. No further instances of these and related terms in Aristonicus *scholia*.

tion to flexion⁵⁵. Nowadays some scholars tend to the view that there must have been a discussion between Crates and Aristarchus on the range of everyday usage and analogy, respectively, in deciding what is correct Greek. In this discussion the literary tradition (*παράδοσις*) must also have played a role, but this aspect is not mentioned. Others, however, deny the very existence of such a discussion⁵⁶. At any rate, we have much reason to distrust Varro's account about the nature, length and extent of the quarrel between analogists and anomalists. At the same time we lack real evidence that Aristarchus and co-philologists of his time used analogy within the framework of a theory of *hellénismos*.

9. In the first century B.C. the subject of what is correct Greek and what not and by which norms one may decide in this matter not only becomes a hot issue but also brings about systematic texts on this subject. Titles of treatises *περὶ Ἑλληνισμοῦ* (-*ν*) are known from this period onwards⁵⁷. In Asclepiades' classification of the parts of *γραμματική* the *μέρος τεχνικόν* consists of the theory *περὶ τῶν στοιχείων καὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν, δρθογραφίας τε καὶ Ἑλληνισμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀκολούθων*. From Asclepiades' wording the connection

⁵⁵ Varro's use of *declinatio* in a double sense of both flexion (*derivatio naturalis*) and derivation (*declinatio voluntaria*) has been connected with a double sense *κλίσις* would have for the Stoics. But this double sense is a fiction. See SCHENKEVELD (1990), 297-298.

⁵⁶ AX (1991), 287 and SIEBENBORN, 31 *pro*, BLANK, 1-4 and TAYLOR, 6-8 *contra*.

⁵⁷ SIEBENBORN, 32. Add Strabo's reference (XIV 2, 28, p. 663) to αἱ τέχναι περὶ Ἑλληνισμοῦ. These *technai* probably are an offshoot of the τέχναι *γραμματικαῖ* and offer an opportunity to discuss in greater detail what has been presented in a global way in the τέχναι *γραμματικαῖ*. See M. BARATIN, *La naissance de la syntaxe à Rome* (Paris 1989), 347-349.

between *orthographia* and *hellēnismos* seems closer than that between sounds and parts of speech, whereas the final words probably refer to notions closely connected with *hellēnismos*, like analogy. To speak correct Greek has several faults as its counterparts: βαρβαρισμός, σολοικισμός are terms known from Stoic theory of virtues of speech but their meaning has now changed in so far as *barbarismos* is "a fault in the form of a single word contrary to common usage" and *soloikismos* "a blunder contravening common usage in respect of the whole composition and without concord" (S.E. M. I 210). Other sources mention a third fault, which, moreover, fills a gap left by the two other, viz. ἀκυρολογία, "use of a word in its non-proper or wrong sense". This fault is not touched upon by Sextus but as the word already appears in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' work *on Lysias* (c. 4) we may well suppose that the distinction of a third offence against *hellēnismos* was made at some time in the first century B.C. or earlier⁵⁸.

From Sextus' attack we may deduce the following picture of the theory of *hellēnismos* of Asclepiades c.s.: The starting point, the model on which all varieties of the languages of communication are based is the Attic dialect⁵⁹. This appears from the number of times the Attic dialect, an Attic form or word are compared to (one from) another dialect (M. I 87, 187, 213, 228). This Attic has evolved into ἡ κοινὴ συνήθεια, the common usage of the educated Greeks, not the vulgar or popular language. Therefore Demetrius Chlorus (first cent. B.C. ?) can define *grammatikē* as "knowledge of the expressions used by the poets and in common usage" (M. I 84). This common Greek has to be maintained and should not deteriorate. But questions arise

⁵⁸ Further data in SIEBENBORN, 35-6.

⁵⁹ See in general K. VERSTEEGH, "Latinitas, Hellenismos, 'Arabiyya'", in *Historiographia Linguistica* 13 (1986), 425-448.

about how to decide what is good Greek. One important criterion is analogy, already occurring in Dionysius' list of parts of *γραμματική* but not yet being placed under *ἔλληνισμός*. Now it becomes so important that *ἀναλογία* can serve as an equivalent of *ἔλληνισμός* (*M.* I 179). Analogy may infringe on the common usage because this contains forms which are unexpected and anomalous (*ἀνώμαλος*, 236-240). In the context of analogy *grammatikoi* develop general rules, called *καθολικὰ θεωρήματα, παραπήγματα* or *κανόνες* (221-227). Having established these they decide the correctness of a disputable form by applying the rule.

Another criterion is etymology (241-247). By this method one explains for what reasons and in what way a word got its original form, how this was changed and thus one detects its true meaning. According to Herodian (*GG* III/2 p. 431, 4-8) Aristarchus derived *θίς* (beach, shore) from *θείνεσθαι* (to be struck) or from *θέειν* (to run) and thought therefore that *θείς* would be the correct form. Dionysius puts 'discovery of etymology' as the fourth part of *γραμματική*. This method is now transferred to *hellēnismos* but Sextus is not very clear on this point. He virtually states no more than that etymology is another criterion. In view of later developments⁶⁰ we may suppose that this method helps to decide in matters of orthography, but in the sections on that subject (169-175) there is no allusion to this tool.

It depends on one's own viewpoint whether one prefers analogically and etymologically correct forms or those in usage or a mix of all three. According to Sextus the grammarians are all defenders of the analogy as the most important criterion (and etymology as the runner up), whereas he defends that common

⁶⁰ SIEBENBORN, 140-146, who does not, however, discuss the sections in Sextus.

usage should be the norm. His opinion is related to his own empiricism⁶¹ and he probably exaggerates the position of the *grammatikoi*. For later theory of *hellénismos* lists analogy, (cultivated) common usage and literary authority as the main criteria, whereas Sextus suggests that the *grammatikoi* neglect common usage. He does not mention literary authority (*παράδοσις*) as a third criterion, whereas e.g. already Varro has it (*auctoritas*)⁶², and also another one, *διάλεκτος*, seems absent. The closest he comes to this criterion is in §§ 228-230 when he has *grammatikoi* speaking on the multitude of *συνήθειαί* and differences between Old and Modern Attic, urban and rural Attic. But section 59 proves that such observations serve the *diorthōsis* of texts.

Sextus discusses correct Greek in the case of individual words and forms and is practically silent about correct syntax. He has but a few remarks on the fault against proper syntax, *σολοικισμός* (209-216). For this reason scholars rightly suggest that the treatises on *hellenism* are mainly concerned with morphology, not also with syntax⁶³.

⁶¹ Cf. Françoise DESBORDES, "Le scepticisme et les 'arts libéraux'", in A.-J. VOELKE (ed.), *Le scepticisme antique*, Cahiers de la Revue de théologie et de philosophie 15 (Genève-Lausanne-Neuchâtel 1990), 167-179. A good indication is Sextus' frequent use of *παρατήρησις*.

⁶² M.T. Varronis *De lingua Latina quae supersunt*, rec. G. GOETZ et Fr. SCHOELL (Leipzig 1910), p. 230, 9 ff. Sextus, *M. I* 186 and 188 discusses the possibility that grammarians base their idea of good Greek on the usage of one person. Pindarion (§ 201) seems to have propagated Homeric usage as the best criterion. SIEBENBORN, 54 equates the 'usage of one person' to the Latin *auctoritas* but also admits that it is not a criterium. His statement (149) "Sextus polemisiert [...] eingehend gegen Analogie, Etymologie und Paradosis" goes too far.

⁶³ Cf. A. D. *Synt. I* 60, p. 51, 7-12 Uhlig (GG II/2).

When comparing these data with what we know about later criteria of *hellēnismos* (and *latinitas*) we get the impression that in the beginning of the first century B.C. the theory of *hellēnismos* has not yet developed into the full-blown theory we find later. There is not yet a clear division between criteria of hellenism and those of orthography. From other sources we may infer that in the course of the century Trypho reorganizes the theory of *hellēnismos* and orthography and distinguishes more sharply between the two parts⁶⁴, but we must also say that Asclepiades c.s. cleared the ground to a great extent.

10. In these representations of two doctrines, those on parts of speech and *hellēnismos*, the position of Dionysius Thrax has been left open. At the end of my discussion of the contributions of scholars to language science I can now come back to this subject. As has been said before (see § 2), both Dionysius' definition and what immediately follows look like an endeavour at systematization. Accordingly, one must suppose that in his *Parangelmata*⁶⁵ Dionysius starts from this point. He may have known Stoic $\tau\acute{e}χναι$ $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{t}$ $\varphi\omegaν\eta\varsigma$ but the disposition at the beginning does not make us suppose that he took over their structure⁶⁶. I suggest, therefore, that the initial disposition of the parts is continued in the structure of the whole work.

We know that Dionysius speaks about appellatives and proper nouns, deictic articles and the verb (§ 2). Under which part of *grammatikē* could he have discussed these items? The best place is the second one, $\acute{e}ξηγησις$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{a}$ $\tau\acute{o}u\varsigma$ $\acute{e}νu\pi\acute{a}ρχoνt\alpha\varsigma$

⁶⁴ SIEBENBORN, 161-163 and FEHLING (1979), 489.

⁶⁵ Sextus' wording (*M. I* 57) $\acute{e}n$ $\tau\acute{o}i\varsigma$ $\pi\alpha\gamma\acute{e}\lambda\mu\alpha\varsigma$ may be taken as referring to a title like *Παραγγέλματα γραμματικά*, *Grammatical Precepts*. I adopt this title for convenience's sake.

⁶⁶ See SCHENKEVELD (1990a) for the structure of the Stoic $\tau\acute{e}χn\eta$.

ποιητικούς τρόπους, "interpretation taking note of the poetic expressions in the text" (GG I/1 p.5, 5). I have shown elsewhere that by ποιητικοὶ τρόποι are not meant the 'tropes' but 'poetic usage' *tout court*⁶⁷. We have a good parallel in Aristotle's *Poetics* 19-21 (1456 a 33 ff.) for a theoretical treatment of linguistic notions as an introduction to a discussion of poetical diction: Aristotle successively examines *lexis* as to its forms (command, prayer etc.), composition (simple or compound), parts (see § 3), kinds (word used in its proper sense, metaphor etc.), gender and ending. After this examination he goes on and reviews their uses in poetic texts. My suggestion is that in order to make clear what interpretation according to poetic usage is about, Dionysius begins by stating what poetic usage is, and in order to explain this notion introduces a whole set of linguistic notions. At this place he can give something of a grammar. Later on when dealing with etymology and analogy he is able to use terms already explained in the second part.

This supposition is in agreement with the development of the philological approach of texts and with that of linguistic study. For it firmly keeps the linguistic approach within the domain of philological interpretation and does not yet set it apart as the technical part of philology.

We may have a parallel to this strategy of Dionysius in the *P. Hamb.* 128. This papyrus dates from the second century B.C. and what we have of it is similar to *Poetics* 21, 1457 b 1-1458 a 7. The text has been ascribed to Theophrastus' Περὶ λέξεως but this ascription is wrong⁶⁸. It may be an *ars poetica* but could also be a parallel to Dionysius' *Parangelmata*.

⁶⁷ SCHENKEVELD (1991), 153-156.

⁶⁸ Cf. D.M. SCHENKEVELD, "Pap. Hamburg 128: A Hellenistic *Ars Poetica*", in *ZPE* 97 (1993), 67-80.

IV

11. The final part of this paper concerns the study of syntax. This part of ancient linguistics is best known from the works of Apollonius Dyscolus (second cent. A.D.) and so we definitely enter the Roman period.

Modern syntax starts from phrases and sentence as the basic unit and then analyses the grammatical functions of its parts in relation to one another and those of the phrases, especially their coordination or subordination. When Apollonius, however, discusses *σύνταξις* he means the combination of the parts of speech into the creation of the independent sentence and their place therein and he treats phrases coupled by conjunctions as being on the same level⁶⁹. His work called *Περὶ συντάξεως* is not a systematic account of all possible constructions of the parts of speech but provides a system to deal with selected problems regarding disputed or disputable syntactical constructions, whether they occur in poetry or in everyday usage — in this respect he moves away from his philological predecessors and contributes to the emancipation of grammar. — The constructions in question are disputed for they do not conform to prose syntax or ordinary language. More importantly, many constructions in poetry as well as common usage often do not conform to regular or rational syntax either. Often they are so common they escape notice, and it is the function of Syntax to state the basic rules in order that deviations from the rule may be detected and understood. At the core of all of Apollonius' discussions of language is the idea that there is a rational correctness and orderliness of language on all levels but it is susceptible to corruption. Correctness (*καταλληλότης*) is first

⁶⁹ BLANK, chh. III and IV. Cf. D. DONNET, "La place de la syntaxe dans les traités de grammaire grecque", in *AC* 36 (1967), 22-48.

and foremost regularity in meaning. At this level corruption does not take place, it only does so in the expressions and their combinations. Apollonius, therefore, strictly differentiates between the outer, visible forms (φωνή) and the intelligibles (ἔννοια, νοητά, σηματινόμενα, δηλούμενα).

This semantic approach of syntax is a consequence of the Stoic theory of meaning and though this point has not been stressed in the foregoing parts of my paper⁷⁰, it may be said that "as soon as the level of the single word is left behind, it is the meaning — not just the structure — that is central"⁷¹. Notwithstanding these Stoic origins the grammarians discuss syntactic matters in their own way. They take over from the Stoa many notions and terms but adapt these, or even use them in a completely un-stoic sense. Moreover, the grammarians' concern is no longer the Stoic proposition, but any complete, well-constructed sentence. Thus we have another example of the contribution of scholars to the emancipation of grammar.

However, this picture obscures the rarity of syntactical studies before Apollonius. It looks as if the Stoic concern for syntax was reserved for studies of logic only and that grammarians saw no reason to spend much thought on syntax. We have some treatises dealing with σολοικισμός but they are of a later date. Very interesting is Dionysius' discussion of Thucydides' many faults against syntax, which he reluctantly excuses as σχήματα σολοικοφανή, and a parallel we have in Quintilian's distinction of *figurae grammaticae*⁷². In other words, syntactical items are discussed in the context of rhetoric and criticism, and rhetor-

⁷⁰ The nature of the sources made almost exclusive attention to morphology necessary.

⁷¹ SLIJTER, 2.

⁷² *Th.*, *Amm. II*; Quint. *Inst. IX* 3, 2 ff.

icians apparently have no need of syntactical theory. Apparently Apollonius is the first to make a systematic study of syntax.

I will illustrate my conclusion on the scholarly contribution to an autonomous grammar by discussing Apollonius' treatment of the phrase *τὰ γύναια λέγει* as an example of an irregular construction, which, however, has gone unnoticed as such by laymen⁷³.

Book III 1-3 opens with a general section on correct construction (*κατάλληλον*) and its opposite (*ἀκατάλληλον* or *σολοικισμός*). Apollonius discusses many cases, the last ones concerning *συνέμπτωσις*, coincidence of forms. This phenomenon occurs whenever one form expresses two or more conceptions or more than one combination of lexical and grammatical meaning of the same conception⁷⁴. Apollonius says that "words which coincide in gender [...] or any of the accidents demanding congruence in the word-forms [these are homophones, DMS], will avoid the fault of irregularity."⁷⁵ Avoidance is possible by combining the homophone form with a proper other form into a regular construction. Another possibility lies in the proven presence of a *σχῆμα* in a (poetic) dialect, which for this reason has authority⁷⁶. At p. 315, 13-15 he ends this general treatment by examples and then, as an apparent after-thought, comes the passage on *λέγει τὰ γύναια*, the case of the irregular construction of a neuter plural governing a singular verb. Here he wishes to prove why the construction is irregular and then to explain why it does not strike one as such.

⁷³ *Synt.* III 50-53, pp. 315, 16-319, 2. My interpretation is somewhat different from those of BLANK, 46-47 and F.W. HOUSEHOLDER in his translation (Amsterdam 1981).

⁷⁴ SLUITER, 125-129.

⁷⁵ *Synt.* III 27, p. 292, 17-293, 1.

⁷⁶ *Synt.* III 27, p. 292, 17 ff. and the examples in §§ 27-34.

He puts the problem as follows: "One ought not, here, to ignore the question why in the case of masculine or feminine plurals the irregularity ($\tauὸ ἀκατάλληλον$) becomes evident when these are combined with the singular (of a verb), if we say $*οἱ ἄνδρες λέγει$, $*αἱ γυναῖκες λέγει$, but not in the neuter form, even when the meaning is the same, the form alone having been altered, if we say $τὰ γύναια λέγει$ ". Apollonius does not avail himself of the notions 'subject', 'predicate' and 'government'⁷⁷ and his wording is somewhat longwinded, but his meaning is clear. In his usual way he first mentions a quasi-solution in order to dismiss it: if it were a matter of a poetic licence as in the *schema Pindaricum*, it would be justified by tradition. But such a construction is conspicuous and this construction is not, and we need a rational answer as to why this construction escapes notice as being irregular. (The duty of the syntactician is clear!) The difference between the two plainly faulty expressions and the one under discussion is one of gender (masc.-fem. v. neuter) but this does not explain the fact that neuter plurals are apt to combine with verb singulars. For verbs, like any other word that is not inflected for case, do not distinguish between various genders. Apollonius explains his meaning by referring to adverbs and conjunctions, which are compatible with other parts of speech irrespective of their number and gender. Similarly, verbs do not distinguish for gender, though they do for number and person etc., and, accordingly, verbs do not have to recognize neuters (as their accompanying forms) by a different form from when they are combined with masculine or feminine words. So the question

⁷⁷ For a possible explanation see M. BARATIN, "Sur l'absence de l'expression des notions de sujet et de prédicat dans la terminologie grammaticale antique", in J. COLLART (et al.), *Varron, grammaire antique et stylistique latine* (Paris 1978), 205-209.

still stands: "Why do we say *λέγουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι* and *λέγει τὰ παιδία?*" (Apollonius silently changes the word order because in the sequel he has to work with the ambiguous expression *γράφει τὰ παιδία*, 'the children are writing' and 'he is painting the children'). Verbs also show number (*παρεμφάνει*), (it is one of their accidentia), and, consequently, plural forms should correspond to plural neuters. Therefore, the Homeric phrase *σπάρτα λέλυνται* is more regular (*ἄναλογκώτερον*) than the other phrase in the same line (B 135) *δοῦρα σέσηπεν*). (So the conclusion must be that *γράφει τὰ παιδία* is an irregular construction). This can also be proved by comparing verbal constructions in the first and second persons: it is correct (*ὔγιές*) to say *φιλοπονοῦμεν παιδία ὄντα* but not *φιλοπονῶ παιδία ὄντα*. One should therefore admit that the phrase *φιλοπονεῖ παιδία ὄντα* ("they work hard, being children") is incorrect. Sound reasoning proves the irregularity. Now comes the explanation why the irregularity has been accepted in common usage. The reason looks to Apollonius to be lying in the homophony of the nominative and accusative plurals in the neuter gender. He proves his point by contrasting the faulty phrase **οἱ ἄνδρες γράφει* with the correct one *ἄνδρας γράφει*. Difference in case forms is, however, absent from nominative and accusative plural neuters, although *γράφει τὰ παιδία* is more natural (*φυσικώτερον*) if the accusative is meant. For this reason the irregularity has gone unnoticed.

In this passage Apollonius exhibits his adherence to the philosophical origins of his semantico-syntactic theory. The whole concept of *καταλληλότης* or *άναλογία* is taken over from the Stoa and its semantic level is present everywhere. The use of *παρεμφάνειν* (to show an additional meaning) and other terms is Stoic too. Also his remark on the greater naturalness of the phrase *γράφει τὰ παιδία* with the neuter plural in the accusative smacks after Stoic views, and Apollonius has even

changed the word order. For it is natural and regular that in the case of transitive verbs the word order is verb-noun. But here is one more case where the natural word order has been corrupted. Despite its being irregular Apollonius accepts this case. His task is not to purify the language, he wishes us to be aware of the reasons for cases of irregularity.

At the same time this passage also demonstrates Apollonius' own position as to the criteria of correct Greek (*ἐλληνισμός* in a wide sense): he takes into account the possibility that the construction under discussion is an instance of poetic usage. This means that the authority of the literary tradition (*παράδοσις*) may justify it. Another criterium is daily usage and the final one is reason (*λόγος*). We see, therefore, how Apollonius transfers the three traditional criteria of correct Greek from morphology to syntax.

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DISCUSSION

F. Montanari: Quando si affronta il tema della grammatica in età ellenistica, non si può fare a meno di scontrarsi con il problema della *Techne grammaticè* attribuita a Dionisio Trace. Schenkeveld ha focalizzato due argomenti fondamentali nella storia della grammatica, vale a dire le parti del discorso e lo *hellenismos*; e poi ha scelto per la sua trattazione due periodi, da una parte quello dell'attività di Aristofane di Bisanzio e di Aristarco, dall'altra il I sec. a.C., una scelta che potrebbe anche essere definita: prima e dopo Dionisio Trace.

A proposito di Aristofane di Bisanzio e di Aristarco, Schenkeveld ci ha fatto vedere in modo molto preciso due cose: essi avevano già compiuto una quantità assai rilevante di osservazioni tecnicamente grammaticali e avevano già un considerevole apparato di distinzioni linguistiche; queste osservazioni erano strettamente connesse con la loro attività di interpreti dei testi, erano funzionali ad essa e nello stesso tempo promuovevano un processo di emancipazione della parte tecnica della loro disciplina in senso globale, cioè della *grammatikè* intesa come *empeiria* delle opere di poeti e prosatori, secondo la definizione (sicuramente autentica, cfr. sotto) di Dionisio Trace. Inoltre è molto importante aver mostrato bene che i primi sviluppi di questi interessi in ambito alessandrino si riallacciano da una parte all'insegnamento di Aristotele e dall'altra all'influsso stoico. Sono tre punti che si integrano precisamente e organicamente ai temi che stiamo discutendo in questi giorni.

Per quanto riguarda la *Techne grammaticè* attribuita a Dionisio Trace, la questione della sua autenticità è naturalmente centrale, ma io mi sono sempre posto anche un altro problema, o meglio lo stesso

problema da un altro punto di vista: i §§ 1-4 della *Techne* sono garantiti come autentici dalla citazione di Sesto Empirico e nessuno ha mai dubitato della loro genuinità. Se il resto che segue è falso (cfr. F. Montanari, "L'erudizione, la filologia e la grammatica", in *Lo spazio letterario della Grecia antica*, vol. I, tomo 2 [Roma 1993], 255 sgg.) e soltanto questa parte iniziale è autentica, cosa aveva veramente scritto Dionisio Trace? E' chiaro che uno studioso non ottuso difficilmente potrà pensare di raggiungere delle certezze a questo proposito: pur restando con un grande dubbio, mi pare che allo stato attuale la soluzione proposta da Schenkeveld sia la più probabile e la più ragionevole. E mi pare molto opportuno sottolineare che la questione dell'autenticità e dell'influenza/autorità raggiunta dal manuale non sono la stessa cosa (altrimenti si rischia di usare argomenti *ex silentio*).

Riusciamo così a vedere in modo soddisfacente almeno alcune linee di sviluppo della grammatica fra Aristotele e il I sec. a.C., linee che riguardano in particolare — come dicevamo — le parti del discorso e il concetto di *hellenismos* in connessione con quello di analogia, dunque aspetti centrali della dottrina grammaticale; vediamo in sostanza il percorso che ha portato gli aspetti tecnicamente grammaticali della riflessione sulla lingua a costituirsì come scienza autonoma. In questo cammino Dionisio Trace compì un passo importante, dopo le premesse assai validamente poste da Aristofane di Bisanzio e Aristarco: poi la vera sistemazione della grammatica come *techne* cominciò a essere fatta a partire dalla generazione dopo di lui. Mi pare di grande rilevanza — e nel contesto dei nostri *Entretiens* non bisogna trascurare di ricordarlo — che questo cammino appare costantemente intrecciato con la filologia in senso stretto, con l'analisi dei testi letterari, con l'attività esegetica: gli argomenti e gli esempi portati sono illuminanti e non mi pare necessario dire di più.

Il terzo argomento di Schenkeveld è quello della sintassi, e ovviamente della sintassi di Apollonio Discolo. Mi pare assai probabile che osservazioni sulla sintassi ci siano state prima di Apollonio, ma egli conserva il fascino e l'importanza di aver scritto il primo trattato sistematico di sintassi che ci sia pervenuto (senza dimenticare il fatto che la sintassi sarà assai poco trattata in seguito per molto tempo). Con la sintassi il quadro della grammatica come scienza è completo nelle

sue parti, il pensiero grammaticale ha raggiunto il suo pieno sviluppo: seguirà il grande e globale lavoro di Erodiano, vero punto d'arrivo della disciplina. E' forse il caso più evidente in cui la formazione degli elementi essenziali di una scienza si comprendono soltanto se si tiene conto con uno sguardo unitario almeno del periodo che va da Aristotele al II sec. d.C.

D.M. Schenkeveld: Thank you for agreeing with the main points of my argument, especially that on the linguistic component of Dionysius' *Parangelmata*.

N. Richardson: You mention (p. 292) the *Hamburg papyrus* 128 of the second century B.C. which is closely similar to part of *Poetics* chapter 21. What light (if any) does this shed on knowledge of the *Poetics* in the Hellenistic period?

D.M. Schenkeveld: The *PHamb.* 128 closely follows the list of kinds of words in *Poet.* ch. 21 but I hesitate to conclude from this fact that the *Poetics* were known in the second cent. B.C. The Aristotelian list could easily be taken out of its context and used separately.

J. Irigoin: L'exposé de D.M. Schenkeveld, très riche et de caractère technique, ne laisse guère de prise à la critique surtout de la part de qui n'est pas spécialiste de l'histoire de la grammaire dans l'Antiquité.

A sa remarque sur l'absence de traces de traités de syntaxe antérieurs à Apollonios Dyscole, j'ajouterai que l'œuvre de ce dernier auteur ne nous est connue que par un manuscrit du X^e siècle conservé à Paris. Il y a quelques décennies, un palimpseste de Vienne nous a rendu quelques pages de la Καθολικὴ προσφοδία d'Hérodien, transcrites au X^e siècle et inconnues par ailleurs. Ces deux exemples nous aident à mieux comprendre les aléas de la transmission.

Ma seconde remarque portera justement sur un problème de tradition. Ce qui a été dit de la *Techne* de Denys le Thrace me laisse un peu perplexe. Si, à partir du § 6, on a affaire à une addition du III^e siècle ou même un peu plus tardive, peut-on admettre que les § 1-5, si courts, n'aient pas subi de retouches au moment où l'ensemble a été

constitué? Il faut rappeler en outre que la tradition de Denys est représentée exclusivement aux X^e et XI^e siècles par des manuscrits copiés en Italie du Sud, et non dans l'empire byzantin.

Un dernier point, en relation avec ce qui a été dit hier de la connaissance des dialectes à Alexandrie. La *συνήθεια*, norme de l'*hellenismos* pour Cratès de Mallos, est-elle différente de la *κοινὴ συνήθεια* mentionnée un peu plus loin à propos d'Asclépiade de Myrléa? Il semble bien s'agir dans les deux cas de la langue courante des gens cultivés.

D.M. Schenkeveld: Your observations on "les aléas de la transmission" may be easily extended to other texts of Apollonius and those of his predecessors Fr. Montanari mentioned at the beginning of this discussion. Trypho, to take one instance, discusses many syntactical problems and he, like others, probably do so in the same "stoicizing" way Apollonius does. I cannot imagine that after an interval of several centuries Apollonius is the first to use Stoic syntax (see also D. Blank, in *ANRW* II 34 [1993], 713). Moreover, Stoic syntactic terms such as *καταλληλότης* and *ἀκολουθία* are found in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Sextus etc.

I do not know of any comparable case of a part of a genuine text coupled with a spurious one as is done in the *Techne* (The introductory letter to Alexander in the *Rhet. ad Al.* of Anaximenes is not a real parallel). We are in the dark about the process of production of the *Techne*.

Indeed, in both cases *ἡ κοινὴ συνήθεια* is speech of educated Greeks. One may compare the Stoic definitions of *ἔλληνισμός* and *βαρβαρισμός* (D.L. VII 59, see my section 7) and S.E. M. I 235 *ἀστειοτέρα καὶ φιλολόγος συνήθεια*.

R. Tosi: Sono d'accordo con Lei per quanto riguarda l'impostazione del problema dell'analogia presso gli Alessandrini, e in particolare sulla divisione in due momenti, uno descrittivo ed uno prescrittivo (anche la mia impostazione della questione della nascita della lessicografia presupponeva che materiale alessandrino passasse attraverso una nuova fase, tipica dell'atticismo). Premesso questo, le

chiedo: l'analogia come principio solo a livello morfologico, o anche a quello lessicale? E se lo è anche sul piano lessicale, in che misura lo può essere?

In quale preciso momento Lei pensa che si verifichi il processo di trasformazione delle categorie stoichi in classi di parole?

D.A. Schenkeveld: Thank you very much for your intervention. As to your question about the analogy, I think, but I may be wrong, that in the early stage analogy was applied on the morphological level only and might be applied to lexicographical items in so far as derivations are concerned.

I would like to know the answer to this question but our data are insufficient. Zeno and Chrysippus use grammatical terminology, which, I think, became known to Aristophanes and Aristarchus. Diogenes of Babylon is to us, at least, the codifier of the Stoic $\tau\acute{e}χn\eta$ $\pi\acute{e}r\acute{i}$ $\phi\omega\eta\acute{h}\zeta$ and knowledge of his book will have reached Alexandria through Apollodorus as I have said.