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VII

JOHN WHITTAKER

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PROCLUS' DOCTRINE OF THE ΑΥΘΥΠΟΣΤΑΤΑ

In explanation of the role of the αὐθυπόστατα or "self-constituted" principles in the metaphysical scheme which Proclus expounds in his *Elements of Theology* E. R. Dodds comments: "It was impossible (i.e. for Proclus) to make a breach in the continuity of this scheme by the introduction of genuinely self-determining principles other than the One; at the same time it was necessary to make some provision for the freedom of the human will, which Hellenistic philosophy in general regarded as a necessary ethical postulate. Hence the concept of the αὐθυπόστατον or "self-constituted", which is not self-caused in the sense of being an independent ἀρχή, but "hypostatizes itself" or determines the particular potentiality which shall be actualized in it".[1] It is certainly the case that Plotinus had employed the notion of the self-causation of the One in the context of a

[1] Proclus, *The Elements of Theology* (Oxford 1933; repr. 1963), 223 f. For Proclus' doctrine of the αὐθυπόστατα cf. above all *op. cit.*, prop. 40-51 with E. R. DODDS' commentary, and Procl. *In Parm.* p. 1145 ff. Cousin. It is noteworthy that the doctrine of the double determination of the αὐθυπόστατα as being (Procl. *In Ti.*, III p. 39, 4 f. Diehl) καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀρχηγικῶν αἰτίων καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῶν—a doctrine which appears in Syrianus as well as elsewhere in Proclus (cf. E. R. DODDS, *op. cit.*, 224)—is not explicit in the *Elements*, where the emphasis is upon the identity in the αὐθυπόστατα of cause and effect; cf. prop. 41 and 46.

discussion of free will (*Enn.* VI 8 [39] : Περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνός), and also that Iamblichus in a similar context based the liberty of the soul in part upon its possession of λόγος αὐθυπόστατος (*ap.* Stob. II 8, 45 (II p. 174, 21 ff. Wachsmuth)) : Καὶ καθ' ὅσον μὲν λόγον καθαρὸν αὐθυπόστατον [1] καὶ αὐτοκίνητον ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τε ἐνεργοῦντα καὶ τέλειον ἡ ψυχὴ συνείληφεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἀπόλυτός ἐστι πάντων τῶν ἔξωθεν. [2] I am, however, struck by the fact that neither in the *Elements* nor (*sauf erreur*) elsewhere does Proclus establish any close link between the αὐθυπόστατα and the freedom of the will, whether human or divine [3]. It is therefore my contention that Proclus' conception of the αὐθυπόστατα has little connection with the problem of free will *contra* determinism but is largely influenced by an entirely different line of reasoning, of which I should like to attempt to trace the historical development.

The history of the notion of self-causation in ancient speculation has never been adequately charted, and cannot be dealt with here in every aspect. We shall be concerned in particular with the major role which the notion plays in many Hellenistic philosophies and theologies, but it may be well to point out

[1] This, as E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 224 points out, seems to be the earliest appearance of the term αὐθυπόστατος in surviving literature. It should be noted that Proclus, *In Ti.*, I p. 277, 8 ff. in no way permits one to conclude that the term was used already by Crantor ; cf. H. Dörrie, Ὑπόστασις : *Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte* (*Nachr. d. Akad. d. Wiss. in Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Kl.*, 1955, 3), 67. More below on Proclus' references to Crantor's *Commentary on the Timaeus*. I am grateful to John M. Dillon for supplying me with a list of compounds in αὐτ— and αὐθ— in the surviving works of Iamblichus.

[2] Cf. further Iamblichus, *ap.* Stob. II 8, 43 (II p. 173, 5 ff. W.) : Οὐσία ἐστὶν ἄϋλος ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς καθ' ἑαυτήν, ἀσώματος, ἀγέννητος πάντῃ καὶ ἀνώλεθρος, παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν, αὐτοκίνητος παντελῶς καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὅλων κινήσεων. Αὕτη δὴ οὖν καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ τὴν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὴν ἀπόλυτον περιείληφεν ἐν ἑαυτῇ ζωήν. That Iamblichus is here immediately dependent upon Porphyry seems evident from a comparison of the above text with the passages from Porphyry, *Sent.* to which E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 224 refers.

[3] Proclus does, however, insist upon the unity of will and being in the realm of the divine ; cf. *Theol. Plat.* I 15, p. 75, 8 ff. Saffrey-Westerink (see p. 217 below).

that the idea of self-generation appears with particular clarity already in the Classical period in a fragment of the *Perithous*, variously ascribed to Euripides and Critias (*Vorsokr.* II 88 B 18 Diels-Kranz = Euripides, fr. 594 Nauck²) :

ἀκάμας τε χρόνος περί τ' ἀενάῳ
ῥεύματι πλήρης φοιτᾷ τίκτων
αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, δίδυμοί τ' ἄρκτοι
ταῖς ὠκυπλάνοις πτερύγων ῥιπαῖς
τὸν Ἀτλάντειον τηροῦσι πόλον.

This clear expression of the notion of self-generation makes it evident that in a further fragment of the *Perithous* the term αὐτοφυής must also be understood to imply self-generation (88 B 19 Diels-Kranz = Eurip. fr. 593 N²) :

σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
ῥύμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ',
ὃν πέρι μὲν φῶς, πέρι δ' ὀρφναία
νὺξ αἰολόχρως, ἄκριτός τ' ἄστρων
ὄχλος ἐνδελεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει.

It is not at all apparent whether it is the self-generating χρόνος of the previous fragment who is here addressed as αὐτοφυής (although similarity of metre leads one to suspect that both fragments derive from the same context), but from the point of view of our enquiry it is of especial interest, as we shall see, that Clement of Alexandria, who quotes the fragment, interprets as follows (*Strom.* V 14, 114, 3, in *GCS* II p. 403, 20) : ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸν μὲν αὐτοφυῆ τὸν δημιουργὸν νοῦν εἴρηκεν. Our investigation will show that Clement's ready identification of τὸν αὐτοφυῆ as the Demiurgic Nous is characteristically Hellenistic.

In a familiar passage of Philodemus, *De pietate* 13 (p. 80 Gomperz = *SVF* II 1078) it is reported of Chrysippus that ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ (sc. Περὶ θεῶν) τά τε εἰς Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον ἀναφερόμενα καὶ τὰ παρ' Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Εὐριπίδῃ κ(ι)αὶ

ποιηταῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς καὶ Κλεάνθης, πειρᾶται συνοικειοῦν ταῖς δόξαις αὐτῶν. ἅπαντά τ' ἐστὶν αἰθήρ, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν καὶ πατὴρ καὶ υἱός, ὡς κἂν τῷ πρώτῳ μὴ μάχεσθαι τὸ τὴν Ῥέαν καὶ μητέρα τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι καὶ θυγατέρα.[1] That the αἰθήρ which is both father and son to itself is in fact Zeus, who may in turn be identified with the universe pantheistically conceived may be concluded from a further fragment of the *De pietate* (= *SVF* II 1076) : ὀν(ομάζεσ)θαι τὸν Δία καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν, with which one should compare Cicero's summary of the pertinent views of Chrysippus at *Nat. deor.* I 15, 39 ff. (= *SVF* II 1077) and, for example, Lucan. IX 580 : *Iuppiter est quodcumque vides, quodcumque moveris*[2]. The identification of creation with creator may indeed be consi-

[1] Cf. *Etymolog. Magn.* s.v. Ῥέα (= *SVF* II 1084) : Χρύσιππος δὲ λέγει τὴν γὴν Ῥέαν κεκλῆσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ῥεῖ τὰ ὕδατα. Cf. further *SVF* II 1085. For the Stoic conception of αἰθήρ cf. *SVF* IV *s.v.* and W. ROSCHER, *Lexicon*, s.v. The etymological link between θεός and αἴθειν which is referred to by Gregory Nazianzen (*Or.* 30, in *PG* XXXVI 128) and John of Damascus (*Fid. orth.* I 9, 14 f. Kotter) may well go back to popular Stoicism. The same etymology appears (as G. W. H. LAMPE's *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* indicates *s.v.* θεός) in the scholia on Johannes Climacus at *PG* LXXXVIII 645, and is certainly implied in the mention made by Anastasius Sinaita, *Viae Dux* 2, in *PG* LXXXIX 85, of the *Septuagint* term φλογίζειν (cf., e.g., *Exod.* 9, 24) as a possible interpretation of θεός.

[2] Cf. Seneca, *Nat.* I, praef. 13 : *Quid est deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum. Ibid.*, II 45, 3 : *ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum.* A similar pantheistic view of the Logos seems to underlie *Logion* 77 of the *Gospel of Thomas* : "Jesus said : I am the Light that is above them all, I am the All, the All came forth from Me and the All attained to Me. Cleave a (piece of) wood, I am there ; lift up the stone and you will find me there". A version of the final sentence survives in Greek in *POxy.* 1, recto 6 ff.:

ἔγειρον τὸν λίθον
κἀκεῖ εὑρήσεις με
σχίσον τὸ ξύλον κἀγὼ
ἐκεῖ εἰμι.

Cf. further, with the commentary thereto of A. D. NOCK-A.-J. FESTUGIÈRE, *Corpus Hermeticum* V 11 (I p. 65, 1 ff.) : σὺ γὰρ εἶ ὃ [ε]ἂν ὦ, σὺ εἶ ὃ ἂν ποιῶ, σὺ εἶ ὃ ἂν λέγω. σὺ γὰρ πάντα εἶ καὶ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔστιν· ὃ μὴ ἔστι, σὺ εἶ. σὺ πᾶν τὸ γενόμενον, σὺ τὸ μὴ γενόμενον, νοῦς μέν, νοούμενος, πατὴρ δέ, δημιουργῶν, θεὸς δέ, ἐνεργῶν, ἀγαθὸς δέ, καὶ πάντα ποιῶν. On the Demiurge in Stoic speculation see W. THEILER's comments in *Reallexikon f. Antike u. Christentum* III 698.

dered a commonplace of popular Stoicism. On Chrysippus' identification of father and son, Ed. Norden commented as follows : "Das Gott Vater und Sohn, das schaffende und das geschaffene Prinzip, zugleich sei, kann ich aus hellenischer Philosophie erst für Chrysippos nachweisen ; aber es kann keine Rede davon sein, dass er diese phantastische Spekulation erfunden habe. Sie ist orientalisch und muss als ein Symptom der Orientalisierung hellenischer Spekulation durch die Stoa aufgefasst werden,..." [1]. Ed. Norden has here failed to take into account not only the above-mentioned (apparently genuine) fragments of the *Perithous*, but also that self-generation is a logical requirement of Stoic pantheism : if one identifies creator with creation, then necessarily the creator *qua* created creates himself. This is stated with considerable clarity by Seneca on a number of occasions and most strikingly in fr. 15 Haase (=Lactantius, *Inst.* I 7, in *PL* VI 152 f.) : *alius nos edidit ; alius instruxit : deus ipse se fecit* [2]. Cf. further Seneca, *Nat.* II 45, 1 ff.: *Ne hoc quidem crediderunt* (sc. *Etrusci*) *Iovem, qualem in Capitolio et in ceteris aedibus colimus, mittere manu sua fulmina, sed eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit. Vis illum fatum vocare, non errabis ; hic est ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. Vis illum providentiam dicere, recte dices ; est enim cuius consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inoffensus exeat et actus suos explicet. Vis illum naturam vocare, non peccabis ; hic est ex quo nata sunt omnia, cuius spiritu vivimus. Vis illum vocare mundum, non falleris ; ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum, partibus suis inditus, et se sustinens et sua.* Similarly at *Nat.* VII 30, 3, it is said of God that *maiorque est pars sui operis ac melior.* Particularly interesting, since it indicates that the self-generation of the universe involves not only the action of the divine active element upon passive matter but also the

[1] *Agnostos Theos* (repr. Darmstadt 1956), 229 f.

[2] On this passage see the learned comments of M. LAUSBERG, *Untersuchungen zu Senecas Fragmenten* (Berlin 1970), 93 ff. Cf. further note 3 p. 214 below.

self-causation of the divine *mens*, is Cicero, *Ac.* II 37, 119: *Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit* (sc. *Stoicus sapiens*), *eam sic animo comprensam habebit ut ea quae sensibus, nec magis adprobabit nunc lucere quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur moveat regat.* As A. Bonhöffer put it, "Gott ist ohne Welt gleichsam nur potentiell vorhanden und wird aktuell nur in und mit der Weltbildung selbst"[1]. Plotinus summarizes the Stoic view as follows (*Enn.* III 1 [3], 2, 17 ff.): οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες ἀπ' αὐτῆς κατάγουσι πάντα, διὰ πάντων φοιτήσασαν αἰτίαν καὶ ταύτην οὐ μόνον κινοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιοῦσαν ἕκαστα λέγοντες, εἱμαρμένην ταύτην καὶ κυριωτάτην αἰτίαν θέμενοι, αὐτὴν οὖσαν τὰ πάντα. The extent to which the Stoic conception of the self-creating universe had become a commonplace is indicated by Secundus' description of the κόσμος as αὐτογέννητον θεώρημα[2]. It may be noted further that according to Philo of Alexandria (*De aet. mundi* 70) Critolaus employed the following argument in support of the view that the universe is everlasting: τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν ἄνοσόν ἐστιν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀγρυπνεῖν ἄγρυπνόν ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἀίδιόν ἐστιν· αἴτιος δ' ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν, εἴ γε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν· ἀίδιος ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν. The view here ascribed to Critolaus is not precisely that of the Stoics, but it testifies nonetheless to an atmosphere of general receptivity towards the notion of self-creation.

That the Stoic view persisted into the later Roman Empire is attested in the Hermetic writings (*Corpus Hermeticum* XVI 19 (II p. 238, 1 ff., ed. A. D. Nock-A.-J. Festugière)): πάντα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ποιεῖ διὰ τούτων (sc. ἡ θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων στρατιά) ἑαυτῷ, καὶ μόρια τοῦ θεοῦ πάντα ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μόρια, πάντα ἄρα ὁ θεός·

[1] *Die Ethik des Stoikers Epictet* (Stuttgart 1894), 248. On Stoic pantheism in general see the remarks of A. Bonhöffer, *op. cit.*, 243 ff.

[2] Cf. Fr. G. A. Mullach, *FPG* I p. 512. On the conception of the universe as a θεώρημα cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* III 8 [30].

πάντα οὖν ποιῶν, ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε παύσαιτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἄπαυστος· καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς οὐ τέλος ἔχει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἡ ποίησις αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἔχει. It is moreover perhaps the same Stoic conception that has inspired *Orph. Hymn.* X 10 Abel, where φύσις is described as αὐτοπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ. Cf. also Nonnos, *Dionys.* XLI 51 ff., where φύσις is described as αὐτογένεθλος and ἀπάτωρ, ἀλόχευτος, ἀμήτωρ. Indeed Proclus' frequent rejection of the idea of the self-generation of the universe suggests that the doctrine still possessed a certain actuality in his day; cf., e.g., *In Ti.*, I p. 253, 3 ff. Diehl: ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ οὐρανός — λέγω δὲ οὐρανὸν τὸ σωματοειδὲς μόνον — οὔτε παράγειν ἑαυτὸν οὔτε συνέχειν πέφυκεν· ἀμερὲς γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, τὸ ἑαυτοῦ παρακτικὸν καὶ ἑαυτοῦ συνεκτικόν. οὐκ ἄρα ὄντως ἀγένητός ἐστιν οὐδὲ ὄντως ἀνώλεθρος, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ σωματοειδεῖ καὶ γενητός ἐστι καὶ σκεδαστός.[1] Particularly interesting is *Theol. Plat.* I 3, p. 13, 8 ff. S.-W.: Μόνη δὲ ἡ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔνθεος ὑφήγησις τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ πάντα πρὸς ἀρχῆς λόγον ἀτιμάσασα (διότι δὴ τὸ μεριστὸν πᾶν καὶ διαστατὸν οὔτε παράγειν οὔτε σῴζειν ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἢ πάσχειν διὰ ψυχῆς ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ κινήσεων), κτλ.[2] Apart from the express denial of the possibility that τὰ σωματικὰ be self-caused Proclus' argumentation coincides with that which Numenius and Ammonius Saccas employed, according to Nemesius, to demonstrate that the soul is necessarily incorporeal (*Nat. hom.* 2, in *PG* XL 537 ff.): Τὰ σώματα τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει τρεπτὰ ὄντα καὶ σκεδαστὰ καὶ διόλου εἰς ἄπειρον τμητά, μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμεταβλήτου ὑπολειπομένου, δεῖται τοῦ συνέχοντος καὶ συνάγοντος καὶ ὥσπερ συσφίγγοντος καὶ συγκρατοῦντος αὐτά, ὅπερ ψυχὴν λέγομεν. Εἰ τοίνυν σῶμά ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ οἱονδήποτε, εἰ καὶ λεπτομερέστατον, τί πάλιν ἐστὶν τὸ συνέχον ἐκείνην; ἐδείχθη γὰρ πᾶν σῶμα δεῖσθαι τοῦ συνέχοντος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον,

[1] Cf. further, e.g., *In Parm.* pp. 785 ff. Cousin; *In Ti.*, I p. 2, 28 f.; I p. 3, 7 ff.; I p. 252, 19 ff. D.; *In Alc.* 124, 18 ff. Westerink.

[2] Cf. in particular the parallel passage at *In Ti.*, I p. 2, 29 ff. D., where, however, there is no specific mention of soul.

ἕως ἂν καταντήσωμεν εἰς ἀσώματον. Εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν, καθάπερ οἱ Στωικοί, τονικήν τινα εἶναι κίνησιν κτλ. It may well be that Proclus' οὔτε παράγειν ... ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν reflects a feature of the anti-Stoic argumentation of Numenius and/or Ammonius which Nemesius has failed to mention.

In view of the prevalence at the beginning of our era of the Stoic theory of the self-generation of the universe, there exists a strong probability that the version of the non-literal interpretation of Plato's *Timaeus* which Proclus ascribes to Albinus should be considered to have been intended in origin as a rejection specifically of the Stoic position ; cf. *In Ti.*, I p. 219, 2 ff. D. : καὶ ὅ γε Πλατωνικὸς Ἀλβῖνος ἀξιοῖ κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν κόσμον ἀγένητον ὄντα γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχειν· ᾧ καὶ πλεονάζειν τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος, ἐκείνου μόνως ἀεὶ ὄντος, τοῦ δὲ κόσμου πρὸς τῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ γενέσεως ἔχοντος ἀρχήν, ἵν' ᾖ καὶ ἀεὶ ὢν καὶ γενητός, οὐχ οὕτως ὢν γενητὸς ὡς κατὰ χρόνον — οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ὤν — ἀλλ' ὡς λόγον ἔχων γενέσεως διὰ τὴν ἐκ πλειόνων καὶ ἀνομοίων σύνθεσιν, ἣν ἀναγκαῖον εἰς ἄλλην αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀναπέμπειν πρεσβυτέραν, δι' ἣν πρώτως ἀεὶ οὖσαν ἔστι πῃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ὢν καὶ οὐ μόνον γενητός, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγένητος. According to the view which Proclus here ascribes to Albinus and which is similar to views expressed in other Middle Platonic as well as Neoplatonic sources [1], the universe is not, as the Stoics supposed, self-creating but rather in a state of permanent dependence upon an outside cause. It should be noted that this interpretation of the *Timaeus* is not identical with that ascribed to Xenocrates (fr. 54 Heinze), Theophrastus (fr. 29 Wimmer) and Speusippus (fr. 54 b Lang) [2], according to which Plato had employed in the *Timaeus* a creation-myth simply as a pedagogical means of describing the permanent state of the uncreated universe. Pro-

[1] See my *Parisinus graecus* 1962 and the writings of Albinus, in *Phoenix* 28 (1974), 320 ff. and 450 ff., and L. TARAN, *The Creation Myth in Plato's Timaeus*, in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, edd. J. P. ANTON and G. L. KUSTAS (New York 1971).

[2] Cf. L. TARAN, *op. cit.*, 405 n. 152.

clus does, however, claim that already Crantor maintained an interpretation of the *Timaeus* similar to that ascribed to Albinus ; cf. *In Ti.*, I p. 277, 8 ff. D.: οἱ δὲ περὶ Κράντορα τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγηταί φασι γενητὸν λέγεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ὡς ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης παραγόμενον καὶ οὐκ ὄντα αὐτόγονον οὐδὲ αὐθυπόστατον. If I am right in supposing Stoic theory to be a presupposition of the interpretation of the *Timaeus* ascribed to Albinus, then Proclus' ascription of a similar doctrine to Crantor must be considered either as evidence of the latter's reaction to the Stoicism of Zeno, or as a mistake on the part of Proclus. In fact one is entitled to suspect that Proclus is in error, and that the view of the *Timaeus* maintained by Crantor was precisely that of his master Xenocrates, namely that Plato presents his creation-myth διδασκαλίας χάριν. Evidence of the agreement of Crantor with Xenocrates upon this matter is to be found in Plutarch, *De an. procr. in Tim.* 3, 1013 A-B : Ὁμαλῶς δὲ πάντες οὗτοι χρόνῳ μὲν οἴονται τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ γεγονέναι μηδ' εἶναι γενητήν, πλείονας δὲ δυνάμεις ἔχειν, εἰς ἃς ἀναλύοντα θεωρίας ἕνεκα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς λόγῳ τὸν Πλάτωνα γιγνομένην ὑποτίθεσθαι καὶ συγκεραννυμένην· τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διανοούμενον ἐπίστασθαι μὲν ἀίδιον ὄντα καὶ ἀγένητον, τὸ δ' ᾧ τρόπῳ συντέτακται καὶ διοικεῖται καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁρῶντα τοῖς μήτε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τῶν γεννητικῶν σύνοδον ἐξ ἀρχῆς προϋποθεμένοις ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν τραπέσθαι. As R. Heinze correctly realized [1], the οὗτοι to whom Plutarch refers at the outset of the above passage can only be, since no others have been mentioned in the preceding portion of the treatise, Xenocrates and Crantor and their followers. In measuring the value of Plutarch's testimony against that of Proclus it is worthy of note that whereas Plutarch frequently refers to Crantor's comments on the *Timaeus* [2], Proclus makes mention of him only

[1] Cf. his *Xenokrates* (Leipzig 1892), 71 and 180.

[2] Cf. *De an. procr. in Tim.* 1, 1012 D ; 2, 1012 F ; 29, 1027 D ; 16, 1020 C ; 16, 1020 D ; 20, 1022 C ; 20, 1022 D.

in two brief instances [1]. One may conclude that there is little likelihood that Proclus had direct access to Crantor's *Commentary*, and good reason to suspect that he has been misled by his source into believing that Crantor had anticipated the "anti-Stoic" interpretation of the *Timaeus* which we meet with from the Middle Platonic period onwards. In any case Crantor could not have used the term αὐθυπόστατος [2] and I know of no instance of αὐτόγονος which can be firmly dated prior to Porphyry, *Hist. phil.* fr. 18 Nauck² [3]. On the basis of the terminology J. M. Dillon argues, with some probability [4], that Proclus' source was Iamblichus [5]. Then, on the supposition that Proclus' information is correct if not in terminology at least in content, J. M. Dillon goes on to argue with considerably less probability that "οἱ περὶ Κράντορα would seem, then, to be substantially Calvisius Taurus" [6]. In fact the "anti-Stoic" view which Proclus ascribes to οἱ περὶ Κράντορα was a commonplace of later antiquity, and in no way the prerogative of Calvisius Taurus [7].

[1] *In Ti.*, I p. 277, 8 ff. D. (cf. p. 201 above), and *In Ti.*, I p. 75, 30 ff. D., where *inter alia* Proclus describes Crantor as ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής. It would be anachronistic to interpret this as meaning that Crantor wrote a full-scale commentary on the *Timaeus*. However, the testimony of Plutarch and Proclus, *In Ti.*, I p. 75, 30 ff. D. (dealing with Crantor's appraisal of Plato's account of Atlantis) indicates that Crantor must have composed some sort of ὑπομνήματα dealing with certain aspects of the *Timaeus*. Although these ὑπομνήματα can hardly have been available to Proclus, it seems to be the case that Plutarch had them at his disposal. In fact the record of Crantor's views on the Atlantis story has been transmitted to Proclus as a part of a comprehensive doxography ; cf. J. M. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta* (Leiden 1973), 268 ff. and 292 f.

[2] Cf. note 1 p. 194 above.

[3] To which we shall return ; cf. pp. 220 ff. below.

[4] In spite of the fact that J. M. Dillon is mistaken in regarding αὐτόγονος as an Iamblichean innovation ; cf. his *op. cit.*, 303.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 303 ff.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 305.

[7] Cf. my *art. cit.* (see note 1 p. 200 above), 451 ff.

We now turn away from the theme of the pantheistic self-creating god of the Stoics to an essentially different, and yet not unrelated conception — that of the self-generation of the transcendent divinity. Here again we find ourselves face to face with a theological common place of the Roman empire. Thus, Aelius Aristides dwells at some length upon the self-generation of Zeus (*Or.* XLIII 7 ff., p. 340, 14 ff. Keil): Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν καὶ Διός ἐστιν ἔργα ὅσα ἐστὶ πάντα, ... ἐποίησεν δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, οὐ Κρήτης ἐν εὐώδεσιν ἄντροις τραφείς, οὐδ' ἐμέλλησεν αὐτὸν Κρόνος καταπιεῖν οὐδ' ἀντ' ἐκείνου λίθον κατέπιεν οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσε Ζεὺς οὐδὲ μήποτε κινδυνεύσῃ, οὐδ' ἔστιν πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲν Διός, οὐ μᾶλλόν γε ἢ υἱεῖς τε πατέρων πρεσβύτεροι γένοιντ' ἂν καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν ποιούντων, ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρῶτός τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων, αὐτὸς ἐξ αὑτοῦ γενόμενος. ὁπότε δὲ ἐγένετο οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεί, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγονέναι. καὶ ὥσπερ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἄρα ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔφυσεν καὶ γάμου οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη εἰς αὐτήν, οὕτως ἔτι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησεν καὶ οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη ἑτέρου εἰς τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον πάντα εἶναι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο. Similarly Zeus is invoked as αὐτοπάτωρ at *Orph.*, *Hymn.* XV 7 Abel [1], and is described as αὐτοτόκος by Nonnos at *Dionys.* VIII 81 and XXVII 62 [2]. Once again Secundus, who defines θεός as ἰδιόπλαστον ἀγαθόν [3], serves to emphasize the commonplace nature of the theme.

The Hermetic Κόρη κόσμου preserved by Stobaeus stresses that it is not φύσις that is self-generated but the transcendent

[1] Divine self-generation occurs elsewhere in the *Orphic Hymns* at XII 9 Abel, where Heracles is referred to as αὐτοφυής, and at VIII 3 where the same epithet is used of the sun.

[2] For further instances of such compounds in Nonnos see W. Peek, *Lexikon zu den Dionysiaka des Nonnos*, Lfg. 1 (Hildesheim 1968), s.vv. αὐτόγονος, ἄσπορος, αὐτολόχευτος, αὐτόσπορος, αὐτοτόκος, αὐτοφυής. Cf. also p. 199 above and note 2 p. 207 and p. 225 below.

[3] *FPG* I, p. 512 Mullach. Secundus describes also κάλλος (*FPG* I, p. 514 M.) as ἰδιόπλαστον ἀγαθόν. The adjectival formation ἰδιόπλαστον does not seem to be attested elsewhere.

creator (*Exc.* XXIII 58 (IV p. 19, 14 ff. ed. A. D. Nock-A.-J. Festugière)) : Πάτερ καὶ θαυμαστὲ ποιητὰ πάντων, αὐτόγονε δαῖμον καὶ τῆς διὰ σὲ πάντα γεννώσης ποιητὰ φύσεως, ἤδη ποτέ, ὦ δαῖμον, ἀεὶ ῥεῖθρα ποταμῶν καθαρὰ πρόσταξον εἶναι. Though the text is corrupt it is apparent that the same message is implied at *Corpus Hermeticum* VIII 2 (I p. 87, 14 ff. N.-F.) : πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων ὄντως καὶ ἀίδιος καὶ ἀγέννητος καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων θεός· δεύτερος δὲ ὁ κατ' εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενόμενος καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συνεχόμενος καὶ τρεφόμενος καὶ ἀθανατιζόμενος, ὡς ὑπὸ ἀϊδίου πατρός, ἀείζωον ὡς ἀθάνατος. τὸ γὰρ ἀείζωον τοῦ ἀϊδίου διαφέρει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ ἑτέρου οὐκ ἐγένετο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐγένετο, ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ· οὔποτε <δὲ> ἐγένετο, ἀλλὰ ἀεὶ γίνεται· † τὸ γὰρ ἀίδιον οὗ ἀίδιόν ἐστι τὸ πᾶν, † ὁ δὲ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἀίδιος· ὁ δὲ κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς † ἀίδιος † καὶ ἀθάνατος γέγονε, κτλ.

The self-generation of the supreme principle seems also to have been a feature of various forms of Neopythagoreanism. We meet it in this guise in [Iamblichus], *Theol. arithm.* 5, p. 3, 17 f. de Falco : ἑαυτήν γε μὴν γεννᾷ (sc. ἡ μονὰς) καὶ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς γεννᾶται ὡς αὐτοτελὴς καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ἀτελεύτητος. Cf. likewise *Corpus Hermeticum* IV 10 (I p. 53, 1 ff. N.-F.) : ἡ γὰρ μονάς, οὖσα πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ ῥίζα, ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστιν ὡς ἂν ῥίζα καὶ ἀρχή. ἄνευ δὲ ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν, ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῆς, εἴ γε ἀρχή ἐστι τῶν ἑτέρων. μονὰς οὖσα οὖν ἀρχὴ πάντα ἀριθμὸν ἐμπεριέχει, ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἐμπεριεχομένη, καὶ πάντα ἀριθμὸν γεννᾷ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς γεννωμένη ἑτέρου ἀριθμοῦ [1]. And we should doubtless classify as Neopythagorean-inspired also the occurrences of the notion in the *Hymns* of Synesius.

Cf. *Hymn.* I 144 ff. Terzaghi

Τί γὰρ οὐ σόν, ἄναξ;
πατέρων πάντων
πάτερ, αὐτοπάτωρ,

[1] In other Neopythagorean schemes, as we shall later see (cf. pp. 221 ff. below), it is the number-series which generates itself out of the ultimate One.

προπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ,
υἱὲ σεαυτοῦ,
ἓν ἑνὸς πρότερον,
ὄντων σπέρμα,
κτλ.

Further, *Hymn.* I 191 ff. Terz.

Σὺ τὸ τίκτον ἔφυς,
σὺ τὸ τικτόμενον
κτλ.

Hymn. IV 1 ff. Terz.

Μετὰ παγᾶς ἁγίας αὐτολοχεύτου,
ἀρρήτων ἑνοτήτων ἐπέκεινα,
κτλ.

Hymn. IX 52 ff. Terz.

ὁ μὲν αὐτόσσυτος ἀρχά,
ταμίας πατήρ τ' ἐόντων,
ἀλόχευτος, κτλ. [1]

The notion of divine self-generation is not absent from Egyptian mythology [2], and it is perhaps an awareness of this which has led Hippolytus to name "the Egyptians" as the source of the Neopythagorean doctrine of the self-generated Monad (*Ref. haer.* IV 43, in *PG* XVI 3106): Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ ... ἔφασαν τὸν θεὸν εἶναι μονάδα ἀδιαίρετον καὶ αὐτὴν ἑαυτὴν γεννῶσαν καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τὰ πάντα κατεσκεύασθαι· αὕτη γάρ, φησίν, ἀγέννητος οὖσα τοὺς ἑξῆς ἀριθμοὺς γεννᾷ, οἷον ἐφ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ μονὰς ἐπιπροστεθεῖσα γεννᾷ τὴν δυάδα κτλ. Familiarity with Egyptian mythology has also undoubtedly inspired Plutarch, *De Is. et Osir.* 62, 376 A: τὴν μὲν γὰρ Ἶσιν πολλάκις τῷ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς ὀνόματι καλοῦσι (sc. οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι) φράζοντι τοιοῦτον λόγον 'ἦλθον ἀπ' ἐμαυτῆς', ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοκινήτου φορᾶς δηλωτικόν.

[1] See N. TERZAGHI's commentary on all of the above passages.

[2] Cf. S. MORENZ, *Ägyptische Religion* (Stuttgart 1960), 181, and E. HORNUNG, *Der Eine und die Vielen: Ägyptische Gottesvorstellungen* (Darmstadt 1971), 140 (I am grateful to Professor R. H. Pierce for these references).

Furthermore, although the predominant influence is undoubtedly that of Greek philosophy, the abundant appearance of divine self-generation in the magical papyri, and in a wide range of Gnostic and related texts may also be partially conditioned by Egyptian and perhaps other non-Greek mythologies.

In fact in the case of the magical papyri the main influence in this regard seems to be that of a Hellenistic Judaism which is in turn heavily influenced by Greek philosophy. This is particularly apparent in a magical papyrus at Leiden in which a Hellenistic Jewish prayer, which I have examined elsewhere [1], opens as follows (*PMag.* XIII 63 ff.): ἐπικαλοῦμαί σε τὸν πάντων μείζονα, τὸν πάντα κτίσαντα, σὲ τὸν α<ὐ>τογέννητον, τὸν πάντα ὁρῶντα καὶ μὴ ὁρώμενον· κτλ. The influence of Hellenistic Judaism is similarly obvious at *PMag.* IV 1559 ff.: ἄκουε, ἄκουε, ὁ μέγας θεός, Ἀδωναῖε..., αὐτογενέτωρ, ἀείζων θεέ, ... Ἰάω ... Ἰάω ... ὁ ὢν... Ἰάω Σαβαώθ, ... The term αὐτογενέτωρ appears also in a magical formula at *PMag.* XIII 267 ff.: ἀβλεψίας δὲ οὕτως· "δεῦρό μοι, τὸ πρωτοφαὲς σκότος, καὶ κρύψον με προστάγματι τοῦ ὄντος ἐν οὐρανῷ αὐτογενέτορος, τὸν δεῖνα." λέγε τὸ ὄνομα. At *PMag.* IV 455 ff. Horus is invoked as αὐτολόχευτε in the following prayer: κλῄζω δ' οὔνομα σόν, Ὦρ', ὃν Μοιρῶν ἰσάριθμον· ... ἵλαθί μοι, προπάτωρ, κόσμου θάλος, αὐτολόχευτε, πυρφόρε, χρυσοφαῆ, φαεσίμβροτε, δέσποτα κόσμου, κτλ. However, in a similar series of *formulae* at *PMag.* IV 1980 ff. the name Iao appears in conjunction with that of Horus: ταῦτα γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔδωκας, ἄναξ, ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δαῆναι· ὅτι ἐπικαλοῦμαι τετραμερές σου τοὔνομα· ... Ἰάω· ... κλῄζω δ' οὔνομα σόν, Ὦρ', ὃν Μοιρῶν ἰσάριθμον· ... Ἰάω· ... ἵλαθί μοι, προπάτωρ, κόσμου πάτερ αὐτογένεθλε. Cf. further *PMag.* I 341 f.: ἵλαθί μοι, προπάτωρ, προγενέστερε, αὐτογένεθλε. And *PMag.* IV 939 ff.: χαῖρε, δράκων ἀκμαῖέ τε λέων, φυσικαὶ πυρὸς ἀρχαί, χαῖρε δέ, λευκὸν ὕδωρ καὶ δένδρεον ὑψιπέτηλον καὶ χρυσοῦ κυαμῶνος ἀναθροΐσκων μελίλωτον, καὶ καθαρῶν στομάτων ἀφρὸν ἥμερον ἐξαναβλύζων, κάνθαρε, κύκλον

[1] In my A Hellenistic context for John 10, 29, in *Vigiliae Christianae* 24 (1970), 245 ff.

ἄγων σπορίμου πυρὸς αὐτογένεθλε, ὅτι δισύλλαβος εἶ, ΑΗ, καὶ πρωτοφανὴς εἶ, νεῦσον ἐμοί, λίτομαι, ὅτι σύμβολα μυστικὰ φράζω· ... ἵλαθί μοι, προπάτωρ, καί μοι σθένος αὐτὸς ὀπάζοις. κτλ.

The vocabulary of self-generation plays an important part in Gnostic literature [1], and partly in consequence of this fell into disrepute to such a degree that it all but disappeared from the more orthodox Christian repertoire [2]. Thus, the *Constitutiones Apostolicae* condemn such terms as characteristic of ἡ τῶν Σιμωνιανῶν ἀθεωτάτη αἵρεσις in particular and of heretics in general (*Const. Ap.* VI 10, in *PG* I 933): Τούτοις δὲ πᾶσιν [3] ἐπίσης σκοπὸς ἦν εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀθεότητος, τὸν μὲν παντοκράτορα θεὸν βλασφημεῖν, ἄγνωστον δοξάζειν, καὶ μὴ εἶναι πατέρα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, μηδὲ τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργόν, ἀλλ' ἄλεκτον, ἄρρητον, ἀκατονόμαστον, αὐτογένεθλον· κτλ. Cf. also *ibid.*, VI 11, in *PG* I 936: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τέκνα θεοῦ καὶ υἱοὶ εἰρήνης, τὸν ἱερὸν καὶ εὐθῆ λόγον κηρύσσοντες τῆς εὐσεβείας, ἕνα μόνον θεὸν καταγγέλλομεν, νόμου καὶ προφητῶν Κύριον, τῶν ὄντων δημιουργὸν, τοῦ Χριστοῦ πατέρα· οὐκ αὐταίτιον καὶ αὐτογένεθλον, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι (i.e. the same concatenation of Simonians and other pseudapostles as in the previous passage) οἴονται, ἀλλ' ἀίδιον καὶ ἄναρχον, καὶ φῶς οἰκοῦντα ἀπρόσιτον. Similar attacks on self-generation occur in the pseudo-Clementine *Recognitiones* in the course of a tirade from the mouth of St. Peter which, although clearly influenced by the *Problematik* of the Eunomian controversy, is once again directed ostensibly against Simon the Mage (*Recogn.* III 3, 8 ff., in *GCS*, *Die Pseudoklementinen* II, p. 97, 8 ff.): *ingeniti autem*

[1] I have previously discussed some of the relevant material in my *art. cit.*, 246 ff.

[2] Nonnos, however, in his metrical *paraphrasis* of the *Gospel of John*, is particularly fond of referring to the self-generation of the Father; cf. A. SCHEINDLER's edition (Leipzig 1881), *Index*, s.vv. αὐτογένεθλος, αὐτόγονος, αὐτόφυτος. As we shall see (cf. p. 225 below), Nonnos in one instance (*Par. Jo.* B 65) refers to the Son as αὐτόγονος.

[3] *Const. Ap.* VI 9, in *PG* I 929 ff. narrates the tale of St. Peter thwarting the attempted levitation of Simon the Mage, and concludes thus: καὶ οὕτω πρώτη ἐπάγη ἡ τῶν Σιμωνιανῶν ἀθεωτάτη αἵρεσις ἐν Ῥώμῃ, καὶ διὰ τῶν λοιπῶν ψευδαποστόλων ἐνήργει ὁ διάβολος.

appellatio non quid sit, nobis intellegere dat, sed quod non est factus; autopatora[n] vero et autogeneton, hoc est ipsum sibi patrem ipsumque sibi filium qui vocaverunt illud quod est ingenitum, contumeliam facere conati sunt dubiis deservientes rationibus. indigere enim nativitate illud quod erat priusquam nasceretur, parvulorum iudicio intellegentes putaverunt, et illud quod non fuerat, pro eo quod fuerit ponentes, quasi per se ipsum factum dicere insania insanierunt, et plantationibus conparare illud quod est ingenitum, ut daemoniosi ausi sunt. haec autem omnia in impietate constituta consequentem habent ignorantiam. non enim intellexerunt hoc ipsum dicentes et fuisse et non fuisse. quatenus enim genuit, fuit, quatenus vero natum est, non fuit. non fuisse ergo eum constat quatenus natum est, fuisse autem eum constat quatenus genuit. haec autem utraque dicere simul eundem sustinuisse, non permittit pietatis professio. deinde etiam communes cogitationes sollicite a se repellunt tantam blasphemiam, dignum honorem ingenito deferentes. quidnam igitur quis interrogatus dicat eorum qui impie appellaverunt, nisi quia fuit priusquam esset ipse sibi pater? qui esse habuit antequam sibi ut esset praestitisset, autopator et autogenes, hoc est ipse sibi pater et ipse sibi filius, qua ratione dicatur? et cum quidem non fuisset quod esset ante extans intellegentiae signum? audes autem factum dicere a semetipso illud quod infectum est? The argumentation here ascribed to St. Peter is precisely that employed down through the ages against the concept of self-generation [1].

[1] Cf., e.g., the anonymous *Opusculum* Περὶ θεοῦ, φυσικαὶ ἀποδείξεις in *Parisinus gr.* 1309, fol. 1 b verso: ἀσθενὲς δέ ἐστιν οὐ τὸ μὴ ὄν (ἐκεῖνο γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι), ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμυδρῶς ὄν. τοῦτο δὲ τοιοῦτον ὂν ἤτοι ἀίδιόν ἐστιν ἢ γενόμενον. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀίδιον ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀσθενές· δύναμις γὰρ ἡ ἀιδιότης. εἰ δὲ γενόμενον, ἢ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντως ἢ ὑφ' ἑτέρου. εἰ δ' ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ μὲν μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι, οὐκ ἐδεῖτο γενέσθαι· ἤδη γὰρ γενόμενον ἦν. εἰ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι, ἀδύνατον ἦν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ὅλως. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὂν ἀδύνατον· ὥστε ἀδύνατον ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι τὸ γενόμενον. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντως ὑπό τινος. ὑφ' ἑτέρου ἄρα. The *opusculum* is difficult to date, but *Parisinus gr.* 1309 was probably copied prior to 1380; cf. J. Irigoin in *Scriptorium* 4 (1950), 201. In any case Leo Allatius (cf. J.A. Fabricius-Harles, *Bibliotheca Graeca* XII, p. 96, = *PG* CLX 786) was almost certainly mistaken in ascribing the work to Plethon; cf. F. Masai, L'Œuvre de Georges Gémiste Pléthon, in *Bulletin de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 40 (1954), 536 ff., in particular 550 f.

To the same Eunomian context as the above passage belongs the statement to Simon which is put in the mouth of St. Peter at Ps.-Clem. *Hom.* XVI 16, 1, in *PG* II 377 : πρὸς τούτοις δὲ, τοῦ Πατρὸς τὸ μὴ γεγεννῆσθαί ἐστιν, Υἱοῦ δὲ τὸ γεγεννῆσθαι· γεννητὸν δὲ ἀγεννήτῳ ἢ καὶ αὐτογεννήτῳ οὐ συγκρίνεται. However, that divine self-generation did indeed appear in the Μεγάλη Ἀπόφασις ascribed to Simon the Mage is attested in a fragment preserved at Hippolytus, *Ref. haer.* VI 18, in *PG* XVI 3222 : Κἀκεῖνος (sc. πατὴρ) ἦν εἷς· ἔχων γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ αὐτὴν (sc. ἐπίνοιαν) ἦν μόνος, οὐ μέντοι πρῶτος, καίπερ προϋπάρχων, φανεὶς δὲ αὐτῷ ἀπὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἐγένετο δεύτερος. ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ πατὴρ ἐκλήθη πρὶν αὐτὴν αὐτὸν ὀνομάσαι πατέρα. ὡς οὖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ ἑαυτοῦ προαγαγὼν ἐφανέρωσεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπίνοιαν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ φανεῖσα ἐπίνοιαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ ἰδοῦσα αὐτὸν ἐνέκρυψε τὸν πατέρα ἐν ἑαυτῇ, τούτεστι τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἀρσενόθηλυς δύναμις καὶ ἐπίνοια, ὅθεν ἀλλήλοις ἀντιστοιχοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει δύναμις ἐπινοίας) ἓν ὄντες. For an indication of the extent to which the vocabulary of self-generation appears in Gnostic literature cf. C. Schmidt, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften* I, 3. Aufl. v. W. Till, *GCS* 45 (Berlin 1962), Wortregister s.vv. αὐτογένεθλος, αὐτογενής,[1] αὐτογέν<ν>ητος, αὐτο-

[1] The earliest appearance of the term αὐτογενής in surviving texts appears to be Philo, *De mut. nom.* 259 f.: Τίνα οὖν ἀπ' <οὐρανοῦ> τροφὴν ἐνδίκως ὕεσθαι λέγει (cf. *Ex.* 16, 4), ὅτι μὴ τὴν οὐράνιον σοφίαν; ἣν ἄνωθεν ἐπιπέμπει ταῖς ἵμερον ἀρετῆς ἐχούσαις ψυχαῖς ὁ φρονήσεως εὐθηνίαν καὶ εὐετηρίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ ὅλα ἄρδων καὶ μάλιστα ἐν ἱερᾷ ἑβδόμῃ, ἣν σάββατον καλεῖ. τότε γὰρ τὴν τῶν αὐτομάτων ἀγαθῶν φορὰν ἔσεσθαί φησιν, οὐκ ἐξ ὅλης τέχνης ἀνατελλόντων, ἀλλ' αὐτογενεῖ καὶ αὐτοτελεῖ φύσει βλαστανόντων καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους φερόντων καρπούς. The mss. reading ἐξ ὅλης τέχνης has provoked numerous emendations, on which see R. Arnaldez' edition (Paris 1964), 153 n. 3; αὐτογενεῖ is not only a Philonic *hapax legomenon* but also the only appearance in Philo of an adjectival formation indicative of self-generation. P. Wendland suggested that one should read αὐθιγενεῖ (a favourite Philonic term), but there is not need to suspect the mss. However, this almost total absence from the works of Philo of the terminology of self-generation suggests either that Philo disapproved of the concept of divine self-generation or that in his day such terms had not yet come into vogue. There is certainly no need to suppose that *De mut. nom.* 259 f. is influenced directly by Greek philosophical concepts ; but cf. G. Luck, *Der Akademiker Antiochos* (Bern/Stuttgart 1953), 30 n. 1. For information on Philo I am much indebted to the complete

πάτωρ, αὐτοφυής. The strange fascination which the notion exercised upon the religious mentality of the early centuries of our era is exemplified in the following antitheses from the treatise entitled « Der Donner, der vollkommene Nus » in *Nag Hammadi Codex* VI, p. 13, 16 ff.[1]: "Denn (γάρ) ich bin die Erste und die Letzte. Ich bin die Geehrte und die Verachtete. Ich bin die Dirne (πόρνη) und die Ehrbare (σεμνή). Ich bin die Frau und die Jungfrau (παρθένος). Ich bin die Mutter und die Tochter. Ich bin die Glieder (μέλος) meiner Mutter. Ich bin die Unfruchtbare, und zahlreich sind ihre Kinder. Ich bin die, deren Hochzeiten (γάμος) zahlreich sind, und ich habe nicht geheiratet. Ich bin die Hebamme und die, die nicht gebiert. Ich bin der Trost meiner Geburtsschmerzen. Ich bin die Braut und der Bräutigam. Und mein Mann ist es, der mich gezeugt hat. Ich bin die Mutter meines Vaters und die Schwester meines Mannes, und er ist mein Abkömmling. Ich bin die Sklavin dessen, der mich bereitet hat. Ich bin die Herrin meines Abkömmlings. Er aber (δέ) ist es, der mich vor der Zeit gezeugt hat in einer Geburts-Art (oder : Geburts-Fall), und er ist mein Abkömmling i[n] der Zeit, und meine Kraft (δύναμις) stammt aus ihm."

But in addition to its role as an ingredient in a variety of more or less exotic Gnostic systems, the notion of self-generation figures prominently — though this seems rarely to be recognized — in the Trinitarian disputes of the early Church. Hippolytus accuses already Noetus of identifying the Father with the Son on the ground that the one supreme God is self-generated and therefore both father and son to himself (*Ref. haer.* IX 10, in

concordance to Philo compiled by P. BORGEN and R. SKARSTEN at the University of Bergen.

[1] *Gnostische und Hermetische Schriften aus Codex II und Codex VI*, edd. M. KRAUSE and P. LABIB (Glückstadt 1971), 122 f. The same antitheses are applied to Eve, the primeval Virgin, in *Nag Hammadi Codex* II, p. 114, 7 ff.; cf. M. KRAUSE, *Der Stand der Veröffentlichung der Nag Hammadi-Texte*, in *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*, ed. U. BIANCHI (Leiden 1967), 82, and M. TARDIEU, *Trois mythes gnostiques : Adam, Eros et les animaux d'Egypte dans un écrit de Nag Hammadi* (II, 5) (Paris 1974), 107 ff.

PG XVI 3378) : ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Υἱὸν εἶναι λέγει (sc. Νοητός) καὶ Πατέρα οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· "ὅτε μὲν οὖν μὴ γεγένητο ὁ Πατήρ, δικαίως Πατὴρ προσηγόρευτο· ὅτε δὲ ηὐδόκησεν γένεσιν ὑπομεῖναι, γεννηθεὶς ὁ Υἱὸς ἐγένετο αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ἑτέρου." οὕτως γὰρ δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν καλούμενον, οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, κτλ. Since it is the guiding principle of Hippolytus that every form of Christian heresy can be traced back to the corrupting influence of Greek philosophy, it is not surprising that he regards the "Filiopatrian Monarchianism" of Noetus as inspired by the Stoic conception of the self-generating pantheistic universe — a conception which Hippolytus finds already in the fragments of Heraclitus. Cf. *Ref. haer.* IX 9, in *PG* XVI 3371 : Ἡράκλειτος μὲν οὖν φησιν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν διαιρετὸν ἀδιαίρετον, γενητὸν ἀγένητον, θνητὸν ἀθάνατον, λόγον [χρόνον ?], αἰῶνα, Πατέρα Υἱόν, Θεὸν δίκαιον. In support of these claims Hippolytus quotes copiously from the fragments of Heraclitus. For example, *ibid.*, in *PG* XVI 3374, he writes ὅτι δέ ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ πάντων τῶν γεγονότων γενητὸς ἀγένητος, κτίσις δημιουργός, ἐκείνου λέγοντος ἀκούομεν· Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν πατήρ ἐστι, κτλ. (*Vorsokr.* I 22 B 53 Diels-Kranz). Cf. also *ibid.*, in *PG* XVI 3375 : λέγει (sc. Heraclitus) δὲ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου κρίσιν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ πυρὸς γίνεσθαι λέγων οὕτως (22 B 64 D.-K.)· Τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός, τουτέστι κατευθύνει· κεραυνὸν τὸ πῦρ λέγων τὸ αἰώνιον. λέγει δὲ καὶ φρόνιμον τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ πῦρ καὶ τῆς διοικήσεως τῶν ὅλων αἴτιον· καλεῖ (22 B 65 D.-K.) δὲ αὐτὸ χρησμοσύνην καὶ κόρον· χρησμοσύνη δέ ἐστιν ἡ διακόσμησις κατ' αὐτόν, ἡ δὲ ἐκπύρωσις κόρος· Πάντα γάρ, φησὶ (22 B 66 D.-K.), τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται. ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ κεφαλαίῳ πάντα ὁμοῦ τὸν ἴδιον νοῦν ἐξέθετο, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸν τῆς Νοητοῦ αἱρέσεως, <ὄν ?> δι' ὀλίγων ἐπέδειξα οὐκ ὄντα Χριστοῦ ἀλλὰ Ἡρακλείτου μαθητήν. τὸν γὰρ ποιητὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν ἑαυτοῦ γινόμενον οὕτω λέγει· Ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, κτλ. (22 B 67 D.-K.). Hippolytus' account is interesting evidence both of Stoic doctrine and utilisation of Heraclitus, as well as of the views of Noetus and his supporters.

The doctrine of divine self-generation could of course be readily enlisted into the arsenal of many versions of "Sabellianism", and there can be no doubt but that it did considerable service in this capacity. In 358 the doctrine was considered important enough to merit the following condemnation at the Synod of Ancyra (cf. Epiphanius, *Adv. haer.* LXXIII 11, in *PG* XLII 424 D) : καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ἄχρονον τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς Χριστοῦ ἐκ πατρὸς ὑποστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγέννητον τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐσίαν ἀναφέροι, ὡς υἱοπάτορα [1] λέγων, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω. The comments of Hilary of Poitiers on this anathema are revealing : *Dedisse superior definitio* [2] *occasionem haereticis videbatur*, writes Hilary (*De synod.* 26, in *PL* X 499 f.), *cum tempus nativitatis Filii negaretur (quia nefas esset, si pater esset in tempore : in tempore autem esset, si Filius tempori subderetur) : ut per hanc opportunitatem temporis abnegati, sub Filii nuncupatione, Pater, qui innascibilis esset, singularis atque unicus ipse sibi et pater et filius praedicaretur : quia ubi nascendi tempus excluditur, illic opinio videtur innascibilitatis admitti ; ut natus non putetur, cuius nativitas non sit in tempore. Idcirco ne per hanc occasionem temporis abnegati, haeresis (Sabelliana) unionis irreperet ; haec impietas damnatur, quae audeat intemporalem nativitatem ad unicam ac singularem innascibilis essentiae referre substantiam : cum aliud sit intemporalem esse, aliud sit esse non natum ; quorum unum habet (licet extra tempus) nativitatem, aliud ipsum sibi, ad id quod est, solus atque idem auctor aeternus sit.* The Father is indeed, says Hilary, the source (*auctor*) of his own being, but is nonetheless not to be confounded with the Son. Just as the Father eternally generates the Son so also is he the eternal cause of his own being. But in expressing this latter idea Hilary carefully avoids the discredited terminology of self-generation and employs instead the neutral term *auctor*. Cf. likewise Faustus of Riez,

[1] On the term υἱοπάτωρ see the material in G.W.H. LAMPE's *A Patristic Greek Lexicon, s.v.*

[2] Cf. *ibid.*, 24, in *PL* X 499 : *Et si quis seniorem tempore Patrem dicat Filio ex se unigenito, juniorem autem Filium Patre : anathema sit.*

Epist. VII, in *PL* LVIII 857 D : *Ipse et sibi auctor et Filio, quia una origo est et fontis, et fluminis.* Here, one thinks, the term *pater* would have been appropriate, but Faustus clearly cannot bring himself to use it.

Hilary goes on to suggest, no doubt wrongly [1], that Paul of Samosata subscribed to the Filiopatrian aberration (*De synod.* 82, in *PL* X 535) : *Vel quis secundum Samosateum, in Christo renatus, et Filium confessus ac Patrem, quod Christus in se sibi et pater et filius sit confitebitur?* Hilary also indicates that one of the objections brought by the semi-Arians against the term ὁμοούσιος was that it had been repudiated as suggestive of Filiopatrian heresy by the Synod of Antioch which in 268 had condemned Paul of Samosata (*ibid.*, 81, in *PL* X 534 B) : *Secundo quoque id addidistis, quod patres nostri, cum Paulus Samosateus haereticus pronuntiatus est, etiam homousion repudiaverint: quia per hanc unius essentiae nuncupationem solitarium atque unicum sibi esse Patrem et Filium praedicabat.* A probably equally ill-founded charge of Sabellianism is brought by Eusebius against Marcellus of Ancyra [2] (*De eccles. theol.* I 1, in *PG* XXIV 829 C) : ὅτι δὲ ταῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, γένοιτ' ἂν ἔλεγχος αὐτὸς (sc. Μάρκελλος) ἑαυτοῦ, Υἱοπάτορα τὸν Θεὸν κατὰ τὸν Σαβέλλιον, εἰ καὶ μὴ γυμνῷ τῷ λόγῳ, τῇ γοῦν ἀληθείᾳ εἰσάγων, τῷ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἀναιρεῖν τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἕνα δὲ Θεὸν ὁρίζεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτον ἑαυτοῦ Πατέρα, καὶ αὖ πάλιν Υἱὸν ἀποκαλεῖν ἑαυτοῦ. By the fourth century the notion of self-generation had clearly become one of the hallmarks of heresy. One of the results of this development was that in order to avoid the charge of having Filiopatrian sympathies Christians were generally satisfied either to avoid altogether the question of the source of the Father's being or to assert simply that He is ungenerated. The so-called *Fides Damasi* (presumably from about the close of the

[1] Cf. G. L. PRESTIGE, *God in Patristic Thought* (London 1952), 205 ff. The charge of Sabellianism is repeated by Epiphanius, *Adv. haer.* LXV 1, in *PG* XLII 13.

[2] Cf. G. L. PRESTIGE, *op. cit.*, 207 f., and T. E. POLLARD, *Marcellus of Ancyra, a neglected Father*, in *ΕΠΕΚΤΑΣΙΣ: Mélanges patristiques offerts à Jean Daniélou* (Beauchesne 1972), 191 f.

fourth century) proclaims that [1] : *Non tres Deos, sed Patrem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum unum Deum colimus et confitemur : non sic unum Deum, quasi solitarium, nec eundem, qui ipse sibi Pater sit, ipse et Filius, ...* But most of the early Symbols either ignore the issue (as do the Nicene and Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creeds) or specifically state that the Father is *ingenitus* [2]. Typical of the orthodoxy of the period is St. Basil's statement (*Ep.* 38, 4, in *PG* XXXII 329 ff.) that ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς ἐξαίρετόν τι γνώρισμα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστάσεως, τὸ Πατὴρ εἶναι, καὶ ἐκ μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας ὑποστῆναι, μόνος ἔχει. Even St. Augustine adopts the same unenquiring attitude ; cf. *Trin.* XV 26, 47, in *PL* XLII 1095 : *Pater enim solus non est de alio, ideo solus appellatur ingenitus, non quidem in Scripturis, sed in consuetudine disputantium, et de re tanta sermonem qualem valuerint proferentium.* Cf. likewise *ibid.*, IV 20, 28, in *PL* XLII 908 : *Sed Pater cum ex tempore a quoquam cognoscitur, non dicitur missus : non enim habet de quo sit, aut ex quo procedat. Sapientia quippe dicit, "Ego ex ore Altissimi prodivi"* (*Ecclus.* 24, 5) ; *et de Spiritu sancto dicitur, "A Patre procedit"* (*Jo.* 15, 26) : *Pater vero, a nullo.* St. Augustine could have added that the Father is the source of his own being ; but in fact he does not. By failing to take up seriously the problem of the source of the Father's being Christians neglected an important department of theology, and by abandoning the concept of self-generation deprived their theology of a suggestive means of expressing the aseity of the supreme divinity [3].

[1] Cf. H. DENZINGER, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* [35] (Freiburg i. Br. 1973), § 15. Cf. likewise Ps.-Justin, *Quaest. Graec.*, in *PG* VI 1469 C : καὶ τὸ θεῖόν φαμεν εἶναι ἀσώματον, οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἀσώματον (ἐπέκεινα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, ὥσπερ τοῦ σώματος, οὕτω καὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου, ὡς ἑκατέρου τούτων ὑπάρχων δημιουργός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ἃ αὐτὸς ὑπάρχει), ...

[2] Cf. H. DENZINGER, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[3] Lactantius (*Inst.* I 7, in *PL* VI 152 f.) does indeed quote Seneca, fr. 15 Haase (cf. p. 197 above) with approval : *Verum quia fieri non potest, quin id quod sit, aliquando esse coeperit, consequens est, ut quando nihil ante illum fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso sit procreatus. Ideoque ab Apolline* αὐτοφυής, *a Sibylla* αὐτογενής, *et* ἀγέννητος, *et* ἀποίητος *nominatur. Quod Seneca, homo acutus, in Exhortationibus vidit : "Nos, inquit, aliunde*

The classic discussion of the self-causation of the supreme principle is that presented by Plotinus in his treatise (*Enn.* VI 8 [39]) Περὶ τοῦ ἑκουσίου καὶ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνός. Such a principle, argues Plotinus, exists neither by chance nor as a result of any external necessity, but solely by reason of its own free choice. In the supreme divinity Will and Being coincide. God exists because he so desires. Cf., e.g., *Enn.* VI 8, 13, 50 ff.: εἰ οὖν ὑφέστηκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ συνυφίστησιν αὐτὸ ἡ αἵρεσις καὶ ἡ βούλησις — ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὐκ ἔσται — δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πολλὰ εἶναι, συνακτέον ὡς ἓν τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ θέλειν· τὸ δὲ θέλειν <εἰ> παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῷ εἶναι, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὐτὸν ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτόν· ὥστε οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός. Many of the subtleties of the probing argumentation of this "most theological" of Plotinus' treatises [1] are no doubt the product of Plotinus' own reflections, but the argument that God is self-

pendemus. Itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui, quod est optimum in nobis debeamus. Alius nos edidit; alius instruxit: Deus ipse se fecit". However, Lactantius' expression of approval has provoked the following castigatory comments quoted by the Migne editor *ad loc.* from the margin of a manuscript: Animadversio R.P. Jo. Mariae Brasichell., sacri palatii apost. Magistri, excerpta ex ora ms. Reg. n. 3759: *Caute lege ista omnia ad finem usque capitis, nam vehementer abhorrent a more loquendi theologorum; neque enim Deus a seipso genitus est aut procreatus, cum nihil magis impossibile sit, quam aliquid seipsum generare aut producere. Nec videntur verba Lactantii in bonum aliquem sensum posse reduci, nisi negative a seipso genitus, id est non ab alio genitus. Denique in hac causa quam illud absurdum: "Fieri non potest quin id, quod sit, aliquando esse coeperit"*. The Migne editor adds (*loc. cit.*) in defence of Lactantius that he has given a correct appraisal (*De Deo recte sensit*) at *Inst.* IV 13, in *PL* VI 482 f., which reads as follows: *Ipse enim pater Deus, et origo, et principium rerum, quoniam parentibus caret,* ἀπάτωρ *atque* ἀμήτωρ *a Trismegisto verissime nominatur* (cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* IV, ed. A. D. Nock- A. J. Festugière, p. 106, fr. 4 b), *quod ex nullo sit procreatus*. Elsewhere, however, Lactantius reports as Hermetic the belief that the supreme God has no parents *quia ex se et per se ipse sit* (*Epit. inst.* 4, in *PL* VI 1022, = *Corpus Hermeticum* IV, p. 107, fr. 4 c).

[1] Cf. E. Bréhier, *Plotin: Ennéades*, VI, 2e partie (repr. Paris 1963), 119. Cf. further H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* (Amsterdam 1967), 398 ff.

caused since in Him Will and Being coincide, seems to be pre-Plotinian. The existence of some such argumentation is a presupposition of the persistent appearance of the terminology of divine self-generation in pre-Neoplatonic literature. Moreover, the basic elements of the Plotinian argument are explicit in the Hermetic *Asclepius*, a work which can hardly have been influenced by the Neoplatonism of Plotinus. Cf. the Latin version of the *Asclepius* 26, in *Corpus Hermeticum* II, edd. A .D. Nock - A.-J. Festugière, p. 331, 12 ff. (*Voluntas etenim dei caret initio, quae eadem est et, sicuti est, sempiterna. dei enim natura consilium est voluntatis*), and more particularly the Coptic version of this section of the *Asclepius* preserved in *Nag Hammadi Codex* VI, p. 74, 12 ff.[1] : "Der Wille Gottes nämlich (γάρ) hat keinen Anfang wie (κατά) seine Natur (φύσις) — das ist sein Wille — ; denn (γάρ) die Natur (φύσις) Gottes ist der Wille. Sein Wille aber (δέ) ist das Gute (ἀγαθόν)." Cf. also the Latin *Asclepius* 14, p. 313, 12 ff. N.-F. : *Quaecumque ergo sunt, quibus inest natura generandi, haec et generabilia sunt, de quibus nasci potest, tametsi ea ex se nata sunt (neque enim dubitatur ex his, quae ex se nata sunt, facile nasci posse, de quibus cuncta nascuntur). deus ergo sempiternus, deus aeternus nec nasci potest nec potuit; hoc est, hoc fuit, hoc erit semper. haec ergo est, quae ex se tota est, natura dei.* This latter passage is unfortunately not included in the portion of the *Asclepius* preserved in Coptic in *Nag Hammadi Codex* VI. [2]

[1] Cf. *Gnostische und Hermetische Schriften aus Codex II und Codex VI* (see n. 1 p. 210 above), 200.

[2] Cf. further *Asclepius* 30, p. 338, 18 f. N.-F.: *ipse enim* (sc. *deus*) *in se est et a se est.* The relevant section of the *Asclepius* is not preserved in the Coptic, but cf. Cyril of Alexandria, *Contra Iulian.* I, in *PG* LXXVI 549 (quoted by A. D. Nock-A. J. Festugière *ad loc.* n. 265), who preserves in a Hermetic fragment the pertinent Greek *formulae* (cf. *Corpus Hermeticum* IV, p. 130, fr. 25 N.-F.) : Εἴ τις οὖν ἀσώματος ὀφθαλμός, ἐξερχέσθω τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀναπτήτω καὶ αἰωρηθήτω (θεωρείτω N.-F.), μὴ σχῆμα, μὴ σῶμα, μὴ ἰδέας ζητῶν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τὸ τούτων ποιητικόν, τὸ ἥσυχον, τὸ γαληνόν, τὸ ἑδραῖον, τὸ ἄτρεπτον, τὸ αὐτὸ πάντα καὶ μόνον, τὸ ἕν, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τὸ ἑαυτῷ ὅμοιον, ὃ μήτε ἄλλῳ ὅμοιόν ἐστι μήτε ἑαυτῷ ἀνόμοιον. Proclus, of course, on the basis of the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, rejects the use of all such terminology with

The identity in the Divine of will and being is maintained by Proclus in somewhat similar terms at, e.g., *Theol. Plat.* I 15, p. 75, 8 ff. S.-W. : Καὶ οὔτε τῇ φύσει παραπλησίως ποιοῦντες τῷ εἶναι μόνον ἀπροαιρέτως ἐνεργοῦσιν (sc. οἱ θεοί) οὔτε ταῖς μερικαῖς ψυχαῖς ὁμοίως μετὰ βουλήσεως ἐνεργοῦντες τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ποιήσεως ἐστέρηνται, συνῃρήκασι δὲ ἄμφω κατὰ μίαν ἕνωσιν, καὶ βούλονται μὲν ὅσα τῷ εἶναι δύνανται, τῷ δὲ εἶναι πάντα καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ ποιοῦντες ἀφθόνῳ βουλήσει τὴν τῆς ποιήσεως αἰτίαν συνέχουσιν. However, the considered view of Proclus is that whereas Nous and Soul are αὐθυπόστατα, the One by its very nature (since the concept of self-generation involves some internal distinction in the self-created) [1] transcends self-generation [2]. Proclus argues this at length at *In Parm.* p. 1147 ff. Cousin, in his comments upon *Parm.* 138 b 2 ff. (Οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἄν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἓν ἀλλὰ δύο). Cf. in particular Proclus, *In Parm.* p. 1150, 16 ff. C. : Εἰ τοίνυν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ὁπωσοῦν διαιρετόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἓν οὐ διαιρετόν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἓν αὐθυπόστατον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν αὐθυποστάτων ἁπάντων αἴτιον, τῷ πάντα σώζεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἕν, καὶ ὅσα παρ' ἑαυτῶν, καὶ ὅσα παρ' ἄλλων ὑφέστηκεν. Οἱ δὲ ἑπόμενοι τῷ Πλάτωνι

reference to the One ; cf. *In Parm.* p. 1169 ff. C., and in particular 1171, 4 ff. C.: Εἴτε οὖν γαλήνη τίς ἐστιν ὑμνουμένη νοερὰ παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς, εἴτε ὅρμος μυστικός, εἴτε σιγὴ πατρική, δῆλον ὡς ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων ἐξῄρηται τὸ ἕν, ἐπέκεινα ὂν καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ σιγῆς καὶ ἡσυχίας καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀνυμνουμένων στασίμων συνθημάτων.

[1] This in spite of, e.g., *Elem. theol.* 47, which argues that Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἀμερές ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν. The question of the duality of the αὐθυπόστατα is raised but hardly settled by Damascius, *In Phlb.* 116 ; cf. L. G. WESTERINK *ad loc.*, p. 55 f.

[2] Particularly interesting, in that it not only insists upon the One's transcendence of self-constitution but also distinguishes a higher and lower category of αὐθυπόστατα, is *In Ti.*, I p. 232, 11 ff. D.: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν καὶ τοῦ αὐθυπόστατον εἶναι κρεῖττόν ἐστι· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸ παντὸς ἐξῃρῆσθαι πλήθους· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ ὂν αὐθυπόστατον μέν, διὰ τὸ ἓν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει ταύτην· τὸ δὲ μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ αὐθυπόστατον ἅμα καὶ ἀπ' αἰτίας ἄλλης ὑφίσταται ποιητικῆς, οἷόν που καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερόν ἐστι· τὰ δὲ ἔσχατα πάρεισι μὲν ἀπ' αἰτίας εἰς τὸ εἶναι κρείττονος, αὐθυπόστατα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἀνυπόστατα.

κρεῖττον καὶ τούτου τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι διαρρήδην εἰρήκασι, κρεῖττον δὲ αὖ καὶ πατρικῆς αἰτίας ἁπάσης εἶναι καὶ γεννητικῆς, ἅτε δὴ καὶ δυνάμεως ἁπάσης ἐξῃρημένον· κτλ. And, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 1151, 10 ff. C.: οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὰ αὐθυπόστατα τῶν ὄντων οὔτε πρῶτα οὔτε ἔσχατα· τὸ δὲ ἄλλων παρακτικὸν ἄνευ τοῦ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ παράγειν διττόν, τὸ μὲν τῶν αὐθυποστάτων κρεῖττον, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον. Taking into account the evidence presented above one may safely conclude that in defending his thesis at such length Proclus is not simply indulging in scholastic exercise but seriously defending his position against the weighty tradition which identified the supreme principle as self-generated. In this connection Proclus emphasizes that when used with reference to the first principle the term αὐθυπόστατος must not be taken to mean no more than that the first principle is uncaused (*ibid.*, p. 1146, 3 ff. C.)[1]: εἰ δὲ ἔστι τὸ αὐθυπόστατον, δῆλον ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οἷον καὶ παράγειν ἑαυτὸ καὶ παράγεσθαι ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστατικὸν καὶ αὐτογενές. λέγω γὰρ αὐθυπόστατον οὐχ ὅ τι ἂν μηδὲν παράγῃ (πρὸς ὅ τινες ἀποδιδόντες τὸ πρῶτον εἶπον αὐθυπόστατον ὡς μηδὲν ἔχον αἴτιον, εἶθ' ὡς μηδὲν ἔχον αἴτιον, ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου τὴν ὕπαρξιν ἔχειν ἐκεῖνο [οὐ] τετολμήκασιν εἰπεῖν), ἀλλ' ὃ ἂν ἑαυτὸ παράγῃ.

Thus, like the Christians (but for different reasons) Proclus rejects the doctrine of the self-generation of the primary principle on the one hand, and the notion that the first principle exists ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου on the other: the One exists necessarily and has no source either inside or outside itself from which it may in any way be distinguished or said to be derived.

That the One is not αὐθυπόστατον but that αὐθυπόστατα do indeed exist is argued by Proclus at *Elem. theol.* 40, p. 42, 18 ff. Dodds as follows: ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔσται αὐθυπόστατον, ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ἢ τὰ πρῶτα ἐκ τἀγαθοῦ ὑποστάντα. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν μηδὲν αὐθυπόστατον, ἐν οὐδενὶ τὸ αὔταρκες ἔσται κατ' ἀλήθειαν. οὔτε γὰρ

[1] The punctuation is mine. V. Cousin has punctuated in such a way as to render the text meaningless.

ἐν τἀγαθῷ (κρεῖττον γὰρ αὐταρκείας ἓν ὂν ἐκεῖνο καὶ αὐτοαγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἔχον τἀγαθόν), οὔτε ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τἀγαθόν (πᾶν γὰρ ἐνδεὲς ἄλλου ἔσται, τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ μόνον <ὄν>). εἰ δὲ τἀγαθὸν αὐθυπόστατον, αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ παράγον οὐχ ἓν ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς προϊὸν οὐχ ἕν. ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ πρόεισιν, εἴπερ αὐθυπόστατον· ὥστε ἓν ἅμα καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ἕν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ αὐθυπόστατον εἶναι μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον· καὶ δῆλον ὡς πρὸ τῶν ἀφ' ἑτέρας αἰτίας μόνον προελθόντων· κυριώτερον γὰρ ἐκείνων καὶ τἀγαθῷ συγγενέστερον, ὡς δέδεικται. The argumentation seems more verbal than real [1]. However, that the self-generation of secondary principles is a logical requirement is implied, e.g., in *Elem. theol.* 26, where it is taken for granted that τὸ ἓν ἀκινήτως ὑφίστησιν [2] and one is left to conclude that if the One produces ἀκινήτως, then that which it produces must be said to proceed from the One rather than to be generated by the One. This is indeed expressed as a general principle in prop. 27 (p. 30, 31 f. D.): μένει δὲ οἷόν ἐστι πᾶν τὸ παράγον· καὶ μένοντος, τὸ μετ' αὐτὸ πρόεισι. The doctrine is explicitly referred to by Syrianus at *In Metaph.* p. 187, 6 ff. Kroll: τὰ δὲ θεῖα πάντα, μενουσῶν ἀεὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν <ἐν> οἰκείοις ἤθεσι (cf. *Ti.* 42 e 5 f.), πρόεισιν αὐτογόνως διά τε τὴν τῆς γονίμου δυνάμεως τῶν πρωτουργῶν αἰτίων περιουσίαν καὶ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν αὐτοφανῆ καὶ αὐτόγονον ἰδιότητα, ἔχει τε ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως, κτλ. Similarly, Iamblichus, *Myst.* VIII 2 argues that it is not the first but the *second* God who is self-generated (Πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν ἐστι θεὸς εἷς, πρώτιστος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως, ἀκίνητος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων. Οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται οὔτε ἄλλο τι· παράδειγμα δὲ ἵδρυται τοῦ αὐτοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ· μεῖζον γάρ τι καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων καὶ πυθμὴν τῶν νοουμένων πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων. Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου

[1] The argument may be directed primarily against Plotinus for maintaining that the One is not only self-caused but also ἐπέκεινα αὐταρκείας; cf. E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 224. Cf. also *Elem. theol.* 9 and 10 with E. R. Dodds' commentary thereon.

[2] Proclus provides the requisite argumentation at *In Parm.* p. 1167, 4 ff. C. in his comment upon *Parm.* 139 a 2 f.: Κατὰ πᾶσαν ἄρα κίνησιν τὸ ἓν ἀκίνητον.

ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτάρχης· ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος καὶ θεὸς θεῶν, μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἑνός, προούσιος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας.), whilst Porphyry is reported as follows by Cyril of Alexandria (*Contra Iulian.* I, in *PG* LXXVI 552 = *Hist. phil.* fr. 18 Nauck [2]): φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Πορφύριος ἐν τετάρτῳ βιβλίῳ φιλοσόφου ἱστορίας ὡς εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ οὕτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τρόπον τινὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νοῦν γενέσθαι τε ὅλον καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν ᾧ δὴ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία τῶν ὄντων. ὃ δὴ καὶ πρώτως καλὸν καὶ αὐτοκαλὸν παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τῆς καλλονῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος. προῆλθε δὲ προαιώνιος ἀπ' αἰτίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὡρμημένος, αὐτογέννητος ὢν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου κινουμένου πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τούτου ἡ πρόοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τούτου παρελθόντος αὐτογόνως ἐκ θεοῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ οὐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινὸς χρονικῆς· οὔπω γὰρ χρόνος ἦν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ χρόνου γενομένου πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστί τι ὁ χρόνος· ἄχρονος γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς. ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος ἀεί, κἂν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γένηται τὰ πάντα, τῷ μὴ τούτοις συναριθμεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὴν ἀξίαν συγκατατάττεσθαι δύνασθαι τῇ ἐκείνου ὑπάρξει, οὕτω καὶ ὁ νοῦς αἰώνιος μόνος καὶ ἀχρόνως ὑποστάς, καὶ τὰ ἐν χρόνῳ αὐτὸς χρόνος ἐστίν, ἐν ταυτότητι μένων τῆς ἑαυτοῦ αἰωνίας ὑποστάσεως.

Cyril's report suggests that the doctrine of the self-generation of the second principle held already an established position in the Platonic tradition at the time when Porphyry wrote his *History of philosophy*. That such was indeed the case seems clear from some of Philo of Alexandria's reflections on the number seven. Thus, at *Quaest. et Solut. in Gen.* II 12 Philo writes[1]: "In a manner befitting God (Scripture) calls the hebdomad pure but the dyad impure, for by nature the number seven is truly pure, inasmuch as it is virginal and unmixed and unmothered, nor does it give birth nor is it born, as are the several (digits) which are in the decad, because of its likeness to the Eternal,

[1] Except for a few fragments in the original Greek only the Armenian version of Philo's *Quaest. et Solut. in Gen.* survives. I quote from R. MARCUS' translation, Philo, *Suppl. I* (Cambridge, Mass./London 1953), 85. For the relevant fragments cf. Philo, *Suppl. II* (Cambridge, Mass./London 1953), 195.

for He is uncreated and unbegotten [1] and nothing is begotten by Him, although He is the causes of generation, and things begotten, for He moves all those powers which are naturally well suited to the generation of what is begotten." Since the supreme God neither generates nor is generated we must assume that the powers responsible for generation "proceed" from the Eternal in some undefined manner. Of even greater interest are Philo's comments at *De opif. mundi* 100: Μόνος δ' ὡς ἔφην ὁ ἑπτὰ οὔτε γεννᾶν πέφυκεν οὔτε γεννᾶσθαι. Δι' ἣν αἰτίαν οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦτον ἐξομοιοῦσι τῇ ἀμήτορι Νίκῃ καὶ Παρθένῳ, ἣν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς κεφαλῆς ἀναφανῆναι λόγος ἔχει, οἱ δὲ Πυθαγόρειοι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων· τὸ γὰρ μήτε γεννῶν μήτε γεννώμενον ἀκίνητον μένει· ἐν κινήσει γὰρ ἡ γένεσις, ἐπεὶ <καὶ τὸ γεννῶν> καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον οὐκ ἄνευ κινήσεως, τὸ μὲν ἵνα γεννήσῃ, τὸ δὲ ἵνα γεννηθῇ· μόνον δ' οὔτε κινοῦν οὔτε κινούμενον ὁ πρεσβύτερος ἄρχων καὶ ἡγεμών, οὗ λέγοιτ' ἂν προσηκόντως εἰκὼν ἑβδομάς. Μαρτυρεῖ δέ μου τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Φιλόλαος ἐν τούτοις· "Ἔστι γάρ, φησίν, ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἁπάντων θεὸς εἷς ἀεὶ ὤν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων." (= *Vorsokr.* I 44 B 20 D.-K.). Like Porphyry, Philo here argues that since generation involves movement the supreme principle cannot generate. Once one has reached this conclusion the self-generation of the second principle becomes a logical requirement. In referring to the Pythagoreans, more specifically to Philolaus, Philo has the support of Iamblichus, *In Nic.* p. 10, 22 ff. Pistelli (Φιλόλαος δέ φησιν

[1] R. MARCUS (Philo, *Suppl. I*, 85) suggests that "uncreated and unbegotten" may correspond to ἀγένητος καὶ ἀγέννητος (a combination which does not occur elsewhere in Philo, or indeed to my knowledge anywhere else in a comparable context) in the original Greek. It is perhaps more likely that Philo wrote ἀποίητος καὶ ἀγέν(ν)ητος. Philo does not elsewhere employ ἀποίητος as a divine epithet, but for this usage see G.W.H. LAMPE's *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, *s.v.*, and my *art. cit.* (cf. note 1 p. 206 above), 249. As a matter of lexicological interest it may be noted that LIDDELL-SCOTT-JONES, *Greek-English Lexicon*, *Supplement* (Oxford 1968), lists on the authority of *Vit. Aesop.* (G) 2, p. 35, 8 Perry, the use of ἀποίητος *c. dat.* meaning *unsuitable* with reference to persons. To this may be added that ἀποίητος meaning *useless* in an absolute sense is used of persons in the *Acta Thomae* 12, p. 117, 11 and 66, p. 183, 12 Bonnet.

ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῆς τῶν κοσμικῶν αἰωνίας διαμονῆς τὴν κρατιστεύουσαν καὶ αὐτογενῆ συνοχήν = 44 B 23 D.-K.), and of Syrianus, *In Metaph.* p. 142, 23 ff. K. (... Φιλολάου δὲ διισχυριζομένου τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι συνοχὴν τῆς τῶν κοσμικῶν αἰωνίας διαμονῆς τὴν αὐτογενῆ καὶ κρατιστεύουσαν, ἁπάντων δὲ ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων Πυθαγορείων κατ' ἴχνη ταύτης τῆς θεωρίας τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὑπόληψιν διαρθρωσάντων). Presumably the doctrine to which Iamblichus and Syrianus refer is that of the self-generation of the number-series out of the Monad as reported by Syrianus (expatiating upon Iamblichus, *In Nic.* p. 10, 12 ff. P.) at *In Metaph.* p. 142, 15 ff. K.: ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἔκτασιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν τῶν ἐν μονάδι σπερματικῶν λόγων εἶναι φῇ τὸν ἀριθμόν, τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς αὐτογόνως καὶ αὐτοκινήτως προεληλυθότα καὶ τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἱδρυμένον καὶ ἐν εἴδεσι παντοίοις ἀφωρισμένον παραδίδωσιν. This view is in marked contrast to that of the generation of the number-series by the One, to which Philo makes reference at *De opif. mundi* 99: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν γεννᾷ τοὺς ἑξῆς ἅπαντας ἀριθμοὺς ὑπ' οὐδενὸς γεννώμενον τὸ παράπαν. In fact, the evidence which we have had occasion to consider suggests a continuing disagreement in Neopythagorean circles not only on the question of whether the One was self-caused or uncaused but also on the matter of the generation of the number-series by, or out of the One. However, as we have seen, already Philo was well aware that if the first principle is to be unmoved, then it cannot generate — a conclusion which, if taken seriously, leads inevitably to the doctrine of the self-generation of the second principle. It is presumably an awareness of this inevitability which lies behind Apuleius' reference to the supreme God as (*Apol.* 64) *sine propagatione genitor*.

It is not surprising therefore that we meet with self-generating secondary principles in a variety of pre-Neoplatonic Gnostic sources, to which the dearth of more specifically philosophical texts compels us to turn for evidence. Hippolytus, *Ref. haer.* V 7, in *PG* XVI 3130 informs us that the Naassenes distinguished three principles of which the second is αὐτογενής;

Hippolytus writes, ἀποροῦσιν οὖν (sc. the Naassenes), καθάπερ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες τῶν ἐθνῶν ἄνθρωποι, πότερόν ποτε ἐκ τοῦ προόντος ἐστίν (sc. ψυχή) ἢ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτογενοῦς ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκκεχυμένου χάους. The phrase καθάπερ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες τῶν ἐθνῶν ἄνθρωποι suggests that for Hippolytus there was nothing at all unusual about the notion of a self-creating second principle. Similarly in the case of the Peratae [1] Hippolytus reports that (*Ref. haer.* V 12, in *PG* XVI 3162) καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀγέννητον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν αὐτογενές· τὸ τρίτον γεννητόν· ... κατενηνέχθαι γάρ φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπερκειμένων κόσμων δύο, τοῦ τε ἀγεννήτου καὶ τοῦ αὐτογενοῦς, εἰς τοῦτον τὸν κόσμον, ἐν ᾧ ἐσμὲν ἡμεῖς, παντοίων δυνάμεων σπέρματα. ... κόσμον, φησὶ, καλεῖ τὰς δύο μοίρας τὰς ὑπερκειμένας, τήν τε ἀγέννητον καὶ τὴν αὐτογέννητον [2]. Hippolytus, *ibid.*, defines as follows this self-generating second principle : τὸ δὲ δεύτερον τῆς τριάδος αὐτῶν μέρος οἱονεὶ δυνάμεων ἄπειρόν τι πλῆθος ἐξ αὐτῶν γεγενημένων. It would be out of place to attempt here a full discussion of the use in Gnostic literature of terms indicative of self-generation. I limit myself therefore to mentioning that we must surely take all the above evidence into account in considering the meaning of the terms αὐτογενέτωρ, αὐτογενής and αὐτογένητος [3] as applied to the Son in the *Apocryphon of John* [4]. There can be no doubt but that these terms are intended to indicate that the Son generates himself out of the Father in much the same manner as the Nous of the Platonists, according to Porphyry, *Hist. phil.* fr. 18 N², proceeds from the first principle [5].

[1] On whom see W. Möller, *Geschichte der Kosmologie in der griechischen Kirche bis auf Origenes* (Halle 1860 ; repr. Frankfurt am Main 1967), 221 ff.

[2] Cf. also *Ref. haer.* X 10, in *PG* XVI 3419 ff.

[3] Quite mistaken is the discussion of these terms offered by Charlotte A. Baynes, *A Coptic Gnostic Treatise Contained in the Codex Brucianus* (Cambridge 1933), 33 ff.

[4] Cf. *Die gnostischen Schriften des koptischen Papyrus Berolinensis* 8502, hrsg. v. W. C. Till, 2. Aufl. v. H.-M. Schenke (Berlin 1972), Index, *s.vv.*

[5] Cf. p. 220 above. For the series ἀγέννητοι, αὐτογενεῖς, γέννητοι see the *Pistis Sophia* (C. Schmidt, *Koptisch-gnostische Schriften* I, 3. Aufl. v. W. Till, *GCS* 45 (Berlin 1962), pp. 2, 2 f. and 24, 38 f.).

The notion of the self-generation of the Son has left little mark on more orthodox versions of Christianity. That Clement of Alexandria was at least familiar with the notion is obvious from *Strom.* V 3, 16, 5 (in *GCS* II p. 336, 12 ff.): προελθὼν δὲ ὁ λόγος δημιουργίας αἴτιος, ἔπειτα καὶ ἑαυτὸν γεννᾷ, ὅταν ὁ λόγος σὰρξ γένηται, ἵνα καὶ θεαθῇ [1]. Only in so far as the Logos became flesh can it be said, since it is δημιουργίας αἴτιος, to be self-generated. Clement's statement may well be intended as a criticism of those who asserted that the Son is self-generated in a more absolute sense. A. Cameron [2] has drawn attention to (but without noting its significance) the application to the Son of the term αὐτοπάτωρ in a fake oracle of Apollo in one of the poems of Gregory Nazianzen (*Carm.* II 2, 7, 253 ff., in *PG* XXXVII 1571):

> Φοῖβος μαντεύοιτο θεῶν μόρον οὐκέτ' ἐόντων·
> Αὐτοπάτωρ, ἀλόχευτος, ἀμήτωρ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνος,
> ὅστις ἐμὸν διέπερσε κακὸν μένος, ὕστατ' ἀείδων ...

In view of the unorthodox background of such terminology Gregory's use of αὐτοπάτωρ, even in such a context, is somewhat surprising. But in this connection it is worth noting that Cyril of Alexandria (*Contra Iulian.* I, in *PG* LXXVI 552) quotes Porphyry, *Hist. phil.* fr. 18 N², without expressing any disapproval [3]. Moreover, as P. Hadot demonstrates [4], the Por-

[1] We have already noted (cf. p. 195 above) that in quoting a fragment of the *Perithous* (88 B 19 D.-K., = Eurip. fr. 593 N²) Clement finds it natural to identify τὸν αὐτοφυῆ as τὸν δημιουργὸν νοῦν, i.e. presumably the *second* principle. Likewise in the *Oracula Chaldaica*, p. 25 Kroll = Fr. 39 des Places (= Proclus, *In Ti.*, II p. 54, 10 D.) the πατρικὸς νόος αὐτογένεθλος is probably a secondary principle and not (as W. Kroll, *op. cit.*, 24 argued) identical with the Father ; cf. P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus* I (Paris 1968), 275.

[2] In his Gregory of Nazianzus and Apollo, in *Journal of Theological Studies* 20 (1969), 240 f.

[3] On the influence of Greek philosophy upon the trinitarian views of Cyril see now E. P. Meijering, Cyril of Alexandria on the Platonists and the Trinity, in *Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift* 28 (1974), 16 ff.

[4] See P. Hadot's *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols. (Paris 1968), in particular vol. 1, pp. 311 ff.

phyrian version of the self-generation of the second principle has had a profound effect on the trinitarian conception of Marius Victorinus ; cf., e.g., Victorinus, *Ad Cand.* 22, 10 ff. Henry-Hadot : Λόγος *ergo, qui est "in deo ipse deus"* (cf. *Jo.* 1, 1), *qui est ipse et voluntas, ipse intelligentia et actio et vita, ex se genito motu ab eo quod est esse, processit in esse suum proprium, id est, in quod est agere, apparuit ipsum agere, quod quidem effecit omnia. Ipsum vero natum est ab eo quod esse in id quod est agere, habens in eo quod est agere et esse.* Nonnos, as we have seen [1], is particularly fond of applying to the Father epithets indicative of self-generation, but it is remarkable that in paraphrasing *John* 2, 12 he describes the Son as αὐτόγονος (*Par. Jo.* B 65 f., in *PG* XLIII 761 C) :

αὐτογόνῳ δὲ
παρθένος ὡμάρτησε θεητόκος υἷει μήτηρ.

More in the Gnostic tradition, on the other hand, is the invocation of Christ as [α]ὐτογενέτωρ and ἀσπερμογόνητε [2] in a prayer for protection against evil spirits which survives amongst the documents of Dioskoros of Aphrodito (ca. 520-585) [3], and reads as follows [4] : [Χρ(ιστός)· ἐξορκίζω] σε, κ(ύρι)ε, π[αν]τοκράτωρ, πρωτογεν[έτω]ρ, [α]ὐτογενέτωρ, ἀσπερμογόνητε, | 7 letters] στεφανη ὁμοῦ παντεπόπτης σὺ καὶ Εἰάω, Σαβαώ, Βρινθαώ, ἔχε με υἱόν, | παρ[α]φύλαξόν με ἀπὸ παντὸς πονηροῦ πν(εύ)ματος καὶ ὑπόταξόν μοι πᾶν | πν(εῦ)μα δαιμονίων φθειροποιούντων ἀκαθάρτων, ἐπίγαια, ὑπόγαια, | ἔνυδρα καὶ χερσαῖα, καὶ πᾶσα<ν> σκιά<ν>. Χρ(ιστός).

[1] See note 2 p. 207 above.

[2] ἀσπερμογόνητε is K. PREISENDANZ' emendation in place of the impossible ἀσπερμολογητε of the Papyrus. Although ἀσπερμογόνητος does not seem to be attested elsewhere (it is listed neither in LIDDELL-SCOTT-JONES, *Greek-English Lexikon*, nor in G. W. H. LAMPE's *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*) the emendation may be regarded as certain.

[3] On Dioskoros, see *RE* Suppl.-Bd. VI (Stuttgart 1935), 27 ff.

[4] *Papyri Graecae magicae* II, p. 202.

Indeed all the above assertions of the self-generation of Christ may be regarded as on or beyond the fringes of orthodoxy. The whole concept of self-generation had acquired a heretical ring, and this is well brought out by Prudentius in making the claim to be self-created the primeval sin of Satan (*Hamartigenia* 159 ff., in *PL* LIX 1023 f.)[1] :

inventor vitii non est Deus : angelus illud
degener infami conceptum mente creavit,
qui prius augustum radiabat sidus et ingens
ex nihilo splendor nutrito ardebat honore.
ex nihilo nam cuncta retro, factumque quod usquam est,
at non ex nihilo Deus et Sapientia vera
Spiritus et Sanctus, res semper viva nec umquam
coepta, sed aerios etiam molita ministros.
horum de numero quidam pulcherrimus ore,
maiestate ferox, nimiis dum viribus auctus
inflatur, dum grande tumens sese altius effert
ostentatque suos licito iactantius ignes,
persuasit propriis genitum se viribus ex se
materiam sumpsisse sibi, qua primitus esse
inciperet, nascique suum sine principe coeptum [2].

Gregory Palamas is doubtless in the same tradition as Prudentius when he describes his opponent Akindynos as αὐτοπάτωρ μοναχός (*Contra Akind.* II 17 [*Parisinus Coislin.* 98, fol.64 recto]) "en voulant dire par là qu'Akindynos n'avait pas persisté

[1] For this reference to Prudentius I am indebted to my colleague David N. Bell who has pointed out to me that the ascription to Satan of the claim to be self-generated (based in this instance upon a forced interpretation of *Ezechiel* 29, 3) appears also in Rupert of Deutz, *De victoria Verbi Dei* I 7 ff., in *PL* CLXIX 1222 ff. The idea that Satan might be self-created is considered but rejected by Pseudo-Clement, *Hom.* XIX 4, 2 ; 9, 1 ; and 17, 5 ff.

[2] The continuation (*hinc schola subtacitam meditatur gignere sectam*, etc.) makes it clear that Prudentius had some particular sect (Priscillians?) in mind.

dans l'obéissance à son père spirituel [1]." Elsewhere Gregory condemns as pagan and therefore heretical the notion of the self-generation of the Father (*Contra Greg.* II [*Parisinus Coislin.* 100, fol. 254 recto]) [2] : αὐτοπάρακτος ἔσται ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ ὁ Θεός, ὡς καὶ ὁ τῶν δοκούντων ἐν Ἕλλησιν ὕθλος προυπηγόρευσε κακῶς. ... αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἥ τε θεία οὐσία καὶ ἡ θεία ἐνέργεια.

The close relationship between on the one hand the notions which we have been considering of the self-generation of secondary principles and on the other hand Proclus' doctrine of the αὐθυπόστατα may not at first sight be obvious. In particular it may be objected that Proclus' αὐθυπόστατα do not belong to the realm of γενητά — a fact which Proclus himself is at pains to point out ; cf. *In Ti.*, I p. 239, 24 ff. D. : τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄν, κἂν ἀπ' αἰτίας προϊέναι λέγηται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πάσας αὐτὸ τὰς αἰτίας οὐ γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' εἶναι ῥητέον· καὶ γὰρ δι' ὃ καὶ πρὸς ὃ καὶ ὑφ' οὗ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν· αὐθυπόστατον γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀεὶ ὄν, οὐ γιγνόμενον ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἵνα μὴ γένηταί ποτε μὴ ὄν — τὸ γὰρ γιγνόμενον ὅτε γίγνεται, οὐκ ἔστιν — οὐδὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ γιγνόμενον, ἵνα μὴ σύνθετον ᾖ, οὐδὲ δι' αὐτὸ γιγνόμενον, ἵνα μὴ ἀτελὲς ᾖ. Cf. likewise *Elem. theol.* 45 : Πᾶν τὸ αὐθυπόστατον ἀγένητόν ἐστιν. However, in spite of such statements Proclus, like his teacher

[1] Cf. J. MEYENDORFF, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas* (Paris 1959), 62 n. 94. The context reads as follows in the *Coislinianus* (my transcription) : Μὴ συνιεὶς γὰρ ἑκάστου τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ προβαλλομένων τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ τῇ ἀνοίᾳ σύνευνον οἷον ποιησάμενος τὴν ἀπόνοιαν, πονηρὰς ἐντίκτεις δόξας σαυτῷ· τῶν μὲν οὓς ηὔχου πατέρας ἔχειν καὶ καθηγητὰς τοῦ βελτίονος ἀπαλλοτριώσας σαυτόν· αὐτοπάτωρ δ'οἷον γεγονὼς μοναχός, καὶ σεαυτῷ καινοτομήσας οὐ βίον ἐνυπόκριτον μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πίστιν.

[2] My transcription. It will be noted that the text of the *Coislinianus* is not identical with that which J. MEYENDORFF quotes (*op. cit.*, 295 n. 68) and claims to be that of the *Coislinianus*. In particular the *Coislinianus* employs the term αὐτοπάρακτος and not, as J. MEYENDORFF indicates, αὐθύπαρκτος. However, the latter term does belong to Gregory's vocabulary ; cf., e.g., his *Apology* (on which see J. MEYENDORFF, *op. cit.*, 356) where the following appears (I quote from *Coislinianus* 99, fol. 46 recto) : ἡ μὲν οὐσία αὐθύπαρκτός τε καὶ παντάπασιν ἀπερινόητος. For αὐθυπόστατος in Gregory cf. J. MEYENDORFF, *op. cit.*, 297 and 300.

Syrianus [1], frequently employs the terminology of self-generation in speaking of the αὐθυπόστατα. Cf., e.g., *In Ti.*, I p. 252, 26 ff. D.: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὄντως ὄντα καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντα γεννᾷ τε ἑαυτὰ καὶ συνέχεται παρ' ἑαυτῶν, ὅθεν καὶ ἀγένητα λέγεται καὶ ἀνώλεθρα κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν. Cf. also αὐτόγονον at *In Ti.*, I p. 372, 8 f. D., and αὐτογόνως at *In Parm.* p. 1151, 17 C.; likewise *In Parm.* p. 1146, 5 f. (τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ὑποστατικὸν καὶ αὐτογενές), and *In Cra.* 49, p. 17, 12 f. Pasquali: ἂν μὴ αὐτόγονον ᾖ καὶ αὐθυπόστατον. We may indeed conclude that the term αὐθυπόστατος (which, as we have seen [2], appears for the first time in surviving literature in Iamblichus) is simply a Neoplatonic counterpart of such terms as αὐτογενής, αὐτογέννητος and their cognates and equivalents. That Proclus prefers αὐθυπόστατος to these latter terms is a matter which hardly requires explanation. Proclus' αὐθυπόστατα are not γενητά and for this reason he prefers when speaking of them to avoid terminology which implies generation. However, he had no desire to avoid entirely, or certainly did not succeed in so avoiding, the time-honoured terminology of divine self-generation.

To sum up: the above investigation has permitted us to trace what seems a clear line of development from the Stoic notion of the self-creating universe, to that of the self-creating transcendental deity of the early centuries after Christ, to that of self-creating secondary principles — a notion which seems well established in, or presupposed by, the Gnostic systems of the second century. The actual state of affairs was no doubt a great deal more complicated than our rapid survey may suggest, but we may be justified in supposing that the various conceptions of self-generation have come to the fore in the order indicated above and as a result of the considerations which I have outlined. Once established, however, these various conceptions existed side by side throughout the entire period of

[1] Cf. *In Metaph.* p. 187, 6 ff. K. (quoted on p. 219 above).

[2] Cf. note 1 p. 194 above.

later antiquity. If only as an object of attack the Stoic notion of the self-generating universe still possessed for Proclus some degree of actuality [1]. Similarly Proclus finds it necessary to refute, or at least attempt to refute, at some length the Plotinian version of the doctrine of the self-creation of the first principle [2]. Proclus' attacks upon the Stoic view may well be no more than scholastic relics with no real relevance to the philosophical issues of Proclus' day, but his comments upon the question of the self-generation of the One suggest a deep and continuing dissension in the ranks of the Platonists.

In particular, however, our investigation suggests that the question of the freedom of the *human* will is one that lies outside the mainstream of the development of the concept of self-generation. The main objective behind the introduction of self-generating secondary principles was, as we have seen [3], that of preserving unimpaired the immobility of the first principle: if the first principle is to remain immobile it cannot generate, and in consequence any secondary principle must proceed from it rather than be generated by it. Such, rather than the question of free will, is the line of reasoning which underlies the doctrine of Proclus. This doctrine is, then, firmly anchored in the philosophical tradition of later antiquity and represents no substantial innovation whether on the part of Proclus, Syrianus or Iamblichus. To what extent the doctrine is at home theoretically in the philosophy of Proclus is another matter. If the One of Proclus cannot generate by reason of its immobility, neither can Nous for the same reason be said to generate itself. That Proclus usually employs the terminology of self-production or self-hypostatization in preference to that of self-generation hardly helps the matter. Even though the process of self-constitution be permanent and con-

[1] Cf. pp. 198 f. above.

[2] Cf. pp. 217 ff. above.

[3] Cf. pp. 218 ff. above.

tinuous, it remains nonetheless a form of process. This latter anomaly hardly existed for the Platonists of the pre-Neoplatonic period in which the notion of the self-generation of secondary principles originated. For these Platonists the distinction between First and Second God was frequently precisely that the latter moves whereas the former transcends movement. Cf., e.g., Numenius, fr. 24 Leemans = fr. 15 des Places : δηλονότι ὁ μὲν πρῶτος θεὸς ἔσται ἑστώς, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἔμπαλίν ἐστι κινούμενος [1]. For Proclus on the other hand the distinction between motion and rest is that which subsists between Nous and Soul (i.e. between two categories of self-causation) rather than between the uncaused One and the αὐθυπόστατα. To this degree the doctrine of the αὐθυπόστατα in the philosophy of Proclus may be considered a philosophical relic — a fragment inherited from a superceded philosophical tradition — which sits somewhat uneasily in the framework of Proclus' metaphysics. In the *Elements of Theology* Proclus is at pains to incorporate the doctrine into his metaphysical scheme, but to what extent his metaphysical scheme is theoretically sound at this point is debatable. In order to stress that the αὐθυπόστατα contain no trace of multiplicity Proclus in the *Elements* plays down the doctrine of 'double determination' [2]. But elsewhere, as we have seen [3], Proclus argues that the One must transcend self-generation since the very concept of self-generation involves in the self-generated some internal distinction incompatible with unity. Here clearly is a contradiction which Proclus has not succeeded in eradicating.

[1] That Numenius' Second God generates himself is perhaps the implication of fr. 25 L. = fr. 16 des Places : ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος διττὸς ὢν αὐτοποιεῖ τήν τε ἰδέαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, δημιουργὸς ὤν, ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὅλως.

[2] Cf. notes 1 p. 193 and 1 p. 217 above.

[3] Cf. pp. 217 f. above.

DISCUSSION

M. Rist: It would clearly be possible to make a great many comments on the excellent paper that we have heard this morning. Let me, however, limit myself to a few :

1. It seems to me that although you are right to point out the Stoic influence on the discussion of αὐθυπόστατα, one could take the matter further back. The whole problem of the self-generation of the first principle has clear similarities with the debate which is evidenced by the tenth book of the *Laws* and by books VII and VIII of Aristotle's *Physics* on the question whether the First Mover is unmoved or self-moving. That it is easy to shift an argument about motion to an argument about existence is shown by the fact that Aquinas restates Aristotle's argument for a *Prime Mover* as an argument for the *existence* of God. And in ancient philosophy it was always easy to shift from considerations of κίνησις to questions of γένεσις (witness the definitions of pleasure that appear in the *Philebus*, in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, in *Nicomachean Ethics* VII and X, etc.). So problems about movement could very easily resolve themselves into problems about γένεσις, with all the difficulties that could involve for a Platonist.

2. I think that you were rather hard on some of the Christian Fathers when you suggested that they dropped the talk about the Father being self-generated in favour of "ideologically" neutral phrases like Hilary of Poitiers' *auctor*. What they seem to have done is, in effect, to have cashed the metaphor in the phrase "self-generating", or at least sorted it out conceptually. For the origin of that kind of language is to be found in the fact that people did not want to allow that such a principle was generated by (or from) anything else, that is, they wanted to make it clear that no kind of necessity, chance, etc., had any effect on it. Hence could it not be that the *philosophical* motive behind (e.g.) Hilary's or Augustine's

language is a recognition that talk about "self-generated" or self-generation should be replaced by talk about what is *un*generated and *supplemented* by talk about willing? Perhaps, therefore we should pay more attention to patristic texts dealing with the relation in the first principle between *esse* and *velle*. H. Langerbeck, in *JHS* 77 (1957), may have been on the right lines here in pointing to some very striking passages of Origenes (*De principiis*) and Pantaenus as reported by Maximus Confessor.

3. My third point deals with Plotinus. It seems to me that there is a very close connection, if not for logical, then perhaps for historical reasons, in *Ennead* VI 8 between discussions of free will and discussions about the nature of τὸ ἕν, whether it is self-generated, or whatever term we care to use. The question of the reason why in VI 8, and in VI 8 alone, Plotinus raises these questions becomes important. It is almost as though for some reason he finds himself face to face in the latter part of his life with a new set of problems. What explanation can we give for this? It seems to show something very "philosophical" about Plotinus, namely his willingness to pursue an *aporia* without fear of what it may do to his system.

4. Finally, about Crantor. How are we to understand the fact that some of Plato's soi-disant followers accepted that the Demiourgos is to be taken metaphorically, despite the fact that you yourself, and Prof. G. Vlastos, have argued persuasively that the literal version is indeed the genuinely Platonic one?

M. Whittaker: Thank you for your most valuable comments. To take your last point first: I think it is obvious that whatever Plato's own intentions may have been in the *Timaeus*, his immediate successors were, in giving their support to a version of the non-literal interpretation of that dialogue, concerned primarily to defend the master against the criticisms raised by Aristotle, above all in the *De caelo*. The Middle Platonists on the other hand were concerned incidentally to reconcile Plato with Aristotle but even more to reject the Stoic view of the self-creating universe. Thus, the position of

Albinus as portrayed by Proclus is substantially different from that of the first generations of Platonists.

You are certainly right in drawing attention to the tenth Book of the *Laws* and in particular to Books VII and VIII of Aristotle's *Physics*. The whole debate in later antiquity was doubtless coloured by the argumentation to be found in these texts. For example, the direct influence of the relevant texts of Plato and Aristotle is clearly obvious (as E. R. Dodds, *ad loc.*, points out) in the formulation of prop. 14 of Proclus' *Elements of Theology*.

With regard to the position of the Church Fathers it was my intention to show that their distaste for the notion of self-generation was primarily the result of the use to which the notion had been put not only in Gnostic systems, but also more particularly in Trinitarian disputes. From the Christian viewpoint the notion of self-generation was dangerous and to be avoided because it invited the confusion of Father with Son. For most of the Church Fathers the question of the source of the Father's being seems to have been virtually tabu, and in consequence they generally failed to explain why it is that God exists neither by chance nor necessity. There is certainly much talk in Augustine about divine will. But, to my knowledge, Augustine nowhere suggests that in God Will and Being are identical in the sense that God exists by an act of his own free choice. Nor is this implied in the passages of Origen to which you have referred or in the purported fragment of Pantaenus.

M. Blumenthal: I too should like to trace the history of this question back to Aristotle *Physics* VII and VIII, though perhaps not to *Laws* X which does not have the specific contrast between self-movement and unmoved moving. This *problématique* could still have been live for Proclus — in addition to all the influences you have so richly documented. The reason for saying this is that perhaps the closest parallel in Proclus to the situation of the αὐθυπόστατα comes in the context of movement. At *Elem. theol.* 14, in the series ἀκίνητον, αὐτοκίνητον, ἑτεροκίνητον the αὐτοκίνητον is μέσον πως,

κινοῦν τε ἅμα καὶ κινούμενον, whereas of the other two one, *i.e.* the ἀκίνητον, κινεῖ : what it moves is the αὐτοκίνητον. So that it like the αὐθυπόστατον is both self-causing and caused by what is superior to it.

M. des Places : Vous trouvez chez la plupart des auteurs allégués une « self-generation of the second principle » ; d'autre part, vous avez fait une enquête à travers les formules christologiques des « premiers credo ». Y a-t-il une conciliation possible entre la « génération par lui-même du second principe » et la génération du Fils par le Père ? Chez Jamblique, le chapitre *Myst.* VIII 2, que vous avez largement cité — le texte est en effet un des plus beaux de l'ouvrage — contient des formules dont certaines pourraient entrer dans une synthèse chrétienne. Vous avez nommé Marius Victorinus : n'y aurait-il pas à chercher davantage encore de ce côté ?

M. Whittaker : The notion of the self-generation of the Son, as I have pointed out, existed as an undercurrent at least from the second century until the sixth. But it is in addition reflected in Christian texts of all periods which speak of some form of "procession from" instead of, or in the same breath as, "generation by" the Father.

M. Trouillard : Il faut prendre garde que l'« autoconstitution » chez Proclus n'est nullement l'« aséité ». Le premier Principe n'est pas autoconstituant, parce que l'autoconstitution implique une procession (intériorisée), une dérivation, donc une dépendance. D'ailleurs la théologie négative de Proclus lui interdit d'attribuer à l'Un la notion de *causa sui*, que Plotin lui accordait dans *Ennéades* VI 8, par mode de figure. Selon Proclus, tout autoconstituant est essentiellement double.

M. Rist : I don't want to dispute that there may be "metaphysical" factors behind Prudentius' notion that the chief sin of Satan is that he claims to be self-generated. But the matter arises also on the

moral plane, with a Neoplatonic background. Why do souls *forget* their father, asks Plotinus in *Enneads* V 1,1. And one of the reasons is "wishing to belong to themselves", i.e. τόλμα or *superbia*. Surely Prudentius' Satan is, in the words of the well-known phrase, a self-made being with a deep reverence for his maker !

M. Whittaker : Your comment is most apt not only in the case of Prudentius but also in that of Gregory Palamas' attack on Akindynos (cf. above, pp. 226-7). But as I point out in footnote 2 p. 226, it seems apparent that Prudentius had in mind some specific sect with strong dualistic tendencies.

M. Beierwaltes : Was die Bedeutung einer göttlichen « Selbstkonstitution » in der westlichen Theologie betrifft, so ist auf Marius Victorinus (Candidi *Epist.* I 3 ; Mar. Victorin. *Gen. div. verb.* 18 : *ipse* [*Pater*] *enim constitutivus est et ipsius* τοῦ λόγου. *Si enim prima causa, non solum omnium causa, sed et sibi ipsi causa est*), Hieronymus (*In Eph.* II 3, in *PL* XXVI 489 A : *Deus vero, qui semper est, nec habet aliunde principium et ipse s u i o r i g o est suaeque causa substantiae, non potest intelligi aliunde habere, quod substitit*) und Eriugena zu verweisen (z.B. *De div. nat.* III 18, in *PL* CXXII 674 A : *Deus seipsum fecit* ; III 20, 683 A : *a seipso creatur*). Für die neuplatonische Tradition, für Hieronymus und Marius Victorinus zumindest verführt der Gedanke der Selbstkonstitution n i c h t zur Vorstellung eines « werdenden Gottes » ; *causa sui* nämlich als Aussage über das absolute Sein Gottes kann in diesem Kontext nicht als *causa e f f i c i e n s sui ipsius* verstanden werden, die einen Zeit- oder Geschichtsprozess initiierte.

M. Whittaker : It was not at all my intention to deny the penetration of the notion of self-constitution into the field of Christian theology. I do, however, assert that in spite of, *e.g.*, Marius Victorinus the notion has left little obvious mark on what might be considered more orthodox versions of Christian theology. I have quoted a passage from Gregory Palamas (cf. above, pp. 226 f.) to indicate an orthodox Eastern reaction to the notion, and for the Western Chris-

tian tradition I refer to the comment on Lactantius which I have quoted above, p. 214 f., n. 3.

M. Brunner : L'histoire de la notion d'αὐθυπόστατον que M. Beierwaltes a prolongée heureusement, pourrait l'être jusqu'à Descartes et Spinoza. Pour le premier, *causa sui* désigne la transcendance de Dieu, tandis que le second nous rapproche du stoïcisme.

Mais voici deux questions. Ne peut-on pas mettre en rapport la notion d'αὐθυπόστατον chez Proclus avec la réflexion du spirituel sur lui-même ? Dans ce cas, il y aurait une nouvelle raison pour laquelle l'Un n'est pas αὐθυπόστατον : vous avez insisté sur le fait qu'il n'est pas mouvement ; on peut dire encore qu'il n'est pas pensée.

D'autre part, n'êtes-vous pas un peu sévère pour Proclus quand vous dites qu'il se contredit en refusant que l'Un soit αὐθυπόστατον parce qu'il est indivisible, tout en déclarant que l'αὐθυπόστατον inférieur à l'Un est indivisible lui-même ? Le néoplatonisme est familier avec la distinction des degrés dans les notions — ce serait ici celle d'indivisibilité — et ce qui est indivisible sous un certain rapport peut ne pas l'être sous un autre rapport.

M. Whittaker : I have not noted that Proclus in fact anywhere established a link between the notions of "self-reflection" and "self-constitution". To your second question I would reply that in prop. 40 of the *Elements of Theology* Proclus seems to be attacking Plotinus by means of considerations which are certainly applicable to his own position and which are quite inadequate to demolish the careful argumentation of *Enn.* VI 8.

M. Beierwaltes : Ich habe immer noch Schwierigkeiten im Verständnis Ihrer These, die proklische Theorie der αὐθυπόστατα sei nicht verbindbar mit der Frage nach dem freien Willen oder der Freiheit. Mir scheint diese Theorie geradezu die sachliche Voraussetzung des proklischen Versuches zu sein, den Begriff des Freien als des Herrn oder der Ursache seiner Handlungen oder seiner Entscheidung zu definieren (= αὐτάρκης), z.B. *De prov.* 35, 3 ff.; 36, 12 ;

57, 5. Das *in nobis* (Möglichkeit zur Selbstbestimmung) ist *autoperigraptum*, *autenergitum* (*De prov.* 56, 4 ff.). Von der Sachfrage her halte ich Proklos' Theorie der αὐθυπόστατα, die Frage nach der freien Selbstbestimmung des Menschen und Plot. VI 8 durchaus verbindbar, zumal letzterer seine (hypothetische) Explikation der « Freiheit » des *Einen* als Antwort und zugleich als Voraussetzung der Frage nach dem freien Willen des *Menschen* versteht.

M. Whittaker : I have not denied any of the obvious links between the notions of free will and self-determination. I have in my paper simply been at pains to emphasize that Proclus' self-constituted principles are hardly explicable in terms of free will. Indeed the question of free will is one that does not enter into Proclus' discussion of these entities.