

**Zeitschrift:** Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique  
**Herausgeber:** Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'Antiquité classique  
**Band:** 21 (1975)

**Artikel:** Plutarch's exposition of the De anima and the psychology of Proclus  
**Autor:** Blumenthal, Henry J.  
**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-660837>

### **Nutzungsbedingungen**

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften auf E-Periodica. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen sowie auf Social Media-Kanälen oder Webseiten ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. [Mehr erfahren](#)

### **Conditions d'utilisation**

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. La reproduction d'images dans des publications imprimées ou en ligne ainsi que sur des canaux de médias sociaux ou des sites web n'est autorisée qu'avec l'accord préalable des détenteurs des droits. [En savoir plus](#)

### **Terms of use**

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. Publishing images in print and online publications, as well as on social media channels or websites, is only permitted with the prior consent of the rights holders. [Find out more](#)

**Download PDF:** 03.04.2026

**ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, <https://www.e-periodica.ch>**

V

HENRY J. BLUMENTHAL

PLUTARCH'S EXPOSITION  
OF THE *DE ANIMA* AND THE PSYCHOLOGY  
OF PROCLUS

From the beginning of Neoplatonism the unity of the person had been a problem. In Plotinus the soul broke in two in the middle, at the level of *phantasia* which he doubled, and also tended to fly apart at the ends, where the intellect remained in the intelligible at the upper end, and the vegetative soul at the lower belonged, at least sometimes, to the world soul rather than the individual soul<sup>1</sup>. That such difficulties should arise among Platonists is not surprising, since they necessarily had to account for the way an immaterial soul could deal with both intelligible and sensible forms of cognition and activity: the more careful they were to do this accurately, the more liable they were to run into problems of coherence and consistency. As often in later Neoplatonism, some of the theories that were put forward may be seen as new approaches to questions which had been left unsolved, or made more acute, by Plotinus. The purpose of this paper is to look at some of the views of Proclus, and where they can be ascertained, his master Plutarch, about the human soul, with special reference to the way in which they dealt with matters affecting its central faculties.

<sup>1</sup> On these problems, cf. my *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague 1971), 27 ff. and 89 ff.

Before going any further it might be as well to disclaim two extreme views about Plutarch which are possibly attractive but probably misleading. One, that Proclus simply followed Plutarch's views about the soul, which he learned either directly by reading the *Phaedo* and *De anima* with him as a young student<sup>1</sup>, or indirectly through Syrianus. The other, which has been put forward by R. Beutler in his Pauly-Wissowa article on Plutarch, that Plutarch somehow stood aside from the wilder tendencies of contemporary Neoplatonism and offered a straightforward interpretation of Aristotle in a commentary on the *De anima* from which most of the clearly identifiable information about him is derived through the commentaries of Simplicius and Stephanus (Ps.-Philoponus)<sup>2</sup>. Though it has been asserted that much material from Plutarch has been absorbed into subsequent commentaries on both Plato and Aristotle<sup>3</sup>, it is not easy to identify such material and I do not propose to make the attempt now. I should merely like to say that Simplicius disagrees with Plutarch sufficiently often — on nearly half the occasions where he cites him — for it to be totally unsafe to assume that anything in him is derived from Plutarch in the absence of firm and specific proof that it is. Therefore nothing that is not actually labelled as the opinion of Plutarch will be taken to be such.

One further general point must be made about Plutarch. This is that all the evidence on his thought — as opposed to

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Marinus, *Procl.* 12.

<sup>2</sup> R. BEUTLER, *Plutarchos von Athen*, in *RE XXI 1* (1951), 963 f., and, with some reservations, *Porphyrios*, in *RE XXII 1* (1953), 309. He is followed by E. EVRARD, *Le maître de Plutarque d'Athènes et les origines du néoplatonisme athénien*, in *Ant. Class.* 29 (1960), 391-7; cf. also K. PRAECHTER, *Syrianos*, in *RE IV A 2* (1932), 1737. For another view see H. D. SAFFREY — L. G. WESTERINK's introduction to the Budé edition of Proclus, *Théologie platonicienne* (Paris 1968), p. XLVII.

<sup>3</sup> R. BEUTLER, *Plutarchos von Athen*, 963; *pace* Beutler, Plutarch's suggestion to Proclus about a *Phaedo* commentary (Marin. *Procl.* 12) tells us nothing about his influence on any other commentary.

biographical and largely anecdotal material in Damascius' *Life of Isidore* and Marinus' *Life of Proclus* — is contained in commentaries. It is therefore arguable that most if not all of the statements about his views which we have are about his views on the interpretation of Plato or Aristotle rather than reports about his own opinions, and that we cannot properly assume that the former represent the latter. I hope however we may agree that they do. If it needs argument, I have argued the point elsewhere<sup>1</sup>, and should merely like to say two things briefly now. First, that on the controversy about the position of the intuitive intellect, an area where we are relatively well informed, it can be shown that commentators' positions reflect their own opinions: in fact views which are given as the opinion of commentators on Aristotle are sometimes views which were not originally offered as such at all. Second, that Aristotle as well as Plato and the Neoplatonists themselves were seen to be aiming at expressions of a single truth, so that a commentary on Aristotle was simply not a place for expressing anything other than what one took to be the truth, an attitude best shown by the to us shocking statement of Simplicius in the introduction to his *Commentary on the De anima* that he would try to expound Aristotle sticking as closely as possible to the views of Iamblichus and the truth itself: ...παντάχου δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀντεχομένῳ ἀληθείας κατὰ τὴν Ἰαμβλίχου ἐν τοῖς ἰδίῳις αὐτοῦ περὶ ψυχῆς συγγράμμασιν ὑφήγησιν (p. 1, 18-20 Hayduck). On the basis of the situation outlined we may perhaps make the following working assumption: if there is no substantial difference between a thinker's opinion about Aristotle and his own view—unless he explicitly expresses disagreement with him—then if Plutarch expresses a view on a passage in Aristotle which differs from Proclus' views on the same subject, Proclus and Plutarch themselves disagree about the point in question, and *vice versa*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my « Neoplatonic elements in the *de anima* commentaries », in *Phronesis* 21 (1976).

On these assumptions, let us return to Plutarch, and try to assess the nature of his approach to psychology as manifested in the *testimonia* to his comments on the *De anima*. Here the picture presented by R. Beutler, and subsequently accepted, in general, by E. Evrard, requires some adjustment. R. Beutler sees Plutarch as being in most matters a faithful transmitter of the outstanding achievement of Alexander, and in particular of Alexander's interpretation of specific texts<sup>1</sup>. The exception which R. Beutler notes is their disagreement about *nous*. Plutarch did not accept that the *De anima* referred to a *nous* other than the human one<sup>2</sup>. This, as R. Beutler recognised, is in itself a matter of far-reaching importance. But the differences are by no means confined to this one point. To begin with, there is an important difference of principle: Philoponus (*In de an.* p. 21, 20-23 Hayduck) tells us that Plutarch accused Alexander of pretending to comment on Aristotle while in fact expounding his own views, a strange accusation from a Neoplatonist which we might take to mean that Alexander was too close to Aristotle and not close enough to Plato. Be that as it may be, it does tell us clearly enough that Plutarch did not see himself as a mere transmitter of results achieved by Alexander, for the complaint is about Alexander's treatment of the whole *πραγματεία*, and not just a single text. And when we look at detailed reports of their opinions, we find that on other occasions, including a classification of various meanings of *nous* in Aristotle<sup>3</sup>, Plutarch disagrees with Alexander. These are usually matters of detailed explanation of a text. That, according to R. Beutler, was Plutarch's style<sup>4</sup>, but the same might be said of Simplicius, Philoponus, Ps.-Philoponus, that is Stephanus, or others. Even if it were not so, one would expect that reports of a commentator's

<sup>1</sup> *Plutarchos*, 963 f.

<sup>2</sup> Philop. *In de an.* p. 536, 2-5 Hayduck.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 518, 9 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Plutarchos*, 964.

opinions should normally refer to matters of detail, for it is after all on these that one goes to a commentary for help.

Even Proclus' style of commentary does not ignore such matters, though it allows for a great deal besides. And if one were to be dependent on reports in the Aristotelian commentators for knowledge of Proclus, and happened to have only some and not others — it is after all only two of the commentaries which furnish the bulk of our evidence about Plutarch — one might form a similar impression of Proclus himself. Thus in Philoponus' *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics* three of the four passages in which we have reports of Proclus contain detailed discussions of texts: the fourth is simply a reference to Proclus' work on a geometrical subject<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand if one looks at Simplicius' *Commentary on the De caelo* one would get a rather different view of Proclus' procedures. There about half the references give us Proclus' specific views on the point under discussion, as opposed to his opinion on a matter that may be relevant to the issue in hand, but few of these contain actual discussion of the meaning of the Greek. Part of the reason for this may be that the material in question comes not from a commentary by Proclus on the Aristotelian treatise, but from remarks made by him in his own *Timaeus commentary* and elsewhere. The other part may be the different way in which Simplicius and Stephanus — from whose commentary on Book III most of the references to Plutarch come — cite their Neoplatonic predecessors. Most of the reports of Plutarch's opinion on the interpretation of Aristotle's Greek happen to come from Stephanus, and far fewer from Simplicius and Priscian, and in this commentary Stephanus does not cite Proclus at all. Thus it is better not to assume that Plutarch's method of exposition was necessarily different from what Proclus' method in expounding the same texts would have been. That is not to make any inference, yet, about the matter.

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 111, 31 ff.; 160, 13 ff.; 181, 19 ff. and 129, 16 Wallies.

To return to the question of Plutarch and Alexander. It may or may not be true that Plutarch often agreed with Alexander. Given the state of our evidence about both we cannot say how often. But we can perhaps say that in many cases all commentators are likely to have agreed with Alexander because he was simply restating what was clearly the meaning of Aristotle's text, and that in those cases where we have their opinions cited side by side there are enough disagreements to suggest the need for some caution in describing Plutarch as a faithful follower of Alexander's interpretation. It is true that on a number of occasions they are quoted together as holding a certain opinion, but one should at least consider the possibility that this is because they alone had written extensive commentaries on some or all of the *De anima*<sup>1</sup>. The matters on which they are reported to have disagreed are not only matters of principle of the kind suggested by Plutarch's accusation of dishonesty, or the difference about the status of the soul or souls discussed in the *De anima*, as reflected in their divergent views on the status of *nous* in that work, but also on points of more limited scope, the meaning of a passage or the interpretation of a particular sentence. We have, it must be admitted, only a single clear case of each, but there is no reason to think that there will not have been others as well. What we have are these. In the first category we have Simplicius expressing his preference for Plutarch over Alexander on the interpretation of the words τὸ δὲ κινεῖν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὄρεκτικόν<sup>2</sup>. Plutarch said that Aristotle meant that the ὄρεκτικὴ ἐνέργεια was a κίνησις with Aristotle speaking Platonically — perhaps we should say Neoplatonically — and that the κίνησις was ποιητικὴ and not παθητικὴ, another way of describing what a Neoplatonist meant by ἐνέργεια. Alexander's rejected (by Simplicius), though clearly correct interpretation, was that the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my « Did Iamblichus write a commentary on the *de anima*? », in *Hermes* 102 (1974), 540-546.

<sup>2</sup> *De an.* 433 b 16 f.

ὄρεξις is moved κατὰ συμβεβηκός (Simpl. *In de an.* p. 302, 23-9 H.). This passage is worth more than its numerical weight, for it exhibits a characteristic which we might in any case expect to find, namely that Alexander gave the simple Aristotelian explanation of a text which Plutarch Neoplatonised. There may also have been a difference about how we perceive that we perceive. According to one of two conflicting reports which we must discuss in more detail<sup>1</sup>, Plutarch and Alexander both said that it was done by κοινή αἴσθησις, according to the other, Plutarch ascribed this function to the λογικὴ ψυχή, probably to *doxa*<sup>2</sup>.

In the second category we have a discussion on a point in Aristotle's section about what has which faculties. Difficulties arose over the meaning of ... οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτικόν, αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ μόνιμον ὄν, γεννητὸν δὲ — ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον· διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει ; or, as some read it, διὰ τί γὰρ ἔξει;<sup>3</sup>. The latter was Alexander's way and he took Aristotle's meaning to be διὰ τί γὰρ ἔξει αἴσθησιν, interpreting, as Stephanus puts it, ἐρωτηματικῶς. Plutarch took the opposite view — τὴν ἐναντίαν βαδίσας — and took the question as διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ ἔξει αἴσθησιν τὰ οὐράνια on the grounds that it was not better for a body not to be so endowed. Alexander had said it was better neither for body or soul to have sense-perception (Philop. *In de an.* p. 595, 36-596, 18 H.). As Stephanus says below they read the text differently, and as he points out at some length, the point rested on a difference between Platonists and Aristotelians (p. 596, 36 ff.). So here too we have a contrast between Plutarch the Platonist interpreter and Alexander the Aristotelian, a difference which also appears, and was seen to appear, in Plutarch's opinion that Aristotle thought children have νοῦς

<sup>1</sup> See below pp. 134 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Philop. *In de an.* pp. 465, 24 f. and 464, 20-25 H.

<sup>3</sup> *De an.* 434 b 3-5.

καθ' ἑξῆς<sup>1</sup>. We may take it then that Plutarch's approach was not utterly at variance with contemporary Neoplatonic trends and that he was not, as Themistius had been, an upholder of true Aristotelianism in his interpretation of the *De anima*.

It does not of course follow from this conclusion either that Plutarch's views were simply the conventional views of his time, or in particular that Proclus can be expected to agree with Plutarch on all points of interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima* or on his view of the soul — as we have suggested before there is not much difference between these. That there is unlikely to be any difference between a Neoplatonist's interpretation of Plato and his own views hardly needs to be said. And in this area we do find some points of disagreement, to be precise in the interpretation of the *Phaedo*. "Olympiodorus" *Commentary on the Phaedo* gives us the only two reports of Platonist views I have been able to discover where Plutarch and Proclus appear together as the holders of different opinions. One is on a general philosophical point, the other on a piece of detailed interpretation. The first, which clearly need not be taken from expositions of the text which "Olympiodorus" (in fact Damascius) is discussing, namely *Phaedo* 69 e-70 a, gives a list of opinions about how much of the soul is immortal ... οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι μόνης τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς Πρόκλος καὶ Πορφύριος (p. 124, 13-20 Norvin)<sup>2</sup>. It is interesting that on this point at least, and a point of some importance, Plutarch lines up with Iamblichus while Proclus agrees with Porphyry — or at least stands between them — not what one would expect if Plutarch were in all matters a representative of

<sup>1</sup> Philop. *In de an.* pp. 518, 20 ff. and 519, 34 ff. A further difference of detailed interpretation may lie behind Simpl. *In de an.* p. 160, 7-13 H., where Simplicius does not report explicit disagreement, but Plutarch's explanation of *De an.* 422 b 27-31 would not make sense if he accepted Alexander's reading of the passage.

<sup>2</sup> The commentator may have over-simplified, cf. Proclus' own account, *In Ti.*, III pp. 234-8 Diehl.

a more sensible kind of Neoplatonism than that represented by Iamblichus and Proclus. That may be true in other areas, like metaphysics, where Plutarch probably did stand closer to Porphyry than to his more immediate predecessors<sup>1</sup>. We might also notice in passing that on this point at least Proclus' view is closer to what may have been Aristotle's than is Plutarch's, how close depends on what λογική was intended to cover here. The second text from Olympiodorus is concerned with the interpretation of *Phaedo* 66 b: who are the speakers? Plutarch said if they were γνήσιοι φιλόσοφοι, how could they endure the πάθη τῶν πολλῶν? Proclus said that they were the γνήσιοι φιλόσοφοι but that the πάθη Plato was talking about were those of men in general (p. 104, 18-23 Norvin). This is hardly a significant or very informative difference. It serves only to confirm that Proclus could disagree with Plutarch. Here he did so even where we know they studied the dialogue together: Plutarch, according to Marinus (*Procl.* 12), told the young Proclus that if he published their discussions of the *Phaedo* and *De anima* he would have his own commentary on the *Phaedo*. It might be as well to say at this point that there is no suggestion in Marinus that these readings also led to a commentary on the *De anima* by Proclus, and no other evidence that Proclus produced such a commentary — or at least that he published one, since it is likely enough that he did lecture on the *De anima* as part of the usual introductory course on Aristotle. It is not impossible however that he simply used Plutarch's commentary, either for the whole of the *De anima*, or for such parts as it covered, and merely pointed out places where he himself held a different view. One's assessment of the likelihood that Proclus did adopt some such procedure depends on how close Plutarch's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology — and so his own — was to that of Proclus. To this question we must now turn.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. E. EVRARD, *art. cit.*, 398 f. and P. HADOT, *Porphyre et Victorinus* I (Paris 1968), 105.

Let us start from the top. Here we can be brief. The controversy between the Neoplatonists about the status of the human intellect is well known. Plotinus, admittedly unorthodox, held that the highest part of our soul does not descend<sup>1</sup>, while Iamblichus, normally at least<sup>2</sup>, and Proclus thought otherwise<sup>3</sup>. Though the second became the commonly accepted view, we cannot simply assume that it was universal, for Damascius took Plotinus' position<sup>4</sup>. Plutarch's adherence to the same view as Proclus can however be deduced from Stephanus' reports in his section on *De anima* III 5. There we are told that Plutarch thought that the human intellect was single and that it thought sometimes but not always: *καὶ τοῦτον τὸν ἀπλοῦν οὐ λέγει ἀεὶ νοοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ποτε νοοῦντα* (Philop. *In de an.* p. 535, 13-15 H.). Since we know that at least part of Proclus' objection to the Plotinian position was that it did not account for the fact that intellection was intermittent but ought, according to him, to entail permanent conscious intellection<sup>5</sup>, we may take it that Plutarch's position was much the same, and that he meant by a single intellect the same as Proclus intended by having intellect and reason as parts of the same *λογικὴ ψυχὴ*, as opposed to putting *nous* and *dianoia* on different ontic levels. On this matter, then, Plutarch and Proclus agree. Since their agreement lies in holding a majority opinion, this would not be a matter of great significance had not R. Beutler argued that Plutarch held the Plotinian view<sup>6</sup>. But, as E. Evrard suspected, the evidence adduced by R. Beutler is probably not to the point<sup>7</sup>. Stephanus' remarks at Philop. *In de an.* p. 553, 10-12 H., on which he

<sup>1</sup> Cf. esp. IV 8, 8, 1-3.

<sup>2</sup> But cf. Simpl. *In Cat.* p. 191, 9 f. K.

<sup>3</sup> *Elem. theol.* 211; *In Parm.* p. 948, 18 ff. Cousin; *In Ti.*, III p. 333, 28 ff. Diehl.

<sup>4</sup> *Pr.* 400, II p. 254, 3 ff. Ruelle.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. *Elem. theol.* 211.

<sup>6</sup> *Plutarchos*, 965 f.

<sup>7</sup> *Art. cit.*, 393 n. 167.

relied, need have nothing to do with the human *nous*: hence the comment τὸ θεῖον γὰρ κεχώρισται.

More can be learnt about the relation between Proclus and Plutarch from a study of their views of the soul's faculties in relation to each other, and in particular how the upper and lower souls are linked. The difficulties involved in this issue centre round the role of *phantasia*. In Plotinus the difficulties had led to a duplication of this faculty. Plutarch and Proclus seem to share a certain indecisiveness in this area. The next section of this paper will discuss the apparently inconsistent statements and reports of their views on the status and operation of *doxa* and *phantasia*. That there are difficulties here in Proclus has already been noted. In particular M. Trouillard has pointed out that, in the *Timaeus commentary*, *doxa* seems to have the role later played by *phantasia* in the *Commentary on Euclid I*<sup>1</sup>. Closer examination of the relevant texts will, however, tend to show that we are not dealing with a straightforward development of Proclus' opinions, but that the situation is more complex than at first appears to be the case. Plutarch presents similar problems.

Given the fact that a Neoplatonic soul splits in a way roughly corresponding to functions involving or independent of the body, problems are liable to arise at the point of junction. That is perhaps obvious. The solutions offered were, however, different. Plotinus' duplication of the central faculty was clearly unsatisfactory. His reasons lay partly in the requirements of his eschatology: he wished the upper soul to retain memories arising from the activities of the lower soul and at the same time wanted to ensure that the upper soul had a power of memory and imagination completely independent of the lower to which this power properly belonged. This particular problem should not have arisen for Proclus since he did not admit the permanent survival of the irrational soul. Plutarch did, and

<sup>1</sup> Proclus, *Eléments de théologie* (Paris 1965), 34 n. 3.

thus exposed himself to the difficulties which Plotinus had encountered. It was perhaps to avoid these that he apparently tried to show that *phantasia* could be double and yet not double at the same time. Ps.-Philoponus reports as follows: τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν διττὴν οἶεται Πλούταρχος· καὶ τὸ μὲν πέρασ αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω, ἡγουν ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς, πέρασ ἐστὶ τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πέρασ αὐτῆς κορυφὴ ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων (*In de an.* p. 515, 12-15 H.). But for Plutarch this duality was not incompatible with unity: a few lines below we are given the parallel Plutarch produced to account for its situation. The duality, which at first sight appears to be one of being, is rather one of function. The parallel Plutarch gave is of two lines, one from above and one from below, meeting at a point: the point is one in so far as it is a single point, but two in so far as it may be taken either with the upper or with the lower line. This would suggest that *phantasia* might similarly be taken as double in so far as it is linked with what is above and below, but Plutarch seems to have thought that it was double in a different sense. Having set out the parallel of the lines meeting at a point he went on to say οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία δύναται καὶ ὡς ἓν καὶ ὡς δύο λαμβάνεσθαι, διότι τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τὸ διηρημένον εἰς ἓν συναθροίζει, τῶν δὲ θείων τὸ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι ἐνιαῖον εἰς τύπους τινὰς καὶ μορφὰς διαφόρους ἀναμάττεται (*ibid.*, 26-29): here the point seems to be that the faculty is agent and focus of both convergence and divergence at the same time. As reported by Stephanus the parallel is intended to illustrate the position of the upper limit of the faculty which is in contact with the reasoning faculty: οὕτω τὸ ἄνω μέρος τῆς φαντασίας τὸ συναπτόμενον τῷ διανοητικῷ ἐστὶν (*ibid.*, 22-23), rather than the connection of *phantasia* with higher and lower faculties.

In any case it is clear that, according to this testimony, Plutarch intended *phantasia* to be the centre of the soul. It borders immediately on *dianoia* above and *aisthesis* below. Yet in another passage of Stephanus it appears that a similar position is occupied by *doxa*. There we are told that Plutarch said that

it is the function of the λογικὴ ψυχὴ to take cognisance of the activities of the senses and that *doxa* is the means by which it does so: φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι κατὰ τὸ ἄτιμον μέρος τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα, τοῦτο γίνεται. The reason, which appears to be Plutarch's, is that *doxa* links the rational and the irrational souls: ἡ γὰρ δόξα, τὸ κοινότατον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἄτιμον, συνάπτει τὴν λογικὴν τῇ ἀλόγῳ (*In de an.* p. 464, 23-7 H.). Since *doxa* must come below *dianoia* and is here stated to be in contact with the senses, it would seem to occupy the same position in the soul which *phantasia* occupied in the other passage. Have we then a similar uncertainty about *doxa* and *phantasia* to that which appears in Proclus? There is unfortunately a further difficulty about Plutarch. In the course of the next page of Stephanus, where he is still discussing how we perceive that we perceive, we read that certain νεώτεροι ἐξηγηταί, following neither Alexander nor Plutarch, and rejecting Aristotle himself, said that such perception was the work of a δύναμις προσεκτικὴ which perceived not only the activities of the senses, but also those of the higher cognitive faculties. These interpreters complained about Plutarch saying that *doxa* was responsible, on the grounds that it does not cognize the activities of *nous*, whereas there should be one thing registering the activities of all the soul's faculties. Though he accepts their προσεκτικόν, our commentator dismisses this complaint in the following words: ταῦτα δὲ λέγοντες οὐ κατηγοροῦσι Πλουτάρχου· οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ αὐτὸν εὔρον λέγοντα ὅτι ἡ δύναμις ἡ αἰσθανομένη τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων τῆς δόξης ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ συμφωνεῖ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, τὴν κοινὴν αἰσθησιν καὶ αὐτὸς αἰτιώμενος... (p. 465, 22-6 H.). How can one reconcile these two reports? Even if in the first the word δόξα was not used by Plutarch himself, but the words ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα were rather the commentator's gloss on τὸ ἄτιμον μέρος τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς, and the sentence about δόξα joining the irrational to the rational soul were to be explained in the same way, we should still have to say that Stephanus on p. 464 understood Plutarch to have held a view for which he was blamed by the νεώτεροι ἐξηγηταί

and wrongly blamed in Stephanus' opinion, because according to Stephanus on p. 465, he did not hold it. One possible explanation — and it is admittedly speculative — is that what we have on p. 464 is a report taken from the text of one of the νεώτεροι ἐξηγηταί themselves<sup>1</sup>, while Stephanus' statement on p. 465 relies on his own reading of a text of Plutarch other than the one they used. That Plutarch changed his mind during the course of his long career is, of course, quite possible.

Thus, given the lack of conclusive evidence, we cannot be certain what Plutarch's view was, or how the text of Stephanus is to be explained. If, however, the view that the senses' activities are perceived by *doxa* were one of two views that Plutarch held, and one that he held towards the end of his career, having perhaps substituted *doxa* for *phantasia* because of inherited difficulties about the latter, and if, further, we are right in taking the remark about *doxa* uniting the upper and lower souls as his, then we might have here a connection between Plutarch's thought and the concept of *doxa* that appears in Proclus' *Timaeus commentary*. That, as we know, was an early work<sup>2</sup>, and so one where it would be reasonable to expect that Proclus still held views learned from his teachers, which he may subsequently have altered. But before we can go further than merely suggesting this as a possibility, we must attempt to clear up the role of *phantasia* and *doxa* not only in the *Timaeus commentary*, but in Proclus' thought as a whole.

Here we are faced with two sets of problems, for neither the status nor the role of these two powers is clearly or consistently described. Thus it is not surprising that the discussion to Mme A. Charles' paper on imagination to the Royaumont congress reflected a feeling that the status of *phantasia* was unre-

<sup>1</sup> So too R. BEUTLER, *Plutarchos*, 966; Beutler, however, implies that Plutarch is simply misreported.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Marinus, *Procl.* 13.

solved<sup>1</sup>. This is perhaps a feeling that adequately represents the truth. The point is that any attempt to find a simple answer to the question, "what did Proclus mean by φαντασία, and what role did he assign to it?" is unlikely to succeed.

Let us then consider what sort of answer might be correct. What is immediately clear is that in the *Timaeus commentary* Proclus has much more to say about *doxa* and much less about *phantasia* than in the other works<sup>2</sup>. The import of his statements, however, is not clear. At first sight the usual view in this work seems to be that the immediate neighbour of *aisthesis* on the higher side is *doxa*. In the first place we have a number of passages which mention several faculties or activities, and do not include *phantasia* between *doxa* and *aisthesis*, such as I p. 257, 18 ff. Diehl. Of course we cannot be sure that any of these are intended to be complete, even for that part of the soul which they cover. In addition some of these texts expressly locate *doxa* next to the sensitive faculty. So at *In Ti.*, I p. 248, 22-8 Diehl, we read: ἔχεται δὲ τῆς δόξης ἢ αἰσθησις, μέση μὲν καὶ αὐτὴ οὖσα τοῦ τε αἰσθητηρίου καὶ τῆς δόξης· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητήριον μετὰ πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αἰσθητῶν ... ἡ δὲ δόξα γνῶσιν ἔχει καθαρὰν πάθους, ἡ δὲ αἰσθησις μετέχει μὲν πῶς καὶ τοῦ πάθους, ἔχει δὲ τι καὶ γνωστικόν, καθόσον ἐνίδρυται τῷ δοξαστικῷ καὶ ἐλλάμπεται παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ γίνεται λογοειδής ... Further, one passage implies that *doxa* belongs to the lower soul rather than the upper where it is clearly placed elsewhere<sup>3</sup>. At II p. 247, 9-16 the joint of the soul comes at the lowest part of the διανοητικόν and the summit of the δοξαστικόν — this seems to indicate that τὸ δοξαστικόν belongs to the part of the soul in which *aisthesis* and the desires are located, that is the part of which *phantasia* is normally the

<sup>1</sup> *L'imagination, miroir de l'âme selon Proclus*, in *Le Néoplatonisme*, Colloques internat. du G.N.R.S., Royaumont 9-13. 6. 1969 (Paris 1971), 249-51.

<sup>2</sup> It is evident that this is not merely a consequence of the subject matter of the *Timaeus*.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *In Ti.*, I p. 223, 16 f.; *In R.*, II p. 91, 9 f. Kroll; *Oracles chaldaïques*, fr. 2.

highest part in Neoplatonic psychology in general and Proclus' other works in particular.

The passage from I p. 248 suggests that *doxa* performs the function which we might expect to be that of *phantasia*, namely the reception and transmission ἀπαθῶς of what *aisthesis* perceives without such freedom from affection. That *doxa* has the same objects as *aisthesis* is shown, if it needs to be, by a statement two pages further on that there is a power superior to *aisthesis*, namely *doxa*, μηκέτι δι' ὀργάνου γινώσκουσα, ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτῆς τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὴν παχύτητα τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐπανορθουμένη (I p. 250, 5-8). Shortly before we find that *doxa* has the duty of passing judgement on the data provided by sense perception, a function which is perhaps more appropriate to the discursive reason (I p. 249, 13 ff.). The point of mentioning this here is that *doxa* appears to behave as an ordinary faculty of the Neoplatonized Aristotelian type soul, rather than merely being a blanket term for all modes of cognition relating to the sensible world such as we should find were Proclus merely using it after the manner of Plato. At II p. 310, 8-10 we find that *doxa* is explicitly described as an activity τῆς δοξαστικῆς ψυχῆς, though this passage may be Iamblichus rather than Proclus<sup>1</sup>, and in any case refers specifically to the cosmic soul. We are also told that *doxa* is the rational soul's link with the irrational. Proclus even says that this is generally accepted: ὅτι μὲν οὖν πέρας ἐστὶ τῆς λογικῆς ἀπάσης ζωῆς καὶ ὅτι συνάπτεται πρὸς τὸ ἀκρότατον τῆς ἀλόγου, πολλάκις ἐστὶ τεθρυλημένον (I p. 248, 7-10)<sup>2</sup>.

Now if *doxa* is as clearly connected with *aisthesis* as it appears to be in the texts we have mentioned, one consequence would be that there is relatively little scope for *phantasia*. And in a number of passages we find that *phantasia* is in fact very closely

<sup>1</sup> It is attributed to him by B. DALSGAARD LARSEN, *Jamblique de Chalcis...*, *Appendice: Testimonia et fragmenta exegetica* (Aarhus 1972), fr. 257, and with some reservations by J. M. DILLON, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta* (Leiden 1973), fr. 59: cf. his commentary on this fragment, pp. 340-2.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. also *In Ti.*, III p. 286, 29 ff., quoted below p. 141.

linked with *aisthesis*, if not actually identified with it<sup>1</sup>. In an account of which gods cause what in this world Proclus says that while Hermes is the cause of the κινήσεις of *phantasia*, the sun, which he has previously said is the maker of all the senses, has made its οὐσία, ὡς μιᾶς οὐσης αἰσθήσεως καὶ φαντασίας (*In Ti.*, III p. 69, 18-20 Diehl). Elsewhere it is not clear whether or not *phantasia* and *aisthesis* are to be taken as separate or as aspects of one faculty: so at I p. 352, 28-32, discussing what we must have for knowledge of the images of reality, he writes: δεόμεθα γὰρ καὶ φαντασίας καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὀργάνων ἄλλων τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν.

There are however a number of passages in the *Timaeus commentary* which apparently include *phantasia* as a full and independent faculty. At I p. 255, 9-13 there is a list of what appear to be powers which are moved by *logos* when it judges their appropriate objects ... τὰ δὲ δοξαστὰ κρίνων κινεῖ καὶ τὴν δόξαν, τὰ δὲ φανταστὰ τὴν φαντασίαν, τὰ δὲ αἰσθητὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. But a list of criteria ascribed to Plato on the previous page reads: τοῖς μὲν νοητοῖς νοῦν ... τοῖς δὲ διανοητικοῖς διάνοιαν, τοῖς δὲ δοξαστοῖς δόξαν, τοῖς δὲ αἰσθητοῖς αἴσθησιν (p. 254, 25-7). Earlier φανταστική γνῶσις is considered, but rejected, as a candidate for νόησις in νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν<sup>2</sup> (I p. 244, 19 ff.). It is however a candidate put up ὑπό τινων, and so the occurrence of φανταστική γνῶσις here may not tell us anything about Proclus himself. But at I p. 343, 3 ff. *phantasia* comes in a series of faculties each of which may refute that below: ἐπεὶ καὶ αἴσθησιν μὲν ἐλέγχει φαντασία, διότι μετὰ πάθους γινώσκει κατὰ σύγκρισιν ἢ διάκρισιν, ὣν αὐτὴ καθαρῆς· δόξα δὲ φαντασίαν...

In addition there is a further group of passages, in which *phantasia* is prominent, whose status is, or may be, different.

<sup>1</sup> This has been noticed by W. O'NEILL, Proclus, *Alcibiades I* (The Hague 1965), 107 n.323, who simply takes it as one of two senses of *phantasia*, the other being that where *phantasia* is a faculty between reason and perception.

<sup>2</sup> *Ti.* 28 a.

First we have a list of entities or faculties which deal with various kinds of object in different ways : τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ γινώσκει ὁ θεὸς μὲν ἠνωμένως, νοῦς δὲ ὀλικῶς, λόγος δὲ καθολικῶς, φαντασία δὲ μορφωτικῶς, αἴσθησις δὲ παθητικῶς (I p. 352, 16-18). Now this list immediately follows a reference to Porphyry and looks like explanation of the view attributed to him that forms of knowledge are not characterised by the nature of their objects : rather ταῖς τῶν γινωσκόντων διαφοραῖς ἄλλοῖος γίγνεται τῆς γνώσεως ὁ τρόπος. A. R. Sodano, who prints these words as a fragment<sup>1</sup> of Porphyry's *Timaeus commentary*, stops the fragment there, but the following words may well be Porphyry's own explanation. A similar question arises over a passage where Proclus reports that Porphyry explains children's good memory by saying that their souls have less experience of human evil : ἅτε οὖν μήτε περισπώμεναι μήτε ἐνοχλούμεναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς εὐτύπωτον μὲν ἔχουσι τὸ φανταστικόν... Proclus gives two further explanations involving *phantasia*, and in all three it has the status of a faculty. The last sentence of this discussion seems to sum up and take account of the whole in a way which strongly suggests that it may all be Porphyry, that is as far as πάσχοντες (I p. 194, 14-195, 8). On this occasion again A. R. Sodano does not print the whole text, but does express hesitation<sup>2</sup>. In one further passage, at I p. 395, 22 ff., we read of *phantasia*'s activities, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ φαντασία πολλὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παθήματα ἀπεργάζεται παρ' αὐτὴν μόνην τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἐνέργειαν. This point is developed at some length. The remarks come in the course of a series of objections by Porphyry against Atticus' views on creation. Here it is quite clear that the whole portion on *phantasia* is to be attributed to Porphyry himself — this time A. R. Sodano prints the whole section<sup>3</sup> — and that strengthens the case for taking the other

<sup>1</sup> A. R. SODANO, *Porphyrii In Platonis Timaeum commentariorum fragmenta* (Napoli 1964), fr. 45.

<sup>2</sup> Fr. 25, and note *ad loc.*

<sup>3</sup> Down to p. 396, 3 : fr. 51 = p. 38, 15-24.

two texts as representing Porphyry's views rather than Proclus' own.

There is nevertheless a residue of passages which have *phantasia* as a faculty and which appear to give Proclus' own views. Some we have already cited, but the most important is III p. 286, 29 ff. This passage, inconsistently with that which puts the junction of the soul at the meeting-place of *dianoia* and *doxa*, has *doxa* and *phantasia* juxtaposed at the centre of the soul : ἔστι γὰρ βᾶσις μὲν τῆς λογικῆς ζωῆς ἡ δόξα. κορυφή δὲ ἡ φαντασία τῆς δευτέρας, καὶ συνάπτουσιν ἀλλήλαις ἢ τε δόξα καὶ ἡ φαντασία καὶ πληροῦται δυνάμεων ἢ δευτέρα παρὰ τῆς κρείττονος. Yet a few lines before Proclus has distinguished between an αἰσθησις μεριστή, πάθει συμμιγῇ ποιουμένη τὴν κρίσιν, ἔνυλος and another which is ἄυλος, καθαρὰ, γνῶσις ἀπαθῆς, and has the same nature as *phantasia* : which it is depends on whether it operates internally or externally. Does the existence of this set of texts mean that the first group we have discussed merely omit *phantasia* but still leave room for it, in spite of indications to the contrary, or do we have here some evidence of doubt preliminary to a change of view?

That the latter may be the case is indicated by evidence from Proclus' other works, and I should like to suggest that we can see some traces of the change : if so, the last passage we have cited, with its distinction of two kinds of *aisthesis*, one of which is of the same nature as *phantasia*, may be a token of the way the change took place.

For in the *Alcibiades commentary* we find that *aisthesis* and *phantasia* are clearly distinguished, while *doxa* and *phantasia* seem to have come closer together. But again all is not clear. At 288, 5-8 (Creuzer) the reception of stimuli from *aisthesis*, *phantasia*, *doxa*, *thumos* and *epithumia* is given as a cause of internal discord. Here *doxa* and *phantasia* are separate, though the presence of *thumos* and *epithumia* makes one wonder whether Proclus is in fact treating them all as faculties rather than as activities. But at 140, 16 f. we are given a hierarchy of faculties : νοῦς γὰρ

προσέχως ὑπὲρ διάνοιαν, διάνοια δὲ ὑπὲρ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν. That this list ends as it does, rather than with καὶ δόξαν (or δόξαν δὲ) ὑπὲρ φαντασίαν, at least suggests that these two are taken together. Further at 199, 5-8 we have a distinction between *aisthesis* knowing things ἐνύλως which are ἀυλότερον ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ, a distinction which implies a substantial difference such as was denied in the *Timaeus commentary*.

Signs of a similar process may be seen in the *Cratylus commentary*, with an interesting addition. For here we find two passages, though in neither case part of a psychological discussion, which refer to ἄλογος δόξα. In the first Proclus says that while Socrates is analogous to *nous*, Hermogenes is analogous to ἄλογος δόξα ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Callias to σωματοειδῆς φαντασία καὶ ἔνυλος (*In Cra.* 67, p. 29, 1-3 Pasquali). Here one is reminded of Plotinus' distinction between a first *phantasia* which is *doxa* and another περὶ τὸ κάτω ἀμυδρὰ οἶον δόξα<sup>1</sup>. In the second, *à propos* applying names according to different aspects of an entity he exemplifies ὡσπερ εἴ τις τὴν ἄλογον δόξαν φαντασίαν προσαγορεύοι, ἢ τὸν νοῦν διάνοιαν, πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο βλέπων (113, p. 65, 13-15). A possible inference from these remarks is that he is now thinking of *doxa* as something much closer to *phantasia* than to the faculties of the rational soul with which he sometimes classes it<sup>2</sup>. If this is correct the statement that *doxa* and *phantasia* are virtually brothers, *quia* neighbours, which follows the first of these two texts, may well signify more than mere quasi-spatial juxtaposition. Another passage, where Proclus says that the things above the heavens would not be μνημονευτὰ καὶ διὰ φαντασίας ἢ δόξης ἢ διανοίας γνωστά (113, p. 66, 9 f.), does not show that *doxa* and *phantasia* should be taken together: on the other hand the absence of *aisthesis* here could indicate that *phantasia* was being taken with what comes above rather than

<sup>1</sup> III 6, 4, 19-21. It should, however, be noted, that both may belong to the irrational soul, cf. *Plotinus' Psychology*, 92 f.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. n. 3 p. 137.

below, that is, that it is being distinguished from *aisthesis* to a greater extent than from *doxa*. Neither of these commentaries, however, gives anything like a full treatment of the soul's organization.

The *Republic commentary* contains the most comprehensive scheme in Proclus of the soul's faculties and activities. This shows *doxa* and *phantasia* co-existing as two separate faculties, one attached to the higher and one to the lower soul. As there are ὀρέξεις and γνώσεις in the ψυχὴ λογικὴ (including two kinds of ὀρέξεις and γνώσεις, one concerned with what is above, the other with what is below), so irrational powers exist as images of these, ἡ μὲν φανταστικὴ τῆς νοητικῆς, ἡ δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τῆς δοξαστικῆς (*In R.*, I p. 235, 2 ff. Kroll). As far as cognitive faculties go we have approximately the same position as in the passage from the *Timaeus commentary* which gave *doxa* and *phantasia* as the bottom and top of the two levels of soul. Nevertheless the usual situation in this commentary is roughly the reverse of that in the *Timaeus commentary*: there too there is an explicit list which contains both, but *doxa* is generally present on occasions where several faculties are mentioned, while *phantasia* is most often absent, here *phantasia* is generally present while *doxa* more often is not. Thus at II p. 277, 18 f. there is a list of criteria: κριτήρια μὲν γὰρ ἄπταιστα λόγος καὶ νοῦς, ἐπταισμένα δὲ φαντασία καὶ αἰσθησις. Here *doxa* is not listed as a critical faculty as it had been in the *Timaeus commentary*, nor is it even given as a correlative of *aisthesis* as one might expect from the first *In R.* passage. It must of course be admitted that such lists tend to be incomplete: thus at I p. 111, 19-22 νοῦς, ψυχὴ νοερά, φαντασία and αἰσθησις participate in different ways in θεὸς μετεχόμενος; *doxa* is absent, but then so is *dianoia*, and both could be included in ψυχὴ νοερά. And there are texts which may refer to both *doxa* and *phantasia*. So at I p. 105, 5-9 we read: ὅποῦ ἅττα γὰρ ἂν ἦ τὰ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδη, τοιαύτην ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν μέθεξιν γίνεσθαι τῶν κρειπτόνων· καὶ οἱ μὲν νοερῶς τῶν νοερῶν μετέχουσιν, οἱ δὲ δοξαστικῶς, οἱ δὲ φανταστικῶς, καὶ οἱ μὲν ἀπαθῶς τῶν παθῶν,

οἱ δὲ μετριοπαθῶς, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαθῶς. But in such a context we cannot, of course, be sure that δοξαστικῶς and φανταστικῶς imply the existence of faculties.

This commentary also discusses specifically whether or not τὸ φανταστικόν is the same as τὸ αἰσθητικόν. Proclus begins by saying that it would seem that when it works externally it is αἰσθητικόν, but when it retains what it has perceived then it is φανταστικόν. Yet he concludes that they are different κατ' οὐσίαν (I p. 233, 3-16). And this is the reverse of the situation in the *Timaeus commentary* where we were told that the οὐσία of both *aisthesis* and *phantasia* is the same.

That in spite of all these signs that its scope has diminished *doxa* remained a faculty in its own right throughout may be seen from *De mal. subsist.* 56, 7-9, if the *Tria Opuscula* are indeed late<sup>1</sup>. And though at *De prov.* 27, 4-6 Proclus seems to acknowledge that it was not one of Aristotle's types of cognition — or even Plato's — and to call its existence into question, it re-appears in the following chapter. That both *doxa* and *phantasia* were kept throughout may possibly have had something to do with Plotinus' original difficulties with *phantasia*.

We have not yet considered the *Commentary on Euclid I*. Here *doxa* is generally absent, while there are constant references to *phantasia*. It does not, however, follow that this work represents the term of the suggested development in Proclus' views. There are special reasons for the prominence of *phantasia* in this work which do not apply to Proclus' other writings, namely that he is concerned to explain how we can have representations of the spatially extended concepts which are the objects of geometry (cf. esp. p. 54, 22 ff. Friedlein)<sup>2</sup>. The point of the references to *doxa*, which are not frequent, is generally that

<sup>1</sup> Cf. H. BOESE, *Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula* (Berlin 1960), p. IX f., and W. BEIERWALTES, Philosophische Marginalien zu Proklos-Texten, in *Philos. Rdschau* 10 (1962), 65.

<sup>2</sup> The connection between *phantasia* and mathematics already appears at *In Ti.*, II p. 237, 11-15.

mathematical knowledge is superior to it : otherwise they merely locate it below *dianoia* (p. 11, 26 ff.)<sup>1</sup>, which is, *inter alia*, the faculty of mathematical reasoning (p. 18, 10-17). It is therefore by no means clear that *phantasia* in this work simply replaces *doxa*. We can only say with safety that *doxa* is generally irrelevant to the questions at issue. It is classed with *aisthesis* as being concerned with externals (p. 18, 14-17) and, unlike the objects of mathematics, their objects are subject to change (p. 27, 7 f.). What we can say is that there is here no suggestion that *doxa* processes the products of *aisthesis*, but only that it too deals with sensible objects. *Phantasia*, on the other hand, is directly in contact with sense-perception. At p. 45, 5-10 Proclus says that the Pythagoreans saw that learning is *anamnesis*, not something coming from outside ὡςπερ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν φαντάσματα τυποῦται ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ, οὐδ' ἐπεισοδιώδης οὔσα, καθάπερ ἡ δοξαστικὴ γνῶσις. Here *δοξαστικὴ γνῶσις* may be merely a form of activity without Proclus necessarily thinking of it as that of a separate faculty. Some support for the first alternative might be seen in the reference at p. 52, 20 f. to *phantasia* τὸ μέσον κέντρον κατέχουσα τῶν γνώσεων, for here *phantasia* is placed straightforwardly at the centre of the soul's cognitive faculties : if we compare this with statements we have already noted that *doxa* and *phantasia* are juxtaposed at the centre of the soul, then it would seem that we have further evidence for the demotion of *doxa* from the role it had in the *Timaeus commentary*, and possibly to a greater extent than in the *Republic commentary*. Moreover *phantasia* seems to be more clearly separated from *aisthesis* than in the other works. But *doxa* still retains its independence : at p. 95, 26 ff. Proclus says the unit and number, by which, he explains, he means *μοναδικὸς ἀριθμὸς*, have their existence in *doxa*, and therefore have no shape or extension, whereas even the point is extended quasi-spatially in *phantasia*. This relationship again has *doxa* above *phantasia*.

<sup>1</sup> Following an exposition of the Divided Line.

Nevertheless *phantasia* is perhaps more closely, or at least more explicitly, linked with thought here than elsewhere. In a passage which has already received some attention<sup>1</sup>, Proclus compares *phantasia* to a mirror in which the soul sees reflections of reality (p. 141, 2 ff.): earlier he had described it as a mirror in which the *logoi* in *dianoia* are reflected externally (p. 121, 1-7) — an old image that Plotinus had used to explain our consciousness of *noesis*<sup>2</sup>. Put more directly, *dianoia* deploys its objects and refers them to *phantasia* which is on its threshold: it cherishes the separation from sensibles but finds τὴν φανταστὴν ὕλην a suitable receptacle for its objects (p. 54, 27 ff.). What *phantasia* “thinks” are impressions and forms of a thought: πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν νοῆι, τύπος ἐστὶ καὶ μορφή νοήματος (p. 52, 25 f.). But the point is still *phantasia*’s role in the representation of mathematical figures. Nothing suggests that its nature is much different from that indicated by the other works, though the emphasis here is very much on its activity in relation to higher faculties<sup>3</sup>. Proclus makes the point that it receives not only *logoi* from *dianoia* but also τὰς τῶν νοερῶν καὶ θείων εἰδῶν ἐμφάσεις (p. 94, 22-4). So it would probably be fair to say that the scope of *doxa* has been restricted by the closing of the gap between *phantasia* and *dianoia*. As in the *Republic commentary*, and perhaps to a greater extent, *phantasia* is now in a position similar to that of *doxa* in the *Timaeus commentary*.

We may conclude this discussion of Proclus’ treatment of *doxa* and *phantasia* as follows. Both appear throughout his works, but in the accounts of the soul’s operations it is *doxa* that is more important at the stage represented by the *Timaeus commentary*, while *phantasia* becomes increasingly important thereafter.

If this is correct, and if Plutarch’s view about the function of *doxa* and its status at the centre of the soul was his later

<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. CHARLES, *loc. cit.* (n. 1 p. 137).

<sup>2</sup> IV 3, 30, 7-11. Cf. also Porphyry, *Gaur.* VI, p. 42, 9 Kalbfleisch, where *phantasia* is not itself the mirror.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also *In Euc.* p. 56, 10-22 Friedlein.

view, then Proclus has started from a position like Plutarch's and moved away from it during the course of his philosophical career. The connection between *phantasia* and thought, though it appears clearly only in the *Euclid commentary*, could also have been retained from Plutarch, who explained why thought does not continue for ever by saying that *nous* works μετὰ φαντασίας<sup>1</sup>. In any case we know that both had the same view about the status of *nous*. If we take these points together we may say that in those areas where we do have evidence Proclus' ideas on psychology corresponded with, or developed from, those expressed by Plutarch in the course of his exposition of Aristotle. Whether or not Syrianus was an intermediary must remain an open question, but the fact that Proclus is known to have studied psychological works with Plutarch makes it unnecessary to assume that he was. Apart from the specific comparisons we have discussed, one further point may be made. This is that if Plutarch's interpretation of Aristotle's psychology was, as we have argued, less austere, and less like Alexander's interpretation than has sometimes been suggested, then it is in general more likely that Proclus will have followed him in matters where his influence can no longer be identified.

<sup>1</sup> Philop. *In de an.* p. 541, 20-24 H.

## DISCUSSION

*M. Rist*: I should like to raise some problems of translation. I was not clear whether you wanted to translate αἴσθησις regularly by “sensation” or by “perception”. I have been wondering whether the developments of which you have been speaking may be explained at least in part as not developments at all, but as variations due to different meanings which Plutarch or Proclus attached to words like αἴσθησις. And some rather similar problems arise about δόξα. I find it hard to know what kind of statements Proclus could be thinking of when he talks of δόξα. Is he thinking of propositions like “this is a table”—when such a proposition is made without any kind of judgment by the speaker as to whether what he is saying is true or false? Or is he thinking of the kind of propositions which bothered Aristotle, like “I know that I see”?

*M. Blumenthal*: Αἴσθησις: I should normally translate by “sensation” though it sometimes means more. But I do not think any of the problems arise from fluctuation here: of course αἴσθησις can mean several things, but it is normally clear which is right and there is no confusion with φαντασία. As for δόξα, I think it is virtually untranslatable, which is why I used the Greek. I’m not sure that “proposition” is an appropriate term to describe what it does, but if it is, then certainly the type “this is a table”. I think its function is simply to supply raw data and so to give the higher soul a means of access to sensible material.

*M. Rist*: If I understand you rightly, you have argued that Proclus’ position on φαντασία gradually became more Aristotelian in that he links φαντασία more and more with “thought”. Does he ever comment on the text from *De anima* that there is no thought without φαντασία?

*M. Beierwaltes*: Δόξα ist auch bei Proklos nicht zu verlässlichen Sätzen oder Urteilen legitimiert, sie liefert lediglich das « Material » für die begriffliche Durchdringung (διάνοια). Zumindest im *Euklid-kommentar* scheint Proklos — von Aristoteles unterschieden — φαντασία als *aktive Vermittlung* vom νοῦς oder der διάνοια her zur αἴσθησις hin zu denken, im Deutschen daher übersetzbar mit *Einbildungskraft* in einem aktiven Sinne. Ansonsten ist die Bedeutung des variablen Gebrauchs von φαντασία nur aus dem Kontext zu eruieren.

*M. Blumenthal*: I think the answer to M. Rist's question is "no", but Plutarch seems to have accepted Aristotle's notion of φαντασία as a concomitant of νόησις since, as I mentioned, he used it to explain why νόησις cannot be uninterrupted (Philop. *In de an.* p. 541, 20-24 H.): φαντασία is responsible for the discontinuity. As for the meaning of φαντασία I should certainly agree with M. Beierwaltes that one must pay attention to the context. That shows that the *Euclid commentary* is a special case. Similarly there are texts where δόξα means virtually nothing but is used by Proclus because Plato used it: this too is usually clear from the context.

*M. Rist*: Does Plutarch ever allude to the Plotinian idea in *Ennead* I 4 that an activity is somehow "weakened" if we become conscious of what we are doing? And if not, where does such "consciousness" fit into his psychological schema?

*M. Beierwaltes*: Wie verhält sich Plutarchs Begriff eines νοῦς χωριστός oder τέλειος zu Plotins Konzeption eines ständig tätigen νοῦς in der Seele? Wie interpretiert er das aristotelische θύραθεν?

*M. Blumenthal*: For Plutarch νοῦς χωριστός simply stood above the human soul which had its own integral νοῦς: he did not accept Plotinus' view at all. Apart from the evidence I mentioned that can be seen from the fact that he re-adopted ἀνάμνησις as an explanation of μάθησις (Philop. *In de an.* p. 518, 23 H.), whereas Plotinus had

merely given ἀνάμνησις as one of the earlier ideas justified by his notion of νοῦς ἄνω (V 9, 5, 23). The meaning of νοῦς θύραθεν was clearly a school problem. Plutarch seems to have thought that it meant something like ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἔξω ὢν: for him that is νοῦς τέλειος (cf. Philop., *ibid.*, 30 f.). So for him consciousness could not be seen in terms of the soul's adjustment to its own suprajacent part. I am not sure that we can discover very much about Plutarch's views on this subject: there are no surviving allusions to *Enn.* I 4, or anything like it.

*M. Dalsgaard Larsen*: Vous avez très clairement analysé les renseignements disponibles sur la conception qu'avait Plutarque des facultés cognitives de l'âme, et vous avez poursuivi votre analyse dans les écrits de Proclus. Estimez-vous que la conception de Proclus s'identifie à celle de Plutarque? Ou bien Proclus a-t-il eu sur l'âme elle-même des vues qui dépassaient celles de Plutarque?

*M. Blumenthal*: Elles les dépassaient certainement, comme je l'ai signalé, mais nos sources sont trop lacuneuses pour que nous puissions le prouver de façon péremptoire.

*M. Dalsgaard Larsen*: Il serait pourtant précieux de savoir comment la conception de l'âme a évolué pendant la période qui va de Plutarque à Proclus, et, plus particulièrement, pendant la période qui nous occupe ici, à savoir celle qui va de Jamblique à Proclus. Car, abstraction faite des théories bien connues chez Plutarque aussi, au sujet de l'âme hypercosmique, de l'âme du monde, de l'âme individuelle, et de théories relatives aux rapports entre l'âme et le κόσμος νοητός/νοῦς; abstraction faite aussi des classes des âmes et des problèmes de l'unité de l'âme, il y a, chez Jamblique, une théorie selon laquelle l'âme a en elle-même τὸ εἶναι et τὸ ζῆν, selon laquelle elle est αὐτοκίνητος παντελῶς et ἀρχὴ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῶν ὄλων κινήσεων (*ap.* Stob. II 8, 43 (II p. 173, 5 ss. W.); cf. I 49, 32 (I p. 365, 27 ss. W.)), ainsi que l'être, la vie, le mouvement, la création etc. sont à la base de ses facultés, selon laquelle, enfin, les

actes de l'âme ressemblent à l'action par laquelle les plantes produisent leurs fruits (*ap.* Stob. I 49, 37 (I p. 373, 10 ss. W.)). Cette conception de l'âme comme principe de vie et d'action de l'organisme, comment s'est-elle développée pendant la période qui nous occupe?

*M. Blumenthal* : Plutarch would certainly have had a wider concept of the soul than our evidence might suggest. The difficulty lies with the documentation. As you pointed out in your paper the question of the σκοπός of a work had become important, and for Plutarch and those who expounded the *De anima* after him, the σκοπός of that treatise was the specifically human soul. That already excludes one area from our sources, which are *De anima* commentaries. His views on the lower area of the soul were probably not extensively reported because this area was relatively uncontroversial. But he did talk about ὄρεξις in the Simplicius report I mentioned, he talked about αἴσθησις and there is a reference to his views on whether φυτά have ὄρεξις (Philop. *In de an.* p. 575, 6-8). So there is no reason to think he dismantled the traditional Aristotelian type structure of faculties : We do have one report that he thought of soul as μία οὐσία πολυδύναμος (Philop. *In de an.* p. 571, 35-7 H.). Unfortunately we do not know what the δυνάμεις were. Proclus seems to have maintained the scheme, though I think one may say that he was much less interested in the details. We should of course know more if we had his *Commentary* on the second half of the *Timaeus*.

