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I

F. W. WALBANK

*Polybius between Greece  
and Rome*



## POLYBIUS BETWEEN GREECE AND ROME

In his excellent recent survey of work on Polybius<sup>1</sup> our colleague Dr. Musti makes an important point. In a historian like Polybius, he says, it must not be assumed that his analysis of the forms taken by Roman imperialism and the reasons behind it necessarily implies that these had his approval. The exact relationship between analysis and approval must be a subject of investigation. This seems to me to be well said; and it is as a contribution to that investigation that I offer this paper. One of the immediate difficulties is Polybius' caution in making explicit statements about the Romans and their policy. But there are others which I may conveniently begin by considering.

### I

The first is the sheer length of time with which we are concerned. Between Polybius' youth in the days of Philopoemen, and the Numantine War, at which he may have been present as an old man, there is a gap of about fifty years. It is on the face of it unlikely that his views on Rome remained constant during the whole of this time; and what we need to know is in what ways and at what stages of his life his attitude towards Rome—and his view about the right policy for Greek states to adopt towards Rome—changed. The answer is difficult because the evidence comes from the *Histories*, so that one must first reach conclusions about the dates at which Polybius prepared, wrote, revised

<sup>1</sup> D. MUSTI, in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* I 2 (Berlin 1972), 1114-81, esp. 1136.

and published his work. I do not, however, wish to become involved in this ancient problem any more than I have to for my immediate purpose.

Polybius' life falls into four main periods. First, there is his youth in Achaëa and career as a statesman down to his holding of the hipparchy in 170/69, and his relegation to Rome with the other Achaëan detainees in 168/7. Next, his *de facto* exile at Rome, with (apparently) some trips elsewhere, especially in the late fifties, when his friend Scipio Aemilianus was becoming influential. Thirdly there are the five years following his repatriation, during which he attended Scipio at the destruction of Carthage, made his famous voyage of exploration on the Atlantic, and acted as mediator in Achaëa after the catastrophe of 146. Finally there are the years of which we know least, from 145 down to his death, which was perhaps as late as 118 (though Professor Pédech would put it earlier) <sup>1</sup>.

Of these four periods only the first three are covered in the *Histories*; and only the first, down to 168/7, fell within the original plan for a work going down to the battle of Pydna and its aftermath. It is, I think, generally agreed that Polybius was working on his original draft while he was at Rome between 167 and 150; but there is no unanimity concerning how many books he had written (or actually published) by 150. The decision to extend the *Histories* beyond 167 could have been taken any time after that date; but in the form in which we have it, and as Polybius sketches it in book III, i.e. to cover the years 167 to 145, the extension must obviously have been planned after 145. Furthermore, we must allow some time after Polybius' arrival in Rome before he conceived his original project, and a longer period after that during which he was working on it. There is therefore quite a strong probability that several of the thirty

<sup>1</sup> *LEC* 29 (1961), 145-56; see my *Polybius* (Berkeley 1972), 6 n. 26.

books which made up the original *Histories* were still unwritten in 150 and had to be finished after 145 (for it is a fair assumption that the events of 150-145 left little time or opportunity for the actual writing of history). The last ten books covering the years 167 to 145 were both conceived and written after the latter date; and this raises an important question. Do opinions expressed in books xxxi to xxxix reflect the views Polybius held at the time about which he is writing, or the conclusions which he had reached at the date of composition?

It is a problem which concerns all writers of contemporary history; but it happens to be especially acute in Polybius' case because of the obvious contrast between his situation immediately after 167 and his situation after 146. As regards the events of the third Macedonian War, it seems a fair assumption that for some time after their arrival in Rome the Achaean detainees will have been expecting some kind of enquiry; hence, that in preparation for that Polybius will have written up, while it was still fresh in his mind, a memorandum on his hipparchy—no doubt phrased so as to put the most favourable interpretation on his actions. And as regards subsequent events which occurred while he was at Rome, M. Gelzer<sup>1</sup> has shown that an important aspect of Polybius' technique of historical composition was his use of memoranda prepared either by himself or by other interested parties concerning contemporary incidents. A significant example exists in Polybius' account of the escape of Demetrius I from Rome to Syria<sup>2</sup>, with the historian's personal assistance. The reference to Carthage as still existing suggests that his account of the episode was composed shortly after it occurred and was incorporated in the *Histories* virtually as it stood. At that time Polybius was almost certainly still

<sup>1</sup> M. GELZER, *Kleine Schriften* III (Wiesbaden 1964), 168.

<sup>2</sup> XXXI 11-15; reference to Carthage: 12, 12.

working on the original plan of his *Histories*; but the preparation of such memoranda perhaps implies that he was already envisaging at any rate the *possibility* of writing up this later period. Be that as it may, my immediate point is that if such memoranda lie behind Polybius' account of the years following 168, there is a reasonable likelihood that it reflects views on Roman policy and the policies of Greek statesmen which he held at that time.

## II

The question of relations with Rome dominated Achaean policy from Polybius' earliest years. In 198—after a painful debate—the Macedonian alliance had been abandoned in favour of collaboration with Rome. But on what terms? That was a subject that was to be hotly debated throughout the next three decades. Philopoemen died in 182. And, until then, Lycortas, Polybius' father, and (one may fairly assume) Polybius himself, from the age when he was capable of holding political views, supported the policy of the great man. The comparison which Polybius draws (in book xxiv) between the policies of Philopoemen and Aristaenus ends with the conclusion that both were safe, but whereas that of Aristaenus was εὐσχήμων (plausible), that of Philopoemen was καλή (honourable)<sup>1</sup>. Since this comparison does not figure in Plutarch's *Philopoemen*, which is generally taken to be derived from Polybius' biography, K.-E. Petzold has argued<sup>2</sup> that it must have been composed later, at a time when Polybius had come to assign greater importance in history to ethical factors. This I cannot accept, partly

<sup>1</sup> XXIV 11-13.

<sup>2</sup> K.-E. PETZOLD, *Studien zur Methode des Polybios und zu ihrer historischen Auswertung* (Munich 1969), 45-6, 49 n. 1.

because I do not believe that Polybius became interested in ethical criteria only in his mature years, and partly because I hesitate to base an opinion about Polybius on an *argumentum ex silentio* in Plutarch. In fact I see no good reason why this comparison of Aristaenus and Philopoemen should not represent a fair account of views which Polybius had heard debated in Lycortas' circle during his early years.

Aristaenus was for anticipating and complying with all Roman wishes, whereas Philopoemen was for collaboration only within the strict conditions of the Achaean laws and the Roman alliance. The latter was Lycortas' policy too. But ten years after Philopoemen's death, in 170, just before Polybius entered upon the office of hipparch, we find him opposing Lycortas at an Achaean assembly<sup>1</sup>. Lycortas had proposed that Achaea should remain neutral in the Third Macedonian War : Rome must not grow too powerful. This policy, a direct continuation of Philopoemen's, recalls an earlier comment by Polybius himself, in which he approved the view of Hiero of Syracuse that Carthage should be preserved as a counter-balance to Rome<sup>2</sup>. But now, in 170, we find Polybius advocating, not indeed full collaboration (like Aristaenus), but a cautious policy of being guided by circumstances and giving the pro-Roman party no chance to denounce its opponents. This extremely flexible approach may mirror the apprehensions of a man about to assume the responsibilities of office at a critical moment ; but also perhaps it indicates a realisation that the Roman attitude towards Greece was hardening.

This hardening had come largely as a result of advice given to the Senate in winter 180/79 by Callicrates, the leading advocate of completely subordinating Achaea to the will of Rome. On the occasion of his visit to Rome in that

<sup>1</sup> XXVIII 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> I 83, 4.

year Callicrates had urged the Senate to give open support throughout Greece to those who, whatever their personal character, put the wishes of the Romans even above their own laws and oaths<sup>1</sup>. It was Polybius' view<sup>2</sup> that Callicrates had thereby done untold harm to the Greeks generally, since he had made it impossible for Achaeans to speak to Romans on equal terms—and so prevented them henceforth from securing adjustments in Roman policy by adducing arguments based on justice and *fides*. The Romans were now surrounded by mere flatterers, who neither would nor could advise them honestly. The validity of this judgment has been hotly debated. For many years scholars accepted Polybius' estimate of Callicrates' influence, and some even went further and condemned him as a traitor to Greece and Achaëa. More recently E. Badian and R. M. Errington<sup>3</sup> have argued that Callicrates' advice was well conceived and salutary, since it ended the vacillation at Rome which had merely caused tension and uncertainty in Greece. For my own part, I have much sympathy for P. Derow's argument<sup>4</sup> that the Senate was not so much vacillating as divided in its views on Greece and that Callicrates' intervention gave a fillip to such tough-minded men as Q. Marcius Philippus. What was perhaps worse, it had the effect of forcing Greek moderates into the extremist camp, a tendency well exemplified by the melancholy story of Cephalus in Epirus; while the unrestrained and partisan behaviour of those who now had the Roman ear caused even greater tension and

<sup>1</sup> XXIV 9.

<sup>2</sup> XXIV 10, 8-14.

<sup>3</sup> E. BADIAN, *Foreign clientelae* (Oxford 1958), 90-3; R. M. ERRINGTON, *Philopoemen* (Oxford 1969), 195-205.

<sup>4</sup> P. DEROW, Polybius and the embassy of Kallikrates, in *Essays presented to C. M. Bowra* (Oxford 1970), 12-23, esp. 22-3; since Polybius usually treats the Senate as monolithic in its decisions, such division of opinion would be unlikely to be expressed in his pages.

bitterness than before. A verdict in this dispute is not essential to my argument for in any case it is clear that Callicrates' policy led to a polarisation of attitudes in Greece. Men like Cephalus moved to the left and became more actively anti-Roman while others, like Polybius, became more cautious and so in effect moved to the right.

### III

This can be seen from Polybius' comments on the anti-Roman groups in the Greek states at the time of the Third Macedonian War<sup>1</sup>. Polybius was writing his account of that war at the earliest in the late fifties and more probably after 145. By then of course he was a protégé of Scipio Aemilianus, with whom he enjoyed close relations of friendship and—may one say?—*clientela*. He may have resided in his household<sup>2</sup>. This could have helped to colour his views on the pro-Macedonian party. But in any case his own policy during the war with Perseus had been one of cautious collaboration with Rome, even if he did employ some cunning in delaying his offer of Achaean help to Q. Marcius Philippus until it seemed likely to be rejected<sup>3</sup>. Thus Perseus had been Achaea's enemy as well as Rome's, and Polybius describes his conduct in hostile and unsympathetic terms. It is not surprising that some of this hostility rubs off on Perseus' Greek supporters. But these men had not merely backed the anti-Roman side: they had backed the losing side, and the excessively harsh tones in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. J. DEININGER, *Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland*, 217-86 v. Chr. (Berlin 1971).

<sup>2</sup> Perhaps implied in XXXI 24, 9.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. XXVIII 13; there is no reason to suppose that Polybius was acting on secret instructions from Archon, the general (as assumed by G. DE SANCTIS, *Storia dei Romani* IV 1 (Turin 1923), 300, 307; cf. P. MELONI, *Perseo* (Rome 1953), 313 n. 3; P. PÉDECH, *LEC* 37 (1969), 257).

which Polybius condemns them illustrates, I suggest, the extent to which, in such a situation, he made success or failure a criterion in judging policy.

In Boeotia for instance Roman envoys arranged to procure the arrest and suicide of the anti-Roman partisans and dissolve the League. Polybius condemns the Boeotians for "rashly and thoughtlessly supporting Perseus"<sup>1</sup>. The Rhodian supporters of Macedonia are accused of being motivated by private debt and unscrupulous avarice<sup>2</sup>. No one, Polybius insists, could approve of men like Hippocritus and Diomedon of Cos, or Deinon and Polyaratus of Rhodes, who did all they could to help Perseus yet, after his defeat, could not muster up enough courage to commit suicide. Posterity had therefore not the slightest grounds for pitying or pardoning them<sup>3</sup>.

These judgments have to be considered in the light of an Achaean policy for which Polybius, as envoy to Q. Marcius Philippus, carried a considerable responsibility. That policy had failed: of this the summoning of the 1,000 to Rome left no doubt. But it had failed less disastrously than had that of Rhodes, and Polybius' comments on the anti-Roman partisans perhaps contains an element of self-defence. About the Romans themselves he is fairly reticent—with one exception. According to Livy, who is here following Polybius, the sharp diplomacy of Q. Marcius Philippus had been characterised by older senators as *nova sapientia*; that was not how Romans used to behave. Philippus was no friend of Achaea or of Aemilius Paullus, and Livy (i.e. Polybius) records his success thus: *vicit... ea pars senatus, cui potior utilis quam honesti cura erat*<sup>4</sup>. But the defenders of old-time

<sup>1</sup> XXVII 2, 10.

<sup>2</sup> XXVII 7, 12.

<sup>3</sup> XXX 7, 9-8, 4.

<sup>4</sup> Liv. XLII 47, 9.

morality did not reject the advantages brought by Philippus' policy ; and when, by 168, Aemilius Paullus and his friends had gained the ascendancy over the harsh and brutal *novi homines* who had recently made their power felt, their own behaviour was by no means free from either treachery or brutality—as Paullus' conduct of affairs in Epirus and elsewhere demonstrates<sup>1</sup>. Polybius may express moral disapproval of a Postumius Albinus or a Marcius Philippus. But by the time he came to write his account of the war with Perseus, he seems to be capable of a fairly detached view of Machiavellian politics, when they were employed against the enemies of Rome (and Achaëa)—especially when it was Aemilius Paullus who employed them.

#### IV

Once settled in Rome Polybius was forced to judge Roman policy from a detached point of view, which was in any case perhaps more congenial to the historian than to the politician. His comments on what was happening during the next fifteen years (166-151) contain an occasional criticism of Roman behaviour towards the Greek world, but in general the cynical aloofness of a man debarred from political action. I will refer briefly to one or two passages. Consider, for example, Polybius' description of the unsuccessful attempt of certain Romans to persuade Attalus to join a plot against his brother, King Eumenes, in 168/7, and the Senate's subsequent failure to hand over Aenus and Maronea to Eumenes, as it had promised<sup>2</sup> ; or his account of the rewards which

<sup>1</sup> See J. BRISCOE, *JRS* 54 (1964), 74-5, who points out that all our sources except Polybius emphasise that Paullus was carrying out the order of an *S.C.* in Epirus.

<sup>2</sup> XXX 1-3.

Prusias derived from his servility <sup>1</sup>, of Eumenes' humiliation at Rome in 167/6 <sup>2</sup>, or of the Senate's unprincipled acquiescence in Athens' claim to Haliartus <sup>3</sup>. Occasionally Polybius specifically states that the Senate was moved by self-interest. They refused to restore Demetrius because they preferred to have an inexperienced youth on the Seleucid throne <sup>4</sup>. They sponsored the revision of the agreement between the two Ptolemies in 163/2, because it was in their interest to keep Egypt weak and divided <sup>5</sup>. "Many Roman decisions, Polybius adds, are now of this kind; profiting by others' mistakes they effectively increase and build up their own power, simultaneously favouring and apparently conferring a benefit on the guilty party (τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας)." Does he disapprove? One might assume so. But twice in this very passage he uses the word *πραγματικῶς* of Roman policy; and in Polybius this usually indicates a praiseworthy quality. In the clashes between Carthage and Masinissa, decisions generally favoured the latter, because that was to the advantage of Rome <sup>6</sup>. The Romans had already decided on the Third Punic War, but postponed its start until they had a pretext that would appeal to foreign opinion — *καλῶς φρονοῦντες*, Polybius adds <sup>7</sup>. He was of course not always so detached. He scarcely conceals his anger when a Charops or a Callicrates persuades the Senate to refuse the Greek detainees permission to return home <sup>8</sup>. But in general his judgment of Roman policy

<sup>1</sup> XXX 18, 1-7.

<sup>2</sup> XXX 19, 1-13.

<sup>3</sup> XXX 20; cf. XXXII 10 for the Senate's refusal to support Priene.

<sup>4</sup> XXXI 2, 1-7.

<sup>5</sup> XXXI 10.

<sup>6</sup> XXXI 21, 6.

<sup>7</sup> XXXVI 2.

<sup>8</sup> XXX 32; XXXII 3, 14-17; XXXIII 1, 3 - 8, 3; 14, 2.

during those years—formulated, I am inclined to think, at the time rather than superimposed later when he was composing the last ten books—was aloof and cynical, no doubt reflecting the views of Greeks living at Rome—οἱ ἐπιδημοῦντες, as he calls them—and perhaps of his fellow detainees in the towns of southern Etruria.

## V

The harsh assumption that for the Romans wise statesmanship naturally meant putting Roman interests first is continuous from the Third Macedonian War, when he recorded the *nova sapientia* of Q. Marcius Philippus, down to the later years of his detention. It goes with an impatient rejection of Greeks foolish enough to work against Rome. During the years just before his release Polybius' position perhaps improved. He now had considerable freedom of movement. It is not known when he visited Locri, but his journey to Spain, Gaul and North Africa in 151/0 clearly connects with the growing authority of Scipio Aemilianus, whom he accompanied.

This close identification with Scipio's family continues throughout the rest of the period covered by his extended *Histories*. It may help to account for the increasingly pro-Roman character of the later books, especially those covering the years 150 to 146, when Polybius was himself making history in Scipio's camp at Carthage or as mediator in Achaëa. This development in his views is expressed less in positive statements of approval of Roman policy than in the violent and even emotional terms in which he discusses the methods and personalities of the enemies of Rome, his hostile contempt for whom surpasses that which he displayed towards the pro-Macedonian parties at the time of the war with Perseus. It is also expressed in his account of the arguments

which, he says, were propounded by the Greeks in discussing the rights and wrongs of Roman action in the Third Punic War—a passage which has been variously interpreted.

Four views are recorded<sup>1</sup>. Some urged that since Carthage had been a constant menace to Rome, and might be again, her destruction was a wise and statesmanlike action (*φρονίμως καὶ πραγματικῶς βουλευέσασθαι*) designed to secure Roman rule. Others argued that the Roman treatment of Carthage represented a change of policy—already visible in the destruction of the Macedonian kingdom in 168; Rome was following in the footsteps of Athens and Sparta and was likely to end the same way<sup>2</sup>. A third group, also critical of Rome, alleged that she had committed impiety and treachery (*ἀσέβημα καὶ παρασπόνδημα*) towards Carthage, thus lapsing from standards of honourable warfare, judged against the background of the *iustum bellum*. But this allegation plays straight into the hands of the fourth group, who argued that the Punic *deditio* completely justified the Roman treatment of Carthage, especially as the Carthaginians had broken both the treaty with Masinissa and the obligations incurred in the *deditio* itself. Polybius does not state which (if any) of these views coincides with his own; hence his readers are forced back on speculation. A case can be made for thinking that he accepted the arguments of Rome's critics<sup>3</sup>. In book x, commenting on the failure of the Carthaginians to exploit the situation in Spain after the death of the two Scipios, he remarks<sup>4</sup> that they had acted on the belief that "there is one method by which power should be acquired and another by which it should be

<sup>1</sup> XXXVI 9; see my *Polybius*, 174 n. 112.

<sup>2</sup> He means either that she will become a tyrant or that her empire will be of short duration (cf. my *Polybius*, 175 n. 114).

<sup>3</sup> Cf. K.-E. PETZOLD, *op. cit.*, 62-3.

<sup>4</sup> X 36, 2 sq.

maintained. They had not learnt that those who preserve their supremacy best are those who adhere to the same principles by which they originally established it." The Carthaginians were enemies of Rome (and of the Scipios); but Philip V, an ally of Achaea during the Social War, is condemned in book v for sacking the Aetolian centre at Thermum, on the moral grounds that "good men should not make war on wrongdoers with the object of destroying and exterminating them, but with that of correcting and reforming their errors<sup>1</sup>." This sententious observation should perhaps be seen in the general context of Philip's later "moral deterioration" when these defects were to prove disadvantageous to Achaea. But the views expressed would certainly be in keeping with those of Rome's critics at the time of the Third Punic War. They were moreover views once propounded by the Romans themselves; for, if we can believe Polybius, Flamininus remarked after his victory at Cynoscephalae that the Romans never exterminated their enemies after a single war (as their treatment of Hannibal after Zama demonstrated), and that brave men ought to be hard on their enemies and angry with them while fighting, if beaten courageous and highminded, and if victorious moderate, gentle and humane<sup>2</sup>. Whether the expression of the same sentiments in Diodorus xxxi 3 is from a version of Cato's speech on the Rhodians and whether in that case it derives from Polybius, I leave open; but a similar passage in Diodorus xxix 31 certainly seems to be Polybian<sup>3</sup>.

These passages, taken together, apparently afford strong support for the view that Polybius took sides with Rome's critics over the Third Punic War. Nevertheless, I believe it to be wrong. Three arguments seem to be decisive

<sup>1</sup> V 11, 5.

<sup>2</sup> XVIII 37, 2; 37, 7.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. D. S. XXI 9; he seems fond of the *sententia*.

against it. The first is that although Polybius gives no overt expression of opinion about Roman policy, he sets out the various Greek views in such a way as to indicate clearly which he regarded as decisive. The arguments are arranged chiastically, so that those favouring Rome begin and end the "debate"; and the space allotted to them (in lines of the Teubner text) is, for the first eight lines, for the second fifteen, for the third fifteen but for the fourth and last twenty-eight. This answers the third argument in detail, and I find it hard to believe that it does not represent Polybius' view of the matter<sup>1</sup>. That he gave the other side the last word and twice as much space as he allotted to the view he is supposed to have held himself—this is *prima facie* incredible. The second reason for supposing that Polybius approved the Roman policy towards Carthage is that it had the backing of Scipio Aemilianus, and that Polybius was present throughout at Scipio's headquarters, and shared his experiences when the city fell. Was he all the time condemning the policy to which by his presence he lent not only moral support but also perhaps technical assistance?

Finally Polybius represents the Third Punic War as the most notable event within the period which he regards as one of *ταραχή και κίνησις* (which perhaps recalls the *ἀκρίσια και ταραχή* which Xenophon<sup>2</sup> saw as supervening upon the battle of Mantinea). The main feature of this period, which includes the Spanish War, Andriscus' revolt in Macedonia, and the Achaean War, is that there is no sense in what happened. Events were unforeseen, *παράδοξα*; policy (in the states opposing Rome) did not obey the rules of reason. Macedonia presents the unbelievable story of a pseudo-

<sup>1</sup> For a similar example see the speeches of the Aetolian and Acarnanian envoys at Sparta in 211; cf. IX 28-39 and my remarks in *Ancient Macedonia* (Salonica 1970), 295-6.

<sup>2</sup> *HG* VII 5, 27.

Philip virtually falling out of the sky (*ἀεροπετής Φίλιππος*) and winning victory after victory. The Macedonians, to whom Rome had brought freedom in place of slavery, rushed to fight for this impostor, who in return exiled, tortured and murdered them in large numbers—an example of heaven-sent insanity (*δαιμονοβλάβεια*)<sup>1</sup>. In Achaëa, disaster took the form of a universal catastrophe, disgraceful and lacking in any of those features which in former disasters had inspired appropriate feelings of consolation and pride: “the whole country was visited by an unparalleled attack of madness, with people flinging themselves into wells and over precipices”<sup>2</sup>. This general madness and demoralisation was such as is scarcely to be met among barbarians, and that Greece did ultimately emerge can only be attributed to the “successful intervention of some kind of smart and ingenious fortune”—who saved the Greeks only by bringing about this downfall with such speed<sup>3</sup>.

The men involved in these disreputable incidents were such as one might expect. Diaeus and Critolaus “and all who shared their views” were, one might say, a deliberate selection of the worst men from each city, hateful to the gods and corruptors of the nation<sup>4</sup>; their political naïveté combined with sheer wickedness led the Achaeans to ruin<sup>5</sup>. Similarly at Carthage, Hasdrubal was an empty-headed fool without political or military capacity, flaunting purple robes and full armour, but never realising that Carthage was lost<sup>6</sup>. Pot-bellied and apoplectic of countenance, he was like a fatted ox at a festival, and he gave lavish dinners while his

<sup>1</sup> XXXVI 17, 12-15.

<sup>2</sup> XXXVIII 16, 7.

<sup>3</sup> XXXVIII 18, 8-12.

<sup>4</sup> XXXVIII 10, 8.

<sup>5</sup> XXXVIII 10, 13.

<sup>6</sup> XXXVIII 7, 1.

fellow-citizens were daily dying of famine in hordes<sup>1</sup>. I have mentioned the resemblance to Polybius' comments on the Greeks who earlier had made the mistake of supporting Perseus; but the present remarks are much more extreme and emotional. No one surely can doubt where Polybius' sympathies lay, as between Scipio's Rome and these despicable and insane men who were at this time opposing her.

## VI

If this is accepted, the possibility arises that Polybius had changed his mind about how conquered peoples should be treated when they repaid benefits with breach of faith, crass ingratitude and revolt. The Roman policy exemplified at Carthage and Corinth was that of eliminating dangerous and intransigent enemies. At Carthage (and later at Numantia) its instrument was Scipio himself. The view has been expressed that Polybius formulated such a policy in a lost part of one of his later books, and that a passage in Diodorus xxxii, to which M. Gelzer first drew attention in a famous essay on Scipio Nasica's opposition to the proposal to destroy Carthage, is derived from Polybius<sup>2</sup>. Diodorus here enunciates a doctrine diametrically opposed to that in which Polybius criticised Carthaginian policy in Spain<sup>3</sup>. "Those, he says, whose object it is to attain hegemony over others use courage and intelligence to gain it, moderation and respect for others to extend it widely, and paralysing terror to secure it against attack." He then proceeds to illustrate this principle from Macedonian history, with Philip II's destruction of Olynthus and the razing of

<sup>1</sup> XXXVIII 8, 7.

<sup>2</sup> D. S. XXXII 2 and 4; M. GELZER, *Kleine Schriften* II, 64 sqq.

<sup>3</sup> X 36.

Thebes by Alexander, and from Roman history with the destruction of Corinth, the eradication of Perseus and the obliteration of Carthage and Numantia. Gelzer's view has been widely accepted<sup>1</sup>; and K.-E. Petzold<sup>2</sup> has underlined verbal parallels between this passage in Diodorus and Polybian passages which it appears to echo—though, unlike Gelzer, he draws the conclusion that Polybius was indicating that Rome was bent on a *φιλαρχία* which would lead to her destruction.

Recently, however, J. Touloumakos<sup>3</sup> has emphasised the fact that the two Greek examples quoted to illustrate the theory—Philip's destruction of Olynthus and Alexander's destruction of Thebes—in fact illustrate it rather badly, since the first was followed by Philip's *φιλανθρωπία* towards Athens and the second by Alexander's *φιλανθρωπία* towards the Persians. In accepting Gelzer's attribution of the Diodoran passage to Polybius I had already mentioned<sup>4</sup> that "the three stages—acquisition, extension and securing of empire—are not necessarily envisaged as always following that chronological order." On this view, Alexander's punishment of Thebes could have been seen within a European context, with the winning over of the Persians as something quite separate. However, on further consideration, I am inclined to think that J. Touloumakos must be right and that the examples quoted from Greece are too inept to be the work of Polybius; and it is on the whole unlikely that Diodorus took over the formulation from Polybius and added the Greek examples himself. Moreover, the mention of Numantia is also an obstacle to the view

<sup>1</sup> For references see my *Polybius*, 179 n. 130.

<sup>2</sup> K.-E. PETZOLD, *op. cit.*, 63.

<sup>3</sup> J. TOULOUMAKOS, *Zum Geschichtsbewusstsein der Griechen in der Zeit der römischen Herrschaft* (Göttingen 1971), 28-9 n. 28.

<sup>4</sup> *JRS* 55 (1965), 11.

that Diodorus' source was Polybius, since the *Histories* ended in 145. True, at the time Diodorus was writing, the fates of Carthage and Numantia were closely associated in people's minds as Scipio's two great military achievements, perpetuated indeed in the titles *Africanus* and *Numantinus*<sup>1</sup>, so that the addition could have come from Diodorus. But taken together with the Greek examples, it seems to weigh against the attribution to Polybius.

However, the elimination of this passage does not greatly affect the issue. For it seems clear that Polybius approved a Roman policy associated with Scipio Aemilianus more than with any other man (unless it was Aemilius Paullus, the destroyer of Macedonia and Epirus); for Scipio, I need hardly say, was a very different man from the fictional Aemilianus drawn in Cicero's *De re publica*<sup>2</sup>. That Polybius did condemn Scipio's policy I find quite improbable as a hypothesis and I would argue that Polybius accepted the events at Carthage, Corinth, and later Numantia, as perhaps inevitable and certainly not blameworthy manifestations of the evolution of imperial power.

How far his support for Roman policy at this time implies a reversal of his earlier approval of the principle of *parcere subiectis* is perhaps a moot point. On the one hand, although expressed in moral terms in reference to Philip V, that principle was basically utilitarian; it was the policy that gave the best results. But that was true only if one had to go on living with the defeated and governing them. If, however, one decided to *destroy* Carthage or Numantia, to make an end of the Macedonian kingdom, to enslave the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Plut. *Aem.* 22, 4, Σκιπίων ὁ Καρχηδῶνα καὶ Νομαντίαν κατάσκαψας; Val. Max. IV 3, 13; V 3, 2; IX 12, 3.

<sup>2</sup> See H. STRASBURGER, *JRS* 55 (1965), 41 sq.; 52 sq.; *Hermes* 94 (1966), 60-72; J. E. G. ZETZEL, *HSPb* 76 (1972), 173-9; cf. A. ASTIN, *Scipio Aemilianus* (Oxford 1967), 294-306; E. S. GRUEN, *Roman politics and the criminal courts* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 17-18.

Epirotes, that was indeed a more ruthless solution, but one perhaps simpler and safer for a dominant power. For, in fact, since 168 Rome's position was new and unprecedented. Hitherto the Carthaginians in Spain, for example, or the Romans themselves after Cynoscephalae, had operated within something approaching a balance of power: now Rome enjoyed virtual supremacy, and the balance of power was dead (as indeed Polybius wrote his *Histories* to demonstrate).

Roman policy at this time was certainly harsh by our standards. But there is no reason to think that Polybius rejected harshness, when it was a question of punishing intransigence or treachery. Standards of harshness vary; and I would remind you of Polybius' criticism of Phylarchus, who had expressed sympathy for Mantinea, and his remark that "nothing more serious befel the Mantineans in their hour of calamity than the pillage of their property and the enslavement of their free population" <sup>1</sup>, or his assertion that the ex-tyrant Aristomachus of Argos deserved to be led around the whole Peloponnese and tortured to death as a deterrent spectacle, whereas "despite his abominable character all the harm he suffered was to be drowned in the sea by the officials in command at Cenchreae <sup>2</sup>." Whether Polybius was conscious of any contradiction between Roman policy in 146 and the views he had expressed earlier is another matter. But in this context it is perhaps worth recalling that in his general comments on Roman policy after the Achaean War—a policy in which he was personally much involved—he stresses the fine impression left behind in Greece by the ten commissioners and by Mummius himself <sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> II 58, 12.

<sup>2</sup> II 60, 8.

<sup>3</sup> XXXIX 5, 1; 6, 2.

## VII

I would argue then that from the late years of his detention in Italy and throughout the period down to 146 Polybius grew increasingly sympathetic towards Rome, where Scipio was now a leading figure. But I have still to consider one important fact—his decision sometime after 145 to extend his *Histories* to cover events down to that year, a period of 22 years which was to require another ten books and thereby to add an extra third to his original work. Any discussion of Polybius' position relative to Greece and Rome must take this revision of plan into consideration.

The reasons Polybius alleges for thus extending his *Histories* are rather remarkable. "If, he writes <sup>1</sup>, from their success alone we could adequately judge how far states and individuals merit praise or blame, I could here (i.e. at 168/7) bring my narrative to a close... in accordance with the plan set out at the beginning of my work... But since judgements regarding either victors or vanquished based purely on the actual struggle are by no means final... I must append... an account of the subsequent policy of the conquerors and how they exercised their universal rule, as well as of the various opinions... entertained by the rest about their rulers, and finally I must describe what were the prevailing and dominant tendencies and ambitions of the various peoples in their private and public life... Contemporaries will thus be enabled to see clearly whether Roman rule is acceptable or the reverse, and future generations whether their government should be considered to have been worthy of praise or admiration or rather of blame."

So the extension of the *Histories* down to 145 is to facilitate passing judgment on Rome—both now, when it is a

<sup>1</sup> III 4, 1 sq.

practical issue, and in the future when it will have become the material of history. K.-E. Petzold<sup>1</sup> has recently argued that the kind of judgments which Polybius expected his readers to pass would resemble the accusations of Roman aggression, and the allegations that the Romans exploited grievances to further their own imperial ends, which are to be found attributed to Greeks in many passages of Polybius (or in Polybian parts of Livy) from the time of the Hannibalic War onwards; and he associates this with an increased sensitiveness in Polybius to moral issues and with the alleged moral deterioration visible at Rome. Concerning this argument I should like to make three points. First, as I have already said, it is certainly true that Polybius admits that from about 171 onwards the Romans exploited Greek quarrels and weaknesses to further their own ends. Their opponents had alleged it earlier: now Polybius admits it. My second point is that there is no reason to suppose that Polybius was more sensitive to moral issues as he grew older than he had been earlier. Book VI, written I would say before 150, lays much stress on ethical factors, and Polybius' criticism of Philip V (of which I quoted an example a few minutes ago) and his discussion of the influence of Aratus, Apelles and Demetrius of Pharos on that king show that he was alert to such matters long before he adopted the revised plan of his *Histories*. Moreover, the question of moral decline had been actively discussed at Rome ever since Cato's censorship of 184, and must have been familiar to Polybius from the time of his arrival there in 167. My third point is that Petzold's theory confuses two separate issues; for I see no reason why the moral decline which Polybius describes—perhaps, incidentally, in somewhat exaggerated colours so as to underline the contrasted abstemiousness of the virtuous young Scipio—need have had

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, 59 sqq.

anything to do with a growth in Machiavellian policies, nor are there grounds for thinking that Polybius' comments on moral decline imply that he disapproved of the use of ruthless and self-interested politics by Rome.

When he sketches his plan to extend his *Histories* Polybius puts forward an unusual criterion—the acceptability of Roman rule to the subject peoples. The implications of this are far-reaching, for it raises the whole question of the purpose of imperial expansion and how imperial achievement is to be assessed. It was generally assumed that the subjection of other states and the preservation of acquisitions without damage to the imperial power were justification enough in themselves. To judge empire from the point of view of the conquered was a novel concept indeed. As H. Strasburger observed a few years ago in an important paper on Poseidonius, Polybius propounded this concept, but never in fact made any serious attempt to apply it<sup>1</sup>. In books xxx to xxxix the matter is slightly complicated by the fact that he divided the twenty-five years between Pydna and the sack of Corinth into two periods—though he did not draw a very clear chronological line of demarcation between them. “The final end achieved by this work”, he wrote<sup>2</sup>, “will be to learn what was the condition of each people after all had been crushed and brought under Roman domination, down to the disturbed and troubled time (ταραχῆ καὶ κίνησις) that afterwards ensued. About this, he goes on, I was induced to write as if beginning a new work, both because of the importance of the actions and unexpected character of the events it contained, and also because I not only witnessed most of these, but also took part in or actually directed others.”

<sup>1</sup> H. STRASBURGER, *art. cit.*, 46 and n. 57.

<sup>2</sup> III 4, 12.

What exactly the time of *ταραχὴ καὶ κίνησις* included is not wholly clear, since Polybius does not list the events which fall between Pydna and its onset. He does list <sup>1</sup> several events which he associates with the *κίνησις*; but since these include Ariarathes' expulsion in 158 and the war between Prusias and Attalus in 156-154, one is bound to conclude that he had not sorted out his two periods very clearly. This conclusion is perhaps supported by the fact that a passage which seems most obviously designed to enable his readers to judge the character of Roman imperialism—which is allegedly his purpose in describing the years down to the period of disturbance—is that which records the various Greek views of Roman behaviour in the Third Punic War <sup>2</sup>, and that falls clearly *within* the period of disturbance. Insofar as Polybius envisaged a chronological demarcation, it perhaps came where book xxxiv interrupts the narrative between Ol. 156 and 157, and so in 152 B.C. Book xxxiv certainly stands immediately before the books covering the years of Polybius' personal involvement in world affairs (especially if we include his journey to Spain and Africa in 151). They contained the Third Punic War, during which he was with Scipio at Carthage, his voyage of exploration in the Atlantic, and his mediation in Greece after the fall of Corinth. But for the reasons I have given this cannot be pressed very hard; and it may well be that Polybius thought of the period after Pydna as gradually merging into the "time of disturbance" without any very clear line of demarcation.

However, neither the years after Pydna nor the years of disturbance are described and discussed in such a way as to facilitate passing judgment on Rome as an imperial power from the point of view of the defeated. There are, as I have

<sup>1</sup> III 5, 1 sq.

<sup>2</sup> XXXVI 9.

emphasised, several cynical observations about Roman policy, which is influenced by self-interest ; but, especially as one comes down to the years from 152 onwards, the defeated states receive virtually no sympathy. Moreover, if one tries to justify Polybius' claim by reference to his comments on the way the Romans received the many embassies which came to Rome from the various Greek states (and these are often quite mordant) there is much more about that in the books dealing with the years *before* Pydna, which contain a very full account of internal factions in Greece, than in books xxx to xxxix, when of course the anti-Roman and even the moderate elements had been mostly eliminated.

It is because of this gap between what Polybius says he is providing in books xxx to xxxix and what he actually does provide that in my recent Sather lectures I threw out the suggestion<sup>1</sup> that his real reason for extending the *Histories* to 145 was not to facilitate passing judgment on Roman rule (as he claims), but rather to enable him to publish important material which he had assembled since 168. Clearly, while he was at Rome Polybius was collecting information and writing and soliciting memoranda, at the same time that he was composing his *Histories* ; and I think it is fair to assume that his attitude to Rome at that time was considerably more cynical than it was later when he came to use the material. From about 151 onwards he was caught up in a series of events about which, in retrospect, he had a personal story of interest and importance to tell. He might have turned *this* into a monograph ; but against that solution was the fact that it did not conform to the character of a monograph (as the Numantine War did later). On the contrary, these years covered separate and quite disconnected actions—Andriscus' revolt, the destruction of Carthage, the voyage on the outer Ocean, and the Achaean

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, 182-3.

War and settlement—episodes linked neither causally nor geographically, but only in time ; and the irrational character of many of them made them typical of *ταραχή καὶ κίνησις*. So Polybius decided to add a pendant to his *Histories* ; and that had the additional advantage of enabling him to include the material which he had collected while at Rome. The only difficulty lay in providing a *rationale* for the addition of two decades, which would make sense in the light of the original plan. This, I have suggested, is the real function of the programme which Polybius propounds but never actually fulfils. The main body of the *Histories* was written under the stimulus of an idea, the pendant because Polybius had material urgently needing to be published. The new programme—to enable his readers to pass judgment on Rome—was not perhaps very important— a *εὐσχημῶν πρόφασις* one might say. In fact, the ‘period of judging’ slides away imperceptibly into the ‘period of confusion’, and in the very last chapter of the whole work<sup>1</sup>, when Polybius is summarising the contents and purpose of his *Histories*, the whole business of ‘passing judgment’ has slipped out of sight and he simply repeats his original programme, adding the new terminal date of 145.

### VIII

In 145 Polybius stood closer to Rome than ever before. But this did not mean that he was or had been in any sense, politically or ideologically, a ‘quisling’. He had a hard realistic sense which led him to judge policies in terms of the possible. He had no sympathy for Demosthenes as against Philip II, and he was apt to make success or failure his criterion (though if one had to go down, like the Aby-

<sup>1</sup> XXXIX 8.

denes, there was something to be said for going down with one's flag flying). Decisions in politics should be based, not on abstract rules, but on the demands of the immediate situation. That was why Polybius opposed his father in 172. This sense of realism (together with less obvious pressures such as his growing intimacy with Scipio, and Scipio's growing influence exercised on his behalf) led him to see collaboration with Rome as the only realistic policy for Carthage, Macedonia or Achaëa in 150-145. For the leaders in those countries to have taken a different view strikes him as sheer insanity. But Polybius would never have given the Senate the sort of advice Callicrates gave. As an active politician in Achaëa it had seemed only reasonable to take account of the growing acceleration in Roman control over Greece, which Callicrates' evil counsel had helped to bring about; but he would do nothing to speed it up and so hasten the end of Achaean independence. It was only later, at Rome, and as a historian, that he came, in retrospect, to recognise this accelerated control as part of the grand design of Tyche.

In 146 Polybius' influence and mediation brought practical results, and many inscriptions testified to the services he was able to render his country. Of course we have only the official version, and no way of knowing how the many Achaëans who had followed their leaders to defeat in a futile and ill-planned struggle for independence felt about their prosperous and benevolent fellow-countryman who had worked to mitigate their misfortunes—from the victor's camp. One thing worries me a little. Polybius' commitment to the doctrine of "the possible" is no doubt a praiseworthy quality in a statesman—even though the really 'great' statesman is the man who makes his own definition of the possible. But had this commitment perhaps a slightly corrupting effect on Polybius as a historian? With his increasing sympathy for Rome, the successful super-power, goes a

marked lack of sympathy for those who had resisted her. The arguments defending Roman policy against Carthage in the Third Punic War—which, I have argued, Polybius accepted—coincide with those which must have been bandied about in ‘hawkish’ circles at Rome; they are harsh and legalistic to a fault, and ignore much—for instance the successive decisions favouring Masinissa (which Polybius elsewhere admits<sup>1</sup> were motivated by Roman self-interest), the Numidian provocation and the trickery which led to Carthage being disarmed before the final ultimatum was presented—which the historian surely ought to take into account. The result is a very one-sided assessment of Punic responsibility which certainly does not show Polybius at his most attractive.

## IX

Despite his commitment to Scipio and to Rome, however, Polybius remained primarily an Achaean. Both in his life and in his writing he never wavered in one criterion—what he regarded as the best policy for Achaea. He rather carefully avoids instituting embarrassing comparisons between Achaea and Rome, and this may be one reason why Achaea does not figure among the highly-rated constitutions discussed in book vi. (In parenthesis, I am not persuaded by K.-E. Petzold<sup>2</sup> that the chapters on Achaea in book ii were introduced at a late stage in order to contrast a state based on equality and philanthropy—Achaea—and Rome based on power.) Polybius’ regard for Achaean advantage colours his judgment at all stages. His early hero is Aratus, campaigning to expel the Macedonians; but when Antigonos Dason is called in to defeat Cleomenes, he becomes a bene-

<sup>1</sup> XXXI 21, 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, 25-128; see my comments in *JRS* 60 (1970), 252.

factor receiving undying honour and glory. Philip V is commended so long as he listens to Aratus, but having laid hands on Messene he becomes a veritable werewolf. In the clash between Rome and Macedonia Achaea had to look to her own survival: Aristaenus' policy of neglecting oaths to Macedon and switching to Rome has Polybius' full approval. In the early years of the Roman alliance he favoured Philopoemen's policy—collaboration within strict limits and no giving away of freedom before it became absolutely necessary; but under the burden of political responsibility and the pressures of the war with Perseus he recognised the need to define more clearly the Achaean alignment with Rome. Exiled in Rome between 167 and 150, his relations with Achaea were tenuous and broken: policies there developed without reference to him, and on his return he found himself out of sympathy with those in power. To be away on the Atlantic during the Achaean War must have been a relief from the embarrassment of having to choose between his Roman friends and his fellow-countrymen.

After 145 we know virtually nothing of Polybius. Presumably he lived in Achaea when he was not on some journey; but he must have been several times at Rome to meet Scipio and join him and Panaetius in the discussions mentioned by Cicero (assuming Cicero is not dealing in historical fiction). I suspect the *Histories* were in the main finished before he wrote the *Numantine War*: but we cannot be wholly certain. This monograph was probably based on autopsy. We are nowhere told that Polybius was at Numantia, but when Scipio invited all his friends and clients to join him there, Polybius is likely to have been among them. By now he no doubt moved at ease between the worlds of Rome and Achaea, the victors and the vanquished. But, as I have argued above, the original purpose of his *Histories* remained unchanged—despite additions and pretexts for adding them. It was, to explain to the Greek world the causes and course

of Rome's rise to world power. It was intended, in short, as a contribution to co-existence and to the solving of such problems as co-existence created—and these continued to exist if in a less urgent form, even after 146. Indeed, the Mithridatic War was to show that several decades after Polybius' death the lessons he had tried to inculcate had still to be learnt the hard way.

## DISCUSSION

*M. Gabba:* Ringrazio vivamente il Professore Walbank per la sua relazione, chiara, precisa e ricca di problemi. Egli ha preso in esame i temi centrali della storiografia polibiana mostrando l'interdipendenza dello svolgimento dei giudizi polibiani su Roma e la sua politica, della biografia dello storico e della situazione politica romana in sviluppo. Emerge una piuttosto netta contraddizione fra la politica romana difesa da Polibio fin verso il 150 a.C. e quella successiva, caratterizzata da altri atteggiamenti. Polibio sente la necessità di adeguarsi alla nuova situazione, di accettare i nuovi indirizzi politici, ma non sa come giustificarli. I fatti nei quali appaiono i mutati atteggiamenti romani mettono in crisi la capacità polibiana di trovarne le cause. Egli deve ricorrere all'irrazionalità degli avvenimenti: il periodo è di sommovimento e di confusione. Questa « spiegazione » offerta da Polibio è, in certo modo, una propria giustificazione, che, apparentemente, può dimostrare una qualche mancanza di coraggio. È sintomatico che Polibio non sembra abbia dato il promesso giudizio politico-morale su questa nuova fase dell'imperialismo romano, nella quale egli era personalmente compromesso. È difficile la posizione di chi, come Polibio e Flavio Giuseppe, si è messo, pur in buona fede, con la parte dominante, ma non può rinnegare le proprie origini.

*M. Schmitt:* Sie haben grossen Nachdruck auf Polybios' Selbstdarstellung seiner Politik im 3. Makedonischen Krieg gelegt. Es ist freilich möglich, dass er erst sehr viel später, unter dem Eindruck seiner inzwischen gewonnenen Erkenntnisse vom Gang der Geschichte, seine damalige Haltung bewusst oder unbewusst « überarbeitet » hat, dass er sich also nachträglich eine weit-schauende, die geschichtliche Entwicklung vorwegnehmende Politik zugeschrieben hat.

Wenn die erhaltenen Teile der Fortsetzung nach Pydna das Programm im zweiten Prooemium nicht erfüllen, so kann das am Zufall der Überlieferung liegen.

*M. Walbank* : I agree with the first point. Polybius may well have represented this policy in the most favourable light and exaggerated the difference between himself and Lycortas. As regards what survives from the years 168-145, I have assumed that the existing excerpts, especially *de sententiis* and *de virtute et vitiis*, are likely not to have omitted anything very important for Roman policy. But clearly we cannot be certain about this.

*M. Pédech* : Avant 168, par tradition familiale et nationale, Polybe est, sinon hostile, du moins méfiant envers Rome. Toutefois, l'accueil des Scipions, la fréquentation de la société romaine, l'admiration pour le régime de Rome et pour sa puissance, lui ont inspiré de la sympathie.

Son jugement sur la politique romaine a donc été un compromis entre ses préventions antérieures et ses sentiments favorables, entre le blâme et la louange, entre le patriotisme achéen et la reconnaissance pour une hospitalité bienveillante.

De là des jugements nuancés, des attitudes mitigées.

1) Il désapprouve la révolte macédonienne, dirigée par Andriscos, et la révolte achéenne de 146, dirigée par Critolaos et Diaios. Il les réproouve parce qu'elles ne peuvent avoir d'autre effet que de ruiner la Grèce. Peut-être aussi son sentiment aristocratique est-il foncièrement hostile à ces révoltes d'origine populaire.

2) Il désapprouve la politique romaine lorsqu'elle intervient dans les affaires intérieures des monarchies hellénistiques, lorsqu'elle soutient Attale contre Eumène de Pergame, Ptolémée Physcon contre Ptolémée VI, le prétendant Alexandre Balas contre le Séleucide Démétrius I. Il se souvient ici de la vieille amitié de la Confédération achéenne avec Pergame et avec

l'Égypte; de même une amitié personnelle l'unissait à Démétrius, qu'il avait fréquenté à Rome. Mais il estimait sans doute aussi que les États hellénistiques faisaient un contrepoids utile à la puissance romaine; il éprouvait à leur endroit une véritable solidarité d'Hellène. Enfin, de tempérament conservateur, il prenait le parti de la légitimité royale.

Le signe de ses efforts pour équilibrer l'éloge et le blâme se manifeste: 1° dans le parallèle entre les politiques différentes de Philopoemen et d'Aristainos (xxiv 10-12); 2° dans ses jugements nuancés sur l'opportunité et la légitimité de la troisième guerre punique (xxxvi 9-10).

*M. Musti:* Vorrei ricollegarmi a quanto ha detto il professore Pédech sulla disapprovazione, da parte di Polibio, degli interventi romani negli affari interni, cioè dinastici, delle monarchie ellenistiche. Senza entrare nel merito del problema della funzione e dell'importanza che Polibio poteva attribuire alla sopravvivenza dei regni ellenistici, devo dire che l'atteggiamento ora sottolineato dal Pédech sarebbe in armonia con la concezione generale dei rapporti interstatali tra grandi potenze e potenze minori, che Polibio propone, con esplicita teorizzazione, nel brano sui « traditori » del libro xviii (13-15). Qui l'ideale ellenistico di autonomia è presentato e illustrato in forma negativa, attraverso una discussione sul concetto di tradimento: tradisce non colui che stringe o muta alleanze con re o dinasti, ma colui che provoca l'ingerenza della potenza alleata negli affari e nei conflitti interni del suo stato, a proprio vantaggio e a svantaggio dei suoi avversari politici. L'esemplificazione concreta è più avanti la politica di Callicrate verso Roma (xxiv 8-10). Se la composizione di questi passi è posteriore al 146 a.C., essi confermano la persistenza in Polibio dell'ideale ellenistico di autonomia dopo l'anno della catastrofe di Cartagine e Corinto. Con una certa estensione analogica, si può pensare che Polibio non fosse alieno (anche se non lo diceva espressamente) dal considerare gli Etoli come « traditori » della Grecia, in quanto avevano provocato l'intervento

romano nell' anno 212 a.C. ; tuttavia, con la logica del « fatto compiuto », giudicava dissennata la politica antiromana da essi perseguita dopo la seconda guerra macedonica. Fra i due estremi si colloca la prospettiva polibiana in tema di rapporti tra potenze grandi e minori. Altro è il problema del giudizio di Polibio sull'imperialismo nel suo momento aggressivo e distruttivo : mi sembra che la posizione del professore Walbank possa dopo tutto conciliarsi con la resistenza in Polibio dell'ideale ellenistico di autonomia, riguardo all'assetto interstatale da garantire a cose fatte, cioè a vittoria romana avvenuta, almeno nell'ambito greco.

*M. Momigliano* : I should like to put three questions to Professor Walbank :

1) whether we have a clear notion of the criteria according to which the excerpts were made : we cannot assume *a priori* that the tenth century excerptors were interested in the problem of Roman imperialism ;

2) whether we can form a clear idea of what Polybius thought about the expansion in the West (Spain) : was he aware of the importance which the Roman ruling class obviously attributed to it ?

3) whether Polybius could make his own what in book xxxvi he gives as the fourth Greek opinion about the destruction of Carthage—that is that Rome had a sound legal pretext—when he had previously declared that the Romans had decided on the destruction of Carthage long before, and were only looking for the right pretext to win over foreign opinion.

*M. Schmitt* : Die Stelle xxxvi 2, auf die Herr Momigliano anspielt, enthält allerdings weder Beifall für Rom noch Verurteilung Roms ; sie ist moralfrei und spricht nur vom συμφέρον einer guten Kriegsschuldpropaganda.

*M. Walbank* : These are important points and the answers are not easy. The interests of the excerptors can, I suppose, be deduced from the actual content of the surviving excerpts.

*M. Momigliano* : Yes, but more important surely would be a comparison between the excerpts from books 1-v and the full text. This, as far as I know, has never been properly done.

*M. Walbank* : That, I agree, would be a very valuable exercise. As regards the West, one is again up against the fragmentary nature of the text. But I have the impression that Polybius was concerned about the West (and about the North, where the legions were so often occupied) only when affairs there involved some person in whom he was interested—Scipio Africanus or Aemilianus. His concept of the Roman conquest of the oecumene was primarily Hellenocentric.

You ask further whether having said that the Romans had already decided upon war long before, Polybius can have made the legalistic defense of Rome his own. I think he could, because in xxxvi 2 he is discussing Roman concern with winning over public opinion whereas in xxxvi 9 he is recording the fact that by their actions the Carthaginians had put themselves inextricably in the wrong. But even if there is an underlying contradiction in Polybius' position, it does not shake my view that he accepted the Roman case—for the reasons I gave.

*M. Marsden* : What I am going to say represents the simple approach of a would-be military historian. Professor Walbank has well observed that Polybius' historical thought may have developed from 167 onwards in various ways. This is most interesting. It is nevertheless notable that in the last chapter of his entire work, referred to and summarized by Professor Walbank, Polybius does not seem to have answered the questions which he set himself at the start, questions clearly presented in the introductions to Books 1 and III and elsewhere. He asked

himself first: how did Rome win the wars over a period of fifty-three years? Secondly, how did Rome also win the peace, as it were? Through his forty books he inserts many discussions and presentations of major and minor points. For example, he deals with such small and relatively unimportant matters as the difference between the Greek and Roman stakes (χάρακες) for palisades—he thinks the Roman design was better, which naturally has military significance (xviii 18; see P. Pédech, *La méthode historique de Polybe* (Paris 1964), 423). But at no point, not even at the end, was Polybius able to say that Rome won her wars and achieved her dominant position for specific reasons. Does this mean that Polybius could not answer the questions, which he set himself, in a manner that really satisfied him?

I wish to ask if Polybius really gave an account of the reasons why the Romans largely withdrew from the area of Greece soon after Cynoscephalae (197), and again after Thermopylae and Pydna. Did he see problems here and did he seek to answer them?

*M. Walbank*: To the best of my recollection, there is no specific discussion of this point in the surviving fragments.

*M. Nicolet*: A propos du problème soulevé par M. Marsden, ne pourrait-on considérer que la réponse à la question « comment Rome a-t-elle gagné ses victoires? » (qu'on pourrait libeller aussi « comment, même si elle a perdu des batailles, a-t-elle gagné ses guerres? ») est donnée par Polybe essentiellement au livre vi, dans le passage sur la *militia Romana*? Toute sa démonstration ne tend-elle pas à prouver que l'armée romaine est mieux préparée que les autres à saisir la victoire ou à surmonter les défaites? On a trop tendance, me semble-t-il, à oublier que le livre vi ne traite pas seulement de la πολιτεία, mais, d'une façon plus générale, des « mœurs et des coutumes ».

Je voudrais revenir à « Polybe entre Rome et la Grèce », et poser à M. Walbank une question: il placerait volontiers, a-t-il dit, la mort de Polybe en 118. Existe-t-il, à sa connaissance, dans

toute l'œuvre, un passage qui ferait allusion à l'événement diplomatique central de l'année 133, le testament d'Attale, l'annexion de l'Asie, avec les polémiques qu'il a déclenchées à Rome même? Pour ma part, je n'en connais pas. N'y aurait-il pas là un indice chronologique important quant à la date de la rédaction primitive, et même des « repentirs », qui seraient ainsi entièrement antérieurs à l'époque des Gracques? Cela confirmerait l'absence — dont je suis convaincu — de toute allusion aux événements des années 133-132, dans les passages concernant la politique intérieure de Rome.

*M. Walbank*: I know of no reference to or even any hint at the annexation of Asia anywhere in the surviving parts of the *Histories*.