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IX

A. H. ARMSTRONG

The Background of the Doctrine
“That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”

THE BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE
 " THAT THE INTELLIGIBLES
 ARE NOT OUTSIDE THE INTELLECT "

THE doctrine $\delta\tau\iota\ \o\upsilon\kappa\ \acute{\epsilon}\xi\omega\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \nu\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\grave{\alpha}\ \nu\omicron\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$, which presents the Divine Intellect, the first great reality generated from the Source of being, as forming an inseparable unity-in-duality with its content, the World of Forms, has always been regarded as one of the most distinctive and important parts of the philosophy of Plotinus. In his own time it provoked what, as far as our information goes, was the most serious philosophical opposition he ever had to meet. The eminent Longinus, as we gather from comparing chapters 18, 8-19 and 20, 89-95 of Porphyry's *Life*, found in it the principal, though not the only, ground of his disagreement with Plotinus, and argued against it with vigour, though also with a courtesy and respect for his opponent almost unparalleled in the history of ancient philosophy; and Porphyry himself, as he tells us in ch. 18 of the *Life*, originally shared the view of his friend Longinus on this point and had to be laboriously converted from it by Amelius. A consideration of the possible reasons for this opposition of Longinus will make quite a good starting-point for our enquiry into the background of the doctrine. All we know about Longinus's own position is that he placed the $\nu\omicron\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$, the Forms or Ideas, in some way « outside » the Intelligence, and that he made the $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\iota\gamma\mu\alpha$ of the *Timaeus* in some way « posterior » to the Demiurge, as Proclus tells us when he is commenting on *Timaeus* 29 A (*In Tim.* I, 322, 24 Diehl). Perhaps he brought the *Timaeus* into connection with the curious passage in *Republic* X 597 B about God making the Idea of Bed, and represented $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ as constructing an ideal model of the cosmos which was not only subordinate to and dependent on but in some way external to itself —

Philo too thought of the Ideas as a preliminary plan or model for the universe made by the Divine Architect (*De op. mundi* V), though Philo of course placed the Ideas *in* the Divine Mind, and I am inclined to think that the resemblance to Longinus is not only superficial but fortuitous. This, which is no more than a guess, is at any rate consistent with another guess which I am going to make, on a very small basis of evidence, at the real reason for Longinus's opposition to Plotinus. Porphyry tells us (*Life*, ch. 14) that « when the treatise *On Principles* and the *Philarchaios* of Longinus were read to Plotinus, he said « Longinus is a scholar, but certainly not a philosopher ». From this remark I would hazardously conjecture that Longinus professed himself to be offering the authentic interpretation of Plato based on a close and accurate study of the text of the *Dialogues*, of a kind which Plotinus considered inappropriate to a philosopher—certainly nobody who knew the *Enneads* would insult Plotinus himself by calling his interpretation of Plato « scholarly ». I would even go so far as to suggest that the *Philarchaios* mentioned in the passage just quoted was a work, as we should expect from the context, philosophical in content and purporting to present the ancient and authentic doctrine of Plato as it could be gathered from a close and accurate study of his writings, as against the free and wide-ranging misinterpretations of the moderns who got so much more out of isolated texts than was ever in them. This guess is at least not, I think, inconsistent with (though it is not confirmed by) the other references to Longinus in Proclus's *Timaeus* commentary. It implies that Longinus's main reason for opposing the doctrine of Plotinus about the Ideas was that he could not find it anywhere in Plato. This of course is the first question to be considered in our investigation of the background of Plotinus's doctrine. Was Longinus right about Plato, or was Plotinus? Before trying to answer this question it will be advisable to pause and consider more

carefully than we have so far done what precisely we are looking for. We are not investigating the origins and background of the Middle Platonist (and Christian Platonist) doctrine that the Ideas are the thoughts of God. No doubt this Middle Platonist doctrine is a forerunner of that of Plotinus, and his knowledge and qualified acceptance of it played an important part in his formulation of his own conception of the relation of Intelligibles to Intellect. But I think that Plotinian scholars would generally agree that it would be an inadequate and unsatisfactory description of this relation to say that for Plotinus the Ideas are the thoughts of Intellect. If we are to summarise his doctrine more or less in his own language and according to his own mind we must say rather « The Ideas are Intellect and Intellect is the Ideas » or « Real Being is Ideas and Intellect; they are one reality described from different points of view. » This means, from the point of view of our enquiry, that any doctrine which we may discover that in some way brings divine mind or divine intelligent soul and Forms or Ideas into a unity, and not only a doctrine that the Ideas are thoughts in a divine mind, has some claim to be considered a forerunner of Plotinus. But even with this widening of the scope of the investigation I cannot say that I have been able to find any evidence that even the beginnings of the development which led to Plotinus's doctrine are *certainly* to be found in the Dialogues of Plato — except in the sense, which everybody would admit, that there are a number of texts which taken in isolation can be interpreted in a Plotinian way and were in antiquity so interpreted. But I am not completely certain that Longinus was right either (his interpretation of the *Timaeus*, if I have guessed its nature rightly, seems to me almost certainly wrong). And with this confession of agnosticism I propose to abandon this very important part of the subject. This will, I am sure, appear to some scholars who specialise in the study of Plato

as very cowardly and frivolous behaviour. I can only plead to them in my defence that the extreme brilliance and extreme variety of their interpretations of Plato has so bedazzled me that I am in a condition of hopeless *aporia*: and that even if I had the competence and the self-confidence to add yet another to the long, majestic and ever-growing series of incompatible versions of Plato's theology it would be unreasonable to expand one section of a paper on Plotinus into the critical history, in at least three volumes, of recent Platonic scholarship which would seem to me the minimum necessary preliminary.

When, however, we turn from Plato to his immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates, there does seem to be fairly good reason for asserting that they maintained the identity of intelligent soul with its mathematically conceived objects. Here I am very much indebted to the careful discussion of the evidence by Merlan in the first two chapters of his *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*. He does seem to me to have shown, if not beyond all doubt at any rate as clearly as can reasonably be expected in this particularly fog-ridden area of the history of ancient philosophy, that we can rely on the ancient attributions to Speusippus and Xenocrates respectively of the definitions of soul as «the idea of the all-extended» (ιδέα τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ...) and «a self-moving (or self-changing) number» (ἀριθμὸς κινῶν ἑαυτὸν, or αὐτοκίνητος); that these mean that Speusippus identified the soul with the objects of geometry and Xenocrates with the objects of arithmetic; that at least in Xenocrates this way of looking at the soul was closely connected with an interpretation of Plato's description of the making of the world-soul in *Timaeus* 35 A; that Posidonius in commenting on the *Timaeus* followed the same line of thought but found the identification of soul with the objects of only one branch of mathematics objectionable and identified it with the whole range of mathematical objects; that he accepted and regarded

as Platonic the tripartite division, sense-objects, mathematical objects, intelligibles (whether he got it from Aristotle or elsewhere) and combined it with the tripartition of the *Timaeus* so as to arrive at a doctrine of the mathematical soul or animate mathematical as intermediate between intelligible and sensible being; and that the doctrine as we find it in Iamblichus and Proclus derives ultimately from Posidonius. I do not recapitulate the ancient evidence for this, which will be familiar to my hearers and is fully discussed by Merlan. It is worth noticing that among the later philosophers who adopted this way of thinking was Severus, for whom the world-soul was a geometrical object (Proclus, *In Tim.* II, 152, 27 ff., 153, 21 ff. Iamblichus ap. Stobaeus I, pp. 363-4, Wachsmuth): and we know from Porphyry (*Life*, ch. 14) that Severus was one of the authors read in the school of Plotinus. There is no need, for the purposes of this paper, to go into the very difficult problems which arise about how these descriptions of soul are to be fitted in with our other information about Speusippus and Xenocrates. It is unlikely that Plotinus knew either of them directly; his reference to Xenocrates's definition of soul in VI 5, 9, 14 does not suggest that it was anything more to him than a doxographical tag which could be pressed into service, in his usual manner, to illustrate his own train of thought. Nor, for reasons which I have indicated above, do I propose to try to follow the dark and obstructed trail which Merlan very tentatively and cautiously suggests may lead back from Speusippus and Xenocrates to Plato himself. I will only remark in passing that if this trail leads anywhere it seems to me to lead, not to any sort of doctrine of Ideas as thoughts of a divine intellect or intelligent soul, but to a bringing together of what appear (as far as I can see clearly) in the *Dialogues* to be two kinds of reality, thinking-and-moving principle and form-principle, in quite a different way by deriving them both from or composing them both

of the ultimate mathematical elements of reality. And the reason why I have mentioned this line of thought is not, of course, because I think that even the developed doctrine, as we find it in Posidonius and after, which we can assume that Plotinus knew, is the source of Plotinus's own doctrine. The difference between an identification of intermediate intelligent soul with intermediate mathematical and an identification of Intellect, sharply distinguished from soul, with the ultimate intelligibles, the Platonic Forms, is much too great to make it possible to regard one as derived from the other. But it does seem important to notice, when we are considering the background of Plotinus's doctrine, that a view of reality which simply identifies the thinking-and-moving principle with what we should normally consider the objects of its thought and the patterns of its activity, appears to be established in the Platonic tradition well before, as I think, we find any evidence for the view of reality which makes the objects of thinking and the norms of intelligent activity eternal thoughts in a divine mind. I propose next to try to trace the origins of this latter view, as I am leaving, for reasons which I think will become apparent, the influence of Aristotle's noetic on Plotinus to a later stage of this enquiry. I should however like to remark at this stage that the way in which Aristotle substitutes self-thinking intellects for the Platonic separate immaterial realities, the Forms, is perhaps another illustration of how easy it was for a philosopher brought up in the Academy to regard rational thinking and rational objects as the same thing, or very much the same sort of thing, though I would not like to press this too far. And, to return to Xenocrates for a moment, the fact that he applied the name νοῦς to the monad, the first principle of reality (Aetius Plac. I, 7, 30. Dox. p. 304 *b*) certainly points in the same direction: though without more knowledge of the context than we have I should not care to speculate on what precisely Xenocrates

may have meant by this identification. Later Neo-Pythagoreans like Nicomachus (*Introduction to Arithmetic* I, 6, cp. I, 4) combine the identification of νοῦς and monad (and the regarding of the Ideas as numbers) with the doctrine of the Idea-Numbers as thoughts of the Divine Mind, which was well established by the 2nd century A.D. But this of course is no evidence that Xenocrates himself thought in this way.

The evidence of the Sicilian Alcimus, brought forward by Witt and others to show that a doctrine that the Ideas were the thoughts of God was attributed to Plato by some at least of his contemporaries, does not seem to me very impressive. The patriotic insistence of the worthy Alcimus, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, that Plato owed a great deal to Epicharmus, does not inspire much confidence in the clarity of his mind. And when he said (Diog. Laert. III, 13) ἔστι δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν ἑκάστων ἀίδιον τε καὶ νόημα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις ἀπαθείς, I should be inclined to agree with Cherniss (in his review of Witt's *Albinus*, *American Journal of Philology* 59, 354-5) that it was a muddled reminiscence of *Parmenides* 132 B. Alternatively, Alcimus may have meant no more by calling the Form a νόημα than that it was immaterial, an object of thought, not an object of sense (this explanation would be unsatisfactory if we had any reason to suppose that Alcimus used words with philosophical precision). In any case, the sentence seems to me too inadequate a foundation to support belief in a fourth-century doctrine of the Ideas as the thoughts of God. And I agree again with Cherniss and with Audrey Rich in her excellent article: *The Platonic Ideas as the Thoughts of God* (*Mnemosyne* S. IV, Vol. VII², 1954, pp. 123-133) that there is good evidence for an interpretation of the Forms as thoughts in the human mind (the suggestion made and rejected in the *Parmenides*) before there is evidence for an interpretation of them as thoughts in a divine mind. The

early Stoics in particular seems to have been in the habit of explaining them away on these lines (cp. Zeno as reported in Stobaeus *Ecl.* I, 12, 6). There does not, however, seem to me to be any need to assume, as Miss Rich does at the end of her article, an influence of Aristotle's theory of artificial γένεσις to account for the placing of the Ideas in the divine mind. The thought that a craftsman has, before he starts work, a plan or pattern in his mind of what he is going to do seems to me a very simple and obvious one, which might have come into anyone's mind without being put there by an eminent philosopher; and, as Miss Rich herself remarks (p. 131) Plato uses παράδειγμα both for «the external, transcendent Idea and the internal immanent plan» (she cites *Republic* 561 E and 472 D) — thus providing a starting-point for this way of thinking if any historian of philosophy considers it against the generally accepted rules of the game of source-hunting to assume that anyone could have thought of the same simple idea independently. It is only the specific influence of Aristotle which I wish to deny. What seems to me undoubtedly true in Miss Rich's account of the passages which refer to the Ideas as the thoughts of God is that again and again the doctrine appears in what I may call a «demiurgic» context; the Ideas in the mind of God are the plan or pattern on which he makes the world: the earliest and best known example is the Philo passage which I have already referred to, but there are plenty of others, some of which Miss Rich cites. Now this is an important observation from the point of view of our enquiry, because, as I think everyone will agree, Plotinus's doctrine of the unity of Intellect and Intelligibles is not really «demiurgic». Intellect in his system is not directly responsible for the formation of the visible world; the powers which are, Soul or Logos, though they are and contain *logoi* from the intelligible world, are other than and dependent on their intelligible model in very much the same way that the

Demiurge of the *Timaeus* as interpreted by Cornford is other than and dependent upon his intelligible model. Intellect is certainly called « the true demiurge and maker » in V 9 [5] 3, 26 (cp. II 3 [52] 18, 15), but it is so only as providing Soul with the *logoi* which are the forms of sensible things, not as making the universe directly. The writers who put forward the doctrine that the Ideas are the thoughts of God seem very often to be concerned with the questions « On what pattern did God make the world ? » and « What is the relationship between the Maker and the pattern he used in making ? » Plotinus in formulating his doctrine that the Intelligibles are in Intellect seems to me to be concerned with a question of a different sort « What is the relationship of eternal intuitive thought to its object (or objects) and how is that object to be conceived ? » In most of the rest of this paper I shall be engaged in trying to show what led Plotinus to ask this question and who had asked and tried to answer it before him. But first it will be as well, for the sake of completeness, to state who I think is the most probable originator of the doctrine of the Ideas as the thoughts of God in its simple « demiurgic » form, in which the Ideas are the plan or pattern in God's mind according to which he made the physical universe. I am afraid my answer to this question is unoriginal and unexciting. I have no hitherto unknown or unnoticed Neo-Pythagorean to put forward as a candidate, nor do I propose to maintain that this was the esoteric doctrine which the New Academy concealed under an outward show of scepticism. It seems to me that much the most likely person to have originated the doctrine is Antiochus of Ascalon: the arguments put forward by Theiler and Luck, and now supplemented by Loenen in the second of his two articles on Albinus in *Mnemosyne* (S. IV, vol. IX⁴, 1956, pp. 296-319 and X¹, 1957, pp. 35-56), to which I am much indebted, seem to me reasonably convincing. I shall not recapitulate their discussions here,

but I should like to draw attention to the point which Loenen makes (on p. 45 of his second article), that the fact that Antiochus believed that Platonism and Stoicism were in all essentials the same, and the Stoic doctrines were to be found in Plato, provides a sufficient reason for his conceiving of the Ideas as the thoughts of God, because this is the only way in which they can be fitted into Stoic theology. They become, to repeat a formulation of my own which has been approved by Luck «the immanent wisdom in the mind of the divine Fire-Reason conceived as Providence operating in the upper, aethereal, regions of the Cosmos.» We must add, however, that though the doctrine does provide a way of bringing the Ideas into the Stoic system, and this was probably why Antiochus thought of it, it seems to have gained wide currency in such vague and general terms as to be in no way obviously or necessarily bound up with Stoic physical theology. It could be, and was, regarded, from Philo onwards, as perfectly compatible with Jewish or Christian theism, and it found its way easily and naturally into the thought of Platonists like Albinus who believed in a transcendent and immaterial God.

Loenen's statement (p. 46 of his second article) that Albinus was «the first Platonist, as far as we know, who explicitly, and as forming part of a consistent theory, transposed this interpretation of Antiochus [the Ideas as God's thoughts] to the level of the transcendent God» seems to be true with the qualifications which he gives it. This alone would make Albinus interesting from the point of view of the present investigation. But he seems to me even more interesting because in his *Epitome* we meet for the first time Aristotle's doctrine of divine νοῦς introduced into Platonism, and furthermore, if I am not mistaken, with a critical rethinking of that doctrine on Platonic lines which anticipates the more subtle and elaborate criticism and rethinking of it in Plotinus. Here I find myself for once in slight disa-

greement with Loenen. His account of Albinus seems to me in general most convincing and satisfactory. I agree with him that Albinus was a coherent and original thinker, and not a mere muddled eclectic to be discerpted into his « sources ». Loenen's remarks about the prejudices and pre-suppositions of historians of philosophy which have led to his being treated, along with other Middle Platonists, in this way, are true and important. But I think that, in his laudable anxiety to refute what I agree are misinterpretations, he has played down the Aristotelian element in Albinus rather too much. On the only point which is strictly relevant to our enquiry, the relationship of the divine intellect which stands at the head of Albinus's system to its object, Loenen, though he admits and indeed emphasises that this supreme intellect in its relation of final causality to the cosmos is Aristotle's Unmoved Mover, wishes to minimise as much as possible the influence of Aristotle's account of the divine thinking on Albinus's statements about God and his thoughts (see in particular p. 314 of his first article). Now I agree with him that Albinus's *starting-point* is not the Aristotelian νόησις νοήσεως but the doctrine, which he assumes without discussion as Plato's, of the ideas as the thoughts of God; and that Albinus never actually speaks of God's thinking as νόησις νοήσεως. But Albinus does say that God thinks himself — though going on immediately to add « and his own thoughts ». The relevant passage in *Epitome*, ch. X (which Loenen dismisses rather too casually) runs: ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς κάλλιστος, δεῖ καὶ κάλλιστον αὐτῷ νοητὸν ὑποκεῖσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ αὐτοῦ κάλλιον. ἑαυτὸν ἂν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ νοήματα ἀεὶ νοοίη, καὶ αὕτη ἢ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἰδέα ὑπάρχει.

It seems to me most unlikely that a philosopher who knew something about Aristotelian theology could have written this without intending an explicit reference to the discussion of divine thought in *Metaphysics* Λ ch. 9 (1074 b 15-

1075 *a* 11). What Albinus seems to me to be doing here is something more interesting and intelligent than simply tacking the doctrine of the Ideas as thoughts of God on to his conception of God as an Aristotelian νοῦς. He is, as I suggested at the beginning of this section, critically rethinking Aristotle on Platonic lines. He accepts from Aristotle that God's thought must be self-thought: but it seems to him (I conjecture) as it has seemed to many critics of Aristotle since, that a bare νόησις νοήσεως is a limited, sterile and unsatisfactory conception. So by boldly combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the identity of thought and its object in the case of immaterial beings (*Met.* 1074 *b* 38-1075 *a* 5) with the doctrine of the Ideas as the thoughts of God, which he assumes, as I have said, without discussion, he arrives at the doctrine that for God to think himself is to think the Ideas, that is the whole of intelligible reality. God is eternally actual thought and that thought is the Ideas, so in thinking himself, what he really is, it is the Ideas which he thinks. If this interpretation of Albinus is correct it is obviously of the greatest importance for our own enquiry. We shall have in second-century Platonism an example of the sort of critical but positive use of Aristotle which is so characteristic of Plotinus; and we shall have appearing for the first time in the Platonic tradition that combination of the Aristotelian identification of eternally actual νοῦς and νοητόν with the interpretation of the νοητόν as the Platonic Ideas which is the basis of Plotinus's doctrine. The resemblance to Plotinus at this point in Albinus's system is further increased by the fact that the Ideas in Albinus, though they are paradigms of the cosmos (as they are in Plotinus) are not the plan in the mind of the maker; the maker (or rather orderer) of the cosmos is the cosmic intelligent soul — here I agree entirely with Loenen's interpretation — which the supreme νοῦς brings from potency to act by « waking », it and directing it πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς

ἐαυτοῦ νοήσεις. Here we have something at least very like the actualisation of the lower thinking principle by a νοητόν on a higher level which is such an important feature of the philosophy of Plotinus. I do not of course want to deny that there are important differences, at this as at many other points in the two systems. But the resemblances seem to me to be enough to make it at least quite likely that Plotinus read Albinus (not necessarily, of course, the *Epitome*) and took some ideas from him. We cannot, I think, positively affirm that he did. We know (*Life*, ch. 14, 12) that Gaius was read in the school of Plotinus. But Albinus is not mentioned in that list, and Loenen (pp. 36-40 of his second article) has very thoroughly refuted the idea that Albinus is nothing but a reproduction of Gaius. On the other hand, I suppose no-one would seriously want to confine Plotinus's reading-list to the books which Porphyry says he used as the basis of his lectures.

Even if Plotinus read Albinus, however, it would be quite unreasonable to suppose that his reading of the earlier Platonist was the only, or the principal, source of the Aristotelian element which is so apparent in his doctrine of intellect. It has been noticed often enough, from Porphyry onwards (*Life*, ch. 14, 4-7) that there is a very large Aristotelian component in the thought of Plotinus; and it would, I think, be generally agreed that it is in his doctrine of intellect that it is most evident. Plotinus obviously knew his Aristotle, and the Peripatetic commentators, very well, and we continually find him critically considering Peripatetic doctrine, by no means always, perhaps not in most cases, wholly rejecting it but rethinking it, adapting it, and using it for his own purposes. One particular piece of rethinking of Aristotelianism which is of the greatest importance from the point of view of our enquiry is his critical study and part-acceptance, part-rejection of the doctrine of the identity of the supreme νοῦς and νοητόν in a single simple reality in the

form, as I think, in which he found it in Alexander of Aphrodisias. We know that the commentaries of Alexander were read in the school of Plotinus (Porphyry, *Life*, ch. 14, 13); and he seems to have devoted particular attention to Alexander's writings on Aristotelian psychology, especially to those parts of them which deal with the Active Intellect. Alexander, as we know, identified this with Aristotle's First Cause (Alexander, *De anima*, p. 89, 22-3. Bruns): and a great deal that he says about it is very close in content and spirit to Plotinus. One passage in particular is worth quoting, though it is not strictly relevant to our main theme, because it provides the most solid evidence that I can find that Plotinus knew and used these particular writings of Alexander. It occurs in the *Mantissa* (p. 112, 18-113, 2. Bruns) and deals with the working of the divine intellect in and through our human intellect. It runs as follows:

ὁ γὰρ ἡμέτερος νοῦς σύνθετός ἐστιν ἐκ τε τῆς δυνάμεως, ἥτις ὄργανόν ἐστι τοῦ θείου νοῦ, ὃν δυνάμει νοῦν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καλεῖ, καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἐνεργείας. Ὡν θατέρου μὴ παρόντος ἀδύνατον ἡμᾶς νοεῖν. Εὐθὺς γὰρ τῇ πρώτῃ καταβολῇ τοῦ σπέρματός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργεία νοῦς διὰ πάντων γε κεχωρηκῶς καὶ ὦν ἐνεργεία, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ σώματι τῶν τυχόντων. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας δυνάμεως ἐνεργήσῃ, τότε ἡμέτερος νοῦς οὗτος λέγεται καὶ ἡμεῖς νοοῦμεν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις τεχνίτην ἐννοήσῃ τοτὲ μὲν ἄνευ ὀργάνων ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ μετ' ὀργάνων, ὅτε καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐνέργεια αὐτῷ περὶ τὴν ὕλην γίνεται. Τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ θεῖος νοῦς αἰεὶ μὲν ἐνεργεῖ (διὸ καὶ ἔστιν ἐνεργεία), καὶ δι' ὀργάνου δέ, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς συγκρίσεως τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς εὐκрасίας γένηται ὄργανον τοιοῦτον. Ὑλικὴν γὰρ ἤδη τινὰ τότε ἐνέργειαν ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ἡμέτερος νοῦς. Καὶ ἐκκρίνεται δὴ, ὅνπερ τρόπον καὶ εἰσκρίνεται. Οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαχοῦ ὦν μεταβαίνει, ἀλλὰ τῷ πανταχοῦ εἶναι μένει καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐκ τῆς ἐκκρίσεως διαλυομένῳ σώματι φθειρομένου τοῦ ὀργανικοῦ, ὡς ὁ τεχνίτης ἀποβαλὼν τὰ

ὄργανα ἐνεργεῖ μὲν καὶ τότε, οὐ μὴν ὕλικήν καὶ ὀργανικὴν ἐνέργειαν¹.

The psychology of this passage is not, of course, Plotinian; it is Alexander's own characteristic version of the psychology of Aristotle. None the less there are some interesting points of general resemblance to Plotinus. The question when and in what sense the divine intellect can be said to be «ours» (112, 24-5, 30) is one which interested Plotinus greatly and which he discusses at length in terms of his own philosophy (I. 1 [53] 7-8; V 3 [49] 3-4). The conception, too, of intellect remaining ever active and ever present, but only active in us when we are in an appropriate state to receive it is also one which Plotinus finds acceptable and transposes into the terms of his own thought (e. g.: VI 4 [22] 3; VI 5 [23] 12 — passages which certainly also show the distance Plotinus had travelled from Alexander, even if he was one of his starting-points). But there is also a more precise resemblance in imagery and even language. Alexander in this passage speaks of the divine intellect as being like a craftsman who sometimes works with tools and sometimes without (112, 25-6, 113, 1-2) Plotinus, in a fine passage at the end of the treatise *On Well-Being* (I 4 [46] 16, 20-29) speaks of the good man's attitude to his lower corporeal self «that which is fastened on to him» (τοῦ προσεζευγμένου); he describes it as follows; οὗ φροντιεῖ καὶ ἀνέξεται, ἕως δυνατόν, οἷον εἰ μουσικὸς λύρας, ἕως οἷόν τε χρῆσθαι. Εἰ δὲ μὴ ἄλλην ἀλλάσσεται, ἢ ἀφήσει τὰς λύρας χρήσεις καὶ

¹ As Professor Dodds pointed out in the discussion, this passage comes from the section of the *Mantissa* which Alexander states is taken from a lecture of Aristokles (110, 4 Bruns, with Zeller's generally accepted emendation Ἀριστοκλέους for Ἀριστοτέλους). It seems to me impossible to be quite certain how much of the whole passage 110, 4-113, 24 is a report of what Aristokles actually said; and there is no evidence that the lecture which Alexander is here reporting was ever in circulation anywhere else in written form. So we are justified, I think, in assuming that Plotinus read the passage in the *Mantissa* rather than in a work of Aristokles.

τοῦ εἰς λύραν ἐνεργεῖν ἀφέζεται ἄλλο ἔργον ἄνευ λύρας ἔχων καὶ κειμένην πλησίον περιόψεται ἄδων ἄνευ ὀργάνων. Καὶ οὐ μάτην αὐτῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ὄργανον ἐδόθη· Ἐχρήσατο γὰρ αὐτῷ ἤδη πολλάκις.

The two images seem to me closely related, though Plotinus's, as we should expect, is more sharply visualised and poetic; the idea which they convey is the same, the activity always going on, always essentially the same, but sometimes using instruments, sometimes laying them aside. But what makes me almost certain that Plotinus had the Alexander passage in mind when he wrote is the odd plural ἄνευ ὀργάνων, which does not fit very well in its Plotinian context and looks to me like a verbal reminiscence of Alexander's ἄνευ ὀργάνων ἐνεργοῦντα..

Alexander, in the passages in both the *De Anima* and the *Mantissa* in which he deals with the divine intellect, insists particularly strongly on the identity of νοῦς and νοητόν at this highest level (*De anima* 87, 43-88, 5. *Mantissa* 108, 7-9, 16-19, 109, 23-110, 3. Bruns). I think it would be difficult for anyone to compare the *Mantissa* in particular with Plotinus's discussions of the same subject, and especially the long argument, very Aristotelian in its phraseology, of V 3, 5, without coming to the conclusion that Alexander provides at least a very likely starting-point for Plotinus's thinking about the identity of intellect with its object. But Plotinus, in his usual manner, critically rethought and adapted this piece of Peripatetic theological psychology to his own purposes, and two features of his adaptation are especially interesting from the point of view of our present investigation. The first is that he seems to consider himself entitled to assume without discussion the identity of the Aristotelian νοητόν with the Platonic νοητά, to apply, without preliminary demonstration of its applicability, what the Peripatetics say of the self-thought of the νοῦς which is its own νοητόν to the self-thought of his own νοῦς which

thinks the World of Forms which it is. The Aristotelian doctrine in this context appears to him as a support against Platonists like Longinus who placed the Forms outside Intellect, not as something to be attacked because, as it might be expected to seem to a Platonist, it evacuated the divine thinking of all intelligible content. This suggests strongly to me that he found the identification of the self which the divine intellect thinks with the Forms ready made and took it over, and I do not know where he could have taken it from except Albinus: so it now seems still more likely that he knew and used the work of his second-century predecessor. The second feature is the line which he consistently takes in demonstrating that Intellect cannot be the first principle, that we must go on beyond being and intelligence to their source, the One or Good. This, as is well known, is his principal reason for dissatisfaction with the conclusions of previous theologians, Aristotelian or Platonist. They had been content to present their first principle as an Intellect, however transcendent and ineffable. Plotinus, moved by a conviction about the absolute simplicity of the first principle, whose origins, in so far as it is not original, it is outside the scope of this paper to explore, denied that even the highest intellect fulfilled the necessary conditions; we must go beyond. The point I wish to make here is simply that his demonstrations that Intellect cannot be the first principle (or, conversely, that the One is not intellect and does not think, as in VI 7, 40-41) always take the form of showing the insufficient simplicity of the Aristotelian self-thinking intellect. It is not the multiplicity of the Forms in it which disqualifies Intellect for being the First but the distinction, even if it is only a logical distinction, between thought and object of thought, which necessarily involves a sort of multiplicity. Alexander had asserted the simplicity of the divine intellect (*Mantissa* 109, 28-110, 3, Bruns), and Plotinus is perfectly prepared to admit that it

is simple, in a sense which would have satisfied Alexander (V 3). — he will, for that matter, speak even of soul as ἀπλοῦς ἐν οὐσίᾳ (I 1, 2, 22). But the kind of simplicity which he is prepared, in agreement with the Peripatetics, to assert of the divine intellect is not, in his view, sufficient for the first principle, as he demonstrates frequently and nowhere more fully than in the later chapters of the treatise (V 3) which he begins by arguing that Intellect is simple. It may be ἀπλοῦς, but it is not τὸ πάντῃ ἀπλοῦν (V 3, 11, 28; 13, 17) ἀπλούστατον. (V 3, 13, 35). The whole discussion starts from the Aristotelian conception of the self-thinking divine intellect as presented by Alexander, which Plotinus accepts as true as far as it goes but as requiring (which the Peripatetics did not see) the awareness of a Source which transcends intellect. It is Alexander's thought about intellect which seems to provide the initial stimulus which led Plotinus to work out one of his most distinctive doctrines, the denial of intellection to the One: a doctrine which, as we can see if we look at V 4 [7] 2, 13-20, does not mean that the One has no sort of consciousness, intelligence, or awareness but that the Peripatetic description of the divine thought which is identical with its object is not adequate to express the absolute simplicity of the first principle. This of course implies that Plotinus regarded the Peripatetic doctrine, as he knew and understood it, as a correct account of divine intellect, and indeed the only correct one. If he had not had it before him as clearly set out as it was by Alexander, it is at least possible that he would have remained content, like his Neo-Pythagorean predecessors, to identify Intellect and the Monad, or, like Albinus, to apply the language of absolute simplicity and ineffability to a supreme self-thinking intelligence. He might, I suppose, have worked out his own doctrine simply by trying to elucidate the obscurities of Middle Platonist accounts like Albinus *Epitome* X: but the clarity of Alexander's account must have

helped him greatly in arriving at his own conclusions. (Incidentally, as we have had occasion to mention V 4, 2, it is worth suggesting that the description of the Good as τὸ νοητὸν in this chapter¹ may have been the result of Plotinus remembering, or half-remembering, a passage of Alexander *De anima* (88, 24-89, 5, Bruns), in which the Active Intellect is spoken of as τὸ κυρίως τε καὶ μάλιστα νοητὸν εἶδος and it is said that, just as light causes sight and the supreme good causes the goodness of all other goods, so the supreme νοητὸν is the cause of the νόησις of all other things: so that here again we should have a transposition of Alexander into terms of Plotinus's own thought.)

My conclusions, then, about the background of the doctrine « that the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect » are as follows. It seems to me not impossible that Plotinus's mind was influenced to some slight extent by the doctrine of the identification of the soul with mathematical which he knew from Severus, and perhaps from other sources. The influence of the simple, un-Aristotelianized doctrine of the Ideas as « thoughts of God », as he found it in Atticus and others, may well have been somewhat greater. The passages V 9, 3 and II 3, 18, to which I have referred, with their assertion that Intellect is the true demiurge and maker of the universe, show that Plotinus knew, and wished to respect at least verbally, the tradition which made the Forms in the *Timaeus* the plan in the mind of the divine architect. But I think that the principal stimulus to the train of thought which led Plotinus to formulate his own doctrine was his study of the Peripatetic doctrine of the identity of divine intellect and its object in the light of Albinus's identification of the Peripatetic divine νοητὸν with the νοητά of the « thoughts of God » interpretation of Platonism, the Forms of Ideas. This identification is extremely important, because

¹ Cp. V 6 [24] 2, where the demonstration that the ultimate νοητὸν need not itself think may well be directed against Alexander.

it is only through it that the doctrine of the self-thinking intellect can be brought into a Platonic system. And, though I do not wish to deny that Plotinus may have found the Peripatetic doctrine in Aristotle himself or in other commentators, Aspasius or Adrastus, it seems to me that his most likely principal source is the very full and clear exposition in the psychological writings of his great near-contemporary, Alexander of Aphrodisias. We have seen that there is some evidence to suggest that Plotinus knew these actual treatises, and he would certainly have read them with sympathy and interest. Alexander's identification of divine intellect and active intellect, which makes the illuminating cause of our thinking a divine principle which is ours in a sense, when we think by it, and yet transcends us, brings his doctrine in one way very close to that of Plotinus.

Plotinus's method of philosophising appears from this investigation to have been, at least in that restricted area of his thinking which we have surveyed, very much as Porphyry describes it in the fourteenth chapter of the *Life*: original speculation based on a critical and independent-minded study of his predecessors, particularly of the Platonist and Aristotelian commentators and expositors of the century or so before he began his philosophical career. In a study of this kind, devoted to background and influences, the originality and independent-mindedness of Plotinus may not have appeared as clearly as it should. But this does not mean that I question it; nor, I think, would anyone who knows the doctrine of Intellect as expounded in the *Enneads*, and also the earlier writings to which I have referred, find it easy to deny that Plotinus, though indebted to his predecessors, had made something new out of his material. Even that too easy method of denying his originality by supposing that Ammonius Saccas had already done all his thinking for him seems to me ruled out as regards the doctrine we are considering by the fact that Longinus clearly regarded it,

and attacked it, as Plotinus's own. And, having arrived back by a somewhat circuitous route at the formidable figure of the great critic with whom we began, we can appropriately end by remembering the eloquent tributes which he paid to Plotinus's philosophical seriousness and originality, which Porphyry reports at length in the nineteenth and twentieth chapters of his *Life*: tributes the justice of which is confirmed by the influence which Plotinus has exerted and the interest he has aroused through the centuries since Longinus wrote, and not least by the calling together of this distinguished assembly in his honour.

DISCUSSION

M. Hadot: M. Armstrong, nous vous remercions pour cette communication si claire, si nuancée, si pleine de finesse, qui a illustré par un exemple précis que l'on pouvait concilier la recherche des sources et l'étude d'une tradition, et qui a montré également le rôle de la tradition aristotélicienne dans la formation de la pensée de Plotin.

M. Harder: Weil ich mir in meinem eigenen Vortrag einige skeptische Bemerkungen über Quellenforschung überhaupt erlaubt hatte, liegt mir daran, hier gleich zu Anfang zu erklären, dass ich diese Art Quellenforschung, wie sie Herr Armstrong betreibt, voll anerkenne. Er hat uns gezeigt, wie eine bestimmte philosophische Äusserung von Rang den Denker Plotin dazu bringt, seine eigene Position zu klären. Dass hier wie schon in verschiedenen frühern Referaten wieder die aristotelische Formel $\nu\acute{o}\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \nu\acute{o}\eta\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ aufgetaucht ist, zeigt uns, dass wir hier an einem der wichtigsten Punkte in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Platonismus und Aristotelikern stehen.

M. Theiler: Ich schliesse mich gern Herrn Harder an; auch ich war beeindruckt von diesem klaren, umfassenden Vortrag. Den Einfluss des Aristoteles halte ich in diesem Bezirk für eminent wichtig. Man kann in gewisser Beziehung sagen, dass die Späteren, also zunächst auch Plotin, zu Ende geführt haben, was bei Aristoteles fehlt. Es ist ja irgendwie jedem Leser der *Metaphysik* halb zu Bewusstsein gekommen, dass dieses Werk nicht eigentlich fertig ist. Die *Metaphysik* ist, so weit wird man immer Jaeger folgen, nicht eigentlich gekrönt durch die ursprüngliche intendierte Theologie. Was wir jetzt als Theologie im Λ haben, ist weder an der Stelle recht am Platze, noch ist es die endgültige Fassung, und ich möchte für möglich halten, dass tatsächlich Aristoteles nicht mehr zu Ende gekommen ist. Irgendwie hatte er Schwierigkeiten gedanklicher Art, die ihn dann nicht mehr zu einer endgültigen schriftlichen Fassung dessen, was er ur-

sprünglich geplant hatte, geführt haben. Sollte eigentlich die νοήσις νοήσεως die Zusammenfassung aller εἴδη der Natur im göttlichen Geiste bedeuten? Es gab also in der späteren Philosophie ein Weiterdenken und Vollenden dessen, was Aristoteles nicht ausgeführt hatte. Auch die Schule des Gaius hat sich am Weiterdenken beteiligt. Ich scheue mich nicht, Gaius zu sagen, wo auch die Zitate aus Gaius im Timaios-Kommentar des Proklos zu Albinus stimmen. Loenen hat freilich mit besonderem Nachdruck die Originalität des Albinus vertreten; aber ich glaube, dass war die verständliche Übertreibung des Monographisten. Die Stelle aus Alexander ist, glaube ich, nicht ein Baustein, der, wenn er herausfiel, das ganze Gebäude zum Einsturz brächte. Man sollte vielleicht eher an Stobäus 2, 130, 3 W.; Seneca *Ep.* 87, 14 (aus dem Antiochos-Bereich?) erinnern. Sonst besteht freilich für mich kein Zweifel, dass Plotin den Alexander gekannt hat.

M. Dodds: I should like, first of all, to say how much I was impressed by the clarity and originality of Mr. Armstrong's contribution. He has drawn, I think for the first time, a clear distinction between the Plotinian doctrine οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά and the older view which we formulate by saying that the Ideas are the thoughts of God. To keep these two apart, and to understand their connection and relationship, seems to me very important. Important also are the verbal parallels between Alexander and Plotinus to which he has called attention. There is indeed a slight doubt which affects the most striking of them (it had struck me independently), namely the simile of the musician who abandons his lyre. The passage of the *Mantissa* where this occurs does not give Alexander's own theory; it is the theory which he quotes from an earlier writer usually identified as Aristokles. It could be, then, that Plotinus took his simile not from Alexander (though we know he had read Alexander) but direct from Aristokles?

I have one other question to put to Mr. Armstrong. It bears on the extent of Plotinus' debt to Albinus. Armstrong quoted

two phrases from Albinus' *Epitome*, chap. 10, the statement that God always νοεῖ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ νοήματα and the statement that the higher nous brings the lower πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ νοήσεις. In each phrase there is an ambiguous καί. Is this the καί that introduces an added explanation, where we should say «*id est*»? or are the two things which are coupled by καί still distinct in the mind of Albinus? In Plotinus, as we know, they are not distinct. What is Armstrong's view?

M. Dörrie: Vielleicht darf ich gleich an das anknüpfen, was Herr Dodds soeben sagte. Es wäre wichtig, auf eine Stelle im Kap. 9 des *Didaskalikos* hinzuweisen. Albinos hat zunächst garnicht vor (wie er es nachher im Kap. 10 tut) über den νοῦς als das über allem stehende transzendente Wesen zu sprechen. Er will vielmehr in den Kap. 8, 9 und 10 die drei Prinzipien ὕλη, ἰδέα, δημιουργός untersuchen — und bei dieser Konzeption steht er noch im Kap. 9. Dort, 163, 18 Hermann, wird der Schöpfer exemplifiziert durch den τεχνίτης. Und wenn man den τεχνίτης betrachtet, ist es zunächst gleichgültig, ob er das *Paradeigma* vor (das will sagen ausser sich) oder *in* sich hat. Hier sieht man den Ausgangspunkt der späteren Fragestellung; das Dilemma, ob die Ideen *vor* dem Demiurgos oder *im* Demiurgos sind, ist hier vorgebildet, ist aber — wie so viele nachmals drängende Fragen — in dieser Systematik des Albinos nicht weiter erörtert worden; eine spätere Generation greift das dann wieder auf. In der Kontroverse zwischen Longin und Plotin ist der Streit hierüber ausgetragen worden.

Dabei ist Albinos zumindest im Kap. 9 nicht inkonsequent. Denn solange vorwiegend an das Demiurgische gedacht wird, ist es ja im Grunde unerheblich, wie das *Paradeigma* zu ihm steht. Ausserdem wird im Kap. 9 noch offen gelassen, ob das *Paradeigma* eigentlich vom Demiurgen *erdacht* wird, oder ob es ihm als seine Vorlage vorgegeben ist. Nun fand ich sehr überzeugend in Ihrer Darstellung, Herr Armstrong: sowie das Demiurgische als eine inferiore Schicht zurückgelassen wird, sowie von einem Intellekt die Rede ist, der als reine ἐνέργεια wirkt — dann musste

die Frage relevant werden, ob das Objekt des Denkens im νοῦς selbst vorhanden ist, oder ob es sich als eine Realität ausserhalb des νοῦς hypostasiert. Nun ist mit dem Stichwort παρυφίστασθαι angedeutet, wieso eine solche Lösung für Plotin unannehmbar war. Wahrscheinlich geht jenes καί auf das Herr Dodds aufmerksam macht, darauf zurück, dass im Kap. 9 des *Didaskalikos* eine Entscheidung darüber garnicht fällt, ob das *Paradeigma* sich *vor* oder *im* Demiurgem befindet. Denn das Kap. 10 geht ja daraus hervor und nimmt einen viel grösseren Umfang an, als es eigentlich sollte. Dies Kapitel entwickelt sich daraus, dass die Funktion des Demiurgen besprochen werden sollte; dabei ist dann aber sogleich zu merken: es ist bereits weit erhaben — ἀμείνων — über die beiden anderen Prinzipien, von denen die Rede war; — die drei Prinzipien sind nicht mehr auf einer Linie nebeneinander geordnet.

Ganz kurz möchte ich auf den Punkt zu sprechen kommen, den Herr Theiler anschnitt. Leider lässt sich über den Gaios im Unterschied zu Albinos gar nichts sagen; denn Proklos zitiert nun einmal regelmässig diese beiden Philosophen zusammen. In dieser Zusammenordnung von Gaios und Albinos müssen wir die Auswirkung der Klassifikation durch Porphyrios erblicken, — von dieser Basis aus ergibt sich keine Möglichkeit, den einen vom anderen zu sondern.

Schliesslich möchte ich noch Folgendes zu bedenken geben: Es ist doch wohl sehr gefährlich, jene wichtige, für die Geistesgeschichte des Mittelplatonismus folgenreiche Vorstellung, die Ideen seien Gedanken Gottes, auf Antiochos von Askalon zurückzuführen. Diese Vermutung geht zurück auf das erste grosse Kapitel von Herrn Theilers beispielhaftem Buche *Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*; er versuchte es mit mancherlei bestechenden Gründen evident zu machen, dass nicht wenig von dem mittelplatonischen Lehrgut auf Antiochos zurückgehe. Später hat dann eine Dissertation, die unter Herrn Theilers Leitung entstand (G. LUCK, *der Akademiker Antiochos*, Diss. phil., Bern 1953), diese Plattform nach allen Seiten zu verbreitern

versucht; allerdings haben Herrn Luck's oft zu kühne Zuweisungen von längeren Partien aus Cicero an Antiochos fast so etwas wie einen Antiochos-Mythos geschaffen.

Dem ist nun gegenüberzustellen eine Göttinger Dissertation von 1940 über *Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochos von Askalon*. Nun wird es freilich so scheinen, als ob ich *pro domo* redete; denn die junge Doktorin, Annemarie Lueder, habe ich unmittelbar nach der Promotion geheiratet. Ich bitte aber doch darum, deshalb meine Stellungnahme in der Antiochos-Frage nicht als allzu subjektiv anzusehen. Es ist ja gewiss ein legitimes Vorgehen, aus den — nur bei Cicero erhaltenen — *testimonia* interpretierend festzustellen, in welcher Weise Antiochos Philosophie trieb und welches seine Interessen und die Triebfedern seines Philosophierens waren. Da liegt nun doch wohl ein wichtiges Ergebnis in Folgendem:

Eine aufs Transzendente gerichtete Fragestellung lässt sich — soweit Cicero darüber berichtet — für Antiochos nirgends ermitteln oder auch nur wahrscheinlich machen. Es muss daher als ganz fraglich gelten, ob Antiochos einem so wichtigen Theorem wie diesem «Die Ideen sind die Gedanken Gottes» jemals nachging — konnte er ihm von seiner geistigen Situation aus überhaupt nachgehen? Hierbei muss man auf die physikalischen Kapitel in den *libri academici* hinweisen (*Ac. pr.* 30 und 33). Da wird die Ideenlehre Platons ganz knapp gestreift, und dann sogleich als von Aristoteles überwunden abgetan. Nun wäre es doch sehr seltsam, wenn der gleiche Antiochos, der mit knapper Handbewegung die Ideenlehre beiseite schiebt, an anderer Stelle (wo zudem nur kraft etwas gezwungener Hypothesen ein Bezug auf Antiochos hergestellt werden kann) die Ideen als Gedanken Gottes definiert haben sollte. Ich glaube, man muss darauf verzichten, dies Theorem dem Antiochos zuzuweisen.

P. Henry: Avec M. Dodds, et avec M. Dörrie, je crois qu'un des points les plus importants de cette recherche si fine et complète de M. Armstrong, est l'idée que la conception du $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ identique aux $\nu\omicron\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$ est à distinguer de la conception d'un Démon.

L'aspect noétique propre comme distinct de l'aspect démiurgique du problème me paraît une découverte de première importance dans l'histoire de la préparation du néoplatonisme, et cela encore nous montre l'originalité et l'indépendance de Plotin. Un second point tout à fait central dans votre exposé est l'influence de l'aristotélisme qui, comme le disait fort bien M. Theiler, se trouvait ainsi, pour ainsi dire, complété à partir de ses propres principes. J'ai été frappé aussi de l'éclairage que votre découverte historique des sources nous donnait sur les problèmes de la conscience ou de la non-conscience du Suprême. Une remarque que vous avez à peine développée me paraît donner une solution à un problème important: comment l'Un peut-il être conscient? Ce que Plotin lui refuse, c'est la conscience propre du *voûς* aristotélicien, dont il reprend par ailleurs tant d'aspects. L'insuffisance des catégories aristotéliciennes expliquerait le genre tout à fait spécial de conscience qu'a l'Un dans les *Ennéades*. On pourrait résoudre par là une grave antinomie dans le langage et dans la pensée de Plotin.

M. Schwyzer: Die Frage, ob dem Einen Bewusstsein zugebilligt werden darf oder nicht, ist schwierig. Plotin scheint mir in diesem Punkte zu schwanken. Es kommt bei ihm ja häufig auf den Gesichtspunkt an, unter dem er gerade eine Stufe des Seins oder des Überseins betrachtet. Dass Herr Armstrong die gestern schon diskutierten Stellen V 4, 2, 18 und V 6, 2, 7 mit Alexander in Beziehung setzt, hat mich überrascht, doch bin ich gerne bereit, an der zweiten Stelle mit ihm eine Polemik gegen Alexander *de an.* p. 89, 4-5 Bruns anzunehmen. Nur möchte ich hinzufügen, dass Plotin auch noch eine Selbstkorrektur anbringt. Sein oberstes Prinzip kann höchstens im Hinblick auf den *voûς* als *νοητόν* bezeichnet werden; für sich genommen, ist es weder *νοοῦν* noch *νοητόν*. Der *voûς* aber hat nicht bloss die *νοητά*, und das ist soviel wie sich selbst zum Objekt seines Denkens machen; er hat in gewisser Beziehung auch das Eine als Objekt. Allerdings darf man diese Beziehung nicht mehr als ein *νοεῖν* bezeichnen, sondern nur noch als ein *ἐφάπτεσθαι*, ein *θιγγάνειν*.

Dankbar dürfen wir Herrn Armstrong auch sein, dass er einen so wichtigen Paralleltext aus der Mantissa zu Alexanders *De anima* ausgegraben hat, wo unter anderm vom ἡμέτερος νοῦς gesprochen wird. Herr Dodds sagte gestern, der philosophische Begriff ἡμεῖς sei kein Continuum, sondern gehöre auf ein bestimmtes psychologisches Niveau. Mir scheint, dieses Niveau sei nicht stets gleich hoch. Gerade in der von Herrn Armstrong herangezogenen Schrift I 1, wo unser νοῦς vom eigentlichen νοῦς unterschieden wird, steht auch der Satz (I 1, 10, 5): διττὸν οὖν τὸ ἡμεῖς, zwiefach nämlich, je nachdem man das « Tier in uns » mitrechnet, oder ob man zum « wahren Menschen » vorstösst.

P. Henry: Je voudrais revenir à l'Un comme νοητόν. Une polémique éventuelle contre Alexandre, en V 6, 2 serait très intéressante. Mais j'hésite. Je me demande si cette priorité du νοῦς ποιητικός, θεός, ἐνέργεια n'est pas d'une certaine façon déjà l'amorce d'un νοητόν supérieur, en quelque sorte, au νοῦς comme chez Plotin. Le νοῦς purement ἐνέργεια n'est sans doute pas directement un objet; mais chez Alexandre, c'est quand même le νοῦς qu'il appelle ὑλικός qui est seul proprement le νοῦς νοῶν. Nous aurions chez Plotin un νοητόν objet d'un νοῦς qui lui est postérieur, de même que chez Alexandre un νοῦς ποιητικός antérieur et supérieur au νοῦς νοῶν.

M. Hadot: Personnellement je ne le croirais pas. La notion d'ἐνέργεια ne va pas dans le sens du νοητόν, de l'objet. Je crois que vous allez dans le sens des idées de Hamelin sur l'évolution de la noétique à partir d'Aristote: il prétend que la logique de l'aristotélisme conduit à l'idéalisme objectif. Je crois que la notion d'ἐνέργεια implique une certaine priorité du νοῦς sur le νοητόν.

P. Henry: Le point crucial c'est que le νοῦς ποιητικός chez Alexandre n'est pas à proprement parler un νοῦς νοῶν. Je pose une question, je ne voudrais pas la trancher. Comme M. Schwyzer vient de le redire, le νοητόν c'est, au fond, l'Un saisi à la manière du νοῦς, devenant pour lui objet, νοητόν à son niveau, tout en restant transcendant. C'est l'interprétation du νοητόν que pro-

posait M. Puech un jour à Paris, au Collège philosophique, tandis que je commentais V 4, 2: le νοητόν demandait-il, ne serait-il pas tout bonnement l'Un saisi par le νοῦς, à son propre niveau ? Comme il est saisi par le νοῦς, il peut être déclaré νοητόν. Mais je crois quand même qu'au total, chez Plotin, il reste transcendant, de sorte que l'expression demeure étrange.

P. Cilento: Una questione marginale, la mia; che, tuttavia, è legata al problema della trascendenza, trattato dal Signor Dörrie e a quella dell'immanenza, trattato dal Signor Armstrong: come rendere, cioè, nelle lingue moderne il termine plotiniano νοῦς. C'è tutta una storia e una problematica, ben nota a voi tutti, intorno a questa così pregnante parola categoriale. Una solenne tradizione ha consacrato il tema « intelligenza » a partire dalla scolastica del sec. XIII, sino a Bouillet e Bréhier, ma è interrotta da quel sottile interprete ch'è il P. René Arnou con la introduzione di « esprit ». Questo, in Francia. Inge (in Inghilterra mi è caro inviare un saluto alla memoria di questo grande studioso, recentemente scomparso) rifiuta il « principio intellettuale » di MacKenna e carica quasi di senso paolino e carismatico la idea del νοῦς, traducendolo « spirit », nella sua generosa cristianizzazione del plotinismo. In Germania, ad Heinemann come al nostro Harder, piace « Geist », che dopo l'uso grandioso fattone di Hegel rischia di modernizzare troppo Plotino. Una illustrazione in questo campo del signor Armstrong non esulterà, penso, dal tema delle « fonti di Plotino ».

P. Henry: Je signale que le Père Festugière dans son livre sur *Personal Religion among the Greeks*, 1954, p. 45, discute la traduction des mots νοῦς et νοητόν. Il présente une solution désespérée, surtout pour un Français désireux de tout traduire. Il veut qu'on garde le mot grec, νοῦς, précisément pour garder l'aspect *Mind* et l'aspect *Spirit*, l'aspect strictement noétique et l'aspect religieux. Il fait équivalentement remarquer que souvent la contemplation suprême, qui dépasse le pur noétique, qui est supra-rationnelle, ponctuelle, qui débouche dans l'inexprimable, est décrite par des expressions comme τῷ νῷ μόνῳ ληπτός

(Albinus, *Did.*, p. 165, 4 Hermann). Le refus de traduire $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ me paraît une preuve caractéristique de l'ambiguïté et de l'ambivalence du terme, peut-être pas tellement chez Plotin que chez d'autres.

M. Armstrong: First I should like to express my gratitude for all the kind things you have said about my paper. I should like to thank M. Theiler for his positive contribution to the discussion, and still more for being the first to disagree with me vigorously on some points. As for Gaius and Albinus, I certainly do not think that Loenen has proved, nor do I myself wish to assert, that there was not a very close connection between the two. I only feel that Loenen's reasons make it necessary to be a little cautious in assuming that because Plotinus had read Gaius he must have found in him everything that we find in our one surviving work of Albinus. To say that there was a close connection between the two is not the same thing as saying that Albinus never did anything but copy Gaius. The position with regard to their possible influence on Plotinus is, I should agree with M. Schwyzer, very puzzling. We have some slight internal evidence that Plotinus knew the thought of Albinus, but our only solid external witness, the *Life*, says that Plotinus read Gaius, but does not mention Albinus at all. It is therefore not easy to come to any decision. All I think that Loenen has clearly shown is that we cannot simply assume that everything that we find in Albinus' *Didaskalikos* was to be found in Gaius.

As for the close relationship between the passage from Alexander's *Mantissa* and the Plotinus passage from I 4 [46], the two points of view have been admirably stated by M. Theiler and M. Dodds. I agree with M. Theiler that the resemblance is not so close that there could not be a closer. All I can say is that I do not know of one. And I agree with him, too, that the context of the two passages is quite different. But even if we had to reject the direct dependence of Plotinus on Alexander for that image, I think that a reading of the psychological works of Alexander, combined with the mention of him in Porphyry's

Life, provides enough evidence, external and internal, to suggest very strongly that Plotinus knew, and was in a way inspired, or stimulated, by Alexander's version of Aristotle's psychology. Dodds is of course perfectly right about Aristokles, but it seems to me unlikely that Aristokles was an independent source of Plotinus. Would you not agree that it is on the whole likelier that Plotinus was influenced by Alexander rather than by this shadowy older Peripatetic? He may, of course, have been much less shadowy to Plotinus and his contemporaries than to us, but he is not in fact mentioned anywhere as known to Plotinus, is he? Aspasius and Adrastus are the other two Peripatetic commentators in the *Life*. But one must agree that it is a possibility.

Now, about the *καί* in the Albinus passage. This seems to me an important point, and I am grateful to Dodds for raising it, and to M. Dörrie for his further contribution. It is not an easy question to settle, and I think that the only evidence I could produce that the *καί* might be, as Dodds says, the *καί* of added explanation, is the admittedly somewhat obscure sentence at the end of the passage *καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἰδέα ὑπάρχει*. This looks to me like a somewhat clumsy way (Albinus is rather clumsy in his language) of bringing the *νοῦς* and the *νοητόν* closer together. Perhaps Albinus might have felt that the *καί* could suggest that *ἐαυτόν* and the *νοήματα* were distinct; and may therefore have added this obscure remark to make the relationship between them appear more intimate. If it does not signify something like this, I find it very difficult to see what «this actuality of his is idea» can signify in the context. It seems to me to be only at this point that Albinus is concerned to introduce the Aristotelian idea of self-thought, to emphasise that the first *νοῦς* is its own *νοητόν*. He does not seem to be concerned with it any longer when he is describing the relations between the first intelligence and the second, where he speaks of the first directing the second: *πρὸς ἐαυτόν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐαυτοῦ νοήσεις*.

I have certainly no wish to be dogmatic about Antiochos or Poseidonios. I do not think it is possible to be dogmatic about

these mysterious figures¹. They were certainly important and influential, and were sources of a great deal that appears in later thought, but I do not think it will ever be possible to arrive at any final certainty about how much they were responsible for.

I found the discussion of P. Henry, M. Schwyzer and M. Hadot on the question of the consciousness of the One intensely interesting. I do not think that I have anything much to add to it, except perhaps that I do not regard my own contribution as quite as important as P. Henry was inclined to consider it. I think it is worth saying that the extreme precision of Plotinus in his argument that the One does not think is due to the fact that he is arguing against this very clearly defined Aristotelian concept of divine intellection. But it continues to seem possible to me that even if Plotinus had not had that before him, he would still have said that the One was ἐπέχειν νοῦ and did not think, just as he says that the One is ἐπέχειν ζωῆς, simply on the principles of the *via negativa*, which require him to refuse any precise determination or description of it. So all I contributed, perhaps, was that the emphasis and precision of his repeated demonstrations that the One does not think are due to the fact that he is arguing that the Aristotelian conception of divine self-thinking cannot be applied to the Principle, the First.

P. Cilento has raised a most fascinating problem, to which I have no solution. I am not sure, indeed, that a solution is possible. Every word which we use for these ancient conceptions has a long modern history, and has at one time or another acquired associations which make it unsuitable, as P. Cilento told us *spirito* had in Italian. I have always felt that *Geist* had something of the breadth of the ancient νοῦς. « Spirit » in English, as used

¹ Mr. Dörrie has since the meeting very kindly sent me a copy of his wife's work (*Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochos von Askalon*. Annemarie Lueder, Göttingen 1940): and the very clear account, solidly based on the best available evidence, which it gives of the philosophical outlook and interests of Antiochus, certainly seems to me to make it unlikely that Antiochus was the originator of the doctrine of the Ideas as « thoughts of God ».

by Inge, I feel has rather too Christian implications. «Intellectual Principle» is perhaps all right in MacKenna's very special language. «Intelligence» I should be reluctant to use in either English or French; it seems to me too human and prosaic a word. «Mind» is a possibility, but both it and «Intellect» land you in considerable difficulties, when you wish to translate e.g. νοῦς νοεῖ, or νοητόν, and, most difficult of all, νόησις.

