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## Aesthetic response and technical analysis in the rhetorical writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus

By Cynthia Damon, Cambridge, Massachusetts

As his contribution to the classicizing revival of his own day Dionysius<sup>1</sup> set himself the task of identifying *τίνες εἰσὶν ἀξιολογώτατοι τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων τε καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ τίνες αὐτῶν ἐγένοντο προαιρέσεις τοῦ τε βίου καὶ τῶν λόγων καὶ τί παρ' ἐκάστου δεῖ λαμβάνειν ἢ φυλάττεσθαι*<sup>2</sup>. Implicit in this task is a theory of evaluation of which the details on occasion become explicit. Various attempts have been made to distill a comprehensive system from the scattered theoretical remarks, most recently by D. M. Schenkeveld<sup>3</sup>. After examining thirteen of these explicit passages Schenkeveld concludes: "He [sc. Dionysius] may well seem to operate within a coherent system, but in reality he discusses isolated aspects of a rather vaguely defined whole: he appears to lack a consistent view of the foundation of his literary criticism."<sup>4</sup> Yet these thirteen short passages comprise a very small proportion of the references to matters relevant to a theory of evaluation, and Schenkeveld's refusal to take into account the chronological relationships between the treatises is rash in view of Bonner's careful demonstration of development in Dionysius' critical method<sup>5</sup>. Indeed one of the greatest weaknesses of the article is a direct result of this synchronic treatment. Schenkeveld's Text I comes from the Thucydides, a relatively late work. It was chosen to be the first, he says, "because there Dionysius

1 Standard works on Dionysius and works to which multiple references are made in the following pages: G. Aujac, *Denys d'Halicarnasse, opuscles rhétoriques*, 3 vols. (Paris 1978. 1981); S. F. Bonner, *The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Study in the Development of Critical Method* (Cambridge 1939); J. van Wyk Cronjé, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: de Demosthene: a Critical Appraisal of the status quaestionis* (Hildesheim 1986); Francesco Donadi, *Il 'bello' e il 'piacere' (osservazioni sul De compositione verborum di Dionigi d'Alicarnasso)*, SIFC 4 (1986) 42–63; G. M. A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* (Toronto 1965); G. M. A. Grube, *Thrasymachus, Theophrastus and Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, AJP 73 (1952) 251–267; M. Lebel, *Evolution de la doctrine de Denys d'Halicarnasse, du De Lysia aux De Compositione Verborum et De Demosthene II*, CEA 2 (1973) 79–88; K. Pohl, *Die Lehre von den drei Wortfügungsarten* (Diss. Tübingen 1968); W. Rhys Roberts, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, on Literary Composition* (London 1910); H. Usener and L. Radermacher, *Dionysii Halicarnasei Opuscula*, 2 vols. (Stuttgart 1965, reprint of 1899 ed.); S. Usher, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the Critical Essays*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass. 1974. 1985). References to the works of Dionysius are to essay and chapter, then to volume, page and line number in the Usener/Radermacher edition of the rhetorical *Opuscula*.

2 *On the Ancient Orators* 4, I 6, 21–24.

3 *Theories of evaluation in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, MPhL 1 (1975) 93–107.

4 Schenkeveld 107. Cf. Lebel 84 and Pohl 44 for other assertions of inconsistency.

5 Schenkeveld's refusal (94) also leads to slips such as the criticism of Dionysius for ignoring "his previous point of view", when that previous point of view comes from a later essay, the *Thucydides* (104, in reference to a passage from the *CV*). It is only previous in the sense that

mentions the various groups of people able to criticize a work, the tools by which they do so, and their specific objects". If it is the fullest discussion of critical theory, it is also (with the possible exception of his Text XII, Din. 7, I 307, 7–17) the latest of the passages he considers. Because it sets up τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον and τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον as critical faculties of apparently comparable competence, Schenkeveld devotes much of his article to elucidating "the question of the range of the two capacities and that of a possible preference for one of them"<sup>6</sup>. Yet this is difficult, because reason (τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον) is mentioned nowhere else in the rhetorical writings as an evaluative tool<sup>7</sup>. The result is the disappointing conclusion already cited. This paper gathers a much greater number of passages relevant to Dionysius' theory of evaluation, then looks to his critical practice for illustrations, explications and contradictions of his theory. Because of the number of passages to be considered in the first part of the paper, they have been organized into three categories by topic: (1) the effect of a work of literature on the hearer, (2) the faculties by which the work is judged, and (3) the critics who judge it.

### I. Effects

Fundamental to a critic's theory of evaluation are the effects he perceives language to have on its audience. Dionysius mentions three types of effect: aesthetic, moral and emotional. These arise from different aspects of language, act on different faculties in the listener and produce different types of evaluation. Each will be considered in its turn. Moral and emotional effects are

Schenkeveld discussed it earlier in his article. A generally accepted chronology of composition is as follows (from Bonner 38, \* indicates placement not certain):

- |  |                                   |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| *1 <i>Mimesis</i> , books 1 and 2  | 6 <i>Demosthenes</i> , ch. 34–end |
| 2 <i>Lysias</i> , <i>Isocrates</i> , <i>Isaeus</i> (and the preface<br><i>On the Ancient Orators</i> ) | *7 <i>ad Pompeium</i>             |
|  | 8 <i>Thucydides</i>               |
| *3 <i>ad Ammaeum</i> I   | 9 <i>ad Ammaeum</i> II            |
| 4 <i>Demosthenes</i> , ch. 1–33  | *10 <i>Dinarchus</i> .            |
| 5 <i>de Compositione Verborum</i> (CV)   |                                   |

Cf. also Usher 1, xxiii–xxvi; Grube 222–224; K. Sacks, *Historiography in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus*, *Athenaeum* 61 (1983) 67–87, esp. 83–87. Aujac (1, 22–28), following Costil, has proposed a different arrangement, making the *Thucydides* prior to the CV and the second half of the *Demosthenes*. The description of Thucydides' σύνθεσις in that work (*Thuc.* 24, I 361, 7–12), however, seems to me to derive from and depend on Dionysius' theory of the ἁρμονίαι, which is worked out in the CV and *Demosthenes* chs. 38–41. The verbal similarities between this description and, e.g., the beginning of ch. 22 of the CV are not to be denied.

6 Schenkeveld 95.

7 Throughout this paper I will be using "reason" as a translation for τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον and "intuition" for Dionysius' interchangeable terms ἡ ἄλογος αἰσθησις and τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον. These terms are compendious rather than precise, however. What Dionysius means by τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον is a critical faculty that can give an explanation for its verdict on a particular passage, whereas τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον can only describe its reaction.

somewhat difficult to identify because it is not always clear what organ or faculty is affected by them. Aesthetic effects, on the other hand, are revealed by the part affected – when language acts on ἡ ἀκοή, ἡ ἀκρόασις or αἱ αἰσθήσεις, the effect is aesthetic. I therefore begin with this category.

### A. Aesthetic effects

The importance of the ear's demands on language can be seen from the following passage: δοκεῖ δέ μοι δύο ταῦτ' εἶναι < τὰ > γενικώτατα, ὧν ἐφίεσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συντιθέντας μέτρα τε καὶ λόγους, ἧ τε ἡδονὴ καὶ τὸ καλόν· ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ ἐπιζητεῖ ταῦτα ἡ ἀκοή, ὅμοιον τι πάσχουσα τῇ ὁράσει· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη πλάσματα καὶ γραφὰς καὶ γλυφὰς καὶ ὅσα δημιουργήματα χειρῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων ὁρῶσα ὅταν εὐρίσκη τό τε ἡδὺ ἐνὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ καλόν, ἀρκεῖται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι πούει (CV 10, II 36, 8–15).

Just as the ear sets the goals of good composition, so it registers approval of the four features found in all well-composed works: καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ (sc. τῇ τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμῃ) καὶ μέλος ἔχουσιν αἱ λέξεις καὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ μεταβολὴν καὶ πρέπον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης ἡ ἀκοή τέρπεται μὲν τοῖς μέλεσιν, ἄγεται δὲ τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἀσπάζεται δὲ τὰς μεταβολάς, πούει δ' ἐπὶ πάντων τὸ οἰκεῖον (CV 11, II 40, 11–15).

The passages which mention more specific aesthetic effects are so numerous that I resort to listing the causes and types of effect. The various elements of language that are said to affect the senses in general or the sense of hearing in particular are: letters<sup>8</sup>, letter junctions<sup>9</sup>, syllables<sup>10</sup>, syllable weight<sup>11</sup>, words<sup>12</sup>, figures (when misused)<sup>13</sup>, melody and rhythm in prose<sup>14</sup>, variety<sup>15</sup>, appropriateness<sup>16</sup>, vividness<sup>17</sup>, passages of poetry taken as a whole<sup>18</sup>, the poetical element in prose<sup>19</sup>, σύνυεσις<sup>20</sup>, and λέξις<sup>21</sup>. Expression, ὁ λεκτικὸς τόπος,

<sup>8</sup> CV 15, II 60, 9–10; CV 16, II 63, 4–18.

<sup>9</sup> Dem. 38, I 211, 18–19; Dem. 40, I 215, 11–13; CV 15, II 60, 2–5; CV 22, II 110, 8–9.

<sup>10</sup> Dem. 38, I 211, 16; CV 22, II 104, 7–9.

<sup>11</sup> CV 15, II 58, 12–14.

<sup>12</sup> CV 12, II 43, 18–20; CV 12, II 46, 4.

<sup>13</sup> Isoc. 2, I 58, 1; Isoc. 14, I 74, 6; Dem. 20, I 171, 10–13; Dem. 40, I 217, 8–13; Thuc. 29, I 374, 17; Thuc. 42, I 397, 20. Cf. also Pomp. 2, II 228, 13–15, though here the part affected is not specified.

<sup>14</sup> Melody: CV 11, II 38, 14; CV 11, II 40, 11; rhythm: Dem. 39, I 212, 6; CV 9, II 34, 17–19; CV 11, II 38, 14; CV 12, II 44, 13.

<sup>15</sup> CV 11, II 38, 14; CV 11, II 40, 12; CV 12, II 44, 17.

<sup>16</sup> CV 11, II 38, 15; CV 11, II 40, 12.

<sup>17</sup> Lys. 7, I 14, 18.

<sup>18</sup> CV 3, II 11, 5; CV 22, II 100, 12.

<sup>19</sup> CV 1, II 6, 10.

<sup>20</sup> CV 19, II 87, 16; Thuc. 42, I 397, 20.

<sup>21</sup> Dem. 15, I 161, 10; Dem. 20, I 171, 8; CV 11, II 43, 12; CV 22, II 108, 3; Thuc. 42, I 398, 13. Schenkeveld's list (98) of elements affecting the ἀκοή, by contrast, is limited to "the acoustic aspects of literary works" and "general features, such as καιρός".



supplies most of the items on this list, while the elements of the πραγματικὸς τόπος (εὔρεσις, κρίσις, τάξις, ἐξεργασία)<sup>22</sup> are entirely absent. As for the type of effect produced, the following verbs are used to describe the action of language on the ear: ἡδύνειν<sup>23</sup>, γλυκαίνειν<sup>24</sup>, τέρπειν<sup>25</sup>, πικραίνειν<sup>26</sup>, πραῦνειν<sup>27</sup>, λεαίνειν<sup>28</sup>, τραχύνειν<sup>29</sup>, χαράττειν<sup>30</sup>, ἀποκναίνειν<sup>31</sup>, ἐκμαλάττειν<sup>32</sup>, διαχεῖν<sup>33</sup>, ἐπιστύφειν<sup>34</sup>, ἐπάγεσθαι<sup>35</sup>, κόπτειν<sup>36</sup>, λυπεῖν<sup>37</sup>, προσίστασθαι<sup>38</sup>, κινεῖν<sup>39</sup>, ἐνοχλεῖν<sup>40</sup>, ταραττειν<sup>41</sup>, ἀποστρέφειν<sup>42</sup>, κηλεῖν<sup>43</sup>, γοητεύειν<sup>44</sup>, ὑέλγειν<sup>45</sup>. Metaphors such as these stress the sensoriness of the effect<sup>46</sup>. A large majority of the passages from which these lists were compiled come from the Demosthenes and the On Composition (with a few from the Thucydides), i.e. from relatively late works, and they seem to present a fairly coherent picture of the sources and nature of aesthetic effects. This concentration of references suggests that Dio-

22 For this list, see W. Kendrick Pritchett, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Thucydides* (Berkeley 1975) xxxvi. See also Grube, *Thrasymachus* 258, note 12, on the subdivisions of τὸ πραγματικόν.

23 *Dem.* 20, I 171, 7; *CV* 11, II 38, 13 (ἡδεσθαι); *CV* 11, II 43, 13; *CV* 14, II 54, 11; *CV* 14, II 55, 6; *CV* 16, II 63, 12. Cf. ἡδέως at *CV* 12, II 46, 3; ἡδεῖς at *Thuc.* 29, I 374, 17; ἀηδεῖς at *Dem.* 38, I 211, 18; ἡδονῆς ἀγωγὰ at *CV* 11, II 39, 18.

24 *CV* 12, II 43, 22; *CV* 12, II 46, 4; *CV* 15, II 60, 2. Cf. εὐγλωσσον καὶ μελιχρόν at *CV* 1, II 6, 9.

25 *CV* 11, II 40, 13.

26 *Dem.* 43, I 224, 14; *CV* 12, II 43, 22; *CV* 15, II 60, 3; *CV* 22, II 100, 12.

27 *Dem.* 43, I 224, 14.

28 *Dem.* 43, I 224, 15; *CV* 12, II 44, 1.

29 *CV* 12, II 44, 1; *CV* 14, II 54, 13; *CV* 22, II 100, 11; *Thuc.* 24, I 361, 10. Cf. ἀποτραχύνειν at *Dem.* 43, I 224, 14 and ὑποτραχύνειν at *CV* 22, II 104, 8.

30 *CV* 22, II 109, 6–7.

31 *Dem.* 20, I 171, 17.

32 *CV* 12, II 46, 4. Cf. μαλακὴ καὶ λεληθότως ὀλισθάνουσα διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς at *CV* 22, II 108 3.

33 *CV* 15, II 60, 3–4.

34 *Dem.* 38, I 211, 8. Cf. στυφεῖν *CV* 15, II 60, 3 (*pace* Usher, the effect here is on the ears, not the mouth).

35 *CV* 3, II 11, 5. Cf. ἄγεσθαι at *CV* 11, II 40, 13.

36 *CV* 12, II 44, 13; *CV* 19, II 87, 16.

37 *Dem.* 40, I 217, 9; *CV* 9, II 34, 17.

38 *Isoc.* 2, I 58, 2; *Isoc.* 14, I 74, 6; *CV* 12, II 44, 18.

39 *CV* 14, II 54, 11.

40 *Thuc.* 42, I 397, 20. Cf. διοχλεῖν at *CV* 9, II 34, 18; ὀχλησις at *Dem.* 38, I 211, 18 and *CV* 11, II 40, 1; ὀχληρῶς at *Dem.* 15, I 161, 7.

41 *Dem.* 40, I 215, 13.

42 *Dem.* 20, I 171, 11–12; *Thuc.* 42, I 398, 13.

43 *Dem.* 39, I 212, 9; *CV* 3, II 11, 5; *CV* 11, II 39, 19.

44 *Dem.* 39, I 212, 9; *CV* 12, II 46, 8.

45 *Dem.* 20, I 171, 7.

46 That pairs like γλυκαίνειν/πικραίνειν are not just fancy equivalents for good and bad (i.e. pleasurable and painful) is shown by the following praise for a model of the austere style of composition: τραχύνει τε ἀλύπως καὶ πικραίνει μετρίως τὰς ἀκοάς (*CV* 22, II 100, 11–12). Πικραίνειν is a term of praise at *Dem.* 40, I 215, 12; at *Dem.* 18, I 167, 6–10 Dionysius says that τὸ ἡδύνειν is not always useful.

nysius' aesthetic theory, already present in the *Lysias*, developed substantially in these later essays<sup>47</sup>.

### B. Moral effects

The moral effect receives limited attention. Under this heading are to be placed passages in which Dionysius claims that a composition has been able to produce (not portray) moral qualities<sup>48</sup>. The distinction between the two functions is most clearly shown in the pseudo-Dionysian *Exetasis*: τὸ ἥθος φημὶ διπλοῦν εἶναι, κοινὸν τε καὶ ἴδιον. πῇ διορίζω τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, φράσω. κοινὸν λέγω τὸ φιλοσοφίας ἐχόμενον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τί; τὸ εἰς ἀρετὴν προτρέπον καὶ κακίας ἀπαλλάττον. ἴδιον δὲ λέγω τὸ ῥητορικόν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τί; τὸ πρέποντας καὶ προσήκοντας τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων πραγμάτων τῷ λέγοντι αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ ἀκούοντι καὶ περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος καὶ πρὸς οὓς ὁ λόγος (*Exetasis* 2, II 375, 9–17)<sup>49</sup>.

It is the first of these two types that concerns us here. Dionysius himself discusses the production of moral qualities virtually only with respect to Iso-

47 Many more topics are treated in the *Thucydides* than in the *CV* or the latter half of the *Demosthenes*; it is the only essay in which elements of the πραγματικὸς τόπος get serious consideration. Style, and with it aesthetic effects, is relegated to a secondary importance.

48 The word ἥθος and its derivatives have a variety of meanings in Dionysius' critical essays. In the early *Mimesis*, the ability to portray appropriate characters seems to be meant when comedians are praised as ἡθικοί (*Mim.* II 207, 4). Similarly, Aeschylus is ἡθῶν καὶ παυδῶν τὸ πρέπον εἰδώς (*Mim.* II 206, 3–4). Sophocles is said to surpass Euripides in ability to preserve the dignity of his characters (*Mim.* II 206, 13–14), i.e. his characters are well-portrayed, but he uses only noble types. Xenophon is deemed not inferior to Herodotus in τὰ ἡθικά (*Mim.* II 208, 5), which here constitutes a general category under the heading of τὸ πραγματικόν, but when τὸ λεκτικόν is being reviewed, he is blamed for assigning inappropriate speeches to his characters (*Mim.* II 208, 10–14). Thus the praise for τὰ ἡθικά is probably based on his overall moral tone. Herodotus surpasses Thucydides in τοῖς ἡθικοῖς (*Mim.* II 207, 13), and that this refers to character portrayal is made clear in the full quotation of this σύγκρισις in the *Letter to Pompeius* (although see Sacks [above, note 5] 66–74 on the possibility of expansion and refinement here), where the category is called ἡθῶν τε καὶ παυδῶν μίμησις (*Pomp.* 3, II 239, 18–19). Finally, ἥθος is used to denote the character of a real person (as opposed to that of a literary persona) in the examination of Philistus. He is said to be an imitator of Thucydides in everything but ἥθος, which is explained as follows: ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ φρονήματος μεστόν· τούτῳ δὲ θεραπευτικὸν τῶν τυράννων καὶ δοῦλον πλεονεξίας (*Mim.* II 208, 15–17). The emphasis in this essay, and in all others but the *Isocrates*, seems to be on portrayal rather than on production of moral qualities. Yet a third meaning of the term, “a less-violent emotion than πάθος”, is found, e.g., at *Dem.* 2, I 131, 5–6. On this, see Grube, *Critics* 291–292.

49 On Pseudo-Dionysius see D. A. Russell, *Classicizing Rhetoric and Criticism: The Pseudo-Dionysian Exetasis and Mistakes in Declamation*, in: *Le Classicisme à Rome aux I<sup>ers</sup> siècles avant et après J.-C.*, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique tome 25 (Vandœuvres-Genève 1979) 113–130. Pseudo-Dionysius is dated to the second century A.D. In Dionysius' own writings the difference is never so explicitly stated, but it is hinted at in the epitome of book II of the *Mimesis* when ἡθοποιία (i.e. the correct portrayal of various characters) is listed in a catalogue of the stylistic virtues that Pindar aims at (*Mim.* II 205, 5), but a separate sentence is allotted to his concern with τῶν εἰς σωφροσύνην καὶ εὐσέβειαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν ἡθῶν (*Mim.* II 205, 6–7), i.e. the production of moral virtues.

crates. Chapters 5–9 of the *Isocrates* paraphrase and appraise the subject matter of various speeches of that orator. In chapters 5, 7 and 8 a rhetorical question stating the moral effect of the speech in question introduces the discussion: (ch. 5) τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο φιλόπολις τε καὶ φιλόδημος ἢ τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπιτηδεύσειε τὴν πολιτικὴν καλοκάγαθειαν ἀναγνοὺς αὐτοῦ τὸν Πανηγυρικόν;<sup>50</sup> (ch. 7) τίς δὲ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν εὐσέβειαν προτρέψαιτο καὶ ἕκαστόν τε ἄνδρα ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ τὰς πόλεις ὅλας τοῦ Περί τῆς εἰρήνης λόγου; (ch. 8) τίς δὲ τὸν Ἀρεοπαγίτικόν ἀναγνοὺς λόγον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο κοσμιώτερος; In chapter 6 Dionysius varies the format by placing the appraisal of the Letter to Philip at the end: πολλὴ γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκοντας ταῦτα δυνάστας φρονήματός τε μείζονος ὑποπίμπλασθαι καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιθυμεῖν τῆς ἀρετῆς; in chapter 9 he limits himself to the general point that the sort of advice that Isocrates is giving is more effective than the moral precepts of philosophers (Isoc. 9, I 69, 24–70, 2). In the *Demosthenes*, a later treatise, he describes the overall effect of a passage of Isocrates as follows: ὅταν μὲν τινα τῶν Ἰσοκράτους ἀναγιγνώσκω λόγων, εἴτε τῶν πρὸς τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς ἐκκλησίας γεγραμμένων ἢ τῶν ...<sup>51</sup> ἐν ἧθει σπουδαῖος γίνομαι καὶ πολὺ τὸ εὐσταυὲς ἔχω τῆς γνώμης, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν σπονδείων αὐλημάτων ἢ τῶν Δωρίων τε κἀναρμονίων μελῶν ἀκροώμενοι (Dem. 22, I 176, 10–15)<sup>52</sup>.

50 Patriotic sentiment is also aroused by Thucydides 2, 63, which, in Dionysius' opinion, is a passage διεγείροντα τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνημα τὸ πατριον (Thuc. 47, I 404, 10–12), but it is difficult to determine whether this is a moral or an emotional effect because the specifically moral term in the comment on Isocrates (καλοκάγαθία) is lacking here. The passage is one of those admired by Dionysius because its subject matter is not impeded by stylistic oddities (Thuc. 47, I 404, 21–24), and this pattern of a cause from the realm of τὸ πραγματικόν and an effect in the political sphere, resembling as it does the causes and effects examined in chapters 5–9 of the *Isocrates*, may incline one to see this as a lone non-Isocratean example of moral effect.

51 Usener marks a lacuna in the text here.

52 Aristotle's discussion of music in the *Politics* helps elucidate what kind of effect Dionysius has in mind here. Chapter 4 of book 8 is an inquiry into the value of music and in particular into how, if at all, music should be used in the education of the young, and an important premise is that music differs from other aesthetic arts in its ability to represent and affect character (1340 a 29–b 15). Both mode and rhythm are said to affect the ἦθος (1430 a 40–b 13), and this idea still lingers on, though at a largely metaphorical level, in Dionysius, who frequently describes modes and rhythms in terms that originally stood for moral values (e.g. Dem. 48, I 234, 20–22). About the spondee of our passage, for example, he says ἀξίωμα δ' ἔχει καὶ σεμνότητα πολλήν (CV 17, II 69, 5–6). He doesn't discuss the Dorian mode elsewhere, but its character-building quality recommended it to both Plato (*Rep.* 399 a–c) and more emphatically to Aristotle (*Pol.* 1340 b 3–5, 1342 b 12–18 and especially 1342 a 28–30, περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωτάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστ' ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρεῖον), who criticizes Plato for allowing any other mode than this in his ideal state (*Pol.* 1342 a 33–b 1). The significance of ἐναρμόνιος is more difficult to assess. Most discussions of it are technical (cf. CV 19, II 85, 1 and 86, 2–3; P. Oxy. 667) rather than evaluative, but a trace of the moral associations it carried may be indicated by a passage in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata* (918 b 21–23) where the enharmonic scale is said to be simpler and the sort of thing used when choruses were composed of free citizens rather than vulgar professionals (cf. *Pol.* 1339 b 8–10). (Note that in this same

The γνώμη is affected as well as the ἦθος, and the analogy seems to be drawn from the sphere of the αἰσθησεις, but this passage is the μὲν part of a μὲν–δέ antithesis, and the δέ part shows the effect of Demosthenes' speeches to be emotional. The contrast between moral and emotional effects is a commonplace<sup>53</sup>; thus we may see in this passage a statement of the moral, rather than intellectual, aesthetic or even non-emotional effect of Isocratean prose. To summarize, the one thing that, according to Dionysius, has a moral effect is the πραγματικὸς τόπος of Isocratean speeches. He never identifies a faculty or critic by which this effect is judged, and does not himself use the concept in his analyses. Thus in chapters 37–41 of the Thucydides, where Dionysius' disapproval of the moral tone of the Melian Dialogue is evident, his criticism is not so much that the sentiments expressed have a deleterious effect on the reader's morals, as that they are obscurely phrased and inappropriate to the speakers<sup>54</sup>. In fact, the category of moral effect seems to have been designed to accommodate Dionysius' sympathy with Isocrates' political philosophy and to give him something favorable to say about the orator, rather than as an essential component of his critical theory<sup>55</sup>.

chapter [XIX] music is again distinguished from flavors, colors and scents by its association with moral character, 919 b 26–37.) Music, then, is the pre-eminently moral aesthetic field (the term is Aristotle's, αἰσθητά, *Pol.* 1340 a 29), and an analogy between men listening to music and Dionysius reading a speech of Isocrates is designed to demonstrate the moral, not aesthetic effect of Isocratean writing. The phrase πολὺ τὸ εὐσταθὲς ἔχω τῆς γνώμης reflects nicely Aristotle's description of the moral effect of the Dorian mode (στασιμωτάτης, cf. καθεστηκότως μάλιστα, 1340 b 4) and inclines one to read the doublet ἦθος/γνώμη as a pair of alternative terms for the seat of moral qualities rather than a contrast between ethical and intellectual effects.

- 53 E.g. *Dem.* 43, I 224, 15–16, where the ability to produce either effect at will is an instance of the versatility of Demosthenes' style: τὰ μὲν εἰς πάθος ἐκτρέπει τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τὰ δ' εἰς ἦθος ὑπάγεται.
- 54 Grammatical inconsistency in the first speech of the Melians prompts the following jibe: τοῦτο τὸ τελευταῖον εἴ τις ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν ἀξιώσει φέρειν, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι πάντας τοὺς σολοικισμούς, ὅσοι γίνονται παρὰ τοὺς ἀριθμούς καὶ παρὰ τὰς πτώσεις, σχήματα καλῶν; (*Thuc.* 37, I 389, 7–10). Their next sentence is an ἐνθύμημα νενοημένον μὲν οὐκ ἀτόπως, ἡρμηνευμένον δὲ οὐκ εὐπαρακολουθήτως (*Thuc.* 37, I 390, 4–5), and one of the later Athenian replies is λαβυρίνθων σκολιώτερα (*Thuc.* 40, I 392, 25). Inappropriate sentiments: πρῶτον μὲν εἶρηκεν ἐνθύμημα οὔτε τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως ἄξιον οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἀρμόττον λέγεσθαι (*Thuc.* 38, I 390, 16–18); βασιλεῦσι γὰρ βαρβάροις ταῦτα πρὸς Ἑλλήνας ἡρμοττε λέγειν (*Thuc.* 39, I 391, 12–15); ταῦτ' οὐκ οἶδα πῶς ἂν τις ἐπαινέσειεν ὥς προσήκοντα εἰρήσθαι στρατηγοῖς Ἀθηναίων (*Thuc.* 40, I 393, 12–14).
- 55 He claims to have written a defence of political philosophy πρὸς τοὺς κατατρέχοντας αὐτῆς ἀδίκως (*Thuc.* 2, I 327, 20–22). This is not extant, but we can see him struggling to find something good to say about Isocrates. After criticizing the lack of variety in the compositions of Isocrates and his imitators, he says καὶ αὐτῷ μὲν ἴσως τῷ Ἰσοκράτει πολλὰί χάριτες ἐπήνθουν ἄλλαι ταύτην ἐπικρύπτουσαι τὴν ἀμορφίαν (*CV* 19, II 87, 18–19) but has no specifics to mention. In another passage he says ἐν τούτοις οὐ μέφομαι τὸν ἄνδρα (sc. Isocrates) τοῦ λήματος (γενναῖα γὰρ ἡ διάνοια καὶ δυναμένη κινῆσαι πάθος), τὸ δὲ τῆς λέξεως λείον καὶ μαλακὸν αἰτιῶμαι (*Dem.* 20, I 171, 1–4). Grube, as usual, has put his finger on the problem:



### C. Emotional effects

Emotional effects, too, come under discussion with surprising infrequency considering the importance, by Dionysius' own estimation, of emotional effects in oratory: ἦν δ' ἄρα πάντων ἰσχυρότατον τῷ μέλλοντι πείθειν δῆμον ἢ δικαστήριον ἐπὶ τὰ πάθη τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἀγαγεῖν (Dem. 18, I 166, 24–26)<sup>56</sup>. Isocrates' inability to produce this sort of effect serves as foil for Demosthenes' mastery, for, when reading a speech of this orator, Dionysius says: ἐνθουσιῶ τε καὶ δεῦρο κάκεῖσε ἄγομαι, πάθος ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου μεταλαμβάνων, ἀπιστῶν, ἀγωνιῶν, δεδιώς, καταφρονῶν, μισῶν, ἐλεῶν, εὐνοῶν, ὀργιζόμενος, φθονῶν, ἅπαντα τὰ πάθη μεταλαμβάνων, ὅσα κρατεῖν πέφυκεν ἀνθρωπίνης γνώμης (Dem. 22, I 176, 16–20)<sup>57</sup>. Here the emotional effect is said to overpower the rational faculty; elsewhere it is subordinate to αἱ ἀκοαί: some figures of speech used by Demosthenes are κινητικώτατα τῶν ὅχλων, but only ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ λυπῆσαι τὰς ἀκοάς (Dem. 40, I 217, 7–9)<sup>58</sup>. Again the category is of extremely limited extent, for, despite the value of emotional effects to an orator, only Demosthenes is said to produce them<sup>59</sup>. As in the case of moral effects, no faculty is adduced by which these might be judged and Dionysius does not comment on emotional effectiveness when analysing specific passages of any author. The category was a traditional one in discussions of rhetoric and our

“The difficulty seems to be that while Dionysius has an unbounded admiration for Isocrates as the real founder of philosophic rhetoric, and all but worships him for the moral effect of his speeches and educational method, he cannot admire his style, especially his word-arrangement, and he is too honest a critic to pretend to do so” (*Critics* 215). Cf. “Dionysius the ‘philosopher’ and Dionysius the literary critic are at odds, but they do not compose their differences; indeed they do not even admit them” (*Critics* 216).

56 The distinction between portrayal and production of πάθος is less clear than that for ἦθος, perhaps because emotion portrayed leads so readily to emotion produced. Cf., e.g., Arist. *Rhet.* 1408 a where Aristotle urges an orator to make his style reflect the emotions appropriate to the subject-matter because συνομοιοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μὴ τὸν λέγει. Or, Horace in the *Ars Poetica*: *si vis me flere, dolendum est / primum ipsi tibi, tunc tua me infortunia laedent / Telephe vel Peleu* (102–104). In the discussion following the passage quoted just below (where Dionysius is experiencing various emotions) he says that Demosthenes felt and displayed these emotions himself during the delivery of his speeches (τὴν αὐτοπάθειαν καὶ τὸ παράστημα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδεικνυμένου, Dem. 22, I 177, 10–11), and that anyone who wants to read them aloud effectively must at least feign them.

57 Dionysius does concede that this was not what Isocrates was aiming at: παυαίνειν τε οὐ δύναται τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, ὅποσα βούλεται, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ βούλεται, πείθεται δὲ ἀποχρῆν τῷ πολιτικῷ διάνοιαν ἀποδείξασθαι σπουδαίαν καὶ ἦθος ἐπεικές (Dem. 18, I 166, 19–21).

58 Parisosis, paromoeosis, antithesis, paronomasia, antistrophe, anaphora. Note that these same figures, when used to excess, actually deprive Isocrates' prose of τὸ παθητικόν (*Isoc.* 2, I 57, 18–58, 3 and *Isoc.* 13, I 73, 10–74, 3).

59 Thucydides, too, receives a point for surpassing Herodotus at τοῖς παθητικοῖς when their relative virtues are being totted up in the *Mimesis*. It is interesting, however, that neither ἦθος nor πάθος (both standard rhetorical categories) is mentioned in the critiques of the orators (Lysias, Isocrates, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides) with which the book concludes.



author seems to have accepted its existence without taking it up into his own critical theory<sup>60</sup>.

There remain a number of passages which are less easy to categorize. In the Lysias, those who use unusual language and artificial expressions are said to stun their inexperienced hearers. Gorgias, for example, κατεπλήξατο τοὺς ἀκούοντας τῇ δημηγορίᾳ (Lys. 3, I 11, 6–7). Compare the effect of Plato's style: εἰ γὰρ τις ἄλλος ἐκπλήττεται ταῖς Πλατωνικαῖς ἐρμηνείαις ... κἀγὼ τούτων εἷς εἰμι (Pomp. 1, II 221, 12–13). This kind of effect does not fit readily into any of our categories – it has the right cause for an aesthetic effect, an element of the λεκτικὸς τόπος – but the metaphor describes something which stuns the rational faculty into inactivity rather than something which stimulates the senses<sup>61</sup>. The verb καταπλήττω recurs in conjunction with purely aesthetic effects (ἡδῶναι, μαλάξαι) in a comparison of Thucydidean and Lysianic λέξεις, but the parts affected are διάνοια and νοῦς: ἡ μὲν γὰρ (sc. λέξις) καταπλήξασθαι δύναται τὴν διάνοιαν, ἡ δὲ ἡδῶναι, καὶ ἡ μὲν συστρέψαι καὶ συντεῖναι τὸν νοῦν, ἡ δὲ ἀνεῖναι καὶ μαλάξαι, καὶ εἰς πάθος ἐκείνη προαγαγεῖν, εἰς δὲ ἥθος αὕτη καταστῆσαι (Dem. 2, I 131, 3–6).

Rational and aesthetic faculties are again confounded when Dionysius amplifies the definition of ἐνάργεια (δύναμις τις ὑπὸ τὰς αἰσθησεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα) by saying: ὁ δὲ προσέχων τὴν διάνοιαν τοῖς Λυσίου λόγοις οὐχ οὕτως ἔσται σκαιὸς ἢ δυσάρεστος ἢ βραδὺς τὸν νοῦν, ὅς οὐχ ὑπολήπεται γινόμενα τὰ δηλούμενα ὁρᾶν ... (Lys. 7, I 14, 20–23). The effect is felt in the αἰσθησεις, but διάνοια and νοῦς are involved too, and not as intellectual qualities, but as equivalents for αἱ αἰσθησεις<sup>62</sup>. It is clear from this last passage that at least one of the problems is terminological (a problem familiar to students of Dionysius<sup>63</sup>), namely that his desire to avoid repeating himself at short intervals leads him to use less-than-precise “synonyms”. There are relatively few parts of the human system that can be said to be affected by language (γνώμη, νοῦς, διάνοια, ἥθος, ἀκοή, αἴσθησις, ἀκρόασις); given the frequency with which aesthetic effects are discussed, terms appropriate to other types of effect tend to be called into service to describe these as well<sup>64</sup>.

<sup>60</sup> E.g. Arist. *Rhet.* 1408 a, Quint. *Inst. Or.* 12, 10, 61–62, [Longinus] 18, 2.

<sup>61</sup> The sort of thing, for example, that Dionysius has in mind when he explains a *sententia* of Aeschines (ὡς ὑμᾶς ὀρωδῶ κακῶς πάσχοντας τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν Δημοσθένους ὀνομάτων ἀγαπήσαντας) as follows: καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα πάλιν οὐ δέδοικε, μὴ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν αὐτοῦ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀγαπήσωσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ λάθωσιν ὑπὸ τῆς συνθέσεως γοητευθέντες, ὥστε καὶ τῶν φανερῶν αὐτὸν ἀδικημάτων ἀφεῖναι διὰ τὰς σειρήνας τὰς ἐπὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας (Dem. 35, I 207, 10–16).

<sup>62</sup> Cf. the confusion of emotional effect and rational part affected at *Thuc.* 23, I 360, 10: pre-Thucydides historians did not stir up emotions in the mind (οὐδὲ πάθος διεγείρον τὸν νοῦν).

<sup>63</sup> Lebel (87) credits him with a “terminologie polyvalente”.

<sup>64</sup> This may be sufficient to explain the terms of the comparison between Thucydides and Lysias, but the three passages where the effect is “dazzlement” remain anomalous. They ought, perhaps, to be put into a minor category of “intellectual effects”, but while Dionysius occa-

## II. Critical faculties

We have seen that of the three types of effect produced by language only the aesthetic effect is considered by Dionysius with any thoroughness. Aesthetics also predominate in discussions of faculties by which literature is judged. The earliest statement occurs in chapter 11 of the *Lysias*, where various excellent qualities, not all literary, are said to be perceived αἰσυθήσει, οὐ λόγῳ. The passage deserves quotation in full: ὥστε εἴ τις ἀξιοίη λόγῳ διδασχῆναι ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἢ τίς ποτ' ἐστίν, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοι καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν πραγμάτων δυσεκκλήτων ἀπαιτῶν λόγον· λέγω δὲ ἐπὶ κάλλους μὲν σωμάτων, τί δὴ ποτε τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὃ καλοῦμεν ὥραν, ἐπὶ κινήσεως δὲ μελῶν καὶ πλοκῆς φθόγγων, τί λέγεται τὸ εὐάρμοστον, ἐπὶ συμμετρίας δὲ χρόνων, τίς ἡ τάξις καὶ τί τὸ εὐρυθμον, καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς δὲ συλλήβδην ἔργου τε καὶ πράγματος, τίς ὁ λεγόμενος καιρὸς καὶ ποῦ τὸ μέτριον. αἰσυθήσει γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον καταλαμβάνεται καὶ οὐ λόγῳ. ὥσθ' ὅπερ οἱ μουσικοὶ παραγγέλλουσι ποιεῖν τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀκούειν ἀκριβῶς ἀρμονίας, ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην ἐν τοῖς διαστήμασι δίεσιν ἀγνοεῖν, τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐνθίζειν καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο ταύτης ἀκριβέστερον ζητεῖν κριτήριον, τοῦτο κάγω τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τίς ἡ παρ' αὐτῷ χάρις ἐστὶ βουλομένοις μαθεῖν ὑποδείμην ἂν ἐπιτηδεύειν, χρόνῳ πολλῷ καὶ μακρᾷ τριβῇ καὶ ἀλόγῳ πάνθει τὴν ἄλογον συνασκεῖν αἰσυθήσιν (*Lys.* 11, I 18, 15–19, 10).

What Dionysius says next is important: he considers charm the most important and characteristic of *Lysias*' ἀρεταί whether composition (as opposed to evaluation) is a matter of τέχνη or not: εἴτε φύσεως αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν χάριν) δεῖ καλεῖν εὐτυχίαν εἴτε πόνου καὶ τέχνης ἐργασίαν εἴτε μικτὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔξιν ἢ δύναμιν (*Lys.* 11, I 19, 12–13; cf. *Dem.* 13, I 158, 9; *Dem.* 47, I 232, 5–6). That is, the critic is to rely on his ἄλογος αἰσυθησις to judge a work that may in fact be the product of τέχνη<sup>65</sup>. The tools of writer and critic are not

sionally says that the intellect is made not to function (intentionally, i.e. when the audience is deceived, e.g. *Dem.* 35, I 207, 10–16, or not, i.e. when the audience is confused, e.g. *Isa.* 16, I 114, 17; *Thuc.* 9, I 337, 18), he never says it is stimulated into activity. In fact it must be cajoled into acting at all: in the *Demosthenes* Dionysius recommends a pleasant style in the narrative portions of speeches because εἰ μὴ τὸ παρηδύνον ἢ σύνυεσις ἐπενέγκοι ἢ παραμυθήσαιτο τὸν τῆς διανοίας κόπον, οὐχ ἔξουσιν αἱ πίστεις βάσιν ἀσφαλῆ (*Dem.* 45, I 230, 5–7).

65 On the whole Dionysius seems to consider the process of creating good writing more technical than the process of evaluation. He defines rhetoric, for instance, as follows: ῥητορικὴ ἐστὶ δύναμις τεχνικὴ πιθανοῦ λόγου ἐν πράγματι πολιτικῷ, τέλος ἔχουσα τὸ εὖ λέγειν (*Mim.* II 197, 2–3), and in a later treatise carps at the spurious orator who practises rhetoric ὁδοῦ τε καὶ τέχνης χωρὶς (*CV* 25, II 131, 16). His goal in the *CV* is to explain the principles which ancient writers used in order to write well, for πολλὴ πρόνοια τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἦν καὶ ποιηταῖς καὶ συγγραφεῦσι φιλοσόφοις τε καὶ ῥήτορσι τῆς ιδέας ταύτης, καὶ οὔτε τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὔτε τὰ κῶλα τοῖς κῶλοις οὔτε τὰς περιόδους ἀλλήλαις εἰκῇ συνάπτειν ὥντο δεῖν, τέχνη δὲ τις ἦν παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ θεωρήματα οἷς χρώμενοι συνετίθεσαν εὖ (*CV* 5, II 27, 8–14). These θεωρήματα τῆς συνυετικῆς ἐπιστήμης applied, for example, to how to fit letters (*Dem.* 40, I 216, 12–16) and words (*CV* 6, II 29, 19–30, 12) together, and to when and how to use periodic

always so clearly distinguished. In the *On Composition*, for example, after prescribing some rules for good composition, Dionysius warns the aspiring author that an un-scientific element – ὁ καιρός – is really the most important: ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάντων οἶομαι δεῖν τὸν καιρὸν ὁρᾶν.<sup>66</sup> οὗτος γὰρ ἡδονῆς καὶ ἀηδίας κράτιστον μέτρον. καιροῦ δὲ οὔτε ῥήτωρ οὔδεις οὔτε φιλόσοφος εἰς τόδε γε τέχνην ὥρισεν, οὐδ' ὅσπερ πρῶτος ἐπεχείρησε περὶ αὐτοῦ γράφειν Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντῖνος οὐδὲν ὅ τι καὶ λόγου ἄξιον ἔγραψεν· οὐδ' ἔχει φύσιν τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰς καθολικὴν καὶ ἔντεχνόν τινα περίληψιν πεσεῖν, οὐδ' ὅλως ἐπιστήμη ὑηρατός ἐστιν ὁ καιρὸς ἀλλὰ δόξη. ταύτην δ' οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ πολλάκις γυμνάσαντες ἄμεινον τῶν ἄλλων εὕρισκουσιν αὐτόν, οἱ δ' ἀγύμναστον ἀφέντες σπανιώτερον καὶ ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τύχης (CV 12, II 45, 10–21).

The terminology is slightly different, but the advice is consistent with that given to τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσι τὸν Λυσίαν καὶ τίς ἢ παρ' αὐτῷ χάρις ἐστὶ βουλομένοις μαθεῖν (Lys. 11, I 19, 6–8), i.e. to critics: “to give the intuition a lengthy course of exercise in feeling without thinking”<sup>67</sup>. The ear plays a major role again in analyzing an Isocratean example of the smooth style of composition. That qualities fundamental to the style are present in the passage, says Dionysius, τὸ ἄλογον ἐπιμαρτυρεῖ τῆς ἀκοῆς πάθος (CV 23, II 119, 16–17). In the Demosthenes, too, the importance of the ἄλογος αἴσθησις in forming a judgement of an author's style is apparent: τοῦτο δὴ ποιεῖν ἀξιῶσαιμ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς βουλομένους τὴν σύνθεσιν ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι τὴν Δημοσθένους, ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὴν δοκιμάζειν ιδιωμάτων, λέγω δὴ τῶν κρατίστων τε καὶ κυριωτάτων· πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς ἐμμελείας, ἧς κριτήριον ἄριστον ἢ ἄλογος αἴσθησις. δεῖ δ' αὐτῇ τριβῆς πολλῆς καὶ κατηχήσεως χρονίου (Dem. 50, I 237, 11–17).

After some discussion of this first item – ἡ ἐμμέλεια – rhythm and variety are added to the list of features to look at in forming an opinion of Demosthenes' style. Both of these are said in the *On Composition* to affect the sense of

sentence structure (CV 9, II 35, 17–36, 4; cf. also CV 26, II 135, 22–136, 13; Dem. 52, I 243, 9–15). He also refers, rather casually, to ἡ τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμη (CV 11, II 40, 9) and to poetry which is κατεσκευασμένον καὶ ἔντεχνον (CV 26, II 137, 19) and poets who ποικίλως φιλοτεχνοῦσιν (CV 15, II 60, 10). Several authors are criticized for not following the precepts of τέχνη (e.g. Hegesias, CV 18, II 79, 15–19; Thucydides *Thuc.* 19, I 353, 13–14 and *Thuc.* 24, I 363, 20–364, 2). A recurring theme which is concerned with the technical nature of composition is the *dissimulatio artis*. In general, the finest style exploits technical variety to conceal τέχνη (CV 19, II 86, 19–21). Lysias is a paradigm for this technique (Lys. 10, I 17, 12–13; *Mim.* II 216, 7–11; Lys. 3, I 11, 17–12, 2; *Isa.* 16, I 114, 18–19; Dem. 2, I 131, 8–14). Plato comes in for some praise under this heading (Dem. 6, I 138, 18–21 = *Pomp.* 2, II 229, 10–12) but the obvious *ars* of Isocrates (*Isoc.* 2, I 58, 1–3; *Isoc.* 14, I 74, 5–6), Isaeus (*Isa.* 4, I 96, 15–18), Demosthenes (*Isa.* 4, I 96, 20–23; Dem. ch. 9) and Theopompus (*Pomp.* 6, II 247, 16–21) is detrimental to their effectiveness. The use of art to conceal art is also a topic in descriptions of the austere style (Dem. 38, I 211, 16–20; CV 22, II 100, 10–101, 6).

<sup>66</sup> I follow Usher in preferring the MSS reading ὁρᾶν to Usener's ὑηρᾶν.

<sup>67</sup> In chapter 6 of the CV, too, the author who desires to compose well is advised to consider the effects of various elements of language on the ear – precisely the same process as is used in evaluating the completed composition.

hearing and are thus presumably also judged by the ἄλογος αἴσθησις<sup>68</sup>. The necessity of practice is a recurring feature in these passages which proclaim the independence and importance of the ἄλογος αἴσθησις, and will be discussed more fully in the section on critics<sup>69</sup>.

We now come (in our roughly chronological survey) to the passage with which Schenkeveld started, chapter 27 of the Thucydides. Here Dionysius discusses the two faculties by which literature is judged: τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον, which is inborn and which is concerned with pleasure and pain, and τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον, which discerns technical excellence in the various arts. After reproducing a lengthy section of Thucydidean narrative (7, 69, 4–72, 1), Dionysius explains that he made the passage his example τεκμαιρόμενος, ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ τούτῳ τῷ γένει τῆς λέξεως ἄγεται, καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον, ᾧ πεφύκαμεν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν ἡδέων ἢ ἀνιάρων, ἀλλοτριοῦται πρὸς αὐτὸ οὔτε τὸ λογικόν, ἐφ' οὗ διαγιγνώσκεται τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη τέχνῃ καλόν (Thuc. 27, I 371, 5–10). We have seen the importance of the ἄλογος αἴσθησις in a number of passages, but τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον appears nowhere else in the rhetorical writings as an evaluative instrument<sup>70</sup>. This leads to difficulties for Schenkeveld when he sets out to discover which faculty Dionysius prefers<sup>71</sup>. Because the nature of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον is never defined more fully than in this passage of the Thucydides (where all that is said is that it discerns τὸ καλόν in the various arts), Schenkeveld has to determine what this faculty is before he can assess its value to Dionysius<sup>72</sup>. His first attempt to do so goes astray.

68 It is perhaps worth remarking that elements of language which produce aesthetic effects are ipso facto judged by the ἄλογος αἴσθησις, but that this is not usually made explicit. Rather, one finds discussions of the critical role of the αἴσθησις in connection with matters like χάρις and καιρός, which one would not automatically assign to it.

69 The pairing of practice (τριβή) and instruction (κατήχησις) in the last passage quoted may seem to contradict Dionysius' earlier denial of the possibility of a τέχνη of, for example, καιρός. In the *Dinarchus*, however, one kind of imitation, that which is φυσικός and ἐκ πολλῆς κατηχήσεως καὶ συντροφίας λαμβανόμενος, is contrasted with another, inferior type which is ἐκ τῶν τῆς τέχνης παραγεγυμμένων (*Din.* 7, I 307, 11–12), so we can see that, whatever it is that κατήχησις provides, it is *not* technical precepts.

70 Schenkeveld (104), following Pavano, finds it “plausible” that “Dionysius plays down the role of the ἄλογος αἴσθησις in favour of the rational judgement, which acts as a corrective of τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον” in the *Thucydides* because he is here arguing against critics whose rational faculties have been overcome by their infatuation with Thucydides (κεκαρωμένοι τὴν διάνοιαν, *Thuc.* 34, I 382, 12). But it does not follow from the fact that these critics have “lost their reason” (Schenkeveld's translation) that they are using (or misusing) τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον to support their judgement. In fact, Dionysius likens them to lovers (τοῖς κεκρατημένοις ὑφ' οἷας δὴ τινος ὄψεως ἔρωτι μὴ πολὺ ἀπέχοντι μανίας) and contrasts them with impartial critics (ὅσοι δ' ἀδέκαστον τὴν διάνοιαν φυλάσσουσι καὶ τὴν ἐξέτασιν τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀρθοὺς κανόνας ἀναφέρουσιν, εἴτε φυσικῆς τινος κρίσεως μετεिल्φότες εἴτε καὶ διὰ διδαχῆς ἰσχυρὰ τὰ κριτήρια κατασκευάσαντες). These last, it is clear, may be either laymen or experts. The admirers of Thucydides use *no* proper critical faculty, and their witlessness cannot justify Dionysius' new emphasis on τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον here.

71 Schenkeveld 98.

72 Schenkeveld suggests (96) that the ὀρθοὺς κανόνας of his Text II (*Thuc.* 34, I 382, 17) are based



Pointing to chapter 12 of the *Lysias*, where Dionysius says he became suspicious about the authenticity of some speeches because his αἰσθησις did not detect the characteristic Lysianic charm but finally proves their spuriousness with a chronological argument, Schenkeveld comments: “We can say that Dionysius professes to have an aesthetic method, but hesitates to apply it. In the ultimate analysis, his *ratio* has the upper hand.”<sup>73</sup> The chronological argument may very well be an application of *ratio*, but it is hardly a judgement of τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη τέχνῃ καλόν. That is, Schenkeveld’s *ratio* and Dionysius’ λογικὸν κριτήριον have nothing in common, and Dionysius cannot fairly be accused here of inconsistency or timidity in practicing aesthetic criticism<sup>74</sup>.

The next few pages of Schenkeveld’s article are devoted to *reductiones ad absurdum* which are meant to show that if one takes Dionysius at his word, the province of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον must be ridiculously limited. Ridiculous, that is, when one recalls Dionysius’ definition of rhetoric as a τέχνη (quoted in note 65 above): “Its consequences would be that, for the greatest part, his instruction in rhetoric is non-technical.”<sup>75</sup> But this is to confound the creation and the criticism of literature<sup>76</sup>, a thing which Dionysius himself does upon occasion, but which, in view of his statement that charm, even if a product of τέχνη, is to be judged αἰσθήσει, οὐ λόγῳ, the critic of Dionysius should be wary of doing. Certainly the passage from the *Thucydides* with its two κριτήρια must be taken into account in any discussion of Dionysius’ theory of evaluation, but one must also accept the fact that his theoretical statements leave the question unanswered, and look for evidence of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον in Dionysius’ critical practice.

### III. Critics

We have now come to the third category, the critics. Of these there are two legitimate types, ὁ ιδιώτης and ὁ τεχνίτης. In some areas their reaction to a work of literature is the same<sup>77</sup>. The charm of *Lysias*, for example, is recognized

on a technical, i.e. logical, principle (although he sees that “this explanation implies a contradiction”), but in the context (being available to both trained and untrained critics) they are much more likely to be of comparable generality to the ἀδέκαστον διάνοιαν mentioned in the same sentence.

<sup>73</sup> Schenkeveld 99.

<sup>74</sup> Note that Dionysius only claims to give his αἰσθησις the casting vote when it is difficult to arrive at an answer with other arguments. The chronological argument has an absolute validity (provided, of course, the dates are reliable), so Dionysius’ αἰσθησις would not be called into play here.

<sup>75</sup> Schenkeveld 103.

<sup>76</sup> Also an early passage (from the *Mimesis*) with a late one (from the *Thucydides*).

<sup>77</sup> As is their original attraction to literature: τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς λέξεις φιλόκαλον καὶ ταῖς νεαραῖς πέφυκε συνανθεῖν ἡλικίαις. ἐπτόηται γὰρ ἅπαντα νέου ψυχῇ περὶ τὸν τῆς ἐρμηνείας ὠραϊσμόν, ἀλόγους τινὰς καὶ ὥσπερ ἐνδουσιώδεις ἐπὶ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσα τὰς ὁρμάς (*CV* 1, II 4, 19–5, 2). Cf. *CV* 11, II 38, 23–39, 2: φυσικὴ τις ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἡμῶν οἰκειότης πρὸς ἐμμέλειαν τε καὶ εὐρυθμίαν. Indeed it is important to Dionysius that literature *not* be the exclusive property of a



by layman and specialist alike because that sort of quality is perceived αἰσυθήσει, οὐ λόγῳ (Lys. 11, I 19, 1–2). Similarly, Thucydides is considered to be at his best when he appeals to both types of critic (although for different reasons, Thuc. 27, I 371, 1–22). Of course, the fact that the different types of critic have different criteria inevitably leads to disagreement at times: ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὀλίγων καὶ εὐπαιδευτῶν στοχαζόμενος λόγος οὐκ ἔσται τῷ φαύλῳ καὶ ἀμαυεῖ πλήθει πιθανός, ὁ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ἰδιώταις ἀρέσκειν ἀξιῶν καταφρονεῖται πρὸς τῶν χαριεστέρων, ὁ δ' ἀμφοτέρω τὰ κριτήρια<sup>78</sup> πείθειν ζητῶν ἥττον ἀποτεύχεται τοῦ τέλους (Dem. 15, I 161, 17–22). But even here there is assumed to be a middling sort of style that would appeal to both tastes. Let us look more closely at the qualifications of each kind of critic.

In the category of σαφήνεια Lysias is preferred to Thucydides and Demosthenes because his speeches are clear καὶ τῷ πάντῳ πόρρῳ δοκοῦντι πολιτικῶν ἀφεστάναι λόγων (Lys. 4, I 12, 18–19; cf. Thuc. 27, I 371, 10–11). When praising the more elaborate style of Demosthenes, however, Dionysius credits the layman with more experience: οἱ συνιόντες εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συλλόγους, ἔνθα πολιτικῶν δεῖ λόγων, οὔτε δεινοὶ καὶ περιττοὶ πάντες εἰσὶ καὶ τὸν Θουκυδίδου νοῦν ἔχοντες οὐδ' ἅπαντες ἰδιῶται καὶ κατασκευῆς λόγων γενναίων ἄπειροι, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ γεωργίας οἱ δ' ἀπὸ ναυλατουργίας οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν συνερρηκότες, οἷς ἀπλούστερον καὶ κοινότερον διαλεγόμενος μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἀρέσαι (Dem. 15, I 160, 20–161, 5). Such experience, of course, does not amount to technical knowledge; the layman evaluates literature by means of τὸ ἄλογον τῆς διανοίας κριτήριον<sup>79</sup>. This

highly cultured minority: πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς οἰομένους μόνων εἶναι τῶν εὐπαιδευτῶν ἀναγνῶναι τε καὶ συνεῖναι τὴν Θουκυδίδου διάλεκτον ταῦτα λέγειν ἔχω, ὅτι τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκαῖόν τε καὶ χρήσιμον ἅπασιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἄν> ἀναγκαιότερον γένοιτο οὐδὲ πολυωφέλεστερον) ἀναιροῦσιν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ βίου, ὀλίγων παντάπασιν ἀνθρώπων οὕτω ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις ἢ τυραννουμέναις πόλεσιν (Thuc. 51, I 410, 8–15).

78 Τάκροατήρια is Reiske's emendation of the MSS reading τὰ κριτήρια. ἀκροατήριον is not used elsewhere by Dionysius. Its usual meaning, "place where listening is done", is inappropriate here. The only reference for the meaning "audience" in LSJ is Plutarch *Cat. Mai.* 22. Reiske's objection to κριτήρια was presumably to its application to persons, but "τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον" is used by Dionysius as an alternative expression for "ὁ ἰδιώτης καὶ ὁ τεχνίτης" at Thuc. 27, I 371, 20–21: ὁ μὲν γε πολὺς ἐκεῖνος ἰδιώτης οὐ δυσχερανεῖ τὸ φορτικὸν τῆς λέξεως καὶ σκολίων καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητον· ὁ δὲ σπάνιος καὶ οὐδ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπιτυχούσης ἀγωγῆς γιγνόμενος τεχνίτης οὐ μέμψεται τὸ ἀγεννὲς καὶ χαμαιτυπὲς καὶ ἀκατάσκευον. ἀλλὰ συνωδὸν ἔσται τό τε λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριον, ὅφ' ὧν ἀμφοτέρων ἀξιούμεν ἅπαντα κρίνεσθαι κατὰ τὰς τέχνας. ὑπό + genitive here, a construction suggesting a personal agent, supports this identification, as does the presence of the verb κρίνεσθαι. Κρίνειν and its nearly synonymous compounds are only used by Dionysius with persons as subjects (except at Dem. 40, I 215, 2 where the subject is a highly personified ἁρμονία), never with organs of judgment. Cf. also Dem. 24, I 183, 14–15 where κρίνειν is used in the passive with a dative instrument when the instrument is the non-personal ἄλογος αἰσυθήσις: ταῖς γὰρ ἀλόγοις αἰσυθήσεσιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὀχληρὰ καὶ ἡδέα κρίνεται.

79 And is unable to improve upon a faulty performance: καίτοι γ' εἴ τις κελεύσειε τὸν ἰδιώτην τοῦτων τι ὧν ἐνεκάλει τοῖς τεχνίταις ὡς ἡμαρτημένων, αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι λαβόντα τὰ ὄργανα, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο. τί δὴ ποτε; ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἐπιστήμης ἐστίν, ἧς οὐ πάντες μετελήφμεν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ

faculty pronounces on pleasure and pain generally: ταῖς γὰρ ἀλόγοις αἰσθήσεσιν ἅπαντα τὰ ὀχληρὰ καὶ ἡδέα κρίνεται, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ ταύταις οὔτε διδαχῆς οὔτε παραμυθίας (Dem. 24, I 183, 14–16). Its displeasure is aroused by mistakes in, say, a musical performance (CV 11, II 39, 3–8) or by an unusual rhetorical style: τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ξένον καὶ πᾶν, ὃ τι μὴ σύνηθες αὐτοῖς ἀκούειν τε καὶ λέγειν, ὀχληρῶς διατίθησιν αὐτούς, καὶ ὥσπερ τι τῶν πάνυ ἀνιαρῶν ἐδεσμάτων ἢ ποτῶν ἀποστρέφει τοὺς στομάχους, οὕτως ἐκείνα ὀχληρῶς διατίθησι τὰς ἀκοάς (Dem. 15, I 161, 5–10). Justifiably so, it appears, for the layman is never said to be an inadequate critic<sup>80</sup>. In fact, while defending his own right to examine the style of a Thucydides Dionysius goes so far as to say ὅτι πολλῶν ἔργων οὐχ ἥττων τοῦ τεχνίτου κριτῆς ὁ ἰδιώτης, τῶν γε δι' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου καὶ τοῖς πάντεσι καταλαμβανομένων<sup>81</sup>, καὶ ὅτι πᾶσα τέχνη

πάθος ὃ πᾶσιν ἀπέδωκεν ἢ φύσις (CV 11, II 39, 8–13). Cf. also CV 3, II 11, 12–14 and CV 26, II 137, 16–18, where the layman's lack of concern and ability to speak and write well are discussed.

80 Only apparently contradictory is the highly metaphorical preface to the studies of Lysias, Isocrates and Isaeus, where the ἄγνοια of the mob is said to enable the slatternly rhetoric of Mysia, Phrygia and Caria (i.e. the Asianist style of rhetoric) to establish itself in Greek cities, indeed even in “highly civilized cities” (οὐδεμιᾶς ἥττον ἐν ταῖς εὐπαιδεύτοις) and to oust the virtuous (i.e. Atticist) rhetoric. Then, later in the preface, ἀμαυρία is said to have delayed the course of the Atticist revival in some cities. The context, however, is not an examination of the critical powers of the general audience, but preparation for the encomium of the discernment of the contemporary Roman δυναστεύοντες, ὑφ' ὧν κοσμούμενον τό τε φρόνιμον τῆς πόλεως μέρος ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐπιδέδωκεν καὶ τὸ ἀνόητον ἠνάγκασται νοῦν ἔχειν and a revival of good literature has taken place (*On the Ancient Orators* 3, I 5, 26–6, 1). This rhetorical flourish, then, highly charged as it is with political overtones, does not constitute an inconsistency in Dionysius' theory of literary criticism.

81 The text here is problematical. The best manuscript (M) has τῶν τε δι' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου καὶ τοῖς πάντεσι καταλαμβανομένων and is followed without comment by Usher. This text requires that τῶν be understood also before τοῖς πάντεσι, i.e. “works perceived both by the ἄλογος αἰσθησις and by the emotions”. This use of the article + τε is not uncommon, but Denniston remarks that “laxity in the placement of τε following the article not infrequently results in serious ambiguity” (518, n. 1). This, in fact, seems to have happened here. Usener wanted to see τε in its more usual place following the first of two coordinated items (cf. Denniston 515–516) and posited a lacuna after πάντεσι to be filled with, he suggested, καὶ τῶν τῷ λογισμῷ, i.e. “works perceived both by the ἄλογος αἰσθησις and the emotions, and by the rational faculty”. This addition, postulating an exercise of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον by the ἰδιώτης, has no parallel in Dionysius' critical theory and, as we have seen above, is not grammatically necessary. L. Sadée (*De Dionysii Halicarnassensis scriptis rhetoricis quaestiones criticae* [Argentorati 1878] 212–213) was troubled by the fact that πάθεσι had an article whereas its coordinate, αἰσθήσεως, had none, but since the constructions themselves are not parallel (διά + gen. vs. dative) this does not seem an insurmountable objection and his emendation (τῶν γε δι' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου καὶ ἀλόγοις πάντεσι καταλαμβανομένων) is neater than it is necessary. It does, however, contain one interesting feature. He claims to be following Reiske in reading γε for τε. Usener, too, attributes this suggestion to Reiske (although the pages to which he refers [881 sq.] are not the pages on which it should have appeared [817]), but I have not found it in Reiske's edition. (He prints τῶν τε δι' αἰσθήσεως τοῖς πάντεσι καταλαμβανομένων, following, he says, H. Stephanus, but also Sylburg.) Whatever its source, the γε is an attractive emendation, because it would make the phrase parenthetical and allow the τούτων τῶν

τούτων στοχάζεται τῶν κριτηρίων καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων λαμβάνει τὴν ἀρχὴν (Thuc. 4, I 329, 24–330, 4). The textual difficulties of this passage are discussed in note 81; I translate as follows: “... that of many works the layman is no less a judge than the expert – of those, that is to say, which produce aesthetic or emotional effects – and that these are the two critical faculties (i.e. the two types of critic) which every form of art, originating in consideration thereof, aims to please”<sup>82</sup>.

The τεχνῖται are described as οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ τε καὶ ἀπ’ ἀγορᾶς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἐληλυθότες (Dem. 15, I 161, 10–11), or, more briefly, οἱ ὀλίγοι καὶ εὐπαιδευτοί, and are contrasted with οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἰδιῶται (Dem. 15, I 161, 17–20)<sup>83</sup>. In chapter 27 of the Thucydides the τεχνίτης is ὁ σπάνιος καὶ οὐδ’ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιτυχούσης ἀγωγῆς γινόμενος τεχνίτης and is said to apply τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον to recognize τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη τέχνῃ καλόν (Thuc. 27, I 371, 12–21). The specific examples in this passage of flaws that attract the attention of the τεχνίτης are illuminating – he notices potential virtues that are absent (ἄγεννές, ἀκατάσκευον; χαμαιτυπές referring, presumably, to a lack of elevation) while the ἰδιώτης is disturbed by awkwardness in what he hears (δυσχερανεῖ τὸ φορτικὸν τῆς λέξεως καὶ σκολιὸν καὶ δυσπαρακολούθητον). The τεχνίτης concerns himself with λέξεις (τὴν κατασκευὴν ταύτης τῆς λέξεως); the attention of the ἰδιώτης is more narrowly focussed on words and figures of speech (ὀνόματι ἢ σχήματι)<sup>84</sup>. The expert enjoys a style that is ἐγκατάσκευον καὶ περιττὸν καὶ ξένον; the layman prefers something ἀπλούστερον καὶ κοινότερον (Dem. 15, I 161, 4). The τεχνίτης may scorn the ignorance of the mob (Thuc. 27, I 371, 13), but Dionysius insists that the criteria of both sorts of judge are valid and to be consulted by the aspiring author, whether his goal is persuasion (Dem. 15, I 161, 17–22) or artistic excellence (Thuc. 27, I 371, 20–22)<sup>85</sup>.

κριτηρίων of the next phrase to refer back to the two types of critic (for which equivalence one can find support from other texts, e.g. Thuc. 27, I 371, 20–22; Dem. 15, I 161, 17–22), rather than to αἰσθησεως and πάθεσι (for which one cannot). Usher makes the phrase parenthetical in his translation, but it is not clear that his text can bear that construction.

82 I am omitting from consideration among references to the ἰδιῶται the very numerous passages in which Dionysius tries to bolster support for his own analysis by saying, for instance: οὐδεὶς ἐστίν, ὃς οὐχ ὁμολογήσειεν, εἰ μόνον ἔχοι μετρίαν αἰσθησιν περὶ λόγους ... (Dem. 32, I 200, 21–22).

83 Again (see above note 82) I am not looking at passages referring to biased, contentious, corrupted or ill-educated critics which serve to attack Dionysius’ opponents rather than to discuss the qualifications and criteria of the ideal τεχνίτης. Examples are Dem. 23, I 178, 16–19; CV 25, II 131, 14–18; Thuc. 34, I 382, 11–23.

84 Cf. the musical errors that the layman reacts to in the theatre: ὅτι μίαν χορδὴν ἀσύμφωνον ἔκρουσε καὶ διέφθειρεν τὸ μέλος and ὅτι σομφὸν ἐμπνεύσας ἢ μὴ πίεςας τὸ στόμα ὑρυλιγμὸν ἢ τὴν καλουμένην ἐκμέλειαν ἠύλησε (CV 11, II 39, 3–8).

85 It is interesting to note that whereas the judgement of the layman is never called into question, the opinions and theories of several τεχνῖται are criticized. The authors of treatises on rhetorical matters (τέχναι) are themselves poor stylists (CV 4, II 21, 6–10) and have nothing useful to say to the neophyte writer (CV 5, II 26, 21–27, 6). Theophrastus is unable to detect a spurious speech in the Lysianic corpus (Lys. 14, I 23, 16–19). Aeschines’ criticisms of Demosthenes may be “malicious” (συκοφαντῶν, Dem. 55, I 247, 23) but Dionysius devotes 3 chapters (55–57) to

But Dionysius' insistence on μακρὰ τριβὴ in conjunction with τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριο prevents us from making neat pairs, from saying that the layman applies intuition and the expert reason to the text in hand. The education of the τεχνίτης is extensive; laymen are at best only οὐκ ἄπειροι (Dem. 15, I 161, 1–2) and lack specific technical knowledge. Yet it is the layman who exercises τὸ ἄλογον κριτήριο and it is with this faculty that μακρὰ τριβὴ is thrice associated (Lys. 11, I 19, 8–10; CV 12, II 45, 18–21; Dem. 50, I 237, 16–17)<sup>86</sup>. The solution, as Schenkeveld has seen<sup>87</sup>, is that both types of critic receive impressions via the ἄλογος αἰσθήσις. Thus Lysianic χάρις, perceived αἰσθήσει, οὐ λόγῳ, is apparent to layman and expert alike. That it is the τεχνίτης who devotes μακρὰ τριβὴ to refining his sensibilities is only to be expected and is, moreover, suggested by the plural τὰ κριτήρια (i.e. both τὸ λογικὸν and τὸ ἄλογον) in a passage which contrasts the natural critic with the trained one: ὅσοι δ' ἀδέκαστον τὴν διάνοιαν φυλάσσουσι καὶ τὴν ἐξέτασιν τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀρθοὺς κανόνας ἀναφέρουσιν, εἴτε φυσικῆς τιнос κρίσεως μετειληφότες εἴτε καὶ διὰ διδαχῆς<sup>88</sup> ἰσχυρὰ τὰ κριτήρια κατασκευάσαντες ... (Thuc. 34, I 382, 15–19)<sup>89</sup>. The expert's double duty is apparent in Dionysius' own criticism. After quoting a passage of Demosthenes, for example, he gives first his aesthetic response (the verb is πάσχω, and he insists that this response is the general one), namely that it is in a general way superior to a piece of Isocrates quoted earlier, then attempts to account for its superiority by an analysis of Demosthenes' technique (Dem. 21, I 175, 20–176, 9). It will be useful, in fact, to examine Dionysius' critical practice in more detail to see the extent to which it follows the theory described above, and in particular to clarify the nature of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριο.

#### IV. Critical practice

An important measure of Dionysius' critical maturation, according to Bonner, is the increasing detail with which he conducts the analysis of his παραδείγματα<sup>90</sup>. Bonner perceives, however, a dichotomy in the treatment of

showing that they are also inept. Finally, the technical system for determining word order that Dionysius himself toyed with is rejected because πάντα δὲ ταῦτα διεσάλευεν ἡ πεῖρα καὶ τοῦ μηδενὸς ἄξια ἀπέφαινε (CV 5, II 26, 16–17).

<sup>86</sup> The statement in the *Demosthenes* that the aesthetic faculty needs neither instruction nor encouragement (οὐθὲν δεῖ ταύταις οὔτε διδαχῆς οὔτε παραμυθίας, Dem. 24, I 183, 15–16) is not inconsistent with the recommendation of μακρὰ τριβὴ. Rather, it is comparable to the πεφύκαμεν of chapter 27 of the *Thucydides*. Practice is not necessary, but it is not unproductive either.

<sup>87</sup> Schenkeveld 95. 103.

<sup>88</sup> Training in the aesthetic arts was not exclusively technical – teachers of music, for example, encouraged their students to sharpen their sense of hearing (Lys. 11, I 19, 2–6). Cf. Dem. 50, I 237, 17–238, 2 for an example from the visual arts.

<sup>89</sup> The plural κριτήρια is not used elsewhere by Dionysius except to refer to these two faculties or to the two types of critic that apply them.

<sup>90</sup> Bonner 68. 74. 84. 88. 92. 97. 101–103.



harangues in chapters 43–48 of the Thucydides: “Those passages of which he approves are set forth in full; those which he finds in any way objectionable are analysed, and the reasons underlying his objection, whether it be obscurity, poetical expression, or frigidity resulting from Gorgianic figures, are in each instance set forth.”<sup>91</sup> This tendency to be explicit about faults but only vaguely encomiastic about virtues (e.g. ταῦτα μὲν δὴ καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις καλὰ καὶ ζήλου ἄξια ἡγοῦμαι, Thuc. 48, I 406, 13–14) is also evident in Dionysius’ discussions of “good” and “bad” narratives and speeches in the Thucydides. In chapter 28 he quotes a “good” narrative and pronounces his verdict: σαφῶς τε καὶ συντόμως καὶ δυνατῶς ἅπαντα εἶρηκεν (Thuc. 28, I 372, 10–11). Enough said. The next bit, a long example of “bad” narrative (and a notoriously difficult section of Thucydides, 3, 82–83), is examined phrase by painful phrase; Dionysius points out numerous faults and rewrites no less than thirteen sentences in an effort to clarify Thucydides’ meaning. This fills chapters 29–33. In chapter 36 Dionysius prefaces the uninterrupted quotation of a set of “good” speeches with a checklist of their virtues: καὶ λόγους ἀποδίδωσιν (sc. Θεουκυδίδης), οἷους εἰκὸς ἦν ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων εἰρησθαι, τοῖς <τε> προσώποις πρέποντας καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἰκείου καὶ μήτ’ ἐλλείποντας τοῦ μετρίου μήτε ὑπεραίροντας, λέξει τε κεκόσμηκεν αὐτοὺς καθαρᾶ καὶ σαφεῖ καὶ συντόμῳ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἐχούσῃ (Thuc. 36, I 384, 1–5).

Chapters 37–41, by contrast, are given over to a thorough investigation of the objectionable points, moral and stylistic, of the Melian Dialogue. And yet this tendency of labeling the “good” and dissecting the “bad” is in despite of Dionysius’ declared intentions for this section of the treatise: παρατιθεῖς τοῖς τε πραγματικοῖς καὶ τοῖς λεκτικοῖς κατορθώμασιν ἢ ἀμαρτήμασι τὰς αἰτίας (Thuc. 25, I 364, 8–10)<sup>92</sup>. A similar imbalance, though differently implemented, can be seen in Dionysius’ treatment of Plato’s two styles. The style which Dionysius approves is described in metaphorical or abstract terms: καθαρὰ γὰρ ἀποχρώντως γίνεται καὶ διαυγής, ὥσπερ τὰ διαφανέστατα τῶν ναμάτων, ἀκριβής τε καὶ λεπτή παρ’ ἡντινοῦν ἑτέραν τῶν τὴν αὐτὴν διάλεκτον εἰργασμένων. τὴν τε κοινότητα διώκει τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὴν σαφήνειαν ἀσκεῖ, πάσης ὑπεριδοῦσα κατασκευῆς ἐπιθέτου. ὃ τε πίνος αὐτῇ ὁ τῆς ἀρχαιότητος ἡρέμα καὶ λεληυότως ἐπιτρέχει χλοερόν τέ τι καὶ τευηλὸς καὶ μεστὸν ὥρας ἄνθος ἀναδίδωσι. καὶ ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωδεστάτων λειμώνων αὐρά τις ἡδεῖα ἐξ αὐτῆς φέρεται (Dem. 5, I 136, 17–137, 5)<sup>93</sup>.

Amidst this talk of clear streams, lush foliage and fragrant breezes, only one concrete virtue – standard vocabulary – finds mention. The many faults of

<sup>91</sup> Bonner 92.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. Thuc. 3, I 328, 3–8. The negative emphasis emerges even in his general statements about what a critic does. A proper critic, as opposed to one with excessive admiration for the author in hand, should show ἐφ’ ἐκάστῳ πράγματι παρατιθεῖς τὸν λόγον, ὅτι ταυτὶ μὲν οὐκ ἦν ἐπιτήδεια ἐν τῷ καιρῷ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν προσώπων λέγεσθαι, ταυτὶ δ’ οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτοις τοῖς πράγμασιν οὐδὲ μέχρι τούτου (Thuc. 34, I 382, 1–4).

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Dem. 13, I 157, 19–23, another metaphorical description of good style.



Plato's more elaborate style, on the other hand, are identified with great specificity: ἐκχεῖται δ' [sc. ἡ Πλατωνικὴ διάλεκτος] εἰς ἀπειροκάλους περιφράσεις πλοῦτον ὀνομάτων ἐπιδεικνυμένη κενόν, ὑπεριδοῦσά τε τῶν κυρίων καὶ ἐν τῇ κοινῇ χρήσει κειμένων τὰ πεποιημένα ζητεῖ καὶ ξένα καὶ ἀρχαιοπρεπῆ. μάλιστα δὲ χεῖμαζεται περὶ τὴν τροπικὴν φράσιν, πολλὴ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις, ἄκαιρος δ' ἐν ταῖς μετωνυμίαις, σκληρὰ δὲ καὶ οὐ σώζουσα τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐν ταῖς <μεταφοραῖς>. ἀλληγορίας τε περιβάλλεται πολλὰς <καὶ μακράς>, οὔτε μέτρον ἔχουσας οὔτε καιρόν, σχήμασί τε ποιητικοῖς ἐσχάτην προσβάλλουσιν ἀηδίαν καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς Γοργείοις ἀκαίρως καὶ μειρακιωδῶς ἐναβρύνεται (Dem. 5, I 137, 13–138, 5).

Another example of this imbalance is found in Dionysius' attempts to illustrate the Protean<sup>94</sup> versatility of Demosthenes' style. Unusual vocabulary, hyperbaton, unnecessary verbiage, odd syntax and awkward periodic structure are among the faults exemplified and corrected in a passage of "Thucydidean" Demosthenes (Dem. ch. 9). Dionysius is refreshingly reluctant to call this kind of composition "bad", but the frequency of the adjective περίεργος here reveals his distaste<sup>95</sup>. In discussing Demosthenic style where it borders on Lysianic, however, he resorts to the weary (and wearying) formula of general ἀρεταί (Dem. ch. 13). These, he seems from the rhetorical questions to think, are self-evident, for no specific passages are adduced. It is thus hardly surprising to find that Dionysius' first attempt at detailed analysis (in ch. 14 of the *Isocrates*) is a response to faults of style, and that the characteristic virtue of Lysias' style, χάρις, was a πρᾶγμα παντὸς κρεῖττον λόγου (Lys. 10, I 18, 10)<sup>96</sup>. It is nothing unusual for a critic to find it easier to point out errors in a passage than to account for its success. Nor is Dionysius alone in being unaware of the asymmetry, but it must be taken into account when we try to determine the nature of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον, for it begins to look as though what the τεχνίτης demonstrates is not τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη τέχνῃ καλόν, but τὸ μὴ καλόν.

A useful index of this is the technique of metathesis, to which Dionysius has increasing recourse in the later treatises<sup>97</sup>. The majority (33) of the rewritten sentences point out stylistic faults in the original by providing simple, unam-

<sup>94</sup> Dem. 9, I 149, 1–2.

<sup>95</sup> The reason for this reluctance is explained in ch. 10; in Thucydides the style is faulty because he uses it to excess, but the bounds of propriety, Dionysius says, are not overstepped by Demosthenes.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *Din.* 7, I 307, 7–17, where of the two sorts of μίμησις he describes (natural and mechanical), he is rendered speechless by the good sort (ὁ φυσικός), but the faults of the other sort (ὁ ἐκ τῶν τῆς τέχνης παραγγελμάτων) constitute a useful critical tool. Also Dem. 13, I 156, 10–14, where it is the virtues of a passage of Lysianic Demosthenes (purity, precision, lucidity, concision, terseness, realism, simplicity) that make critics uncertain about authorship.

<sup>97</sup> In the *Isocrates* there is one re-written sentence, in the *Isaeus* there are two, in the *Demosthenes*, nine, in the *CV*, nine, and in the *Thucydides* and its appendix the second *Letter to Ammaeus*, twenty-two. There is also a lacuna in ch. 25 of the *Thucydides* which will have contained more metatheses. While this may not be a strictly logical technique of analysis, it is certainly the sort of thing only a τεχνίτης does.

biguous and otherwise unobjectionable renderings of the same idea<sup>98</sup>. The new versions are intended to show what a layman (Isa. 11, I 107, 5) or, rather, what οἱ ἀκολουθῶς τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ σχηματίζοντες τὴν φράσιν (Amm. II 11, I 430, 18–20) would have written. Ten of the metatheses, however, are intended to show that by changing the word arrangement in a passage of good writing one can either produce a different style of equal acceptability, or destroy its effectiveness altogether<sup>99</sup>. In chapter 4 of the *On Composition*, for example, he quotes a sentence of Herodotus, describes its style as ὑπαγωγικὸν καὶ ἱστορικόν, then gives two rearrangements. The style of the first is ὀρθὸν καὶ ἐναγώνιον and rather Thucydidean, of the second, μικρόκομψον, ἀγεννές and μαλθακόν, reminiscent of the writing of the Asianist Hegesias (CV 4, II 19, 9–11). In places like this, if anywhere, we might expect τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον to reveal technical excellence, but all Dionysius does is label the various stylistic characters, never putting his finger on that wherein the character lies. There is only a disappointing series of comments like ἄρ' ἔτι μένει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡρμοσμένων τῶν κώλων ἢ αὐτὴ χάρις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι (CV 7, II 30, 16–17). Metathesis, then, though an eminently satisfactory means of locating a passage's faults, is not used by Dionysius to explain its virtues in any but the most general terms<sup>100</sup>.

It is in the *On Composition* that Dionysius makes his most energetic attempts to account for the effectiveness of good writing<sup>101</sup>. He limits his attention here to σύνθεσις (omitting for the present, he says, ἐκλογή ὀνομάτων and τὰ νοήματα) and seems to be breaking new ground with the three ἀρμονίαι (CV, ch. 1)<sup>102</sup>. The number of the elements of language said to affect the ear

98 In three cases he claims more positive virtues for his versions (συντομωτέραν καὶ χαριεστέραν, *Dem.* 19, I 168, 4–5; στρογγυλότερα, *Dem.* 19, I 168, 18 and *Dem.* 20, I 170, 2. See Grube, *Thrasymachus* 257 [with note 10] for the meaning of στρογγύλος). These three of course hardly constitute a comprehensive application of τὸ λογικόν for the purpose of identifying τὸ καλόν.

99 For the use of the technique in ancient criticism see N. A. Greenberg, *Metathesis as an instrument in the criticism of poetry*, TAPA 89 (1958) 262–270. Three of Dionysius' ten metatheses in this category involve poetry.

100 Demetrius, by contrast, who uses this technique extensively in the *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, has 44 metatheses, 38 illustrating virtues in the original, only 4 correcting faults. The remaining 2 give unranked alternatives.

101 He is concerned here to a much greater extent than elsewhere with poetry, and some of his best criticism is of passages of Homer. This may be due to the quality of his predecessors in the field. According to Max Pohlenz (*Τὸ πρῆπον, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des griechischen Geistes*, NAG [1933] 53–92, esp. 74–79), he is indebted to earlier critics like Panaetius, Ariston of Chios, Diogenes of Babylon, Heracleides of Pontus and Crates of Mallos, in short to “den Kreisen, die sich mit der Dichterkritik beschäftigen” (77). See also D. M. Schenkeveld, *Οἱ κριτικοὶ in Philodemus*, Mnemosyne 21 (1968) 105–106 for the influence of these critics on Dionysius. Both the surviving fragments of οἱ κριτικοὶ and Philodemus' rebuttal, however, deal primarily with the theory of aesthetic effect. Of their practice no traces remain. Aujac (3, 40) admits Dionysius' debt to the past, but concludes: “Le fait est, en tout cas, que l'on constate une assez grande distance entre la situation qu'il présente et celle que l'on peut deviner à travers le témoignage de Philodème, son aîné de quelque cinquante ans”.

102 Pohl 49.

escalates rapidly in this work, yet Dionysius puts together a critical framework making use of both aesthetic response and technical analysis. Chapter 11 begins with a list of the four means by which a composition is rendered pleasing: μέλος, ῥυθμός, μεταβολή and τὸ πρέπον (CV 11, II 37, 11–12). The uses of these are surveyed briefly in chapter 12, then more thoroughly in chapters 14–20<sup>103</sup>. Under the heading of μέλος Dionysius describes the 24 letters and assigns them their euphonic values. Long α, for instance, is the εὐφωνότατον of the vowels (CV 14, II 51, 13), σ is ἄχαρι δὲ καὶ ἀηδὲς (ὑηριώδους γὰρ καὶ ἀλόγου μᾶλλον ἢ λογικῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ φωνῆς ὁ συριγμός, CV 14, II 54, 16–17). In the section on ῥυθμός 12 metrical feet are evaluated in quasi-moral terms: the trochee is ταπεινός τε καὶ ἄσεμνος καὶ ἀγεννής (CV 17, II 70, 6–7), the bacchius ἀνδρῶδες πάνυ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ εἰς σεμνολογίαν ἐπιτήδειον (CV 17, II 72, 12–13). This groundwork laid, he analyses the effects of syllables and letters (i.e. μέλος) in some passages of Homer, and of meter (ῥυθμός) in four prose authors. It will be worth looking at his treatment of several examples in detail.

To illustrate the possibility of representing reality by the letters and syllables appropriate to it Dionysius cites the line ἡϊόνες βοόωσιν ἐρευγομένης ἁλὸς ἔξω (Il. 17, 265) which, he says, portrays the ocean's ceaseless roar by means of the παρέκτασις τῶν συλλαβῶν (CV 15, II 60, 12). What exactly does he mean by παρέκτασις? W. Rhys Roberts would have it that he is referring to the long vowels, particularly ω and η, in the line<sup>104</sup>. Usher suggests that “the effect of restless movement is achieved in the Greek by the juxtaposition of vowels in diaeresis and the pure dactylic metre”, but he is supplementing Dionysius' statement considerably<sup>105</sup>. In the first part of this chapter Dionysius had devoted several paragraphs to explaining how some long and short syllables are longer than others (σπλήν vs. ῥῆ, or στρόφος, τρόπος and Ῥόδος vs. ὁδός; CV 15, II 58, 1–59, 14), but this kind of lengthening is nowhere referred to by παρέκτασις or any comparable term, and the concept is not strikingly relevant to the line in question. Comparison with the next two examples, said to portray a hugeness of grief and a lengthy, passionate prayer (Κύκλωψ δὲ στενάχων τε καὶ ὠδίνων ὀδύνησι, / χερσὶ ψηλαφῶν [Od. 9, 415–416] and οὐδ' εἴ κεν μάλα πολλὰ πάυη ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων, / προπροκυλινδόμενος πατὴρ Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο [Il. 22, 220–221]), suggests that what Dionysius has in mind are the “extra” syllables in ἡϊόνες and βοόωσιν: ψηλαφῶν, ὀδύνησι, προπροκυλινδόμενος and αἰγιόχοιο are all longer than their Attic counterparts ψηλαφῶν, ὀδύναις, προκυλινδόμενος, and αἰγιόχου<sup>106</sup>. Compare also the passages exemplifying ἡ τῶν συλ-

<sup>103</sup> Chapters 14–16 deal with the euphonic values and effects of letters and syllables, which are rather different topics from μέλος as described at CV 11, II 40, 17–42, 14, where he discusses the tonal intervals available to a writer (i.e. what we call “melody”), but Dionysius does not explain the shift in focus.

<sup>104</sup> Roberts, ad loc.

<sup>105</sup> Usher 1, 110, note 1.

<sup>106</sup> As, of course, are ἡϊόνες and βοόωσιν with respect to Attic ἡόνες and βοῶσιν. Cf. Aristotle on

λαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων ἐλάττωσις (CV 15, II 61, 17–19): in the line ἀμβλήδην γοόωσα μετὰ δμῶϊσιν ἔειπεν (Il. 22, 476), ἀμβλήδην is a contracted form of ἀναβλήδην; in ἡνίοχοι δ' ἔκπληγεν, ἐπεὶ ἴδον ἀκάματον πῦρ (Il. 18, 225), ἔκπληγεν and ἴδον are shorter or lighter than Attic ἐξεπλάγησαν and εἶδον<sup>107</sup>. It is of course exasperating to see Dionysius attributing impressive effects to small causes, but it is characteristic of Dionysian argumentation to do so<sup>108</sup>. In chapter 3 of the essay On Composition, for example, he claims that word-arrangement alone accounts for the excellence of the description of Odysseus' first encounter with Telemachus (Od. 16, 1–16)<sup>109</sup>. Again, in chapter 18 he would have us believe that the principal difference between Homer's lines on the abuse of Hector's corpse and the description of a similar incident in a historical work of the much-despised Hegesias is the rhythm<sup>110</sup>.

After discussing the effects of syllables, he looks at how Homer uses letters: smooth, flowing letters portray youthful beauty (Od. 17, 36–37; 6, 162–163; 11, 281–282), letters that are difficult to pronounce introduce pitiable, frightening or awe-inspiring sights (Od. 6, 137; Il. 11, 36–37), unpleasant and ill-sounding letters are used for the unpleasant fate of the Cyclops' victims (Od. 9, 289–290). He does not point to specific letters in specific lines, but in some cases it is possible even for those not equipped with Greek ears to guess what he means: λ is fairly prominent in Od. 11, 281–282 and is the right sort of letter for bridal beauty (ἡδύνει μὲν γὰρ τὸ λ καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν ἡμιφώνων γλυκύτατον, CV 14, II 54, 11–12), the feral σ probably contributes to the unpleasant effect of Od. 9,

lengthened (ἐπεκτεταμένον) and shortened syllables, *Poetics* 1457 a 35–b 5: ἐπεκτεταμένον δὲ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀφρημένον τὸ μὲν ἐὰν φωνήεντι μακροτέρῳ κεκρημένον τι ἢ τοῦ οἰκείου ἢ συλλαβῇ ἐμβεβλημένη, τὸ δὲ ἀφρημένον τι ἢ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεκτεταμένον μὲν οἷον τὸ πόλεως πόληος καὶ τὸ Πηλείδου Πηληιάδεω, ἀφρημένον δὲ οἷον τὸ κρῖ καὶ τὸ δῶ καὶ “μία γίνεται ἀμφοτέρων ὄψ”. The importance of the word βοόωσιν in Il. 17, 265 is further attested by Aristotle (*Poetics* 1458 b 31) and by the scholium on the line which Roberts cites (155): καὶ ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν κῦμα μέγα ὑαλάσσης ἐπιφερόμενον ποταμοῦ ρεύματι καὶ τῷ ἀνακόπτεσθαι βρυχώμενον, καὶ τὰς ἐκατέρωθεν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ὑαλασσίας ἡϊόνας ἡχούσας, ὃ ἐμιμήσατο διὰ τῆς ἐπεκτάσεως τοῦ βοόωσιν. αὕτη ἡ εἰκὼν Πλάτωνος ἔκαυσε τὰ ποιήματα· οὕτως ἐναργέστερον τοῦ ὁρωμένου τὸ ἀκουόμενον παρέστησεν ... τῆς γὰρ ἐπαλλήλου τῶν ὑδάτων ἐκβολῆς ἢ τοῦ “βοόωσιν” ἀναδίπλωσις ὁμοίαν ἀπετέλεσε συνωδίαν.

107 The first example of ἐλάττωσις is somewhat puzzling, since the forms γοόωσα and ἔειπεν recall βοόωσιν of Il. 17, 265, which serves as an example of παρέκτασις. Dionysius' comment (ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος δηλοῦται συγκοπὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ἄτακτον, CV 15, II 61, 15–16), however, suggests that he may have more than one effect in mind here. Cf. CV 16, II, 64, 8 where συγκόψει is used of things difficult to pronounce, bearing in mind the alleged difficulty of pronouncing consecutive vowels (also *Dem.* 38, I 210, 12–211, 4; *Dem.* 40, I 215, 8–10; CV 20, II 93, 4–6).

108 One must resist the temptation to give him credit for the kinds of analyses modern critics can devise for the lines.

109 Bonner remarks (72): “This is indeed a precarious process of elimination, a typical result of the rhetorical training; Dionysius quite fails to see that the attraction of the passage lies partly in the dramatic beauty of the situation and partly in the very simplicity of the words chosen for the narrative.”

110 Roberts' discussion of the differences occupies 3 pages (53–55) in his Introduction.



289–290. In the other examples it is less easy to identify the important letters<sup>111</sup>, but Dionysius leaves us in no doubt as to how much importance for composition as a whole he attaches to the euphonic values of letters: ὥστε πολλή ἀνάγκη καλὴν μὲν εἶναι λέξιν ἐν ἣ καλὰ ἐστὶν ὀνόματα, κάλλους δὲ ὀνομάτων συλλαβὰς τε καὶ γράμματα καλὰ αἷτια εἶναι, ἡδεῖαν δὲ διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἡδυνόντων τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παραπλήσιον ὀνομάτων τε καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων, τάς τε κατὰ μέρος ἐν τούτοις διαφοράς, καὶ ὅς δηλοῦται τὰ τε ἡυη καὶ τὰ πάυη καὶ αἱ διαυέσεις καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῶν προσώπων καὶ τὰ συνεδρεύοντα τούτοις, ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης κατασκευῆς τῶν γραμμάτων γίνεσθαι τοιαύτας (CV 16, II 63, 9–18, cf. CV 13, II 47, 22–48, 2).

Rhythm is likewise important: διὰ μὲν τῶν γενναίων καὶ ἀξιωματικῶν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχόντων ῥυθμῶν ἀξιωματικὴ γίνεται σύνυσις καὶ γενναία καὶ μεγαλοπρεπής, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀγεννῶν τε καὶ ταπεινῶν ἀμεγέθυς τις καὶ ἄσεμνος (CV 18, II 73, 13–17). But Dionysius' metrical analyses are not particularly instructive<sup>112</sup>. Leaving aside the incredulity that arises when one finds Dionysian single-mindedness leading to an evaluation of Thucydides like ὑψηλὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ καλλιπὴς ὡς εὐγενεῖς ἐπάγων ῥυθμούς (CV 18, II 75, 16–17), the scansion itself, as he admits, are open to question<sup>113</sup>.

The various *materiae* of word-painting used in Homer's description of Sisyphus and his boulder (Od. 11, 593–598) are analysed with great success in the chapter on τὸ πρέπον (ch. 20)<sup>114</sup>. Dionysius' first step is to describe the effect of the passage: ἐνταῦθα ἡ σύνυσις ἐστὶν ἡ δηλοῦσα τῶν γινομένων ἕκαστον, τὸ βάρος τοῦ πέτρου, τὴν ἐπίπνον ἐκ τῆς γῆς κίνησιν, τὸν διεριδόμενον τοῖς κώλοις, τὸν ἀναβαίνοντα πρὸς τὸν ὄχθον, τὴν μόλις ἀνωθουμένην πέτραν (CV 20, II 90, 13–17). This, he says, is felt by everyone. He then demonstrates how the effect, by no means an accidental one, was achieved, investigating rhythm, word length, syllable length and the letters that occur at word boundaries<sup>115</sup>.

<sup>111</sup> What is one to make of the hiatus and semi-vowel/consonant clashes in *Od.* 17, 36–37, for example? If this had been a line of Pindar, its composition might have been called rough!

<sup>112</sup> Even the epitomator of *CV* thought that the chapters on rhythm could be improved: “Le seul remaniement important du traité primitif concerne les chapitres 17 et 18, consacrés à l'étude des rythmes: l'abrégiateur, tout en s'appuyant sur Denys, fait un exposé original, systématique, et présente une nomenclature des pieds métriques assez différente de celle adoptée par Denys.” Aujac 3, 45.

<sup>113</sup> For a similar over-valuation of rhythmic effects cf. the assessment of the opening sentence of the *De Corona*: τί οὖν ἐκώλυε καλὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι λέξεως, ἐν ἣ μήτε πυρρίχιός ἐστι πούς μήτε ἱαμβικός μήτε ἀμφίβραχος μήτε τῶν χορείων ἢ τροχαίων μηδεῖς; (CV 18, II 79, 1–4). On his scansion, cf., e.g. Bonner (74): “Dionysius frequently runs into metrical difficulties in his eagerness to prove his case, and has left more than one editor nonplussed over his apparent disregard of the quantities of the Greek language.” Also Roberts' and Usher's notes ad locc.

<sup>114</sup> The claims of μεταβολή having been dealt with summarily in ch. 19. The examples suggested to illustrate good variety are “all of Herodotus, all of Plato and all of Demosthenes” (CV 19, II 87, 3–5); for counter-examples, the student is directed to the works of Isocrates and his followers (CV 19, II 87, 10–11).

<sup>115</sup> A. Hurst (*Un critique grec dans la Rome d'Auguste: Denys d'Halicarnasse*, ANRW vol. 2, pt. 30, no. 1, p. 857) is interpreting Dionysius' statement that Homer's word-arrangement was de-



That is, aesthetic response and technical analysis constitute the basis for his evaluation of the passage. We may suppose, then, that it is this sort of detailed analysis that he would consider application of τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον<sup>116</sup>. But it remains to consider the critical techniques he employs in the final part of the *On Composition* and in the later critical works.

He continues to use the foundations established in chapters 14–20 when analysing examples of the austere and smooth ἀρμονίαι (chh. 22–23), retaining also the format of the discussion of the Sisyphus passage, namely a description of effects followed by an examination of causes. His attention has shifted somewhat away from the intrinsic qualities of letters themselves to the “roughening” effect of certain letter combinations at word junctions<sup>117</sup>. In general he objects to hiatus and to consonant combinations that do not naturally belong together, by which he means those that are not found together at the beginnings of syllables within words. The junction of final ζ and initial ξ in the phrase Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε, for example, is rough, since οὐ ... προτάττεται τὸ σ τοῦ ξ κατὰ συνεκφορὰν τὴν ἐν μιᾷ συλλαβῇ γινομένην (CV 22, II 108, 20–109, 1)<sup>118</sup>. Other objectionable consonant *iuncturae* are: Πελοποννησίων καὶ; ἐν χορόν; κλυτὰν πέμπετε; τὸν Φίλιππον; πανδαίδαλόν τε; χάριν θεοί; ἰοδέτων λάχετε; αἵρεσίν μοι; γὰρ ῥοπή. Rhythmic concerns are not prominent in this portion of the CV – he only notes the absence of satisfying *clausulae* in two periods of the introduction to Thucydides’ *Historiae* (CV 22, II 110, 9–16) and states that the presence of such is a general feature of the smooth style (CV 23, II 113, 6–11). In his comments on the prose passages he mentions larger compositional units – figures, clauses and periods – but provides no examples. These chapters seem to reflect his high estimation of the value of individual letters for good composition.

The topic of chapter 25 is πῶς γίνεται λέξις ἄμετρος ὁμοία καλῶ ποιήματι

signedly mimetic (CV 20, II 90, 6–8) without taking into account the elements of the passage that Dionysius actually examines when he says: “Ce que le critique nous montre là, ce n’est pas le rôle que jouerait la composition dans un passage homérique, c’est que cette dernière constitue en tant que telle le moyen mimétique auquel le texte doit sa beauté. À l’extrême limite, la poésie homérique est composition dans la mesure où l’analyse qu’en offre Denys lui semble épuiser ce qu’on peut dire des moyens.”

116 Cf. CV 23, II 119, 10–16 where Dionysius lists qualities fundamental to a particular style that are present in a passage under examination. This list is derived from his theoretical and technical exposition of the nature of the style at CV 23, II 111, 19–112, 9, but he justifies his assessment (i.e. that the passage exemplifies this style) by saying τὸ ἄλογον ἐπιμαρτυρεῖ τῆς ἀκοῆς πάθος.

117 This had already come under notice in a general way in ch. 20: τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν ὀνομάτων ψῦγμα καὶ ἡ τῶν τραχυνόντων γραμμάτων παράθεσις (sc. ἐμιμήσαντο) τὰ διαλείμματα τῆς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς ἐποχὰς καὶ τὸ τοῦ μόχθου μέγεθος (CV 20, II 91, 14–17).

118 This concept is put to good use, at least on paper. Roberts notes that Dionysius’ statements run contrary to our ideas of Augustan pronunciation of final αι, subscript iota, assimilated stops, etc. (219. 221. 224. 231; also Aujac 3, 154. 158; Pohl 190). Aujac suggests an explanation: “Denys semble en effet étendre un peu arbitrairement à la prose une théorie qui concernait proprement la poésie, et la poésie chantée” (3, 31).

ἢ μέλει (CV 25, II 122, 14–15) and it focusses largely on prose rhythm<sup>119</sup>. The details of analysis are messy and involve him in at least one contradiction<sup>120</sup>, but the chapter is important for our study because it contains Dionysius' defense of the method of detailed analysis that we have been examining. His opponents, he thinks, will say: ὁ Δημοσθένης οὖν οὕτως ἄθλιος ἦν, ὥσθ' ὅτε γράφοι τοὺς λόγους, μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ὥσπερ οἱ πλάσται παρατιθέμενος, ἐναρμόττειν ἐπειράτο τούτοις τοῖς τύποις τὰ κῶλα, στρέφων ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ παραφυλάττων τὰ μήκη καὶ τοὺς χρόνους καὶ τὰς πτώσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὰς ἐγκλίσεις τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ πάντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα τοῖς μορίοις τοῦ λόγου πολυπραγμονῶν; (CV 25, II 132, 1–8). Their objections center on the search for prose rhythm, but Dionysius' reply defends the analysis of euphonic details as well: τί οὖν ἄτοπον, εἰ καὶ Δημοσθένης φροντὶς εὐφωνίας τε καὶ ἐμμελείας ἐγένετο καὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἰκῇ καὶ ἀβασανίστως τιθέναι μήτε ὄνομα μήτε νόημα; πολὺ τε γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ προσήκειν ἀνδρὶ κατασκευάζοντι λόγους πολιτικούς μνημεῖα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως αἰώνια μηδενὸς τῶν ἐλαχίστων ὀλιγωρεῖν, ἢ ζωγράφων τε καὶ τορευτῶν παισὶν ἐν ὕλῃ φθαρτῇ χειρῶν εὐστοχίας καὶ πόνους ἀποδεικνυμένοις περὶ τὰ φλέβια καὶ τὰ πτίλα καὶ τὸν χνοῦν καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας μικρολογίας κατατρίβειν τῆς τέχνης τὴν ἀκρίβειαν (CV 25, II 133, 13–134, 1).

Letter combinations, though not the sole point under discussion in the descriptions of the austere and smooth ἁρμονίαι which occupy chapters 38–41 of the Demosthenes, are still the most prominent. Clashing *iuncturae* are responsible for the primary characteristics of the austere style (Dem. 38, I 210, 9–211, 5), and the effort to fit words together without clashes (rather than, e.g., a desire for balanced clauses) is made to account for the padding found in examples of smooth composition (Dem. 40, I 214, 24–215, 8)<sup>121</sup>. None of the παραδείγματα is analysed here, but when a Demosthenic example of the mixed ἁρμονία is under consideration (ch. 43) letter junctions are the only details mentioned. After spending about 40 lines pointing out rough *iuncturae*<sup>122</sup> he pays only lip service to other elements of this style: οὐ μόνον δὲ αἱ τῶν ὀνομάτων συζυγίαι τὴν μικτὴν ἁρμονίαν λαμβάνουσι παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ μέσην, ἀλλὰ

<sup>119</sup> He is interested in rhythm throughout a sentence rather than *clausulae*. See Usher 2, 9 on these two different traditions.

<sup>120</sup> He scans a bit of the proem to the *De Corona* as follows: ὅσην εὐνοίαν ἔχων ἔγωγε διατελῶ (CV 25, II 130, 20–131, 4), having altered ἐγὼ to ἔγωγε to complete the iambic line and taking liberties with the obligatory short in the first metron, not to mention the anapaest (falsely divided, so that there is no proper caesura) in the third foot, whereas in chapter 18 he had scanned a slightly longer version of the phrase in such a way as to emphasize the absence of “ignoble” feet: ὅσην εὐνοίαν ἔχων ἔγω διατελῶ τῇ τε πόλει καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν (CV 18, II 78, 7–12). On the problems of the version in chapter 22, see Roberts, ad loc.

<sup>121</sup> In the earlier essay on Isocrates Dionysius had said that Isocratean padding resulted from the pursuit of periodic structure and rhythmic *clausulae* (Isoc. 3, I 58, 13–21). This discrepancy is a clear indication of the narrowing of Dionysius' critical focus.

<sup>122</sup> Only clashes are discussed, even when the composition tends towards the “smooth” extreme (Dem. 43, I 225, 7–226, 5). Apparently whatever combinations are not rough are smooth.

καὶ αἱ τῶν κώλων κατασκευαί τε καὶ συνθέσεις καὶ τὰ τῶν περιόδων μήκη τε καὶ σχήματα καὶ οἱ περιλαμβάνοντες αὐτάς τε καὶ τὰ κῶλα ῥυθμοί (Dem. 43, I 226, 21–227, 4).

With this constant imbalance in mind we can perhaps achieve a more precise understanding of Dionysius' advice to neophyte critics: τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἀξιῶσαιμ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς βουλομένους τὴν σύνθεσιν ἀκριβῶς εἰδέναι τὴν Δημοσθένους, ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὴν δοκιμάζειν ἰδιωμάτων, λέγω δὲ τῶν κρατίστων τε καὶ κυριωτάτων· πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς ἐμμελείας, ἧς κριτήριον ἄριστον ἢ ἄλογος αἰσθησις. δεῖ δ' αὐτῇ τριβῆς πολλῆς καὶ κατηχήσεως χρονίου (Dem. 50, I 237, 11–17). The first of the significant characteristics that he urges a critic to consider is ἐμμέλεια. We have seen that the chapters of the CV that, structurally speaking, were devoted to μέλος – the first of the four means of good composition – dealt, in fact, with the effects of letters and syllables, and that *iuncturae* received the first and generally the foremost consideration in all subsequent analyses of the ἁρμονία. It is likely, I think, that this is the kind of subject matter he is recommending here<sup>123</sup>. But note that in this same passage the importance of the ἄλογος αἰσθησις and the insufficiency of τέχνη alone for critical evaluation of ἐμμελὲς ἁρμονία are stressed<sup>124</sup>. With this we are back to the two essential faculties. Although the effects of *iuncturae* are not discussed in the *Thucydides*, it was Dionysius' confidence in the validity of this kind of detailed analysis that prompted his portrayal in that work of intuition and reason as partners in the task of evaluating literature<sup>125</sup>. We may conclude, then, that Dionysius' critical system is not inconsistent, only incomplete<sup>126</sup>.

123 Pohl (44) considers this sort of analysis inconsistent with Dionysius' theories about the aesthetic effects of language. Now it may very well be that the way Dionysius tries to account for good writing is inadequate or that we would have preferred a more purely aesthetic reaction, but there is no conflict here between aesthetic and rational systems; rather, the description of an aesthetic effect and the technical analysis of causes are two facets of a thorough critical examination.

124 To be sure, the τέχνη envisaged is rather scanty: ἐξ ὀλίγων παραγγελμάτων καὶ προσκαίρου κατηχήσεως (Dem. 50, I 238, 2–3).

125 The subject-matter of the *Thucydides* is much more comprehensive than that of the CV or the latter half of the *Demosthenes*, and the description of Thucydidean σύνθεσις is relegated to a single sentence: ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς συνθέσεως τῶν τ' ἐλαττόνων καὶ τῶν μειζόνων μορίων τὴν ἀξιωματικὴν καὶ αὐστηρὰν καὶ στιβαρὰν καὶ βεβηκυῖαν καὶ τραχύνουσαν ταῖς τῶν γραμμάτων ἀντιτυπίαις τὰς ἀκοὰς ἀντὶ τῆς λιγυρᾶς καὶ μαλακῆς καὶ συνεξεσμένης καὶ μηδὲν ἐχούσης ἀντίτυπον (Thuc. 24, I 361, 7–12). Since we have seen that it is only in the area of σύνθεσις that Dionysius was able to use τὸ λογικὸν κριτήριον to identify positive elements of τὸ καλόν, it is not surprising to see that the detailed analysis of the *Thucydides* concentrates again on faults. The polemical aim of the treatise – he is trying to counteract the folly of those admirers of Thucydides who considered him the κανόνα τῆς ἱστορικῆς πραγματείας and, more dangerously, τῆς περὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους δεινότητος ὅρον (Thuc. 2, I 327, 11–13) – also diverts his attention from beauties of σύνθεσις, which could never excuse obscurity, Thucydides' fundamental failing according to Dionysius.

126 I should like to record here my gratitude to K. J. Dover, M. McCall, D. A. Russell and the anonymous referees at Museum Helveticum for the valuable suggestions they made at various stages in the preparation of this paper.