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Sophocles Ajax 68–70
A reply to Professor Eduard Fraenkel

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*θαρσῶν δὲ μίμνε μηδὲ συμφορὰν δέχου
τὸν ἄνδρον· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὀμμάτων ἀποστρόφους
αὐγὰς ἀπείρξω σὴν πρόσοψιν εἰσιδεῖν.*

In a recent issue of *Museum Helveticum* (20, 1963, 103–106), Professor E. Fraenkel condemns as an interpolation lines 68–70 of Sophocles' *Ajax*. He is not the first to cast doubt on the passage. E. Reichard¹ rejected the lines as being inconsistent with what follows (lines 74, 83–85), and was supported by Nauck in the eighth edition of Schneidewin's commentary (1882). Recent scholars however have accepted the lines. Professor Fraenkel now argues that the dramatic inconsistency of these verses is accompanied by linguistic difficulties which together confirm interpolation. My purpose is to defend the passage against both these lines of attack.

We may begin with the linguistic difficulties. Professor Fraenkel finds the construction of *δέχεσθαι* in vv. 68–9 *θαρσῶν δὲ μίμνε μηδὲ συμφορὰν δέχου / τὸν ἄνδρον* unintelligible. Two explanations are generally suggested. Either *συμφοράν* is taken as a second accusative after *δέχου*, 'do not regard the man as a disaster', or *τὸν ἄνδρον* is made the object of *μίμνε* and the words in between, *μηδὲ ... δέχου*, understood parenthetically, 'and do not expect disaster.' The former explanation is adopted by Schneidewin, Hermann, Blaydes, Jebb, Radermacher, Campbell and Mazon-Dain²; Whitelaw, Wunder, Lobeck and Schaefer adopted the latter; Kamerbeek is prepared to accept both! I would agree with Professor Fraenkel in doubting this second interpretation. What of the former?

Professor Fraenkel's problem is the absence of an exact parallel for the double accusative with *δέχεσθαι*. Now *δέχεσθαι* frequently takes two accusatives when it has a literal sense 'receive', cf. Thuc. 1, 43 *Κερκυραίονς τούσδε μήτε ξυμμάχους δέχεσθε* 'neither receive these Corcyraeans as allies'. But *δέχου*, if *συμφοράν* is dependent upon it, must have in addition an intellectual sense, 'consider', 'regard as'. *δέχεσθαι* may certainly have such a sense, cf. Plato *Epist.* 3, 315c 7 *σὺ δ' ἀναγνοὺς αὐτά, δπῃ βούλει δέξασθαι, ταύτῃ δέχου* 'take' (i.e. 'regard') 'them in whatever way you like'³. If then *συμφοράν* is a second accusative (Campbell's ellipse of *ως* is a sensible suggestion), we may suppose *δέχου* to be used like *ἀπέδειξεν* at Plato *Theaet.* 166a 5 *γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν*. Why is it

¹ *De interpolatione fabulae Sophoclis quae inscribitur Ajax* (Jena 1880) 14.

² This explanation is also preferred by W. B. Stanford in his new edition of the play, *Sophocles Ajax* (London 1963).

³ So also Plut. *De Def. Orac.* 415 d *οἱ μὴ καλῶς δεχόμενοι τὴν γενεάν*, where *δεχόμενοι* means 'explain', 'interpret'.

easier to 'show someone as a laughter' than to 'receive someone as a disaster'? For both passages we might cite as a model Hdt. 4, 79 *συμφορὴν μεγάλην ἐποιήσαντο* 'they regarded the matter' (understood) 'as a great misfortune'. 'Sophocles' Greek is rarely simple and often ambiguous. He shows a liking for abstract nouns in reference to persons, loosely constructed, often in apposition to a sentence or another noun⁴. We find *κόρην ... παρεσδέδεγμαι ... λωβητὸν ἐμπόλημα* (Tr. 536-8) 'I have received the girl (as) a merchandise'; the singular *ὑπαγκάλισμα* in apposition to the subject of the plural verb *μίμνομεν* ib. 539-40⁵; *διαφθοράν* (sc. Aerope) in apposition to the unexpressed object of *ἔφηκεν* Aj. 1297 etc. Hence the absence of an exact parallel for *δέχεσθαι* with a double accusative is not in itself an argument for impugning the lines, when we are aware of Sophocles' boldness in applying abstract nouns to persons. I would suggest that Sophocles intended his audience to understand *δέχον* in both a literal and an intellectual sense, and selected the word by reason of its being able to perform this double role.

Professor Fraenkel's second difficulty is *πρόσωψιν*, line 70. He argues that to be intelligible here *πρόσωψις* must possess a concrete sense, 'face', whereas during the fifth century the word never «eine andere Funktion hat als die eines Nomen Actionis zu *προσορᾶν*». He states that commentators and lexicographers have behaved with «beträchtliche Willkür» in interpreting this word, and dismisses out of hand the statement by Stephanus-Dindorf, adopted by Jebb, that *πρόσωψις* is a poetic alternative to *πρόσωπον*⁶.

Professor Fraenkel is quite right to point out the absence of uniformity in translations of *πρόσωψις*. But to quote every passage in which *πρόσωψις* appears during the fifth century, without in the most crucial cases offering his own comment or translation, is unconvincing. *πρόσωψις* might denote both the action of *προσορᾶν*, 'looking at', or the result of the action, 'what is looked at'. In the latter case it might perfectly well mean a particular thing looked at, that is to say a concrete 'object of sight'. *Ὄψις* frequently has such a sense, and for another -*σις* noun so used by Sophocles we may compare Aj. 8 *εῦ δέ σ' ἐκφέρει / κυνὸς Λακαίνης ὡς τις εὑρινος βάσις*, where *βάσις* means 'going', 'movement', and Ph. 1378 *πρὸς τοὺς μὲν οὖν σε τὴνδε τ' ἔμπνον βάσιν*, where *βάσιν* clearly refers to Philoctetes' 'festering foot'. The question is whether there are other passages in which the sense of *πρόσωψις* is concrete, or at least possibly concrete. At Pindar Pyth. 4, 29, I would accept Professor Fraenkel's 'Anblick', *φαιδίμαν ἀνδρὸς αἰδοίον πρόσωψιν* (*πρόσωψιν* C) *θηκάμενος*, though one should note that Paley⁷ translates *πρόσωψιν* by 'countenance', Rumpel⁸ gives 'facies' and Holt⁹ suggests 'visage'. But

⁴ For *δέχεσθαι* in Soph. with an abstract noun as its direct object, used in a personal sense, cf. Tr. 376 *εἰσδέδεγμαι πημονὴν ὑπόστεγον*.

⁵ I have discussed this passage in Cl. Rev. (NS) 13 (1963) 128 s.

⁶ Professor Stanford, op. cit., translates *πρόσωψις* by 'face'.

⁷ F. A. Paley, *The Odes of Pindar* (Cambridge 1868).

⁸ I. Rumpel, *Lexicon Pindaricum* (Lipsiae 1883).

⁹ J. Holt, *Les noms d'action en -sis (-tis)*, Aarskrift for Aarhus Universitet 1941, 106. Holt finds that *πρόσωψις* is used with substantially the same sense as *Ὄψις*.

at Soph. El. 1285 *προύφάνης δὲ φιλτάταν ἔχων πρόσοψιν*, Jebb's 'countenance' and Campbell's 'form' are no less probable than 'looks' or 'expression' for Electra's welcome of Orestes. It is even more difficult to deny a concrete sense at Eurip. Hel. 636, where Menelaus addresses Helen with *ὦ φιλτάτη πρόσοψις* (cf. *ὦ πρόσωπον εὐγενές τέκνων* Md. 1072). 'Dearest face' is the most natural apostrophe.

But even if it were true that *πρόσοψις* may not have any concrete application in the fifth century, this would not give any ground for suspicion. LSJ (s.v. *πρόσοψις*) suggests that *σὴν πρόσοψιν εἰσιδεῖν* is a periphrasis meaning 'person', 'self', or 'presence'. This suggestion does not merit Professor Fraenkel's censure. Sophocles not infrequently uses abstract nouns to refer to persons by periphrasis when he wishes to concentrate attention upon a particular quality or action. Thus *σὴν πρόσοψιν εἰσιδεῖν* could perhaps mean 'to see your looking at (him)', i.e. 'you, looking at (him)' just as *ἡμῶν παρονόταν* El. 1104 means 'us, being present', and *πατρὸς ... δευτέραν δμιλίαν* ib. 418 means 'the father, associating for a second time'. An even bolder example, which I have discussed elsewhere, is *ὅταν παρονόσια φράξῃ* ib. 1251, 'when presence gives the signal', that is 'when they give the signal, by their presence'¹⁰. If *πρόσοψις* then has an abstract sense, it may be taken as a periphrasis for the person. Or if *πρόσοψις* is, as it may well be, concrete, then the word is an ornate alternative to *πρόσωπον*, just as *γένεσις* Tr. 380 equals *γένος*, *οἰκησις* Ph. 31 equals *οἶκος* etc.

Professor Fraenkel proceeds to suggest that an interpolator modelled Aj. 69–70 on Euripides' Or. 1020 ff., *ώς σ' ἵδοντ' ἐν δύμασιν / πανυστάτην πρόσοψιν ἔξεστην φρενῶν*. A greater probability is that Euripides himself based Alc. 876–7 *εἰσιδεῖν φιλίας ἀλόχον πρόσωπον* upon Sophocles' line. The 'interpolator' worked cleverly, for the grandiloquence of lines 68–70 is entirely consistent with the rest of Athene's speech (cf. especially 53–55), hardly what we should expect from someone tampering with the text.

I turn now to the 'dramatic inconsistency' of the lines. Professor Fraenkel makes two points: first, Odysseus' astonished question in 84 *πῶς, εἴπερ ὀφθαλμοῖς γε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὁρᾷ*; in reply to Athene's assurance that he will remain invisible to Ajax, implies that «with a regrettable lack of respect for the goddess, he had not previously heard correctly», i.e. lines 68–70. The second argument is that 'diverting the gaze' (69–70) is substantially different from 'darkening the sight' (85).

Now the second argument is of little significance, if we can bring objections against the first. For if, as Jebb and others maintain, it is dramatically relevant for Athene to repeat her assurance to Odysseus, then we should not expect an exact repetition. The only substantial difference between the promise in 69–70 and that given in 85 is one of emphasis. *σκοτώσω βλέφαρα* is a simpler and stronger statement to the effect that Ajax will not see Odysseus. Athene can achieve this in many ways and if it is necessary for her to reassure Odysseus, it is natural enough that her language be more direct than the allusive *δύματων ἀποστρόφους αὐγὰς ἀπείρξω*, which

¹⁰ See my discussion in Cl. Rev. (NS) 14 (1964) 130 ss.

had failed in its effect. In neither case, as *καὶ δεδορκότα* 85 shows, will Ajax be temporarily blinded; thus the result of her actions will in each case be identical.

Judgments about dramatic relevance are too subjective to admit of positive proof but there are certain points which I would urge against Professor Fraenkel. With or without lines 68–70 Odysseus requires 15 lines of stichomythia before he accepts (and even then reluctantly) Athene's decision to call out Ajax. Sophocles therefore treats Odysseus' reaction to this situation in considerable detail because of its relevance to his presentation of the character of Odysseus. If Odysseus were as confident in Athene as lines 34–35 suggest, *πάντα γὰρ τά τ' οὖν πάρος / τά τ' εἰσέπειτα σῇ κυβερνῶμαι χερί*, we might expect him to accept her rebuke in 75 without demur, *οὐ σίγ' ἀνέξῃ μηδὲ δειλίαν ἀργῆ*. The fact is that Odysseus is understandably terrified of Ajax in his deranged condition, and also, as Bowra observes¹¹, «reluctant to derive enjoyment from the spectacle», *ἔμοι μὲν ἀρκεῖ τοῦτον ἐν δόμοις μένειν* (80). If lines 68–70 are satisfactory in terms of Greek, may we say that they are also germane to the plot? Athene desires Odysseus as a witness to the madness of Ajax, 66–70, and assures him that he need not be afraid. Confident in her own powers she does not wait for comment by Odysseus and proceeds at once to summon Ajax. The function of the stichomythia which follows, as Adams has shown¹², is to test Odysseus' reliance on Athene's guidance. Is it dramatically weak (or psychologically unconvincing) for a naturally cautious man to react not to a promise uttered three lines previously but to the immediate terrifying situation, and cry *τί δρᾶς, Αθάνα?*¹³ The cry gains dramatic intensity because of the previous assurance and the goddess who gave it. An Athenian audience, encountering Odysseus and Athene together on stage, could not fail to recall the *Odyssey*, and it seems highly probable that Sophocles in this scene is not departing from tradition. The general situation is comparable to Od. 13, 300ff. There Odysseus, newly returned to Ithaca, accuses Athene of tricking him (326–7), in spite of the goddess's assurances (300–310), and she respects him for his wariness. Even at lines 358–60 Odysseus is still doubtful so that Athene must say (362): *θάρσει, μή τοι ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆσι μελόντων*. So too in Sophocles Odysseus only reluctantly accepts Athene's assurances, and at the end of the stichomythia declares that he would prefer to be far away (88): *μένοιμ' ἀν· ἥθελον δ' ἀν ἐκτὸς ἀν τυχεῖν; μένοιμ' ἀν* looks like a deliberate resumption of line 68 *θαρσῶν δὲ μίμνε*.

Professor Fraenkel is right to recall attention to the difficulties in this passage, but his recourse to amputation exaggerates the seriousness of the case¹⁴.

¹¹ C. M. Bowra, *Sophoclean Tragedy* (Oxford 1944) 36ff.

¹² S. M. Adams, *Sophocles the Playwright* (Toronto 1957) 27ff.

¹³ Professor Stanford's comment on the situation, which I read after completing my own argument, is eminently sensible: "In fact Odysseus is only showing reasonable caution. Nobody in his senses would want to confront a raving maniac of Ajax's formidable powers. Sophocles emphasises Odysseus' apprehensions to increase the interest of the audience in the entrance of Ajax, not do disparage Odysseus."

¹⁴ Professor Fraenkel's paper has now been reprinted in his *Kleine Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie* (Rome 1963) I 409 ss.