

Zeitschrift: Judaica : Beiträge zum Verstehen des Judentums
Herausgeber: Zürcher Institut für interreligiösen Dialog
Band: 74 (2018)

Artikel: Disciples of Aristotle and the prophets : the religious passion of the radical Jewish philosophers and its political implications
Autor: Sadik, Shalom
DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-960597>

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Disciples of Aristotle and the Prophets – The Religious Passion of the Radical Jewish Philosophers and its Political Implications

By Shalom Sadik*

Abstract

The general image of the Jewish radical philosophers (most of them Averroist philosophers) is that they don't have any kind of religious passion. This image comes from two major principles: (I) Philosophers don't have passion in general for anything. They think only rationally. (II) Religious passion comes from irrational faith. For example: belief that God hears and answers prayers, belief in reward in this world and in the world to come, belief in providence, belief in the metaphysical influence of actions and word etc. The Jewish radical philosopher doesn't believe in any of these beliefs. Therefore we can conclude that they don't have any religious passion. According to this general image the Jewish radical philosopher albeit continues to live in a religious community abiding the ritual obligations and Jewish laws but only for social or pedagogic reasons (religion is needed to influence the mass) or for fear of the mass.

In this paper, I will argue against this generally accepted opinion. Firstly, I briefly describe that philosophers have extreme passion derived directly from their rational learning (Eros to knowledge in the opinion of Plato). Secondly, I will describe that the rational learning of the philosopher builds a very strong religious passion that is very similar to the passion of the biblical prophets. A religious passion coming from being chosen by God to open the eyes of the misled people, and to lead them to the truth.

This article sets for itself a very challenging goal: to conduct a historical analysis of the sentiments that people felt hundreds of years ago. This goal is very challenging because the vast majority of the available sources are philosophical works or commentaries; this kind of literature does not readily express nor allow others to infer sentiments. Prose, poetry, theatre – even history – are all more apt in terms of revealing sentiment. Philosophical books are, like other scientific accounts, a kind of literary medium that strives to be objective and thus does not afford any significant space to the personality of the writer and his feelings.

Another problem is related to the specific sentiment that I wish to analyse: religious passion. This is a very important sentiment, but its definition is not so clear: While, for example, the more earthly sentiment of love for a

* Dr Shalom M. Sadik, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Jewish Thought, Beer Sheva Israel.

woman can be described in any number of ways: singing at her window in the middle of the night; thinking about her all day long; making sacrifices so she will be happy; demonstrating the willingness to sacrifice one's life to save her life – religious passion, is far more difficult to understand in terms of practical expressions. What *are* the practical expressions of religious passion? Does it mean being ever conscious that God is watching us? Fervently singing in prayer? Practicing all the obligations of the Law? Studying religious texts all day? Being prepared to go to our death for a religious cause? Is it going out to proselytize other people to our faith?

This last question is related to the specific philosophers that I wish to analyse. The radical (or Averroist) philosophers, in the tradition of Maimonides, wrote their works in an esoteric manner. Even if they described something very clearly – and in some cases, *especially* when they described something very clearly – it is nonetheless difficult to understand if they truly believe as they wrote. If they are describing or analysing their own religious sentiments or the religious sentiments of other people in history, like the prophets, how can we be sure that they are being sincere? Perhaps their only goal is to influence the irrational masses for political and/or pedagogical purposes?

Despite the difficulties that will be encountered, it is crucial to try to ascertain the nature of the religious passion of the medieval radical philosophers, for, in my view, the current conception is in fact completely erroneous, and therefore leads to a similarly mistaken conception of the very relation between religion and philosophy. We will see in this article that the general opinion that religious philosophers are without any religious passion (as opposed to the more traditional and mystical religious thinkers) is completely wrong. The opinion that an intellectual understanding of religion kills all religious sentiment has been a popular view starting from as early as the Romantic period, but religious medieval philosophers held exactly the opposite opinion: It is not mysticism that invigorates faith, but only a philosophical understanding of religion that can engender true religious passion.

Leo Strauss and lack of religious passion

Leo Strauss in his research on medieval philosophy¹ explains the irreconcilable difference that exists between religion and philosophy,² between

1 It should be noted that medieval philosophy was arguably the field that Strauss was most devoted to, and consequently, a proper summary of his opinion on this subject unfortunately lies beyond the narrow scope of this article.

2 On the subject of the relation between religion and philosophy see especially: LEO STRAUSS, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, Ill., 1952; reissued

Jerusalem and Athens. According to his opinion, the medieval philosophers were well aware of true, unadulterated philosophy. However, they were also of the opinion that religion is a very important tool for promoting a healthy society. The medieval philosophers understood that the basis of religion is not rational and that precisely because of the religion's non-rational basis, it is the best instrument for improving life in society given the irrationality of the masses of humanity. Philosophy cannot render religion obsolete because these two approaches to life deal with completely different spheres: philosophy has to do with truth, while religion has to do with ethics.

Strauss's take on Maimonides evolved over the course of his lifetime, but where there was no change was in Strauss's definition of religion, which he always maintained was the revelation of non-rational opinions or laws by prophets. In his earliest writings, Strauss argues that Maimonides accepted this definition and thus described the creation of the world on the basis of revelation. In his later writings, though obscuring his thoughts via an esoteric approach to recording his ideas, Strauss apparently revised his earlier understanding of Maimonides, who he now presented as a citizen of

Chicago, 1988); LEO STRAUSS, *Spinoza's Critique of Religion*, translated by E. M. Sinclair (New York, 1965). On Strauss's position on religion see LEORA BATNITZKY, "Leo Strauss and the 'Theological-Political Predicament'," in: STEVEN B. SMITH (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss* (Cambridge / New York, 2009), pp. 41-62. On Strauss's interpretation of Maimonides see KENNETH HART GREEN (ed.), *Leo Strauss on Maimonides – the Complete Writings* (Chicago, 2013), editor's introduction, pp. 1-87. Regarding the interpretation of Strauss on Maimonides I am nearer to the position of JEFFERY A. BERNSTEIN, *Leo Strauss on the Border of Judaism, Philosophy, and History* (Albany, 2015); but see also KENNETH HART GREEN, *Jew and Philosopher – The Return to Maimonides in the Jewish Thought of Leo Strauss* (Albany, 1993). On the subject of the relation of Strauss to Judaism in general, see HILLEL FRADKIN, "A Word Fitly Spoken: The interpretation of Maimonides and the Legacy of Leo Strauss," as well as KENNETH SEESKIN, "Maimonides' Conception of Philosophy," in: DAVID NOVAK (ed.), *Leo Strauss and Judaism: Jerusalem and Athens Critically Revisited* (Boston, 1996), pp. 55-86 and pp. 87-110, respectively.

On a critic of Strauss's interpretation of Maimonides, see MENAHEM KELLNER, "Strauss's Maimonides," in: *Iyyun* 50 (2001), pp. 397-406. In this important article, Kellner rightly criticizes Strauss' interpretation of Maimonides as a modern intellectual without any religious passion he also explains the importance of Love of God to Maimonides. In the present article I focus on another subject: the political implication of God's love. Another difference between my opinion and the opinion of Kellner is on religious passion upon Averroist thinkers. According to my opinion the position of Maimonides was shared by the majority (if not all) other Jewish medieval radical philosophers.

Athens. Strauss rejected the possibility of affirming a religious philosophy that is completely spiritual, and denigrated the belief in revelation. This is also the opinion of some of the modern scholars who have interpreted Strauss. In positing this essential definition of religion as related to ‘revelation’ in the popular sense of the term, Strauss was probably influenced by Spinoza himself, and thus chose to go against the medieval radical philosophers, including Maimonides, who argued that all religious beliefs are to be interpreted in light of philosophical study.³ According to Strauss, if Maimonides denigrated revelation, he must have been a citizen of Athens and not of Jerusalem. However, according to my reading of Maimonides, we can interpret the Bible in accordance with a given philosophical opinion that then becomes a part of the religiously acceptable opinions. Jerusalem, according to Maimonides, has no essential, ever-consistent definition, and there is no essential contradiction between religion and philosophy. We will return later to this fundamental difference in approach.⁴

For Leo Strauss and those of his ilk, the religious philosophers of the Middle Ages live in Jerusalem but think in Athens. They understand the insurmountable abyss between the two, and try not so much to bring them into accord as to find an accommodation between the two⁵ when in the

3 See, e.g., SPINOZA, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, chapter 7, and cf. Maimonides’ interpretation in his *Guide of the Perplexed* II: 25.

4 It is interesting to note that even searchers who generally disagree with Strauss’ interpretation of Maimonides accepted his essential definition of religion. For example, in his aforementioned article, Seeskin clearly sees Maimonides as a citizen of Jerusalem, and not as a citizen of Athens, as Strauss believed. According to his explanation, Maimonides understood the essential difference between revelation and philosophy (on this point Seeskin and Strauss are in accord). However, Maimonides did not attempt any sort of (impossible) synthesis between philosophy and religion, but rather built his response on different sources based on the two modes of thinking (revelation vs. reason). In his article, Kellner criticizes the definition of orthodoxy by Strauss, although not on this point.

On the relation between revelation and reason in Strauss there are also a number of studies. For example see SUSAN ORR, “Strauss, Reason, and Revelation: Unravelling the Essential Question,” in: NOVAK (ed.), *Leo Strauss and Judaism* (note 2), pp. 25-54, who analyses the argument of Strauss that reason cannot denigrate revelation; In Strauss’s opinion on the relation between philosophy and religion in his early writing see DAVID JANSSENS, *Between Athens and Jerusalem – Philosophy, Prophecy, and Politics in Leo Strauss's early Thought* (SUNY Series in the Thought and Legacy of Leo Strauss; New York, 2008). On the religious personal position of Strauss, see especially pp. 191-193.

5 The present debate on the position of Strauss on this question is: How much is this kind of accommodation possible?

mode of living their daily life they have to be completely religious, but when in the mode of thinking, they have to be completely philosophical.

According to this Straussian position, the philosophers see the Bible as a superb pedagogical work that has a very positive influence on the people. They also see that this book has a lot of philosophical problems, and they try to resolve these problems using various philosophical interpretations. But the philosophers don't *really* believe in their commentaries. These commentaries are the *exoteric* part of their works, i.e. what is intended for the masses. Deep down, they know that the essence of religion goes against the essence of philosophy. Their philosophical interpretation of religion is only a way to speak philosophically without telling the ignorant masses that they don't believe in the same religion as the masses. Were the masses to understand the true opinion of the philosophers, the resulting confusion would be very negative for them and their social development, which is in need of a religion to maintain the social order. Moreover, revealing the full truth would be dangerous for the philosopher himself as he might come to be persecuted by the masses as an unbeliever.

According to the Straussian position, religious passion is itself much like any of the obligatory beliefs as posited by Maimonides:⁶ One is obliged to believe that God has supernatural providence, that God hears our prayers, and that He is influenced by them. These beliefs are necessary in order to explain and express the religious way of life, which itself is necessary in order to preserve the social order. However, these religiously *de rigueur* beliefs are nonetheless entirely mistaken from a philosophical point of view. The philosopher can accept the fact that the religious passion of the masses is part of a very productive belief system. However, we can fairly ask of the philosopher how he can continue to feel passionate about a primitive sentiment that doesn't have any kind of philosophical accuracy.

We see this position of Leo Strauss very well in his interpretation of the love of God in his remarks on the "Book of Knowledge" in Maimonides' *Mishneh Torah*.⁷ In this passage, Strauss explains that, according to Maimonides, there exists a connection between knowledge of God and love of God. However, as Strauss argues, this connection is only viable if one can have true, unequivocal knowledge of God's existence – a point which Strauss emphatically rejected. According to Strauss, the true philosopher has no metaphysical proof of the existence of God – indeed, cannot have any

6 *Guide of the Perplexed* III, 27-28.

7 Relevant passages can be found especially in: GREEN (ed.), *Leo Strauss on Maimonides* (note 2), pp. 556-557.

knowledge of Him, and therefore is incapable of harbouring any kind of sentiment toward him.

Strauss was quite consistent over the course of his writings regarding his rejection of religious passion in the true philosopher. However, it would seem that as his familiarity with the depth of Maimonides' philosophical writings increased over the years, he came to view the modern criticism (especially Spinoza's) of Maimonides' stance on knowledge and love of God as inaccurate, for surely one such as Maimonides, with his philosophical appreciation of the social value of religious practice, only presented proofs of God's existence along with calls for love of God for purely exoteric, didactic purposes, and did not actually espouse such ideas inwardly. In a way, Maimonides' philosophical depth caused Strauss a sort of cognitive dissonance, which he could only resolve by suggesting that Maimonides was not being sincere about his understanding of, and passion for, God.

To no small extent, Strauss perforce reached this rather *ad hoc* conclusion based on the widespread assumption that there is only one kind of religious passion – the one that arises from the non-rational beliefs of the ignorant masses, and which is based on the fear of punishment, be it in this world or in hell. The masses perceive God as a kind of hot-tempered super-being that metes out punishment or reward to people according to whether or not they fulfil His will. But philosophers don't have any of these perceptions or beliefs – and therefore, they cannot continue to live with any kind of genuine religious passion.

There is yet another kind of argument against philosophers maintaining any kind of religious passion that comes directly from the stoic opinion against passion. According to this position, one of the major aims of philosophy is to free humans from every passion. Passions are by definition non-rational and come from the animal part of the human soul. There is in this approach an intriguing irony in that the standard description of a philosopher is as a *lover* of wisdom, i.e. one who is passionate about knowledge of the truth. This ironic contradiction amply demonstrates that the stoic rejection of religious passion is not the only rational opinion open to philosophers.

The religious passion of Maimonides

In the remainder of the article, I will attempt to counter this common (or Straussian) position and demonstrate that, like the two kinds of *Eros* of Plato's banquet, there exist also two kinds of religious passions. The passion of the masses, which arises from non-rational belief in a supernatural God;

and the passion of the philosophers, which derives from the proper knowledge of the true God – a God that sends them on a mission, like the prophets of the Bible, to open the eyes of the misled people, and to lead them to the truth.

According to Plato,⁸ and against the opinion of the Stoics, there exist two kinds of *Eros* or Love (manifested by two gods of the Greek mythology) as two kinds of Aphrodite. The first and more popular one is the *Eros* of the body, while the second is the *Eros* of the soul. The common denominator of these two *Eroses* is the strong sentiments that people feel about them. These powerful emotions make them ready to do many things, even dangerous and difficult things, in order to fulfil their love.

We will see that, according to Maimonides and the majority of the Jewish philosophers of the second half of the Middle Ages, there is a kind of love⁹ of God that derives from philosophical studies and which has a very important impact on the life of the philosophers and their place in society.

We see this position in Maimonides' ruling in his *Mishneh Torah*, *Sefer ha-madda'*, *Hil. Yesode ha-Torah* ("Foundations of the Torah"), chapter two:¹⁰

It is a mitzvah to love and fear this glorious and awesome God, as [Deut. 6:5] states: "And you shall love the Lord, your God" and, as [Deut. 6:13] states: "Fear the Lord, your God."

8 PLATO, *Symposium*, found essentially in the speeches of Pausanias (180c-186a) and Socrates (201d-214e).

9 On the love of God in Maimonides, see DANIEL LASKER, "Love of God and Knowledge of God in Maimonides' Philosophy," in: JACQUELINE HAMESSE / OLGA WEIJERS (eds.), *Écriture et réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux. Volume d'hommage à Colette Sirat* (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 329-345 (Hebrew version to appear in: *בין עבר לערב* 5); AMIRA ERAN, "המונחים רגבה ורהבה כמקור לאהבה ויראה בתפיסת," in: *תרביץ* (Tarbiz) 70 (2001), pp. 465-505; DOV SCHWARTZ, "התשוקה," in: *דעת* (Daat) 81 (2016), pp. 162-206, in this article the author analysis also the possibility that the passion for metaphysic can be one of the major cause of error. HOWARD T. KREISEL, "אהבתה' ויראתו במשנתו של הרמב"ם," in: *דעת* (Daat) 37 (1996), pp. 127-151. ALEXANDER EVEN-CHEN, "על הידיעה האלוהית ועל החוויה הרגשית והשכלית של היחיד," in: *דעת* (Daat) 74 (2013), pp. 105-134, esp. pp. 128-133. On this subject in medieval philosophy in general see DANIEL LASKER, "Can a Jewish Philosopher Love God?" in: LEONARD J. GREENSPON / RONALD A. SIMKINS / JEAN CAHAN (eds.), *Studies in Jewish Civilization 18: Love – Ideal and Real – in the Jewish Tradition* (Omaha / Lincoln, Nebraska 2008), pp. 21-34.

10 On the love of God see also MAIMONIDES, *Mishneh Torah*, *Sefer ha-madda'*, *Hil. Teshuvah*, X, 3.

What is the path [to attain] love and fear of Him? When a person contemplates His wondrous and great deeds and creations and appreciates His infinite wisdom, which surpasses all comparison, he will immediately love, praise, and glorify [Him], yearning with tremendous desire to know [God's] great name, as David stated: "My soul thirsts for the Lord, for the living God" [Ps. 42:3]. When he [continues] to reflect on these same matters, he will immediately recoil in awe and fear, appreciating how he is a tiny, lowly, and dark creature, standing with his flimsy, limited, wisdom before Him who is of perfect knowledge, as David stated: "When I see Your Heavens, the work of Your fingers [...] [I wonder] what is man that You should recall Him" [Ps. 8:4-5].

Based on these concepts, Maimonides continues, I shall explain important principles regarding the deeds of the Master of the worlds to provide a portal for a person of understanding to [develop] love for God, as our Sages said regarding love: "In this manner, you will recognize He who spoke and [thus,] brought the world into being."¹¹

In this well-known text, we see Maimonides' understanding of love of God. Like Plato's words in the mouths of Socrates and Pausanias at the symposium after the banquet, Maimonides draws a comparison between love of God (or wisdom) and love of women. The intensity of the sentiment is necessarily the same, but the object of the sentiment is entirely different. Another very important point is that according to Maimonides, there is a necessary relationship between love of God and studying. The love of God is a necessary consequence of true learning and knowledge. The masses may claim that they love God; however, they don't love the one true God but rather another God that they build in their imagination based on their superstitions.¹²

The necessary conclusion of this position is that people who lack any kind of philosophical knowledge of God are in fact idolaters who don't

11 MAIMONIDES, *Mishneh Torah, Sefer ha-madda'*, Hil. Yesode ha-Torah II, 1-2:

[Deut. 6:5] "ואהבת את יי אלהיך" שנאמר: "ואהבת את יי אלהיך" [Deut. 6:13] ונאמר: "את יי אלהיך תירא".

והיאך היא הדרך לאהבתו ויראתו? בשעה שיתבונן האדם במעשיו וברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים ויראה מהן חכמתו שאין לה ערך ולא קץ, מיד הוא אוהב ומשבח ומפאר ומתאוה תאוה גדולה לידע השם הגדול, כמו שאמר דוד: "צמאה נפשי לאלהים, לאל חי" [Ps. 42:3]. וכשמחשב בדברים האלו עצמן, מיד הוא נרתע לאחוריו ויפחד, ויודע שהוא בריה קטנה שפלה [ואפלה], עומדת בדעת קלה מעוטה לפני תמים דעות, כמו שאמר דוד: "כי אראה שמיך, מעשה אצבעותיך, מה אנוש כי תזכרנו" [Ps. 8:4-5]. ולפי הדברים האלו, אני מבאר כללים גדולים ממעשה רבון העולמים כדי שיהיו פתח למבין לאהוב את השם כמו שאמרו חכמים בענין אהבה, שמתוך כך אתה מכיר את מי שאמר והיה העולם.

12 On this subject see MAIMONIDES, *Guide of the Perplexed* I: 50.

worship the true God – even if they call their God by the same name that Maimonides uses.¹³

A philosopher like Strauss can think that this case is the true consequence of the abyss that exists between philosophy and religion. Religion is some kind of praxis whereas philosophy is the only way to truth. The position of the Muslim philosophers Averroes¹⁴ and Ibn Tufail can be interpreted more easily according to Strauss.

In one of his major works on religion and philosophy, in *فصل المقال في ما بين الحكمة والشريعة من إتصال* (*Faṣl al-maqāl fī mā baina l-ḥikma waš-šarī'a min ittiṣāl* “*The Decisive Treatise, Determining the Nature of the Connection between Religion and Philosophy*”), Averroes explains that there is a possibility of interpreting the Koran according to the opinion of the philosophers.¹⁵ However, these kinds of interpretations are very dangerous for the people who don't have any kind of philosophical capacity. For these people, it is better not to try to explain to them any kind of philosophical opinion, because such ideas will only be destructive to their beliefs and their lives in general. The masses don't have any kind of intellectual capacity to understand philosophy. For them, the philosophical opinion will be only negative – they will break away from their past religious belief, but won't construct any kind of better

13 On the relation between God's knowledge and love see also MAIMONIDES, *Mishneh Torah, Sefer ha-madda*, *Hil. Teshuvah*, X, 6; *Guide of the Perplexed* I, 9; III, 28.

14 There is an interesting modern debate which the present article cannot delve into concerning the relation between Strauss's opinion and the thought of Averroes. The controversy stems from Averroism being a later Latin trend that does not agree with Averroes in all matters. For a summary of the various opinions see *Jew and Philosopher*, *op. cit.* footnote 2, Chapter 2, note 76, pp. 180-182. On the relation between Maimonides and Averroes in the writings of Strauss see GREEN (ed.), *Leo Strauss on Maimonides* (note 2), pp. 270-274.

15 In another treatise, in *كتاب الكشف عن مناهج الأدلة* (*Kitāb al-kašf 'an manāhiġ al-adilla*) or *Faith and Reason in Islam*, Averroes adopts a surprisingly progressive position and actually supports the teaching of true philosophical opinions to the common Muslim. This approach is closer to the position of Maimonides than the one Averroes expressed in *Faṣl al-maqāl*, which is closer to the position of Ibn Tufail. Yet despite the more progressive stance found in *Kitāb al-kašf* on what to teach the masses, even in this book Averroes refrains from positing a relation between love of God and philosophical knowledge. On the comparison between Maimonides and Averroes on this subject see CARLOS FRAENKEL, “Spinoza on Philosophy and Religion: The Averroistic Sources,” in: CARLOS FRAENKEL / DARIO PERINETTI / JUSTIN E. H. SMITH (eds.), *The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation* (Dordrecht, 2010), pp. 27-43.

opinion in its stead. The consequence of this situation will be that these people will probably become non-religious – a situation that if widespread will disrupt the social order and cause significant damage to the lives of these people.

In this opinion, Averroes is close to the opinion of the Muslim philosopher Ibn Tufail in his philosophical novel *Ḥayy ibn Yaqzān*. By the end of the novel, its two protagonists, Ḥayy and Absāl, understand that religion and superstition are necessary for the well-being of the masses. For the common people, any exposition of philosophical opinions will be negative and bring about disruption of the social order. By contrast, the philosopher knows the truth, which can only be dangerous for the masses.

However, the opinion of Maimonides on this subject is very different from these two Muslim philosophers. Maimonides is very aware of the danger of explaining philosophical opinions to people who are not ready to understand philosophy.¹⁶ He compares this situation to a man who gives a steak to a baby. The baby will die, not because steak is a bad food, but because it is not the right food for babies.¹⁷ The same is true with regard to philosophical opinions. Their truth is not enough of a reason to explain them to the ignorant masses. However, Maimonides sees a religious importance to spreading basic beliefs of philosophy to the entire population. This is the reason that Maimonides explains philosophical opinions in critical places in the beginning of the *Mishneh Torah* and *Sefer ha-Mitzvot*, and the reason he wrote his Thirteen Principles of Faith, which is found in his commentary on the Mishna on Tractate Sanhedrin.

As opposed to the opinion of Strauss, Maimonides saw religion not only as a political tool for maintaining social order, but also as pedagogical instrument for spreading philosophical truth to human beings. All human beings, including the most ignorant, have to understand some basic philosophical ideas such as that God is non-material. After explaining the difficulties and dangers of metaphysical inquiry, Maimonides expressly states

16 For example, *Guide of the Perplexed* I, 31-34. On the question of esoteric and exoteric readings of Maimonides there has been ample research, including: LEO STRAUSS, "The Literary Character of the Guide of the Perplexed," in SALO W. BARON (ed.), *Essays on Maimonides* (New York, 1941), pp. 37-91; STRAUSS, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (note 2), pp. 38-94; DOV SCHWARTZ, סתירה והסתרה (Ramat-Gan, 2001); AVRAHAM NURIEL, גלוי וסמוי בפילוסופיה היהודית בימי הביניים (Jerusalem, 2000); MARVIN FOX, *Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy* (Chicago, 1990); JOSEF STERN, *The Matter and Form of Maimonides' Guide* (Cambridge; Mass., 2013).

17 *Guide of the Perplexed* I, 33.

that the rejection of any kind of belief regarding God having a physical body must be taught to all the people for all time.¹⁸ According to Maimonides, religion has two major aims:¹⁹ the well-being of society, which, from an educational point of view, is primary; and the teaching of true philosophical knowledge, which is ultimately more important vis-à-vis one's relationship with God. Given the importance of true philosophical knowledge, one might expect that Maimonides happily supported the imparting of this knowledge at an early stage. However, he advised that this happen only after a student had attained a certain moral perfection, for otherwise the student would likely abuse the deeper knowledge to justify his misdeeds. Thus we see that the two aims of the Torah are more or less chronological: first comes the creation of a healthy, ethical society, and only then can true philosophical knowledge be taught, and only to those individuals whom the philosopher identifies as having the necessary moral character.

The teaching of this true philosophical knowledge is, according to Maimonides, the exclusive province of the truly divine religion. One could say that for Maimonides, the Torah has a kind of monopoly on teaching the masses philosophical truth. All other religions have a political influence,²⁰ but the errors and lacunae in their philosophical underpinnings lead to the spread of falsehoods, while only a truly divine religion can successfully spread only true philosophical opinions regarding God.²¹

Maimonides concedes that there exists a vast gulf between accurate philosophical ideas and religion as social order. Nonetheless, this gulf must be spanned because an important role of religion is to spread philosophical ideas to the masses. The bridge for spanning this gulf is the religious passion of the philosophers. Their love of God, itself a direct result of their philosophical research, obligates them to spread their philosophical opinions to the masses. In the first chapter of "Laws of Idolatry" in the *Mishneh Torah*, Maimonides analyses the biblical figure of Abraham.²² According to this

18 *Guide of the Perplexed* I, 35.

19 *Guide of the Perplexed* III, 27-28.

20 *Guide of the Perplexed* II, 39. In this passage, the religion of the Jews is superior to the other religions even in its social role, albeit in a relative way.

21 *Guide of the Perplexed* II, 40.

22 On the figure of Abraham, see MAIMONIDES, *Mishneh Torah*, *Sefer ha-madda', Hil. 'Aku"m* ("Laws of Idolatry") I; *Sefer ha-Mitzvot* (*Book of the Commandments*), third commandment (the fourth commandment has to do with fear of God). In the *Sefer ha-Mitzvot*, Maimonides clearly said that the consequence of the love of God is to propagate the true belief in God to others.

explanation, initially, Abraham came to understand the true definition of God just by his study of nature. The consequence of this learning would not be just a philosophical understanding, but also a profound feeling that God had sent him on a mission to spread this truth to all humankind. The second aspect of the Law, social order, came only in the time of Moses, in order to reverse and prevent the kind of assimilation of false ideas that happened to the descendants of Abraham in Egypt. According to Maimonides, prophecy, in its higher form, includes not just the underlying idea but also the spreading of the philosophical truth to society. One of the main ways to know the perfection of a prophet is to examine his influence: The degree to which this influence becomes significant and ubiquitous determines how perfect the prophet truly was.²³

23 *Guide of the Perplexed* III, 37. On prophecy in the thought of Maimonides see HOWARD KREISEL, *Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy* (Dordrecht, 2001). For a Straussian commentary on the opinion of Maimonides on prophecy see BENJAMIN LORCH, "Maimonides on Prophecy and the Moral Law," in: *Interpretation* 43 (2016), pp. 91-110. According to this researcher, Maimonides' esoteric view on prophecy is that there is a clear contradiction between philosophy, which relates to philosophical truth, and religion, which relates to morality. Lorch explains *Guide of the Perplexed* II, 33 as showing a difference between true knowledge (i.e. the first two commandments only), which the prophet teaches as a philosopher, and popular opinion which reflects the realm of morality. (The Arabic word for what is translated here as "popular opinion" is مشهورات (*mašhūrāt*). On this term and the difficulty of its translation see SHALOM SADIQ, "Eckhart, Lost in Translation: La traduction de *Sh-b-r* par Yehuda Alharizi et ses implications philosophiques," in: *Vivarium* 54 (2016), pp. 125-145). In my opinion, the true position of Maimonides is that the prophet has to be both a philosopher and a political leader, because only a philosopher can be a good political leader. Moreover, the philosopher teaches as a prophet as part of his political leadership, given the prophet's perfection of his intellect and imagination (*Guide of the Perplexed* II, 32 and 36-37). The perfection of the imagination helps the prophet to teach opinions and give laws that do not arise out of purely intellectual learning. According to Maimonides, political leadership is correlated with human free will. On this subject see SHALOM SADIQ, "מגננון הבחירה אצל הרמב"ם," in: *AJS Review* 38 (2014), pp. א-יח. Because of human free will, the political leadership has to guess what consequences its acts of legislation or education will have. A non-philosopher cannot successfully intuit the repercussions, because his estimations are based on incorrect facts. Therefore, only a prophet, who by definition has a perfect intellect and imagination, can be an effective political leader. On the political role of the philosopher-prophet see also *Guide of the Perplexed* I, 54.

The consequent emotional reaction to attaining philosophical understanding moves the philosopher to try to spread a part of his philosophical truth to the masses and to achieve some important social reforms. This religious passion for God fills the gulf between philosophical learning and the religious political leadership of the society. Only a philosopher can be a true lover of God, and only a true lover of God can be a good political leader. Love of God includes seeking philosophical knowledge, and the love of God by the philosopher brings him to explain philosophic knowledge to the masses and to convey that in the Bible, the most basic commandment is to love God, which is identical to knowing Him. Thus, ultimately, the philosopher's love of God motivates him to spread the love of God to the masses via the teaching of philosophical truths. All this is the true position of Maimonides.

Other radical Jewish philosophers on love of God

The Jewish Averroist philosophers who come after Maimonides have a general tendency – not surprisingly – to interpret Maimonides in light of Averroes. This is true in the case of his opinion regarding the eternity of the world, and even in the case of the non-personal existence of the soul after death, a position that cancels all possibility of posthumous reward in the form of life after death or resurrection. However, in their definition of the philosophical goal of religion and in their interpretation of love of God, they follow Maimonides, and are quite different from Averroes. We will analyse a few specific examples of Jewish Averroists in this regard.

Rabbi Isaac Pulgar

Rabbi Isaac Pulgar lived in northern Castile at the end of the 13th century and the first half of the 14th century.²⁴ In the first chapter of עֶזֶר הַדָּת (*Ezer*

24 On R. Pulgar see CARLOS DEL VALLE RODRÍGUEZ, “La Contradiction del Hereje de Isaac Ben Polgar,” in: JUDIT TARGARONA BORRÁS / ÁNGEL SÁENZ-BADILLOS (eds.), *Jewish Studies at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1999), vol. I, pp. 552-560; NORMAN ROTH, “Isaac Polgar y su libro contra un converso,” in: JOHANN MAIER / CARLOS DEL VALLE RODRÍGUEZ (eds.), *Polémica judeo-cristiana: estudios* (Madrid, 1992), pp. 67-73; JONATHAN L. HECHT, *The Polemical Exchange between Isaac Pollegar and Abner of Burgos/Alfonso of Valladolid according to Parma MS 2440 ‘Iggeret teshuvat apikoros’ and ‘Teshuvot la-meharef’* (Ph. Diss. New York, 1993), pp. 35-38; SHOSHANA GERSHENZON, *A Study of Teshuvot la-meharef by Abner of Burgos* (Ph. Diss. JTS, New York, 1984), pp. 74-85; COLETTE SIRAT, “Deux philosophes juifs répondent Abner de Burgos à propos du libre-arbitre humain et de l’omniscience divine,” in: *Melanges offerts*

ha-dat “In Support of the Religion”), his major philosophical work, R. Pulgar explains the criteria for judging if a certain code of law is good. According to Pulgar, every legal code needs to fulfil three goals:

(1) To help humans control their evil inclination; (2) To provide a set of practical laws that establishes the best social order; and (3) To explain to the non-philosopher population the true philosophical ideas in the context of tradition. Pulgar wrote:

And for this reason there can be found in [the ideal law] a few of the true and right beliefs that we must accept given that we have the power of speech along with wisdom. Because the majority of human endeavour and toil is in the pursuit of sustenance, most throughout their lifetime cannot devote [any time] to their thoughts and to preparing their intellect in order to extrapolate and comprehend these beliefs from their principles and origins. As for the one involved with the true fields of wisdom, in assembling the religion that was inspired from Heaven, he perforce had to incorporate within it most of the true beliefs without which human excellence and perfection are impossible. [For this reason] he wrote them there [in the Torah] by way of tradition so that no human [i.e. believer in the Torah] would ever die with his soul empty of them like the foolish nations.²⁵

In this passage we see that R. Pulgar posits that an important goal of religion is to spread true philosophical knowledge to all non-philosophers. According to Pulgar, there are some beliefs that are necessities for all humans, regardless of their endeavours and their lack of philosophical query. Those who construct the legal systems – the kings, prophets, and philosophers – cannot explain the true beliefs to the masses in a purely intellectual way based on esoteric philosophical proofs. Rather, the intellectual elite needs to disseminate these key concepts via the law and by way of tradition.

These opinions of R. Pulgar are identical to those that Maimonides explains in chapters 31-35 of the first part of the *Guide of the Perplexed*. Metaphysics is a very complicated issue that demands the full attention of the student. Maimonides mentions attending to material needs as one of the major reasons that most people cannot devote their full attention to

Andr  Neher (Paris, 1975) pp. 87-94; COLETTE SIRAT, *Introduction a la philosophie juive au Moyen Age* (Paris, 1983), pp. 352-355.

25 *Ezer ha-dat*, I, 1 p. 32: ולזה ימצאו בה מקצת האמונות האמתיות הצודקות המחייבות עלינו קבלתם לא, מצד שאנחנו בעלי נפש מדברת וחכמה, כי מפני היות רוב עסקי האדם וטרחיו בבקשת מחייתם יוכלון רובם להפנות דעתם ולהכין את שכלם כל ימי חייהם לידע ולהשיג את האמונות ההן מעיקרן אשר הוא בחכמות האמתיות, הוצרך בהכרח מיחד הדת הנאצלת אליו מן השמיים לקים בה רוב. ומקורן עיקרי האמונות האמתיות, אותם אשר אי אפשר תמימות האדם ושלימותו מבלעדיהם, רשם אותם שמה בדרך קבלה, כדי שלא ימות האדם ונפשו ריקה מהם כאומות הסכלות.

understanding metaphysics.²⁶ Nevertheless, people need to be aware of some basic ideas, such as the non-corporeality of God. Consequently, these basic truths have to be written in the Bible and taught to the masses as a tradition. The other nations generally don't know these basic truths regarding God, because they are not mentioned in their laws. We see that Pulgar, like Maimonides, determined that the imparting of philosophical truths is an integral part of the divine law.

In the next chapter of *Ezer ha-dat*,²⁷ R. Pulgar explains that Jewish law meets all the necessary criteria for being considered an ideal legal system. At the beginning of this chapter, R. Pulgar mentions explicitly the Maimonidean opinion that without the knowledge of God, humans cannot love Him. This is the reason that the commandment to love God includes some basic beliefs like the rejection of divine corporeality.

We can summarize that R. Pulgar agrees with Maimonides on three major points: 1. Love of God is related to the knowledge of God; 2. This love is not just an intellectual phenomenon of the philosopher, but also a religious obligation of the masses;²⁸ and 3. The teaching of true philosophical beliefs is the exclusive province of the divine law. The collective upshot of these three points is that the legislator of the divine law has to instruct the people to accept these opinions as a tradition, even if, and actually precisely because the masses cannot understand them via philosophical reflection.

Rabbi Nissim of Marseilles

R. Nissim of Marseilles lived in Provence at the beginning of the 14th century.²⁹ In the eleventh chapter of the first part of his work, *Ma'aseh Nissim*,

26 *Guide of the Perplexed* I, 34.

27 *Ezer Ha-dat* I, 2, pp. 34-40.

28 Like Maimonides, R. Pulgar also think that the leader cannot explained all the true opinion to the masses. For example see *Exer ha-dat* I, 8, pp. 65-67.

29 On R. Nissim, see HOWARD T. KREISEL, 'נסים בן ר' מנשה נסים: פירוש לתורה' לר' נסים בן ר' משה ממרסיי (Jerusalem, 2000), pp. 1-52; HOWARD T. KREISEL "משה ממרסיי קטע מפירוש מגילת "רות המיוחס לר' נסים בן משה ממרסיי" in: *Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought* 14 (1998) = AVIEZER RAVITZKY (ed.), מרומי לירושלים: ספר זיכרון ליוסף-ברוך סרמוניטה, pp. 159-180; HOWARD T. KREISEL *Judaism as Philosophy: Studies in Maimonides and the Medieval Jewish Philosophers of Provence* (Boston, 2015), pp. 161-206; COLETTE SIRAT, "רעיונות פוליטיים של נסים בן משה ממרסיי," in: *Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought* 9 (1990) = MOSHE IDEL ET ALII (eds.), ספר היובל לשלמה פינס במלאת לו שמונים שנה, vol. II, pp. 53-76; MOSES SCHORR, "רבי נסים בן רבי משה ממרסיי," in: החלוץ (*He-Halutz*) 7 (1865), pp. 88-144.

he mentions that the Torah includes some basic beliefs that are the principles of all metaphysical knowledge:

And so we see that [regarding the following axiomatic beliefs, specifically:] the necessity of the existence of God (May He be Praised) and His unity; and that He is not a force contained in a corporeal body; and that He is far removed from the dimensions of corporeality, be it by essence or by accident – for all these no proof need be brought as they are intellectual [matters]. [And we see] that upon them [these principles] rests all of divine wisdom [i.e. metaphysics]. And given that these [axioms] are a part of the principles of our divine religion, this is clear; for the most basic aim of the Torah and its very purpose is to ensure that every person has correct ideas. And these [axioms] are the elementary beliefs [that are the basis] for all the rest of the true beliefs.³⁰

In these passages, we see that R. Nissim also agrees with the opinion of Maimonides, namely, that the Bible has to include some basic knowledge about God. One of the major aims of the Torah is to spread these true ideas to the maximum number of believers. R. Nissim also accepts Maimonides' determination that the Jewish Torah is divine because of its containing consistently true knowledge about God. Moreover, in his commentary on Deuteronomy, R. Nissim also asserts a necessary relation between the love of God and knowledge of Him, as did Maimonides.³¹

In general, we see that R. Nissim, like R. Pulgar, is in accord with Maimonides and not with Averroes (or Strauss, for that matter) in their definition of the philosophical aim of religion. R. Nissim also sees that divine religion doesn't have only a social role. To be a divine religion, the Bible has to spread true philosophical beliefs to the people. These beliefs are the condition for the believers of the religion truly attaining love of God.

Rabbi Levy ben Abraham

R. Levy ben Abraham lived in Provence in the latter half of the 13th century and into the beginning of the 14th century.³² He too maintained that the aim

30 *Ma'aseh Nissim*, chapter 11: והנה חיוב מציאות השם ית', ויחודו, ושאינו כח בגוף, והרחיק ממנו מדות הגוף (בעצם) ובמקרה – לא אצטרך לך להביא ראיה, כי הם שכליים. כי בזה סובבת כל חכמת האלוהות. וכן בהיות אלו מעקרי דתנו האלוהית מבואר, לפי שראשית כוונת התורה ותכליתה להישר שכל האדם בדיעות אמתיות. ואלה הם אמונות ראשיות לכל שאר האמונות האמתיות.

31 *Ma'aseh Nissim* (on Deuteronomy), p. 447.

32 On this work and the life and philosophical positions of R. Levi, see the various introductions by HOWARD (HAIM) KREISEL to modern editions of Levi's *Livyat Hen*. These include: מעשה בראשית לר' לוי בן אברהם (Jerusalem, 2004); VI, 3: לוי בן אברהם: לוי בן אברהם (Be'er Sheva, 2007); VII, 1: לוי בן אברהם: לוי בן אברהם (Jerusalem, 2013); III, 2: לוי בן אברהם: לוי בן אברהם

of the Torah and indeed all revelation is to improve the situation of the Jewish people. As an important part of this improvement, R. Levy explains that there are some commandments whose aim is to improve the intellectual knowledge of the Jews. In his *לויית חן* (*Livyat hen*), he writes in the section on prophecy and other mysteries as follows:

And we now return to the subject at hand, namely, that the intention of the giving of the Torah was to provide benefit to all of Israel, and to perfect their soul...³³ But the cognitive commandments, such as the upright beliefs and the unity of the divinity, they are the province of the intellect alone.³⁴

In this text we see that R. Levy, like Maimonides, R. Pulgar, and R. Nissim, also thinks that one of the major aims of the Bible is to teach true beliefs about God to the Jewish masses.

Another similarity is that R. Levy also describes how love of God stems from the development of the intellect. In the short version of the same part of *Livyat hen*, R. Levy writes:

And so it is that everyone who continuously (studies) divine matters, his intellect becomes purified such that he will always desire them (i.e. the divine matters) and he will naturally continue to seek after them until material matters seem like a dream and a mirage to him, and he will love spiritual things with an intense love.³⁵

In this text we see that R. Levy, like Maimonides and the other radical Jewish philosophers whom we've reviewed, think that love of God derives from the development of metaphysical knowledge. The amount people learn of metaphysics determines how much they know God, and by extension, how much they love Him.

(Be'er Sheva, 2014). See also KREISEL *Judaism as Philosophy* (note 29), pp. 116-160.

33 Here R. Levy explains the positive influence of the practical commandments on society.

34 KREISEL (ed.), *איכות הנבואה וסודות התורה: לויית חן* (note 32), pp. 246-247. On the subject of the commandment to know God, see also *ibid.* pp. 344, 351-352, 811, and 842. – Hebrew original: ונאמר כי הכונה היתה בנתינת התורה, כגון האמונות הישרות וייחוד האל, הן להיטיב לכל ישראל ולהשלים נפשם... אבל המצוות העיוניות, כגון האמונות הישרות וייחוד האל, הן מייחדות לכח השכלי בלבד.

35 KREISEL (ed.), *איכות הנבואה וסודות התורה: לויית חן* (note 32), pp. 794-795. On the relation between wisdom and love of God see for example pp. 83, 118-119, and 314. – Hebrew original: וכן כל אשר יתמיד האדם העניינים האלהיים, יזדכך שכלו וישתוקק להם תמיד וימשך אחריהם בטבע, עד שהעניינים הגשמיים ידמו לו כחלום וכדמיון, ואהב הדברים הרוחניים אהבה עזה.

Conclusion

In this paper we have seen that Jewish philosophers describe the love of God as a necessary consequence of true knowledge about God and the world. One of the major results of this religious passion is the fostering of a real desire on the part of the lover of God to take action and spread to others some of the true beliefs that he has attained, much like a troubadour who describes to one-and-all the beauty of his beloved through his poem and song.

Jewish philosophers believe that they have true knowledge of God. They also try to spread this knowledge by means of their philosophical books. We can conclude that they think of themselves as lovers of God, and that the main motivation to write their books is their religious passion. In their writings, they see themselves as the continuation of the prophets, looking to spread the truth about divinity, and prove to all the world that the God of Aristotle is the only God. When they study Aristotle and understand his metaphysical opinion, they see themselves as being as near as possible to the situation of the biblical prophets who would hear the words of God when He would send them to preach truth to the masses. The connection these philosophers felt with the prophets is made more palpable if we recall that the philosophical approach to the Bible rejects all anthropomorphisms, including the literal reading of the many passages where God speaks. For these philosophers, such descriptions are purely metaphorical: God did not literally speak to the prophets, for He has no mouth or vocal cords. Rather, He caused an intellectual understanding in the minds of the prophets, such that the prophets “heard” the word of God. The Jewish thinkers that have been discussed herein felt their philosophical insights were the result of an experience that is very similar to that of the prophets.

In contrast to these Jewish medieval philosophers, Leo Strauss understood only the social importance of religion. In his notably extensive writings, he never tried to explain any true belief about God. If any people called him a heretic, he probably accepted the definition as a badge of honour confirming that he is a true philosopher and a proud heretic to the God of Jerusalem, who in any case has no place in Athens.³⁶

36 Regarding the opinion of Strauss on the existence of God see *Jew and Philosopher*, *op. cit.* footnote 2, pp. 237-239. In this passage, Green quotes Strauss’s reaction toward the assertion made by a certain Professor Spitz that “Strauss rejects God”. Strauss repudiates the assertion and counters that only a fool can reject God. On this question see also WERNER J. DANNHAUSER, “Athens and Jerusalem, or Jerusalem and Athens,” in: NOVAK (ed.), *Leo Strauss and Judaism* (note 2),

But as for Maimonides and the medieval philosophers, their understanding was that the God of Athens is also the true God of Jerusalem. If a more reactionary scholar were to call them heretics, they would answer³⁷ that the true heretic is the reactionary who serves his own superstitions and not the true God – the God of Athens whose Temple is in Jerusalem.

Vis-à-vis the popular conception of God among the masses, Maimonides chose to juxtapose this less-than-accurate understanding with the correct understanding as espoused by the Aristotelian philosophers. By contrast, Strauss contrasted the popular understanding with that of the philosophers who perceived religion as the price that needs to be paid to achieve morality and peace in society.³⁸ The lack of any kind of positive definition of God in the philosophy of Strauss renders completely impossible any kind of religious passion. This difference may be the reason that Strauss, the thinker who explained the need for religion in society,³⁹ was

pp. 155-171. In this article, the author argues that the probable position of Strauss on this question was “undogmatic Atheism”. By the end of the article he also asks some questions on the viability of this interpretation of Strauss. On the modern debate in the “Straussian” school on this subject (and the subject of morality), see CATHERINE H. ZUCKERT, “Straussians,” in: STEVEN B. SMITH (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 263-286.

37 As Maimonides expressly states in his *Mishneh Torah*, *Sefer ha-madda*, *Hil. Yesode ha-Torah*, chapter I, 3-4:

ג המצוי הזה--הוא אלוה העולם, אדון כל הארץ. והוא המנהיג הגלגל בכוח שאין לו קץ ותכלית, בכוח שאין לו הפסק, שהגלגל סובב תמיד, ואי אפשר שיסוב בלא מסבב; והוא ברוך הוא המסבב אותו, בלא יד ולא גוף.

ד [ו] וידעת דבר זה [הוא] מצות עשה, שנאמר "אנוכי ה' אלוהיך" [Exod. 20:2; Deut. 5:6]. וכל המעלה על דעתו שיש שם אלוה אחר חוץ מזה, עובר בלא תעשה, שנאמר "לא יהיה לך אלוהים אחרים, על פניי" [Exod. 20:2; Deut. 5:6]; וכפר בעיקר, שזה הוא העיקר הגדול שהכול תלוי בו.

In short, people who believe in another god, and not in the God of the philosophers, is an idolater.

38 In his earlier writings, Strauss (in articles like “Spinoza’s Critique of Maimonides” and “Cohen and Maimonides”) defined religion as the belief in supernatural beings and events. This definition of religion remains consistent throughout his writings. However, at a much later stage, Strauss changed his opinion on Maimonides and no longer viewed “The Great Eagle” as a religious thinker. In this last and more developed period, Strauss interpreted Maimonides as an esoteric philosopher who understood the tension between Athens and Jerusalem. The best example of this re-interpretation is how Strauss explained in his early writings that Maimonides believed in the creation of the world, while in his later writings implied, however indirectly, precisely the opposite.

39 On the necessity of religion for establishing and safeguarding the morality of the society see for example, LEO STRAUSS, “Maimonides on political science,”

not a practicing adherent of his own religion. His was a purely intellectual understanding, which is far more difficult to translate into action than religious passion – especially if this passion is the consequence of philosophical knowledge.

In conclusion, in examining and contrasting Strauss with Maimonides and the other medieval Jewish philosophers, we can now see a general pattern: While the philosophical understanding of the social functions of religion is very important, ultimately, without a deep religious passion for some kind of God (even the God of Aristotle), it is very difficult to translate this functional approach into sustainable religious practice. This is so not only for the philosopher, but perhaps even more so for the members of the lay population, who will not likely be motivated to religious practice – however beneficial for society religion appears – when their philosophical religious leaders do not project an underlying passion in their relationship with the Divine, and who, due to a lack of any true, intense religious passion for the God of the philosophers, fail to spread their unique theology.

in: GREEN (ed.), *Leo Strauss on Maimonides* (note 2), pp. 400-415; LEO STRAUSS, "The Law of Reason in the Kuzari," in: *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research* 13 (1943), pp. 47-96. Republished in. STRAUSS, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (note 2), pp. 95-141.