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Comments On Present **Swiss Economic Problems**

By MARCEL HEIMO

Economic Counsellor at the Swiss Embassy, London.

In our May issue we reprinted from the Swiss Observer Marcel Heimo's views on Switzerland's economic implications pending Britain joining the EEC. In this issue he sets out the implications in the political field.

The signing of the Treaty of Rome implies definite surrenders of sovereignty. That in practice and up to now the national Governments have been and still are consulted at every stage of policy formulation, and that disputes between Member States arising out of the Treaty or its application can be decided by a Court of Justice does not alter or diminish the validity of this fact, especially if one looks at it from a long period point of view. All international agreements entail a diminution of sovereignty in the sense that parties to them are bound to fulfil the obligations they have thereby contracted. But those who sign them have every opportunity of knowing the precise conditions and limits in substance or in time, of their undertakings. The infringement of sovereignty that goes with the Treaty of Rome is of a different order. It is only partly composed of precise obligations. But it is largely or even mainly an outline of objectives which leaves the actual policies to be formulated later. This will be done by a voting system which could compel a Member country to carry out decisions which are detrimental to its national interest and to which it is itself opposed. You will agree that this is a far-reaching commitment and that even if its subject matter is mainly economic, it does extend far into the realm of politics.

If one does accept perhaps two or three "considerants" of the Preamble to the Rome Treaty, such as

"Determined to establish the foundations of an even closer union among the European peoples," or

"Resolved to strengthen the safeguards of peace and liberty by establishing this combination of resources, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts,"

no article in the Agreement has a direct political bearing. Some have deduced from the absence of open political commitments that the Treaty is a purely economic instrument. This opinion has received, for reasons I will not enter into, larger credit in this country than anywhere else.

My contention is that the Treaty is so engrained with politics that it is, to say the least, an economic instrument at the service of political aims. Here are my reasons:

1. Considered in its historical perspective, the Rome Treaty is a step along the road to political unity, which has been preceded by many other steps, such as:

- The creation of the *Council of Europe* in Strassbourg in 1949 after leading Europeans such as Monet, Spaak, de Gasperi, etc., had called for the economic and *political* integration of Western Europe;
- the establishment of the *Coal and Steel Community* in 1952, following a proposal in 1950 by Robert Schumann, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose main aim was to render impossible any new war between France and Germany by fostering integration in particularly sensitive sectors; by the way, the Preamble of the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community contains distinctly political objectives;
- the draft Treaty of the *European Defence Community* which was rejected by its sponsor, France;
- by the draft constitution of a *European Political Community* based on an indissoluble union of States, from which the Economic Community was to be derived;
- the 'setting up of the *Western European Union*, to associate Britain with the Six in the control of German rearmament, after the EDC was rejected.

The movement toward European Unity was freed, momentarily at least, from the defence and political issues by the rejection of the European Defence Community. Their leaders then decided, for obvious tactical reasons, not to attack directly for the time being on the political front. The "relance" of European integration was decided upon at the Messina meeting of the Six in June, 1955. The communique issued at the end of this meeting stated that "The next phase in the building of a United Europe must lie in the economic field." To all intents and purposes, the creation of the EEC was a political move camouflaged by economic garments.

2. Because of the importance of the subjects with which the Rome Treaty deals, and the governmental supranationalist character of the procedures by which decisions are taken, it goes far beyond the economic sphere it formally covers.

3. The growth of regular consultation between the heads of States or of Governments has led the Six to adopt, on 18th July, 1961, a solemn declaration—called the "Bonn Declaration"—whereby they announced their intention to hold periodic meetings with a view to reaching common attitudes on political issues and decided that a Committee should study ways and means of giving "the unity of their peoples a statutory character." This Committee, named after its Chairman the "Fouchet Committee," has now formulated precise proposals for the formal establishment of a permanent European political Union amongst them which are considered as the culmination of the activities of the EEC in the political field. At least some of the Six refuse to admit Britain to the deliberations of the Committee or to agree to her participation in the formalised political union until the negotiations for her entry into the Common Market have been completed. This demonstrates the links which exist between the Treaty of Rome and what can be considered as its direct political superstructure.

Enough has been said, I think, to convince even the most sceptical that the Rome Treaty is an economic instrument to achieve political objectives.

This conclusion has been recently confirmed by Mr Hallstein, who, as you know, is the President of the Commission of the Community, in a speech made in Zurich. The Swiss authorities have been given to understand that, the Common Market being a political construction, the prerequisite of Switzerland's participation would be a change in her present political status, an adaptation of her political objectives to those of the Six. Although this was expressed in diplomatic terms, the demand was no less clear. The pre-condition of Switzerland's association to the EEC seems to be, to Mr Hallstein's way of thinking, the giving up of her neutrality. Mind you, this is not the personal opinion of Mr Hallstein only, but also of many personalities in France and in the United States.

● RECIPE

CARROT TORTE

$\frac{1}{2}$ lb. sugar, 5 eggs, $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. ground almonds, 7 ozs. raw, grated carrots, $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. butter, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. flour, finely grated rind of half a lemon and its juice. Beat till creamy sugar and egg yolks, add other ingredients and lastly whipped egg whites. Bake in medium oven. If fancied, decorate with whipped cream before serving. —H.B.