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Duns Scotus's Anti-Averroism in the Prologue to *Ordinatio*: A First Approach

INTRODUCTION

In the central and sole question of the First Part of the Prologue to his *Ordinatio*, namely, “whether it is necessary to man, in the present state, that any special doctrine be supernaturally inspired [to him], namely one that he could not achieve through the natural light of the intellect”,¹ Duns Scotus reacts in specific ways to theses which he himself, on the interpretation I propose, regarded to be “Averroistic” or “heterodox Aristotelian” in character. It is his reactions to such theses – which I describe and exposit below while surveying the famous debate between “philosophers and theologians” (Sections I., II., and IV. of the essay) – that comprise Scotus’s “anti-Averroism” (Sections III. and V.). Moreover, by expositing these theses, we may also establish Scotus’s convictions about the nature of theology and philosophy, since these convictions take shape in his indirect replies to paradigmatic views about the relationship of theology and philosophy in “Averroistic” or “heterodox Aristotelian” circles (Sections III.-V.).

Comprised of five parts and including a total of nine questions, the Prologue to Scotus’s commentary on the Lombard’s *Sentences* is, in com-

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¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio: Prologus* (= *Opera theologica omnia*, vol. I). Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 1950), p. 1, q. un., n. 1, 1: “Quaeritur utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessarium aliquam doctrinam specialem supernaturaliter inspirari, ad quam videlicet non posset attingere lumine naturali intellectus”. I have always this formulation in mind when I refer to the “central” or “main question”. WOLTER, Allan B., in his introduction to *Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge*, in: *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951) 234, is right to say that the emphasis in the formulation relies not just on the question about the necessity of revealed doctrines, but equally on the way of obtaining knowledge about theological truths; depending on whether they are obtained in a natural or supernatural way, the central question will be denied or affirmed. See also IDEM: *Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge. Introduction and Translation of the Prologue of the Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus Part I*, in: *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951) 231–272. DE BONI, Luís Alberto: *Filosofia y teología en Duns Escoto. El prologus de la “Ordinatio”* (p. 1 q. un.) y la condenación de 1277, in: AERTSEN, Jan A. (Hg.): *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1998, 404, points out that, in the formulation of the question itself, one sees three pairs of key concepts for the First Part of Duns Scotus’s Prologue: *pro statu isto*-*in patria*; *naturaliter*-*supernaturaliter*; *posse attingere*-*posse recipere*.

parison with the Prologues to the commentaries of Thomas Aquinas² and Bonaventure³ extraordinarily long.⁴ The very lengthy analysis at the beginning of the Prologues⁵ of the necessity of theological revealed doctrines shows that their necessity was no longer understood to be obvious but, on the contrary, demanded justification. Arguably, this argumentative expectation itself is an example, and perhaps the most striking one, of the impact of the Condemnation of 219 articles promulgated by the Bishop of Paris on March 7, 1277.⁶ But even if we grant this and also that Scotus's

² See the five articles of the first question in: THOMAS AQUINATIS: *Scriptum super libros sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi*. Ed. R.P. MANDONNET. Parisiis: P. Lethielleux 1929, Vol. 1.: *Prologus*, 5-19: (1) "utrum praeter physicas disciplinas alia doctrina sit homini necessaria", (2) "utrum tantum una doctrina debeat esse praeter physicas", (3) "utrum sit practica vel speculativa", (4) "utrum Deus sit subjectum istius scientiae" and (5) "utrum modus procedendi sit artificialis". See ibidem, I *Prologus* 19-24, the "divisio textus Prologi" and the exposition of it.

³ See the four questions of the *Prooemium* and the short *Commentarius in Prologum Magistri* in: BONAVENTURA: *Opera theologica selecta. Vol.1: Liber I Sententiarum*. Editio Minor. Florentia : Ad Claras Aquas 1934, 1-16.

⁴ See DE BONI: *Filosofía y teología en Duns Escoto. El prologus de la "Ordinatio" (p. I q. un.) y la condenación de 1277*, 403.

⁵ In the First Part of the Prologue to *Lectura*, Scotus presents a shorter treatment of the same issue, which will be considered in the exposition that follows. Scotus approaches the theme of the natural knowledge of God also in the third question of the Prologue to *Reportatio* I-A, namely "Utrum ex puris naturalibus possimus scire omnes veritates scibiles de Deo" (see IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Reportatio I-A: Prologus* (= John Duns Scotus – *The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture*, ed. A.B. WOLTER/O. BYCHKOV). St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute 2004, q. 3, a. 1-3, 74-88. However, he approaches it there on a very different basis, and so this text is not taken into account for the present study.

⁶ See BOULNOIS, Olivier: *Duns Scot – La rigueur de la charité*. Paris: Editions du Cerf 1998, 66. Concerning the difficulty of determining the character of these condemnations and their meaning to theology and philosophy in the Middle Ages, see FLASCH, Kurt: *Aufklärung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 1277*. Mainz: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung 1989, 55-56. See in particular the introductory essay of EMERY, Kent Jr./SPEER, Andreas: *After the Condemnation of 1277: New Evidence, New Perspectives, and Grounds for New Interpretations*, in: AERTSEN, Jan A./EMERY, Kent Jr. /SPEER, Andreas (Hgg.): *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 27). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2001, 3-19. This volume contains studies – some of them used and mentioned in the present essay – directly focused on the repercussions of those condemnations for Scotus's thought. On the First Part of Scotus's Prologue as a whole see HOFMEISTER PICH, Roberto: *João Duns Scotus – Prólogo da Ordinatio* (Coleção Pensamento Franciscano 5). Porto Alegre: Edipucrs 2003. For further remarks and interpretations of Scotus's reception of the outcome of the 219 articles condemned on March 7, 1277 see, for instance, ARMELLADA, B. de: *Il beato Giovanni Duns Scoto nella spiritualità francescana*, in: *Laurentianum* 34 (1993) 30; BALIĆ, C.: *Duns Scot*, in: *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité* III (1957) 1813; IDEM: *Johannes Duns Scotus und die Lehrentscheidung von 1277*, in: *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 29 (1966) 215-217; BOEHNER, Ph./GILSON, É.: *Christliche Philosophie*³. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh 1954, 520; DETTLOFF, W.: *Die franziskanische Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus*, in: *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 46 (1983) 86-87; IDEM: *Franziskanertheologie*, in: *Handbuch theologischer Grundbegriffe I*. München: Kösel Verlag 1962, 388-389; GILSON, Étienne: *Metaphysik und Theologie nach Duns Skotus*, in: *Franziskanische Studien* 22 (1935) 228; HONNEFELDER, Ludger: *Duns Scotus*, in: *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche III*. Freiburg: Herder 1995, 403; VIER, Raimundo: *São Francisco e o*

Prologue expresses some of his most important criticisms of “Averroism” proper – that is to say, of the philosophical movement of the late 13th century led by thinkers “who were influenced by Averroes” or defended and extended “the views of writers such as Siger of Brabant” – it is nonetheless important to remember that an “Averroism” of this kind, with its distinctive “loyalty towards Averroes” was, we now know, not exactly characteristic of the thinkers condemned in 1277.⁷

It is not a direct purpose of this study to establish any new thesis about “Averroism” as a movement; its concern is what can be arguably taken as Scotus’s understanding and criticism of significant philosophical views held by some “Averroistic” group of thinkers at the very opening of his theological major work – that is his *Sentences*-commentary.⁸ I use “Averroism” and “heterodox Aristotelianism”, first of all, as general historiographical labels for philosophers of this period who allied themselves with the thought of Averroes – who interpreted his thought and put it, in different ways, into critical dialogue with theology. The thinkers in this group uphold at least some intellectual concerns of a quite broad yet definable scope that can be captured under headings such as “monopsychism”, “happiness in this life”, “eternity of the world”, “autonomy of philosophy”, “philosophy and religious belief”, “the interconnectedness and varying methods of the theoretical sciences”, “contradictions between philosophy and theology”, “denial of the supernatural”, and “double truth theory”.⁹ I will

pensamento medieval, in: GARCIA, A. (org.): *Estudos de filosofia medieval – A obra de Raimundo Vier*. Petrópolis: Editora Vozes 1997, 188–193.

⁷ See EBBESEN, Sten: *Averroism*, in: CRAIG, Edward (ed.): *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 1. London: Routledge 1998, 595–596. See also KUKSEWICZ, Z.: *The Latin Averroism of the Late Thirteenth Century*, in: NIEWÖHNER, F./STURLESE, L. (Hgg.): *Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance*. Zürich: Spur Verlag 1994, 102–109. Especially on the two first phases of Latin averroism (1260–1277 and 1280/1290–1300, respectively) see KUKSEWICZ, L.: *De Siger de Brabant à Jacques de Plaisance. La théorie de l’intellect chez les averroïstes latins des XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*. Wrocław: Ossolineum 1968, 19–116.

⁸ Although partial and indirect studies on the subject can be found, studies focusing specifically on the idea that the First Part of Prologue to *Ordinatio* is a complex reaction to (such and such) “Averroistic” theses are unknown to me. The expression “*averroistae*” – the expression “*averroista*” was first used by Thomas Aquinas in his *De unitate intellectus* – is not used in the Prologue, and the Prologue does not make references to philosophers seen as sympathizers of Averroes (such as Siger of Brabant or Boethius of Dacia). The First Part contains information only about a group of philosophers who profess allegiance to Averroes concerning what is in dispute in the question; in this sense I call *their* ideas “Averroistic”, not “Averroist”, if “Averroist” means what should be taken *simply* as Averroes’s thought.

⁹ See EBBESEN: *Averroism*, 595–598; see also LEAMAN, O.: *Ibn Rushd, Abu’l Walid Muhammad (1126–98)*, in: CRAIG, Edward (ed.): *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 4. London: Routledge 1998, 638–639, 642–643; IDEM: *Averroes and his Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1988, 163–178; BADAWI, ‘A.: *Averroès (Ibn Rushd)*. Paris: Vrin 1998. For the thesis that “Averroism” has to be said “in many senses”, following both explicit and implicit understandings of it, which we can acquire surveying respective sources from the 13th up to the 17th century, see also recently CALMA, Dragos: *Études sur le premier siècle de l’averroïsme latin. Approches et textes inédits* (= *Studia Artistarum* 31). Turnhout: Brepols Publishers 2011,

use these labels in the casual and qualified way suggested above until I present the initial conclusions of my study.

I. THE PHILOSOPHI-VERSUS-THEOLOGI CONTROVERSY

A certain controversy between philosophers and theologians is the first main theme of the Prologue.¹⁰ The controversy turns on positions philosophers and theologians hold on (a) the state in which human nature finds itself and (b) the necessity of a supernaturally revealed doctrine. For both the philosophers and the theologians, the position that each holds on the first subject determines the position that he holds on the second subject. Philosophers hold concerning (a) that human nature is perfect and concerning (b) that there is no supernatural perfection, and thus that supernatural perfection is unnecessary. As Scotus puts it in the *Lectura*, these views affirm the dignity of nature as such, since it is able through itself alone to achieve its own perfection.¹¹ By contrast, theologians hold – the text actually says “they know” (*cognoscunt*)¹² – that (a) (human) nature is deficient and (b) that there is need of divine grace and also supernatural perfection, and hence that supernatural perfection is necessary.

The disagreement can be formulated as the following disjunction:¹³

(A) – “Supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines supernaturally revealed to human beings are necessary or supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines supernaturally revealed to human beings are unnecessary”.

It can also be similarly read as follows:

(A') “Supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines supernaturally revealed to human beings are necessary” is, according to the theologians, a true proposition; it is a theological truth.

And

11–21 (“Occurrences et citations”). Moreover, on discussions of the correctness of the notion and historiographical category of “double truth” with respect to Medieval thinkers and works as such, see BIANCHI, Luca: *Pour une histoire de la « double vérité »*. Paris: Vrin 2008, especially 7–22.

¹⁰ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 5a, 4: “In ista quaestione videtur controversia inter philosophos et theologos. Et tenent philosophi perfectionem naturae, et negant perfectionem supernaturalem; theologi vero cognoscunt defectum naturae et necessitatem gratiae et perfectionem supernaturalem”.

¹¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura: Prologus* (= *Opera theologica omnia*, vol. XVI). Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1960, p. 1, q. un., n. 6, 3: “[...] quod philosophi negant omnem cognitionem supernaturalem, quia ponunt quod dignitas naturae est quod possit acquirere suam perfectionem; [...]”.

¹² This remark has some significance for the evaluation of what these *theologi* – not necessarily Scotus himself – think about rational access to theological truths and to theological arguments. See also Section IV below.

¹³ See also Sections IV and V below.

(A'') "Supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines supernaturally revealed to human beings are unnecessary" is, according to some philosophers, a true proposition; it is a philosophical truth.

It is important to realize that the perfection of human nature affirmed by the philosophers is understood, in this context, without exception, as the perfection of the intellectual potency. It denotes the natural sufficiency for the actualization, through the potency itself, with no external help concerning its capacity for activity concerning what is necessary to it – that is, concerning the necessary knowledge (of maximally intelligible objects), which is the proper fulfillment of that potency.¹⁴ This coheres with the well-known Aristotelian axiom (*De anima* Γ 9 432b21–22) affirming nature's capacity for the actualization of its own end: *natura non deficit in necessariis*.¹⁵ And the natural realization of what is necessary to naturally perfect potencies concerns (1) the acts they should perform and (2) the end they must achieve, through those acts, according to their natures.¹⁶ If requirements (1) and (2) are met, we may affirm that the realization of the perfection of a potency has been shown.

Like the *theologi*, Scotus answers his central question affirmatively. In order to clarify his supposedly anti-Averroistic stance, it is useful to outline his own account of (a') deficiency of nature and (b') necessity of supernatural doctrines which perfect the intellectual potency. I begin with (b'). The necessity of natural knowledge for realizing natural potency – for realizing human nature – is, perhaps, for philosophers, an ontological ne-

¹⁴ See, for example, THOMAS AQUINATIS: *Quaestiones disputatae* (= *Quaestiones disputatae I – De veritate*). Cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi SPIAZZI. Torino: Marietti Editori 1964, q. 14, a. 10, arg. 4, 137: "Praeterea, potentia non indiget habitu propter id ad quod naturaliter est determinata; [...]". See ibidem, arg. 5, 137: "Praeterea, perfectius est quod per seipsum potest consequi finem quam quod non potest per seipsum. Sed alia animalia ex principiis naturalibus possunt consequi fines suos. Unde, cum homo sit eis perfectior, videtur quod cognitio naturalis sit ei sufficiens ad consequendum finem suum; et sic non indiget fide".

¹⁵ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 2, 3: "Praeterea, sensus non indiget aliqua conditione supernaturali pro statu isto; ergo nec intellectus. Antecedens patet. Probatio consequentiae: "Natura non deficit in necessariis", III *De anima*; et si in imperfectis non deficit, multo magis nec in perfectis; ergo si non deficit in potentiis inferioribus quantum ad necessaria earum propter actus suos habendos et finem earum consequendum, multo magis nec deficit in necessariis potentiae superiori ad actuum suum et finem consequendum. Ergo etc.". The point is significant, since what was controversial for medieval thinkers was not so much the existence of an "intrinsic finality" to supernatural perfection in nature, but whether the existence of an inclination whose realization is beyond natural powers implies an imperfection. See WOLTER, Allan B.: *Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural*, in: ADAMS, M.M. (ed.): *The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1990, 125–126. More on Scotus's preservation of that axiom is found in Section IV below.

¹⁶ See ibidem.

cessity. The necessity of supernatural knowledge,¹⁷ beyond the fact that it is not naturally accessible, is, for theologians like Scotus, “practical”¹⁸ or “relative”. The knowledge of supernatural truths is necessary in relation to the attainment of the supernatural end or the eternal beatitude given by God. It seems to me that such a necessity can be defined simply as the necessity of a necessary condition alone according to the material implication “only if P , then Q ” ($Q \supset P$); it is no logical or metaphysical necessity. An example of this would be “Only if a human being has, through faith, the knowledge of the divine ordination to the supernatural end, can a human being reach this end”. In any event, given speculations about God as a necessary being and about the contingency of creation, as well as about divine ordinations according to the determinations *de potentia Dei ordinata* and *de potentia Dei absoluta*, the same material implication ($Q \supset P$) can be bound to a modal operator, and this one would be, logically and metaphysically, the possibility operator: $\Diamond(Q \supset P)$, where “ \Diamond ” is defined as “ $\Diamond P = \neg \Box \neg P$ ”. Of course we can bind to that material implication a contingency operator – with fidelity to Scotus’s account of synchronic contingency – if we talk about it specifically in terms of ontic modalities.

Turning now to (a’), throughout the Prologue, Scotus tacitly presupposes an idea of human nature “in the present state”. Given the discourse of the *theologi* about the deficiency of human nature, it must be pointed out that Scotus’s judgment about the nature of the soul and its potencies – particularly the intellect – is a judgment pertinent to his account of the “condition” of human nature “now”, that is, to human nature in its earthly “status”, to which Scotus refers using expressions such as “*pro statu isto*” and “*iste status*”.¹⁹ In the treatment of the definition of the first object of the intellect,²⁰ Scotus understands *status*, in Augustinian sense, as a “stable permanence”, confirmed by laws of wisdom”, whose ultimate ground seems to be (i) either the will of God alone (ii) or His punishing justice.²¹ The

¹⁷ In *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1 there is no talk of supernatural truths as necessary; it is the knowledge of them that is necessary.

¹⁸ See MANN, W.E.: *Believing Where we Cannot Prove: Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Supernatural Belief*, in: STOEHR, K. (ed.): *The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy. Vol. 4: Philosophies of Religion, Art, and Creativity*. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center Bowling Green State University 1999, 61. For a critical debate on this topic see CROSS, Richard: *Duns Scotus*. New York: Oxford University Press 1999, 10–11, and HOFMEISTER PICH, Roberto: op. cit., 143–148. See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 54–55, 32–33.

¹⁹ See GILSON, Étienne: *Jean Duns Scot, Introduction a ses positions fondamentales*. Paris: Vrin 1952, 70–71.

²⁰ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* I d. 3 (= *Opera theologica omnia*, vol. III). Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis 1954, p. 1, q. 3, n. 186–187, 113–114.

²¹ Ibidem, n. 187. See also FÄH, H.L.: *Anmerkungen*, in: IDEM: *Johannes Duns Scotus: Die Erkennbarkeit Gottes – Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1–3 (Zweite Fortsetzung und Schluß)*, in: *Franziskanische Studien* 50 (1968) 356–361, note 618. The conditions of knowledge “now” can indeed be characterized by a state willed by God *ex mera voluntate*, for human being’s sake,

laws of wisdom establish an order according to which the intellect knows now only the objects whose “intelligible forms” (*species*) shine forth in the “sensible species” (*phantasmata*). Because of those laws, intellectual capacity is constituted now by “a natural agreement of the soul’s potencies in operating”.²² Given this factual condition, in its present state the superior intellectual potency operates on the same things on which the inferior sensible potency first acts. This brings as a result an order of dependence of the intellect’s activity upon the senses,²³ since each knowable universal that the intellect knows, each quiddity it conceives, it does so by forming first, through an act, the sensible image of the universal attached to the sensible singular thing.²⁴ However, the factual conditions of agreement do not correspond to the original performance conditions of the intellect.²⁵ That the first object of the intellect *pro statu isto*, but not *ex ratione potentiae*, is the *quiditas rei sensibilis*²⁶ implies a limited abstractive knowledge of immaterial substances: one limited to the acquisition of a transcendental concept of being essentially or virtually contained in the intelligible species.²⁷ And the same account of the intellect’s first object implies the factual incapacity of the intellect to have intuitive knowledge of immaterial substances.²⁸

These last two points, which clarify the structure of the First Part of the Prologue, should be seen within Scotus’s overarching strategy for negotia-

independently of the fall; see VIGNAUX, Paul: *Lire Duns Scot aujourd’hui*, in: BÉRUBÉ, C. (ed.): *Regnum hominis et regnum Dei I*. Roma: Societas Internationalis Scotistica 1978, 36–37.

²² IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* I d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 187, 113.

²³ See BARTH, T.: *Erbsünde und Gotteserkenntnis. Eine philosophisch-theologische Grenz-betrachtung im Anschluß an Johannes Duns Skotus*, in: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 56–57 (1946/1947) 82.

²⁴ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* I d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 187, 113–114.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, n. 187, 114. See *Quaestiones quodlibetales* (= *Opera omnia*, vol. XII). (Reprografischer Nachdruck der Ausgabe Lyon 1639). Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung 1969, q. 14, n. 12, 373.

²⁷ For a study of theological presuppositions in Scotus’s epistemology, particularly on the nature and function of the agent intellect, limited *now* to abstractive knowledge of immaterial objects, see BAZÁN, B.C.: *Conceptions on the Agent Intellect and the Limits of Metaphysics*, in: AERTSEN, Jan A./EMERY, Kent Jr./SPEER, Andreas (Hgg.): *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 27). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2001, 178–210. Bazán relates the theological orientation of Scotus’s epistemology to the condemnations of 1277, beginning with the denial of any capacity of the soul for knowing *now* its own nature and supernatural end, since the operations naturally performed by it do not reveal it at all (180–188); see IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 15, 10–11. See also HONNEFELDER, Ludger: *Duns Scotus*. München: Verlag C.H. Beck 2005, 27–33.

²⁸ See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* IV (= *Opera omnia*, vol. X). (Reprografischer Nachdruck der Ausgabe Lyon 1639). Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung 1968, d. 45, q. 2, n. 12, 182. See also WOLTER: *Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural*, 134–136; DUMONT, R.E.: *The Role of the Phantasm in the Psychology of Duns Scotus*, in: *The Monist* 49 (1965) 622–623.

ting the “philosophers versus theologians”-controversy. These considerations are, in a sense, theological arguments or, as Scotus would say, *persuasiones*.²⁹ Such considerations comprise what I call the second part of a two-part strategy for solving the problem.³⁰ The first is to present, explain, and refute philosophically the arguments of the philosophers on behalf of a negative reply to the central question; Scotus does this in *Ord.* prol. n. 5b-11 and n. 72-89. The second is to present, explain, and defend theologically the arguments of the theologians, or better, of Scotus himself as theologian, on behalf of an affirmative reply to the central question; Scotus does this in *Ord.* prol. n. 12-56. Several “Averroistic” theses figure prominently in each of these parts. Scotus’s discussion provides clues as to the historical sources and authorship of these theses.³¹ It also makes it possible to reconstruct Scotus’s “anti-Averroism” and to explain the methodological attraction that “heterodox Aristotelianism” may have held for him.

Returning to the exposition of the controversy, we note that the first part of Scotus’s strategy relates to what can be seen as non-conclusive philosophical arguments (n. 5b-11 and 72-89). Each of them includes at least one false or at least very questionable premise. Moreover, in these arguments, Scotus maintains, philosophers reach conclusions that are not merely philosophical (n. 5b). He sees as particularly problematic that their arguments are supposed to be *conclusive* arguments on behalf of a negative answer to the central question of the First Part of the Prologue. On the philosophers’ view, it is possible to establish deductively that human beings have no need of a supernaturally-inspired doctrine, and this negative conclusion should count as *philosophical truth*. For Scotus, by contrast, the question about the necessity of a supernaturally-inspired doctrine is properly only a theological one (n. 12). For understanding Scotus’s philosophical aims in thinking about the relationship of philosophy and theology and the nature of these disciplines, it is imperative to recognize that he considers several philosophical arguments for a negative answer to the central question and judges them to be philosophically bad.

²⁹ Concerning this kind of argument, see Section IV below.

³⁰ Surely in order to reach an affirmative answer to the central question, Scotus must provide a rationally acceptable explanation of the meaning of “supernatural”, and hence of “supernatural knowledge”; see IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 57-65, 35-40. This is perhaps a third side of the whole strategy for defending the theologians’ opinion. But even if it is taken by Scotus as the solution of the question, it does not add anything to the discussion about his “anti-Averroism”. This third aspect could actually already be placed within a coherent account of how to proceed in philosophical and theological matters. See also HOFMEISTER PICH, Roberto: *William E. Mann sobre a doutrina scotista da necessidade do conhecimento revelado: segunda consideração*, in: *Dissertatio* 10 (2005) 21 7-59.

³¹ The words “*philosophus*” (in small letters) and “*philosophi*” never refer in the First Part unambiguously to a *specific* philosopher or to a *named* group of philosophers.

II. "HETERODOX ARISTOTELIAN" PROPOSITIONS

In *Ord. prol. n. 5*, Scotus attributes to the philosophers the views (a) that nature is perfect and (b) that a supernatural perfection should be denied, and accordingly that, on their view, the supernatural perfection that comes from supernatural knowledge is unnecessary "now" / in this life. This, Scotus says, is the stance of the "philosopher" – "*diceret igitur philosophus*" –, one that is clearly inspired by Averroes's affirmations of the human person's power to acquire, through the action of natural causes, all knowledge necessary for his perfection. Averroes affirms this proposition in his commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysica* and *De anima*.³² Scotus presents philosophers who hold this view as taking for granted that they have Aristotle's "authority and reason" (*auctoritas et ratio*) on their side – that Aristotle himself supports propositions (a) and (b).³³ In this sense those Heterodox Aristotelians certainly believed that they were themselves defending the "opinion of Aristotle".³⁴

The first argument of the philosophers (n. 6) relates to the idea that the cognitive soul can attain naturally the knowledge of every intelligible object; the second argument (n. 7) to the necessary correspondence of a passive natural potency to an active natural potency; the third (n. 8) to the sufficiency of the three Aristotelian theoretical habits; the fourth (n. 9-11) to the possibility of knowing all knowable conclusions.³⁵ Scotus's discussion of each of these four arguments makes extraordinary contributions to, respectively, (i) the causes and principles of apprehensive knowledge, (ii) the account of the potencies of the soul, (iii) the notion of scientific theoretical habits and (iv) syllogistics and the semantics of terms.³⁶ In what follows, I devote most attention to the first argument and only use pieces of the other three. My aim is to illustrate the philosophers' theses, to identify basic features of the Heterodox Aristotelian outlook, and to summarize Scotus's first engagement with "Averroism".³⁷

³² See AVERROES: *Metaphysica* II com. 1 and *De anima* III com. 36 (= *Aristotelis opera, latine*, Venetiis 1483). On Averroes's account of human intellectual knowledge see LEAMAN, O.: *Averroes and his Philosophy*, 96–103; DE LIBERA, A.: *Existe-t-il une noétique "averroïste"?* Note sur la réception latine d'Averroès au XIII^e et XIV^e siècle, in: NIEWÖHNER, F./STURLESE, L. (Hgg.): *Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance*. Zürich: Spur Verlag 1994, 53–64.

³³ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 5b, 5: "*Diceret igitur philosophus quod nulla est cognitio supernaturalis homini necessaria pro statu isto, sed quod omnem cognitionem sibi necessariam posset acquirere ex actione causarum naturalium. – Ad hoc adducitur simul auctoritas et ratio Philosophi ex diversis locis*".

³⁴ So begins Scotus's answers to the four arguments in *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 72, 44: "*Ad argumenta pro opinione Aristotelis*".

³⁵ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 6–11, 5–8.

³⁶ Ibidem, n. 72–89, 44–54.

³⁷ To analyze each one of the other three arguments, together with Scotus's answers to them, as a dispute with Averroistic theses is a project for the future.

Two general features of Scotus's arguments deserve mention at the outset. First, each argument quotes or uses only general principles of Aristotle's philosophy; Scotus quotes them directly or through the *Summa* of Henry of Ghent.³⁸ And when Scotus, for example, rejects the first argument by rejecting its minor premise, he does so by invoking again Aristotelian theses, presuming his own correct reading and understanding of them.³⁹ The same could be said of his replies to the second,⁴⁰ third, and fourth arguments, even though in the replies to arguments three and four he attacks the philosophers using notions of habit and scientific object and of supposition theory that are more his own than Aristotle's.⁴¹ Second, none of the four arguments that Scotus attributes to "the philosophers" shows a correct understanding of strict formal representations or concepts of the Christian God, despite the fact that it is arguably just such concepts that must be considered by someone attempting to acquire knowledge of God in the form of propositions (i.e., in the form of the principles and conclusions of syllogistic reasoning).

The first argument of the philosophers provides an example of this structure:⁴²

- (Major premise): Whenever a natural active principle⁴³ and a natural passive principle are approximated and not hindered, an action follows necessarily.
- (Minor premise): With respect to all intelligible objects, the agent intellect and the possible intellect are in the soul naturally and not hindered.
- (Conclusion): Given the natural conditions of the active and passive principles, the intellection of every intelligible object can follow (necessarily).

The argument – particularly its minor premise – is supposed to be a correct interpretation of *De anima* Γ 5 430a14–15. It is thus based on a classic and controversial passage for "Averroistic" and "anti-Averroistic" debates

³⁸ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 6–11, 5–8.

³⁹ Ibidem, n. 72, 44.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, n. 73–78, 44–47.

⁴¹ Ibidem, n. 79–82. 83–89, 47–50. 50–54.

⁴² Ibidem, n. 6, 5: "Primo illud III *De anima*, ubi dicit quod 'intellectus agens est quod est omnia facere, et possibilis est quo est omnia fieri'. Ex hoc arguo sic: activo naturali et passivo simul approximatis et non impeditis sequitur actio necessario, quia non dependet essentialiter nisi ex eis tamquam ex causis prioribus; activum autem respectu omnia intelligibilis est intellectus agens, et passivum est intellectus possibilis, et haec sunt naturaliter in anima, nec sunt impedita. Patet. Ergo virtute naturali istorum potest sequi actus intelligendi respectu cuiuscumque intelligibilis".

⁴³ *Activum naturale* stays here, see Lychetus, F.: *Commentarius*, in: IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Opera omnia* V. 1. Reprografischer Nachdruck der Ausgabe Lyon 1639. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung 1968, n. 1, 5, not in distinction to "supernatural", but opposing to *activum a proposito* or *liberum*.

on the nature of the intellect and of intellectual knowledge. The use of that passage in the minor premise sounds “Averroistic” in the general sense that the agent intellect alone brings the forms or intelligible objects of every kind to the possible intellect (it surely also brings the forms of immaterial substances and the divine nature, as well as first rational principles and *formationes* (“concepts” or “conceptualizations”) to it; see the expression “*respectu omnis intelligibilis*”), so that the possible intellect acquires proper intelligible forms, and it is in this way made perfect through complete intellections that express a natural and necessary relationship between agent and possible intellect. But very surprisingly there is not the least textual information in *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1 concerning monopsychism⁴⁴ or any unique “extra-human”⁴⁵ separated intellect which “is connected” – *copulatur, continuatur* or stays in a *continuatio* – by the individual soul by means of *phantasmata* “of extramental things”, which are then used as a “basis for abstraction” and for the soul’s reception of pure intelligible forms.⁴⁶ When possible intellect is made perfect, the agent intellect unites with the individual soul, and through it the intellection of all abstract things as such can follow, that is, the agent intellect itself is actua-

⁴⁴ In fact, the “label” is “misleading”, for Averroes’s doctrine makes a claim for the “unicity of the intellect”, whereas “each individual” has her / his own soul; see BLACK, D.L.: *The Nature of the Intellect*, in: PASNAU, Robert/VAN DYKE, Ch. (eds.): *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010, 328 (also 326–328).

⁴⁵ See AVERROES: *De anima Liber Tertius*, in: ARISTOTELES: *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis – Aristotelis De anima libri tres*, ed. Iuntina, com. 36, 181 (*translatio antiqua*): “Ex quo consequitur vt intellectus sit innatus intelligere quiditatem intellecti, cuius intellectus est vnus omnibus hominibus: & quod est tale est substantia abstracta”. Cf. ibidem, ed. Iuntina, 184 (*translatio antiqua*): “[...]: Et fuit declaratum quod necesse est vt intellecta habita a nobis naturaliter sint ab aliquo quod est in se intellectus liberatus a materia, & est intellectus agens: [...], iam enim declaratum est intellectus agens esse vnum, & aeternum, vt intendebant quidam Antiquorum, & opinati sunt quod eas intendebat Aristoteles per intellectum agentem”. The quotations from Averroes’s *Commentarium magnum* on *De anima* are taken from the Editio Iuntina of Aristotle’s works in Latin, where the Latin comments of Averroes appear too. The modern critical text of the *Commentarium* by Averroes, which in this case at least reveals no relevant divergences from the edition just quoted, is AVERROES: *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*, in: CRAWFORD, F.S. (ed.): *Averrois Cordubensis – Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros*. Cambridge (Mass.): The Mediaeval Academy of America 1953, here, particularly, 479–502. We find no significant divergences in: AVERROES: *Über den Intellekt. Auszüge aus seinen drei Kommentaren zu Aristoteles’ De anima*. Arabisch – Latenisch – Deutsch, hrsg., übers, eingeleitet u. mit Anmerkungen versehen v. David WIRMER (= Herders Bibliothek der Philosophie des Mittelalters 15). Freiburg: Herder 2008, 232–285.

⁴⁶ See EBBESEN: *Averroism*, 596. See also WIRMER, David: *Einleitung*, in: AVERROES: *Über den Intellekt. Auszüge aus seinen drei Kommentaren zu Aristoteles’ De anima*. Arabisch – Latenisch – Deutsch, hrsg., übers, eingeleitet u. mit Anmerkungen versehen v. David WIRMER (= Herders Bibliothek der Philosophie des Mittelalters 15). Freiburg: Herder 2008, 16–18, 21–26. See further GEOFFROY, M.: *Averroès sur l’intellect comme cause agente et cause formelle, et la question de la « jonction »*, in: BRENET, J.-B. (éd.): *Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et latin* (= FIDEM – Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 40). Turnhout: Brepols 2008, 77–110.

lized as a form “in us”,⁴⁷ “we ourselves” are then “intelligent by means of it, since it is the form for us [*forma nobis*]”.⁴⁸ This monopsychist view, which might surely be held to be presupposed by the particular argument Scotus is analyzing, receives *no explicit mention* from Scotus in his rejection of the argument (*Ord. prol. n. 72*).

This is remarkable, since the premise of that argument is scarcely understandable without the monopsychist background. Moreover, Averroes himself, right in *De anima* III com. 36,⁴⁹ presents the separated agent intellect as the perfection of the material intellect,⁵⁰ and connects it to the

⁴⁷ See AVERROES: *De anima Liber Tertius*, ed. Iuntina, com. 36, 177 (*translatio antiqua*): “[...] quando intellectus, qui est in potentia, fuerit perfectus, tunc intelligentia agens copulabitur nobiscum, per quam intelligemus alias res abstractas, & per quam faciemus res sensibiles esse intellectas in actu, secundum quod ipse efficitur forma in nobis. Et quasi intendit per hunc sermonem quod intellectus, qui est in potentia, quando fuerit perfectus, & completus, tunc copulabitur cum eo iste intellectus, & fiet forma in eo, & tunc intelligemus per ipsum alias res: non ita quod intellectus materialis intelligat ipsum, & propter illud intelligere fiat continuatio cum hoc intellectu: sed continuatio istius intellectus nobiscum est causa eius, quod intelligit ipsum, & intelligimus per ipsum alias res abstractas”.

⁴⁸ See AVERROES: *De anima Liber Tertius*, ed. Iuntina, com. 36, 177–178 (*translatio antiqua*): “[...], & hoc erit per ascensionem intellectus materialis apud illam formam, tunc dicetur intellectus adeptus: quoniam in illa dispositione erimus intelligentes per ipsum, quoniam est forma nobis: quoniam tunc erit vltima forma nobis”. See also DE LIBERA, Alain: *Notes*, in: AVERROES: *L’intelligence et la pensée, Grand Commentaire du De anima Livre II* (429 a 10–435 b 225)². Trad., introduction et notes par Alain DE LIBERA. Paris: Flammarion 1998, notes 781–783, 373–375. For a more critical view on the way how medieval thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas understood Averroes commentary and interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of the cognition of intelligible forms, see for example TAYLOR, R.C.: *Intelligibles in Act in Averroes* (FIDEM – Textes et Études du Moyen Âge 40), in: BRENET, J.-B. (éd.): *Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et latin*. Turnhout: Brepols 2008, 111–140 (especially 117ff.).

⁴⁹ As it is well known, Averroes commented Aristotle’s *De anima* at least three times. In the short commentary (*epitome*) and also in the extended commentary – not so much in the middle commentary (at any rate unknown by the schoolmen) – the influence of post-Aristotelian (Neoplatonic) tradition is quite evident; see IVRY, Alfred L.: *Introduction*, in: IVRY, Alfred L. (ed.): *Averroës – Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima*. A critical edition of the Arabic text with English translation, notes, and introduction by Alfred L. IVRY. Provo: Brigham Young University Press 2002, xiii–xiv. See also IVRY, Alfred L.: *Averroes’ Three Commentaries on De anima*, in: ENDRESS, Gerhard/AERTSEN, Jan A. (eds.): *Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd* (1126–1198). Leiden: Brill 1999, 199–216.

⁵⁰ See DE LIBERA: *Existe-t-il une noétique “averroïste”? Note sur la réception latine d’Averroès au XIII^e et XIV^e siècle*, 53–54. On the understanding of the “possible intellect” in terms of Averroes’s “material intellect” and also, especially departing from Averroes’s Long Commentary on Aristotle’s *De anima*, in terms of “an immaterial receptive substance and an intellect insofar as it is receptive of intelligibles in act and functions as a thesaurus of intelligibles in act, which is the single, distinct set of referents of scientific universals in thought and speech” (see TAYLOR, Richard C.: *Introduction*, in: AVERROES (IBN RUSHD) OF CORDOBA: *Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle*. Translated with an introduction and notes by Richard C. TAYLOR with Thérèse-Anne DRUART, subeditor. New Haven: Yale University Press 2009, lxx–lxxix) must not be further commented here. After all, there is no specific concern of Scotus in this regard. For him the point to be stressed is the account of the agent intellect as *the single active principle* for the intellection of pure intelligible objects.

possibility of achieving, through the thought of the agent intellect, the further perfection of intellectual union with separated intelligences and divine being, that is, of possessing the whole *scientia eius*.⁵¹ Even if it is certainly presupposed by Scotus here, this “Averroistic” view, with the many difficulties that it brings, remains undisputed in its more characteristic terms.⁵² Moreover, Scotus does not attack the minor premise merely for what it affirms, but – and this is the *first* basic feature of Scotus’s first strategy for determining the *quaestio* – more directly for the reason that it reveals a false understanding of what Aristotle himself says about agent and possible intellects, and about the apprehension of any form in intellectual knowledge. From this we may infer that, if Scotus is right that the principle and the account of knowledge that it offers is not Aristotelian, then presumably no element of the theory of monopsychism and separated agent intellect is premised on a correct exegesis of Aristotle.

Scotus believes the first argument to be philosophically invalid because it determines wrongly, in the minor premise, the active principle necessary for the intellective act.⁵³ The premise construes the agent intellect as the “total active” principle for all intelligible objects.⁵⁴ Here this surely means that, for the purpose of achieving *proper* knowledge, the group of philosophers believes that abstraction and reception of forms just departing from external perceptual objects is an unreliable mechanism. Scotus maintains together with Augustine that actual knowledge depends on the intellective soul and the known object *as total active principles*. He is sure that this is the opinion of Aristotle as well,⁵⁵ and he is happy to show the philosophers

⁵¹ See LEAMAN, O.: *Is Averroes an Averroist?*, in: NIEWÖHNER, F./STURLESE, L. (Hgg.): *Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance*. Zürich: Spur Verlag 1994, 20–21; on controversial points in Averroes’s theory of cognition see also ARNALDEZ, R.: *Averroès: un rationaliste en Islam?*. Paris: Éditions Balland 1998, 74–117. See also AVERROES: *De anima Liber Tertius*, ed. Iuntina, com. 36, 186 (*translatio antiqua*): “Homo igitur secundum hunc modum, sicut dicit Themistius, assimilatur Deo in hoc, quod est omnia entia quoquo modo, & sciens ea quoquo modo. Entia enim nihil aliud sunt nisi scientia eius, neque causae entium aliud sunt nisi scientia eius”.

⁵² Perhaps we should say that, while Averroes’s worry concerned not so much the idea that human soul is (or can be) in possession of all intelligibles, but more the determination of what makes human thought possible at all, Scotus shows no concern regarding this last point, but only insists that, according to Aristotelian philosophy, the human soul is not in possession of all intelligibles. See DE LIBERA, Alain: *Existe-t-il une noétique “averroïste”? Note sur la réception latine d’Averroès au XIII^e et XIV^e siècle*, 60–61.

⁵³ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 72, 44: “Ad primum dico quod cognitio dependet ab anima cognoscente et obiecto cognito, quia secundum Augustinum, IX *De Trinitate* cap. ultimo, “a cognoscente et cognito paritur notitia”.

⁵⁴ See LYCHETUS, F.: *Commentarius*, in: IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: op. cit., n. 77, 31.

⁵⁵ See, for example, HOENEN, Maarten J.F.M.: *Metaphysik und Intellectlehre. Die aristotelische Lehre des ‘intellectus agens’ im Schnittpunkt der mittelalterlichen Diskussion um die natürliche Gotteserkenntnis*, in: *Theologie und Philosophie* 70 (1995) 405–407.

that this thesis is something we can learn from reading *De anima* Γ 4.⁵⁶ What Scotus wants to say about “total active principles” is perfectly deducible from the Aristotelian axiom that without the real object, sense impression, abstraction, and reception of formal aspect in it, the intellect remains *tabula nuda* and does not have the actuality of intellection. On the nature of intellection, Scotus himself admits that the cognitive soul and the object, present as such or in the *species intelligibilis* – a *medium* which represents formally and universally the object and is a true similarity of it, with no account to its actual presence and existence – are partial efficient causes, essentially ordered, of intellection.⁵⁷ The argument is thus invalid because the knowledge of every intelligible object is caused by the intellect and the object as active principles, which form “a unique total complete cause of the effect”.⁵⁸ In its own causality each cause – intellect and object – is perfect and independent of the other. They have to cooperate hierarchically and simultaneously for the intended effect of cognition, just as they do in any essentially ordered causal series; in this way neither the sun nor the man alone generate the whole man, but they cooperate to generate it.⁵⁹

It is certainly true that Scotus's theory of cognition gives a special place to the role played by the possible intellect.⁶⁰ But more important here is that, for Scotus, the emphasis on the active and *partial* causal power of the

⁵⁶ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 72, 44: “Licet igitur anima habeat sufficiens activum et passivum intra pro quanto actio respectu cognitionis convenit animae, tamen non habet sufficiens activum intra se pro quanto actio convenit obiecto, quia sic est ut tabula nuda, ut dicitur III *De anima*. Est igitur intellectus agens quo est omnia facere, verum est in quantum ‘factio’ respectu cognitionis convenit animae, non in quantum obiectum est activum”. The passage of Aristotle is *De anima* Γ 4 429b30–430a2.

⁵⁷ See PERLER, D.: *Things in the Mind: Fourteenth-Century Controversies on “Intelligible Species”*, in: *Vivarium* 34 (1996) 251–252; HONNEFELDER: *Duns Scotus*, 36–57. See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* I d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, n. 486–503, 289–298.

⁵⁸ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 35, 15: “Causa notitiae est intellectus possibilis cum obiecto, sicut in inferioribus secundae causae particulares sunt una tota causa integralis effectus; [...]”.

⁵⁹ Ibidem: “[...] nec enim sol causat totum hominem, nec homo totum, sed ista duo sunt una causa integralis respectu hominis generati; sic etiam in non ordinatis, ut trahentes navem sunt una causa integralis tractus”.

⁶⁰ See KUKSEWICZ, Z.: *Criticisms of Aristotelian Psychology and the Augustinian-Aristotelian Synthesis*, in: KRETZMANN, N./KENNY, A./PINBORG, J. (eds.): *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982, 627–628; BOADAS-LLAVAT, A.: “Intellectus agens”: Bacon, Buenaventura, Escoto, in: SILEO, L. (org.): *Via Scoti – Metodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti* II. Roma: PAA 1995, 869–871. In the relationships between active and possible intellect and intentional object (*species*), important noetical issues are involved – for examples, issues about cognitive processes which, through spontaneous and receptive activities of the intellect and through the activity of the intentional object, produce abstractive and habitual knowledge; see PIZZO, G.: *Intellectus und memoria nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus. Das menschliche Erkenntnisvermögen als Vollzug von Spontaneität und Rezeptivität*. Köln: Verlag Butzon & Bercker Kevelaer 1998 (with analyses of *Ordinatio* I d. 27, q. 1–3).

cognitive soul shows that, on Aristotle's view, the agent intellect is the active principle of every "cognitive act" (*cognitio*) and "production" (*factio*) of an intelligible object with respect to the soul, but "not insofar as the object is an active [principle]". The cognitive soul has in itself (*intra*) enough active and passive principles, insofar as the cognitive act "respects the soul". It does not have in itself (*intra se*) enough active principle insofar as the cognitive act respects the object. In the Prologue of *Lectura*, Scotus affirms simply that the soul does not have "the active [principle] required on the side of the object".⁶¹ Hence, the internal active principle of co-causality on the side of the soul is not sufficient for intellection insofar as intellection demands whole active causality, that is, causality of internal and of external active principles (again, active intellect and object). Scotus explains and reiterates Aristotle's empiricism and philosophy of mind according to *De anima* I 4.

Scotus's first strategy will reveal, moreover, as its *second* basic feature the dismissal of premises and conclusions of the philosophers which implicitly affirm natural knowledge of God as an intelligible object by making explicit a conflict of intuitions about their definitional notion of God⁶² and the formal representation of the Christian God. A paradigmatic example of this *second* feature can be found at the end of Scotus's refutation (*Ord.* prol. 79–82) of the third argument of the philosophers (*Ord.* prol. n. 8). The second basic feature applies more or less directly to all four arguments of the philosophers. Scotus actually engages this issue at length in *Ord.* prol. n. 40–48,⁶³ while advancing his third main argument against the theory of the philosophers and in the process revealing something new about his "anti-Averroism".

In their third attempt, the *philosophi* assert, with the alleged support of Aristotle, that there are only three theoretical habits (i.e., habits whose end is the knowledge of the truth or knowledge as such,⁶⁴ and which are naturally obtainable and perfect the intellectual soul): mathematics, phy-

⁶¹ The active principle on the side of the soul is – at least in a first presentation of the object, producing the true similarity of the thing – a "diminished" principle, according to IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 35, 15: "Unde dico quod aliquid animae habet vere actionem respectu notitiae, et etiam obiectum. Unde anima habet activum et passivum quod requiritur ex parte animae, sed non habet activum quod requiritur a parte obiecti; unde illud activum quod habet ex parte sui, est deminutum".

⁶² Such a notion is nowhere clearly declared in the First Part of the Prologue to *Ordinatio* (see above in this Section), but presumed as rationally accessible and as such sufficient for bringing the intellect into perfection.

⁶³ See HOFMEISTER PICH, Roberto: *William E. Mann sobre a doutrina scotista da necessidade do conhecimento revelado: primeira consideração*, in: *Dissertatio* 19–20 (2004) 183–234.

⁶⁴ See *Ethica ad Nicomachum* A 1 1094b27–1095a11; Z 2 1139a26–29; *Metaphysica* α 2 982a14–16; E 1 1025b25–28.

sics and metaphysics ("metaphysical" theology).⁶⁵ The view that there are only three is supported, they say, by the fact these three theoretical habits consider being as a whole, both "as such" (*in se*, studied in metaphysics) and in its parts (mathematics and physics), and so there cannot be any other theoretical habit because there is nothing else for such a habit to consider. Moreover, it follows, since supernatural knowledge is presumed to be a theoretical habit, that there cannot be a supernatural theoretical habit.⁶⁶ The *philosophi* make a second argument: If indeed the object of theoretical intellect is being, and the three acquired theoretical sciences cover the knowledge of the whole of being, such sciences would seem alone to perfect theoretical intellect by promoting the full knowledge of its object.⁶⁷ Accordingly, no other habit is necessary for the perfection of theoretical intellect. Likewise, no supernatural habit is necessary. The cogency of the second argument thus clearly depends on the cogency of the first. If it can be shown that those acquired theoretical sciences do not cover knowledge of being as a whole, including knowledge of God (of the sort that professional theologians involved in the controversy believe themselves to possess, as Scotus is concerned to argue in *Ord.* prol. n. 82), then, of course, it will be possible to show that nobody is entitled to assert that those habits suffice to perfect the theoretical intellect in the complete knowledge of its object, as such or in its parts.

In spite of his detailed critical analysis of Aquinas's teaching on the nature of theoretical habits, Scotus's objection to the argument in *Ord.* prol. n. 8 is not directly related to that analysis. The decisive thesis is that, even if we admit that those theoretical sciences treat all knowable objects in a general way, they do not attain to everything knowable "about them" (*de eis*), since they do not treat of "what is proper of them" (*quantum ad propria eorum*).⁶⁸ This perspective changes radically the basic premise of

⁶⁵ Aristotle refers to metaphysics as "theology" in *Metaphysica* A 1 1026a18–23. For discussion concerning Aristotle's oscillations between first philosophy as "universal ontology" and first philosophy as "theology" in *Metaphysica* E 1 see PATZIG, G. *Theology and Ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, in: BARNES, J./SCHOFIELD, M./SORABJI, R. (eds.): *Articles on Aristotle 3 – Metaphysics*. London: Duckworth 1979, 33–49. On Scotus's reception of Aristotle's account of these three theoretical sciences, see MIRALBELL, I.: *La distinción entre metafísica, matemática y física según Duns Escoto*, in: SILEO, L. (org.): *Via Scoti – Metodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti* I. Roma: PAA 1995, 347–358.

⁶⁶ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 8, 6: "Praeterea, VI *Metaphysicae* distinguitur habitus speculativus in mathematicam, physicam et metaphysicam; et ex probatione eiusdem, ibidem, non videtur possibile esse plures habitus esse speculativos, quia in istis consideratur de toto ente, et in se et quoad omnes partes".

⁶⁷ Ibidem: "Sicut autem non posset esse aliqua speculativa alia ab istis, sic nec posset esse aliqua alia practica a practicis acquisitis activis et factivis. Ergo scientiae practicae acquisitae sufficiunt ad perficiendum intellectum practicum, et speculativae acquisitae sufficiunt ad perficiendum intellectum speculativum".

⁶⁸ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 82, 50: "Ideo ad argumentum respondeo quod in illis scientiis speculativis etsi tractetur de omnibus speculabilibus, non

the first part of the argument.⁶⁹ The expression “knowable about them” surely refers to immaterial substances as theorizable objects; the expression “what is proper of them” – and hence what is particularly knowable of such theorizable objects – refers at least to the “proper properties” of immaterial substances.⁷⁰ But I think the point can be made specifically about the divine essence, since it cannot be known properly *ut haec essentia* through natural knowledge, a knowledge which might be called “knowledge of the definition of ‘God’”, since knowing it would enable one to know a first immediate truth about God, from which it should be possible “to infer all other features” of Him.⁷¹ As Cross puts it, this is a knowledge *per se* or “essential”, “proper” or “specific to one kind”, and “immediate” or “definitional”, providing the “whole *ratio*” of God’s knowability.⁷² If professional theology can offer a formal definition of God’s nature (one divine substance and three divine Persons) and a formal description of its properties (properties of the divine essence and of the Persons), and systematize all of that within propositions, *that* is not covered by those standard theoretical sciences. This is a rational statement from the theologian’s point of view.

Philosophers can even insist that they have natural knowledge of the concepts signified by the names that they and the theologians employ and, therefore, that there is no need for any supernatural habit.⁷³ But it is possible to show philosophically that what professional philosophers and theologians conceive naturally is the same – of course only what is naturally conceivable and naturally proper for an act of assent – *and* that what they conceive as formal descriptions of theological contents (e.g., imperfect concepts of *Deus ut haec essentia*, Trinity, properties of the divine Persons, exclusive divine pure perfections as such, etc.) does not suffice, either *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, for natural knowledge of the truth or falsity

tamen quantum ad omnia cognoscibilia de eis, quia non quantum ad propria eorum, sicut patuit prius in tertia ratione contra primam opinionem [...]”.

⁶⁹ That is, that being as a whole, as such and in its parts, is considered in mathematics, physics, and metaphysics.

⁷⁰ See LYCHETUS, F.: *Commentarius*, in: IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: op. cit., n. 4, 34.

⁷¹ See CROSS, Richard: *Duns Scotus on God*. Aldershot: Ashgate 2005, 249.

⁷² Ibidem. R. Cross quotes *Ordinatio* I d. 3, p. 1, q. 1–2, n. 56, 38 and *Quaestiones quodlibetales* q. 14 n. 10. 21, 369. 400.

⁷³ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 42, 25: “Contra istam rationem arguo quod quaecumque necessaria de substantiis separatis cognoscantur a nobis nunc per fidem sive per communem revelationem, possint cognosci cognitione naturali. [...]; sed omnium necessariorum revelatorum terminos naturaliter cognoscimus; [...]”. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 44, 26: “Probatio minoris principalis, quia habens fidem et non habens contradicentes sibi invicem, non contradicunt de nominibus tantum sed de conceptibus, sicut patet cum philosophus et theologus contradicunt sibi invicem de ista ‘Deus est trinus’, ubi non tantum idem nomen sed eundem conceptum unus negat et alius affirmat; igitur omnem conceptum simplicem quem habet ille habet iste”.

of propositions composed from them.⁷⁴ The only thing that it is possible to conceive naturally about immaterial substances, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*, are contents, which although they may be “theologically named”, are grounded on general properties of being that is “common” to all things, including sensible things.⁷⁵ Philosophical theology thus places “limits” on any metaphysical knowledge of theological truths as such.⁷⁶ Scotus puts it even more clearly in the parallel text of *Lect.* prol. n. 38–43. The enumerated habits do not deal with all intelligible objects, since they do not deal with all theorizable objects, particularly immaterial substances, according to their quiditative reason. They do not deal, therefore, with their proper properties according to their proper quiditative (definitional) reason.⁷⁷ Metaphysics is the abstract science of “being as such” which begins with the real sensible. Aristotle himself was aware of the fact that the cognitive soul, departing from the material, does not attain through abstraction proper concepts of the real that are not perceptible to the senses: “Ideo dico, sicut dixi [Aristoteles], [...]”.⁷⁸ By quoting in *Lect.* prol. n. 43 the passage of *Metaphysica* E 1 1025b3–1026a19, Scotus sets the evidence of the text

⁷⁴ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 45, 26–27: “Ad istud respondeo. [...]. Ita est de nobis, quia conceptus quosdam communes habemus de substantiis materialibus et immaterialibus, et illos possumus invicem componere; sed istae complexiones non habent evidentiam nisi ex veris immediatis quae sunt de illis quiditatibus sub ratione earum propria et speciali, sub qua ratione non concipimus illas quiditates, et ideo nec scimus illas veritates generales de conceptibus generalibus”. See *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 40–48, 22–30. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 48, 29–30: “Haec tertia ratio potissime concludit de prima substantia immateriali, quia eius tamquam obiecti beatifici potissime est cognitio necessaria. Et tunc responsio ad obiectionem contra ipsam: supponit videlicet quod naturaliter nunc non concipimus Deum nisi in conceptu sibi communi et sensibilibus, quod inferius in 1 quaestione distinctionis 3 exponetur. Si etiam negetur istud suppositum, adhuc oportet dicere conceptum qui potest fieri de Deo virtute creaturae esse imperfectum; qui autem fieret virtute ipsius essentiae in se, esset perfectus. Sicut igitur dictum est de conceptu generali et speciali, ita dicatur secundum aliam viam de perfecto conceptu et imperfecto”. See important discussions on these topics in MANN, W.E.: *Duns Scotus, Demonstration, and Doctrine*, in: *Faith and philosophy* 9 (1992) 436–462; IDEM: *Duns Scotus on Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God*, in: WILLIAMS, Thomas (ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, 238–262; HOFMEISTER PICH, Roberto: *William E. Mann sobre a doutrina scotista da necessidade do conhecimento revelado: primeira consideração*, 183–234.

⁷⁵ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 40, 17: “[...], quia in metaphysica non tractatur nisi de communibus passionibus entis. Unde in scientiis naturalibus non tractatur de omnibus quantum ad passiones proprias et communes”.

⁷⁶ See HUALLACHÁIN, C.Ó.: *On Recent Studies of the Opening Questions in Scotus's Ordinatio*, in: *Franciscan Studies* 15 (1955) 1–29.

⁷⁷ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 43, 18: “Ideo dico, sicut dixi, quod licet scientiae naturales, quae numerantur in VI *Metaphysicae*, sint de omnibus subiectis speculabilibus, non tamen de eis secundum rationem quiditativam eorum, nec per consequens de passionibus illorum propriis secundum rationem propriam et quiditativam istorum, sicut patet de angelis in metaphysica”.

⁷⁸ See HUALLACHÁIN, C.Ó.: *On Recent Studies of the Opening Questions in Scotus's Ordinatio*, 19.

against the philosophers' reading of it, implying, once again, that they misinterpret Aristotle's theses.⁷⁹

Before establishing the significance of this misinterpretation in respect of the aim of the second aspect of the first strategy, I want to analyze a certain tension that Scotus considers regarding the view that it is necessary to acquire the contents of the supernatural knowledge of God as such in order to bring human nature to perfection. Scotus considers this view even though, on his own account, such knowledge is not something achievable through the natural powers of the soul alone. He discusses in *Ord. prol. n. 74–76* a conflict of intuitions *about God* as the object that fulfills intellectual nature. Those paragraphs are directed against the second argument of the philosophers (in *Ord. prol. n. 7*). There Scotus explains that, even though nature does not possess in itself the active principle required to bring naturally the natural passive potency to perfection in the intellection of God's essence as such, nevertheless nature (as passive potency for knowledge/perfection) does not exist in vain, and passive *desiderium naturale* (or *capacitas passiva*) combined with active *attingentia supernaturalis* (or *causalitas activa*) does not vitiate nature.⁸⁰

His view here is surely inspired by the theological principle that God as a singular essence is the proper end of human being. For Scotus, this means that the excellence of nature discloses a natural inclination to the dignifying perfection of the vision and fruition of God.⁸¹ The metaphor of "natural desire" (*appetitus naturalis* or *desiderium naturale*) for the perfection of vision and fruition of God as supernatural end in "attainment" (*attingentia*) itself denotes "in a more prosaic idiom [...] nothing more than that the 'will [the soul] could be naturally perfected by such a glory'".⁸² This perfection can neither be known nor realized through natural means, since it is voluntarily and graciously constituted and given by the supernatural object.⁸³ Reacting to the statement that a natural passive potency

⁷⁹ Something similar can be said of *Metaphysica* A 2 982a8–10; see IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 40, 23.

⁸⁰ See also IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 32, 18–19: "[...]: concedo Deum esse finem naturalem hominis, sed non naturaliter adipiscendum, sed supernaturaliter. Et hoc probat ratio sequens de desiderio naturali, [...]".

⁸¹ See MANZANO, G.: *El humanismo implicado en la comprension escotista de la vision beatifica*, in: BÉRUBÉ, C. (ed.): *Regnum hominis et regnum Dei I*. Roma: Societas Internationalis Scotistica 1978, 86–88. See TODISCO, O.: *Duns Scoto e il pluralismo epistemologico*, in: SILEO, L. (org.): *Via Scoti – Metodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti I*. Roma: PAA 1995, 124–125; ARMELLADA, B. de: *La gracia, misterio de libertad – El "sobrenatural" en el beato Escoto y en la escuela franciscana*. Roma: Instituto Storico dei Cappuccini 1997, 45.

⁸² See WOLTER: *Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural*, 147; IDEM: *Introduction*, in: WOLTER, Allan B. (ed.): *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*. Selected and translated with an introduction by Allan B. WOLTER. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press 1986, 43.

⁸³ See ARMELLADA, B. de: *El deseo de Dios en los escotistas del siglo XVI*, in: *Naturaleza y Gracia* 40 (1993):1 239–263; IDEM: *Metafisica escotista del sobrenatural – Un estudio sobre J.*

for supernatural perfection would then exist in vain, Scotus insists that this is not a corruption of nature.⁸⁴ By deducing from revelation the human being's "divine gift of having need of supernatural grace",⁸⁵ Scotus in no way diminishes the dignity of nature, even when viewed through the limited vision of the philosophers. On the contrary, he adds something further to it, as he states in *Lect. prol. n. 37*: "[...]; et cum hoc pono plus".⁸⁶ This means that, for an idea of happiness or human fulfillment, Aristotle's account of the natural attainment of the perfection of the soul's potencies is maintained by Scotus's theological view, and it is furthermore integrated into his account of the ultimate perfection of the soul's potencies in God.

In *Ord. prol. n. 74–76*, Scotus sees no conflict in maintaining that perfection of nature or "our happiness" (*felicitas nostra*) lies "in the highest theoretical investigation" (*in speculatione suprema*) naturally attainable now.⁸⁷ For Scotus, it is a correct view that "Aristotelian happiness"⁸⁸ consists in this, and such happiness is indeed achievable through the intellect *ex puris naturalibus*. It is perhaps also for him an "Averroean happiness" as well, at least when it is grasped from a "clear view", which is to say, on the basis of a "theoretical knowledge" of human nature.⁸⁹ Presupposing the three Aristotelian theoretical sciences which Scotus discusses in this context (see above), we can now at least think about the theoretical habit of philosophical "wisdom" (*sophia*), one of the five intellectual habits through which the soul knows the truth. As a supraconcept for *nous* and *episteme*,

Pérez López (m. 1724), in: *Laurentianum* 6 (1965) 441–442. See also VILLAMONTE, A.: *Naturaleza y gracia. El pecado original, el sobrenatural*, in: *Naturaleza y Gracia* 44 (1997) 55–56; IDEM: *El pecado original: perspectivas teológicas*, in: *Naturaleza y Gracia* 30 (1983):1 244–245, 253.

⁸⁴ See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 74–75, 45–46. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 75, 45–46: "Et si obicitur quod istud vilificat naturam quod ipsa non possit consequi perfectionem suam ex naturalibus, cum natura minus deficiat in nobilioribus, ex II *De caelo et mundo*, respondeo: [...]".

⁸⁵ See de ARMELLADA, B. de: *Il beato Giovanni Duns Scoto nella spiritualità francescana*, in: *Laurentianum* 34 (1993) 14–15.

⁸⁶ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 37, 16): "Et ego pono quod tantum potest acquirere ex naturalibus, cum ipso Philosopho; et cum hoc pono plus, quod sibi correspondet perfectio nobilior, quae causatur a superiore agente; et ideo dignifico naturam et non vilifico".

⁸⁷ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 75, 46: "[...]: si felicitas nostra consisteret in speculatione suprema ad qualem possumus nunc naturaliter attingere, non diceret Philosophus naturam deficere in necessariis. Nunc autem illam concedo posse haberi naturaliter, et ultra, dico aliam eminentiorem posse recipi naturaliter. Igitur in hoc magis dignificatur natura, quam si suprema sibi possibilis poneretur illa naturalis; nec est mirum quod ad maiorem perfectionem sit capacitas passiva in aliqua natura quam eius causalitas activa se extendat".

⁸⁸ See BOULNOIS: *Duns Scot – La rigueur de la charité*, 36–37.

⁸⁹ See LEAMAN: *Averroes and his Philosophy*, 137 (132–137, 157–159).

Aristotle calls it “the most perfect science”.⁹⁰ Wisdom’s primacy is due partially to the idea that it is knowledge *both* of first theoretical principles (*nous*)⁹¹ and of conclusions (*episteme*), and for this reason is knowledge with “absolute correctness” (*akribeia*)⁹² concerning, apparently, any first object of any theoretical habit.⁹³ Its primacy is also explained because, in certain contexts, primary objects of *sophia* are in the divine region of the cosmos (separate immaterial substances), where both first object (divine substance) and immediately posterior objects are immutable and most knowable.⁹⁴ In *Ord. prol. n. 40*, following Aristotle in *Metaphysica* A 2 982a8–10, Scotus equates “metaphysics” and the “metaphysician” with “wisdom” (*sapientia*) and the “wise” (*sapiens*) respectively. Its concern is the knowledge of all things “in a certain aspect” (*aliqua*liter), not “in particular”, and, in a special way, the (highest) knowledge of the separate substances (*Metaphysica* E 1 1026a21–23),⁹⁵ in which “perfect [natural] happiness” (*felicitas perfecta*) is to be found.⁹⁶ Scotus recognizes in Aristotle a clear discourse on philosophical theology and the philosophical happiness that involves the first substance.⁹⁷

⁹⁰ See *Ethica ad Nicomachum* Z 6 1141a1–3; 7 1141a16–20; 7, 1141b1–3. See also GIGON, O.: *Phronesis und Sophia in der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles*, in: MUELLER-GOLDINGER, Ch. (Hg.): *Schriften zur aristotelischen Ethik*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag 1988, 358.

⁹¹ See KAHN, C.H.: *The Role of nous in the Cognition of First Principles in Posterior Analytics II 19*, in: BERTI, E. (ed.): *Aristotle on Science – The “Posterior analytics”*. Padova: Editrice Antenore 1981, 398–399; HINTIKKA, J.: *Concepts of Scientific Method from Aristotle to Newton*, in: ASZTALOS, M./MURDOCH, J.E./NIINILUOTO, I. (eds.): *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy I* (= *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 48). Helsinki: Yliopistopaino 1990, 76–77.

⁹² See *Metaphysica* A 2 982a9–21.

⁹³ Therefore, *sophia* does not have a specific object, and does not characterize a specific cognitive process either; see GIGON: *Phronesis und Sophia in der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles*, 358. But Aristotle, see *Metaphysica* E 1 1026a14–23, links the objective domain of wisdom to the domains of the theoretical sciences, metaphysics, physics, and mathematics, which treat first causes and principles.

⁹⁴ See *Ethica ad Nichomacum* Z 5 1140b5–6; 7 1141b1–3. See DEFOURNY, P.: *Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics*, in: BARNES, J./SCHOFIELD, M./SORABJI, R. (eds.): *Articles on Aristotle 2. Ethics and Politics*. London: Duckworth 1977, 109; GIGON, O.: *Phronesis und Sophia in der Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles*, 361.

⁹⁵ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 40, 22–23: “Item tertio arguitur contra opinionem philosophorum principaliter. VI *Metaphysicae*: cognitio substantiarum separatorum est nobilissima, quia circa nobilissimum genus; [...]. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus I *Metaphysicae*, quod oportet sapientem omnia cognoscere aliqua liter, et non in particulari; et subdit: “Qui enim novit universalia, novit aliqua liter omnia subiecta”. ‘Sapientem’ vocat ibi metaphysicum, sicut metaphysicam vocat ibi ‘sapientiam’”.

⁹⁶ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 14, 10: “[...]”: primo, quia Philosophus sequens naturalem rationem aut ponit felicitatem esse perfectam in cognitione acquisita substantiarum separatorum, sicut videtur velle I et X *Ethicorum*, [...].

⁹⁷ Of course this does not mean, as seems to be the case for Averroes, that when Aristotle refers to metaphysics as the science of being as being, that he thinks of it as a science that has as its subject the primary instance of being, namely, God.

It seems that Scotus does here associate the idea of “happiness” with both possible destinies of human life, that is, the realization of natural capacities and the actuality of knowledge and love of God. These destinies in turn appear to model “Aristotelian happiness” (natural actualization of all powers/ends of a rational being) and “Augustinian happiness” (supernatural actualization of a rational being’s capacity for the highest perfection, that is, for the vision and fruition of God) respectively.⁹⁸ But if there is any conflict of fundamental intuitions, and if it is clear that philosophy proceeds rationally, then the theological point is an addition, and *not* a refusal or a correction. Because nature is naturally able to *receive* the highest happiness – a perfection higher than any naturally attainable, since it is an action from an ontologically superior agent⁹⁹ – it is for the theologian more dignified than if it were perfectible only under that first model. And now it becomes obvious that the axiom *natura nihil frustra fecit* is preserved. Natural desire for supernatural perfection, expressed as “an ontological relationship of perfectibility”,¹⁰⁰ does not exist in vain: if the possibility of its intrinsic realization is already given, so is the possibility of its extrinsic realization, because the theologian knows that there is some active principle that can bring that potency to realization, although it need not bring it to realization.¹⁰¹ Theology thus only adds something true, in this case about human being’s natural passive capacity for supernatural perfection, to whatever is true of human nature according to reason.

What then is the significance of the misinterpretation concerning the theological idea of God for the second aspect of the first strategy? As I understand it, the first strategy is an attack, using reason alone, upon four philosophical arguments. The second aspect, as explained above, reveals something about the philosophers’ own understanding of their premises and conclusions. Propositions such as (1) “The agent intellect and the possible intellect are in the soul naturally and not hindered with respect to all intelligible objects” (first argument) and (2) “The knowledge contained in Aristotle’s three acquired theoretical sciences extends to the whole of being” (third argument), even if they were not falsifiable and irrespective of their being falsifiable, are understood by the philosophers in an absolute sense that they cannot rationally possess. The point is that, in an absolute

⁹⁸ See PERREIAH, A.R.: *Scotus on Human Emotions*, in: *Franciscan Studies* 56 (1998) 343–345 (also note 68).

⁹⁹ See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 37, 16. See VIGNAUX, Paul: *Lire Duns Scot aujourd’hui*, 35; IDEM: *Humanisme et théologie chez Jean Duns Scot*, in: VIGNAUX, Paul: *De Saint Anselme à Luther*. Paris: Vrin 1976, 175–176.

¹⁰⁰ See WOLTER: *Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural*, 146.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem. See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* III (= *Opera omnia*, vol. VII. 1). Reprographischer Nachdruck der Ausgabe Lyon 1639. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung 1968, d. 13, q. 4, n. 15, 272.

sense, they are not evident¹⁰². In an absolute sense they cannot be the object of a rational assent, since the intellect cannot have evidence of the true meaning of (1') "The agent intellect and the possible intellect are in the soul naturally and not hindered with respect to all intelligible objects *absolutely*" and (2') "The knowledge contained in Aristotle's three acquired theoretical sciences extends to the whole of being *absolutely*", where "absolutely"¹⁰³ means "there is no knowable truth which is beyond the active power of human nature to know it". After all, in his discussion of the axiom *natura nihil frustra fecit*, Scotus attempts to show that at least the possibility of the contradictory proposition is true: "It is logically possible that some knowable truth is beyond the active power of human nature to know it, so that human nature can receive it only in a supernatural way".¹⁰⁴

Because of this, reason can only assent to the following versions of those philosophical propositions: (1'') "The agent intellect and the possible intellect are in the soul naturally and not hindered with respect to all intelligible objects *knowable through natural reason alone as it is now*" and (2'') "The knowledge contained in Aristotle's three acquired theoretical sciences extends to the whole of being *knowable through natural reason alone as it is now*". Reason can even suppose that these propositions are true, but nevertheless *they are not* the philosophers' propositions in the form that they assume within the arguments. Falsity for Scotus is not the only problem with the propositions of the *philosophi*; in the sense explicated, they also generally lack the property of being evident.

III. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Having concluded my analysis of the first argument of the first strategy, I offer the following preliminary conclusions about the controversy and Scotus's "anti-Averroism", having eliminated, so I believe, the need to speak of his anti-Averroism as if it were a conjecture: (i) The Averroist philosophers transform an interpretation of Averroes into an opinion putatively held by Aristotle himself. They perform a similar transformation of some putative Aristotelian conclusions concerning truths of Christian theology (main question). For Scotus, then, the opinions in question are neither Aristotle's own nor Aristotelian; in terms of their contents, they are at most *heterodox* Aristotelianism. (ii) If such a heterodox Aristotelianism represents an interpretation and development of central aspects of Averroes's thought and is thus a kind of "Averroism" (again in the sense of making use of

¹⁰² See also Sections IV and V below.

¹⁰³ I have in mind the Latin expression "*simpliciter*".

¹⁰⁴ Unfortunately I cannot explain here a central content of this proposition, namely the concept of supernatural (see IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 57–65, 35–40); on this topic see HOFMEISTER PICH, Roberto: *William E. Mann sobre a doutrina scotista da necessidade do conhecimento revelado: segunda consideração*, 7–59.

Aristotle against Christian theological statements), then, for Scotus, heterodox Aristotelianism or Averroism is not genuine Aristotelianism. (iii) If such an Averroism represents a misinterpretation and misuse of Aristotle's (true) premises in arguments – one that yields conclusions contrary to Aristotle's intentions – then Averroism is a product of both bad history of philosophy and bad philosophy. (iv) Scotus's philosophical rejection of the four arguments of the philosophers illustrates his view that Averroism is bad philosophy as such, and that its premises can be rationally falsified. In this sense Scotus's anti-Averroism can be understood as a legitimate controversy involving philosophy versus philosophy, since it can be arbitrated within the field of rational assessment alone. (v) If Averroism for Scotus is a philosophical denial of the necessity of supernaturally revealed theology, in the sense that what is knowable – about God too – in an absolute sense is what is philosophically knowable, then even if Averroism were good history of philosophy, it would disrespect Christian theological standards for conceiving and knowing God and/or go beyond (in a sense to arrive short of) what can be said rationally about the knowability of supernaturally revealed truths. In this sense, Scotus's anti-Averroism can again be understood as a legitimate controversy involving philosophy versus philosophy, since it is arbitrated within the field of rational assessment alone. (vi) According to the elements of the first strategy in the First Part of the Prologue, Scotus is philosophically an anti-Averroist, as Averroism was represented by a group of philosophers. To be such is of course not the same as being against Averroes.¹⁰⁵ (vii) Thus far I conclude that, of the traditional themes associated with Averroism in the general historiographical and theoretical senses outlined, four concern Scotus: the topic of the autonomy of philosophy, the topic of philosophy's relationship to religious beliefs, the problem of dealing with starting points and conclusions very different in theology and philosophy, and the rational account of happiness in this life. These four topics have special importance for Siger of Brabant and for Boethius of Dacia.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ See also Section I above.

¹⁰⁶ See WIPPEL, J.F.: *Siger of Brabant* (c. 1240–c. 1284), in: CRAIG, Edward (ed.): *The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 8. London: Routledge 1998, 764–766; EBBESEN: *Averroism*, 597. See also WIELAND, Georg: *Happiness: the Perfection of Man*, in: KRETZMANN, N./KENNY, A./PINBORG, J. (eds.): *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982, 680–683; LEAMAN: *Averroes and his Philosophy*, 163–178; WELS, H.: *Zu einer Theorie der doppelten Wahrheit in dem 'Tractatus de aeternitate mundi' des Boethius von Dacien*, in: NIEWÖHNER, F./STURLESE, L. (Hgg.): *Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance*. Zürich: Spur Verlag 1994, 87–90, 95–97; SANGALLI, I.J.: *O filósofo e a felicidade – O filosofar como condição para a felicidade em Siger de Brabante, Boécio de Dácia e Giacommo de Pistóia*. Porto Alegre: PUCRS (Tese de Doutorado em Filosofia) 2004, 122–136, 137–157; PERKAMS, M.: *Einleitung*, in: SIGER VON BRABANT: *Quaestiones in tertium De anima: Über die Lehre vom Intellekt nach Aristoteles* (= Herders Bibliothek der Philosophie des Mittelalters 12). Freiburg: Herder Verlag 2007, 12–15, 21–23.

IV. METHOD AND TRUTH

Some important studies of the Prologue to *Ordinatio* have established that the *theologi* involved in the controversy with “heterodox Aristotelian” philosophers are most likely a group of “Augustinians” influenced by Henry of Ghent.¹⁰⁷ Scotus allies himself with them but only partially. For example, he does not affirm, as they do, the “deficiency of nature” (*defectum naturae*).¹⁰⁸ And he is in agreement with the first three arguments of the theologians (*Ord. prol. n. 13–18. 40–41*), but not with the last two (*Ord. prol. n. 49–53*),¹⁰⁹ which presuppose the doctrine of special illumination. However the second general strategy to deal with the controversy – namely to present, explain, and defend theologically the arguments of Scotus the theologian – is to be found precisely in Scotus’s five *rationes* for the central question and against the account of the philosophers (*Ord. prol. n. 12–56*). There is a theological knowledge that human beings need for “perfection”, and it must be supernaturally inspired. Since this is the conclusion that decides the *quaestio*, our first focus now is actually on the justification for the way that a theological conclusion can be obtained from the first principles of theology.

If the theologian wants to speak of supernatural truths and what can be deduced from them, he must grant two premises; the text which formulates them, *Ord. prol. n. 12*, was originally a marginal note in the course of the exposition.¹¹⁰ It represents Scotus’s own reflection on the nature of the five arguments in *Ord. prol. n. 13–56*, and not that of the theologians. For Scotus, through natural reason (and experience, we might add) (a) nothing supernatural can be shown to exist in the pilgrim, nor can anything supernatural (as a natural truth) necessarily be required as such for his perfec-

¹⁰⁷ See especially WOLTER, Allan B: *Introduction to “Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge. Introduction and Translation of the Prologue of the Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus Part I”*, in: *Franciscan Studies* 11 (1951) 235–236; IDEM: *Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural*, 128–129.

¹⁰⁸ It is just the case that the potencies of the soul are not in their ideal “modality of activity”; see GHISALBERTI, A.: *Metodologia del sapere teologico nel Prologo alla “Ordinatio” di Giovanni Duns Scoto*, in: SILEO, L. (org.): *Via Scoti – Metodologica ad mentem Ioannis Duns Scoti I*. Roma: PAA 1995, 278–279. See also Section I above.

¹⁰⁹ See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 13–18. 40–41, 9–13. 22–25; n. 49–53, 30–32*. See *ibidem*, n. 54, 32: “Tres primae rationes probabiliore apparent”.

¹¹⁰ See WOLTER: *Introduction to “Duns Scotus on the Necessity of Revealed Knowledge. Introduction and Translation of the Prologue of the Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus Part I”*, 235. IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 12, 9*: “Nota, nullum supernaturale potest ratione naturali ostendi inesse viatori, nec necessario requiri ad perfectionem eius; nec etiam habens potest cognoscere illud sibi inesse. Igitur impossibile est hic contra Aristotelem uti ratione naturali: si arguatur ex creditis, non est ratio contra philosophum, quia praemissam creditam non concedet. Unde istae rationes hic factae contra ipsum alteram praemissam habent creditam vel probatam ex credito; ideo non sunt nisi persuasiones theologicae, ex creditis ad creditum”.

tion, (b) nor can the one who has in himself some supernatural thing know that some supernatural thing is in him.¹¹¹ In light of these convictions, it is wrong to think that the five *rationes* (which presuppose the faith statement that certain truths are supernatural in causation), when combined with Aristotelian principles, can yield conclusions through natural reason, and hence conclusions against philosophy. The point is not that those arguments cannot yield conclusions against Aristotle or against philosophy – this is plainly possible (see below). The point is that, as a matter of fact, they do not yield conclusions against Aristotle or philosophy “through natural reason” (*ut ratione naturali*) – that is, as if they were philosophical reasonings based on evidence against Aristotle’s philosophical reasonings based on evidence. There is no cognitive experience, therefore, in the present state, which provides strict knowledge of the supernatural.¹¹² The “anti-Averroism” of the *theologi* does not succeed as long as they try to provide experiential or evident proofs of any kind against the *philosophi*.

For supernaturally revealed doctrines and their necessity, the theologian argues based on premises (non-inferentially) believed or (inferentially) believed. Scotus does refute the philosophers’ opinion with *rationes*. However he forms syllogisms using premises from faith. He now takes premises of the philosophers’ arguments – not of philosophical arguments as such – as false (see below) because they contrast with premises of faith taken as true. The reasons which refute a negative reply to the central question are, therefore, “theological persuasions” (*persuasiones theologicae*).¹¹³ They include at least one premise taken from revelation and accepted by faith. Epistemically, such *rationes* are *syllogismi dialectici*, but they are not *opiniones*: their premises do not possess evidence, but they are supposed

¹¹¹ Actually premise (b) seems conflated with the first part of (a), but perhaps the specific point in (b) is that it puts the emphasis on a subject’s own experience.

¹¹² See AUER, J.: *Die “skotistische” Lehre von der Heilsgewißheit. Walter von Chatton, der erste “Skotist”*, in: *Wissenschaft und Weisheit* 16 (1953) 3; BÉRUBÉ, C.: *Humanisme et vertus théologiques chez Duns Scot*, in: BÉRUBÉ, C. (ed.): *Homo et mundus*. Roma: Societas Internationalis Scotistica 1984, 13, 24–25. Bérubé notes that Scotus in *Ordinatio* I d. 17, q. 3, denies any noetical certainty to the state of grace. No experience and no use of natural reason can prove that someone has in himself infused habits and virtues. The three conditions for a theological habit, (i) that it has God as its immediate object, (b) that it has God as a practical rule and is not acquired, (c) that it is infused immediately by God, are not known with evidence. See also IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* III (= *Opera omnia* VII. 1). Reprographischer Nachdruck der Ausgabe Lyon 1639. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung 1968, d. 23, q. un., n. 14. 17, 468–469, 471. Since the scholars in charge of the modern Vatican edition concluded that *Ordinatio* III d. 18–25, transmitted as a *supplementum* in several codices and also in the Wadding and Vivès editions, comes directly from (and remains in terms of contents very close to) the Oxonian *Lectura* III, I give here also the corresponding reference to IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* III (= *Opera theologica omnia* XXI). Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis 2004, d. 23, q. un., n. 48. 56–58, 115–116. 118–119.

¹¹³ See MANN: *Duns Scotus, Demonstration, and Doctrine*, 36–62; IDEM: *Duns Scotus on Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God*, 252–253.

to have, as objects of intellectual acts, different grades of external *certainty* and *intensity* of assent for the one who holds them, because of their credibility, truthful origin and testimony, and defense by authority (acquired faith), or because of their highest truthful and authoritative origin in the revealing God Himself (infused faith).¹¹⁴ Theological persuasions begin with believed premises, but do not begin, like opinions, with inevidence and uncertainty.¹¹⁵ Of course they are not demonstrations, since their premises do not possess, as the subject knows them according to the meaning of the terms, “internal” certainty and evidence. Scientific knowledge is basically knowledge of a necessary first object, defined through the primacy of containing virtually all truths of a habit. *Scientia* is hence a logical-deductive system of necessary conclusions, based on necessary and self-evident propositions. Conditions for scientific knowledge *in se* of a necessary object are the three *objective* conditions of *perfect* knowledge: (a) certainty, (b) necessity and (c) evidence.¹¹⁶

Theological persuasions do however have a rational argumentative function.¹¹⁷ They demand methodological purity, showing that philosophical language must not use premises that are not knowable in an evident way through natural reason. I now present briefly a corollary to this: the theologian, since he accepts propositions through faith, is entitled to classify in the manner of faith certain philosophical statements as false, and may also affirm rationally that premises of faith represent a limit to reason’s power of assent to what is evident. The judgment of the philosopher must be simpler: he can only assure that he does not employ at all either theological truths or mere beliefs, since he does not have evidence of their truth through reason. Concerning such propositions, the philosopher’s appropriate attitude is one of “neutrality”.¹¹⁸ For the theologian (or the man of faith), it is acceptable to judge that philosophical truth is not the sole

¹¹⁴ See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* III d. 23, q. un., n. 4–5. 14–19, 460–461. 468–473; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* III d. 23, q. un., n. 13–20. 48–67, 100–104. 115–122. If *a* believes that *p*, then *p* is certain for *a*; see VOS, A.: *Kennis en noodzakelijkheid. Een kritische analyse van het absolute evidentialisme in wijsbegeerte en theologie*. Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij 1982, 73.

¹¹⁵ See *Analytica posteriora* A 33 88b30–90a10; 89a33–89b6; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* III d. 23, q. un., n. 5, 461; IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Lectura* III d. 23, q. un., n. 17–20, 102–104.

¹¹⁶ Being (d) discursivity modified in non-Aristotelian ways and not belonging as such to the definition of science. See IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 3, q. 1–3, n. 141–149, 95–101; p. 4, q. 1–2, n. 208–209, 142–143. See also HOFMEISTER PICH, Roberto: *Der Begriff der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis nach Johannes Duns Scotus*. Bonn: unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn) 2001.

¹¹⁷ See GILSON, Étienne: *Les maîtresses positions de Duns Scot d’après le Prologue de l’Ordinatio*, in: Antonianum 28 (1953) 8; ZAVALLONI, R.: *Ragione e fede in Duns Scoto nel contesto del pensiero medievale*, in: SILEO, L. (org.): *Via Scoti – Methodologica ad mentem Ioannis Duns Scoti* II. Roma: PAA 1995, 605.

¹¹⁸ See BOULNOIS: *Duns Scot – La rigueur de la charité*, 68.

truth or the truth as such,¹¹⁹ and that philosophy cannot replace theology; for the philosopher (the man of evidence), it is not possible to judge whether philosophical truth is the sole truth or not, and he has no way to know whether philosophy can replace theology or not.

The truth of all this is not trivial. The corollary above has substantial textual support in *Ord.* prol. n. 70–71, where Scotus presents a last objection to his three central reasons. Philosophers affirm that those three arguments of the theologians (i) either are only known through faith (ii) or, if they are not only known through faith, permit one to conclude (*concluditur*) the opposite of what they “prove” (*probant*).¹²⁰ I suppose that the philosophers here do not take the theologians’ arguments according to Scotus’s critical explanation of them in *Ord.* prol. n. 12, where he explicitly establishes their foundation on faith and their persuasive character. Because of this misinformation, they accuse *the theologians* of bringing forward reasons that are self-destructive:¹²¹

- (Major premise): What is shown to be necessary to be known is shown to be true – some thing’s being the case is a necessary condition of its being knowable, under any kind of “modal” qualification.¹²²

- (Minor premise): Many truths are shown by the theologians to be necessary to be known (“The fruition of God in Himself is human being’s ultimate end” (*ratio prima*); “The way to achieve the fruition of God in Himself relies on the merits that God freely accepts as being worth of such a reward” (*ratio secunda*); “God is triune and causes contingently” (*ratio tertia*), etc.).

- (Conclusion): Therefore, all theological truths derived by Scotus and the group of theologians are shown to be true.

Why do the reasons against the philosophers destroy themselves? The key for seeing this is to understand the middle term of the premises as reading “To be shown to be necessary to be known *supernaturally*”, since it is the

¹¹⁹ See FLASCH: *Aufklärung im Mittelalter? Die Verurteilung von 1277*, condemned thesis 146: “Quod possibile vel impossibile simpliciter, id est, omnibus modis, est possibile vel impossibile”. This thesis clearly shows a confusion concerning the notion of taking a thesis “absolutely” and the notion of taking it only “naturally”. See above at the end of Section II.

¹²⁰ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 70, 41: “Vel igitur istas rationes non sunt nisi ex fide, vel ex ipsis concluditur oppositum illius quod probant”.

¹²¹ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 70, 41: “Contra istas tres rationes simul instatur quod seipsas destruant, quia quod ostenditur esse necessario cognoscendum, hoc ostenditur esse verum, quia nihil scire nisi verum; ergo quidquid istae rationes ostendunt necessarium esse cognosci (puta quod fruitio Dei in se est finis hominis, quoad primam, – via deveniendi ad ipsam, est per merita quae Deus acceptat ut digna tali praemio, quoad secundam, – quod Deus est trinus et contingenter causat, et huiusmodi, quoad tertiam), totum illud ostenditur esse verum”.

¹²² Many authorities can be quoted here; see, for instance, *Analytica posteriora* A 2 71b25–26.

basic form of the conclusion of all three arguments. Seen in this light, the reason for the philosophers' complaint seems to be that, if theologians "prove" or "show" that certain truths are necessary to be known supernaturally, then they "prove" or "show" that it is true that certain truths are necessary to be known supernaturally, and that means that "Certain truths are necessary to be known supernaturally" – the positive conclusion of the whole *quaestio*! – is a natural truth. Even more can be said: such a stance cancels the property of "being believed" of any theological truth, for if I prove that "The proposition 'The fruition of God in Himself is human being's ultimate end' is necessary to be known supernaturally", this implies that I show that that proposition is true, hence that it is a natural truth. (Of course I can only know the truth of a conclusion in a valid syllogistic demonstration if I know the truth of the premises as well – the evident truth of a syllogistic conclusion is explained *per aliud*. So the argument is even more damaging for the theologians). If this is correct, it appears that I need no supernatural revealed knowledge at all – in opposition to the theologians' own conclusion. The probative character of those reasons seems to be contradictory, since I cannot *demonstrate* ("ostendere" and "*probare*" are the verbs used in *Ord. prol. n. 70–71*)¹²³ that the knowledge of something necessarily has to be caused supernaturally unless I *know* it to be true, that is, if I only *believe* in it. The syllogism above sounds like a legitimate objection to an incorrect understanding by the group of theologians about their very own arguments.

Shortly thereafter Scotus explains the "demonstrative" character of his reasons.¹²⁴ They do not destroy themselves, unless people misunderstand them, since they are not strict Aristotelian demonstrations, but persuasions that do not provide evidence. The way that faith persuasions work and the way that men of evidence can slip out of the path of their epistemic rule is the lesson to be learned through another example of a disjunction (one that resembles the contradiction at the beginning of this study):

(B) – "The fruition of God in Himself is the human being's ultimate end or the fruition of God in Himself is not the human being's ultimate end".¹²⁵

This can be similarly read as:

¹²³ Perhaps they reveal a common usage among the group of theologians involved in the controversy.

¹²⁴ IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 71, 41–42: "Respondeo: naturali ratione ostenditur necessarium esse scire alteram partem determinate huius contradictionis 'fruitio est finis, fruitio non est finis', hoc est, quod intellectus non est mere dubius vel neuter in hoc problemate 'an fruitio sit finis', quia talis dubitatio vel ignorantia impediret inquisitionem finis; non autem ostenditur naturali ratione quod haec pars sit necessario cognoscenda. Et hoc modo rationes praedictae ut sunt naturales concluduntur de altera parte contradictionis, hac vel illa; non determinate de hac nisi ex creditis tantum".

¹²⁵ That is, "The fruition of God in Himself" as professional theologians would describe it.

(B') "The fruition of God in Himself is the human being's ultimate end" is a true proposition, according to the theologians; it is a theological truth.
and

(B'') "The fruition of God in Himself is not human being's ultimate end" is a true proposition, according to some philosophers; it is a philosophical truth.

Through natural reason, following the non-contradiction and the bivalence principle, it is shown to be necessary to know a proposition (Scotus repeats the terminology of *Ord. prol. n. 70*) or one part of a contradiction¹²⁶ "according to its truth value" (*determinate*), in order to know the other part of the contradiction according to its truth value – hence to know what is true and what is false in it. This is an instance of natural knowledge, and it amounts to, first, that by naturally knowing that requirement about this very contradiction everyone knows naturally that the intellect doubts and is indifferent regarding "whether the fruition of God in Himself is human being's ultimate end or not" – that is, regarding the truth value of each of the two propositions. Second, the first natural knowledge implies that by naturally having doubt and being indifferent to this contradiction, the intellect naturally knows that it is necessary to know this or that part of this contradiction according to its truth value, in order to remove doubt or ignorance about that end, otherwise its doubt or ignorance about that end hinders the investigation (and the attainment) of that end. Scotus seems here to conflate the first group of natural knowledge about that contradiction with another definitely natural knowledge – namely, that every rational agent knows that, in order to achieve his proper end, it is necessary to know a determinate end, which is the realization of his nature, for which he must then necessarily act in a specific way.¹²⁷

For Scotus the theologian, the decisive idea about that contradiction is that through natural reason it is not possible to show that this or that part is true of human nature, and therefore must necessarily be known to bring it to perfection – this a rational lesson. No part of that contradiction is a proposition rationally knowable now, and natural reason knows with evidence no premise which contains this or that part. The three reasons, "as they are natural" (or "proceed naturally" or syllogistically;¹²⁸ *ut sunt naturales*), conclude determinately the truth of one part of that contradiction, on the necessity of knowing this part of that contradiction, therefore, that it is necessary to know supernaturally that the fruition of God in Himself is

¹²⁶ Of course I understand "contradiction" here as an exclusive "disjunction" of two contradictory propositions, to be solved just like in the following disjunctive syllogism: "Either *P* or $\neg P$ "; "Not- $(\neg P)$ "; "Therefore, *P*".

¹²⁷ See LYCHETUS, F.: *Commentarius*, in: IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: op. cit., n. 87, 30.

¹²⁸ Ibidem. See also the comment on "persuasions" as "valid deductive arguments" in: CROSS: *Duns Scotus on God*, 127–130.

the human being's ultimate end. But theologians follow all these steps departing from premises of faith – truths supernaturally revealed. Philosophers do not conclude to any part of that contradiction at all, and so they suspend judgment on every theological proposition of this sort. They are for them neutral propositions.¹²⁹ This is what follows from the “epistemic duty”¹³⁰ of evidence: to say that “The fruition of God in Himself is not human being's ultimate end” is a true proposition, that is, to assent to it, is to go far beyond the duty of evidence.¹³¹ The “doxastic duty” of faith concedes revealed truths and what remains in agreement with them, and this is what follows from it: it is permissible to assent to the proposition “The fruition of God in Himself is human being's ultimate end”. The doxastic duty of faith concedes also the judgment that some philosophical propositions – surely *not* rationally evident true propositions! – are false: it is permissible to say that “The fruition of God in Himself is not human being's ultimate end” is a false proposition.

This last move, the move of identifying errors, irrespective of its pointing to the recklessness of inevidence or even to philosophical falsities as such demonstrable through a good use of reason, is especially clear in the famous paragraph of *Ord. prol. n. 41*.¹³² Scotus refers in it to errors already

¹²⁹ See also HOFMEISTER PICH: *William E. Mann sobre a doutrina scotista da necessidade do conhecimento revelado: primeira consideração*, 185–196.

¹³⁰ With the expression “epistemic duty” I am not making reference to any specific contemporary theory of knowledge in terms of a theory of justification of beliefs. I am also not making a point on the general question “How do we know?” or “How do we have justified true belief?”, but only on the way that philosophers, accepting rational assent to evident propositions, have to observe this in arguments; the same is valid analogously of the expression “doxastic duty” – the way theologians, giving assent of faith to inevident propositions, observe this in arguments.

¹³¹ Interestingly, Scotus's sharp criticism of Avicenna's way of determination of the first natural object of the intellect – irrespective of its relevance to the theme itself and the topic of a proper knowledge of God in metaphysics – denounces a certain confusion of philosophical proof with religious belief; see IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 24, 15; n. 33, 19–20: “Ad aliud negandum est illud quod assumitur, quod scilicet naturaliter cognoscitur ens esse primum obiectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum total indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia, et quod dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum. Miscuit enim sectam suam – quae fuit secta Machometi – philosophicis, et quaedam dixit ut philosophica et ratione probata, alia ut consona sectae suae: unde expresse ponit libro IX *Metaphysicae* cap. 7 animam separatam cognoscere substantiam immaterialem in se, et ideo sub obiecto primo intellectus habuit ponere substantiam immaterialem contineri”. See also ANDONEGUI, J.: ““Miscuit enim sectam suam”: Escoto entre Avicenna y Averroes”, in: SILEO, L. (org.): *Via Scoti – Metodologica ad mentem Joannis Duns Scoti* II. Roma: PAA 1995, 661–679.

¹³² IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 41, 23–25: “Nec cognoscimus ista eorum propria demonstratione quia et ex effectibus. Quod probatur: nam effectus vel relinquunt intellectum dubium quoad ista propria, vel abducunt illum in errorem. Quod apparet de proprietatibus primae substantiae immaterialis in se; proprietates enim eius est quod sit communicabilis tribus; sed effectus non ostendunt istam proprietatem, quia non sunt ab ipso in quantum trino. Et si ab effectibus arguatur ad causam, magis deducunt in oppositum et in errorem, quia in nullo effectus invenitur una natura nisi in uno supposito.

condemned in 1277 – and there is no doubt that *he* is condemning errors of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, and whomever else repeats these theses;¹³³ paradigmatically, natural reason can be in doubt about the existence of the triune God, but theology affirms directly that philosophy is wrong if it states *a posteriori* in a *quia* demonstration that “There is a first being whose unique divine nature is in only one supposit”, “The triune God does not exist”, or “The first being causes necessarily everything it causes”,¹³⁴ etc. The old condemned theses of 1277 figure here as errors of philosophers in a general sense; the new ones appear as errors too, and as a wrong, non-orthodox understanding of (Aristotelian) philosophy, of a specific group of philosophers who invoke Averroes.

V. FINAL CONCLUSIONS

Having concluded my analysis of the second strategy, I offer some final conclusions about the controversy and Scotus's “anti-Averroism”, here too seeing no further need to place it within scare quotes: (viii) philosophy and theology have different starting points and conclusions; they are methodologically separated, because of the epistemic nature of their starting-points. (ix) In this respect, Scotus manifests *indirect* agreement with Averroistic authors such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, who insist on the methodological autonomy of theology and philosophy, with starting points in faith/revelation and evidence/reason alone, respectively.¹³⁵ The

Proprietas etiam istius naturae ad extra est contingenter causare; et ad oppositum huius magis effectus ducunt, in errorem, ut patet per opinionem philosophorum, ponentium primum necessario causare quidquid causat. De proprietatibus etiam [...]. Similiter [...]. Similiter [...]. Quae omnia sunt absurda”. See, for example, FLASCH, Kurt: op. cit., condemned theses 1, 34, 52, and 87.

¹³³ See his words on the Greco-Arabic “necessitarianism” also in IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS: *Ordinatio* prol. p. 1, q. un., n. 18, 13: “[...], quia hic errabant philosophi, ponentes omnia quae sunt a Deo immediate esse ab eo necessario”.

¹³⁴ It is Scotus's *philosophical* conviction that God's actions *ad extra* are free; see HONNEFELDER, Ludger: *Die Kritik des Johannes Duns Scotus am kosmologischen Notwendigkeitsbegriff der Araber: Ansätze zu einem neuen Freiheitsbegriff*, in: FRIED, J. (Hg.): *Die Abendländische Freiheit vom 10. zum 14. Jahrhundert*. Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag 1991, 253–254, 260–263. But that belongs to the first strategy (see Sections II and III above), not to the persuasions. In texts like *Ordinatio* prol. n. 41 Scotus expresses a *theological* conviction about God's freedom in relation to creation – perhaps a conscious rejection of the use that Siger of Brabant made of Aristotle's thesis *quod Deum necesse est facere quidquid immediate fit ab ipso*. See INGHAM, M.E.: *The Condemnation of 1277: Another Light on Scotist Ethics*, in: *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 37 (1990) 93–94; STONE, Martin W.F.: *Moral Psychology after 1277 – Did the Parisian Condemnation Make a Difference to Philosophical Discussions of Human Agency?*, in: AERTSEN, Jan A./EMERY, Kent Jr./SPEER, Andreas (Hgg.): *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 27). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2001, 797–804.

¹³⁵ Surely the recognition of different conclusive methods means also, for Siger of Brabant, a distinction of different ways of demonstration concerning God, namely, in terms of “philosophical theology” or “metaphysics” and of *sacra scriptura*; see MAURER, Armand:

philosopher must evaluate premises and conclusions of arguments according to their evidence to natural reason; the theologian must evaluate premises and conclusions of arguments according to their origin in revelation.¹³⁶ (x) The group of philosophers in question is clearly characterized by Scotus as having the tendency to hold certain philosophical propositions through a rational procedure and then, in compliance with this procedure, to feel compelled to *deny* theological propositions related to the same topics – they express a kind of “rationalism” inspired by Averroes that should imply the denial of the “supernatural”:¹³⁷ so they can hold rationally, on the question about the first being in the order of essential causes, that “There is a first being whose divine nature is in one supposit”, concluding “Therefore, the triune God does not exist”, etc. We have seen how Scotus shows that this tendency¹³⁸ – “I know *P* with evidence; therefore, I judge that *Q*, which is not evident to me, is false” – is philosophically mistaken. Scotus proposes a correction to this “rationalism”.¹³⁹

(xi) Yet another conclusion regarding a subject outlined at the beginning of the study emerges: namely, Scotus has a clear, even if also indirect, view concerning the problem of “double truth”. First, since we have seen that supernatural truth – the supernatural truth of a *desiderium naturale* (Section II above) – adds to what we know about nature and its perfection, I do think that Scotus would admit the “logical subtlety”¹⁴⁰ of distinguishing *veritas secundum quid*, partial truth, rationally obtainable about

Siger of Brabant and Theology, in: *Mediaeval Studies* 50 (1988) 257–278. The analysis above (Section II) shows that Scotus makes a similar distinction, relating both in terms of “addition”.

¹³⁶ See WIPPEL: *Siger of Brabant* (c. 1240–c. 1284), 765; IDEM: *Siger of Brabant: What it Means to Proceed Philosophically*, in: AERTSEN, Jan A. (Hg.): *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1998, 493–494. See MARENBON, John: *Later Medieval Philosophy (1150–1350). An Introduction*. London: Routledge 1991, 71–72.

¹³⁷ Averroes’s theology shows a certain ambiguity on this subject; see ALONSO, Manuel: *Teología de Averroes (Estudios y documentos)*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 1947, 102–105; URVOY, D.: *Averroès – Les ambitions d’un intellectuel musulman*. Paris: Flammarion 1998, 136–146. But see also LEAMAN: *Is Averroes an Averroist?*, 19–22.

¹³⁸ See, for example, BADAWI, ‘A.: *Averroès (Ibn Rushd)*, 123–124.

¹³⁹ In the Prologue to *Ordinatio*, the group of philosophers shows nothing like a “fideist” approach to apparent contradictions between reason and faith. Averroism was characterized indeed both by “rationalism” and “fideism” concerning the status of philosophy and theology; see LEAMAN, O.: *Averroes and his Philosophy*, 170–174. See also TORNERO, E.: *Fideismo e razionalismo di Averroè*, in: CAMPANINI, M. (a cura di): *L’intelligenza della fede. Filosofia e religione in Averroè e nell’averroismo*. Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore 1989, 147–151; BADAWI, ‘A.: *Averroè era razionalista?*, in: CAMPANINI, M. (a cura di): *L’intelligenza della fede. Filosofia e religione in Averroè e nell’averroismo*. Bergamo: Pierluigi Lubrina Editore 1989, 163–167.

¹⁴⁰ See DE LIBERA, Alain: *Philosophie et censure – Remarques sur la crise universitaire parisienne de 1270–1277*, in: AERTSEN, Jan A. (Hg.): *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1998, 87–89.

the world and human nature as in all theoretical sciences, and *veritas simpliciter*, absolute truth affirmed by faith¹⁴¹ – a distinction well known in Averroistic circles and among the opponents of Averroism in the last quarter of the 13th century. But if the distinction applies to Scotus, then it is not the case that to state a proposition *P* as philosophical truth *secundum quid* in the full sense of philosophical evidence is to profess it for the sake of discussion or in a non-assertive way, as in a “non-apophantic” discourse, but rather to state it in an only “natural” or “non-absolute” sense. In this vein, we might say that “The highest theoretical activity is human being’s happiness *naturally*” functions as a rational *truth* asserted by philosopher and (philosophical) theologian as well. However it does not express everything about human nature’s happiness. Thus to a truth of faith belongs not only an assertive statement on the part of the theologian, but surely an assertion in an absolute sense, where “absolute sense” means “highest”, “most perfect”, “ultimate” or “absolutely proper to bring fulfillment”. Accordingly, we might say that “The vision and fruition of God is human nature’s happiness *absolutely*”.¹⁴²

(xii) Second, if “double truth theory” means that “two contradictory propositions, one taught by philosophy and one taught by faith, could both be true at the same time”¹⁴³ – for example “Supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines inspired supernaturally to human being are unnecessary” and “Supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines inspired supernaturally to human being are necessary”, so that the *caput* of the main question of the First Part of the Prologue to *Ordinatio* is itself inserted in the controversy as a double truth (*Ord. prol. n. 5a*)! – then Scotus’s point cannot be simply to deny such a theory. His point is rather to say that this is a pseudo-problem, since no relevant double truth can be formed. The reason is that no *legitimate* philosophical proposition – e.g., “The highest theoretical activity is human being’s happiness *naturally*” (we must keep in mind that propositions denying supernatural revealed contents are not legitimate, since they are inevident, just as, for example, “Supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines inspired supernaturally to human being are unnecessary” is not legitimate) – can entail the *falsity* of a theological proposition as such, as, for example, “The vision and fruition of God is human nature’s happiness *absolutely*”. *A fortiori* no philosophical argument can show the truth of a strict theological proposition, given that strict theolo-

¹⁴¹ See BOULNOIS, Olivier: *Le chiasme: la philosophie selon les théologiens et la théologie selon les artiens, de 1267 à 1300*, in: AERTSEN, Jan A. (Hg.): *Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter?* (= *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 26). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 1998, 602–603.

¹⁴² See again Section II above.

¹⁴³ See WIPPEL: *Siger of Brabant* (c. 1240–c. 1284), 765.

gical propositions are *by definition* supernaturally originated and about a supernatural, essentially necessary, freely causative, and infinite being.¹⁴⁴

The only proposition a given philosophy would conclude is contradictory to a strict theological proposition would be the denial of the latter proposition, as stated in the debate, i.e., “Supernatural perfection or necessary doctrines inspired supernaturally to human being are unnecessary”. However, as has been shown, this is for the philosopher to go beyond his duty. Philosophical and theological truths are *different*. But if the philosophical truth is rationally in the clear, theological truth is only, but significantly, an *addition* to it – just like *visio et fruitio Dei ut haec essentia* is added to *speculatio suprema pro statu isto*. This is credible, since anyone can validly form and accept a non-contradictory conjunction of the truths “Human nature has a natural desire for the natural end of *speculatio suprema*” (*secundum quid*) and “Human nature has a natural desire for the supernatural end of *Deus ut haec essentia*” (*simpliciter*).

Abstract

In order to solve the sole question of the First Part of the Prologue to his Ordinatio, Duns Scotus reacts in specific ways to theses which he himself, on the interpretation I propose, regarded to be “Averroistic” in character. It is his reactions to such theses – which I describe while surveying the famous debate between “philosophers and theologians” – that comprise Scotus’s “anti-Averroism”. By expositing these theses, we may also establish Scotus’s convictions about the nature of theology and philosophy, since these convictions take shape in his indirect replies to paradigmatic views about the relationship of theology and philosophy in “heterodox Aristotelian” circles.

¹⁴⁴ The problem posed by the theory of double truth was the object of several “solutions” by medieval thinkers; see EBBESEN: *Averroism*, 597. I tend to think that, for Scotus, the philosophical theologian would hold that, in the relevant cases, “philosophers had misinterpreted some of the information obtained by natural means”, instead of holding that “there was no way to detect any error in the derivation of the philosophical thesis, so that the only way out of the impasse consisted in rejecting the thesis on the authority of faith (as did Siger)”. In this sense I hold that no *legitimate* theological proposition – e.g., “The vision and fruition of God is human nature’s happiness *absolutely*” – can entail the falsity of a *legitimate* philosophical truth such as “The highest theoretical activity is human being’s happiness *naturally*”; however, based on an argument of compatibility, it can entail or confirm a philosophical truth. I cannot explore here this point about the rationality of Christian faith – i.e., that it accepts everything rationally evident and adds to it what is supernaturally revealed, so that there cannot be any contradiction between legitimate philosophy (reason) and theology (faith). However I think that this is coherent with Scotus’s thought in the First Part of the Prologue to *Ordinatio* and with his whole *opera*. It could be developed nicely in the Prologue regarding God’s contingent relationship to all creatures and free causation of all things.