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JOHN F. WIPPEL

BISHOP STEPHEN TEMPIER AND THOMAS AQUINAS:

A SEPARATE PROCESS AGAINST AQUINAS?

A few years ago R. Wielockx advanced an interesting proposal in his valuable edition and careful study of Giles of Rome's *Apologia*, i. e., Giles's defense of 51 propositions for which a censure was about to be imposed on him by the theologians at Paris and by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in March 1277. Wielockx proposed that in addition to the well-known condemnation of 219 propositions by Bishop Stephen Tempier of March 7, 1277, and in addition to the separate process against and censure of Giles of Rome dating between March 7 and March 28, 1277, the same Bishop, along with Simon of Brion, the Papal Legate, had initiated still a third inquiry and process against Thomas Aquinas.¹

According to Wielockx's reconstruction of these events, some of Thomas's views were indeed considered and censured at a special meeting of the Paris Masters in Theology held in March 1277, and called by the Bishop and the Legate. However, because of the unanticipated death of Pope John XXI on May 20, 1277, Stephen received orders from some Cardinals of the Roman Curia not to go forward during the vacancy in the Papal See with the process he had planned against Aquinas until he received other orders from the Roman authorities. Since these other orders were not forthcoming, Tempier's planned process did not run its course and he himself did not censure Thomas's views; but the Masters of Theology had already done so.²

¹ See Wielockx, Robert, ed. and com., Apologia. Florence 1985, 92-96, 215-24 (Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia III,1). For an excellent restatement of his reasons for holding that the process and censure directed against Aquinas was distinct from the other two, also see his «Autour du procès de Thomas d'Aquin», in: *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 19 (1988) 413-38.

² See Wielockx, Apologia, 92, 215-16.

If this third and separate process against Aquinas was indeed initiated, and if it did result in a separate censure of Aquinas's views by the Masters of Theology at Paris, it would be one more sign of the hostility that had developed against his views by March 1277, only three years after his death.³ At the same time, it has been offered by some, although incorrectly, in my opinion, as evidence that Thomas himself had not been directly targeted by any of the 219 propositions condemned by Tempier on March 7 even though, it is readily granted, Thomas was indirectly targeted in a number of instances. While I have dealt with the last mentioned point at some length in another article, in the present study I propose to concentrate on Wielockx's effort to show that a separate and distinct process against Aquinas was both intended and initiated by the Bishop and that a separate censure by the theologians actually occurred.⁴

Wielockx offers three major pieces of documentary evidence to support his case: (1) a letter written by Archbishop John Pecham of Canterbury on December 7, 1284, to the Chancellor and Regent Masters at Oxford; (2) some remarks made by Henry of Ghent in the first (and unpublished) version of his Quodlibet X, q. 5; (3) remarks in William de la Mare's Correctorium.⁵

I.

In his letter to the Chancellor and Regent Masters at Oxford on December 7, 1284, Archbishop Pecham, himself a Franciscan, reports on an earlier conversation he had held with the Dominican Prior for England, William of Hothum, about relations between Pecham and the Dominican Order. Pecham had assured William that in recently renewing the 1277 prohibition of a set of propositions originally issued by his predecessor as Archbishop of Canterbury, the Dominican Robert Kilwardby, including in particular propositions dealing with unicity of substantial form in human beings, Pecham himself bore no ill will against the Dominican Order or the opinions of the Order insofar as they are the opinions of the Order. On the contrary, he protested to William that he loved the Dominicans dearly, and he reports that the Dominican Prior had then ac-

³ See my remarks in WIPPEL, John F., Mediaeval Reactions to the Encounter between Faith and Reason. Milwaukee 1995, 26–28, 70–72 and notes (The Aquinas Lecture, 1995).

⁴ See WIPPEL, «Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277», in: *The Modern Schoolman* 62 (1995) 2/3, 233-72.

⁵ See WIELOCKX, «Autour du procès de Thomas d'Aquin», 413–16.

knowledged to him that he himself shared Pecham's views on the issue of the plurality of substantial forms.⁶

Pecham reports that together they agreed in detesting the error of those who maintain that in human beings there is only one (substantial) form. Indeed, Pecham had noted that some had gone so far in defending this view that they had said and written that if a human being had another form apart from the rational soul, a corrupted human body could not be restored so as to be numerically one and the same as before (at the time of resurrection) even by a miracle. Upon hearing this the Dominican Prior had responded that Pecham might surely condemn this error with his knowledge and consent.⁷

Pecham then reports that he also referred in his conversation with William to the case concerning the opinions of Brother Thomas. He had noted that while the Dominicans say that Thomas's opinions are the opinions of their Order, on one occasion Thomas himself had submitted his views to the judgment of the Paris Masters of Theology in Pecham's presence. Pecham had indicated to William that Thomas's case was still pending at the Roman Curia without any decision because, during the vacancy in the Apostolic See caused by the death of Pope John XXI, Bishop Stephen Tempier of Paris had thought of proceeding to an examination of these articles with the counsel of the Paris Masters of Theology. However, he had been commanded by certain Cardinals of the Roman Curia to desist completely from any such action with respect to Aquinas's opinions until he received other orders. 9

⁶ See DENIFLE, Heinrich/CHATELAIN, Émile, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis I. Paris 1889, 624–26, n. 517 for the text. See especially 624–625: « ... sed factum praedecessoris nostri circa errores ab eo inventos in liberalibus disciplinis, ac damnatos de consilio magistrorum, et in parte suscitatos denuo in scandalum plurimorum, prosequi justitia mediante. Et subiunximus quod fratrum Praedicatorum Ordinem diligebamus intime, sicut ipse, et modo secure addimus, plus quam ipse ... Procedentibus demum nobis ambobus ulterius in tractando, et errorem ponentium (in homine existere tantummodo formam unam) concorditer detestando, subiunximus nos quosdam istius erroris temerarios defensores in tantae subversionis foveam corruisse, ut dixerint scilicet et scripserint, quod si homo haberet aliam formam ab anima rationali, non posset corpus hominis corruptum idem numero etiam per miraculum reparari. Quo audito respondit prior: (Hunc errorem secure de mea conscientia condemnetis).»

⁷ See the latter part of the text cited in n. 6 above.

⁸ Ibid., 625: «Causam vero opinionum bonae memoriae fratris Thomae de Aquino, quas fratres ipsi opiniones sui Ordinis esse dicunt, quas tamen in nostra prasentia subiecit idem reverendus frater theologorum arbitrio Parisiensium magistrorum, pendere diximus in Romana curia indecisam ...»

⁹ Ibid.

Pecham takes care in this letter to point out that there is a difference between what the Roman authorities had reserved to themselves concerning Aquinas's opinions in dealing with Bishop Tempier, and what had been condemned at Oxford by his predecessor at Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, when he was dealing with certain «puerile» disputes at Oxford (in 1277). 10 In other words Pecham wants to make it perfectly clear that the Roman Cardinals' instructions to Tempier against taking additional measures against Aquinas did not apply to Kilwardby's prohibition at Oxford in 1277 or to Pecham's subsequent renewal of this on October 29, 1284. Hence Pecham maintains that he himself did not need the approval of the Dominicans to act against any theologian who might inappropriately introduce such «puerile» questions into his theological treatises. Indeed, he had no other choice but to take action against such persons. If he had done this without seeking the permission of the Dominicans, which he did not need, he had also done it without consulting his Franciscan brothers. Hence nothing in his renewal of Kilwardby's 1277 prohibition should be charged to the Franciscans. Nor should his action be regarded as sowing discord between the two Orders. 11

Of greatest interest to my immediate purpose is Pecham's reference to Tempier's plans to move against Aquinas, and to the order which Tempier received from the Roman authorities not to proceed further in this matter during the vacancy in the Papal See. Most striking to me is Pecham's statement that Tempier had planned to take such action. The text does not state that he had already done so, even though at times Wielockx seems to assume that this had happened. The text reads:

Causam vero opinionum bonae memoriae fratris Thomae de Aquino ... pendere diximus in Romana curia indecisam pro eo quod cum vacante sede apostolica per mortem sanctae memoriae domini Ioannis, Dei gratia tunc temporis Romani pontificis, episcopus Parisiensis Stephanus bonae memoriae ad discussionem ipsorum articulorum de consilio magistrorum procedere cogitaret: mandatum fuisse dicitur eidem episcopo per quosdam Romanae curiae dominos reverendos, ut de facto illarum opinionum supersederet penitus, donec aliud reciperet in mandatis (italics mine). 12

¹⁰ Ibid. «Aliud igitur est, quod de scriptis theologicis est Romanae celsitudini reservatum Parisiis, ab eo quod inventum Oxonie in certaminibus puerilibus per praedecessoris nostri sapientiam est damnatum.» For the text of Kilwardby's prohibition see Chartularium I, 558-59.

¹¹ Ed. cit., 625.

¹² Ibid. For the omitted text see n. 8 above.

To me this means that Bishop Stephen was thinking of proceeding to a discussion of the articles in question with the counsel of his theologians, but was prohibited from doing so until he would receive further notice. The text does not say that the theologians had already censured Aquinas's positions.

When Wielockx first presents this piece of evidence in his article concerning this, he expresses it correctly. Tempier « ... avait pensé faire une procédure contre Thomas d'Aquin.» But a few pages later in the same study Wielockx refers to this as meaning that the process against Aquinas «est suspendu par certains cardinaux de la Curie Romaine ...» and immediately afterwards he again refers to the process as having been suspended. By referring to the process as having been suspended he seems to be reading something more into the text, namely that the process was underway. Indeed, this impression is confirmed by his subsequent reconstruction of the events of March 1277.

According to Wielockx's reconstruction, after condemning 219 propositions in his well known Condemnation of March 7, 1277, Tempier seized upon Giles of Rome's Commentary on I Sentences in order to examine it personally, and he also charged the sixteen Masters in Theology who had been members of the March 7 investigating committee to take part in the investigation of Giles. In addition, Tempier appointed one of his own men, John des Alleux, to assist with this task. Because Giles refused to retract the list of propositions drawn up for censure by this group, Tempier censured him some time between March 7 and March 28. Of the 51 articles censured, 31 also touch on and envision opinions of Thomas Aguinas indirectly, i. e., by way of Giles of Rome. Strengthened by the support of the Papal Legate, Simon of Brion, Tempier then set in motion a process directed against Thomas Aquinas, still before March 28. Once more he summoned the Masters of Theology to meet. They did so and produced their censure of Aquinas's views. Because of the intervention of the Roman Cardinals, however, Tempier did not go so far as to pronounce an explicit condemnation of Aguinas in his own name. 15

If one grants that all of this happened, one wonders why Tempier waited so long to censure Aquinas's views. It would seem that he could have done so in March or April, after the censure of these views by the theologians, and that his action would not then have been delayed by the death of Pope John and the subsequent intervention of the Roman Cardi-

¹³ See WIELOCKX, «Autour du procès de Thomas d'Aquin», 414.

¹⁴ Ibid., 419.

¹⁵ See «Autour du procès de Thomas d'Aquin», 423-24. See WIELOCKX, Apologia, 87-88.

nals some time after May 20. This relatively long delay seems out of character in light of his speedy action against the 219 propositions which he condemned on March 7, and his subsequent condemnation of those defended by Giles shortly thereafter. Wielockx proposes that this delay occurred because of the intervention on Thomas's behalf at Paris by the Dominican Superior General, John of Vercelli, who had been sent to Paris on a special mission after October 15, 1276 and would remain on mission until 1278.¹⁶

However, something less than all of this seems to be indicated by Pecham's letter to William of Hothum. To think about initiating an investigation of Aquinas's views (and about censuring them) is one thing, and this is what Pecham's text suggests. To assemble the Masters of Theology and to have them actually censure some of Aquinas's positions is something else, and this event is not supported by the evidence in Pecham's letter, at least if that letter is taken alone.

It is true that Pecham himself refers to the case of Aquinas's opinions as still pending before the Roman Curia and as still undecided at the time of his letter of December 7, 1284.¹⁷ One might argue that this means that a censure by the Paris theologians had already taken place, or at least that a list of suspect Thomistic propositions had already been compiled by the Paris theologians. However, it need not be taken that way, and may simply refer to some communication by intermediaries which had reached Rome which suggested that Tempier was thinking of conducting an investigation with the theologians about Aquinas's positions. To repeat, of itself Pecham's letter does not state either that the inquiry had taken place or that a censure by the theologians had occurred. Hence it will now be necessary for us to examine the additional evidence offered by Wielockx in support of his claim.

II.

As a second major piece of evidence in support of a separate process initiated by Tempier against Aquinas and a separate censure of some of his views by the Paris theologians, Wielockx turns to the testimony of Henry of Ghent. In the first version of Henry's Quodlibet X, q. 5 of 1286 (although not in the finally published version), Henry offers some interesting historical details concerning recent discussion at Paris of the issue of unicity of substantial form in human beings. He refers to a certain

¹⁶ «Autour du procès ...», 427–28.

¹⁷ See n. 12 above.

letter, signed by twelve Masters from the Theology Faculty, in which they indicate that they were not aware that the position defending unicity of form in human beings had been condemned in recent times at Paris as erroneous and heretical.¹⁸

Henry concedes that he, too, is not aware of any explicit condemnation of this position publicly by a figure who would be empowered to condemn heresies, i. e., the Bishop or the Papal Legate, we may assume. But Henry also recalls a condemnation issued by the Masters of Theology which had taken place some ten years earlier at which he himself had been present. Indeed all the Masters at Paris who could be assembled, both Regent and non-Regent, had been called together at the command of Bishop Stephen (Tempier) and the Papal Legate, Simon of Brion, to examine certain articles. Included among these was one which states that in a human being there is no substantial form except the rational soul. According to Henry's account, this position was condemned at that time by the Masters unanimously with only two exceptions as false, though he does not say they condemned it as heretical or erroneous. On the condemned it as heretical or erroneous.

Henry also refers to another meeting of the Masters, who had been called together in the year preceding his present Quodlibetal Disputation of Advent, 1286, and hence probably in 1285, this time at the command of Pope Honorius. One would suspect that this meeting was connected with the Pope's charge to the Paris theologians to reexamine the earlier

¹⁸ All due credit must be given to Ludwig HÖDL for having first edited and commented on this revealing text in his article: «Neue Nachrichten über die Pariser Verurteilungen der thomasischen Formlehre», in: *Scholastik* 39 (1964) 178–96. For the text see 183–184. It has again been edited in the critical apparatus by Raymond MACKEN in his: Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet X, Leuven/Leiden 1981, 127. Also see my remarks in my The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington D.C., 1981, 318–19, n. 89. See WIELOCKX, «Autour du procès ...», 414.

^{19 «}Magistri vero 12 theologicae facultatis, ut intellexi, in quadam littera sigil-laverunt quod positionem quae ponit in homine non esse nisi unam formam, nesciunt suis temporibus in studio parisiensi fuisse condemnatam tamquam erroneam et haereticam. Quod re vera et ego nescio, loquendo de damnatione per sententiam latam ab homine publice, qui potestatem habuit super haeresum damnatione.» MACKEN ed., 127.

²⁰ «Loquendo autem de damnatione per sententiam magistrorum, scio, quia interfui, quod iam 10 annis elapsis, magistri omnes theologiae tam non regentes actu quam regentes, qui haberi (MACKEN: habui) potuerunt Parisius, simul congregati ad examinandos quosdam articulos de mandato domini Stephani episcopi parisiensis et domini Simonis legati, qui postmodum fuit papa Martinus, inter quos articulos erat ille, quod in homine non erat forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis, omnes unanimiter uno ore, duobus exceptis, dixerunt quod dicere in homine non esse formam nisi animam rationalem falsum erat» (MACKEN ed., 127). Cf. WIELOCKX, Apologia, 87, n. 44.

condemnation of Giles of Rome of March 1277, but we shall return to that issue below. Henry recalls that at this meeting (in 1285) the Masters, with only two exceptions and with one expressing doubt, maintained that it is *false* to hold that in a human being there is only one substantial form – the rational soul. Henry is forced to acknowledge, however, that they did not say that this view is erroneous, thereby creating difficulty for his long-standing claim that unicity of form had been condemned at Paris as heretical and erroneous.²¹ More important, perhaps, for our purpose, is the similarity, though not identity (as Wielockx claims) between Henry's language and that used by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 4: «nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva.»²²

At this juncture one may ask whether the meeting which occurred some ten years before 1286 was (1) a special assembly convoked by the Bishop (and Legate) to censure Thomas Aquinas's views; or (2) one of the Commission's meetings held in connection with drawing up the 219 propositions condemned by Tempier on March 7, 1277; or (3) a meeting leading to the censure of Giles of Rome in March 1277.

Wielockx notes that Van Steenberghen adopted the second explanation. The theory of unicity of substantial form in human beings would have been included in a preliminary list drawn up at a first meeting of

²¹ «Iterum autem anno praecedente annum disputationis huius omnes magistri theologiae tam regentes actu quam non regentes, qui haberi potuerunt, congregati Parisius ad examinandum quosdam articulos de mandato domini Honorii papae. Intererat articulus praedictus de unitate formae substantialis in homine. Omnes unanimiter, duobus exceptis et quodam alio dubie respondente, dixerunt idem: quod et licet dixerint falsum esse dictum quod in homine non est forma substantialis nisi anima rationalis, non tamen dixerunt illud esse erroneum» (MACKEN ed., 127). Cf. HÖDL, «Neue Nachrichten ...», 184. Also during this same quodlibetal period, Advent, 1286, in his Quodlibet III, q. 5 Godfrey of Fontaines refers to the letter signed by the theologians and goes on to wonder in strong language how one man, i. e., Henry, could maintain that the doctrine of unicity of form in human beings had been condemned as heretical or erroneous. For Godfrey's text see DE WULF, Maurice/PELZER, Auguste, Les quatre premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, Louvain/Paris 1904, 207-208 (Les Philosophes Belges II). Henry goes on in the same context to offer a weak justification for his having made this claim (MACKEN ed., 127-128). The fact that this entire section is deleted from the published version of his Quodlibet X, q. 5 may indicate that he realized that his attempted self-justification was not convincing. Cf. HÖDL, «Neue Nachrichten ...», 184-85; WIPPEL, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 318, n. 89.

²² See WIELOCKX, «Autour du procès ...», 414: « ... et cet article correspond littéralement à un énoncé de la Prima Pars de la Somme de théologie de Thomas d'Aquin.» As may be seen from the texts cited in nn. 20 and 21 above, Henry refers to the view that in a human being there is no substantial form except the rational soul. Thomas refers to the intellective soul.

the Masters who were preparing the list for Tempier's March 7 condemnation; but this proposition was dropped from the final list of 219 propositions because of the great authority enjoyed by Aquinas.²³ Wielockx notes that Van Steenberghen's explanation is only an hypothesis, and then argues strongly against it. As Wielockx points out, many of the propositions condemned on March 7, 1277, indirectly attack positions defended by Thomas. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that a number directly attack his views. If so, it would seem unlikely that in 1277 the Masters would have decided against including unicity of substantial form in their final list simply because of Aquinas's great prestige and moral authority. Hence the second possible explanation should be dropped.²⁴

As for the third suggestion, that the meeting to which Henry refers is to be identified with one or other meeting leading to the censure of Giles of Rome, Wielockx also rejects this. He has argued that the Condemnation of March 7 is prior in time to the censure of Giles of Rome, and that both of these censures are prior in time to the meeting of Masters called by Tempier (and the Legate) to investigate Aquinas's positions. However, that there was such a distinct meeting of the Masters aimed at and resulting in a censure of Aquinas's views still remains to be established. Taken alone Henry's text does not justify our concluding that the

²³ See VAN STEENBERGHEN, Fernand, Maître Siger de Brabant, Louvain/Paris 1977, 128, n. 17. In this context Van Steenberghen argues that the meeting to which Henry refers took place at the beginning of 1277, not in 1276 as HÖDL suggested in his «Neue Nachrichten ...», 187. Cf. VAN STEENBERGHEN, 148. For WIELOCKX see «Autour du procès ...», 416.

²⁴ WIELOCKX, «Autour du procès ...», 417; Apologia, 93; see my «Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277», cited above in n. 4.

²⁵ See his «Autour du procès ...», 433-37, for his effort to show that the process against Giles came after the decree of March 7, 1277. Without reproducing his argumentation for this point in detail, I should note that in establishing this part of his claim he reasons from the fact that at the time of their meeting concerning Giles's positions, the Masters conceded the well-known propositio magistralis: «Non est malitia in voluntate nisi sit error vel saltem aliqua nescientia in ratione.» As he points out, both Godfrey of Fontaines in Quodlibet VIII, q. 16 (See HOFFMANS, Jean, Le Huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, Louvain 1924, 165-66 [Les Philosophes Belges IV]) and an anonymous annotation in Vat. lat. 853 indicate that because the granting of the propositio magistralis happened after the decree of March 7, the decree should be interpreted in light of the propositio magistralis and not vice versa. That this action was taken by the Masters in their 1277 discussions of Giles's positions and not only in 1285 when they reconsidered Giles's case as a result of the request of Pope Honorius IV is indicated by the testimony of John of Pouilly in his Quodlibet II, both according to a first reportatio and according to the definitive version. See WIELOCKX, 434-36 for references.

meeting of the Masters some ten years earlier (prior to 1286) was called specifically to deal with the views of Aquinas.²⁶ It does tell us that at some meeting held at that time, the Masters condemned as false the view that in human beings there is no substantial form other than the rational soul, and that they repeated their condemnation in 1285. This view was defended by Thomas and also by Giles, at least at this point in his career.

III.

As a third piece of documentary evidence to support his case, Wielockx turns to the *Correctorium* of William de la Mare. There William states that in ST I, q. 76, a. 3 Thomas maintains: «quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis, scilicet anima intellectiva.» Wielockx comments that this proposition is taken literally from Thomas's ST I, q. 76, a. 4, although once more it should be noted that the citation is not quite literal. After presenting Thomas's arguments for this position, William comments that it is rejected by the Masters (of Theology).²⁷

²⁶ I should note that Henry's first version of Quodlibet X, q. 5 also refers to his having been summoned to a private meeting called by Simon of Brion in the presence of Bishop Stephen, Ranulphe de la Houblonnière (Stephen's successor as Bishop of Paris), and Jean des Alleux (then Chancellor of Paris). According to Henry this meeting also took place some ten years before. At it Simon closely questioned him about his views on unicity of substantial form in a human being, especially because, as Henry himself notes, he had left this issue open in his Quodlibet I (of Advent, 1276). Henry replied that he was inclined to think that there is more than one form in a human being: « ... respondissem quod potius sentirem quod plures» (MACKEN ed., 128, critical apparatus). This answer did not fully satisfy Simon, and after consulting briefly with the others who were present, he took Henry aside and told him in no uncertain terms: « Volumus et praecipimus tibi, quod publice determines in scholis tuis, quod in homine sint formae substantiales plures, non sola anima rationalis, ne scholares de cetero super hoc maneant in dubio.) Et quia, secundum quod mihi visum fuit, suspicabatur ne satis efficaciter mandatum suum in hoc exsequerer, comminando addidit: (Sis sollicitus ut clare et aperte determines plures formas substantiales esse in homine, quia in causa fidei nemini parcerem».» Henry recalls that he had concluded from all of this that, in the minds of those present, this issue touched on a matter of faith, and that the Legate had condemned the theory of unicity of substantial form in a human being, though not publicly. Wielockx maintains that this meeting took place in 1277, but prior to Easter of that year, which fell on March 28. See Apologia, 82. Since the meeting clearly happened after Henry's determination of Quodlibet I (Advent, 1276) and perhaps after he had released it for publication, as Wielockx maintains, it seems more likely that it occurred fairly early in 1277 rather than in December 1276, as I had written in The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines, 318, n. 89.

²⁷ See GLORIEUX, Palémon, Le Correctorium Corruptorii (Quare), Le Saulchoir, Kain (Belgium) 1927, art. 31, 127–28 for the text quoted, and 128–29 for William's summary of Thomas's arguments from ST I, q. 76, a. 3 and a. 4. William then com-

Here we do indeed have an explicit statement by William to the effect that the Masters rejected unicity of substantial form in human beings, first, because from it many things follow which are opposed to Catholic faith, second because it contradicts philosophy, and third because it is opposed to Sacred Scripture.²⁸ Interestingly enough, in dealing with William's treatment and presentation of this position in his own Correctorium of William, Richard of Knapwell does not explicitly challenge William's claim that unicity of form had been rejected by the Masters.²⁹ However, neither does William tell us when it was rejected by them. Indeed, he puts their action in the present tense, granted that, writing as he is ca. 1278, he could easily enough be referring to a censure issued by the Masters in March 1277. If we accept William's testimony at face value, we may ask whether he is referring to a separate action taken by the Masters directly against Aquinas at a special meeting, or simply as part of some other meeting, just as we have raised that question about the meeting of Masters referred to by Henry.³⁰

As additional support for his interpretation of these events, Wielockx cites another proposition which, according to William, had also been censured by the Masters – «quod Deus non potest dare esse actu materiae sine forma.» Wielockx also notes that in the anonymous *Declarationes* which had previously but incorrectly been attributed to William, it is

ments: «Haec positio de unitate formae substantialis reprobatur a magistris, primo, quia ex ipsa plura sequuntur contraria fidei catholicae; secundo, quia contradicit philosophiae, tertio quia repugnat Sacrae Scripturae» (129). In ST I, q. 76, a. 4, Thomas writes: «Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva.» For WIELOCKX see «Autour du procès ...», 415. There he somewhat inaccurately also comments: «De plus, cet énoncé correspond littéralement à l'énoncé qui, selon Henri de Gand, figura dans la liste des articles examineés par les maîtres parisiens sur un ordre d'Etienne Tempier.» For Henry's text see note 20 above.

²⁸ For William see GLORIEUX ed., 129-31.

²⁹ As HÖDL has pointed out, already in article 27 William had denounced the theory of unicity of substantial form as «a magistris ut erronea reprobata propter plures haereses inde sequentes ...» (ed. cit. 115). And in article 32 William denounces Thomas's denial that accidental dispositions can be present in matter prior to a substantial form as following from his defense of unicity of substantial form and as being false because it is against faith and against philosophy (144). While not explicitly denying or dealing with the claim that unicity of substantial form had been condemned by the Masters of Theology, Richard argues at great length to show that it is not opposed to faith (or to philosophy). See 135ff. For HÖDL see «Neue Nachrichten ...», 192.

³⁰ Again, while we know that the doctrine of unicity of substantial form in human beings was not included in the final version of the 219 propositions condemned on March 7, 1277, we also know that the more general claim that there is (only) one form in every composite was included in the list of propositions drawn up against Giles of Rome (see WIELOCKX, Apologia, 59, pr. 48).

stated that the Masters censured this position in these terms: «Deum non posse facere materiam sine forma.»³¹ Wielockx comments that this proposition, especially under the form in which it is cited by the *Declarationes*, is almost literally found in Thomas's Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1. There Thomas writes in the *sed contra*: «Non ergo Deus potest facere quod materia sit sine forma.»³²

Interestingly, in commenting on this issue in William's critique of Thomas's ST I, q. 66, a. 1, Richard of Knapwell expresses some reservations about whether or not the Masters had in fact recently agreed that it is erroneous to hold that God cannot make matter exist without form. Richard himself will not accept the claim that this had happened without evidence since he knows that the greater Masters, those who more correctly understand the nature of matter and form, hold the opposite position, that is, they hold that God cannot make matter exist without form. Moreover, even if we grant that the Masters had recently condemned this position as erroneous, we may still ask whether this happened at a special process directed against Aquinas, or again, perhaps, at the meeting(s) leading to the censure of Giles of Rome.

For Wielockx, however, William's testimony indicates that this – the denial that God can produce prime matter without any substantial form – was another of the Thomistic articles censured by the Paris Masters in their special meeting against Aquinas himself.³⁴

³¹ See «Autour du procès ...», 415. For William see GLORIEUX ed., 114. There he argues against Thomas's ST I, q. 66, a. 1, to the effect that for him to deny that God can enable matter to exist without form detracts from divine omnipotence. For even though an accident depends on its subject more than matter depends on form, God can make an accident exist without its subject, as in the Eucharist: « ... unde omnes magistri concordaverunt nuper quod erroneum est dicere quod Deus non potest dare esse actu materiae sine forma.» See PELSTER, Franz, Declarationes Magistri Guilelmi de la Mare O.F.M. de variis sententiis S. Thomae Aquinatis, Münster 1956, 19, n. 22: «Hoc videtur erroneum, tum quia derogat omnipotentiae divinae, tum quia nuper damnatum est Deum non posse facere materiam sine forma et quod Deus non potest in effectum causae secundae sine causa secundaria.»

³² See SPIAZZI, Raymundus, Quaestiones quodlibetales, Turin/Rome 1956, 40. «Sed contra.» See WIELOCKX, «Autour du procès ...», 415.

³³ See GLORIEUX ed., 116: «Quod ergo dicunt quod omnes magistri nuper concordaverunt quod erroneum est dicere, etc.; non recipimus sine testimonio cum sciamus quod maiores naturam materiae et formae rectius intelligentes, oppositum sentiant. Nec hoc derogat potentiae divinae; nihil enim quod includit contradictionem potest habere rationem factibilis sive producibilis a Deo.»

³⁴ See «Autour du procès ...», 415. He notes that according to John Pecham and Henry of Ghent unicity of substantial form was only one censured article among others. For Pecham see his letter of December 7, 1284, Chartularium I, 625. There he does refer to the «articles» which Stephen was thinking of investigating with the aid

As additional support, Wielockx also cites John of Paris's reply to William de la Mare's *Correctorium*. According to Wielockx, John assumes that William is there referring to a censure by the theologians of this position which had been carried out at Paris. But as I read John's text, he is saying something very different. He writes that their (William's) very claim that all the Masters recently agreed at Paris that this position is erroneous is itself false. In other words, John simply denies that such a declaration has been issued by the Masters! His text reads: "Quod dicunt, quod omnes magistri concordaverunt nuper Parisius hoc erroneum esse, dico quod falsum est." Hence John of Paris's text does not prove, indeed, it does not even support the claim that a special and separate meeting and censure by the theologians of Aquinas's views took place in March 1277.

In all fairness, I should also note that Wielockx does acknowledge that the existence of this special meeting and process (against Aquinas) was contested by the Dominicans who replied to William's *Correctorium*. Wielockx maintains, therefore, that it must have been kept secret. Once again, however, his conclusion presupposes that there was a distinct censure of Thomas's views by the Paris Masters, the very point which remains to be proved! If this event did not happen, there is no reason to hypothesize that it was kept secret.³⁷

of the theologians. For Henry see Quodlibet X, q. 5, MACKEN ed., 127, critical apparatus. There Henry refers to the meeting of the theologians called some ten years before 1286 to examine certain «articles». See n. 20 above. However, as we have pointed out above, the evidence we have examined so far does not prove either that the process to which Pecham refers actually led to a censure of Aquinas's views or that the theologians' condemnation of unicity of substantial form in human beings to which Henry refers was part of a special censure of Aquinas's views.

³⁵ See MÜLLER, Jean-Pierre, Le Correctorium Corruptorii (Circa) de Jean Quidort de Paris, Rome 1941, 137: «Praeterea dicunt, quod magistri concordaverunt nuper Parisius erroneum esse, quod Deus non potest facere materiam esse actu sine forma.» See 142 for John's rebuttal as quoted in our text. For WIELOCKX see «Autour du procès ...», 415.

³⁶ Cf. WIELOCKX, Apologia, 95, n. 75.

³⁷ Ibid. WIELOCKX also reasons from this that in exploiting the secret character of the censure of Aquinas by the Paris Masters, i. e., in insisting that it had not taken place, Dominicans such as John of Paris could not have been identifying it with the censure of art. 47 directed against Giles, for his ecclesiastical censure was surely a public act. This is not surprising since it would not have served their purpose (defense of Thomas) to do so. WIELOCKX also turns to Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet X, q. 5 for evidence that the censure of Thomas's views by the Masters of Theology was kept secret for a long time. See Apologia, 216. However, in the reference he gives to Henry's Quodlibet X, q. 5 (MACKEN ed., 127, critical apparatus), I do not find Henry making this claim about the action of the theologians. He does imply this about his private meeting with the Legate, Bishop, etc. See p. 128, critical apparatus.

In sum, Wielockx's appeal to William de la Mare's reference to support the existence of a special censure of Aquinas's rejection of the possible separate existence of matter by the Masters is open to two objections. First, according to one contemporary witness, Richard of Knapwell, such a censure by the Masters may not have taken place. He demands to see the evidence pointing to such an event. Secondly, according to John of Paris, it did not take place. If one stopped at this point, one would have to be very cautious about accepting William's claim that a censure of this point by the Paris theologians had occurred. And if one stopped at this point, one would find it difficult to subscribe to Wielockx's claim: «Il est donc hors de doute que Thomas a fait l'objet d'un procès intenté à Paris contre sa mémoire ...» 38

IV.

Hence one can understand why Wielockx goes farther in offering evidence to prove that there was a separate process against and censure of Aquinas's views by the Paris Masters in March 1277. He does this by appealing (1) to the distinctive wording of the propositions as they are listed in the allegedly three distinct censures; and (2) to the chronological difference between the March 7 prohibition and the censure of Giles and, he will maintain, another slight chronological gap between the latter and the alleged censure of Aquinas.

As regards the first point, Wielockx draws upon the testimony of John Pecham, Henry of Ghent, and William de la Mare to show that in referring to the prohibition of unicity of substantial form, their language reflects Aquinas's formulation in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 4:

Pecham: « ... errorem ponentium (in homine existere tantummodo forma unam).»³⁹

Henry: « ... inter quos articulos erat ille, quod in homine non erat form substantialis nisi anima rationalis, omnes unanimiter uno ore, duobu exceptis, dixerunt quod dicere in homine non esse formam nis animam rationalem falsum erat.»⁴⁰

William: « ... dicit quod in homine est tantum una forma substantialis, scilice anima intellectiva qua homo est animal, vegetabile, corpus ... Hae positio de unitate formae substantialis reprobatur a magistris ...»⁴¹

³⁸ See «Autour du procès ...», 415.

³⁹ See Chartularium I, 625, n. 517.

⁴⁰ See Quodlibet X, q. 5 (MACKEN ed., 127), cited above more fully in n. 20.

⁴¹ See GLORIEUX, Le Correctorium Corruptorii (Quare), 127–28, 129.

Wielockx notes that William's text is taken literally from Thomas's ST I, q. 76, a. 4 («Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva ...) and adds that William's formulation corresponds literally to Henry's representation of this as one of the articles examined by the Paris Masters.⁴²

Even though Wielockx overstates the literal similarity between the formulations by Thomas and by William, on the one hand, and by Henry, on the other, he is correct in pointing out that the issue of unicity of substantial form does not appear at all in the list of 219 propositions condemned by Tempier on March 7, 1277, and that the formulations of this position by William and by Henry (and by Thomas) differ considerably from that found in Giles of Rome's *Apologia* for which he would be censured. There proposition 48 reads: «In quolibet composito est una forma.»⁴³

From this and a similar conclusion concerning Giles's distinctive formulation of his view on the possible separate existence of prime matter (see below), Wielockx concludes that the list of suspect articles serving as the basis for the process against Aquinas is distinct both from the list censured on March 7 and from the list censured in the process against Giles.⁴⁴

This claim is interesting since the formulation offered by Giles for unicity of form is more general than the other versions reported by Pecham, Henry and William and, indeed, appears to cover them. If the position which maintains that in any (substantial) composite whatsoever (in quolibet composito) there is only one (substantial) form was condemned as part of the censure of Giles, then the view which states that there is only one substantial form in a human being was presumably also thereby condemned. It was the application of unicity of form to human beings that was thought, in the eyes of Henry and William and others, to have grave theological consequences. In referring to the censure by the Masters of the view that there is only one substantial form - the intellective soul (William) or the rational soul (Henry) in a human being -Henry and William could, it would therefore seem, simply have in mind the censure of Giles. And Pecham's text does not clearly indicate that a special censure of Aquinas's views had actually occurred. At the same time, I would acknowledge, if there was indeed a separate process against

⁴² See «Autour du procès ...», 414, 415, 418.

⁴³ Ibid., 418. For pr. 48 see WIELOCKX, Apologia, 59.

⁴⁴ See «Autour du procès ...», 418.

and censure of Aquinas's position, they could all also be referring to that. The texts just cited do not suffice to prove that this was the case.⁴⁵

Wielockx also argues that the censure of the denial that God could make prime matter exist without any form, as reported by William de la Mare, the *Declarationes*, and by John of Paris, again recalls the language of Thomas's formulation of this view in his Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1:⁴⁶

William: « ... unde omnes magistri concordaverunt nuper quod er

roneum est dicere quod Deus non potest dare esse actu ma

teriae sine forma.»⁴⁷

Declarationes: «Hoc videtur erroneum, tum quia derogat omnipotentia

divinae, tum quia nuper damnatum est Deum non posse facer

materiam sine forma ...»⁴⁸

John: «Praeterea dicunt, quod magistri concordaverunt nupe

Parisius erroneum esse, quod Deus non potest facere mate

riam esse actu sine forma.»49

Thomas: «Non ergo Deus potest facere quod materia sit sine forma.»⁵⁰

Again Wielockx notes how different the formulations of this position by William and by John are from that found in Giles's *Apologia*, prop. 47: «Materia nec etiam est distincta opere ut quod possit per se fieri sine forma, nec est distincta existentia, quia non potest per se existere sine forma.» Once more Wielockx sees in this additional evidence indicating that a separate list of articles was drawn up by the theologians against Aquinas and censured, distinct both from the list censured on March 7 and the list drawn up against Giles and censured later in March. 52

⁴⁵ WIELOCKX correctly notes that the process referred to by Pecham cannot be identified either with the March 7 condemnation or with the March censure of the views of Giles of Rome. Both of these concluded with public censures, whereas Pecham's letter indicates that Tempier's (intended) process against Aquinas had been put on hold by the Curia between May and November 1277 and, indeed, that it had not been resolved by the time of another letter of his dated January 1, 1285. See WIELOCKX, Apologia, 95, n. 75; «Autour du procès ...», 419. This is a good point, but Wielockx assumes too readily that Tempier's process against Aquinas had actually resulted in a censure of his views by the Paris theologians. Pecham's letter taken alone does not justify this conclusion.

⁴⁶ See Wielockx, Apologia, 95, n. 75; «Autour du procès ...», 415, 418.

⁴⁷ See GLORIEUX ed., 114.

⁴⁸ See PELSTER ed., 19.

⁴⁹ See his Correctorium ... (Circa), MÜLLER ed., 137.

⁵⁰ Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1, SPIAZZI ed., 40.

⁵¹ Apologia, 59, pr. 47, for the text.

⁵² See the references given in n. 46 above.

However, as we have already pointed out above, William's claim that Thomas's position on the possible separate existence of matter had been censured as erroneous by the Masters was itself challenged by Richard of Knapwell in his *Correctorium*. Richard demanded to see the evidence for this claim. And, against Wielockx's reading of a comment in John of Paris's *Correctorium*, I see in it a flat denial by John that such a censure had taken place.⁵³

Hence there are two weaknesses in Wielockx's argumentation for a special condemnation of Thomas's view on the possible separate existence of matter. First of all, some thirteenth-century writers either doubt or deny that such a censure had taken place, against William's claim. Secondly, if it did take place, this may simply mean that it was implied by and included in the censure of Giles of Rome's position. There it is condemned to hold either that matter can be brought into being without form or that it can exist without form. If such is impossible in itself, then one could easily reason, as Thomas Aquinas himself does in Quodlibet III, q. 1, a. 1, that it cannot be done by God. Admittedly, this explicit point is missing from Giles's formulation.

As with the issue of unicity of substantial form, once again I would concede that if there was a separate list of articles drawn up against Aquinas and a separate condemnation of his view on prime matter by the Paris theologians, William and the *Declarationes* may indeed be referring to it. But their references to this alleged censure, even if we grant their historical reliability, do not necessarily imply such a separate process. These references could be taken as referring to Giles's censure, even though there are some differences in the linguistic formulations.⁵⁴

V.

As we have indicated above at the beginning of Section IV, Wielockx also cites the difference in time between the prohibition of March 7, 1277, and the censure of Giles, and then, he maintains, still another slight chronological gap between the censure of Giles and the alleged process against and censure of Aquinas by the theologians. He recalls Pecham's letter which tells us that the process against Aquinas had been suspended by certain Cardinals from the Roman Curia during the vacancy in the Apostolic See between May 20, 1277 and November 25, 1277 (the election of a new Pope). He reasons correctly that since this

⁵³ See above, III.

⁵⁴ See the texts cited above in nn. 47, 48, and 51.

process had been suspended, it must be different from the process which resulted in the condemnation of 219 propositions on March 7. It must also be different from the process against Giles of Rome, for that, too, resulted in a public censure before March 28, 1277.⁵⁵ If one grants that there was a distinct censure by the Paris theologians of Aquinas's views, all of this would follow, of course, but that still remains in doubt.

As additional evidence Wielockx recalls another letter dated January 1, 1285, from Pecham and this time addressed to Pope Martin IV, which implies that the case of Aquinas was still pending in Rome as of that date. In this letter Pecham urges the Pope to involve himself actively in this matter because if it is left unresolved, it may damage relations between the Franciscans and Dominicans. 56 But on April 2, 1285, Pope Honorius IV succeeded Pope Martin and then, according to Wielockx's interpretation of these events, the new Pope sent Aquinas's case back to Paris to be reconsidered by the theologians there. He also intervened to have Giles's case reconsidered by them. They would have examined the Thomistic articles in question between the date of his election as Pope on April 2, 1285, and April 14 (Easter), 1286.57

If this reconstruction of the events is correct, it would seem to offer additional corroboration for Wielockx's claim that the process against Aquinas was completely distinct from the censure of March 7, 1277, and perhaps also distinct from the censure of Giles in March 1277. If it were not distinct from the censure of Giles, why would the Pope have asked for a separate reconsideration of Thomas's case, distinct from the theologians' reconsideration of the censure of Giles?

The question can be raised, however, as to whether or not the Pope did ask for such a separate reconsideration of Aquinas's case. Another reading of these events would suggest that the Pope simply sent Giles's case back for reconsideration by the theologians and at that meeting the issue of unicity of substantial form in a human being was also reexamined. For it is to Henry of Ghent's testimony that Wielockx appeals to support his claim that there was a separate meeting of the Masters to deal with Thomas's case. As will be recalled, in Quodlibet X, q. 5, in the un-

⁵⁵ See «Autour du procès ...», 419. Cf. Apologia, 86-88; 91-92.

 $^{^{56}}$ See «Autour du procès ...», 419, citing Chartularium I, 626–627, n. 518, for the letter.

⁵⁷ See «Autour du procès ...», 419; Apologia, 221–222.

⁵⁸ For Pope Honorius's letter to the Bishop of Paris of June 1, 1285, see Chartularium I, 633, n. 522. This letter tells us that the Masters were charged by the Pope to reconsider the case of Giles. It says nothing about considering or reconsidering the case of Aquinas.

published version, Henry refers to a meeting held in the preceding year, hence in 1285, of all the Paris Masters who could be assembled. They had been called together under orders from Pope Honorius to examine certain articles, including the issue of unicity of substantial form in human beings. Since Henry is explicitly discussing that issue, we are not surprised to find that he goes on to report that concerning this matter the Masters stated with two exceptions and another being in doubt that it is false to hold that there is no substantial form in a human being other than the rational soul. As we have seen, Henry admits that they did not condemn this view as erroneous.⁵⁹

For our purposes this report is not enough to prove that a special meeting had been called by the Pope in 1285 to deal with the process against Aquinas. That is indeed possible. But it is also just as possible that this discussion of unicity of substantial form was part of the meeting concerned with Giles of Rome's rehabilitation, and with article 48 in particular. Our source indicating that a special meeting was to be held in connection with the rehabilitation of Giles of Rome is the letter from Pope Honorius IV of June 1, 1285, to the Bishop of Paris, in which the Masters are charged to reexamine the censure of Giles. The letter does not refer to the case of Aquinas. To repeat the point made above, this meeting dealing with the rehabilitation of Giles of Rome may be the very same meeting to which Henry refers in Quodlibet X, q. 5, at which unicity of substantial form in human beings was again considered.⁶⁰ Hence as regards this part of Wielockx's case for a separate process against and censure of Aquinas in 1277, if there was indeed such a separate process in 1277, I would agree that it should be dated after the censure of Giles, and that Giles's censure should in turn be dated after March 7. But what still remains to be demonstrated is that there was a separate censure of Aguinas.

VI.

In summing up the results of this study, we may recall the major pieces of evidence offered by Wielockx to support his claim that a special process had been introduced by Bishop Stephen Tempier against Thomas Aquinas in March 1277, and that this had resulted in a special censure of some of his views by the Paris theologians in that same month.

⁵⁹ See MACKEN ed., 127, critical apparatus, also cited above in n. 21. For more on this meeting see WIELOCKX, «Autour du procès ...», 435.

⁶⁰ See Chartularium I, 633, n. 522. See WIELOCKX, Apologia, 221, for references to others who have held this (HÖDL, MIETHKE), and his critique of this proposal.

Pecham's letter of December 7, 1284, which tells us that Tempier was thinking of initiating such an inquiry with the counsel of his theologians, does not of itself justify the conclusion that such a special censure of Aquinas by the Paris theologians actually occurred. Henry of Ghent's testimony indicates that some ten years before his Quodlibet X of 1286, therefore ca. 1277, the Paris theologians had considered and rejected as false the view that in human beings there is only one substantial form, the rational soul. Here Henry could simply be referring to a meeting held by the theologians in preparation for their censure of Giles of Rome's article 48 («that in any [substantial] composite whatsoever there is [only] one form»). By implication this censure would also have covered Thomas's defense of unicity of substantial form in human beings, but it need not be taken as implying a special process against him.⁶¹

William de la Mare's remarks in his *Correctorium* concerning a censure of Thomas's defense of unicity of substantial form in human beings could also be taken as referring to the Masters' action against Giles in censuring the same article 48. William's claim that the theologians had censured Aquinas's view that prime matter cannot exist without some substantial form was itself challenged by Richard of Knapwell and rejected by John of Paris. If such a censure did actually occur, it could simply be that of Giles of Rome's article 47. Finally, Henry of Ghent's report about another meeting of the Paris theologians called for by Pope Honorius IV, at which unicity of substantial form was again considered and rejected, could simply be taken as referring to the meeting held for the rehabilitation of Giles in 1285.

My view, therefore, is that the evidence offered by Wielockx for a special process against and censure of Aquinas's positions by the Paris theologians in March 1277 is not conclusive. Such an event could have taken place, and if it did, it would account for the various pieces of evidence he has assembled. But all of this evidence can, it seems to me, be accounted for in simpler fashion as indicated above. Hence Wielockx's proposal should be regarded as a possible and even as a plausible way of accounting for this evidence, but not as the only way and not as demonstrated.

⁶¹ See WIELOCKX, Apologia, 213–14, for his commentary on art. 48. There he rejects as simplistic the suggestion that, at the time of the censure of Giles for this proposition, Thomas was not envisioned in any way. Also see 213 for his remarks concerning Giles's art. 47 (on the separate existence of matter without form).