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CHARLES H. LOHR

Christianus arabicus, cuius nomen Raimundus Lullus

For Brucker, whose still valuable *Historia critica philosophiae* (1766–67) was composed under the influence of Leibniz' ideas, Ramon Lull (1232–1315) represented the beginning of a new epoch in intellectual history. Later historians of philosophy – often confused by the great variety of Lull's more than 280 works and by the still greater number of works falsely attributed to him – were less well informed about Lull's position in the history of Western thought. Taking the colored triangles and revolving circles of the *Ars inveniendi veritatem* for the essence of his work, they misunderstood his ideas and presented only a caricature of his doctrine. In recent years more and more of Lull's authentic works have been made available¹ and our understanding of Lull's ideas has consequently improved², although there is still much to be done.

The distorted picture of the *Ars lulliana* which has been current is due in large measure to Lull's own situation. Conscious of the fact that he

¹ This essay is a revised and expanded version of a ponencia read at the II Congreso Internacional de Lulismo under the title «Ibn Sab Ḥin de Murcia y el desarrollo de la Ars luliana» (Miramar, Mallorca, Oct. 1976). The following abbreviations have been employed: *OE* = Ramon Llull, *Obres essencials*, 2 vols., Barcelona 1957–1960; *MOG* = *Raimundi Lulli opera*, ed. I. Salzinger, vols. I–VI, IX–X, Mainz 1721–1742; repr. Frankfurt/M. 1965; *ORL* = *Obres de Ramon Lull*, 21 vols., Palma de Mallorca 1906–1950; *ROL* = *Raimundi Lulli opera latina*, I–V, Palma de Mallorca 1959–1967; VI–XI, Turnhout 1975–1983.

² On Lull's life and doctrine see E. Colomer, *Nikolaus von Kues und Raimund Llull*, Berlin 1961; E.-W. Platzeck, *Raimund Lull, sein Leben, seine Werke, die Grundlagen seines Denkens*, 2 vols., Düsseldorf 1962–1964; R. Pring-Mill, *El microcosmos lul·lià*, Oxford 1962; J. N. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France*, Oxford 1971; J. Gayà, *La teoria luliana de los correlativos*, Palma de Mallorca 1979. For a comprehensive survey of the literature since 1870 see R. Brummer, *Bibliographia Lulliana*, Hildesheim 1976.

stood at the frontier between two civilizations, he described himself as «arabicus christianus» and «procurator infidelium»³. As such, he attempted to use methods proper to the Arabic tradition to convince the Muslims of the truth of Latin Christianity. His native island of Majorca was the point of contact between these two worlds. After his decision to dedicate his life to a missionary apostolate (ca. 1263), Lull originally planned to go to Paris to learn the Latin language and Latin theology, but was advised by Ramon de Penyafort, the great canonist and zelator fidei propagandae inter Saracenos, to return to his native island where could learn not only Latin, but also Arabic and something of Muslim theology (*Vita coetanea* 10–11, *ROL* VIII 278f.). Penyafort seems to have recognized the isolation of the Parisian theologians, whose knowledge of the Islamic tradition was limited to the few Arabic Peripatetics translated into Latin along with the Aristotelian scientific encyclopaedia. As general of the Dominican Order and later as adviser to James I of Aragon, Penyafort encouraged the foundation of houses of the Order for the study of the Arabic language and Muslim theology. In Lull he seems to have seen the opportunity for a true encounter between the mature Islamic civilization and the still culturally under-developed world of Latin Christendom. In accordance with Penyafort's program Lull not only undertook the study of Arabic, but also himself founded a school of languages in Majorca (1275) and pleaded incessantly with kings, popes, and cardinals for the establishment of other such schools in Europe⁴. In the earliest form of his often revised *Ars inveniendi veritatem* (1273/75) he confronted what he knew of Majorcan Islam with his own Western

³ Arabicus christianus: *Liber de fine*, I 2 (1305; *ROL* IX 256); *Disputatio Raimundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni*, prol. (1308; *MOG* IV 431: quidam homo christianus arabicus, cuius nomen erat Raimundus). Procurator infidelium: *Blanquerna*, c. 61 n. 4 (1282/87; *ORL* IX 211); *Disputatio fidelis et infidelis*, prol. (1287/89; *MOG* IV 377). On Lull's relation to Islam two important studies have recently appeared: D. Urvoy, *Penser l'Islam: les présupposés islamiques de l'«art» de Lull*, Paris 1980; S. Garcías Palou, *Ramon Llull y el Islam*, Palma de Mallorca 1981. See also U. Monneret de Villard, *Lo studio dell'Islam in Europa nel XII e nel XIII secolo*, Città del Vaticano 1944.

⁴ Regarding Lull's school of languages see S. Garcías Palou, *El Miramar de Ramon Llull*, Palma de Mallorca 1977; R. Brummer, «L'Enseignement de la langue arabe à Miramar: faits et conjectures», *Estudios lulianos* XXII, 1978, p. 37–48. See also J. Fück, *Die arabischen Studien in Europa bis in den Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts*, Leipzig 1955.

heritage⁵ and later sought continually to learn about and assimilate further aspects of Muslim thought.

This effort often made his ideas seem strange to Latin ears, but it also played a role in the ultimate discarding of the clerical paradigm of medieval Scholastic thought and made him, in fact, the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Western philosophy. In this essay I want (1) to bring together some of Lull's statements regarding his knowledge of Arabic, (2) to suggest some possible parallels to his ideas in Arabic authors, and (3) to indicate one certain Arabic source for his approach.

I. LULL'S KNOWLEDGE OF ARABIC

Lull's knowledge of Arabic⁶ made him unique among Latin theologians. He was very proud of his mastery of the language, as his frequent references to his knowledge of it show⁷. Not only does he occasionally cite and explain Arabic words⁸, but at least once he also defended the unusual Latin verb-forms which he had coined as being modelled on the *modus loquendi arabicus*⁹. He notes often in his works

⁵ *Libre de gentil e los tres savis*, prol. (1270/71; *OE* I 1057: Com ab los infaels hajam participat long de temps e hajam enteses lurs falses opinions e errors). In Majorca in Lull's time the total population totalled about 50,000 of whom about half were Muslims; see Ch.-E. Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane et le Maghrib au XIII^e et XIV^e siècles*, Paris 1966, p. 184.

⁶ Cf. R. Brummer, «Ramon Llull und das Studium des Arabischen», *Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie* LXXXV, 1969, p. 132–43. See the appendix to this article for a discussion of Lull's knowledge of the Arabic language.

⁷ *Libre de contemplació*, c. 125 n. 20–21 (1271/73; *ORL* IV 148f.); *De principiis theologiae* (1299; cited by A. R. Pasqual, *Vindiciae lullianae*, Avignon 1778, I 229 n. 1); *De fine*, I 2 (*ROL* IX 257); *Supplicatio Raimundi*, prol. (1310; *ROL* VI 236); *Vita coaetanea*, 45 (1311; *ROL* VIII 304); *Disputatio Petri et Raimundi*, c. 1 (1311; *ROL* op. 190 [typescript]). Cf. A. Llinares, «Références et influences arabes dans le Libre de contemplació», *Estudios lullianos* XXIV, 1980, p. 109–27.

⁸ *Libre de contemplació*, c. 352 n. 7 (*ORL* VIII 446: la esposicio moral la qual es appellado en lengua aràbica *rums*); *Arbre de sciencia*, arb. exempl., VII 10 (1296; *ORL* XII 440f.: *nabit*, qui es aytant a dir com vi en aràbic); *Disputatio Raimundi et Hamar*, II 1 (*MOG* IV 442: *ens necessarium, cui nullum ens praeiacet, et istud est Deus, quod philosophi saraceni in arabico dicunt huuiden mutlach*).

⁹ *Compendium artis demonstrativa*, de fine huius libri (1275/81; *MOG* III 452).

of dialogue with Islam that they were written not only in Latin and Catalan, but also in Arabic. At the beginning of his long literary career he composed the original form of at least part of two of his most important works in Arabic: *Libre del gentil e los tres savis* (1270/71; prol. and colophon, *OE* I 1057, 1138) and *Libre de contemplació* (1271/73; colophon, *ORL* VIII 645). From the same period dates the original Arabic form of his *Compendium logicae Algazelis* (1270/73; prol., ed. Lohr p. 94). In preparation for his second visit to North Africa he formulated in Arabic the arguments of his *Disputatio Raimundi Christiani et Hamar Saraceni* (1308; pars III, *MOGIV* 476). At the end of his life he composed several brief Arabic treatises in connection with his fateful last voyage to Tunis: *Liber de secretis SS. Trinitatis et Incarnationis* (1312; prol. and colophon, *ROL* op. 198 [typescript]) and *Ars consilii* (1315; colophon, *ROL* II 269), probably also *Liber de Deo et suis propriis qualitatibus infinitis* (1315; prol., *ROL* II 275) and *Liber de bono et malo* (1315; prol., *ROL* II 312). Arabic versions also existed of the tracts *De consolatione eremitarum* (1313; MS note, *ROL* I 120) and *De accidente et substantia* (1313; MS note, *ROL* I 135). Lull also translated from Latin into Arabic his *Ars inventiva veritatis* (1289/90; cf. his *Vita coaetanea* 19, *ROL* VIII 284) and planned the translation from Catalan into Arabic of his *Ars amativa* (1289/90; prol., *ORL* XVII 7).

Lull himself situated these works within the context of Christian Arabic controversial literature. In his *Liber de fine*, which outlined a program for the recovery of the Holy Land, he recommends to the clerics of the Military Order in addition to his own *Libre del gentil* two works which had been translated into Latin in the twelfth century: the *Risālat al-Kindī*, a ninth-century Christian polemic against Islam, and a *Liber Telif*, which is probably to be identified with an anonymous work known in Latin as *contrarietas alfolica*¹⁰.

Lull's Arabic works seem to have received some attention in North Africa. We know of a discussion which took place in the year 1394 in the Sultan's palace at Fez and concerned one of Lull's late treatises, probably the *De secretis Trinitatis et Incarnationis* referred to above. The Sultan was impressed not only by the fact that the work was composed in «lengua morisca de mano de Remon Luyll», but also by the calligraphy; he

¹⁰ *De fine*, II 6 (*ROL* IX 283). See C. H. Lohr, «Ramon Llull, *Liber Alquindi* and *Liber Telif*», *Estudios lulianos* XII, 1968, p. 145–60.

exclaimed, the narrative tells us, «que por mano de angeles devia ser escripta»¹¹. Lull knew and respected the Muslims' attitude to their language as a divine creation¹².

II. ARABIC PARALLELS TO LULL'S APPROACH

Whereas the Latin Scholastics were in general acquainted only with the comparatively few Arabic philosophical works which were translated into Latin, Lull was distinguished by his knowledge not only of Arabic philosophy, but also of Muslim religion. He refers often to the *Koran*¹³ and cites at least once a specific text (Sura CXIII 3)¹⁴. He knows not only the *Koran*, but also the ḥadīth and the commentaries of Muslim scholars on the collections of traditions¹⁵. He is also familiar with Muslim ritual practices¹⁶. In the *Libre del gentil* he gives a popular summary of Muslim beliefs in twelve articles (IV: De la creença dels sarraïns; *OE* I 1118–1133) and in the *Doctrina pueril* an account of the origins of Islam, which unfortunately reflects the distortions of Christian polemic (c. 71: De Mafumet; 1282/87, *ORL* I 125–128).

Parallels to Lull's most fundamental concern may be found in Islamic mystical literature. He had the notion that an approach to the true God might be found in the contemplation of the divine names. He

¹¹ «Disputa que fue fecha en la çibdad de Fez delante del rey e sus sabios», in: J. M. Azaceta, ed., *Cancionero de Juan Fernández de Ixar*, Clásicos Hispanos, Madrid 1956, II 491–6 at p. 491; F. Vendrell de Millás, «La tradición de la apologética luliana en el Reino de Fez», *Estudios lulianos* I, 1957, p. 371–6; M. Ruffini, «Una disputa a Fez nel 1344 sul «Liber de Trinitate» di Raimondo Lullo in un MS inedito del sec. XV», *ibid.* 385–407; J. M. Millás Vallicrosa, *El «Liber predicationis contra Judeos» de Ramón Lull*, Madrid-Barcelona 1957, p. 63–6; M. Batllori, *A través la història i la cultura*, Montserrat 1976, p. 26.

¹² D. Urvoi, «Les musulmans et l'usage de la langue arabe par les missionnaires chrétiens au moyen-âge», *Traditio* XXXIV, 1978, p. 416–27.

¹³ For example, *Libre del gentil*, IV 12 (*OE* I 1133); *Els cent noms de Deu*, prol. (1289; *ORL* XIX 80f.); *De fine*, I 2 (1305; *ROL* IX 257).

¹⁴ *De bono et malo*, I 9–12 (1315; *ROL* II 314).

¹⁵ *Libre del gentil*, IV 12 (*OE* I 1133: segons exposició literal, la qual prenen de l'Alcorà, qui és nostre lig, e dels Proverbis de Mafumet, e de les gloses dels exponedors de l'Alcorà e dels Proverbis).

¹⁶ For example, *Els cent noms de Deu*, prol. (*ORL* XIX 80f.). See N. A. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, Edinburgh 1958, p. 209–11.

called the divine names «dignitates»¹⁷ or «principia» and listed in the final form of his Art nine of them: bonitas, magnitudo, duratio; potentia, sapientia, voluntas; virtus, veritas, gloria. He thought that through contemplation on various combinations of these names, which are common to all religions, agreement between Muslims and Jews, Greek and Latin Christians could be reached. Following this approach he composed dialogues, like the *Libre del gentil e tres savis*, in which wise men represent the various world religions. One recognizes, of course, the Neoplatonic «Bonum est diffusivum sui» behind bonitas as the first of the dignities, perhaps Anselm's maximum behind the inclusion of magnitudo, and certainly the twelfth-century triad of potentia, sapientia, voluntas behind the second group of three divine names. But Lull's inspiration for the way in which these names are to be understood seems also to have been influenced by Arabic sources. He composed his *Liber de centum nominibus Dei* because the Saracens say – as he tells us in his prologue – that the Muslims believe there are ninety-nine names of God in the *Koran* and that one who knows the hundredth would know all things. Just as God has placed powers in stones and plants, so also he has placed even more virtue in his own names (1289; *ORL* XIX 80f.). Although Lull lists the dignities in the abstract forms of the Latin language, we can only understand his theory correctly if we take these designations to stand for active virtues or powers. He asks us to refer all the names and powers which we encounter in created things to the supreme power of God – the divine dignity who created the natural powers of the words and all things (*Libre de oracions e contemplacions* X 13; 1273/75, *ORL* XVIII 268). It is this conception of the dignities as active that finds a parallel in Islamic mystical literature. Ibn 'Arabī, an Andalusian Sufi († 1240), for example, tells us that the letters which make up the divine names have virtues or properties, just as do drugs, the physical elements, and all other things¹⁸.

Lull's idea of assigning letters to each of the dignities – B for bonitas, C for magnitudo, and so forth up to K for gloria – in order to facilitate

¹⁷Cf. M. Asín Palacios, *Abenmasarra y su escuela: Orígenes de la filosofía hispano-musulmana*, Madrid 1914, p. 155–64 (apendice 6: La teoría de las «hadrás» de Abenarabi y las «dignitates» de Lulio. Otras analogías de ambos sistemas); L. Eijo Garay, «Las dignidades lulianas», *Estudios lulianos* XVIII, 1974, p. 25–46; H. Merle, «Dignitas: signification philosophique et théologique de ce terme chez Lulle et ses prédecesseurs médiévaux», *ibid.* XXI, 1977, p. 173–93.

¹⁸ *Futūhāt* (Asín 210f.).

meditation on the combinations of God's powers – BC, BD, BCD, etc. – seems clearly to be related to the science of the letters ('ilm al-hurūf) or letter magic (sīmiyā¹⁹) practised by extremist Sufis. The great historian, Ibn Khaldūn († 1406), tells us that the Sufis maintained that the divine powers are active in the world of nature by means of the beautiful names of God. The secrets active in created things are active in the words in which the secrets of the letters are active in turn. On this basis the Sufis constructed «the science of the secrets of the letters». Assuming that the secret of the magic power of the letters was their inherent temper, they divided the letters into four groups corresponding to the elements. Thus alif is fiery, b airy, j watery, and d earthy. The series starts again with the next letter and continues through the whole alphabet, so that seven letters are fiery, seven airy, seven watery, and seven earthy¹⁹. The natures of the letters are the same as the combinations of the qualities of the four terrestrial elements: heat combines air and fire, cold earth and water, humidity air and water, dryness fire and earth, each combination being represented consequently by fourteen letters²⁰.

Elemental theory played a very important role in the earlier forms of Lull's Art. The four elements through the interrelation of their qualities supplied for him the essential pattern underlying the physical world. In both the *Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem* (1273/75; *MOG* I 433–473) and the *Ars demonstrativa* (1275/81; *MOG* III 93–204) there are elemental figures, formed by combinations of the four elements. In his *Tractatus novus de astronomia* (1297; ed. Pereira [typescript]) Lull worked out a system of elemental astrology or way of calculating the influences of the stars through their influences on the elements, using the letters ABCD to designate the elements and their qualities²¹. His system is very similar

¹⁹ Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, F. Rosenthal, tr., New York 1958, III 171–3; cf. III 76–103.

²⁰ *Muqaddimah*, III 219f.


²¹ See F. A. Yates, «The Art of Ramon Lull, an Approach to It Through Lull's Theory of the Elements», *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* XVII, 1954, p. 115–73. In a Spanish version of this article Miss Yates added a study of the geometry of the elemental figures, especially as they are found in the *Ars demonstrativa*: «La teoría luliana de los elementos», *Estudios lulianos* III, 1959, 237–50; IV, 1960, 45–62, 151–66. In a subsequent article she showed that the adaptation of the system of primordial causes and elements found in the *Periphiseon* of John Scotus Erigena to a new kind of astrology was an essential part of Lull's scheme: «Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena», in: *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* XXIII, 1960, 1–44. In this article Miss Yates pointed out the parallelism between Erigena's system and the Hebrew Cabbala (which arose in Provence and Aragon at about the same time as Lull's work). G. Scholem (*Ursprung und Anfänge der Kabbala*, Berlin

to one branch of the science of letter magic practised by the Sufis, the technique of seeking answers for questions by means of connections existing between the letters of the expressions used in the question. Ibn Khaldūn uses as an example of this technique the discussion in al-Sabti's (s. XIII) *Zā'irajah*²². This long passage provides many close parallels not only to the association of letters with the elemental powers in Lull's early *Artes* and to the application of them to astrology in the *Tractatus novus de astronomia*, but also to the triangles and revolving circles which have been responsible for much of the misunderstanding of Lull's intention in the Art (see figure 1). It would seem that Lull became acquainted with Sufi speculation quite early in his career. At the end of the *Libre del gentil*, which was written while he was still in Majorca, he tells us that there are some Muslims who interpret the *Koran*'s doctrine of the future life not literally, but spiritually. They do not observe all the precepts of the Law and are therefore regarded by devout Muslims as heretics, having arrived at their heresy through the study of logic and natural philosophy (IV 12; *MOG* II 109).

Lull developed his method of contemplation not only by considering the nine different dignities – so to speak, horizontally – but also by making explicit – vertically – three degrees of the powers of each of the dignities. The God whom the dignities designate is not merely good, he is the best; not merely great, but the greatest. Lull conceived his Art as a method of ascent which proceeds by a double transcensus: a transcending of sense knowledge by the ascent from the positive to the compar-

1962, *passim*) indicated many additional points of contact between the Cabbala and Erigena. Platzeck (*Raimund Lull* I 327–336) then reopened the question of the influence of the Cabbala on Lull (cf. M. Cruz Hernández, *El pensamiento de Ramon Lull*, Valencia 1977, p. 72–79). Certainly there is room here for very fruitful research on the interrelationships of Andalusian Sufism, Provençal Cabbalism, and the elemental theory in the *Artes Lull* composed in Majorca and Montpellier.

²² *Muqaddimah* I 238–245, III 182–227 and chart with translation in III endpocket. Regarding the *Zā'irajah* and its author see *Enzyklopädie des Islam*, IV, 1934, 29; C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur* Suppl. I, Leiden 1937, p. 909f.; H. P. J. Renaud, «Divination et histoire nord-africaine au temps d'Ibn Khaldūn», *Hésperis* XXX, 1943, 213–21; J. Vernet, «La fecha de composición de la *Zā'irajat al-Ālam* (1253/69)», in his *Estudios sobre historia de la ciencia medieval*, Barcelona 1979, p. 325f. Regarding Lull's knowledge of this work see Llinares, «Références et influences», at pp. 125 f. There were many similar works composed in western Islam at Lull's time; see S. H. Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass. 1978, p. 71; T. Burckhardt, *Cle spirituelle de l'astrologie musulmane d'après Mohyidīn Ibn Arabī*, Milan 1974; S. H. Nasr, *Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study*, Westerham 1976, p. 31–36.



Zā'irajah of al-Sabtī (MS Istanbul, Bibl. topkapusaray, Ahmet III 3042 [XV] I f. 237A)




Figure 1 $Zā'$ irajah: translation (Rosenthal, Muqaddimah III)

ative degrees of the dignities and a transcending of rational knowledge by the ascent from the comparative to the superlative degrees. If the objects of sense knowledge are good and great, those of the intelligible world are better and greater. But God is in comparison with all creatures absolutely the best and the greatest – optimum et maximum. At this superlative degree the differences found in the first two degrees of the various names of God derived from the created world are transcended.



Figure 2 Lull's *Tractatus novus de astronomica*

Figure 3 Lull's System of the Elements

Because God is the best «in superlativitate», he can, as such, no longer be distinguished from the greatest or the most powerful. This is the reason why Lull begins his alphabet with B, and not with A. At the highest degree of knowledge the mystic encounters the principle of agreement between all religious opinions, the Highest One, in whom we can no longer distinguish between goodness, greatness, and power. He encounters that A in whom BCD and all other letters coincide²³.

This method of ascent through degrees of perfection finds a parallel in an important Arabic philosophical treatise which was well known in Muslim Spain and translated in the twelfth century into Latin: the *Iḥṣā’ al-‘ulūm* of al-Fārābī. In the course of his discussion of the Greek scientific encyclopaedia al-Fārābī comes to speak of the science of metaphysics, the divine science, in which it is shown that incorporeal essences in their multiplicity rise from the less perfect to the ever more perfect, until they arrive at last at the one perfect thing, more perfect than which it is impossible that anything should be: *ilā kāmilin lā yumkinu an yakūna shay’ un huwa akmalu minhu* (which could be rendered into Latin with a phrase reminiscent of Anselm of Canterbury: *ad perfectum quo perfectius esse nequit*). Al-Fārābī concludes that the predicates «first», «eternal», «uncaused», and «unique» apply to this most perfect essence²⁴.

Lull’s emphasis on the dynamic aspect of all reality led him to distinguish clearly between the end of an action and the means to the end. He calls the end of an action the «first intention» and compares it to the fruit of a tree, while giving the name «second intention» to the means to the end, the tree itself. He relates the first intention to substantial, essential action, and the final cause, and the second intention to chance, accidental action, and the other three causes (*Ars compendiosa* II pars 1 modus 1; *MOG* I 443). In his earliest works Lull used this distinction primarily in the sphere of ethics: God should be loved for himself, while all other things are only a means to this end; sin reverses this order (*Libre de contemplació* 45; *ORL* II 227–232). But he soon applied it in other areas as well: in the *Liber mirandarum demonstrationum* to the problem of the relationship between faith and reason (1273/75; I 23

²³ See C. H. Lohr, «Ramón Lull und Nikolaus von Kues: Zu einem Strukturvergleich ihres Denkens», *Theologie und Philosophie* LVI, 1981, 218–31, esp. p. 220–2.

²⁴ A. González Palencia, ed., *Al-Fārābī, Catálogo de las ciencias*, 2a ed., Madrid-Granada 1953, arabic text p. 89 (cap. 4).

and III 30, *MOG* II 185, 308f.), in the *Ars demonstrativa* to the theory of knowledge (III, *MOG* III 135) and in the *Liber chaos* of the same period to the theory of the elements (*MOG* III 263f.). The *Liber de intentione* offers a generalized theory of the two intentions (1282/87; *MOG* VI 537–560).

Lull's distinction of a first and second intention is thus quite different from the well known Scholastic distinction in logic between concepts of things known as first intentions and concepts of concepts known as second intentions. Lull knew this distinction (*Logica nova* prol.: 1303, ed. Palma 1744 repr. Frankfurt 1971; *Ars generalis ultima* X 157: 1308, ed. Palma 1645 repr. Frankfurt 1970, p. 381), which seems to have been introduced in Arabic philosophy by al-Fārābī and in Latin Scholasticism by way of Avicenna²⁵. But the distinction between *‘alā al-qasd al-awwal* («according to the first intention») and *‘alā al-qasd al-thānī* («according to the second intention») was employed by Arabic authors in a much broader way than its application in logic would imply. Lull's use of the distinction reflects this broader meaning. The terms seem to have been used originally in the Arabic translations of Aristotle where they stand simply for «primarily, in the first place» (πρώτως, πρώτον) and «in the second place» (δεύτερον)²⁶. Applied to the creative activity, God's first intention in creating can not be anything outside himself, but as a second intention his action causes the world. God knows himself intentione prima and in this knowledge knows the world intentione secunda. The intelligences think themselves and their source intentione prima and the motion of the heavenly bodies belonging to them intentione secunda. The unmoved mover creates the heavenly bodies for themselves intentione prima and for the sublunar world intentione secunda²⁷. Applied to the divine providence the terms take on an even broader meaning. The first, essential (bi-dhātihī) intention of an action is its proper end, the second, accidental (bi-l-‘arad) intention is not the proper end, but that which is for the sake of the proper

²⁵ K. Gyekye, «The Terms «prima intentio» and «secunda intentio» in Arabic Logic», *Speculum* XLVI, 1971, p. 32–8.

²⁶ S. Pines, «Un texte inconnu d'Aristote en version arabe», *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* XXIII, 1956, 5–43 at p. 18f.

²⁷ M. Asín Palacios, *La espiritualidad de Algazel y su sentido cristiano*, IV, Madrid 1941, p. 127; A. Neuwirth, 'Abd al-Latīf al-Bagdādī's Bearbeitung von Buch Lambda der Aristotelischen Metaphysik', Wiesbaden 1976, p. 16, 86, 186–90 (exkurs).

end. In this sense the terms are used in the philosophical encyclopaedia of the *Ikhwān al-ṣafā*²⁸. They explain, for example, that the first intention of the creator is the permanence and welfare of creatures, whereas corruption and pain are accidental and due to the imperfection of matter (III 9 8, *Diwald* p. 471; et passim).

It was undoubtedly through the encyclopaedia that the distinction of two intentions came to Lull, either directly or perhaps through cultivated Majorcan Jews, of whose intellectual baggage the encyclopaedia formed an essential part²⁸. His application of the distinction between an essential (proper) and an accidental (improper) intention to the theory of the elements gave rise to an important development in his conception of active power and instrumentality. We have seen that in the traditional view fire is associated with the qualities of heat and dryness. Lull distinguished these two qualities, maintaining that heat is a quality proper to fire, while dryness comes to it from earth. He therefore holds that each element has a «proper» quality due *prima intentione* to the «natural» action of the element and an «appropriated» quality due *secunda intentione* to its «contingent» action (*Liber de intentione*, *De elementis*; *MOG* VI 555f.)²⁹.

III. AN ARABIC SOURCE FOR LULL'S APPROACH

Between the years 1289 and 1308 the *Ars lulliana* assumed its final form. To the principles, letters, and figures which were included in the earliest versions of the Art several other important elements were added to form the structure found in the *Ars generalis ultima* (1308). In the *Ars inventiva* (1289/90) the absolute principles were definitively reduced to nine and nine relative principles also introduced. In the same work a nine-fold division of reality (the nine subjects: divina, angelica, caeles-

²⁸ The distinction of first and second intentions is found in Lull's *Compendium logicae Algazelis* (ed. Lohr p. 123), but in a later addition which does not derive from the logic of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-falāṣifa*. For another point of contact between Lull and the *Ikhwān* see J. Dagenais, «New Considerations on the Date and Composition of Llull's *Libre de bésties*», *Actes del segon col.loqui d'estudis catalans a Nord-Amèrica*, Yale 1979, ed. M. Duran, et al., Montserrat 1982, 131–9 at p. 135–8.

²⁹ Cf. Pring-Mill, *El microcosmos lul.lià* p. 59–70.

tis, rationativa, imaginativa, sensitiva, vegetativa, elementativa, and instrumentativa) made its first appearance, although here only in connection with the rule concerning the three (positive, comparative, and superlative) degrees of knowledge (dist. III, reg. 8 de punctis transcendentibus; *MOG* V 47–60). In the *Tabula generalis* (1293) nine fundamental questions (utrum, quid, de quo, quare, quantum, quale, quando, ubi, quo modo/cum quo) were substituted for the rules of the *Ars inventiva* (dist. V; *MOGV* 243–295). In order to facilitate the combinations of the generalized *Tabula*, the letters B to K were associated not only with the principles, but also with the subjects and the questions, so that both could be systematically worked into the alphabet of the Art (*Tabula* prol.; *MOG* V 222). In the *Ars generalis ultima* all these elements were brought together³⁰.

These developments were accompanied by profound reflection on the methodology of the Art. Lull's *Logica nova* (1303) represents a decisive stage in this reflection. At first glance the work seems not to go beyond Porphyry and the various parts of the Aristotelian logic, but this revolutionary work deserves closer study. In the first distinction Lull substitutes for the traditional Arbor porphyriana a division of substantial being into the above mentioned subjects of the Art, and of accidental being – considered dynamically – into «proper» and «appropriated» accidents, corresponding to the types of action we have seen above (cap. 1–5); in this distinction he also discusses the nine questions which were introduced in the *Tabula generalis* (cap. 6–16). The second and third distinctions reinterpret the predicables and predicaments in function of Lull's dynamic conception of reality by applying the nine questions to each of them. The fourth distinction provides a philosophical lexicon, containing a hundred definitions, of which the first eighteen match the nine absolute and nine relative principles of the Art. The fifth distinction presents Lull's theory of scientific proof in the light of his conception of the relationship between faith and reason. The sixth applies this new methodology to the concept of nature and the four faculties of theology, philosophy, law, and medicine, while the seventh lists questions which may be answered by means of the new logic. This section provides a sort of index to the whole work.

³⁰ T. and J. Carreras y Artau, *Historia de la filosofía española, Filosofía cristiana de los siglos XIII al XV*, Madrid 1939, I 369–456; Platzeck, *Raimund Lull* I 104–116, 262–97 et passim.

The considerations which led to the introduction of the relative principles and to the definitive reduction of the absolute principles to nine have been studied³¹. For the origin of the other elements – the nine subjects and the methodology of the nine questions – I want to suggest a single source: the logic of the *Budd al-‘arif* of the Muslim philosopher and theologian, Ibn Sabīn of Murcia (1217/18–1269/71 Mecca)³². Although born in Andalusia, this author was active from about 1242 for a long period of time in the Maghreb, especially in Ceuta and Bugia, before being forced by accusations of heresy to take refuge in the Orient. Ibn Sabīn’s works – like those of Lull – may be regarded as the result of the encounter between two civilizations. For some historians he is the last of the Arabic peripatetics, for others a pantheistic Sufi who eagerly cultivated «the science of the letters», for still others a representative of the traditional Islamic *kalām*. He is best known as the author of the answers to the *Sicilian Questions* (1237/42) addressed by the Emperor Frederick II to the Almohade sultan ‘Abd al-Wāhid al-Rashīd (1232–1242)³³. His *Budd al-‘arif* is a comprehensive introduction to metaphysics in three parts, dealing first with logic and then with the first two Neoplatonic emanations, intellect and soul³⁴.

The logic of the *Budd al-‘arif* begins with an introduction on definition (Lator 1–5) and the nine basic questions (Lator 5–14) which we have found in Lull’s *Logica nova*. The author then turns to the standard

³¹ R. Pring-Mill, «The Trinitarian World Picture of Ramon Lull», *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* VII, 1955–56, p. 229–56; *id.*, «El número primitivo de las dignidades en el «Arte general»», *Estudios Iulianos* I, 1957, p. 309–34, II, 1958, p. 129–56; *id.*, «Grundzüge von Lulls Ars inveniendi veritatem», *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* XLIII, 1961, p. 239–66.

³² *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, III, 1971, 921f. (A. Faure); M. Cruz Hernández, *Historia de la filosofía española, Filosofía hispano-musulmana*, Madrid 1957, II 295–310; A. Badawi, «El pantheísmo integral de Ibn Sabīn», in: *Ibn Sabīn, Kitāb al-ibāta*, Madrid 1958, Spanish part p. 103–8; L. Massignon, «Ibn Sabīn et la «conspiration ḥallāgienne» en Andalousie et en Orient au XIII^e siècle», *Etudes d’Orient dédiées à Lévi-Provençal*, Paris 1962, II 661–81; D. et M.-Th. Urvoy, «Les thèmes chrétiens chez Ibn Sabīn et la question de la spécificité de sa pensée», *Studia Islamica* XLIV, 1976, p. 99–121.

³³ S. Yaltkaya, ed., *Ibn Sabīn, Correspondance philosophique avec l’empereur Frédéric II de Hohenstaufen*, Paris 1941–1943; D. Cabanelas, «Federico II de Sicilia e Ibn Sabīn de Murcia: las «Cuestiones Sicilianas»», *Miscelánea de estudios árabes y hebraicos, Boletín de la Universidad de Granada* IV, 1955, p. 31–64.

³⁴ L. Massignon, «Ibn Sabīn et la critique psychologique dans l’histoire de la philosophie musulmane (1928)», in his *Opera minora*, Beirut 1963, II 508–13; S. Lator, *Die Logik des Ibn Sabīn von Murcia*, diss., Rome 1942; *id.*, «Ibn Sabīn de Murcia y su «Budd al-‘arif»», *Al-Andalus* IX, 1944, p. 371–417.

texts on logic: Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories*, *Peribermeneias*, *Priora*, and *Posteriora*. Several points should be noted about Ibn Sabīn's treatment of these subjects. In the section corresponding to the *Isagoge* he maintains that Porphyry treats not of five, but of six words (Lator 14–21), taking individual to be a sixth predicate, as was often the case in Arabic logic. After dealing with the ten Aristotelian categories (Lator 22–34), he adds remarks on «being before» or «earlier than», on the being of a thing «in another», on «being with», and on things which are «connected» in some way (Lator 34–38). In his treatment of the *Posteriora* he deals only with the notion of definition, omitting the theory of proof entirely (Lator 50–51).

In all these points and throughout the rest of his work he betrays his dependence on the corresponding tracts of the *Ikhwān al-ṣafā*⁹ (Dietterici IV 40–43). At the very beginning of the introduction to the *Budd al-ṣārif* we find the doctrine of the two intentions which Ibn Sabīn has – like Lull – adopted from their encyclopaedia. At the end of his logic he adds a dictionary of technical terms used by jurists, theologians, philosophers, and mystics (Lator 58–88), which is similar in form to Lull's philosophical lexicon (dist. 4) and in content to his application of the methodology of the *Logica nova* to the concept of nature and the four faculties (dist. 6). Such dictionaries represent a literary form common among the Muslims. Here again Ibn Sabīn is often directly dependent on the *Ikhwān al-ṣafā*⁹. His lexicon is related to a similar list of definitions given at the end of their treatment of definition and description. The *Budd al-ṣārif* also follows their encyclopaedia in omitting (in contradistinction to Lull's *Logica nova*) a treatment of the fallacies and the topics, as well as rhetoric and poetry.

Throughout his work Ibn Sabīn's emphasis is on conciseness. He often interjects expressions like «I would explain all this in detail if I did not fear to sin by prolixity» or «I will not explain further because I want to be brief», statements which recall Lull's oft repeated «ut prolixitatem evitamus». The following outline will serve to clarify the relationships between the two works:

Introduction
Definition and description

Nine basic questions: Whether, what, how much, how, of what nature, where, when, why, who

ISAGOGE
CATEGORIAE

substance	spiritual	corporeal	celestial	natural	compound	Animal Plant Mineral	simple – 4 Elements	quantity, quality... opposition, reference, being in, connected things
	Intellect Soul Intelligible forms First matter							

I.	De arbo	divina	incorpore	substantia	de ente	corpore	accidens	de quaestionibus: Utrum, quid, de quo, quare, quantum, quale, quando, ubi, quo modo/cum quo	De arbo
									De praedicabilibus: genus, species...
II.	De praedicamentis	substantia	De definitionibus/de centum formis	De syllogismo	De propositione	De demonstratione	De figura syllogismi	De fallacis	De praedicabilibus
									De quaestionibus
III.	De definitionibus	substantia	13 modi propositionum	13 modi propositionum	13 modi propositionum	13 modi propositionum	13 modi propositionum	13 modi propositionum	De definitionibus
									De propositione
IV.	De definitionibus/de centum formis	De syllogismo	De contradictione	De contradictione	De contradictione	De contradictione	De contradictione	De contradictione	De definitionibus
									De contradictione
V.	De syllogismo	De propositione	De demonstratione	De demonstratione	De demonstratione	De demonstratione	De demonstratione	De demonstratione	De syllogismo
									De propositione
VI.	De applicatione	de natura	De figura syllogismi	De fallacis	De applicatione				
									De fallacis
VII.	De quaestionibus	Nature, meaning of	Definitions	Definitions	Definitions	Definitions	Definitions	Definitions	De quaestionibus
									De quaestionibus
			Jurists						Jurists
			Theologians						Theologians
			Philosophers						Philosophers
			9 Unities: God, Universal Intellect, Soul, Nature, Matter, Absolute Body, Spheres, Elements, Natural Things						9 Unities: God, Universal Intellect, Soul, Nature, Matter, Absolute Body, Spheres, Elements, Natural Things
			Nature, meaning of						Nature, meaning of
			Mystics						Mystics

Lull's dependence on Ibn Sabīn appears clearly in the inclusion in his *Logica nova* of the nine fundamental questions: utrum, quid, de quo, quare, quantum, quale, quando, ubi, quo modo/cum quo (dist. I cap. 6–16). The source for these questions is without doubt the treatment of nine basic questions found at the beginning of the logic of the *Budd al-ṣārif* (Lator 5–14). Lull's list matches that of Ibn Sabīn with but two exceptions. Lull substitutes a question de quo for the question qui which is found in Ibn Sabīn. He adds the question cum quo to Ibn Sabīn's quo modo, possibly as the result of reflection on Ibn Sabīn's notes on «being with» and «being in» which conclude his treatment of the categories. Ibn Sabīn's own source for the doctrine is again the logic of the *Ikhwān al-ṣafā*³⁵ (Dieterici IV 5–10). To their discussion of the questions he has simply added remarks on the order in which the questions are to be asked and their applicability to God. Lull's acquaintance with the method dates from some time before the *Tabula generalis* (1293), in which the questions appear for the first time. They are not definitively worked into the alphabet of the Art until the *Ars compendiosa* (1298).

An additional, and much more important, point of contact with the logic of the *Budd al-ṣārif* may be found in Lull's doctrine of the nine subjects: Deus, angelus, caelum, homo, imaginativa, sensitiva, vegetativa, elementativa (plus instrumentativa) (*Logica nova* dist. I cap. 1–2). Here again Lull's list and the way it is conceived show clearly his dependence on Ibn Sabīn. At the beginning of his section on the technical terms of the philosophers Ibn Sabīn divides existents into universal and particular things and defines the universal things as comprising the nine unities: God, intellect, soul, nature, matter, matter in three dimensions, the celestial spheres, the four elements, and the natural things of this world (Lator 76). A similar doctrine is found in one of the opening tracts of the *Ikhwān al-ṣafā*³⁵. They list the following subjects: God, intellect, soul, first matter, nature, second matter, the celestial spheres, the elements, and the natural things of this world. Of course the ultimate source of this doctrine is the Neoplatonic scheme of emanations from the One. In early Arabic sources, like the Pseudo-Empedocles, it is found as a pentadic arrangement from the creator through intellect, soul, and ideal nature to the second creation of material nature³⁵. A nine-fold emanation is found not only in Ibn Sabīn

³⁵ Nasr, *Introduction* 51f., 71. For the earlier Arabic sources see Asín Palacios, *Abenmasarra* 59–64.

and the *Ikhwān al-ṣafā*³⁶, but also in Avicenna who – in order to be able to assign numerical values to the emanations – repeats twice the Neoplatonic tetrad of creator, intellect, soul, and nature, and concludes with the material world as a ninth emanation³⁶.

Lull's relation to Ibn Sabīn appears not so much in the items included in the list, as in the way in which the list is conceived. All of these lists are presented as a means of ascending from the particular things of this world to the nine universal things or of descending from these universals to the particulars. Ibn Sabīn, for instance, follows up his enumeration of the nine unities with the statement: These are the nine universals, in which one descends by dissolution from the highest to the lowest, or to which one gradually ascends from particular things as to the highest and most important (Lator 76). As an example of this ascent he shows how one may rise from stone to plant, from there to animal nature, then to rational soul, and thus by way of the active intellect to the separate intellect (Lator 76). The stages of the descent are in other authors often associated with the letters of the alphabet (which being, of course, also numbers thus supply what was known as «the arithmetical values of the degrees of being»). In Avicenna, for example, combinations of the numerical values for the nine original unities give rise to the «creative plan» ($10 = 5 \times 2$), the structure of creation ($20 = 5 \times 4$), the «divine commandment» ($30 = 5 \times 6$), the created universe ($40 = 5 \times 8$), and so on. Here we recognize at once the intellectual climate in which thinking machines like the *Zā'irajah* originated³⁷.

From here it is also but a step to Lull's doctrine of the nine subjects and their associated letters. His direct dependence on the logic of Ibn Sabīn's *Budd al-ṭarif* may be seen in the derivation he provides for the subjects in his *Logica nova*. Substance, he tells us, is either incorporeal or corporeal. Incorporeal substance comprises divine, angelical, and rational substance. Corporeal substance comprises celestial, imaginative, sensitive, vegetative, and elemental substance (dist. I cap. 2).

³⁶ L. Massignon, «La philosophie orientale d'Ibn Sīnā et son alphabet philosophique (1952)», in his *Opera minora*, Beirut 1963, II 591–605; Nasr, *Introduction* 210. In Ibn 'Arabī and his school a system of revelations or manifestations takes the place of the Neoplatonic emanations; see A. E. Affifi, *The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Dīn-Ibnul 'Arabī*, Cambridge 1939, 62–65; H. Corbin, «Imagination créatrice et prière créatrice dans le soufisme d'Ibn 'Arabī», *Eranos Jahrbuch* XXIV, 1956, 121–240 at p. 162, 221f.

³⁷ Massignon, *ibid.*; Nasr, *Introduction* 210.

When one makes allowance for Lull's Christian rejection of the Neoplatonic emanations, this division matches Ibn Sab^cīn's division of substance into incorporeal and corporeal. Although the enumeration of incorporeal substance (intellect, soul, intelligible forms, and first matter) differs, Ibn Sab^cīn does provide us with the principle of division for Lull's enumeration of corporeal substances. He divides the latter into celestial and natural, and natural substance into composed (sensitive, vegetative, and mineral) and simple (elemental) (Lator 24). Thus we can account for seven of the types of substance listed in Lull's *Logica nova*. The addition of an imaginative soul between the animal and the rational soul possibly reflects the teaching of other authors who wrote in the tradition of Avicenna³⁸. The addition of instrumentativa as a ninth type of substance is obviously a consequence of Lull's doctrine of appropriated qualities.

Since the doctrine of the nine subjects appears as early as Lull's *Ars inventiva*, we may conclude that his acquaintance with Ibn Sab^cīn's *Budd al-^cārif* dates from at least that period (1289/90). Since in that work the subjects are included in connection with the rule concerning the three degrees of knowledge (dist. III reg. 8), it would appear that Lull already associated this Neoplatonic doctrine with the idea of the ascent of the intellect. In the *Tabula generalis* (1293) the subjects are worked into the alphabet of the Art; in the *De ascensu et descensu intellectus* (1305; ROL IX op. 120) they are explicitly employed as stages in the intellect's ascent.

The fact that the preceding points of contact between Lull and Ibn Sab^cīn are also points of contact between Lull and the Ikhwān al-ṣafā³⁹ could occasion the question whether the relevant tracts in their encyclopaedia provided the model for Lull's *Logica nova*, rather than the logic of the *Budd al-^cārif*. But in addition to the general parallelism between the *Logica nova* and Ibn Sab^cīn's work, there is an important argument for Lull's direct dependence on the *Budd al-^cārif*. In the *Logica nova* Lull

³⁸ For example, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī († 1274), the great Persian commentator on Avicenna, added an imaginative soul to the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls; see M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, I, Wiesbaden 1963, p. 575. Samuel ibn Moṭot, a Jewish Cabalist who lived in Spain in the second half of the fourteenth century, in dealing with the question of prophetic illumination inserts an imaginative faculty between the sensitive and cogitative/intellectual faculties; see G. Vajda, «Recherches sur la synthèse philosophico-kabbalistique de Samuel ibn Moṭot», *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge* XXVII, 1960, 29–63 at p. 60.

distinguishes thirteen types of proposition according to their probative force (dist. V cap. 1). This classification is found in Ibn Sabīn (Lator 49f.), but not in the *Ikhwān*. It had its origin in Avicenna's proposed reform of Islamic theology in accordance with the Aristotelian theory of demonstrative science.

This development is important for the understanding of Lull's relationship to the *Budd al-`arif* and the evolution of his method of theological argumentation. Before Avicenna's time two types of logic had developed more or less independently in Islam: a Greek logic of three terms and the syllogism and a Semitic logic of two terms which argued on the basis of analogy with an authority or a tangible fact like the miraculous works of the Prophet. The Islamic jurists (*fuqahā*³⁹) rejected the notion of causal connections and essences which the syllogism implies as an affront to the divine omnipotence. But the appearance of the Mu'tazilite heresy in the second century H. caused a crisis in Islam. In discussing the problem of predestination and free-will these adherents of Greek rationalism were confronted with the question of God's justice and consequently with the question of his properties and essence. The orthodox were forced to respond to this challenge. While some took refuge in a literal interpretation of the *Koran*'s anthropomorphisms, others attempted to give reasons for the traditional doctrines of the faith. In this way the class of theologians (*mutakallimūn*) was called into life. Theology (*kalām*) has, therefore, in Islam an essentially apologetic character. It is a science which attempts to defend the doctrines of faith with rational arguments and to refute innovations which depart from the teachings of the early Muslims. The origin of this discipline is described at length by Ibn Khaldūn³⁹.

The most celebrated figure in this movement was that of al-Ash`arī († 935). In trying to mediate between the Mu'tazilites and the orthodox he laid the foundations of Islamic theology. Al-Ash`arī and his followers continued in their argumentation to make use of the logic of the *fuqahā*³⁹. Basically their methodology (a methodology which readers of Ramon Lull will readily recognize) consisted in the dialectical confrontation of two opinions, concluding either with the affirmation or denial of one of the opinions or with a distinction. For example, where the orthodox understood the *Koran*'s reference to God's hearing literally and

³⁹ *Muqaddimah* III 34, 44–68.

the Mu^ctazilites rejected it, the Ash^carites distinguished, claiming that God hears, but not as men do. In this dialectical approach they made considerable use of the *reductio ad absurdum*. For example, they proved that the divine properties are not identical with the divine essence in the following way: If the properties were identical with the essence, then there would be contradictory properties (mercy, justice) in the one essence. But this is impossible; therefore...

It is in this context that we must situate Avicenna's classification of various types of proposition. He admitted that probable opinions, conjectures, and propositions accepted on faith could be employed in the «rhetorical» argumentation of the *fuqahā*³⁹. But in the *mutakallimūn*, who base their reasoning on accepted opinions and propositions conceded for the sake of argument, he can see nothing more than «dialecticians». For this reason he proposed a reform of Islamic theology in accordance with Aristotle's theory that a demonstrative science must be based on true and certain premisses and proceed by syllogistic deduction. Avicenna's early Arabic encyclopaedic works manifest an increasing occupation with the problem of theological methodology. In his Persian *Dānišnāma* he directly opposed the logic of the syllogism to the logic of the *fuqahā*³⁹ and *mutakallimūn*. In this work he not only refutes their methods of proof, but also maintains that theology must be reformed on the Aristotelian model. Accordingly, he distinguished thirteen types of proposition, classifying them according to the Arabic canon of Aristotle's works on logic. We have seen above his enumeration of the five types of premiss which meet the requirements of a demonstrative science: axioms, sense-data, data of immediate experience, traditional statements, and propositions which contain their own proof. The other eight types are associated with dialectical, sophistical, rhetorical, and poetical argumentation (*Dānišnāma* I 27–28; Achen and Massé I 66–76)⁴⁰. This classification found its place in al-Ghazālī's Arabic reworking of Avicenna's Persian text, the famous *Maqāsid al-falāsifa* (Dunyā 110–112) and thence in Lull's *Compendium logicae Algazelis* (§ 2.11–17; Lohr p. 100f.). Avicenna's classification also found its way

⁴⁰ On the origin and development of Muslim theology see D. B. Macdonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, London 1903, p. 186–214; A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development*, Cambridge 1932, p. 83–94, 250–63; L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane*, Paris 1948, p. 21–78, 309–15; *Encyclopaedia of Islam* III, 1971, 1141–50 (L. Gardet).

into the *Budd al-ārif* of Ibn Sabīn. In the *Logica nova* Lull seems to have used this work rather than his own compendium. The terms he uses in the *Logica nova* are quite different from those used in his earlier work and probably represent a new translation directly from Ibn Sabīn⁴¹.

IV. CHRISTIANUS ARABICUS: PRAECURSOR PHILOSOPHIAE
TEMPORIS RESUSCITARUM LITTERARUM

Lull seems to have known, however, not only Avicenna's classification of propositions according to their admissibility in theological argumentation, but also something of the speculations of the Muslim theologians concerning their sources. The ideas of the latter were apparently influenced by Avicenna's critique, but their approach differed from his in that they discussed not propositions, but the «channels» of knowledge where propositions could be found⁴². One theologian, with whose works Lull was no doubt acquainted, played a particularly important role in this discussion: Ibn Ḥazm of Cordova (994–1064)⁴³. Although active primarily in Andalusia, this violent opponent not only of Sufi monism, but also of Mu'tazilite speculation and the Ash'arite introduction of divine attributes, lived in Majorca from about 1040 to about 1050. On the island Muslim theology was more traditional and conservative than in Andalusia and he gained many adherents there. Even under the Almohades and in Lull's time his influence continued to make itself felt⁴⁴.

⁴¹ *CLA* (§ 2.11; Lohr p. 100): (1) de necessario, (2) de sensualitate, (3) de experientia, (4) de taretur, (5) de re continent in se ipsa demonstrationem (6) de cogitatione, (7) de publico, (8) de suppositione, (9) de concessione, (10) de similitudine, (11) de generalitate, (12) de opinione, (13) de imaginatione. *LN* (dist. V cap. 1): (1) *axioma*, (2) per sensibilitatem, (3/4) per experientiam, (4/5) per communem conceptionem, (5/3) subiectum continet in se ea per quae est cognitum, (6) per opinionem, (7) per publicum, (8) per suppositionem, (9) per consensum, (10) per similitudinem, (11) per publicam famam, (12) per existimationem, (13) per imaginationem. Al-Ghazālī and Ibn-Sabīn both use the same Arabic terms for these types of proposition. Lull's terms differ from those used by Gundissalinus in his translation of al-Ghazālī (ed. Lohr IV 531–675).

⁴² Gardet-Anawati, *Introduction* 374–86.

⁴³ R. Arnaldez, *Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Ḥazm de Cordoue*, Paris 1956; Cruz Hernández, *Filosofía hispano-musulmana I* 239–99; *Encyclopaedia of Islam* III, 1971, 790–9 (R. Arnaldez).

⁴⁴ D. Urvoy, «La vie intellectuelle et spirituelle dans les Baléares musulmanes», *Al-Andalus* XXXVII, 1972, 87–132; *id.*, *Penser l'Islam* 41–71.

In spite of his harsh criticism of all speculation Ibn Ḥazm taught that philosophy is not contrary to religion, but that it must necessarily arrive at the same conclusions as revealed doctrine. In his *Kitāb al-fīsāl fī l-milāl wa-l-ahwā' wa-l-nihāl* – the first great Islamic history of religious ideas – he employed arguments based on reason not only to classify heresies, but also to refute errors and explain and establish proofs for doctrines of the faith. He gives no systematic treatment of his methodology, but at various places in the *K.al-fīsāl* he does discuss different types of proof or demonstration (burhān). Setting aside merely persuasive argument (burhān iqnā'ī), Ibn Ḥazm distinguishes two types of necessary demonstration (burhān ḍarūrī): that based on revealed texts (burhān ḍarūrī sam'ī) and that based on speculative reason (burhān naẓarī mushāhad) (I 25: ed. 1317 II 106f., Asín III 153). The former uses the *Koran*, the traditions from the Prophet, and the consent of the Muslims as sources; the latter the immediately evident data of sense and intellectual experience, as well as logical consequences inferred from such data (II 10: ed. II 177, Asín III 218; II 20: ed. III 55, Asín III 290)⁴⁵.

The term «burhān» is Koranic and signifies «a shining light», «a clear, brilliant manifestation» come from God (*Koran* IV 174). It also signifies the decisive proof which the infidels are called upon – in vain – to furnish as justification of their false beliefs (II 111; XXIII 117). In these contexts the term refers to the manifest evidence of an irrefutable proof, which may take the supreme form of the miracle. In accordance with their apologetic purposes the theologians used the term for arguments they employed. They undertook to provide «shining proofs» for the truth of Islam. Of course, their arguments were based above all on authority, on the *Koran* and on the ḥadīth. But the theologians also included arguments from reason, while the philosophers recognized the demonstrative force of the truths found in the Muslim tradition. Avicenna's list of propositions admissible in the science of theology comprises not only axioms and the data of experience, but also the *mutawātirāt*, premisses based on reliable traditions from the Prophet. For Ibn Ḥazm not only the revealed texts, but also the data of experience and logical conclusions drawn from them can be the sources of necessary demonstrations (barāhīn ḍarūriyya) (*K.al-fīsāl* II 20: ed. III 55, Asín III

⁴⁵ Cf. *K. al-fīsāl* I epilogue (ed. II 110; Asín III 156); II 7(ed. II 153; Asín III 200); II 10 (ed. II 176; Asín III 217); II 13 (ed. III 15; Asín III 247).

290). Such considerations led eventually to a clear distinction in Islamic theology between rational and traditional tracts (*‘aqliyyāt* and *sam‘iyyāt*)⁴⁶ and later to a division between the philosophical sciences (*al-‘ulūm al-ḥikmiyya al-falsafiyya*) and the positive sciences of the Muslim tradition (*al-‘ulūm al-naqliyya al-wad‘iyya*)⁴⁷.

Ramon Lull was well acquainted with these distinctions. Translating literally the Arabic, he introduced into Latin Scholasticism the term «*theologia positiva*» (*wad‘* = ponere). Developing the ideas behind the Arabic words (*sam‘* = to hear; *naql* = to remove, transfer, transmit; *naṣar* = to see, to contemplate; *shuhūd* = to see, to experience personally), he tells us in his *Libre dels proverbis*: *Teología positiva* està per voluntat e demostrativa per enteniment (276; *ORL* XIV 301)⁴⁸. Discovering in the *Budd al-‘arif* of Ibn Sab‘īn that Ibn Ḥazm’s distinction of revealed and rational sources for necessary demonstrations was related to one common among the Ash‘arites (Lator 64f.), he seems in the *Logica nova* to have wanted to accommodate Avicenna’s classification of propositions to Ibn Ḥazm’s distinction between necessary demonstration and persuasive argumentation by assigning the former’s five types of demonstrative premisses (which include – as has been said – traditional statements) to syllogistic proof, while describing the other eight types simply as arguments (dist. V cap. 1). The title of one of his earliest polemical works, the *Liber mirandarum demonstrationum* (1273/75; *MOG* II 177–420), reflects no doubt the original, Koranic meaning of the term «*burhān*» as a «shining proof». Most importantly, in Ibn Ḥazm’s concept of *barāhīn ḍarūriyya*, «necessary demonstrations», we have found the origin of one of Lull’s most controversial notions, that of giving «*rationes necessariae*» for doctrines of the faith⁴⁹.

⁴⁶ Gardet-Anawati, *Introduction* 329, 343f., 429–33.

⁴⁷ Gardet-Anawati, *Introduction* 107f., 121–4, 162–4.

⁴⁸ See C. H. Lohr, «Lección inaugural en la Escuela lulística mayoricense», *Estudios Julianos* XVII, 1973, p. 114–23.

⁴⁹ See S. Garcías Palou, «Las «rationes necessariae» del Bto. Ramón Llull, en los documentos presentados por él mismo a la Sede Romana», *Estudios Julianos* VI, 1962, p. 311–325. Lull probably knew that Anselm of Canterbury and Richard of St. Victor also spoke of «rationes necessariae», since he maintains that they held the possibility of understanding the articles of faith (*Liber mirandarum demonstrationum* I 14 [*MOG* II 183]; cf. S. Garcías Palou, «San Anselmo de Canterbury y el beato Ramón Llull», *Estudios Julianos* I, 1957, 63–89). Since Anselm’s project of *fides quaerens intellectum* is also directed at the infideles and since he expressly wants to provide *rationes necessariae* for the Incarnation to that end (*Cur Deus homo*, praef.; Schmitt II 42), the question arises for research to what

Lull's conception of the theologian's task differed from that of contemporary Latin Scholasticism. He maintained that in controversy with the infidels one can not be content to remain a *theologus positivus*, but must become *probativus cum rationibus*, since there is no traditional common ground between Muslims and Christians. In his *Liber de acquisitione Terrae sanctae* (dist. 3; ed. Longpré, *Criterion* 3 [1927] 265–278) he explicitly rejected the approach of the celebrated Dominican missionary, Ramon Martí, for this reason⁵⁰. But his conception of a *theologus probativus cum rationibus* also differed from the Aristotelian notion of demonstration. Lull's encounter with the position of the Scholastic theologians of the university of Paris that the articles of faith can not be proved forced him to turn his attention to the theory of scientific demonstration. As he explains in the *Epistola* appended to his *Liber de experientia realitatis Artis* (1308/09; *ROL* XI 220f.), the theologians knew only the Aristotelian demonstrations *per quia* and *propter quid*, which can not be applied to God. Therefore they maintained that it was impossible to supply proofs in matters of faith. But since he knew from experience that the infidels could not be persuaded to abandon one belief concerning God for another, he sought new forms of argumentation which would enable him to demonstrate the Christian doctrines.

To this end Lull developed two new methods of proof. The first made use of the Sufi conception of the active powers of the divine names and proceeded by way of the equivalence of such perfections in God. This method, which he called «*demonstratio per aequiparantiam*» in contradistinction to the two Aristotelian methods, is described in the *Logica nova* (dist. V cap. 3) and treated *ex professo* in a treatise of 1305 (*ROL* IX op. 121). But because he sought a method which could be employed in the universal science of his Art, he also developed a fourth method of proof, which he called «*demonstratio per hypothesim*», because it regards not only opinions, presuppositions, and the like, but also religious beliefs, as hypotheses. In that this method attempts to

extent Anselm was acquainted with contemporary Islamic theological methodology. Cf. F. S. Schmitt, «Die wissenschaftliche Methode in Anselms «*Cur Deus homo*»», in: *Spi-cilegium beccense* I, Bec-Paris 1959, p. 349–70; R. Roques, «Les pagani dans le *Cur Deus homo* de Saint Anselme», *Miscellanea mediaevalia*, II, 1963, p. 192–206.

⁵⁰ E. Longpré, «Le B. Raymond Lulle et Raymond Martí, O.P.», *Estudios lulianos* XIII, 1969, 197–200.

distinguish true hypotheses from false ones by means of a dialectical procedure involving falsification it resembles the method of the Asharite theologians we have encountered above.

In accordance with the Muslim distinction between *sam'iyyāt* and *aqliyyāt* and appealing to the text of Isaiah (VII 9), «*Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis*», Lull distinguished two degrees of knowledge: *scientia positiva per credere* and *scientia demonstrativa per intelligere*. The *demonstratio per hypothesim* is a method of advancing from one to the other. It attempts to supply a sufficient reason for a belief or an opinion. The question which is implicit in every belief or opinion is first expressed in the form of two contradictory hypotheses. Then in accordance with the principle that a proposition is necessary when its contradictory implies a contradiction, the argument concludes to the truth of one of the hypotheses by drawing out the consequences of the other and showing that they are impossible. Lull saw this method of proof as one which should supplant the Aristotelian syllogism. Whereas the syllogism has its ontological basis in the essences of things, Lull's method abandons the attempt to penetrate into essences and substances and is satisfied with a negative type of understanding. In the ascent from belief to understanding the intellect experiences itself as the interpretation of truth, in that it recognizes that it can not assent to the opposite conclusion.

A good example of Lull's method of demonstration may be found in his *Liber de novo modo demonstrandi*, in which this method reached its final form. In this short treatise he argues that there is one God and not many, because, if one assumes that the contradictory hypothesis be true, it would follow of necessity that the infinite essence of each would limit the infinite essences of the others, which is impossible (1312; dist. I pars 2, *MOG* IV 597). A further example will bring out better the way in which Lull made use in this method of argumentation of the two principles that he had found in Arabic authors: that the powers of things are active and that in God in the superlative degree. The contemporary life of Lull records a debate which this *christianus arabicus* carried on with the *qādī* (episcopus) of Bugia at the time of his visit in North Africa in the year 1307. The *qādī* demanded of Lull a *ratio necessaria* for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Both agreed as a common principle that God is good in the superlative degree from eternity (Deus est perfecte bonus ab aeterno). But their beliefs regarding the divine activity differed. The *qādī* maintained that God is not productive; since he is

perfectly good, he has no need to beg or produce any other good outside of himself. Lull maintained a contradictory position: that God is productive. His proof proceeds by drawing out the conclusion from the qādī's position and showing it to be impossible. Since the qādī believes in creation, Lull argues that it follows that God would necessarily be more perfectly good (*magis perfectus in bonitate*) after creation than before, an impossible conclusion, since it was presupposed that God is good in the superlative degree. Whence it follows that God is productive in himself, even before creation, the Father generating the Son and the Spirit proceeding from both (*Vita coetanea* 37; *ROL* VIII 298).

In the discussions which he carried on with Muslim scholars in North Africa Lull sought naturally some common ground which could serve as the point of departure for his explanation of Christian doctrine. In Bugia his opponent seems to have represented a more conservative theological position, since he appealed only to the facts of God's goodness and the world's creation. The subliminal appeal to the Neoplatonic principle, «*Bonum est diffusivum sui*», as a proof that God would be more perfectly good after creation than before (*cum bonitas sit magis bona diffudendo se, quam existendo otiosa*; *ibid.*) was possibly directed as much to the Parisian readers of the contemporary life as to the Muslim qādī. During an earlier sojourn in Tunis in 1293 Lull seems to have directed his argumentation to an audience influenced by Sufi doctrines. He took as his point of departure in this discussion the presence of the dignities in God in the superlative degree. But in order to demonstrate the activity of the divine dignities, he appealed not to the Neoplatonic principle, but rather to the fact that his opponents admitted the activity of the divine intellect and will (*Vita coetanea* 26; *ROL* VIII 290)⁵¹.

Lull seems here to be referring to the Sufi idea that in God and the illuminated mystic knowledge (*al-^cilm*), the knower (*al-^cālim*), and the object known (*al-ma^clūm*) are one. Ibn ^cArabī, for example, writes: «Knowledge, the object known, and the knower are three to be considered one. If you wish, they may as they are be considered in the eye of the witness as three. But the Lord of the supernatural is seen as One. There is nothing additional to Him in the heights»⁵². This doctrine reflects, of

⁵¹ See D. Urvoy, «La structuration du monde des ulémas à Bougie au VII^e/XIII^e siècle», *Studia islamica* XLIII, 1976, 87–107; *id.*, *Penser l'Islam* 220–34.

⁵² Cited by F. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, Leiden 1970, p. 188–192.

course, Aristotle's teaching regarding νόησις νοήσεως (*Metaph.* A 9; 1074b34) as expanded in Neoplatonism from two to three terms. The *Theologia Aristotelis* explains that the νοῦς understands («intelligit» in the Latin translation) continually; the action of understanding (intellectio) is its very substance. In it that which understands (intelligens) and that which is understood (intellectum) are one and the same thing (VIII 4; ed. 1519f. 58v). Christian controversialists writing in Arabic took up this doctrine as an analogy for the Trinity. For example Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī († 974), an Oriental Lull, who tried to provide natural arguments for the Trinity, maintained that the intellect (ʿaql), intelligens (ʿāqil), and intellectum (maʿqūl) are one⁵³. Lull could have found the Sufi version of this doctrine as the definition of knowledge (ʿilm, ʿālim, maʿlūm) among the definitions of the theologians in the *Budd al-ʿarif* of Ibn Sabīn (Lator 65)⁵⁴.

Lull also maintained in his Tunis sermon that his opponents admitted the activity of the divine will⁵⁵. It is more difficult to find parallels to this doctrine in Sufi works, although Ibn ʿArabī presented the goal of spiritual love as an identification in which the essence of the lover becomes the very essence of the beloved⁵⁶. The idea of the oneness of the amans, the amatum, and amor itself plays, of course, an essential role in Lull's charming collection of proverbs, the *Libre de amic e amat* (1282/87; *ORL* IX 379–431), which he tells us was composed in the manner of the Sufis (*Blanquerna* 99, 3; *ORL* IX 378). But as with the appeal to the principle, «Bonum est diffusivum sui», in the Bugia disputation, it may be that Lull has included the idea of the will's activity in order to stress the agreement of Sufi doctrine with an analogy with which his Parisian readers would certainly have been acquainted, Augustine's famous conclusion: *Et illic igitur tria sunt, amans et quod amatur et amor* (*De Trinitate* VIII 10; *CCSL* 50 290f.).

Lull's conception of the dynamism of the divine dignities extended, however, far beyond the activity of the divine intellect and will. In the Tunis sermon he saw it as essential for his argument that all the divine dignities are regarded as active (*loc. cit.*). Throughout his works and

⁵³ See G. Graf, *Die Philosophie und Gotteslehre des Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī und späterer Autoren*, Münster 1910, p. 24, 236.

⁵⁴ Cf. Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant* 52–69.

⁵⁵ Also in *Arbor scientiae*, Arbor exempl., de exem. situs arb. div. (1296; cited by A. R. Pasqual, *Vindiciae lullianae*, Avignon 1778, I 201n.¶).

⁵⁶ *Futūhāt* (Asín 211).

especially in his later works Lull argued that without an inner, triadic division of the dignities they would be otiose, which is impossible. Coining new forms – possibly on the analogy of the Arabic terms we have seen – he held that bonitas must be active (bonificativum), bringing forth, producing something good (bonificabile), a division which is transcended by an ultimate concord (bonificare). Even the divine unity must be structured; as a unity, it must have a moment which is to be united, otherwise it would not be active. If God is truly one in an active sense of the word, he must be triune (*De ente absoluto*; 1313, *ROL* I 154)⁵⁷.

Lull's originality consisted in the generalization of this conception. For every verb he forms words which signify the one who acts, the one who is acted upon, and the connection of both in the activity. Lull refers to these moments as correlatives of action and came to speak even of the abstract forms -tivum, -bile, and -are⁵⁸. In all aspects of the created world Lull sees images of the Trinity: in the fact that an action consists of a potency, an object, and an act; in the three dimensions of corporeal reality; in the two premisses and one conclusion of the syllogism. The correlative unfolding of all beings thus becomes an absolute ontological principle, being and activity and consequently being and relationality become ultimately identical. Activity is not, as in Aristotle, an accident, but is understood as something substantial. Rest is not, as for medieval Scholasticism, the goal of activity, but nature is at rest in its activity: *Natura est essentia in suo naturali concreto sustentata et mota per actum naturale, in quo quidem actu est in quiete (Ars generalis ultima X cap. 8 no. 17)*. Nicholas of Cusa learned much from Lull's approach. Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* represents the last attempt to follow it out in all its consequences.

Appendix: Lull's knowledge of the Arabic language

In the prologue to his *Compendium logicae Algazelis* Lull tells us that the work contains a part of the logic of al-Ghazālī and has been translated

⁵⁷ See Daniel, *Islam and the West* 177–80.

⁵⁸ On the doctrine of the correlatives J. Gayà, *La teoria luliana de los correlativos*, Palma de Mallorca 1979. An interesting parallel to the forms -tivum, -bile, and -are is found in Gundissalinus' translation of al-Ghazālī's *Maqāsid* on the question of accidents. Where the Arabic text reads: al-bayād wa-l-sawād yakhtalifāni fi l-sawādiyya wa-l-bayādiyya (Dunyā 168), Gundissalinus translates: albedo et nigredo differunt in albificando et nigrificando (Muckle 23).

from Arabic into Latin. That Lull's excerpts from al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid al-faṭāṣifa* were based on the original Arabic text (ed. S. Dunyā; Cairo 1961) and not on the Latin translation of Gundissalinus (ed. C. H. Lohr, «Logica Algazelis, Introduction and Critical Text», in: *Traditio* 21 [1965] 223–90; cited by section and line) can be confirmed by a comparison of Gundissalinus' translation with Lull's text (ed. C. H. Lohr, *Raimundus Lullus' Compendium logicae Algazelis*, diss. Freiburg 1967, pp. 94–123; cited by paragraph number).

In dealing with the division of propositions Lull translates the Arabic *qadiyya maḥṣūra* (Dunyā 59) as *propositio determinata* (§ 2.02), whereas Gundissalinus has *propositio definita* (III.100). Had Lull known the Latin translation, he would have retained *propositio definita*, which was the standard term in the Latin tradition (cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicales* [De Rijk § 8]).

In enumerating the conditions for a real contradiction between propositions Lull translates the third condition, *an lā yakhtalifā fi l-juz³iyya wa-l-kulliyya* (Dunyā 62) as *fit de particulari et universalis* (§ 2.05), whereas Gundissalinus has *ut non differant de parte et in toto* (III.164).

The total number of conditions listed by al-Ghazālī for a real contradiction between propositions is seven, of which the last two are (6) that the statements do not differ by reason of time or place, and (7) that they be quantitatively opposed (Dunyā 63). Here the Arabic text used by the Latin translator was apparently defective. The condition regarding time and place was omitted and condition (7) came to be numbered as (6) (III.180). Lull includes the condition based on time and place (§ 2.05).

In classifying premisses according to their probative force al-Ghazālī assigns *mutawātirāt* to demonstrative argumentation (Dunyā 110). This term was used for religious truths based on «reliable» traditions from the Prophet. Gundissalinus translates the term as *famosae* (IV.679). Lull, who knew the religious connotation, simply transliterates the Arabic word and explains that it means reliable premisses: *tavetur, quod est vocabulum arabicum, quae raro fallit* (§ 2.12).

Al-Ghazālī refers *wahmiyyāt* and *mushbihāt* to sophistical argumentation (Dunyā 111). Gundissalinus erroneously translates these terms as *putabiles* and *simulatoriae* (IV.711). Lull correctly has *de cogitatione* and *de similitudine* (§ 2.14).

A conclusive proof that Lull used the Arabic original is supplied by a place where the Latin translator modified his original. Where al-Gha-

zālī uses as an example for the question, *Quid est: Ka-mā yuqāl, mā al-^cuqār? fa-yaqūl: huwa al-sharābu al-muskiru al-mu^ctasaru min al-^cinab* (As is said: What is ^cuqār?, one says: It is the intoxicating drink pressed from grapes [Dunyā 119]), Gundissalinus substitutes: *Ut cum quaeratur, «Quid est anthropos?», respondetur, «Animal rationale mortale»* (V. 20f.). Lull has: *Ut si quaeratur, «Quid est vinum?», convenienter respondetur, «Vinum est aqua putrefacta in vite»* (§ 3.17), which, though not exactly accurate, shows that he could not have been working from the Latin version.

In general, Lull has rendered the Arabic quite adequately, although his version is of course much abbreviated. There are, however, a few places where he seems to have misunderstood his original. In his division of propositions according to their form al-Ghazālī distinguishes predicative (e. g., «the world is created»), conditional copulative (e. g., «if the sun rises, it is day») and conditional disjunctive (e. g., «the world is either created or eternal») (Dunyā 54). Lull's rendering of this passage is as follows:

Propositio bipertitur. Prima enim est praedicativa; altera vero est conditionalis. *Praedicativa* autem est duplex: una enim est disiunctiva, alia coniunctiva. *Disiunctiva* quidem est vel falsa vel vera; quoniam in ea nullum cadit medium. In *coniunctiva* vero cadit medium; sicut quando homo dicit: «Claude archam». *Conditionalis* autem est, cum dico: «Si dilexeris me, dabo tibi librum» (§ 2.01).

It is difficult to understand why Lull here tries to correct his original. The Arabic text is simple and clear. Lull has not only confused the terminology by putting conjunctive and disjunctive under praedicative (categorical) propositions, but also shown by the examples he gives that he has misunderstood al-Ghazālī's principle of division between conjunctive and disjunctive. The examples he gives refer to the division between propositions which are either true or false and other utterances which are neither, such as questions and commands. This division had been treated by al-Ghazālī a few lines earlier, and perhaps this is the source of the confusion. Since the standard Latin terms for predicative and conditional propositions were *categorica* and *hypothetica* (cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicales* [De Rijk § 7]), Lull also betrays here – as with his translation of *qaḍiyya mahṣūra* – that he was not yet conversant with the scholastic terminology at the time when his compendium of al-Ghazālī's work was made.