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THE “NEITHER ONE NOR MANY” ARGUMENT FOR ŚŪNYATĀ, AND ITS TIBETAN INTERPRETATIONS: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND SOURCE MATERIALS

Dans un précédent article, l’auteur a entrepris l’étude d’un important argument avancé par le Mādhyamika, une des écoles philosophiques inspirées par le bouddhisme du Grand Véhicule, en faveur de la vacuité. Il s’agit maintenant d’illustrer cette étude par deux textes tibétains qui portent sur l’argument en question. Le premier, dû à Se-ra Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, dégage la ligne principale de l’argument; le second écrit par Tsoñ-kha-pa, débat de problèmes logiques connexes.

L’article ci-après est une introduction à ces deux textes, dont l’édition et la traduction paraîtront ultérieurement.

A. INTRODUCTION

In my first article on this subject¹ I presented various forms of the Mādhyamika argument that entities are in reality (*yañ dag tu; tattvataḥ*) without their own-nature (*rañ bžin; svabhāva*) because they have neither the nature of oneness nor manyness. This “neither one nor many” argument (*gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs; ekānekaviyogahetu*) finds its locus classicus in Śāntarakṣita’s *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, and it is there that I began my exposition. I then proceeded to Tsoñ-kha-pa’s interpretation of Śāntarakṣita, as found in *Drañ ñes legs bśad sñin po*.

This time I shall translate and expand upon relevant sections in two important dGe-lugs-pa texts: Se-ra Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan’s *sKab dañ po’i spyi don*, and Tsoñ-kha-pa’s *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*. The first work is a monastic textbook (*yig cha*) on the first chapter of Maitreya’s *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, and as I mentioned in my previous article, its section on the “neither one nor many” argument is simply an expanded version of the presentation in *rNam bśad sñin po rgyan*, rGyal-tshab-rje’s commentary on *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*. As a result, a translation of Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan, in itself, virtually constitutes a translation of rGyal-tshab-rje, the latter text appearing almost verbatim in the former.

Both the *sKabs dañ po'i spyi don* and *rNam bsad sñiñ po rgyan* seem to follow, in style and substance, *dBu ma dgoñs pa rab gsal*, Tsoñ-kha-pa's commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. In the section dealing with the Svātantrika in *dBu ma dgoñs pa rab gsal*,² we find a discussion of the object to be refuted (*dgag bya*), the example of the illusion (*sgyu ma*), and an explanation of how phenomena do not ultimately (*don dam par*) have a nature, but still have a nature conventionally (*kun rdzob tu*). In addition, we find the argument (cf. note 28 of my first article) which Tsoñ-kha-pa maintains is an abbreviated, easily understood way (*mdor bsdus go sla bar*) to describe the Svātantrika position.³ All these subjects are discussed in major dGe-lugs-pa presentations of the "neither one nor many" argument such as lCañ-skyā-rol-pa'i-rdo-rje's *Grub mtha' Thub bstan lhun po'i mdzes rgyan*,⁴ A-lag-śa bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa's *gCig du bral gyi rnam bžag*,⁵ as well as Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan and rGyal-tshab-rje's texts. As usual, what happened was that the dGe-lugs-pa scholastics developed a standardized presentation of the argument, with the result that after Tsoñ-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab-rje, the texts follow more or less the same format, often virtually repeating verbatim. In sum, the *sKabs dañ po'i spyi don* represents a standardized schoolbook on Tsoñ-kha-pa's ideas.

Now, if we can say that the presentation of the philosophical issues in the "neither one nor many" argument traces back to *dBu ma dgoñs pa rab gsal*, the basic Tibetan source for the logical issues surrounding this argument is definitely Tsoñ-kha-pa's *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*.⁶ It appears that this work, judging from its title, *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris rje-rañ gis gnañ ba*, was in fact written by Tsoñ-kha-pa himself and was not (like other *zin bris* included in Tsoñ-kha-pa's *Collected Works*) a set of lecture notes taken by rGyal-tshab-rje.

In this text we find, *inter alia*, the following group of miscellaneous technical problems:

- (1) Can one still use a *svatantrahetu* to prove a proposition when the subject (*chos can*; *dharmin*) of this proposition is non-existent? In other words, how to avoid the fallacy of *āśrayā-siddha* when proving that *ātman*, *prakṛti*, etc. are non-existent.
- (2) Can the "neither one nor many" argument be taken as a *pra-saṅga*, given that no opponent will accept that entities are neither truly one nor many?⁷
- (3) Are the reason (*gtan tshigs*; *hetu*) and property to be proved

(*bsgrub bya'i chos; sādhyadharma*) non-implicative negations (*med par dgag pa; prasajyapratishedha*), or implicative negations (*ma yin par dgag pa; paryudāsapratishedha*)?⁸

- (4) How are we to classify the “neither one nor many” argument in terms of the traditional *Pramāṇa*—text classification of reasons (*kārya*, *svabhāva*, and *anupalabdhi* and sub-groups)?⁹

While these problems are not discussed in Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan and rGyal-tshab-rje (with the exception of a brief discussion of the last question), lCañ-skyā-rol-pa'i rdo-rje and bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa discuss them extensively, once again using large passages verbatim from *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*.

From the foregoing remarks we can see that the *sKabs dañ po'i spyi don* and *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, taken together, give a fairly complete picture of the basic dGe-lugs-pa treatment of the argument, the former presenting the philosophical argumentation, and the latter giving responses to the technical logical issues which arise in the course of this argumentation. Naturally, it was impossible for me to discuss all the issues raised in these texts, not to mention the fact that a full translation of *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* would have been out of the question due to lack of space. As a result, I was forced to limit my discussion to what I considered to be the most important points. Section *B* is designed to help situate the discussion in the *sKabs dañ po'i spyi don*. *C* concerns Tsoñ-kha-pa's treatment of the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha*, a logical problem which has elicited much discussion from Western scholars, discussion based exclusively on Indian sources as the Tibetan treatment of the problem remains unknown.

B. THE SVĀTANTRIKA ONTOLOGY

(I) *The dGe-lugs-pa view on what it means to be a Svātantrika*

A quick perusal of Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan's text shows that the author, following Tsoñ-kha-pa's example,¹⁰ has consecrated a great deal of space to explaining exactly what is to be refuted (*dgag bya*). Now, whether we are dealing with the Svātantrika or Prāsaṅgika schools, their respective conceptions of what is to be refuted are direct consequences of their ontologies, in particular their views on the two truths. And at the root of these ontologies

lie—according to dGe-lugs-pa texts—differing ideas on the necessary conditions for logical argumentation.

As the “neither one nor many” argument was primarily used by the Mādhyamika-Svātantrika school, Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan introduces the Svātantrika ontology and hence, their view of what was to be refuted: true existence (*bden par yod pa*) or ultimate own-nature (*don dam par ran bzin yod pa*). This object to be refuted stands out in relief when contrasted with the Prāsaṅgika position—the difference between the schools will be investigated below—especially, the Prāsaṅgika idea that own-nature of any sort, conventional or ultimate, is to be refuted. However, all these points are better approached by considering the fundamental question of the necessary conditions for reasoning to function. Here lies the origin of the appellations *Svātantrika* and *Prāsaṅgika*, deriving from the schools’ reliance on either the *svatantra-hetu* (“autonomous reason”) or the *prasaṅga* (“consequence”); once these names are understood the ontologies and objects to be refuted fall into place.

Unfortunately, these logical issues are not developed by Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan in the appended text, but their understanding seems to be simply supposed. Alas, for us this is a big presupposition, given that the dGe-lugs-pa view is a rather special one, and is often in contradiction with the prevailing Western views on the *prasaṅga-svatantra-hetu* distinction. As a result, some background information is required.

There have been many scholars, not just Western, but also, it seems, Indian and Tibetan, who have thought that the Svātantrikas were so called because of their *simple* reliance on the types of proof found in the *Svārthānumāna* and *Parārthānumāna* chapters of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s works. To put it another way: the simple use of reasons (*rtags* or *gtan tshigs*; *liṅga* or *hetu*) such as, “sound is impermanent, because it is a product”, or inferences-for-others (*gžan don rjes dpag*; *parārthānumāna*) such as, “All products are impermanent, for example, as a vase. Sound is also a product”, constitutes *ipso facto* acceptance of the *svatantra-hetu*, and hence entails being a Svātantrika. This is to be contrasted with the Prāsaṅgika method, where one simply uses *reductio ad absurdum*, but does not state one’s own proof. In accordance with this distinction it is argued that the Prāsaṅgikas assert no thesis (*dam bca’*; *pratijñā*) or philosophical views (*lta ba*; *drṣṭi*). Svātantrikas however, in keeping with their logical methodology, are said to make these sorts of assertions. Thus

another approach, in fact a corollary, to the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is one of having or not having theses.¹¹

In short, we have here a purely *formal* demarcation criterion, one which certainly has philosophical consequences, but one in which the root terms *svatantrahetu* and *prasaṅga* are constructed as inference-forms and no more. (To draw a contemporary parallel, it is somewhat similar to our calling “constructivists” those logicians who accept only constructive existence proofs, and “non-constructivists” those who do not subscribe to this restriction. The philosophical consequences are enormous, but centre around the choice of logical forms.)

For my purposes it is not necessary to adjudicate this view of the matter, except to say that *it is not the way the dGe-lugs-pa conceived the difference between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika*. For the dGe-lugs-pa, the question whether a Mādhyamika does or does not use *Pramāṇa*-style forms of argumentation seems to be unimportant for deciding between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika. In his *dBu ma'i spyi don*, Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan lists a number of reasons (*gtan tshigs*)¹² which he claims the Prāsaṅgikas use to prove *śūnyatā*, and which are close to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti model.¹³ These reasons, the same five as listed in the appended text, clearly cannot be considered to be *svatantrahetu*, as they were also used by Prāsaṅgikas. (As we shall see below in the definition of “Prāsaṅgika”, these philosophers can accept reasons, the three modes and other elements of the “Prāmāṇika” logical machinery, but on the condition that they are “acknowledged by the opponent” (*gžan grags kyi gtan tshigs, gžan grags kyi tshul gsum*).)¹⁴

What the dGe-lugs-pa hold is that the *svatantrahetu* is not just a logical form, a *hetu* or a *parārthānumāna*, but also involves a metalogical view on what are the conditions necessary for such a form to function. Specifically, Svātantrikas are said to believe that for argumentation and proof to function, phenomena must be “conventionally established by their own-nature (*tha sñad du rañ bžin gyis grub pa*), or what comes to the same, “conventionally established from their own side” (*tha sñad du rañ ños nas grub pa*), or “conventionally established by their own defining characteristics” (*tha sñad du rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa*).¹⁵ Tsoñ-kha-pa goes so far as to say that Svātantrikas accept the conventional existence of *svalaksana* (*ran mtshan* “particulars”).¹⁶ The key point of the Svatantrika position is that when arguing, one’s reason must possess by its own-nature (*rañ*

bžin)—that is, by its own defining characteristics or from its own side—the three modes necessary for validity.¹⁷ These three modes (*tshul gsum*; *trairūpya*) consist of: the *pakṣadharma*, the fact that the reason applies to the subject; the *anvayavyāpti*, the fact that the reason entails the property to be proved; the *vyatirekavyāpti*, the fact that the negation of the property to be proved entails the negation of the reason. A related point is that in a *pramāṇa*-style reasoning the opponent (*phyir rgol*) and proponent (*sñā rgol*), in short both parties in the debate, must come to know that the *pakṣadharma* and *vyāpti* are established. This demands that the subject (*chos can*; *dharmin*), examples (*dpe*; *drṣṭānta*), and other terms in the reasoning appear similarly to both parties (*mthun snañ ba*).¹⁸

In less technical terms, if the reason did not possess the three modes in this way, argumentation would become arbitrary and dependent only on what one believed. If one cannot say that producthood implies impermanence by its own defining characteristics or its own nature, then how could one ever justify that inference to an unbeliever, one who held that producthood was compatible with permanence? The provision for “similar appearance” is necessary to avoid systematic misunderstanding, an argument at cross-purposes where both parties are talking about different things. For a Svātantrika this problem would become insurmountable if phenomena had no properties by their own nature, with the result that the examples would be fallacious and the reasons “unestablished” (*ma grub pa’i gtan tshigs*; *asiddha-hetu*).

Here then is a typical dGe-lugs-pa description of a Svātantrika, the definition found in *Grub mtha’ rin chen phreñ ba*:

Why does one say “Mādhyamika-Svātantrika”? It is because they refute truly existent real entities by means of valid reasons whose three modes are established from their own side (*tshul gsum rañ nos ñas grub pa’i rtags yañ dag*).¹⁹

An alternative approach, one found in *lCañ skya grub mtha’*, is to first define what is meant by *svatantra* and then define *Svātantrika* accordingly:

The subject appears similarly to the non-deceptive *pramāṇa* of the debaters, by virtue of its objective mode of being (*don gyi sdod lugs*), a mode of being which belongs to the side of the locus in question (*gdams gži*), and is not guided by the mere belief of the opponent. On the basis of such a subject the

various modes of the reason are ascertained, and there arises an inference which cognizes the proposition to be proved. This is the meaning of *svatantra*. Those Mādhyamikas who agree that the above mentioned requirements are necessary are called “Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas”.²⁰

So to sum up, in the Tibetan view there are three elements which make one a Svātantrika:

- (a) one uses logical forms along the lines of those used by *Pramāṇa* philosophers;
- (b) one holds that the modes of the reason are established by the properties which the terms possess by their own-nature;
- (c) one holds that the subject, examples, etc. appear in a similar fashion to both parties.

As for the Prāsaṅgikas they can accept (a), but certainly not (b) and (c). As lCañ-skyā states:

The definition, or what makes one a Prāsaṅgika is: A Mādhyamika who holds that it is not necessary that the modes of the reason are established by virtue of the objective mode of being of entities, and who holds that it is not necessary that the subject appear similarly to the non-deceived (*ma 'khrul ba*) *pramāṇa* of the debaters, but one who holds that an inferential understanding of non-true existence is produced by a reason (*rtags*) whose three modes are acknowledged (*grags pa*) by the opponent in dependance on his mere position (*khas len pa tsam*).²¹

As we see, there is no hesitation to attribute to Prāsaṅgika philosophy the logical machinery of the three modes, reasons, etc. What Tsoñ-kha-pa and lCañ-skyā stress as being fundamental to the Prāsaṅgika position is that the reason and its modes are established because of the opponent’s *acceptance*, rather than by the objective mode of being of entities (*don gyi sdod lugs*). Thus they speak of *gžan grags kyi gtan tshigs* (“other-acknowledged reasons”) and *gžan grags kyi thsul gsum* (“other-acknowledged three modes”), and in so doing avoid having to accept “established by own-nature” (*rañ bžin gyis grub pa*) to justify logic’s functioning.²²

(II) *The Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas on the source of error: the object to be refuted (dgag bya)*

There is another important element in the Tibetan view of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika dispute which surfaces in lCañ-skyā's definition of a "Prāsaṅgika", and which we should now explain. The Svātantrikas are said to hold that direct perception (*mñon sum; pratyakṣa*) is not deceived (*ma 'khrul ba*), whereas for the Prāsaṅgika even direct perception is said to be deceptive. What this comes down to is that for a Svātantrika, simply *seeing* an object as having a certain nature is innocuous, and is in fact necessary for communication and reasoning.²³

The error, that which is to be refuted, comes in when one thinks (*rtog pa*) that the objects have properties independently of the mind which cognizes these objects. This is known as "grasping at true-existence" (*bden 'dzin*), and consists in mistaking appearance (*snañ tshul*) for a reality outside the framework of perception, an ultimate mode of existence (*don dam pa'i gnas lugs*).²⁴ We can thus understand the Svātantrika idea—mentioned in the appended text, as well as in Indian texts such as Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*—that conventional truths "only come into being by virtue of the mind" (*blo'i dbañ gis bžag pa tsam*) and are, in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*'s words, "only as they appear" (*ji ltar snañ ba 'di kho na*).²⁵ To think otherwise is to posit ultimate existence, that which is to be refuted.

Now, the Prāsaṅgika's are said to accept the terminology *blo'i dbañ gis bžag pa tsam*, but mean something different by "mind" (*blo*). As lCañ-skyā points out,²⁶ in the context of the above phrase, "mind" for the Svātantrika means non-deceived cognition, i.e. direct perception, but for the Prāsaṅgika it is conception (*rtog pa*), and hence deceived. Whereas for the Svātantrika the possibility of logic demanded non-deceived knowledge of objects' own-nature, the Prāsaṅgikas, due to their different philosophy of logic, can say that even the direct perception of this subtle notion of own-nature is mistaken.

As lCañ-skyā explains, *any* notion of establishment by own-nature, more or less by the meanings of the words, will imply an existence independent of causes and conditions (*rañ dbañ*).²⁷ The second point which he makes is that any notion of own-nature implies findability (*rñed pa*) under analysis. Strangely enough, he maintains that Svātantrikas accepted a certain degree of findability: "Given that he [a person] is in some way to be found amongst his bases of imputation (*gdags gži'i gseb nas*), either as

one of his parts, the collection, or the continuum, such a person can then be posited...”²⁸

Now, this findability is at most a consequence of the Svātantrika view, but certainly not something which Indian Svātantrikas would accept. (Jñānagarbha, for example, repeatedly stresses that conventional truths do not withstand analysis (*’di la dpyad mi ’jug go*).)²⁹ At any rate, the Tibetan Prāsaṅgika line of attack is to use classical Mādhyamika arguments such as the “seven-fold reasoning”,³⁰ to show that *all* objects, however subtle they may be, are unfindable under analysis. The consequences are that even simply seeing an object as having a certain own-nature leads to absurdities, even direct perception is mistaken, and hence objects can only exist “as imputed by conception (*rtog pas brtags pa tsam*)”. The result, as Tsoṅ-kha-pa points out, is that the conventional own-nature accepted by the Svātantrikas becomes the subtle object to be refuted (*dgag bya phra mo*) for the Prāsaṅgikas.³¹

For the sake of clarity let us sum up our results by means of the following table. Most, if not all these terms can be found in the appended text of Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan; they continually occur in dGe-lugs-pa *grub mtha’* texts by such authors as Kon-mchog-’jigs-med-dbañ-po, lCañ-skyā-rol-pa’i rdo-rje, ‘Jams-dbyaṅs-bśad-pa, and Chos-kyi-rgyal mtshan,³² as well as in the writings of Tsoṅ-kha-pa and rGyal-tshab-rje. Some of these terms—in particular, numbers 1, 2, and 3—are very probably Tibetan inventions, although arguments could be advanced to show that even if the exact terms are not those of the Indian Svātantrika, the ideas might be.³³

CONVENTIONAL TRUTH (<i>kun rdzob bden pa</i> and <i>tha sñad</i>)	SVĀTAN- TRIKA (<i>rañ rgyud pa</i>)	PRĀSAṆ- GIKA (<i>thal ’gyur ba</i>)
1. establishment by own-nature (<i>tha sñad du rañ bžin gyis grub pa</i>)	accept	reject
2. establishment from its own side (<i>tha sñad du rañ ños nas grub pa</i>)	accept	reject
3. establishment by own defining characteristics (<i>tha sñad du rañ gyi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa</i>)	accept	reject

- | | | |
|---|----------|----------|
| 4. objects only come about by the mind (<i>blo'i dbaṅ gis bžag pa tsam</i>) | accept * | accept * |
| 5. objects are only imputed by conception (<i>rtog pas brtags pa tsam</i>) | reject | accept |

ULTIMATE TRUTH
(*don dam bden pa*)

- | | | |
|--|--------|--------|
| 6. establishment by own-nature (<i>don dam du raṅ bžin gyis grub pa</i>) | reject | reject |
| 7. establishment from its own side (<i>don dam du raṅ ṅos nas grub pa</i>) | reject | reject |
| 8. establishment by its own defining characteristics (<i>don dam du raṅ gyi mtshan ṅid kyis grub pa</i>) | reject | reject |
| 9. true existence (<i>bden par yod pa</i> or <i>bden par grub pa</i>) | reject | reject |

* Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas understand *blo'i dbaṅ gis bžag pa tsam* in their own respective ways.

C. LOGICAL PROBLEMS: THE FALLACY OF ĀŚRAYĀSIDDHA
(*gži ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs*)

(I) *Historical background to Tsoṅ-kha-pa's theory*

In general, a fallacious reason (*gtan tshigs ltar snaṅ; hetvā-bhāsa*) is one which does not satisfy one or more of the three modes. As the *vyatirekavyāpti* and *anvayavyāpti* have, since Dharmakīrti, been recognized as implying one and other,³⁴ there end up, in effect, being only two basic types of fallacies: those connected with the *pakṣadharma* and those connected with the entailment (*khyab pa; vyāpti*) between the reason and the property to be proved. Our problem concerns the *pakṣadharma*, and the fallacy in question is one which leads to a “non-established reason (*ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs; asiddhahetu*)”, a reason which

does not qualify the subject. Within the rubric of non-established reasons one finds, according to certain sources,³⁵ fourteen sorts. But what is at stake in the “neither one nor many” argument is what Tibetan *rtags rigs* texts would term “a reason which is not established because its subject does not have an essence (*chos can gyi ño bo med nas ma grub pa’i gtan tshigs*)”,³⁶ and what Indian texts would term “a reason whose locus is not established (*gñi ma grub pa’i gtan tshigs; āsrayāsiddha*).”³⁷ The problem arises when the subject (*chos can; dharmin*) is non-existent, as happens in the “neither one nor many” argument when one tries to refute the existence of *ātman*, *prakṛti* and other such entities which Buddhists can not countenance.³⁸

At the root of the controversy there seems to have been an intuition, a common sense understanding, which was logically sound: if you know that a certain subject is non-existent, you usually can say that this implies that the subject could not have a particular property in question. Broadly speaking, there seem to have been two lines of development of this intuition. Chapter IV of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* mentions that when the subject is falsified (*gnod pa; bādhanam*) the property to be proved is refuted (*’gog pa; uparodha*), hence the proposition to be proved is falsified.³⁹ In other words, given the proposition “S is P”, if one knows that S is non-existent, this is a sufficient condition for saying that “S is P” is false and is to be negated. The second line of development was that of the Nyāya, who maintained that any predication of properties to non-existent entities is not false, but illegitimate or meaningless. According to Udayana’s *Ātmavivēka*,⁴⁰ if the subject is non-existent there can be no *pramāṇa* which understands that it has one property and not another. This seems to be linked to the fact that the Nyāya theory of error was one of *anyathākhyāti*—one thinks that something is other than what it is. Error demands that the subject possess some degree of existence, with the result that in case the subject is utterly non-existent, one can not make any affirmations or negations, and must remain silent.

But so much for intuitive understanding, be it Nyāya or Buddhist. In both cases, a problem arises if one seeks a hard and fast formal rule. If it is false or meaningless to ascribe properties to non-existent subjects, then equally, all ascriptions of non-existence would become false or meaningless; after all non-existence is a property. Thus, while the intuition, taken liberally, is arguably sound, its rigid, simplistic formalization leads to paradox!

As it is clearly impossible for me to discuss the whole history of the treatment of this problem, let me distinguish three developments towards a solution, all three becoming key points in Tsoṅ-kha-pa's theory. First of all we find the notion of two types of subjects discussed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Secondly, there is the notion of an "image" (*rnam pa; ākāra*), an idea present in Dharmakīrti's writings, but used in this problem by Ratnakīrti et al. Thirdly, Kamalaśīla and Ratnakīrti's view that predication of negations could be legitimate even though the subject was non-existent.

As I mentioned above, Dharmakīrti was of the opinion that non-existence of the subject implied falsity of the proposition to be proved. Now he manages at the same time to keep this principle, and still salvage non-existence proofs, by using a neat trick: he distinguishes between two sorts of subjects, the actual (*rañ gyi chos can; svadharmin*), and the merely nominal (*chos can 'ba' zig pa; kevaladharmin*).⁴¹ The former is explained as being the basis (*rten; āśraya*) which is qualified by the property to be proved, whereas the latter is a subject which, to use rGyal-tshab-rje's formulation, is "unrelated (*'brel med*) with the property".⁴² In short, it is logically irrelevant and plays no role.⁴³ According to Dharmakīrti, if the actual subject is refuted, then indeed the proposition is false.⁴⁴ But if it is the merely nominal subject which is refuted—as he maintains is the case in refuting non-Buddhist notions such as the Vaiśeṣika's space (*mkha' sogs; khādika*)⁴⁵—then the proposition is not necessarily false. This attempt at a solution seems to have been hinted at in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* where he uses the words *rañ gyi chos can la* ("to its own, or actual subject"),⁴⁶ a phrase which Dharmakīrti takes as the jump-off point for his theory in *Pramāṇavārttika*.

It may be interesting to see an example of Dharmakīrti's theory in action. He gives a case of a Buddhist trying to refute the Sāṃkhya's notion of *prakṛti*. In fact, the subject of the argument in *Pramāṇavārttika* is "happiness, etc." (*bde sogs; sukhādi*), that is "happiness, suffering and dullness." But each of these terms is to be understood in the light of Sāṃkhya philosophy where each feeling is correlated with one of the three *guṇas*, these *guṇas* in turn, being in essence *prakṛti*.⁴⁷ The Buddhist argues that happiness, etc., i.e. *prakṛti*, is not the permanent nature of the various effects or transformations (*rnam 'gyur; vikṛti*) making up the world, because if it were, then all the effects would be produced simultaneously. Here the Sāṃkhya objects that this is tantamount

to refuting the subject, happiness, etc., or *prakṛti*. But Dharmakīrti replies⁴⁸ that what one is really proving is that happiness, etc., are impermanent, because they produce their effects sequentially, and thus one does not refute the actual subject, which is the ordinary impermanent entity happiness, and not the “happiness” accepted by the Sāṃkhyas.

I turn now to the second development crucial to Tsoṅ-kha-pa’s theory. Logicians, such as Ratnakīrti, when faced with a potential charge of *āśrayāsiddha* in the course of their refutations of non-momentary entities (*akṣaṇika*), retorted that the subject could still be “established as mere conceptual construction (*vikalpamātra-siddha*)”,⁴⁹ and in such a case, the subject would be “an image (*ākāra*)”.⁵⁰ Exactly what this “image” might be is difficult to glean from Ratnakīrti’s works, however it clearly did play a considerable role in *Pramāṇa* philosophy; for example *kārikās* 70, 127, 128 of *Pramāṇavārttika*’s *Svārthānumānaparicheda* argue that it is not ultimately existent, and that it is imputed and created by the mind. However the image is not completely non-existent either; as such, if it is the subject, one cannot claim *āśrayāsiddha*. We shall see below that the Tibetans develop this notion of an image to a high degree and give it a precise definition.

The third development which influenced Tsoṅ-kha-pa was the view that there was an asymmetry between ascribing properties to non-entities and denying or negating such ascriptions. This view must also have been fairly widespread in later Indian Buddhist logic; we find it, for example, in Kamalaśīla’s *Madhyamakāloka* and *Sarvadharmāṇiḥsvabhāvasiddhi*,⁵¹ as well as Ratnakīrti’s *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi Vyatirekātmikā*. More specifically, to take Ratnakīrti’s point of view, *āśrayāsiddha* can be avoided, provided the reason and property to be proved are not real entities (*vastu*), but are absences (*abhāva*). Thus one can, for example, unproblematically predicate “absence of fragrance” to a sky-flower. Kamalaśīla has a similar formulation, maintaining that there is no fault so long as the properties are not real entities (*dños po*) and “are merely proving the negation of projected phenomena (*sgro btags pa’i chos rnam par bcad pa sgrub pa tsam*).”⁵² It may very well be, as Matilal points out, that later Buddhist logicians were more or less on the verge of discovering exclusion negation, that is, instead of formulating the negation of “S is P” as “S is not-P”, they may have been leaning towards “it is not the case that S is P.” In such a case, one could credibly maintain that

“negations of projected properties” were on the latter model, and hence would not necessitate an existent subject S.⁵³ I leave this question open, although I think one can argue that while exclusion negation could fit Kamalaśīla, it probably does not fit so well with Tsoñ-kha-pa’s theory.

I turn now to the solution proposed in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, where, as we shall see, Tsoñ-kha-pa synthesizes these three elements which we have distinguished so far.

(II) *Tsoñ-kha-pa’s position*

The key to understanding Tsoñ-kha-pa’s proposed solution to the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* befalling refutations of non-Buddhist notions, is his use of the “image”. First of all, while the ontological status of images may be murky in Indian texts, by the time we get to Tsoñ-kha-pa and later Tibetan authors the status of these “conceptual constructions” becomes more precise. A look at a basic text on logic such as the *bsdus grwa* of Phur-bu-lcog-byams-pa-rgya-mtsho⁵⁴ shows a rigid separation of the *Pramāṇa* school’s ontology into two divisions: “permanent” (*rtag pa*) and “impermanent” (*mi rtag pa*). Co-extensive (*don gcig*) with “permanent”, we find *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (*spyi mtshan*), “unconditioned dharma” (*’dus ma byas kyi chos*) and “non-momentary dharma” (*skad cig ma ma yin pa’i chos*). And co-extensive with “impermanence” is “real entity” (*dños po*), *sva-lakṣaṇa* (*rañ mtshan*), and “momentary entity” (*skad cig ma*), and other properties. Both permanent and impermanent entities are said to exist (*yod pa*), although it is the impermanent entities which make up what is real (*dños po*) and substantial (*rdzas yod*) in the world. The permanent entities—and under this rubric are included such things as negations (*med dgag*), and images—are mind-dependent and merely conceptually imputed (*rtog pas brtags pa tsam*).⁵⁵

The Tibetan equivalents of the terms *ākāra* and *buddhyākāra* (*rnam pa* and *blo’i rnam pa*) are not used in Tsoñ-kha-pa. Instead, Tsoñ-kha-pa and dGe-lugs-pa authors use the term *don spyi* (“general object”) or *snañ ba* (“appearance” or “image”).⁵⁶ In *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, Tsoñ-kha-pa frequently speaks about the “image of not not-sound” (*sgra ma yin pa las log par snañ ba*),⁵⁷ and this is the usual form for examples of “general objects”. Unfortunately, I can not explain here the *apoha* theory, the rationale behind such a double negative form, and an idea which goes back to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. However, for our

purposes, understanding the double negative form is not crucial; what is important is that Tsoñ-kha-pa regarded these images as existent and permanent, even if the “locus of the image” (*snañ gži*), the object to which the image corresponds, might be something non-existent like *ātman* or *prakṛti*.

There is one other element to mention in Tsoñ-kha-pa’s use of the notion of an image or general object: he stresses the view of Dharmakīrti (and Dignāga) that a word’s meaning (*sgra don*; *śabdārtha*), or its “direct basis” (*dños rten*), to use Tsoñ-kha-pa’s term, is a conceptual construction,⁵⁸ and is never the external object itself. Meanings of words are “images”. If it were otherwise, and a word like “sound” meant the *svalakṣaṇa* sound, then absurd consequences would ensue. As the *svalakṣaṇa* and its properties are in fact, essentially identical (*ño bo gcig*), there could be no difference of meaning between “sound”, “sound’s impermanence”, and “sound’s being a product”. Hence, inferring sound’s impermanence would be pointless; anyone who understood the phrase “sound is a product”, would *thereby* understand that sound is impermanent. Thus, for Dharmakīrti, the *svalakṣaṇa* can be an “implied denotation” (*brda’i žen yul*), but the direct basis or meaning must be a non-*svalakṣaṇa*, an image.⁵⁹

We can now put the puzzle together:

- (1) Tsoñ-kha-pa subscribes to the view that every word must have a meaning or direct basis which is an image, and an implied denotation, the object itself.
- (2) He holds the view that *āśrayāsiddha* occurs when the actual subject is non-existent. What happens to the merely nominal subject is irrelevant.
- (3) Usually the object itself, the implied denotation, is the actual subject. But in certain cases—precisely those mentioned by Kamalaśīla and Ratnakīrti—where the property to be proved and reason are mere negations, and are not “real entities” (*dños po*), the image will become the actual subject.
- (4) Because the image is permanent, and hence existent, the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided.

Let us take two examples: proving that *ātman* is not a real entity (*dños med*), and proving that sound is impermanent.⁶⁰ In the first case the actual subject is the image of *ātman*. Remember that the image is permanent and hence, is not a real entity (*dños po*). Therefore, the property to be proved will qualify the actual

subject! The merely nominal subject, *ātman*, is thus refuted, but *āśrayāsiddha* is avoided because the actual subject, the image of *ātman*, exists. Now take sound's impermanence. Here the property to be proved is, in fact, a real entity, thus the case is not parallel to the previous one. If the actual subject were to be the image of sound, rather than sound itself, then it would be false to predicate impermanence to this subject. Hence, in this case, there can not be a split between nominal and actual subjects: both subjects must be the *svalakṣaṇa*, sound.

	Proving that <i>ātman</i> is not a real entity (<i>bdag dños med yin pa</i>)	Proving that sound is impermanent (<i>sgra mi rtag pa</i>)
actual subject (<i>rañ gyi chos can</i>)	image of <i>ātman</i> (permanent)	sound (<i>svalakṣaṇa</i>)
nominal subject (<i>chos can 'ba' žig pa</i>)	<i>ātman</i> (non-existent)	sound (<i>svalakṣaṇa</i>)
meaning of the word (<i>sgra don</i>) or direct basis (<i>dños rten</i>)	image of <i>ātman</i>	image of sound
implied denotation (<i>brda'i žen yul</i>)	<i>ātman</i>	sound
property to be proved (<i>bsgrub bya'i chos</i>)	"not a real entity" (<i>dños med</i>)	impermanent (<i>mi rtags pa</i>)

D. CONCLUSION

It seems to me that to further assess Tsoñ-kha-pa's contribution to the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, two widely different avenues need to be followed. First of all, it is essential to perform the necessary "Buddhological" research to understand the texts. An important element in this approach would be to evaluate and investigate more fully the Tibetan *Pramāṇa* theory, an interpretation of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti which is thorough-going and coherent.

Secondly, it has been pointed out that the Indian discussion of the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* bears a strong resemblance to the Russell-Meinong and Russell-Strawson debates on non-referring expressions: here Matilal, MacDermott and Potter have made fruitful comparisons, using modern logical methods.⁶¹ Given the formal nature of the problem of *āśrayāsiddha*, it seems to me that there is a necessity for the type of understanding which modern logic can bring. Ultimately it seems that the ideal approach would be similar to that used in Lukasiewicz's work on Aristotle's syllogistic:⁶² half the book is consecrated to traditional largely philological and historical approach, the other half is an analysis using formal logic.

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NOTES

¹ Forthcoming in the *Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium, Velm, Austria. September 1981.*

² *dBu ma dgoṅs pa rab gsal*, pp. 129-136, Sarnath ed.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁴ See *lCañ skya grub mtha'*, pp. 325-407, for the section on the Svātantrikas. pp. 368-407 discuss the "Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas" (*rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rañ rgyud pa*). Concerning the names "Svātantrika", "Prāsaṅgika", and "Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas", which are in fact Sanskrit translations of the Tibetan terms, see note 33 below.

⁵ *gCig du bral byi rnam bžag*, volume *ka* of the *Collected Works*, pp. 422-505.

⁶ *dBu ma rgyan byi zin bris*, pp. 427-431, *Collected Works*, volume *ba*.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 424-427. Tsoñ-kha-pa argues that the opponent's reticence to accept the *prasaṅga*'s reason can be overcome by first presenting him properties of the entity in question which he would accept, and then showing that these properties would imply that the entity is neither truly one thing, nor many different things. This method of finding an agreed upon property, which would, in turn, imply the unaccepted property, is found in Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakāloka*. On page Sa 149b⁵ Kamalaśīla poses the problem as follows: *gal te thal ba sgrub na ni de'i tshe gžan dag de lta bu khas mi len pa'i phyir gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin te/ gcig dañ du ma'i rañ bžin dañ bral ba'i dños po ni su yañ khas mi len to//* Later, on page Sa 238b¹, he replies: *de la 'di thal ba sgrub na gtan tshigs ma grub pa yañ ma yin te/ 'di ltar ji ste pha rol po dag gis dños po rnams gcig dañ du ma dañ bral bar khas ma blaṅs su zin kyañ/ 'on kyañ des khyab pa'i chos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir śugs kyis na de yañ khas blaṅs pa kho na yin te...*

A sidelight which I wish to mention is that it would seem that Kamalaśīla therefore allowed the use of a *prasaṅga* of the form “it follows that entities are in reality without own-nature because they have neither the nature of oneness nor manyness”. This is a *prasaṅga* which is not of the usual *reductio ad absurdum* variety; later logic texts like Phur-bu-lcog-byams-pa-rgya-mtsho’s *bsdus grwa che ba* would term this a *sgrub byed mi ’phen pa’i thal gyur* because it does not imply a proof (*sgrub byed*) by the usual method of contraposition (cf. K. Mimaki’s *La Réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses*, pp. 55-59 for an explanation of this contraposition, or *viparyaya*). The example of such a *prasaṅga* in *bsdus grwa che ba*, p. 16b is “it follows that sound is impermanent because it is a product” (*sgra chos can/mi rtag pa yin par thal/byas pa’i phyir*). I have added this note by way of a response to a question raised in Velm by D.S. Ruegg and others as to when this form of a *prasaṅga*—a form very similar to a *svatantra*—made its appearance. It seems that Kamalaśīla knew of it.

⁸ *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, pp. 431-433.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 423-424.

¹⁰ This question of the importance of recognizing exactly what is to be refuted, and therefore to avoid refuting too much or too little, is discussed extensively in the *lhag mthoñ* chapter of Tsoñ-kha-pa’s *Lam rim chen mo*. The precise specification of the object to be refuted (*dgag bya*), as well as the psychological and meditative techniques to recognize it, are arguably some of the most important contributions of dGe-lugs-pa *Mādhyamika* philosophy.

¹¹ Let me give some examples which more or less fit this bill. Tsoñ-kha-pa in the *Lam rim chen mo* (*lhag mthoñ* chapter), p. 250 of volume *pa* of *Collected Works* states: “Also according to certain translator disciples of this pandit [Jayānanda], Mādhyamikas are without their own theses, merely refuting others’ positions. And Mādhyamikas consider that as the subjects, etc. are not acknowledged in common by both [parties in the debate], the *svatantra* is incoherent. Moreover, the result of logical analysis is the mere destruction of the others’ tenets. Apart from that, as one has no personal views, in no circumstances should one present a *svatantra*hetu.”

pan di ta de’i slob ma lo tsa ba dag kyañ ’di skad du dbu ma pa la gzan gyi ’dod pa ’gog pa tsam ma gtogs pa’i rañ gi dam bca’ med ciñ chos can la sogs pa gñis ka la grags pa’i thun moñ ba ma grub pas rañ rgyud mi ’thad do/ rig pas rnam par dpyad pa’i ’bras bu yañ gzan gyi grub mtha’ ’dor ba tsam žig yin la de las gzan pa’i rañ ’dod med pas rañ rgyud kyi gtan tshigs rnam pa tham cad du brjod par mi bya’o//

As Tsoñ-kha-pa points out later, these disciples of Jayānanda are fundamentally rejecting the possibility of having a thesis when “analysing the ultimate nature of things” (*don dam par dpyod pa’i skabs su*). He contrasts this position with one which denies the possibility that a Prāsaṅgika has *any* thesis at all, be it with regard to conventional or ultimate truth. On p. 252 he states: “These days the following [types of thinkers] are accepted as being Mādhyamika-Prāsaṅgika: even with regard to conventionality, they do not, in their own standpoint, have any position which might be framed in terms of the conventional or ultimate. If they were to have such a thesis, then they would have to accept reasons and examples proving this thesis, and in such a way, they would become Svātantrikas. Therefore, a Prāsaṅgika has absolutely no standpoint of his own. As it says in the *Vigrahavyavartanī*:

If I had a thesis then I would have that fault,
But as I have no thesis, I am completely without fault.”

*da lta dbu ma thal 'gyur bar 'dod pa dag ni don dam pa dan tha sñad pa gañ
la brtsam pa'i khas len ni tha sñad du yañ med de gal te de 'dra ba'i dam bca'
yod na de sgrub byed kyi dpe dañ rtags kyañ 'dod dgos la de lta na rañ rgyud par
'gyur ro/ des na thal 'gyur ba la rañ lugs gañ yañ med de/ rtsod zlog las/ gal te
ñas dam bcas 'ga' yod/ des na ña la skyon de yod/ ña la dam bca' med pas na/
ña la skyon med kho na yin/*

It seems that it would especially be this latter type of Prāsaṅgika which would come closest to fitting my characterization. Finally, consider the following quotation from Professor Jacques May's introduction to his translation of the *Prasannapadā* (p. 15): “La méthode Mādhyamika est celle de la réduction à l'absurde, littéralement de la ‘conséquence nécessaire’ (*prasaṅga*) et fausse tirée des thèses adverses. Le Mādhyamika y est assuré d'un constant avantage: car la méthode de réduction à l'absurde, efficace contre l'adversaire, qui a une position philosophique, un système où ne doit se glisser aucune contradiction logique, ne peut jamais être rétorquée contre le Mādhyamika, qui n'a pas de thèses, qui n'a pas de syllogismes indépendants mais se contente de dégager le paralogisme dans les raisonnements d'autrui, et qui n'est pas lié par ses réfutations car elles n'impliquent nullement qu'il accepte l'opinion contraire.”

¹² *dBu ma'i spyi don*, p. 97b. *bden med gtan la 'bebs pa'i rigs pa de la du ma yod de/ thal 'gyur gyi dbaṅ du byas pa dañ gtan tshigs kyi dbaṅ du byas pa gñis*. For the five reasons see pp. 97b-98a.

¹³ There is one difference, however. The *dBu ma'i spyi don* (p. 111b) mentions that Prāsaṅgikas—in particular, Buddhapālita—preferred the five-membered (*yan lag lña*) reasoning, when giving a full form of an argument. This was the form favoured by the Naiyāyikas, and is contrasted with Dharmakīrti's three-membered form.

¹⁴ In this vein Tsoñ-kha-pa, quoted in *lCañ skya grub mtha'* p. 408, states: “It is very clear that the teacher's [Candrakīrti] point in categorizing a Prāsaṅgika was as follows:

[He holds that] proof is effectuated by the [reason's] three modes which are acknowledged by the other, i.e. the opponent. The *svatantraheṭu* and type of *pramāṇa* explained previously [in connection with the Svātantrikas] are unsuitable for proving propositions, whereas [following Svātantrikas] such a proof would be by means of reasons which are established for both parties by the previous sort of *pramāṇa*.

*sñar bsad pa lta bu'i tshad mas rgol ba gñis ka la grub pa'i rtags kyis bsgrub
bya sgrub pa la rañ rgyud kyi rtags dañ des mi 'grub par phyir rgol gzan la grags
pa'i tshul gsum gyis bsgrub pa la thal 'gyur bar 'jog pa de ni slob dpon gyi dgoñs
par sin tu gsal ba yin no/*

¹⁵ See note 32 below, as well as Chos-kyi-rgyal-mtshan's text, p. 24b.

¹⁶ See Tsoñ-kha-pa's *rtsa ba ses rab kyi dka' gnas chen po brgyad*. He speaks of the Svātantrikas' view as *tha sñad du rañ mtshan khas len pa*.

¹⁷ See notes 18, 19, 20, 33. Below, I give lCañ-skyarol-pa'i-rdo-rje and Kon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbañ-po's definitions of *svatantraheṭu* and *Svātantrika*; both of them bring out clearly this key point of the Svātantrika view.

¹⁸ This point occupies an important place in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālamkāra* and *vṛtti*, Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamakālamkāra-pañjikā*, Jñānagarbha's

Satyadvayavibhaṅga and *vr̥tti* and other texts. Śāntarakṣita, for example, argues (*vr̥tti*, pp. 73b⁶-74a³) that if there were not at least a datum of appearance which, qua appearance, would be understood by “scholars, women and children”, then “the locus [i.e. the subject] of the reason would be unestablished (*gtan tshigs kyi gzi ’grub par mi ’gyur*).” Kamalaśīla (*Pañjikā*, p. 130b⁸), commenting on this problem of the locus being unestablished, states that “although one refutes projections of a real nature to such an appearing subject, one does not refute the essence of the subject.”

chos can snañ ba ’di la rañ bzin yañ dag par sgro btags pa dgag pa sgrub byed kyi/ chos can gyi rañ gi ño bo ’gog par ni ma yin pas...

This seems to me one of the strongest quotations one can find for arguing that Indian Svātantrikas—and not just Tibetans—accepted that objects had to conventionally have properties by their own-nature for logic to function. However, it is not clear just how much importance should be attached to the phrase *rañ gi ño bo*, or how much importance Kamalaśīla placed on the notion. What does seem clear, though, is that the notion of a “common appearance” was a central one for Indian authors. (In the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vr̥tti* of Jñānagarbha, page Sa5b⁴ we find the words *mtshun par snañ ba* used in the context of showing that conventional truth “appears similarly to the consciousness of everyone, from children on up”.) But whether one can move from that to phenomena being “conventionally established by their own-natures”—as the Tibetans did—is a much more thorny problem. I take up this question again in note 33.

¹⁹ *ci’i phyir dbu ma rañ rgyud pa zes bya ze na/ tshul gsum rañ ños nas grub pa’i rtags yañ dag la brten nas bden dños ’gog par byed pas na de ltar brjod pa’i phyir*, p. 56.

²⁰ *des na phyir rgol gyi khas blañs tsam la ma ’khris par gdams gzi’i ños nas don gyi sdod lugs kyi dbaṅ gis rgol gyi tshad ma ma ’khrul ba la chos can mtshun snañ du grub ciñ/ chos can de’i steñ du rtags kyi tshul rnams ’grub tshul ñes par byas nas bsgrub bya rtogs pa’i rjes dpag bskyed pa žig rañ rgyud kyi don yin la/ de ltar dgos pa ’thad par khas len pa’i dbu ma pa la dbu ma rañ rgyud pa zes zer pa yin no/ (lCañ skya grub mtha’, p. 325.)*

²¹ *dños po rnams kyi sdod lugs kyi dbaṅ gis rgol phyir rgol gyi tshad ma ma ’khrul ba la chos can mtshun snañ du grub pa’i sgo nas rtags kyi tshul sgrub ma dgos par phyir rgol gyi khas blañs tsam la ’khris nas phyir rgol rañ la grags pa’i tshul gsum pa’i rtags gyis bden med rtogs pa’i rjes dpag bskyed par ’dod pa’i dbu ma pa ni thal ’gyur pa’i ’jog byed dam mtshan ñid yin no/ (lCañ skya grub mtha’, p. 407.)*

²² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 407-408, where lCañ-skya cites passages from the *Prasannapadā* and interprets them to show that “the proposition is proven by means of a reason acknowledged by the other, but one does not have to accept a *svatantra*...” *gžan grags kyi gtan tshigs kyis bsgrub bya ’grub pa yin gyi/ rañ rgyud khas len mi dgos pa’i*... It is interesting to compare this notion of an other-acknowledged reason with Indian Svātantrika admonishments against reasons being established “simply because one accepts them”. (*dam bcas pa tsam gyis ’dod pa’i don ma grub pa* cf. Kamalaśīla’s *Sarvadarmanihsvabhāvasiddhi*, p. Sa 326b⁷. Presumably this latter view is that of the Prāsaṅgikas.

²³ Cf. Śāntarakṣita’s *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, p. 74a³: “As for us, we do not deny entities in so far as they are appearances to the eye and other sense consciousnesses.” *kho bo yañ mig la sogs pa’i šes pa la snañ ba’i nañ can gyi dños*

po ni mi sel gyi/ In the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti*, p. Sa5a³, Jñānagarbha says that conventional truths such as form, happiness, etc. are known “by a direct perception which is free of *vikalpa*, i.e. erroneous conceptions” (*rnam par rtog pa med pa’i mñon sum gyi śes pas yoñs su bcad pa’i ño bo’i dños po gzugs la sogs pa dan bde ba la sogs par rig par grub pa rnams ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa kho na yin no*).

²⁴ *lCañ skya grub mtha’*, p. 375. *de bžin du sems can tha mal pa rnam kyis dños po rnams nañ blo’i dbaṅ gis bžag pa la gtan ma ltos par yul rañ gi sdod lugs kyi ños nas grub pa žig tu ’dzin pa yin te/ de ni bden ’dzin lhan skyes kyi ’dzin tshul lo//*

²⁵ *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, p. Sa1b³, *kārikā* 3.

²⁶ *lCañ-skya grub mtha’*, p. 415. *rañ rgyud pas blo’i dbaṅ gis bžag pa ma yin pa’i sdod lugs la dgag byar byed ces pa’i blo ni gnod med kyi śes pa ma ’khrul ba la byed bar ’dod ciñ/ ’di bas rtog pa’i dbaṅ gis bžag par ’dod pa’i rtog pa ni ’khrul žes su bžed pas mi ’dra’o//*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 411. *rañ rgyud rañ dbaṅ don gcig tu bžed pas dbu ma rañ rgyud pas tshul gsum rañ ños nas grub par bžed pa la yañ lugs ’di’i bden grub kyi don tshañ no*.

²⁸ *Ibid.* *gdags gži’i gseb nas cha śas sam tshogs pa’am rgyun lta bu žig rñed nas gañ zag de ’jogs byuñ na...*

²⁹ *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*, p. Sa2b⁴, *kārikā* 21.

³⁰ This is the reasoning which analyses as to whether a cart is identical with or different from its parts, its shape, etc. Cf. Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvatāra*, chapter VI, verses 150-161.

³¹ *rTsa ba’i śes rab gyi dka’ gnas chen po brgyad kyi bsad pa*, p. 19, Sarnath edition. P. 579, *Collected Works*.

³² Cf. the chapters on the Svātantrika in these authors’ *grub mtha’* texts.

³³ I would hypothesize that the origin as well as the justification for Nos. 1-3 is similar to what K. Mimaki shows for the terms *rañ rgyud pa*, *thal ’gyur ba*, *rnañ ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma rañ rgyud pa*, and *mdo sde spyod pa’i dbu ma rañ rgyud pa* (cf. his forthcoming article on the Mādhyamika classification in the *Blo gsal grub mtha’* in the *Proceedings of the Csoma de Körös Symposium*, as well as his forthcoming translation of this *grub mtha’* text.) These terms are Tibetan in origin, but nonetheless, if understood with due caution, are useful for summarizing and classifying Indian positions.

Indian texts seem to come very close to using the formulations in 1-3. Śāntarakṣita’s *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* and *vṛtti*, Kamalaśīla’s *Madhyamakāloka*, *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* and *Sarvadharmāṇiḥsvabhāvasiddhi* and Jñānagarbha’s *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and *vṛtti* use phrases like *kun rdzob pa’i ño bo*, *kun rdzob pa’i sdod lugs*, *kun rdzob pa’i de bžin ñid* and *kun rdzob pa’i rañ bžin*, as well as other more or less similar formulations such as *snañ ba’i ño bo* and *kun btags pa’i ño bo* and *rdzun pa’i ño bo*. However, a passage in Tsoñkha-pa’s *Drañ ñes legs bsad sñiñ po* leads me to believe that the terms *tha sñad du rañ bžin gyis grub pa*, etc. may not figure in Indian Svātantrika texts. Tsoñkha-pa (p. 110) cites a passage from Bhāvaviveka, where these terms are not explicitly used, and says that this is the “clearest source for this teacher’s holding entities are conventionally established by their own defining characteristics” (*slob dpon ’dis dños po la rañ gi mtshan ñid kyis grub pa tha sñad du bžed pa’i khuñs gsal śos yin no*).

In the case of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrikas, Tsoṅ-kha-pa does not seem to give direct evidence that these authors used these phrases either.

Even if these terms do make a stray appearance in Indian texts, I think it is clear that the Tibetans placed much more importance on them than the Indians did; if we are to say that the Tibetans were justified in their attribution of these notions, it has to be for philosophical, rather than simple textual reasons. We have a mosaic of *rationes pro*: notions like *kun rdzob pa'i ho bo*, etc.; the non-deceived nature of direct perception; the necessity for terms to appear similarly; the difference between valid and invalid conventional truth; the fact that Svātantrikas will not accept that proofs are justified by simply accepting them (cf. note 22.). On the other hand, suppose we were to acknowledge that the Svātantrikas had some notion of conventional own-nature. The key question is whether this Svātantrika idea is the same as what the Prāsaṅgikas are saying would lead to independent existence and findability. Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla explicitly deny findability, to which Tsoṅ-kha-pa reacts by going into a hair-splitting analysis to interpret Jñānagarbha's denial (*Draṅ ñes legs bśad sñiṅ po*, p. 148)! But, ultimately it is difficult to avoid the impression that the Prāsaṅgikas wished to reify the Svātantrikas notion of own-nature, all the better to knock it down.

³⁴ Cf. Mookerji and Nagasaki's translation of *Pramāṇavārttika* I (*Svārthānumānapariccheda*) pp. 70-71. The key phrase in Dharmakīrti is in *kārikā* 28: *arthāpattiyā dvitīye 'pi smṛtiḥ samupajāyate. don gyi go bas cig śos la dran pa yaṅ dag skye bar 'gyur*.

³⁵ Cf. *Yoṅs 'dzin rtags rigs*, pp. 24a-25a.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24a.

³⁷ Cf. for example, Ratnakīrti's *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ Vyatikrāntikā*, 79.11 (in MacDermott's text).

³⁸ Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, 3, 8, 10-12, for a description of *prakṛti*, the primordial matter.

³⁹ *Pramāṇavārttika* IV (*Parārthānumānapariccheda*), 143: *dvayasyāpi hi sādhyatve sādhyadharmoparodhi yat/ bādhanam dharminastatra bādhetyetena varṇitam//*

'dis ni gñis ka bsgrub bya ñid/ yin na chos can la gnod gaṅ/ bsgrub par bya ba'i chos 'gog pas/ de la gnod ces bstan pa yin/

⁴⁰ Cf. B.K. Matilal: *Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic*, section V, VI and Appendix A.

⁴¹ Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, 137, 139, 140.

⁴² rGyal tshab-rje's *Thar lam gsal byed*, volume 2, p. 317: *bsgrub bya'i chos daṅ 'brel med kyi chos can 'ba' žig pa...*

⁴³ Cf. *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*. Tsoṅ-kha-pa terms it *yan gar bar*, "isolated, alone, unrelated".

⁴⁴ *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, 138:

bādhāyām dharmino 'pi syād bādhetyasya prasiddhaye/ āśrayasya virodhena tadāśritavirodhanāt//

chos can la ni gnod pas kyaṅ/ gnod 'gyur žes ni grub don te/ rten ni 'gal bar gyur ba yis/ de rten pa ni 'gal ba'i phyir/

rGyal-tshab-rje, in *Thar lam gsal byed*, vol. 2 p. 317, explains this verse as: "If its actual basis, the locus, the subject, is falsified, it follows that the relevant proposition to be proved is falsified, because by negating or contradicting the

basis, i.e. the locus, the subject, one negates or contradicts the property which necessarily must depend on it.”

rañ gi rten gži chos can la gnod na skabs kyi bsgrub bya la gnod par thal/ rten gži chos can grub par 'gal žiñ khegs par gyur pa yis/ de la ñes par brten dgos pa'i chos grub par 'gal žiñ khegs par 'gyur ba'i phyir/

⁴⁵ *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, 141, cf. note 7 (H) below (to appear in a continuation of this article).

⁴⁶ Cf. note 4, in H below.

⁴⁷ As for *sukhādi* in the Sāṃkhya sense, Manorathanandin (p. 408) makes it clear that we are referring to *pradhāna* (“the principle”), i.e. *prakṛti*: *sukhādiḥ sukhaduḥkhamohātmaṃ pradhānam*, “Happiness, etc. i.e. the principle which has the nature of happiness, pain and dullness...” For the Sāṃkhya view, cf. Gauḍapāda’s commentary to *kārikā* 12 of the *Sāṃkhyakārikās*. Manorathanandin also makes it clear that *sukhādi* as understood by the Buddhist must be impermanent:

anityasvabhāvo hi sukhādiḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ. “In fact, happiness, etc. is held to be proven as impermanent in nature.”

⁴⁸ *Pramāṇavārttika* IV, 144b-145-146. Cf. *Thar lam gsal byed*, volume 2, pp. 321-322.

⁴⁹ Ratnakīrti, op. cit. 81.23, 83.10 and 83.14. See also K. Mimaki, *La Réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses*, p. 60.

⁵⁰ Ratnakīrti, 81.23.

⁵¹ *Madhyamakāloka*, cf. note 52. *Sarvadharmāṇiḥsvabhāvasiddhi*, pp. Sa 326b-327a.

⁵² *Madhyamakāloka*, Sa 188a³:

“When one does not wish to prove of it an existing essence, a property which is a real entity, but wishes to merely prove a negation of a projected entity, then for avoiding supposed faults such as *asiddha*, etc. it is not necessary that the subject be a real entity, even conventionally.”

gañ la dños po'i chos yod pa'i ño bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi/ 'on kyañ sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par bcad pa sgrub pa tsam žig brjod par 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa ñid la sogs pa'i ñes pa brjod pa tha sñad du yañ dños por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te/...

I should point out that in this part of the *Madhyamakāloka*, Kamalaśīla also cites a verse of Dharmakīrti which mentions the two types of subjects (*Pramāṇavārttika* IV, 136-137, *Madhyamakāloka*, Sa 189a¹), and on page Sa 191a⁴ he may be hinting at the notion of an image.

⁵³ Cf. Matilal, *Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic*. In brief, my reasoning for doubting that one can meaningfully ascribe exclusion negation to Tsoñ-kha-pa is that one can only differentiate choice and exclusion negations when there are three (or more) truth values: true, false and indeterminate. I see no reason to ascribe a multi-valued logic to Tsoñ-kha-pa. The fact that it is only the third truth-value, *I*, which would distinguish choice and exclusion negations can be readily seen from the truth-tables below (cf. Matilal, p. 101):

Choice negation

<i>P</i>	<i>-P</i>
<i>T</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>F</i>	<i>T</i>
<i>I</i>	<i>I</i>

Exclusion negation

<i>P</i>	<i>Ṗ</i>
<i>T</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>F</i>	<i>T</i>
<i>I</i>	<i>T</i>

⁵⁴ *bsdus grwa chuñ*, pp. 5a-8b, *gži grub kyi rnam bžag*.

⁵⁵ Cf. *bsdus grwa*'s definition of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (*spyi mtshan*), p. 8b: "merely imputed by word and concept, and not a *svalakṣaṇa*."

sgra rtog pas brtags pa tsam yin gyi ran mtshan du ma grub pa'i chos.

⁵⁶ Cf. *bsdus grwa chuñ*, p. 21a. The definition of the general object corresponding to a vase (*bum pa'i don spyi*) is: "a projected entity which looks like a vase to a conceptual mind thinking of vase, but which is not in fact a vase."

bum 'dzin rtog pa la bum pa ma yin bžin du bum pa lta bur snañ ba'i sgro btags kyi cha.

⁵⁷ *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, p. 430.

⁵⁸ *Pramāṇavārttika* III (*Pratyakṣapariccheda*) 287: *śabdārthagrahī yad yatra tajjñānam tatra kalpanā/ śes gañ gañ la sgra don 'dzin/ de ni de la rtog pa yin/*

"Whatever consciousness grasps a meaning of a word, that consciousness is conceptual."

⁵⁹ These reasonings find their source in *Pramāṇavārttika* I, 44, 45, and 46. Cf. rGyal-tshab-rje, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 81-86. *brda'i žen yul* is rGyal-tshab-rje's term. op. cit. p. 116. I have been unable to find the proper term in Dharmakīrti.

⁶⁰ These are the cases which Tsoñ-kha-pa himself discusses. Cf. *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, p. 430.

⁶¹ Cf. Potter, MacDermott and Matilal's articles on reference and existence in later Buddhist logic.

⁶² *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*.

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(To be continued)