Dignga and Dharmakrti on adaranamatra and anupalabdhi

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Recently we have been witnessing a growing interest in Buddhist logic among Buddhologists and have accumulated a considerable amount of knowledge concerning its texts and their authors. Yet we are still far away from reconstructing an accurate history of Buddhist logic in India. One of the main obstacles is that we know very little of some of the important Buddhist logicians, e.g. Īśvarasena, who was a successor of Dignāga (ca. 480-530) and presumably the teacher of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660), and whose works have been completely lost except for some fragments preserved in the works of Dharmakīrti and his interpreters. It is Ernst Steinkellner who first tried to reconstruct Īśvarasena’s contributions to Buddhist logic by using the materials he collected from the Pramāṇavārttika chapter 1 with its Svavrtti, Arcaṭa’s Hetubinduṣṭikā and other texts. Let us first see the result of his investigation.

"According to Īśvarasena the absence of the probans in the heterologue is proved by a third kind of valid cognition (pramāṇāntaram), called non-perception (anupalabdhiḥ), which is nothing but mere absence of perception (upalabdhyabhāvamātram). In consequence of this new concept Īśvarasena seems to have rethought the whole theory of the infallibility (avyabhicāra) of the probans and of the conditions the probans has to fulfil to be considered infallible to the probandum. As a result of his concept of non-perception he taught the infallibility of the probans no longer as with Dignāga to be due to the three marks only, but to at least four marks, the fourth being that its object, the probandum, must not have been cancelled by perception (abādhitaḥviṣayatvam).”¹

Later, Steinkellner came to attribute to Īśvarasena the sadlaksana hetu-theory which is disscussed in detail towards the end of the Hetubindu. According to this theory, the valid logical reason must possess, in addition to the standard three forms (trainūpyam), three more forms, viz. abādhitaḥviṣayatvam (not being cancelled by perception) mentioned above, vivakṣitaikasamkhyatvam (being intended to be one), and jñātatvam (being

¹ “Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund”, WZKSO 10, 1969, p. 84.
known). In this paper I would like to demonstrate that Īśvarasena's theory of 'non-perception', discovered by Steinkellner, can be traced back to Dignāga at least in part, and that Dharmakīrti's theory of 'non-perception' seems to have had a germ in Dignāga's Nyāyamukha.

As I discussed elsewhere Indian logicians had gradually developed the theories of how to justify their logical proof or inference. By the time of Dignāga it seems that two theories had already appeared, somewhat independently. One was the theory of trairūpya according to which the valid logical reason (hetu) had to possess the three forms, viz. paksadharmanvatam (being a property of the topic of the proof), sapakse sattvam (presence in the similar instances) and vipakse asattvam (absence in the dissimilar instances). The other was the theory of avinābhāva (/nāntariyakatva/ ayyabhicāra), according to which the valid inference had to be based on the inevitable/necessary relation between the inferential mark (līṅga) and what is to be inferred (līṅgin). The former theory was, if not supported, at least known to Asaṅga, and the latter was clearly found in the logical works of Vasubandhu.

It was Dignāga who combined these two theories. Namely, by introducing the restrictive particle eva into the second and the third form of trairūpya, he could claim that the theory of trairūpya implied that of avinābhāva. I believe that Dignāga was the first Indian logician who established the theory of pervasion (vyāpti) as the foundation of his theories of logical proof and inference.

Now, Dignāga justified proof and inference by the theory of pervasion. But how could he justify the latter? What guaranteed the pervasion of the probans by the probandum in Dignāga's system of logic? In a stock example of Indian proof, the existence of a remote fire is proved by the observation of a column of smoke arising from the area concerned.

6 See Ibid., pp. 5-10.
Dignāga justified this procedure by the supposition that the domain of smoke is pervaded by the domain of fire in our universe of discourse, or more precisely, in our ‘inductive’ domain. But how could he justify such a pervasion?

Since Dignāga criticized the Vaiśeṣikas and the Śāmkhyas who claimed that their proof and inference were based on such logical connections (sambandha) as causation, inheritance, owner-owned relation, etc., he could not insist that the domain of smoke was pervaded by the domain of fire because the former was caused by the latter. Dignāga naturally knew what Cardona has called the “inductive reasoning of India”, the anvaya-vyatireka method, viz. under the condition that x is present when y is present, and x is absent when y is absent, there is some relationship between x and y, such as x is caused by y or x is the meaning of a linguistic item y. As a matter of fact, the second and the third form of trairūpya respectively represent anvaya and vyatireka. Nonetheless, Dignāga does not seem to have made any formal attempt to try to justify his theory of pervasion.

It is now well known that Dharmakīrti introduced the notion of svabhāvapratibandha (“essential connection”) as a basis for avinābhāva/vyāpti, thus providing the ontic foundation for valid reasoning. When there are two different items x and y, if and only if x is

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9 There has been a considerable amount of literature published concerning how to interpret the term svabhāvapratibandha, beginning with E. Steinkellner, “Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti,” WZKS 15, 1971. During the 2nd International Dharmakīrti Conference held in Vienna, June 1989, we had a debate on this topic and came to realize that there were at least two opposing views; namely, one held that svabhāvapratibandha represented the state of affairs in reality (how things are and how they are connected to each other) and the other held that the term meant a logical concept, i.e. the necessary connection between the probans and the probandum (thus, somewhat synonymous with avinābhāva/avabhicāra/niyama/vyāpti). Steinkellner playfully named the former sambandhavāda and the latter vyāptivāda. In my paper: “Svabhāvapratibandha revisited,” Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū 35-1, 1986, I once criticized Steinkellner’s ontic interpretation of the term and naturally supported the vyāptivāda in Vienna last year. Since then, however, I came across Pramāṇavārttika IV.202-207 (the first three verses correspond to Pramāṇaviniścaya III.37-39) which converted me to the sambandhavāda. I would like to discuss these verses in a future paper, and just like to mention the following chain of related concepts in the order of
the result (kārya) of y, the observance of x can make us infer the existence of y, for the domain of the result is naturally pervaded by that of the cause. And when x and y represent two conceptually distinguished properties (svabhāva) of one and the same item in reality, the observance of x makes us infer the existence of y in the same item, provided that the domain of x is regarded as being pervaded by the domain of y in our common sense. The former connection, i.e. causality (tadutpatti), is determined by the above-mentioned anvayavyatireka method. Dharmakīrti considers that either three or five successive perceptions and non-perceptons can determine the causality between two items. In order to establish the latter connection, i.e. identity (tādātmya), on the other hand, Dharmakīrti finally in the Hetubindu introduced a kind of hypothetical reasoning named viparyaye bādhakapramānam (the negative proof with reference to the contradictory).

As Steinkellner says, in the Pramāṇavārttika chapter 1 and Svākriti as well as in the Pramāṇaviniścaya chapter 2,

“Dharmakīrti applies all possible means of his exegetical art to prove that Dignāga’s theory of the logical reason (hetu) is impossible without the assumption of an essential connection (svabhāvapratibandha) as a basis of the logical nexus (niyama).”

This is because, as Steinkellner has at various times indicated, Dharmakīrti had to refute Īśvarasena’s theory that the negative concomitance (vyatireka or the absence of the reason in the dissimilar instances) could be determined by mere non-perception (adarśanamātrena). In this connection, Dharmakīrti even quoted a passage from Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti chapter 2 where Dignāga criticized the Vaiśeṣikas who negated the existence of a special touch-sensation of the wind in visible substances by mere non-perception (adarśanamātrena).

the preceding being the basis of the following: tādātmya & tadutpatti → svabhāvapratibandha → avinābhāva/avyabhicāra/niyama/vyāpī → ganyagamaka-bhāva/sādhyasādhanabhāva.


12 “Remarks on niścitagrahāna”, p. 1433.

13 See Pramāṇavārttika-Svākriti, ed. Gnoli, Roma 1960, p. 14: yady adarśanamātrena drstebhyah pratisedhah kriyate / na ca so ‘pi yuktaḥ = Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Peking
Thus, if we follow Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, Iśvarasena might seem to have significantly deviated from Dignāga’s system of logic. However, I do not think that is the case. If we look at the Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti chapter 5, where Dignāga discussed his semantic theory, i.e. the Apoha doctrine, we come across the forerunner of the adarśanamātra theory. For example, Dignāga says:

“A linguistic item (śabda) expresses its object(artha) in two ways, viz. anvaya and vyatireka. And they are defined as ‘application to the similar’ (tulye vṛttih) and ‘non-application to the dissimilar’ (atulye vṛttih), respectively. Of them, regarding the similar, it is not necessary to mention the application (or anvaya) to all instances, for they are in some cases infinite in number and impossible to mention every object. Regarding the dissimilar, however, although infinite, it is possible to mention the non-application (or vyatireka) on the basis of mere non-perception (adarśanamātra). Therefore, as [a linguistic item] is not perceived elsewhere from that to which it is related, the inference which excludes the [other] (tadvya vacchedānumāna) is called ‘expression of its own object’.”

Here Dignāga is claiming that vyatireka can be confirmed by mere non-perception (adarśanamātra). Although the above passage deals with the problem of the śabda-artha relation, I believe the general principle expressed there can be extended to the case of inference and proof, for,

110a5): gal te ma mthong ba tsam gyis ma mthong ba 'gag pa byed na de yang mi rig te (Cf. Peking 29a1-2: ma mthong ba tsam gyis mthong ba las log par grub pa'i phyir ro // de ltar yang rig pa ma yin te), English translation by R. Hayes, “Dignāga’s Views on Reasoning (Śvārthānumāna),” JIPh 8-3, 1980, p. 250: “Q: Suppose one argues that touch is denied in visible substances just on the ground that it is invisible itself. A: That also is incorrect.” For the recent discussion of this passage, see Shōshin Nozawa, “The Theory of Inference in Chapter II-1 of the Vaiśeṣikasūtra” (in Japanese), Indian Philosophy and Buddhism, Essays in Honour of Prof. K. Fujita on his sixtieth Birthday, 1989 Kyoto, pp. 172-175.

as is well known, Dignāga saw no essential difference between inferential and verbal knowledge because he thought they function on the same principle, i.e. ‘exclusion of others’ (anyāpoha/anyavyavaccheda). Therefore, I do not consider that Īśvarasena was guilty of misinterpreting Dignāga in this respect.

In a recent paper of mine I suggested that the above passage might indicate that Dignāga’s system of logic was of a purely hypothetical nature. In other words, our inference is valid as long as a counterexample is not discovered. I don’t think this is completely off the mark, if we take into account the inductive nature of Dignāga’s system of logic. As I mentioned earlier, Dignāga did not resort to any specific relations, such as causation, in order to justify his theory of vyāpti, the core of his logic. I believe that his final recourse in determining the pervasion between two items was people’s common sense or the way they used their own language (lokavyavahāra or lokaprasiddhi).

Then what was the original contribution of Īśvarasena on this matter? He must have inherited the idea of mere non-perception from Dignāga. However, he gave it the status of a valid means of cognition (pramāṇa); thus he admitted a third type of pramāṇa in addition to Dignāga’s perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa). By doing so, I think, Īśvarasena believed that he could firmly establish the negative concomitance (vyatireka) and the pervasion between two items, so that he could remove the hypothetical and inductive nature of Dignāga’s logic.

As I mentioned before, Dharmakīrti strongly criticized the above theory of mere non-perception (adarsanamātra) in the Pramāṇavārttika-Svārtti as well as in the Pramāṇaviniścaya chapter 2. It is most curious why Dharmakīrti, in this context, did not refer to the above-quoted Pramāṇasamuccayaavṛtti ad V.34. This becomes even stranger when we consider the fact that Kumārila, a Mīmāṃsaka who was more or less contemporary with Dharmakīrti, explicitly referred to and criticized that passage of Dignāga. Perhaps Dharmakīrti did not want to criticize

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15 See Pramāṇasamuccaya V.1: na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat(or sah) / krtakatvādīvat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate // Hattori, ed., p. 107 fn. (1).
17 For detail, see Steinkellner’s article mentioned in footnote 1 as well as his German translation of the Pramāṇaviniścaya chapter 2, Wien 1979, p. 112ff.
18 Ślokavārttika, Apoha v. 75: na cādāsānamātrena tābhyaṃ pratyāyanam bhavet / sarvatrayaḥ hy adṛṣṭatvāt pratyāyam nāvāsīṣyate // M. Hattori, “Mīmāṃsālokavārttika, Apohavāda-sū no kenkyū (II)”, Memoirs of The Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 15, 1975, pp. 11-12; cf. Anumāṇa v. 131c-132: aṣeṣāpeksītavāc ca saukaryāc cāpy
his great predecessor Dignāga directly. As a matter of fact, Dharmakīrti often tried to prove that he was the correct interpreter as well as the most legitimate successor of Dignāga, although his system of logic shows a clear departure from that of Dignāga. For example, in the Pramāṇavārttika chapter 4, Dharmakīrti indicated that Dignāga’s well-known Wheel of Reasons (hetucakra) in essence implied the two kinds of his valid reasons, viz. kārya and svabhāva.\(^9\) In any case, by attacking Īśvarasena’s theory of adarśanāmātra, while ignoring the possible conflict between the implication of the Pramāṇasamuccaya-vrtti ad V.34 and his own position of svabhāvapratibandhā, Dharmakīrti, I believe, implicitly criticized Dignāga’s whole system of logic.

Although Dharmakīrti denied Īśvarasena’s claim that non-existence could be established by the third pramāṇa, i.e. mere non-perception, he must have realized the necessity of proving non-existence, a problem which does not seem to have been fully discussed by Dignāga. Thus non-perception (anupalabdhi) became one of the main logical notions which Dharmakīrti developed throughout his career.

Dharmakīrti recognized two kinds of non-perception, viz. dṛṣṭānu-palabdhi (non-perception of a perceptible object, such as a pot), and adṛṣṭānupalabdhi (non-perception of an imperceptible object, such as the remote past or a future event or a ghost). Both have the same function of preventing us from treating such objects as existent (sadyavahāra-pratisedha). But only dṛṣṭānupalabdhi can determine the non-existence. In other words, when all conditions for perception, e.g. enough light, attention, etc., are present (upalabdhilaksanaprāpta), then if a pot is not perceived at a certain spot, we can safely determine that the pot is non-existent at that spot. However, we cannot do the same thing with a ghost. A ghost, which is by nature beyond our ordinary perception, cannot be convincingly determined by non-perception as existent or as non-existent. Dharmakīrti regarded dṛṣṭānupalabdhi as a third type of logical reason, one destined for proving the non-existence of an object; it was a type of reason in addition to kārya and svabhāva, which were meant for proving the existence of an object.\(^{20}\) In this way Dharmakīrti

\(\text{adarśanā // sādhane yady apisto 'tra vyatireko 'numām prati / tāvatā na hy anarāgatvam yuktih śāhde hi vakyate // Sh. Ōyakami, et al., "Slokavārttika, anumāna-shō no kenkyū (III)". Indo Shisōshi Kenkyū 4, Kyoto 1985, p. 21. See also Nyāyaratnakara ad the latter.}


\(^{20}\) Dharmakīrti’s three-fold division of valid reasons is a kind of cross-classification and anupalabdhi is in fact included in svabhāva. See e.g. Pramāṇavārttika IV.260.
succeeded in incorporating non-perception into his theory of inference and proof without committing himself to the third type of pramāṇa.

The division of objects into drśya and adṛśya seems to have played an important role in determining the scope of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology and logic. For him the objective field of the valid means of knowledge may be divided into two classes, viz. one to which we can have an access through our ordinary sense organs (drśya) and one which is beyond our ordinary experience (adrśya = aytantaraparokṣa). Objects belonging to the former class can be known either by perception, if they are in the perceptible environment (pratyakṣa), or by a kind of inference which functions by force of reality (vastubala-pravṛttiānumāṇa), if they happen to be out of this environment (parokṣa). Objects belonging to the latter class may include such controversial doctrinal entities as ‘other continua’ (santānāntara), ‘other worlds’ (paraloka), etc. Their existence, although absolutely obscure, can be proved, according to Dharmakīrti, by another kind of inference which is based on scripture (āgamaśri tiānumāṇa).

Judging from the proof of other continua presented by Dharmakīrti in the Santānāntarasiddhi, I consider that the second kind of inference essentially consists in what we call ‘Proof by Analogy’. Dharmakīrti naturally denies the authority of the scriptures of other schools on the ground that they contain the statements which contradict our ordinary valid experiences. Consequently, he rejects the proofs presented by other schools with reference to their metaphysical entities, such as ākāśa and ātman. In the Pramāṇavārttika chapter 4 Dharmakīrti discusses this interesting problem of how to assess different sets of scriptures, a problem which I would like to deal with in a future paper.

Concerning non-perception, there is another important distinction between Īśvarasena and Dharmakīrti. As the expression ‘adarśanamātra’ suggests, the former takes non-perception as pure negation (prasajyapratisedha), while the latter, at least in the Hetubindu, regards it as relative negation (paryudāsa), for he defines non-perception of x to be perception of something other than x (anyopalabdhir anupalabdhiḥ).

In this connection it may be interesting to note that the notion of anupalabdhi was not completely unknown to Dignāga. In his first

23 Hetubindu, ed. by Steinkellner, p. 21*: anyopalabdhir anupalabdhiḥ, vivakṣitopalabdher anyatvād ahakṣyasparsāṇīyavat paryudāsavṛtiyā.
systematic treatise on logic, Nyāyamukha, he presented the following arguments:

"Now, the principle of presenting a property of the subject of a thesis (paksadharma = hetu) is that one should prove one property (sādhyadharma) by taking another property (sādhanadharma) as its reason.\(^\text{25}\)

[Opponents:] But suppose that we are to prove [not a property but] a property-possessor (dharmin, i.e. the subject of a thesis itself) to be existent or non-existent. For example, some [=the Sāṅkhya] argue:


[Reason] Because we see that the various individuals possess a [similar]
general characteristic.\(^\text{26}\)

while some [others = the opponents] argue:

[Thesis] [The Primordial Matter] does not exist.

[Reason] Because we do not perceive it.

\((nā santi pradhāṇādayo 'nupalabdheḥ)\(^\text{27}\)

How do you explain this?

[Answer:] For them, [as for the first syllogism,] they should formulate the thesis as 'The various individuals certainly possess one and the same cause [i.e., pradhāna],\(^\text{28}\) in which case they do not prove [directly the existence of] the Primordial Matter [i.e. dharma]; hence, there is no error [of the violation of the above-mentioned principle]. [As for the second syllogism,] when they argue that [The Primordial Matter] does not exist [because of non-perception], 'non-perception' is a property of the imagined object [i.e. pradhāna] (kalpitasyānapalabdhir dharman)\(^\text{29}\); hence, there is no error of [admitting] the existence of a property-possessor [= the subject of a thesis, whose existence they do not accept]."

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\(^{27}\) Cf. Sāṃkhyaśāstra 15:16: bhedaṁ... samanvayāt... kāranaṁ asti avayaktam.

\(^{28}\) Quoted in the Pramāṇavārttikasvavrtti, p. 105. Cf. Sāṃkhyaśāstra 8: saukṣmyāt tadanaupalabdhir nābhāvāt.

\(^{29}\) Cf. Sāṃkhyaśāstra 15: ... vyāvṛtānam esām tathāmavasvabhāvākakāranakatvam āvaśyakam, tāca kāranaṁ yogyatāya pradhānam eva.

\(^{29}\) Quoted in the Pramāṇavārttikasvavrtti, p. 107.
In Dignāga’s system of logic, the subject of a thesis must be accepted as a real entity by both parties of a debate. Therefore, the second syllogism mentioned above presents a serious problem to Dignāga, for the Primordial Matter of the Sāṃkhya school is, by their definition, beyond our ordinary experience and cannot be accepted as real by their opponents. In the above passage, however, he seems to allow that it can be the subject of a negative proposition, although it is an imagined object. Unfortunately, Dignāga did not elaborate on this important topic. In his main work of logic, the *Pramāṇa-samuccayavṛtti* chapter 2, on the other hand, Dignāga plainly denies that ‘the Primordial Matter’ is a subject of inference, and in chapter 3, where he presents the parallel discussion to the above quotation, he tacitly drops the second syllogism from his argument. This may suggest that at the end of his career Dignāga abandoned his position in the *Nyāyamukha*, where he accepted an imagined subject of a negative proposition, in order to adopt the more rigid attitude towards the real accessibility of the subject of a debate. In any case his system of logic does not seem to be much concerned with negative propositions and negative judgements.

In his first work on logic, the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, when Dharmakīrti for the first time tried to establish his new theory of non-perception, he referred to and fully discussed the second syllogism of the *Nyāyamukha* quoted above. Dharmakīrti came to the conclusion that the subject of a proposition, either positive or negative, could only be a mere conceptual construction which was an object of our verbal discourse (*sabdārtha*); here Dharmakīrti’s new interpretation of *apoha* doctrine played a key role. I suspect that the above passage of the *Nyāyamukha* might have had some impact upon the formation of Dharmakīrti’s new system of logic. It is a little ironical that Dharmakīrti seems to have started with what Dignāga had once hinted at and finally dismissed.

30 Peking 111a5: phyogs 'dis ni gtso bo la sogs pa'i rang bzhin rnams la rjes su dpag pa bkag pa yin no; English Translation by Hayes, “Diṇnāga’s view on Reasoning,” p. 252: “This view denies inference with respect to such things as (the Sāṃkhya) thesis of Primordial Substance (because it has never been seen before).”

31 Peking 128b6-8: chos can yang des min / chos kyi(s) chos can yang bsgrub pa ma yin te (/) dper na gtso bo gcig yod pa yin te / khyad par rnams la rjes su 'gro ba mthong ba'i phyir ro zhes bya ba lta bu'o // de ni khyad par rnams khol da rgyu gcig pa can nyid du bsgrub par bya ba yin te / der yang gyo mo la sogs pa'i rgyu gcig pa nyid dper byed pa yin no // de'i phyir chos gzhans khol da bsgrub par bya ba yin no //

32 For detail, see H. Yālā’s articles mentioned in footnote 24.