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Kamalaśīla's Views on Dependent Origination

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Abstract: Directly or indirectly, by way of scriptural commentary or philosophical investigation, dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) plays an important role in several of Kamalaśīla's works. His interpretation is remarkably consistent. As earlier “Yogācāra-Mādhyamika” authors such as Śrīgupta, Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla regards dependent origination as one of the characteristic features of genuine conventional reality, non-origination (*anutpāda*) being characteristic of ultimate reality/truth. Genuine conventional reality and ultimate reality correspond to the two modes – conventional and ultimate – of dependent origination in the ŚŚūT, a commentary whose purpose was to provide the ŚŚū with a Mādhyamika interpretation. Although it seems to leave no room for the Madhyamaka and culminates in a Yogācāra analysis of reality, the TSP likely is no exception to this, as its maṅgala's indebtedness to Nāgārjuna already suggests. Close comparative and intertextual analysis reveals that the intention underlying the TS(P) was to provide a description of true conventional reality, i.e., the domain of dependently originated though ultimately essenceless entities similar to magical horses and elephants. As a corollary, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla attempted to “purify” it from pseudo-entities, i.e., non dependently originated fictions, or, equivalently, entities with incongruous causes (*vिषमाहेतु*), such as a rabbit's horn, the self, and God. In this perspective, the TS(P) can be read as a detailed philosophical propedeutics to a Mādhyamika analysis of reality, cognition, and truth.

Keywords: dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*); Kamalaśīla; Madhyamaka; *Tattvasaṅgraha(pañjikā)*; two truths

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Dependent origination arguably constitutes Buddhism's most essential doctrine, the importance of which is mirrored in its eventual incorporation into the scenario and contents of the Buddha's awakening.¹ Its centrality can also be seen from the fact that its two declensions, the progressive (*anuloma[tas]*) and the retrogressive (*pratiloma [tas]*), encapsulate Buddhism both as an explanation and as a therapy of suffering. For whereas the twelve limbs in progressive order account for the rise of suffering, i.e., pollution/defilement (*saṅklesa*), the same twelve limbs considered in retrogressive order account for the elimination of suffering and its causes, or, equivalently, for purification (*vyavadaṇa*). Dependent origination can thus be regarded as the very matrix of the noble's truths: whereas truth no. 2 originates in the progressive sequence, truth no. 3 is connected to the retrogressive order.² This is likely what Kamalaśīla had in mind in the verse opening his commentary on the ŚŚū, one of Buddhism's most authoritative sources on dependent origination: "Having bowed to the King of Dharma who, by indicating that an entity arises in dependence, pronounced what is truly excellent and what is not excellent, [I] will explain as [I am] able the meaning of the *Young Rice Plant [Sūtra]*."³ The essential identity between dependent origination and Dharma both as the law governing phenomena and as the teaching revealing it is best reflected in the *sūtra*'s most famous statement, viz., "he who sees dependent origination sees the Dharma, [and] he who sees the Dharma sees the Buddha."⁴

Given the importance of the topic, one can legitimately be curious about the way in which one of Indian Buddhism's most outstanding representatives, Kamalaśīla (740–795), understood dependent origination. For not only did he write on epistemology while commenting on Śāntarakṣita's (725–788) TS; again in the footsteps of his teacher, Kamalaśīla was a staunch advocate of what came to be labelled "Yogācāra-Madhyamaka," a doctrinal stance that permeates several of his most outstanding contributions, the MAP, the three BhKs, and the ŚŚūT, not to speak, of course, of the *Madhyamakāloka*.⁵

1 See Eltschinger 2019: 196–201.

2 As Lamotte 1977: 281 points out, while explaining the four noble truths, AN I.176–177 (Bodhi 2012: 269–270) resorts to the so-called *Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra* for truths no. 1 and 4, but reproduces the standard wording of the *anuloma* and *pratiloma* sequences for truths no. 2 and 3, respectively.

3 ŚŚūT 450,3–6: /gai gis dños po brten 'byun bstan pa yis/ /yan dag mchog dañ mchog myin bka' tsald pa/ /chos kyi rgyal po de la phyag 'tshal te/ /sa lu ljan pa'i don ni ji nus bśad/. Translation Schoening 1995: I.192–193. The interlinear gloss (in MS Pelliot Tibétain 553) explains that "what is truly excellent" refers to dependent origination in retrogressive order, whereas "what is not excellent" refers to dependent origination in progressive order (Schoening 1995: I.192, nn. 8–9). For similar equivalences in Theravāda Buddhism, see Schoening 1995: I.192–193, n. 9 (SN II.4–5; Bodhi 2000: 536).

4 See below, n. 91. On this *sūtra* and its constitution, see also Schoening 1995: I.4.

5 The interlinear gloss introduces Kamalaśīla, the author of the ŚŚūT, as a *dbu ma'i mkhan po* (*madhyamakopādhyāya*?). See Schoening 1995: I.192, n. 1. Note also Schoening 1995: I.107: "Quite possibly one of Kamalaśīla's reasons for writing a commentary to the Śālistamba Sūtra was to interpret it according to the Madhyamaka 'ultimate/conventional' analysis rather than the Yogācāra

Now, dependent origination features more or less prominently in all of these works, either as their very topic (TS[P], ŚŚūṭ) or as one of their most decisive articulations (MA [V/P], BhK). How did Kamalaśīla, who wrote as a realist, an idealist, a Mādhyamika, a meditation teacher and a *sūtra* commentator, contextualize and harmonize his views on dependent origination? Is there, in Kamalaśīla's treatment of the topic, a guiding principle or a doctrinal “habitus” that would not be entirely determined by the works he commented upon?

The present paper is based on the TSP, the MAP, the BhKs, and the ŚŚūṭ, but does not take the *Madhyamakāloka* into account, which remains a *terra incognita* in many respects. Given the wealth of materials and the space at my disposal, I have chosen not to integrate Kamalaśīla's views on rebirth and the relation between action and its result as they appear in chapters 9 (*karmaphalasambandhaparīkṣā*) and 22 (*Lokāyataparīkṣā*) of the TSP. Although these materials provide valuable informations on the embryological and gnoseological aspects of rebirth, they are not directly relevant to dependent origination as such. I have also refrained from taking the individual limbs/members (*anga*, *nidāna*) of dependent origination into the picture. Except for *avidyā*, Kamalaśīla has hardly anything to say about them outside the limited framework of his commentary on the ŚŚū, where his ideas often reflect those of the work commented upon. And while I have refrained from integrating ideas from the *sūtra* proper, I have not hesitated to include excerpts from Śāntarakṣita when they proved more explicit, or more synthetic, than Kamalaśīla's own explanations, or when Kamalaśīla did not comment upon them, with the (admittedly controvertible) implicit assumption that Kamalaśīla shared his teacher's views in such cases. My use of the ŚŚūṭ almost entirely relies on Schoening's fine 1995 study and translation.

1 Dependent Origination in the *Tattvasaṅgraha(pañjikā)*

Dependent origination lies at the very heart of Śāntarakṣita's (and the Buddha's !) project as it is spelled out in the initial verses of the TS and their commentary.⁶ In TS 5–6, Śāntarakṣita claims to “compose the *Tattvasaṅgraha* after paying homage to the omniscient [Buddha] who, best among speakers, taught dependent origination without resorting to any [supposedly] independent revelation [such as the Veda, and] after making great compassion his very essence over innumerable great aeons out of

three-nature theory as in the *Kārikā* and the *Tīkā*.” According to BhK 1.207,7–8, the Buddha preached the ŚŚū with a Mādhyamika intention. See below, n. 68.

⁶ See already McClintock 2010: 95–111, and *passim*, and Matsuoka in the present volume.

[his] desire for the welfare of the living beings (*jagaddhita*).⁷ As TS 1–6—a deliberate echo of Nāgārjuna’s MMK⁸—make clear, Śāntarakṣita’s epistemological agenda turns out to be in fact nothing but a defence of dependent origination, each of the latter’s epithets in TS 1–5a picking up a specific topic of the Buddhist epistemologists’ philosophical program and polemics against the non-Buddhists, and a few, mostly Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika, Buddhists.⁹ According to Kamalaśīla, dependent origination is even implicitly present in the title of the work, for *tattva* (lit. “reality,” “true nature”), here in the plural, refers to the true characteristics of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādavīśeṣaṇāni*)—being devoid of the operation of pseudo-causes like the Sāṅkhyas’ primordial nature, etc. (*prakṛtyādīvīpārarahitatvādi*)—that are enumerated in TS 1–5a.¹⁰ Śāntarakṣita’s treatise thus presents itself as a 3645-stanza *Compendium of the true properties (of dependent origination)*.¹¹

Why should this eulogy (*stotr[ābhidhān]a*, or worship, *pūjā[bhidhāna]*) of the Buddha center on the revelation of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādadeśanā*) and not on his innumerable other qualities?¹² According to Kamalaśīla, dependent origination is the very essence (*pradhāna*) of the Blessed One’s jewel-like teaching (*pravacanaratna*) insofar as it causes living beings to obtain (*prāpaka, prāpaṇa*) elevation (*abhyudaya*), viz. good rebirth states (*sugati*), and the *summum bonum* (*nīḥśreyasa*), viz., liberation (*apavarga*). On the one hand, teaching dependent origination is responsible for their confident certainty (*sampratyaya*) about the relationship between actions and their results (*karmaphalasambandha*), a certainty which, by fostering good moral conduct, is conducive to higher rebirth states. On the other hand, teaching

7 TS 5–6: *svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅgo jagaddhitavidhitsayā / analpakalpāsaṅkhyeyasātmībhūtamahādayah // yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṁ jagāda gadatāṁ varāḥ / taṁ sarvajñāṁ praṇamyāyaṁ kriyate tattvasaṅgrahāḥ //*

8 Cf. MMK, second “benedictory” stanza: *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṁ [...] / deśyāmāsa sambuddhas taṁ vande vadatāṁ varam //*. Whereas Nāgārjuna’s eight epithets of *pratītyasamutpāda* epitomize Madhyamaka metaphysics, Śāntarakṣita’s dozen of epithets reflect the philosophical program of the mature Buddhist epistemological tradition (See McClintock 2010: 88–91).

9 According to ŚŚU 456,17–18 (Schoening 1995: I.207–208), the ŚŚU, hence dependent origination, is as unshakable by the non-Buddhists as a mountain is by the wind (the interlinear gloss claims that the *sūtra*, “by teaching the definitive meaning, is [unshakable], because it is not shaken by the views of causelessness and dissimilar [causes] such as the non-Buddhists [hold]” [*ṇes pa'i don ston pa yin bas na mu stegs chan lastsogs pa myi 'thun ba gyur lta ba dan rgyu myed par lta ba dag gis myi sgul ba'i phyir ro //*; translation Schoening 1995: I.208, n. 1]). More generally, dependent origination remains unfathomable for people who are not *buddhas* (ŚŚU 455,7–8; Schoening 1995: I.202); meditation on dependent origination is said to be common to *śrāvakas* and *bodhisattvas* (ŚŚU 457,14–16; Schoening 1995: I.209).

10 See TSP_K 7,20–21/TSP_S 8,23–24/TSP_T D ze 138b5–6 (quite strongly diverging from the Skt.).

11 On the debates on the nature, the scope and the function(s) of the TS(P), see Ratié 2014: 163–167.

12 The present section relies on TSP_K 10,8–23/TSP_S 11,1–15/TSP_T D ze 141a2–b3 and TSP_K 15,15–16,4/TSP_S 15,23–16,6/TSP_T D ze 146a3–b5.

dependent origination causes those longing for liberation to gradually (through scriptural learning, rational reflection and repeated meditative cultivation) understand the selflessness of the person and the selflessness of the factors (*pudgaladharmanairātmya*).¹³ Teaching dependent origination, i.e., teaching the proper path to heaven and liberation (*aviparītasvargāpavargopadeśa*), is thus the core of the Buddha's perfection in altruistic practice (*parahitānuṣṭhānasampad*) together with its means (*upāya*), i.e., insight (*prajñā*)—defined as a yogin's direct intuition of the *dharma*s (*dharmeṣu sākṣāddarsitvam*)—and compassion (*Imahājkaruṇā, kṛpā*). The Buddha's perfection in altruistic practice results from the elimination of the two types of obstructions, i.e., the obstruction which consists of all the defilements together with their after-effects and the obstruction to the knowable (*saṃśānaśeṣakleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇa*), and distinguishes him from the *bodhisattvas* and the *śrāvakas*, who, although they do teach dependent origination, do not reveal it independently (*svatas*).

But acting for other peoples' benefit (*parānugraha*), though only remotely and derivatively comparable to the Buddha's paradigmatic action, also characterizes Śāntarakṣita's own endeavor as the author of a philosophical treatise.¹⁴ The action of composing the TS, i.e., collecting (*saṅgraha*) the *tattvas* scattered (*viprakīrṇa*) in earlier teachers' (*pūrvācārya*) works, aims at making simpleminded persons' (*mandadhi*) understanding of these *tattvas* easier (*tattvasukhāvabodha*) so that they can quickly obtain elevation and liberation (all *āstikas* indeed agree that these result from one's knowledge of the *tattva*[s]). Now as Kamalaśīla again insists, securing them is due to truth (*aviparyāsa*; for wrong notions [*viparyāsa*] are the root[-cause] of all pollution,¹⁵ and the welfare of the living beings is contrary to pollution), truth being nothing but complete confidence (*abhisampratyaya*) in the relation between

13 TSP_K 10,17–18/TSP_S 11,10–11/TSP_T D ze 141a7–b1: *tadutpattau hy avidyā saṃsārahetur nivartate / tannivṛttau ca tanmūlam sakalam kleśajñeyāvaraṇam nivartata iti sakalāvaraṇavigamād apavargasamprāptir bhavati /*. “For when this [understanding of selflessness] arises, ignorance ceases, which is the cause of transmigratory existence, and when this [ignorance] ceases, all obstructions—those consisting of defilements and those to the knowable—which have it as their root(-cause), cease, [and] thus, thanks to the elimination of all obstructions, one obtains liberation.” According to Kamalaśīla (ŚSūT 453,6–16; Schoening 1995: I.198), the purpose (*prayojana*) of the ŚSū is to eliminate the two obstructions and to enter the *apratiṣṭhitānirvāṇamārga*, which basically consists of insight and compassion.

14 This section is based on TSP_K 9,9–21/TSP_S 10,9–20/TSP_T D ze 140a5 and TSP_K 8,21–9,8/TSP_S 9,25–10,9/TSP_T D ze 139b5–140a5.

15 Cf. ŚSūT 479,15: *phyin ci log ni kun nas ñon moñs pa mtha' dag gi rtsa ba yin pas [...]*, “because wrong notions (*viparyāsa*) are the root(-cause) (*mūla*) of all pollution (*samastasaṅkleśa?*)” (see also Schoening 1995: I.256); cf. also BhK 1.197,4–5: *prajñayā ca sakalaviparyāsaprahāṇān na saṃsāre 'vasthāṇam viparyāsamūlatvāt saṃsārasya /*. “And since all wrong notions are eliminated by insight, he does not abide in transmigratory existence, because transmigratory existence has wrong notions for its root(-cause).”

action and its result (*karmaphalasambandha*) and the true understanding (*avabodha*) of the two types of selflessnesses. As we have seen above, and as Kamalaśīla again emphasizes, one's complete confidence in karmic retribution and true understanding of selflessness are caused by a treatise revealing (*samprakāśaka*) dependent origination in a proper way, again through the sequence (*krama*) of learning scriptures, rationally reflecting upon them and mentally cultivating soteriologically relevant contents. People who have eliminated neither of the two forms of the personalistic belief act by wrongly interpreting the psychophysical series as a substantial unity (*santatim ekatvenādhya-vasāya*). On the contrary, those best among ordinary people (*prthagjanakalyāṇa*) who comprehend the true nature of things (*tattva*) by rationally and scripturally (*yuktyāgama*) understanding momentariness and selflessness, learn the law of dependent origination (*pratīyasamutpādadharmatā*) and act accordingly, i.e., perform good deeds (*śubhakriyā*) in a way that fosters their and other peoples' good.¹⁶

What exactly is dependent origination?¹⁷ To make an idea, let me quote the most famous and most ubiquitous canonical description of the *pratīyasamutpāda*, a text

16 According to TSP_K 183,18–27/TSP_S 162,1–10/TSP_T D ze 256a1–5. The compound *pratīyasamutpādadharmatā* (Tib. *rten ciṇ 'brel bar 'byuṇ ba'i chos ŋid*) is liable to several interpretations, notably “[learn that mental events] have dependent origination for [their] property.”

17 Due to Matsuoka's masterly treatment of the subject (Matsuoka, forthcoming), I refrain from dealing here with Kamalaśīla's important etymological remarks in TSP_K 15,10–15/TSP_S 15,17–23/TSP_T D ze 146a1–3. As shown by Matsuoka, Kamalaśīla insists that *pratīyasamutpāda* and *pratīyasamutpanna* point to the same entities (the *skandhas*, etc.) but according to two alternative descriptive modes, the first focusing on just the property (*dharma*) of origination to the exclusion of other differentiating features (*bheda*), the other focusing on the property-bearer (*dharmin*) without setting aside other differentiating features. To put it otherwise, “origination” as a property is by no means distinct from the originated entities themselves, and the difference is purely conventional. In doing so, Śāntarakṣita's commentator follows Dharmakīrti's ideas on these alternative descriptions, a key point of his *apoha* theory.* Here is Kamalaśīla's terse and innovative explanation: “The aggregates, etc., arising in dependence on, i.e., relying on causes [and] conditions, this is [what we call] ‘dependent origination.’ Here is [Śāntarakṣita's] point: ‘[The Blessed Buddha] who taught the aggregates, etc., (as being) arisen (*utpanna*) by force of causes [and] conditions.’ Even if [in this expression,] ‘origination’ is presented as [if it were] distinct [from the originated aggregates, etc.], it is nonetheless nothing but the dependently originated (*pratīyasamutpanna*) entity itself that is presented in this way as one wishes to know just the exclusion of all other differentiating features. Or [we say] *samutpāda* because it originates, [with the primary affix] GHaṄ [i.e., -a] in the sense of an agent (*kartari*) because it is said [in A 3.3.113] that ‘the affixes called *kṛtya* and the affix *lyuṭ* are diversely applicable and have other senses than those taught before.’** Therefore, [*samutpāda* forms] a compound with the word *pratīya* either of the *supsupā* type [according to A 2.1.4], or due to being [of] the *mayūra-vyaṇṣakā* [type according to A 2.1.72].***** *See PV(SV) 1.59–62 (Eltschinger et al. 2018: 55–60) and PV 2.97–99 (Matsuoka forthcoming, [9–11], with literature). **A 3.3.113, translation Vasu 1997: I.524 (cf. Renou 1966: I.243). ***A 2.172, translation Vasu 1997: I.253 (cf. Renou 1966: I.100, and Renou 1984: 121–122 [§96B]); the list of “irregularly formed *tatpuruṣa* compounds” comprises several expressions with an absolute as the first member: *pītvāsthiraka*, *bhuktvāsuhita*, *proṣyapāpiyān*, etc.

Kamalaśīla was well aware of for having commented on it in his ŚŚūṭ,¹⁸ for quoting from it while commenting on TS_K 544/TS_S 543,¹⁹ and, not implausibly, for being a Mūlasarvāstivādin well versed in his monastic order's *Vinaya*:²⁰

[Here is dependent origination considered in progressive order:] when this exists, this comes into existence; due to the arising of this, this arises.²¹ Namely, with ignorance for their condition, the karmic constructions arise; with the karmic constructions for its condition, consciousness arises; with consciousness for their condition, name-and-body arise; with name-and-body for

****TSP_K 15,10–15/TSP_S 15,17–23/TSP_T D ze 146a1–3 (for the Tibetan, see Matsuoka forthcoming, [3, n. 14]): *hetūn pratīyān pratītya samāśritya yaḥ skandhādīnām utpādaḥ sa pratītyasamutpādaḥ / etad uktāṇ bhavati / hetupratīyayabalenotpannān skandhādīn yo jagādeti / yady api⁽¹⁾ samutpāda iti vya-tirekīva nirdeśas tathāpi pratītyasamutpannam eva vastu bhedāntarapratikṣepamātrajijñāsāyām⁽²⁾ tathā nirdiśyate / yadvā samutpadyata iti samutpādaḥ kṛtyalyuṭo⁽³⁾ bahulam iti vacanāt kartari ghañ / tataḥ pratītyāśabdena supsupeti mayūravyāmsakādītvād vā⁽⁴⁾ samāsaḥ / asamastam eva vā /.*⁽¹⁾ Note TSP_T 'di ltar yan for yady api. ⁽²⁾Note TSP_T śes par 'dod pas (-jijñāsayā?). ⁽³⁾kṛtyalyuṭo TSP_K: kṛtyaluṭo TSP_S. ⁽⁴⁾TSP_K vā: TSP_S om. vā. On traditional explanations of the expression *pratītyasamutpāda*, see the references in Matsuoka forthcoming [4, n. 15], to which La Vallée Poussin 1913: 48–49 and MacDonald 2015: II.18–38 can be added.

18 See i.a. ŚŚūṭ 463,1–465,8 (Schoening 1995: I.221–223).

19 See below, n. 27.

20 SBhV I.127,1–129,16 narrates the recently awakened Buddha's "discovery" (Gnoli) of dependent origination (in my opinion, the passage does not necessarily exclude that the Buddha discovered dependent origination earlier). The passage opens as follows (SBhV I.127,1–6 ['*Dul ba*, D ṇā 38a4–6]): *atha bhagavān yathābhīramyam mucilindasya nāgarājasya bhavane vihṛtya yena bodhimūlam teno-paśānkrāntaḥ / upaśānkrāmya prajñapta eva tṛṇasamstarake niṣaṇṇaḥ paryāṇkam ābhujya rjuṇ kāyaṇ prāṇidhāya pratimukhaṇ smṛtim upasthāpya saptāham eka paryāṇkenātīnāmayatādām evaṇ dvādaśānīgām pratītyasamutpādām anulomapratīlomām vyavalokayan [...].* "Then the Blessed One, having remained as long as was agreeable [to him] in the place of Mucilinda the king of snakes, went to the foot of the tree of awakening. Having arrived [there], he sat on a [previously] arranged mat [made] of grass, assumed a sitting posture with the legs doubled under the buttocks, fixed his body upright, directed his attention in front of him and spent seven days in this sitting posture, contemplating the twelve-membered dependent origination in progressive and retrogressive order [...]."

21 In TSP_K 173,6–8/TSP_S 153,15–17/TSP_T D ze 250a3–4, Kamalaśīla explains conditionality/"conditionedness" (*idampratyayatā*; see also TSP_K 182,15/TSP_S 161,4/TSP_T D ze 255a5) by resorting to a famous *logion*: *yathoktam asti karmāsti phalaṇ kārakas tu nopalabhyate ya imān skandhān nikṣipaty anyāṁś ca skandhān upādatte 'nyatra dharmasāṅketāt / tatrāyaṇ dharmasāṅketo yadutāśmin satīdaṇ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyata iti /.* "As [was] stated [by the Blessed One], 'Action exists [and its] result [also] exists, but an agent does not exist/[is not perceived], who would give up these constituents [at death] and take up new ones [at birth], except for a [mere] convention[al designation/metaphor] for the [dependently arisen] *dharmas* (*dharmasāṅketa*) [themselves. And] here is this convention[al designation/metaphor] for the [dependently arisen] *dharmas*, i.e., when this exists, this comes into existence; due to the arising of this, this arises.'" On this *logion* from the *Paramārthaśūnyatāśūtra*, see Lamotte 1976: 1998, SWTF, s.v., and Eltschinger 2010b: 323, n. 102; see also AKBh 468,24–26. For interpretations of this twofold formulation, see AKBh 138,28–139,24 on AK 3.28 (La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931: II.81–83); for Dharmakīrti's opinion, see PV 2.49 and Franco 1997: 227–230.

their condition, the six sense bases arise; with the six sense bases for its condition, contact arises; with contact for its condition, feeling arises; with feeling for its condition, craving arises; with craving for its condition, clinging arises; with clinging for its condition, becoming arises; with becoming for its condition, rebirth arises; with rebirth for their condition, aging, death, sorrow, grief, suffering, dejectedness and mental disturbance arise. Such is the origin of this entire great²² mass of suffering. [And here is dependent origination considered in retrogressive order:] when this does not exist, this does not come into existence; due to the cessation of this, this ceases to exist. Namely, due to the cessation of ignorance, the karmic constructions cease to exist; due to the cessation of the karmic constructions, consciousness ceases to exist; due to the cessation of consciousness, name-and-body cease to exist; due to the cessation of name-and-body, the six sense bases cease to exist; due to the cessation of the six sense bases, contact ceases to exist; due to the cessation of contact, feeling ceases to exist; due to the cessation of feeling, craving ceases to exist; due to the cessation of craving, clinging ceases to exist; due to the cessation of clinging, becoming ceases to exist; due to the cessation of becoming, rebirth ceases to exist; due to the cessation of rebirth, aging, death, sorrow, grief, suffering, dejectedness and mental disturbance cease to exist. Such is the cessation of this entire great mass of suffering.²³

To the best of my knowledge, Kamalaśīla never explicitly refers to either the progressive or the retrogressive order in the TSP. However, two passages at least presuppose the two modes of dependent origination, the one accounting for pollution and the one accounting for purification.²⁴ In TS 496, an opponent claims that the

22 In ŚŚU 464,9 and 11 (Schoening 1995: I.223), Kamalaśīla explains *kevalasya* with *bdag dan bdag gi dan bral ba*, “devoid of ‘I’ and ‘mine,’” and *mahataḥ* with *thog ma myed pa*, “beginningless.”

23 ŚŚU 71,1–17 ≈ SBhV I.127,6–22 (‘*Dul ba*, D ḥa 38a6–b4): *yadutāśmin satīdaṁ bhavati; asyotpādād idam utpadyate; yadutāvidyā*pratyayāḥ saṃskārāḥ; saṃskārapratyayaṁ vijñānam; vijñānapratyayaṁ nāmarūpam; nāmarūpapratyayaṁ ṣaḍāyatanaṁ; ṣaḍāyatanapratyayaḥ sparśaḥ; sparśa-pratyayā vedanā; vedanāpratyayā ṭṛṣṇā; ṭṛṣṇāpratyayaṁ upādānam; upādānapratyayo bhavaḥ; bhava-pratyayā jātiḥ; jātipratyayā jarāmarāṇaśokaparidevaduḥkhadaurmanasyopāyāsā amī bhavanti**; evam eva*** kevalasya mahato duḥkhaskandhasya samudayo**** bhavati; yadutāśminn asatīdaṁ na bhavati; asya nirodhād idam nirudhyate; yadutā*****vidyānirodhāt saṃskāranirodhāḥ; saṃskāranirodhād vijñānanirodhāḥ; vijñānanirodhān nāmarūpanirodhāḥ; nāmarūpanirodhāt ṣaḍāyatana-nirodhāḥ; ṣaḍāyatana-nirodhāt sparśanirodhāḥ; sparśanirodhād vedanā-nirodhāḥ; vedanā-nirodhāt ṭṛṣṇā-nirodhāḥ; ṭṛṣṇā-nirodhād upādāna-nirodhāḥ; upādāna-nirodhād bhava-nirodhāḥ; bhava-nirodhāj jāti-nirodhāḥ; jāti-nirodhāj jarāmarāṇaśokaparidevaduḥkhadaurmanasyopāyāsā nirudhyante; evam eva*** kevalasya mahato duḥkhaskandhasya nirodho bhavati. *yadutāvidyā- SBhV: *yad idam avidyā-* ŚŚU. **amī bhavanti SBhV: *sambhavanti* ŚŚU. ***eva SBhV: *eva* om. ŚŚU. ****-skandhasya samudayo SBhV: -skandhasyotpādo ŚŚU. *****yadutāśminn asatīdaṁ na bhavati; asya nirodhād idam nirudhyate; yaduta- SBhV: *yadutāśminn asatīdaṁ na bhavati; asya nirodhād idam nirudhyate; yaduta-* om. ŚŚU.*

24 ŚŚU 452,1–7: *yoñs su śes par bya ba'i dños po gañ ūe na / rtend ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba lugs su 'byuñ ba dan / lugs su myi 'byuñ ba ste / de yañ śes rab kyis śes par bya ba yin bas yoñs su śes par bya ba ūes bya ste / 'dis kun nas ūon moñs pa'i de kho na / ūon moñs pa dan las dan tshe'i mtshan ūid dan / rnam par byañ ba'i de kho na rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba lugs su myi 'byuñ ba'i mtshan ūid kyañ bstan to //.* “What is the subject to be comprehended [in the *sūtra*VE]? [It is] progressive (*anuloma*) and retrogressive (*pratiloma*) dependent arising; because it, moreover, is to be known by discriminating insight

Buddhist position on *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* is unintelligible insofar as “one moment is tied by the iron chains of desire, etc., in the prison of existence, while another, [being] untied, is liberated.”²⁵ Here is Śāntarakṣita’s reply to the objection that the distinction between bondage and liberation is illegitimate:²⁶

[The limbs consisting of] ignorance, etc., are regarded here as bondage inasmuch as they are the effects [of those preceding them] and the causes [of those following them in the series. As for] liberation, it is held to be the mind’s immaculate condition due to the elimination of the [said limbs].²⁷

Kamalaśīla explains:

Nowhere for us are bondage and liberation established as relying on one single [continuous] person, for [according to us, there is] no one [who could be] established as being bound and liberated. It is just that the conditioning factors from ignorance to rebirth and death are conventionally designated as ‘bondage’ inasmuch as they are the causes of the arising of suffering. And thus is it said: ‘Such is the origin of this entire great mass of suffering.’ And what is called ‘liberation’ is the mind’s (*dhī*) immaculate condition once ignorance, etc., have been eliminated due to the knowledge of *tattva*, as is said: ‘Transmigratory existence is nothing but the mind (*citta*) perfumed by defilements such as desire, [while] that very [mind] delivered from these [defilements] is referred to as the end of existence.’²⁸

As we can see, Kamalaśīla’s explanation, though it remains, like Śāntarakṣita’s verse, doctrinally neutral as regards the interpretation of the individual limbs (notably *avidyā*) and their interrelations, clearly resorts to the two opposite sequences of

(*prajñā*), [it] is called ‘[the subject] to be comprehended’; by this is indicated the reality (*tattva*) of the all-pervasive defilements (*sanklesa*)—the defining characteristic of the defilements (*kleśa*), karma, and life (*āyus*)—and the reality of purity (*vyavadāna*)—[that is,] the defining characteristic of retrogressive dependent arising.” Translation Schoening 1995: I.195; see also below, n. 47, and above, nn. 2–3.

25 TS 496ac: *rāgādinigadair baddhah kṣaṇo 'nyo bhavacārake** / *abaddho macyate cānyaḥ [...] //.* *-cārake MSS (Shiga 2022: 154, n. 74): -vārake TSP_K, TSP_S.

26 TSP_K 184,13/TSP_S 162,27–28/TSP_T D ze 256b3: *bandhamokṣavyavasthānam anupapannam*.

27 TS_K 544/TSP_S 543: *kāryakāraṇabhūtāś ca tatrāvidyādayo matāḥ / bandhas tadvigamād iṣṭā** muktir nirmalatā dhiyāḥ //. *iṣṭā TSP_S: iṣṭo TSP_K.

28 TSP_K 184,17–22/TSP_S 162,31–163,7/TSP_T D ze 256b3–6: *na hi kvacid asmākam ekapuruṣādhikaraṇau bandhamokṣau prasiddhau / kasyacid badhyamānasya macyamānasya cāsiddheḥ** / *kevalam avidyādayaḥ saṃskārā jarāmaraṇaparyantā duḥkhotpādahetutayā bandha iti vyavahriyante / tathā coktam evam asya kevalasya mahato** duḥkhaskandhasya samudayo*** bhavati****ti / teṣām cāvidyādīnāṁ tattvajñānād vigatau satyāṁ yā nirmalatā dhiyāḥ sā muktir***** ity ucyate / yathoktaṁ cittam eva hi samsāro rāgādikleśavāśitam / tad eva tair vinirmuktam bhavānta iti kathyata***** iti /.* *cāsiddheḥ TSP_K (TSP_T): yāsiddheḥ TSP_S. **mahato MS J (Shiga 2022: 181, n. 246), TSP_T chen po: heto MS Pā, hetor TSP_K, TSP_S. ***samudayo em. (Shiga 2022: 181, n. 246, TSP_T skye ba[r 'gyur ro]; SBhV): samudāyo TSP_{K/S}. ****See above, n. 23. *****nirmuktir TSP_S (Shiga 2022: 182): muktir TSP_K. *****Unidentified (though ubiquitous) quotation.

dependent origination: whereas the twelve limbs in progressive order are the cause of suffering, i.e., bondage, their gradual elimination on account of *tattvajñāna* is the cause of the cessation of suffering, i.e., liberation.

Let me now consider an excerpt from the TS in which Śāntarakṣita presents what can be regarded as a Dharmakīrtian understanding of the two modes of dependent origination (Kamalaśīla contents himself with a few notes on these important stanzas):

Due to the vision of all *dharma*s being selfless that was revealed by Him [i.e., the Buddha], the multitude of defilements arisen from the personalistic false view cease to exist. The false view of a [substantial] living being comes into existence with the seeing of self and one's own for its aspect, and when the conceit of 'I' and 'mine' is [in activity], all defilements come into existence. Now the counteragent of the false view of a [substantial] living being is this [very] intuition of selflessness. When it has become coessential [to the mind] due to [its] repeated practice, it ceases to exist, and the [whole] mass of the defilements that are rooted in this [false view of a substantial living being] disappears for want of a cause. [But] when this [whole mass of the defilements] is missing, existence (*bhava*), which has it for its cause, does not arise anymore. Complete/definitive release from it²⁹ is what is referred to as 'liberation,' so that (*atas*) the vision of selflessness is the entrance gate to the supreme bliss.³⁰

This passage provides a very good summary of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's views on dependent origination in the TS(P) and fully testifies that, as far as this treatise is concerned (at least provisionally; see below), the two authors fully endorse Dharmakīrti's understanding of ignorance and dependent origination.³¹

Even if *pratīyasamutpāda* related concepts (*anuloma/pratiloma*; twelve limbs) do not explicitly appear, the wording and the syntax of this passage are clearly reminiscent of dependent origination: ablative + *niVRT-* (= *na BHŪ-/niRUDH-*)/*praVRT-* (= *BHŪ-/utPAD-*), locative + (*vi*)*niVRT-/na JAN-* (= *na BHŪ-/niRUDH-*)/*praVRT-* (= *BHŪ-/utPAD-*); *hetu*, *mūla*, *udbhūta-*; *tasminn asati...*, etc. Like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and

29 Note TSP_K 905,13–14/TSP_S 766,7/TSP_T D 'e 314a3: *teṣāṁ kleśānāṁ tasya vā punarbhavasyātyantāṁ punarupattito vimuktih...*, "complete release from the rearising either of these defilements or of rebirth." Cf. NBh 22,1 on NSū 1.1.22: *tena duḥkhenā janmanātyantāṁ vimuktir apavargah* /. NV 81,2: *tena śārīradinā duḥkhenā*tyantiko viyoga iti* /. **duḥkhenā*- MS J[aisalmer]: *duḥkhāntenā*- Ed.

30 TS_K 3488–3492/TS_S 3487–3491/TS_T D ze 127a5–6: *samastadharmanairātmyadarśanāt tatprakāśitāt / satkāyadarśanodbhūtakleśaughasya nivartanam* // *ātmātmīyadṛgākārasattvadrṣṭih pravartate** / *ahaṁ mame tīrtha** kleśo 'śeṣaḥ pravartate* // *sattvadrkpratyānikam ca tan nairātmyanadarśanam* / *abhyāsāt sātmyam āyāte tasmin sā vinivartate* // *tanmūlakleśarāśiś ca hetvabhāvāt prahīyate**** / *tasminn asati taddhetur na punar jāyate bhavaḥ* // *tadatyantavimokṣṭi**** apavargaḥ***** ca kīrtiyate / advitīyaśivadvāram ato nairātmyadarśanam* /. *Note TS_T /*bdag* dañ *bdag* *gir* 'dzin *lta can* / *yod pa'i stobs la* 'jug par 'gyur/; *stobs la* is certainly to be emended, perhaps to *lta ba*. **Note TS_T *na rgyal gyis*, suggesting *mānena*. ****prahīyate* em. (TS_T *med par 'gyur*); cf. TS_K *pratī(hī?)yate*: *pratīyate* TS_{K/S}. ****-*vinirmuktir* em. (McClintock 2010: 220, n. 530) TSP_{K/S}, TSP_T (*rnam grol ba*): -*vinirmukter* TS_{K/S}. *****Cf. NSū 1.1.22: *tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargah* (TSP_K 905,14/TSP_S 766,8).

31 See Eltschinger 2010a: 28–48 and Eltschinger 2014: 278–292.

Kamalaśīla regard the personalistic belief (*satkāyadrṣṭi-darśana*) as the root-cause (*mūla*, *nidāna*, *hetu*) of all defilements,³² hence of entanglement in *samsāra* and suffering.³³ Their vocabulary is as rich as Dharmakīrti's and earlier accounts: belief in/false view (*drṣṭi*, *darśana*, *graha*) of self and one's own (*ātmātmīya*; i.e., what supposedly belongs to the pseudo-self), of a (substantial) living being (*sattva*), etc. The mass/magnitude (*ogha*, *rāśi*, *gaṇāḥ*) of the defilements and minor defilements (*kleśopakleśa*, *doṣa*) include desire (manifesting as [*ākāreṇa*] attachment [*abhiṣvāṅga*]), hostility (*dveṣa*, manifesting as malice [*pratīghāta*]), delusion (*moha*, manifesting as self and one's own [*ātmātmīya*]), conceit (*māna*, manifesting as pride [*unnati*]), arrogance (*mada*), envy (*īrṣyā*), stinginess (*mātsarya*), etc.³⁴ Though in outline, this accounts well for the progressive sequence of dependent origination, i.e., for ignorance and craving as the remote and proximate causes of suffering, which Kamalaśīla variously describes as rebirth, etc. (*jātyādi*), *samsāra*, and the threefold suffering consisting in physical and/or psychological pain, change (for worse) and being conditioned (*samskārādidiukhātritaya*).³⁵ As for the reverse order, which defines Buddhism as a medicine, it relies on the identification (and subsequent cultivation) of the antidote or counteragent (*pratipakṣa*, *pratyānika*, *bādhaka*) of the (remote) cause of defilements and suffering, the personalistic false view. How to determine the nature of this antidote? According to Kamalaśīla, who relies here on Deven-drabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's elaborations on PV 2.133cd–136,³⁶

from knowing the nature of the cause [of defilements], one distinctly ascertains that the antidote to this [cause] is that thing (*vastu*) that has an object-support and an aspect that are contrary (*viparītālambanākāra*) to it. Now, the vision of selflessness is [its] antidote since it has an object-support and an aspect that are contrary to that.³⁷

In other words, the vision of selflessness and the false view of a self are in a relation of mutual contrariety/annulment (*bādhyabādhakabhāva*), of counteragency

32 TSP_K 906,21/TSP_S 767,14/TSP_T D 'e 315a3: *kleśamūlam sattvadṛṣṭir eva* /.

33 *Samsāra* is defined as the five transmigratory destinies (*gati*) in TS_K 3350/TS_S 3549, listed in TSP_K 916,1–3/TSP_S 775,2–4/TSP_T D 'e 320b1 thereon (*narakapretatiryagdevamanuṣyabhedena pañcagatyātmakah samsārah*). For eloquent (though pretty standard) descriptions of suffering in the five destinies, see BhK 1.188,6–189,8 (Adam 2002: 118–120) and BhK 2.7,14–11,1 (Adam 2002: 183; see Goshima 1983: 8 for Sanskrit parallels).

34 See TSP_K 872,16–17/TSP_S 739,15–16/TSP_T D 'e 287a6–7.

35 See TSP_K 872,1–4/TSP_S 738,31–739,3/TSP_T D 'e 286b6–287a1.

36 See Eltschinger 2005: 401–405, and especially PVP D *che* 56a5–6/P *che* 64a2–3 (Eltschinger 2005: 402, n. 32) with PVṬ P ū 143b5 (Eltschinger 2005: 402, n. 32); see also Eltschinger 2009: 48–49, and Eltschinger 2014: 253–254.

37 TSP_K 873,22–24/TSP_S 740,16–18/TSP_T D 'e 288b1–2: [...] *hetusvarūpajñānād eva yat tadviparītālambanākāraṁ vastu sa tasya pratipakṣa iti sphuṭam avasīyata eva / nairātmyadarśanāṁ ca tatra viparītālambanākāratvāt pratipakṣaḥ [...] /.*

(*vipakṣapratipakṣabhbāva*),³⁸ contradictory with each other (*anyonyavirodha*), so that the repeated practice of that thing whose nature is contradictory to the cause of the defilements (*svahetuviruddhasvabhāvapadārthābhyaśa*) is the means to eliminate them (*kṣayopāya*).³⁹ Teaching selflessness, the true antidote of evil, is what distinguishes the Buddha from all other teachers:

[The Blessed One,] having pointed out that evil (*adharma*) consists of [defilements] such as desire and what[ever] originates from them, taught, in order to eliminate it, that [its] antidote is nothing but the perception of selflessness inasmuch as it is contradictory to its cause, the perception of a self; but contrary to treatises such as [those] of Kapila, etc., he did not teach [physical practices] such as ablutions and fire oblation, which are not [in the least] contradictory to the [purely psychological] cause of [evil].⁴⁰

2 On the Relationships between the Individual Limbs

To the best of my knowledge, Kamalaśila commits himself only once concerning the type of relations obtaining between the twelve limbs of dependent origination, and

38 See TSP_K 874,21–23/TSP_S 741,8–11/TSP_T D 'e 289a7–b2.

39 See TSP_K 873,19–22/TSP_S 740,13–15/TSP_T D 'e 288a7–b1. Note also ŚSūT 464,12–465,4: *ma rig pa las stsogs pa 'gag pa yāñ rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba žes ji skad du bya / smras pa / 'di ni ñes pa myed do // 'dir de myed par dgag pa la ni / ma rig pa las stsogs pa dgag pa žes brjod par byas pa ma yin kyi / sman bcud kyis len zos pa bžin du / lam goms par byas pa'i stobs kyis / ma rig pa dañ myi 'thun ba'i gnas 'byuñ ba' // gañ rig pa skye ba de ni 'dir ma rig pa 'gag pa žes bya ste / 'dir ram / 'dis ma yin bar gyur pa brjod par byas pa / ma rig pa las stsogs pa 'gag pa'i phyir ro // de bas na goñ nas goñ du 'du byed las stsogs pa dañ / myi 'thun ba'i gnas 'byuñ ba ñid 'dir 'du byed la stsogs pa 'gag par blta'o //.* “[Objection:] Though ignorance and so forth ceases, ‘dependent arising’ is [still] called thus, [‘dependent arising,’ even when there is cessation, not arising]. Answer: This is without fault. Here, the statement that ignorance and so forth ceases is not an existential negation, but, just like taking a medicinal elixir, by the power of having cultivated the path, the arising knowledge (*vidyā*), which is the antidote to ignorance, is here called ‘ignorance ceases’; because on this or by this [Noble Path], ignorance and so forth, which was called ‘that which comes to an end,’ ceases. Therefore, it will be seen that the conditioning factors and so forth [up the list of twelve components] cease at the very arising of the antidotes of conditioning factors and so forth.” Translation Schoening 1995: I.223. On the meaning of *paryudāsa*- vs. *prasajyapratiṣedha* in this context, see Schoening 1995: I.91 and 223, n. 3.

40 TSP_K 878,8–11/TSP_S 744,1–3/TSP_T D 'e 302a6–7: [...] *rāgādirūpam tatprabhavañ cā**dharmaṁ** uddiṣya tatprahāñāya tannidānātmadarśanavirodhena nairātmyadarśanam eva pratipakṣo deśito na tu kapilādiśāstravat tannidānāviruddhaḥ snānāgnihotrādir upadiṣṭaḥ /. *cā- em. (TSP_T dañ; cf. PVSV 109,1–2): vā- TSP_K/TSP_S. **dharmaṁ em. (TSP_T *chos ma yin pa*): dharmaṁ TSP_K/TSP_S. Cf. PVSV 109,1–3 and Eltschinger 2007: 105–109 and 223.*

this not in the TSP, but in the ŚŚūṭ. Let me briefly review it here before turning to Kamalaśīla's views as a Mādhyamika thinker:

Here the first three [of the twelve components of dependent arising: ignorance, conditioning factors, and consciousness] are the projecting components (*ākṣepakāṅga*). Name-and-form, the six sense-bases, contact, and feeling are the projected components (*ākṣiptāṅga*). Craving, attachment, and existence are the manifesting components (*abhinirvartakāṅga*). Birth is the manifested component (*abhinirvṛtyaṅga*). Old age and death is the affliction component (*ādinavāṅga*). In that case, the projecting component indicates the distant cause (*vidūrahetu*). The manifesting component indicates the proximate cause (*āsannahetu*). Without those two, birth will not occur, therefore [the cause] is taught to be two-fold. By karma, which arose from the cause of ignorance, infecting (*parihāvita*) consciousness, birth is projected into the future. Then, because craving and attachment activate that karma, birth will become manifest. Therefore, because from that which projects and that which is projected and [from] that which [causes manifestation and that which] is manifested comes affliction, because only twelve components have been indicated, there were precisely twelve components, neither more nor less. Earlier, intermediate, and later are, respectively, two, eight, and two; in that [connection], others state the components by positing in three groups as just mentioned in order to counter delusion.^{41,42}

As noted by Schoening, Kamalaśīla refers here to two alternative models whose *loci classici* are Asaṅga's AS and Vasubandhu's AK(Bh).⁴³ Following Kritzer's terminology, the first, Yogācāra model,⁴⁴ entails "two lifetimes and one round of causation," whereas the second, which predominantly belongs to the

41 According to AK 3.25cd and AKBh 133,20–134,4 (La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931: II.67–68), this second model, or "Three-lifetimes/Twofold Causation System" (see below), is aimed at getting rid of delusion (*sammoha*) concerning the past, the future, and the present.

42 ŚŚūṭ 465,9–466,8: 'di la dañ po gsum ni 'phen pa'i yan* lag go // myiñ dañ gzugs dañ skye mched drug dañ / reg pa dañ tshor ba rnams ni 'phañs pa'i yan lag go // sred pa dañ len pa dañ srid pa dag ni mñon par sgrub pa'i yan lag go // skye ba ni mñon par bsgrubs pa'i yan lag go // rga śi ni ñes dmigs kyi yan lag go // de la 'phen pa'i yan lag gis ni riñ ba'i rgyu bsthan to // mñon bar bsgrub pa'i yan lag gis ni ñe ba'i rgyu bsthand to // de gñis myed na skye ba 'grub par myi 'gyur te / de bas na rnam pa gñis su bśad do // ma rig pa'i rgyu las byuñ ba'i las kyis rnam par śes pa la bsgos pas / ma 'oñs pa na skye ba 'phañs par 'gyur ro // de nas sred pa dañ len pa gñis kyis las de bskul pas skye ba mñon par 'grub par 'gyur te / de bas na gañ gis gañ 'phen ciñ 'phañs pa de yan / gañ gis grub pa de las ñe dmigs su 'gyur bas yan lag bcu gñis kho nar bstan pa'i phyir yan lag bcu gñis ñid du gyurd te / myi ñuñ myi mañ ño // gžan dag ni sñia ma dañ bar ma dañ phyi ma rnams su gñis dañ brgyad dañ gñis go rims bžind te / de la rmoñs pa rnam par bzlog pa'i phyir bstand par dum bu gsum du rnam par 'jog pas yan lag rnams brjod do //. *yan em.: yan Ed. Translation Schoening 1995: I.224–225.

43 Schoening 1995: I.91. See AK 3.20 and AKBh 131,3–16 (La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931: II.60–62). I refrain here from providing any explanation concerning the well-known second model. Kamalaśīla's passing mention of it likely reflects his general aversion for Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika ideas.

44 For a Yogācāra-cum-ālayavijñāna account of this model, see La Vallée Poussin 1928–1929: II.481–501; for a genealogy of this model, see Kritzer 1999: 67–92.

Sarvāstivāda,⁴⁵ involves “three lifetimes and two rounds of causation.”⁴⁶ Both models distribute the twelve limbs into “defilement” (*kleśa* = *avidyā*, *trṣṇā*, *upādāna*), “action” (*karman* = *saṃskāra*, *bhava*), and “(re)birth” (*janman* [or “result,” *phala*, or “substance,” *vastu*] = *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, *saḍāyatana*, *sparśa*, *vedanā*, *jāti*, *jarāmarana*).⁴⁷ According to the “Yogācāra” model, *avidyā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna* (“projecting members”) as well as *trṣṇā*, *upādāna*, and *bhava* (“actualizing members”) belong to one life, whereas *nāmarūpa*, *saḍāyatana*, *sparśa*, and *vedanā* (“projected members”) as well as *jāti* and *jarāmarana* (“actualized members”) belong to the next life.⁴⁸ What the projecting members – “consciousness impregnated by actions preceded by ignorance of the [Noble] Truths”⁴⁹ – are projecting are in fact not the actual *nāmarūpa*, *saḍāyatana*, *sparśa*, and *vedanā*, but their seeds (*bīja*), i.e., future birth in a purely virtual form. For these seeds to be actualized in the next life, the present-life actualizing members, i.e., the *vijñāna* under the sway of craving and clinging, are required, which actualize birth, old age, and death “in a group of beings that is distinguished [according to] the various destinies, classes of beings, etc.”⁵⁰ If I understand well, this amounts to Kamalaśīla’s statement to the effect that, “[b]y karma, which arose from the cause of ignorance, infecting consciousness, birth is projected into the future. Then, because craving and attachment activate that karma, birth will become manifest.”⁵¹ According to the ASBh, “mention of birth and old age and death [is made] for the sake of [causing] aversion by referring to the three characteristics of conditioned things.”⁵²

45 See Kritzer 1999: 69. Does the interlinear gloss ascribe this position to the “Śrāvaka Sautrāntikas” (*ñan thos mdo sde pa dag*)? See Schoening 1995: I.225, n. 1.

46 Kritzer 1999: 71 and 69, respectively. Kritzer (1999: 90) also names the first model “The Two-lifetimes/Singlefold Causation System.” This model is alluded to in AKBh 131,16–18 (La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931: II.62).

47 In ŚŚūT 452,4–5 (Schoening 1995: I.195 [see above, n. 24]; see also p. 90), Kamalaśīla regards “pollution” (*saṅkleśa*) as consisting (*lakṣaṇa*) of defilement (*kleśa*), *karman*, and *āyus* (tib. *tshe*). See La Vallée Poussin 1913: 35–36, AK 3.26ab and La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931: II.68; on the various classifications of *vijñāna* (“fruitional” [Kritzer; *pratisandhivijñāna*] in the Sarvāstivāda system and Xuanzang’s *Siddhi* [La Vallée Poussin 1928–1929: II.482], but of causal character in the AS), see Kritzer 1999: 68–69.

48 Kritzer 1999: 71, and AS 26,7–9 in Kritzer 1999: 28.

49 According to ASBh 31,13–14: (*anāgatajanmābhinirvṛttaye*) *satyeṣv ajñānapūrvakeṇa karmanā cittavāsanārthena*, translation Kritzer 1999: 28.

50 ASBh 31,20–21: *antarasmīn gatiyon yādibhedabhinne nikāyasabhāge*, translation Kritzer 1999: 29.

51 See above, n. 42.

52 ASBh 31,21–32,1: *jātijarāmaranāvacaṇam saṃskṛtalakṣaṇatrayādhikāreṇodvejanārtham*, translation Kritzer 1999: 30.

3 Dependent Origination in the Madhyamakālaṅkāra(pañjikā) and Bhāvanākramas

Kamalaśīla's understanding of dependent origination as a Mādhyamika philosopher raises more problems than his position in the TSP. He is the author of a lengthy treatise, the *Madhyamakāloka*, of which important parts remain unedited and unstudied. As for his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's MA, it consists of discontinuous notes on selected terms and passages and hardly reflects its author's opinion. To show that, at least in the passages of interest to me, Kamalaśīla's Mādhyamika thought does not significantly differ from Śāntarakṣita's, I shall quote somewhat lengthy excerpts from Kamalaśīla's BhKs. These testify to the latter's strong indebtedness to Śāntarakṣita's thought and dialectical strategy in the MA, although the actual and/or ideal audiences of the two works must have been fairly different.

In MA 2–62, Śāntarakṣita mercilessly applies the “neither-one-nor-many” (*ekāneka*) argument to the allegedly real entities (atoms, etc.) postulated by the Vaiśeśikas, the Vaibhāśikas and the Sautrāntikas. This critical analysis reveals that all entities, since their natures are neither unitary nor multiple, are ultimately essenceless. “As a consequence,” says Śāntarakṣita, “these entities have a purely conventional character.”⁵³ According to him, “since all entities are unable to withstand critical analysis (*vicārākṣama*) by the aforementioned argument (*yukti*), they just have the nature of being fine when not analyzed (*avicāraramaṇīya*), like magically created elephants, horses, and men.”⁵⁴ But, one may object, “isn't this conventional nature [mere] nonexistence (*abhāva*?)? If it is [just] nonexistence, it is contradictory with [these entities' empirically] observed (*drṣṭa*) and [generally] accepted (*iṣṭa*) causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*).”⁵⁵ MA 64 is intended as an answer to this criticism: “One should understand that conventional [truth] (*saṃvṛti*) is in essence (1) that which is fine only when not analyzed (*avicāraikaramaṇīya*?), (2) that which is characterized by arising and destruction (*utpattivināśadharma*?), and (3) that which

53 MA 63ab: */de phyir dños po 'di dag ni/ /kun rdzob kho na'i mtshan ñid 'dzin/*. For translations, see Ichigo 1985, CXLII = 1989: 213 and Blumenthal 2004: 139.

54 MAV 196,6–8: *ji skad bśad pa'i rigs pa dag gis dños po thams cad ni brtag mi bzod pa'i phyir ma brtags na ñams dga' ba kho na'i bdag ñid kyi ṇo bo 'dzin te / sgyu ma'i glaṇ po che daṇ rta daṇ mi la sog pa bžin no //*.

55 MAV 202,1–3: *'o na ci ste kun rdzob kyi ṇo bo 'di ci dños po med pa yin nam / gal te 'di dños po med pa yin na ni mthoṇ ba daṇ 'dod pa'i don byed pa daṇ 'gal lo že na /*. Here are Kamalaśīla's rather insignificant comments on *drṣṭa* and *iṣṭa* (MAP 203,20–21): *mthoṇ ba ni mig gi rnam par śes pa la sog pas ñams su myoṇ ba'i phyir ro // 'dod pa ni ji ltar ñams su myoṇ ba bžin ṇes pa'i phyir ro //*. Let it be reminded here that causal efficacy is the hallmark of existence in Dharmakīrti's system.

is capable of producing an effect(/fulfilling [human] expectations, *arthakriyāsa-martha?*).⁵⁶ As Eckel and others have pointed out, Śāntarakṣita's threefold characterization of conventional reality is likely indebted to slightly earlier Mādhyamika thinkers,⁵⁷ and has become standard in later accounts of conventional truth.⁵⁸ According to him, correct/true convention (*yañ dag pa'i kun rdzob, samyaksamvṛti?*), far from owing just to verbal convention (*śabdavyavahāra?*), consists in the empirically observable and generally accepted dependently originated entities.⁵⁹ As Kamalaśīla emphasizes in BhK 1,

56 MA 64: /ma brtags gcig pu ŋams dga' źin/ /skye dañ 'jig pa'i chos can pa/ /don byed pa dag nus rnam kyi/ /rañ bžin kun rdzob yin rtogs/. My translation is indebted to Ichigo 1985, CXLI 213; see also Blumenthal 2004: 141.

57 See Eckel 1987: 40–43 and Tillemans 2016: 12 and 23. In his TAV, Śrīgupta (late 7th c.?) states that a conventionally real entity “satisfies only when it is not analyzed; from such a thing something else seems to arise, and such things produce just this kind of effective action” (TAV, D ha 41b1: /ma brtags gcig pu ŋams dga' ste/ /de 'dra las byuñ de bžin no/ /dños po de dag de lta bu'i/ /don bya de dañ de byed do/. Translation Eckel 1987: 63, n. 49). Jñānagarbha (early 8th c.?) also claims that “[the relative] corresponds to appearances, so it must not be analyzed. Something is contradicted if, when analyzed, it turns out to be something else. [Objection:] Explain why one thing appears to be caused by another? [Reply:] It is just that one thing appears to be caused by another. What more is there to say?” (SDV vv. 21–22: /ji ltar snañ bžin ḋo bo'i phyir/ /'di la dpyad pa mi 'jug gol/ /rnam par dpyod pa byed na don/ /gžan du soñ bas gnod par 'gyur/ /ci yi phyir na rgyu 'di las/ /der snañ ba 'di smra bar byos/ /'di 'dra 'di ni rgyu 'di las/ /snañ ste ci źig smra bar bya/. Translation Eckel 1987: 41; see Śāntarakṣita's useful *Pañjikā* on these two stanzas in SDVP 122,6–123,2.) Jñānagarbha's ideas on causation are reminiscent of Candrakīrti's. In the PrP, the latter states that “the world, not having launched an investigation (*vicāra*) [into whether things arise] from self [or] other, etc., presumes [merely] this much: an effect arises from a cause” (PrP_{LVP} 27,4–5 = PrP_{AMD} 171,2–4: *loko* [...] *svataḥ parata ityevamādikam* *vicāram anavatārya kāraṇāt kāryam utpadyata ity etāvanmātram pratipannaḥ* //, translation MacDonald 2015: I.99; see also Eckel 1987: 63, n. 49, also referring to MAV 6.35, on which see La Vallée Poussin 1910: 315).

58 Eckel refers to (1) the Deutero-Bhāviveka/Bhavya's (?) MRP 1.4 (D tsha 260a2): /snañ ba tsam gyi* kun rdzob yin/ /chu ſiñ gi ni phuñ po bžin/ /ma brtags ŋams dga'i mtshan ŋid can/ /rgyu las skyes dañ don byed nus/. *gyi em.: gyis D. “The [genuine] relative truth of the confined outlook /Is, however, like the pith of plantain (*kadalīskandha*) /When you do not examine it, it affords pleasure. /And it is causally produced and efficient.” Translation Lindtner 1981: 170, quoted in Eckel 1987, 137–138, n. 104. (2) Atīśa's (982–1054) SDA v. 3: /ma brtags gcig pu ŋams dga' ba'i/ /skye ba dañ ni 'jig pa'i chos/ /don byed nus dañ ldan pa ni/ /yari dag kun rdzob yin par 'dod/. “A phenomenon (*dharma*) which arises and is destroyed, which only satisfies when it is not analyzed (*avicāraramaṇīya*), and is capable of efficiency (*arthakriyāsāmarthyavat*)—is maintained to be genuine relative truth.” Translation Lindtner 1981: 193, quoted in Eckel 1987: 63, n. 49.

59 See MAV 204,1–3. In MAP 205,2–3, Kamalaśīla mentions *iśvarādi* as an example of “incorrect convention” (*log pa'i kun rdzob, mithyāsamvṛti?*). Note also MAV 210,16–18, where causally efficacious entities are regarded as correct/true convention, whereas pseudo-entities such as the *pudgala* are mere words (*śabdamātra*).

that which has no cause even at the conventional level does not arise even at the conventional level, like a rabbit's horn, etc. But it is certainly the case that, even if it is ultimately unreal, that which has [such a cause] arises [at the conventional level], like a magical illusion, a reflection, etc. And it does not follow that a magical illusion, etc., is ultimately real if it is dependently originated at the conventional level, because it does not withstand critical analysis. Therefore, the entire world is comparable to a magical illusion.⁶⁰

In MA 65–66ab, Śāntarakṣita also makes clear that “even that which is fine when not analyzed implies the production of similar successive effects conditioned by their own successive causes. Therefore, it is also correct to say that it would be impossible for conventional truth to be causeless.”⁶¹ It is simply so that the causes (*svahetu*) in dependence on which these entities arise are just fine only when they are left unanalyzed.⁶² However, critical analysis has made abundantly clear that entities are

60 BhK 1.218,20–219,2: *yasya saṃvṛtyāpi kāraṇam nāsti sa saṃvṛtyāpi notpadyate / yathā śaśaviṣāṇādi / yasya tu vidyate sa paramārthato 'līko 'pi samutpadyata eva / yathā māyāpratibimbādi / na ca māyādeḥ saṃvṛtyā pratītyasamutpāde paramārthato vastutvaprasaṅgaḥ / tasya vicārākṣamatvāt / ataḥ sarvam eva māyopamāṇ jagat /*. See also Adam 2002: 149. Dependently originated entities and pseudo-entities of the type of a rabbit's horn are also contrasted in MAP 205,6–7: *rten ciṇ 'brel par 'byuṇ ba'i dños po rnams kho na don dam pa'i rai bžin daṇ bral ba'i phyir stoṇ pa žes bya'i ri boṇ gi rwa daṇ 'dra ba'i bdag ūid kyi phyir ni ma yin no //*. “Dependently originated entities are termed ‘empty’ because they are devoid of an ultimately real own nature, but not because they are (-ātman) comparable to a rabbit's horn.”

61 MA 65–66ab: */brtags pa ma byas ūams dga' ba'aṇ / bdag rgyu sṇa ma sṇa ma la / brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yin / 'bras bu de 'dra 'byuṇ ba yin / de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med na / ruṇ min žes pa'aṇ legs pa yin /*. Translation Ichigo 1985, CXLII ≈ 1989: 213, modified; see also Blumenthal 2004: 143. Note also MA 84–87: */rgyu daṇ 'bras bu'i dños po ni / kun rdzob tu ni mi bzlog pas / /kun nas ūon moṇs rnam dbyaṇ sogs / rnam par gžag pa 'khrugs pa med / 'di ltar rgyu daṇ 'bras bu yin / chos 'di rnam par gžag pas na / /tshogs rnams dri ma med pa yaṇ / gžuṇ 'di ūid la ruṇ ba yin / rnam par dag pa'i rgyu las ni / 'bras bu rnam par dag pa 'byuṇ / [...] de bžin rnam pa dag ma yin las / 'bras bu rnam dag ma yin 'byuṇ / [...].* “Since causal relation is not denied in conventional truth, there is no confusion as to the distinction between defilement (*saṅklesa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*). Indeed, since the law of causal relation has been established, it is also possible in our system [to gather] the pure equipment [of merit and wisdom; *punyañānasambhāra*]. A pure effect results from a pure cause. [...] Likewise, an impure [effect] results from an impure [cause]. [...]” Translation Ichigo 1985, CXLIV ≈ 1989: 219–221; see also Blumenthal 2004: 164. Note also BhK 2.55,8–11: [...] 'di sñam du chos 'di dag thams cad don dam par ūo bo ūid med pa ūid yin du zin kyaṇ / kun rdzob tu rnam par gnas pa ūid do de lta ma yin na las daṇ 'bras bu 'brel pa la sogs pa ji ltar rnam par gnas par 'gyur / bcom ldan 'das kyis kyaṇ dños po skye ba kun rdzob tu dam pa'i don du raṇ bžin med ces bka' stsal to //.

“[The yogin] thinks [as follows]: ‘All these *dharmas*, although they are ultimately devoid of own nature, do subsist conventionally. Otherwise, how would the relationship between action and result, etc., be established?’ The Blessed One has also said: ‘Entities arise conventionally, [but] in reality they are devoid of own nature.’” For parallels and hypothetical sources, see Goshima 1983: 57; see also Adam 2002: 213.

62 According to MAV 210,18–19: *de lta bu de la yaṇ brjod pa'i tshul gyis brtags pas dpyad mi bzod pa'i rai gi rgyu la brten nas 'byuṇ na rgyu med par ji ltar 'gyur /*. Note MAP 211,16–17: *brjod pa'i tshul gyis žes bya ba ni gcig daṇ du ma'i rai bžin stoṇ pa ūid du bstan pas so //*.

ultimately devoid of own nature. As Śāntarakṣita himself says, “ultimately, even subtle entities cannot (*anupapanna*) be established (*pariniṣpanna*) because they are devoid either of a unitary or of a multiple nature in the way pointed out above.”⁶³ Now essenceless entities cannot be said to be dependently originated or to produce any effect. This is why Śāntarakṣita, combining the result of logical arguments (*pramāṇaphala*) and the meaning of scriptures (*āgamārtha*),⁶⁴ claims that “there is no entity that can be established in reality. Because of that the *tathāgatas* preached the non-production (*anutpāda*) of all *dharmas*.”⁶⁵ As Kamalaśīla has it, “the meaning [of Śāntarakṣita’s verse] is thus that the blessed *buddhas* have said that, since no entity whatsoever is established in reality, all *dharmas* are unarisen (*anutpanna*).”⁶⁶

In his BhKs, Kamalaśīla devotes considerable space to showing that entities are ultimately unarisen. According to him, “the real/true nature of entities should be [mentally] cultivated after one has analyzed [it] through the insight born of reflection [operating] by means of reasoning and scripture. Now, entities’ [real/true] nature is ascertained by both scripture and reasoning as being ultimately unarisen.”⁶⁷ After quoting from various authorities (*Āryadharmaśaṅgīti*, *Āryabuddhaśaṅgīti*, *Āryasatyadvayavibhāga*, *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Hastikakṣyasūtra* [BhK 1.200,5–6 = MAV 222,16–19], *Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra* [BhK 1.200,7–9 = MAV 228,8–12]), Kamalaśīla resumes his analysis:

[The real/true nature of entities] had first to be analyzed in this way by means of scripture. But since the meaning of scripture cannot be denied by opponents [when it has been] corroborated by reason(ing), [the real/true nature of entities] has to be analyzed by means of reason(ing) as well. The reason(ing) [in question] is briefly stated here. The arising of [real] things could be either without a cause or with a cause. To begin with, [their arising can]not [be] causeless, because one observes that they are [purely] occasional. Indeed, since they do not differ [insofar as they are] independent of [any] cause (Tib. *rgyu la mi ltos par bye brag med pa'i phyir*), why would [these] things not appear (*bhaveyuh*, Tib. *'byuñi*) everytime and everywhere in [exactly] the same way as [they appear] at the time of [their empirically observable] arising? Or, since they are not different from [what they are at] the time when they do not exist, they cannot appear (Tib. *'byuñi bar mi rigs so*) at all even at the

63 MAV 222,5–6: *yañ dag par na dños po phra rab kyañ yoñs su grub par mi 'thad de / ji ltar bstan pa'i tshul gyis gcig dañ du ma'i rañ bžin dañ bral ba'i phyir ro //.*

64 According to MAP 223,2–4: *'dis ni tshad ma'i 'bras bu luñ gi don dañ sbyar ba'am / luñ gi don tshad ma'i 'bras bu dañ sbyor bar byed do //.*

65 MA 69: */de phyir yañ dag ñid du na/ dños po gañ yañ grub pa med/ /de phyir de bžin gšegs rnams kyis/ /chos rnams thams cad ma skyes gsuñs/*. Translation Ichigo 1985, CXLII ≈ 1989: 215; see also Blumenthal 2004: 146.

66 MAP 223,4–7: *des na don ni gañ gi phyir dños po 'ga' yañ yañ dag par bsgrub pa med pa de'i phyir chos thams cad ma skyes pa'o žes bya [ba] sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyis gsuñs so žes bya ba 'di yin no //.*

67 BhK 1.198,19–199,2: *tasmāc cintāmayyā prajñayā yuktyāgamābhyañ pratyavekṣya bhūtam eva vastusvarūpam bhāvanāyam / vastūnām svarūpam ca paramārthato 'nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaś ca niścitam /.*

time of [their expected] arising. Thus, to begin with, [their arising] cannot be causeless. Nor [can they be endowed] with a cause, for, to begin with, they are not born from a permanent cause such as God [as it is] postulated by the non-Buddhists, because one observes that [they arise] in succession. Now [something] whose cause is complete (*vikalakāraṇa*, Tib. *rgyu ma tshai ba med pa'i rgyu'i 'bras bu*) cannot arise in succession, because it does not depend [on anything]. Nor does God, etc., [which is causally] capable by itself, depend on [anything] else, because it cannot be provided any assistance by other [things] inasmuch as it is permanent[, hence immutable], and because one cannot depend on [something] that does not provide [any] assistance. As a consequence, because they are empty of any [causal] capacity, [pseudo-causes] such as God are just as essenceless as the son of a barren woman, etc., for an entity is causally capable [by definition] (*arthakriyāsamarthatvāt*, Tib. *dhiś po ni don byed nus pa'i mtshan ūid yin na*). As [has just been] examined, these [entities] have no capacity to [produce] any effect in succession. Nor [does such an entity have a capacity to produce it all] at once, for, having produced all of its effect at one time, if it were capable of producing [it according to its very essence], then [its] effect would arise (*utpattiprasaṅgah*, Tib. *skyē bar 'gyur ro*) after this just as [it did] before since [its causally] capable nature would continue [unaffected]. Or if it did not continue, it would turn out to be impermanent due to the loss of its previous nature. Therefore, there is no entity that can be said to be permanent. [...] As a consequence, these [entities] cannot arise from a permanent [cause]. Nor [can they arise] from an impermanent [cause], for, to begin with, inasmuch as [what is] past and [what is] future with regard to them is not real (*avastu*), they cannot be produced by it (*na tāvat tato janma yuktam*, Tib. *de las skyes ūes bya ba mi ruṇ ūo*), because they would turn out to be causeless. Nor [can they be born] from [something] present, because neither contemporary nor noncontemporary [entities] can be produced by it. To explain: to begin with, that which is contemporary [with it cannot be produced by it], because the effect would be as established (*niśpanna*, *grub pa*) as the nature of [its] cause inasmuch as it would occur simultaneously with it. Nor [can] that which is not contemporary [with it be produced by it], because if it arose with an interval of time (*kālāntaravyavādhāna*), it could be born from [something] past, etc. (*atītādeḥ*, Tib. *'das pa la sog pa las*). [And] even if it were born [from a noncontemporary cause] without any interval [of time], if it were entirely contiguous [with the cause], then, since all moments would be included in a single moment, an aeon would have the [same] duration of a [single] moment—as a composite whole (*piṇḍa*) would have the size of a [single] atom if an atom aggregated [with another] in its entirety. But if [it were only] partly [contiguous with the cause], then it would [inevitably] follow that a [single] moment would have parts. [Moreover, these entities] do not arise from themselves, because this hypothesis is included in the 'causeless' hypothesis, and because it is contradictory [for entities] to operate on themselves. Nor are they born from both [themselves and others], for the two [types of] problems raised by both theses would follow. Therefore, these things are ultimately unarisen, but since [their] arising conventionally exists, there is no contradiction with scripture, etc. And thus spoke the Blessed One: '[Although] entities do conventionally arise, they are ultimately essenceless. The error concerning essenceless entities is [to be] regarded as 'convention.' And such was the reason(ing) intended by the Blessed One in [sūtras] such as the *Śālistamba*, because a production by themselves, by others, by both [themselves and others] and without a cause is negated [there].⁶⁸

68 BhK 1.200,9–202,8 (BhK 1_T D ki 28b6–29b5): *evaṁ tāvad āgamataḥ pratyavekṣaṇīyam / yuktyā hi sthīrīkṛtasyāgamaṁarthasyānyair** *apohitum aśakyatvāt / ato yuktyāpi pratyavekṣaṇīyam / tatra saṅkṣepato yuktir ucyate / utpādo bhāvānām ahetuko vā syāt sahetuko vā / na tāvad ahetukaḥ kādācitkatvadarśanāt / kāraṇānapekṣā hi viśeṣābhāvād utpādakālavat sadā sarvatraiva ca bhāvāḥ kim na bhaveyuh / abhāvakālād aviśeṣād vā utpādakāle 'pi naiva bhaveyuh / evaṁ tāvan na nirhetuko*

Now, do the conventional, dependently originated entities merely consist of the mind and concomitant mental factors (*cittacaitta*), or are they also external (*bāhya*) to the mind?⁶⁹ According to Śāntarakṣita, “that which is cause and effect is nothing but cognition.”⁷⁰ In other words, idealism, or mind-only, provides the most consistent description of conventional reality, a position already endorsed by earlier “Yogācāra-Mādhyamika” philosophers such as Śrīgupta and Jñānagarbha. But the Yogācāra analysis that discards external entities does not go far enough in that it does not question the very existence of the mind. Subjecting the mind to the same critical investigation as external entities, i.e., asking whether it ultimately has a unitary or a multiple nature, is Śāntarakṣita’s last philosophical step, which he spells out in the famous v. 92: “Based on [the standpoint of] mind-only one must know the

yuktaḥ / nāpi sahetukah / tathā hi yas tāvad** īśvarādis tīrthikair nityo hetuḥ kalpitas tato bhāvā na jāyante krameṇotpādadarśanāt / na tv avikalakāraṇasya krameṇotpādo yukto nirapekṣatvāt / nāpiśvarādeḥ svayaṁ samarthyasya parāpekṣā / nityatvena parair anupakāryatvāt*** / anupakāriṇi cāpekṣā'yogāt / ata evesvarādīnām sarvasāmarthyāśūnyatvād vandhyaputrādivan niḥsvabhāvatvam eva / arthakriyāsamarthatvād vastunāḥ / teṣāṁ kvacid api kārye na krameṇa sāmarthyām yathā**** vicāritam / nāpi yaugapadyena / tathā hi sarvakāryām sakṛd utpādyottarakāle 'pi yady utpattisamartha evāsau***** tadā punar api samarthaśvabhāvānuvṛttau pūrvavat kāryotpattiprasaṅgāḥ / ananuvṛttau vā pūrvasvabhāvaparityāgād anityatvaprasaṅgāḥ / tasmān na nityām nāma kiñcid vastu vidyate / [...] tasmān***** na nityād eṣām utpādo yuktaḥ / nāpy anityāt tatrātītānāgatayor avastutvān na tāvat tato janma yuktam / ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt / nāpi vartamānāt / samānāsamānakālayos tata utpādāyogāt / tathā hi na tāvat samānakālaṇ kāraṇasvabhāvāvajt kāryasyāpi tatsamānakālabhāvitayā***** niṣpannatvāt / nāpi bhinnakālam / kālāntaravayavadhānenotpāde 'titāder evotpattiprasaṅgāt / avyavadhānenāpy utpāde sarvātmanā yady avyavadhānam tadaikasmīn eva kṣaṇe sarvakṣaṇānām anupraveśāt kalpasya kṣaṇamātratāprasaṅgāḥ / yathā paramāṇoh sarvātmanā saṃyoge piṇḍasyāṇumātratāprasaṅgāḥ / athaikadeśena***** / tadā kṣaṇasya sāvaya-vatvaprasaṅgāḥ / svato 'pi notpadyante / nirhetukapakṣeṇaivāya pakṣasya saṅgrhītāt / svātmani ca kāritravirodhāt / nāpy ubhayataḥ / ubhayapakṣabhāviṣadadvayaprasaṅgāt***** / tasmāt paramārthato 'nutpannā evāmī bhāvāḥ***** / saṃvṛtyā tūtpādasya vidyamānatvān, nāgamādivirodhāḥ / tathā coktaṇ bhagavatā – bhāvā jāyante saṃvṛtyā paramārthe 'svabhāvākāḥ / niḥsvabhāveṣu bhāveṣu bhrāntiḥ sā saṃvṛtir mateti***** / iyaṁ ca yuktir bhagavato 'bhipretā śālistambādau / svataḥ parata ubhābhyaṁ ahetoś ca janmaniṣedhāt /. *Tib. has no equivalent of anyair. **Tib. has no equivalent of tāvad. ***Note Tib. de la (*tasya), with no equivalent in Skt. ****Note Tib. goṇ du for yathā. *****Note Tib. gal te de kho na bzin du de ūid bskyed nus na ni for yady utpattisamartha evāsau. *****Note Tib. de ltar re ūig (*evaṁ tāvat) for tasmāt. *****According to Tucci (p. 201, n. 2), the MS reads -bhāvatasya, which is equally possible without any significant change in meaning; Tib. (de daṇ dus gcig tu) 'byuṇ ste (grub pa'i phyir ro) is not unambiguous. *****Note Tib. phyogs gnis ka'i skyon 'du bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro for ubhayapakṣabhāviṣadadvayaprasaṅgāt. *****Note Tib. dños po 'di dag thams cad for amī bhāvāḥ. *****LAS 10.429 (with variant readings).

69 See MAV 290,10–13.

70 MA 91ab: /rgyu daṇ 'bras bur gyur pa yai/ /śes pa 'ba' ūig kho na ste/. Translation Ichigo 1989,221 ≈ 1985, CXLIV (with “cognition” for “knowledge”; see also Blumenthal 2004: 169).

non-existence of external entities. Based on the standpoint [of the lack of intrinsic nature of all *dharma*s] one must know that there is no self at all even in that [which is mind-only].”⁷¹ Before quoting several authorities to the effect that the mind is no less unsubstantial than its objects, Śāntarakṣita provides the following explanation:

Relying on the method of mind-only (*cittamātranaya?*), one understands without difficulty that [entities] accepted as external to the mind together with its associates (*sasamprayuktacitta?*), self and one's own (*ātmātmīya*), object and subject (*grāhyagrāhaka*), etc., are devoid of own nature. Although one already understands that the mind [itself] is devoid of own nature because it is not self-arisen, when one knows this middle way that is devoid of all extremities, one perfectly understands that it is devoid of own nature inasmuch as it has neither a unitary nor a multiple own nature.⁷²

To sum up, Śāntarakṣita's “final position involves the use of a Yogācāra or Mind Only framework for understanding conventional truths and a Madhyamaka framework for ultimate analysis.”⁷³

The transition to a Mādhyamika analysis of the mind and its final rejection features repeatedly in Kamalaśīla's BhKs. Suffice it to quote two excerpts from BhK 2 and 3:

In this way [the yogin] should also cultivate the selflessness of the [allegedly real] *dharma*s. To sum up, what is called 'dharma' consists of the five constituents, the twelve sensory bases, and the eighteen elements. Among them, the corporeal (*rūpin*) constituents, sensory bases and elements ultimately do not exist independently from the aspect of the mind (*cittākāravyatirekeṇa?*), for having [first] divided them into atoms (*paramāṇu*) and [next] considered the atoms themselves (*api*) [according to?] the nature of [their] parts (*bhāga*), one cannot ascertain (*avaDHR_{caus?}*) any nature [for them]. Therefore, it is the mind itself that, due to [their] beginningless adherence to erroneous corporeality, etc., manifests itself to the infantiles as corporeality as [if it were] externally distinct, like an appearance of corporeality perceived in a dream. Ultimately, however, corporeality, etc., do not exist independently from the mind, [and] thus he should analyse [things]. Thinking that the three worlds (*traidhātuka*) are nothing but mind-only (*cittamātra*), and understanding thus that whatever is designated as 'dharma' is nothing but mind-only, having thoroughly considered [this], the nature of all *dharma*s is thoroughly considered; this is the reason why he [now] also thoroughly considers the nature of

71 MA 92: /sems tsam la ni brten nas su/ /phyi rol dños med śes par bya/ /tshul 'dir brten nas de la yañ/ /śin tu bdag med śes par bya/. Translation Ichigo 1989: 221 ~ 1985, CXLV; see also Blumenthal 2004: 171.

MA 92 is notoriously based on LAS 10.256 (also quoted in MAV 296,15–18 and BhK 1.210,7–8): *cittamātraṃ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet / tathālambane sthitvā cittamātram atikramet /*.

72 MAV 294,9–14: *sems tsam gyi tshul la brten nas mtshuṇ par ldan pa dañ bcas pa'i sems las phyi rol du 'dod pa bdag dañ bdag gi dañ gzuñ ba dañ 'dzin pa la sog pa rañ bžin med par tshegs med pa kho nar rtogs so // tshul 'dis* ni rañ byuñ ba med pas sems de rañ bžin med par rtogs su zin kyañ / mtha' thams cad spañs pa dbu ma'i lam 'di rtogs na / gcig dañ du ma'i rañ bžin dañ bral bas rañ bžin med par śin tu rtogs so //.* *dis em. (see Ichigo 1985: 295, n. 5): 'di Ed. (MAV, MAP).

73 Blumenthal 2004: 169.

the mind [itself]. The [yogin] analyzes [it] as follows. The mind cannot be ultimately real (*satya?*) either. For if (*yadā*), while apprehending aspects such as corporeality whose nature is unreal (*alika*), it is the mind itself that appears with a manifold aspect (*citrākāra*), then how could it be real (*satyatā?*)? Just as [*dharma*s] such as corporeality have a nature that is neither unitary nor multiple due to being manifold, in the same way the mind also has a nature that is neither unitary nor multiple, since it is not distinct from them. Therefore, the mind is just comparable to the nature of a magical illusion, etc. (*māyādi*). [The yogin] analyzes that just as the mind, all *dharma*s as well are just comparable to the nature of a magical illusion, etc. Thus when he thoroughly considers the nature of the mind with insight (*prajñayā*), he ultimately perceives [it] neither inside (*adhyātmam?*), nor outside (*bahir?*), nor both [inside and outside]; he perceives neither a past mind, nor a future mind, nor a present mind. [...] Having thus understood that the mind is without middle and extremes (*madhyānta*), he does not perceive any nature of the mind whatsoever. He realizes that the mind with which he imagines (*pariKlP-*) [things] is as empty (*śūnya*) as [these things]. And realizing this, he does not see (*samanuDRś-*) [any] nature of corporeality, etc., [a nature] that has been established (*siddha*) [earlier] as a [mere] aspect of the mind (*cittākāra*).⁷⁴

Then in order to realize the selflessness of the *dharma*s, [the yogin] should also analyze the corporeal *dharma*s[, and this in the following way]: do these [*dharma*s] subsist independently from the mind as ultimately existing [things], or is it [rather] the mind itself that appears with the appearance of corporeality, etc., like an appearance in a dream state? Examining them [first] from the point of view of atoms (*paramāṇuśas*), and [then] thoroughly considering the atoms [themselves] from the point of view of their parts (*bhāgaśas*), he does not perceive these

74 BhK 2.37,24–43,23: *chos la bdag med pa yañ 'di ltar bsgom par bya ste / chos žes bya ba ni mdor bsdus na phuñ po lña dañ / skye mched bcu gñis dañ / khams bco brgyad do // de la phuñ po dañ skye mched dañ khams dañ gzugs can gañ dag yin pa de dag ni don dam par na sems kyi rnam pa las gud na med do // de dag rdul phra rab tu bśig la rdul phra rab rnam kyai cha śas kyi no bo ñid so sor brtags na ño bo ñid ñes par bzuñ du med pa'i phyir ro // de lta bas na thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzugs la sogs pa yañ dag pa ma yin pa la mñon par žen pa'i dbañ gis rmi lam na dmigs pa'i gzugs la sogs pa snañ ba bžin du byis pa rnam la sems ñid gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol du chad pa bžin du snañ gi / don dam par na 'di la gzugs la sogs pa ni sems kyi rnam pa las gud na med do žes dpyad par bya'o // de 'di sñam du khams gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam mo sñam du sems sñiñ / des de ltar chos brtags pa mtha' dag ni sems kho na yin par rtogs nas de la so sor brtags na chos thams cad kyi no bo ñid la so sor brtags pa yin no žes sems kyi ño bo ñid la so sor rtog go // de 'di ltar dpyod do // don dam par na sems kyañ bden par mi ruñ ste / gañ gi tshe brdzun pa'i no bo ñid gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam pa 'dzin pa'i sems ñid sna tshogs kyi rnam par snañ ba de'i tshe de bden pa ñid du ga la 'gyur / ji ltar gzugs la sogs pa brdzun pa de bžin du sems kyañ de las gud na med pas brdzun pa ñid do // ji ltar gzugs la sogs pa sna tshogs kyi rnam pa yin pas gcig dañ du ma'i no bo ñid ma yin pa de bžin du sems kyañ de las gud na med pa'i phyir gcig dañ du ma'i no bo ñid ma yin no // de lta bas na sems ni sgyu ma la sogs pa'i no bo ñid lta bu kho na'o // sems ji lta ba de bžin du chos thams cad kyañ sgyu ma la sogs pa'i no bo ñid lta bu kho na'o žes dpyod do // de de ltar šes rab kyis sems kyi no bo ñid la so sor brtags na don dam par sems ni nañ du yañ mi dmigs / phyi rol du yañ mi dmigs / gñis ka med par yañ mi dmigs / 'das pa'i sems kyañ mi dmigs / ma 'oñs pa yañ mi dmigs / da ltar byuñ ba yañ mi dmigs so // [...] des de ltar sems mtha' dañ dbus med par khoñ du chud nas sems kyi no bo ñid gañ yañ mi dmigs so // sems gañ gis yoñs su rtog pa de yañ stoñ par rtogs so // de rtogs pas sems kyi rnam par bsgrubs pa'i no bo ñid gzugs la sogs pa'i no bo ñid kyañ yañ dag par rjes su mi mthoñ no //.*

See also Adam 2002: 203–206.

[*dharmas*]; thus failing to perceive [them], he rejects the concepts of existence and nonexistence (*astināstitvavikalpa*) and penetrates (*avatārati*, Tib. *rtogs*) the triple world (*traidhātuka*) as [being] mind-only, not otherwise. [...] The following occurs to him: it is the mind itself that, due to [their] beginningless adherence to erroneous corporeality, etc., manifests itself to the infantiles with the appearance of corporeality as [if it were] externally distinct (*bahir vicchinnam iva*, Tib. *phyi rol du chad pa bzin du*), like an appearance of corporeality perceived in a dream. Therefore, the triple world is nothing but mind-only. Having ascertained that whatever is designated as a *dharma* (*sakalaprajñapti*, Tib. *chos su gdags pa mtha' dag*; cf. Bhk 2.39,13 *chos brtags pa mtha' dag*) is nothing but mind-only, and having thoroughly considered this, the nature of all *dharmas* is thoroughly considered; this is the reason why he [now] also thoroughly considers the nature of the mind [itself]. The [yogin] analyzes [it] as follows. The mind as well is ultimately unarisen, like a magical illusion. For if (*yadā*), while apprehending (*upagraheṇa*, Tib. *'dzin par*) aspects such as corporeality whose nature is unreal, it is the mind itself that appears with a manifold aspect (*citrākāra*), then since the [mind] is not distinct from this [aspect], how could it be more real (*satyatā*) than corporeality? Just as [*dharmas*] such as corporeality have a nature that is neither unitary nor multiple due to being manifold, in the same way the mind also has a nature that is neither unitary nor multiple, since it is not distinct from them. Neither does the mind, when it arises, come from anywhere, nor does it, when it ceases, go anywhere, nor can it ultimately owe its arising to itself, to something else, or to both [itself and something else]. Therefore, the mind is just comparable to a magical illusion, [and] just as the mind, similarly all *dharmas* are ultimately unarisen, like magical illusions.⁷⁵

The shift from a philosophical treatise (the MA/V/P) to a meditation handbook—provided the BhKs are anything like that—is likely enough to explain the differences in wording and doctrinal analysis. The progression in the argument is, however, the same: ascertaining the ontological inconsistency of the *dharmas*, one comes to the conclusion that these are mind-only, and applying the very same critical analysis to the mind itself, one discovers that it is ultimately without a singular or a multiple nature, and thus that it is empty and unarisen.

75 BhK 3.6.5–7,9 (BhK 3_T D ki 58a1–b1): *tato rūpiṇo 'pi dharmān dharmanairātmyādhigamāya vicārayet / kim ete cittavyatirekeṇa paramārthasantah sthitāḥ / āhosvic cittam eva rūpādinirbhāsam svapnāvasthāyāṁ pratibhāsavat pratibhāsata iti / sa tān paramāṇuśo nirūpayaṇ paramāṇūṁś ca bhāgaśāḥ pratyavekṣamāṇo nopalabhatē / tathā cānupalabhamānas teṣv astināstitvavikalpān nivartayati / cittamātrām ca traidhātukam avatārati nānyathā / [...] tasyaivam bhavati / cittam evānādikālikavitatharūpādyabhiniveśavaśāt svapnopalabhyamānarūpādipratibhāsavad bālānāṁ bahir vicchinnam iva rūpādipratibhāsam khyāti / tasmāc cittamātrām eva traidhātukam / sa evam cittam eva sakalaprajñaptim niścīya tatra pratyavekṣya ca sarvadharmaṇām svabhāvāḥ pratyavekṣito bhavatītī cittasvabhāvam api pratyavekṣate / sa evam vicārayati / cittam api paramārthato māyāvad anutpannam / yadā hy alikasvabhāvarūpādyākāropagraheṇa cittam eva citrākāram pratibhāsate tadāsyāpi rūpādīvat tadavyatirekāt satyatvam kutra bhavet / yathā citrākāratayā rūpādayo naikānekasvabhāvās tathā cittam api tadavyatirekeṇa naikānekasvabhāvam / nāpi cittam utpadyamānaṁ kutaścid āgacchatī / nāpi nirudhyamānaṁ kvacīd gacchatī / nāpi svaparobhayataḥ paramārthenāsyotpādo yuktāḥ / tasmān māyopamam eva cittam / yathā cittam evam sarvadharmaṇāmāvāt paramārthato 'nutpannāḥ /* See also Lamotte 1952: 341–342 and Adam 2002: 235–237.

4 Dependent Origination in the *Śālistambasūtraṭīkā*

We are now in a position to understand the ŚŚūṭ's fundamental distinction between the ultimate (*don dam pa'i tshul*) and the conventional modes (*kun rdzob kyi tshul*) of dependent origination—a distinction which, as far as I can see, has no explicit basis in the ŚŚū itself. As Kamalaśila has it,

[d]ependent arising is to be understood in both the ultimate and conventional mode in order to eliminate the extremes of superimposition and underestimation. If [one] meditates only on the ultimate mode, [one] falls into the extreme of underestimation and dwells in an annihilation view, or the *nirvāṇa* of the śrāvaka; if [one] meditates only on the conventional mode, [one] falls into the extreme of superimposition; by [reason of that], if [one] meditates on both modes, by avoiding both extremes, [one] enters into the middle way.⁷⁶

According to him,

although ignorance and so forth, just like an illusion (*māyā_{VE}*) and reflection (*pratibimba_{VE}*) and so forth, is dependent on causes and conditions, that which is unborn in the three times is here the ultimate mode. Thus, [the Buddha] said, 'An unborn *dharma* is true, but other *dharmas* are false.' Moreover, that [ultimate mode], because [it] transcends all conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*), is the personal realization of the *buddhas*.⁷⁷

76 ŚŚūṭ 474,7–13: *rten ciṇi 'brel par 'byuṇ ba ni don dam pa daṇi / kun rdzob kyi tshul gñis su śes par bya ste / sgro 'dogs pa daṇi / skur pa'i mtha' spaṇ ba'i phyir ro // don dam pa'i tshul kho nar bsgoms na ni skur pa'i mthar ltuṇ žiṇ chad par lta ba'am / ūnan thos kyi mya ūnan las 'das pa la gnas par 'gyur / kun rdzob kyi tshul kho nar bsgoms na ni sgro 'dogs pa'i mthar ltuṇ bas / gñi ga'i tshul du bsgoms na mtha' gñis spaṇs pas dbu ma'i lam la žugs par 'gyur ro //*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.242–243.

77 ŚŚūṭ 475,1–6: *ma rig pa las stsogs pa sgyu ma daṇi / gzugs brñan las stsogs pa bžin du rgyu rkyen la ltos pa yin mod kyi / dus gsum du yaṇ gaṇ ma skyes pa de ni 'dir don dam pa'i tshul te / de skad du myi skye ba'i chos ni bden kyi / chos gžan ni brdzun no* žes gsuṇs so // de yaṇ spros pa thams cad las 'das pa'i phyir saṇs rgyas rnams kyi so so raṇ gis rig pa'o //*. *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra (see Schoening 1995: I. 244, n. 2 for references, including BhK 1.199,4–5: *anutpādaḥ satyam asatyam anye dharmāḥ*). Translation Schoening 1995: I.243–244. Note also the following interlinear gloss (Schoening 1995: I.243, n. 2, text and translation): *da 'dir ni sñar je [sic] don dam pa'i tshul du śes par bya ba de bstan pa'i phyir dkyus 'di dag smos te / de yaṇ dper na sgyu ma laststogs pa yaṇ / sñags daṇ sman daṇ rgyu rkyen gyi sbyor ba las rta daṇ glaṇ po che tsam du snaṇ mod kyi / de la rta daṇ glaṇ po che laststogs pa'i raṇ bžin myed pas ma skyes pa de / don dam pa yin par bžin du ma rig pa laststogs pa'i yan lag bcu gñis kyaṇ kun rdzob du rgyu rkyen la bltos pa sgyu ma tsam du snaṇ yaṇ dños ūnid raṇ bžin myed pas ma skyes pa'i [hole in paper] ni bden bas na don dam pa'i tshul žes bya ba'o //*. "Now here, this was said at length in order to indicate at first what is to be understood in the ultimate mode: that also, for example, even illusions and so forth, from the application of mantras, medicine, and cause[s and] condition[s] appear as just a horse and elephant, but in that [connection], because the horse and elephant and so forth have no essential nature, [they] are unborn. Just as in the ultimate, even the twelve components

As we can see, in the ultimate mode, dependent origination and whatever pseudo-*dharmas* are held to be dependently originated are regarded as unarisen, their arising and existence being comparable to those of elephants or horses created by magical illusion. Kamalaśīla thus reads his Mādhyamika understanding of the two truths or realities into the ŚSū. He introduces this distinction while commenting on a statement of the Buddha to the effect that

he who, having seen dependent arising as permanent, without life, free of life, just as it is, unerring, unborn, unarisen, not made, unconditioned, unobstructed, baseless, peaceful, fearless, not to be taken away, as an essential nature that is not pacified, who sees the Dharma also in a similar way as permanent, without life, free of life, just as it is, unerring, unborn, unarisen, not made, unconditioned, unobstructed, baseless, peaceful, fearless, not to be taken away, as an essential nature that is not pacified, [he], having realized the Noble Dharma, by possessing perfect wisdom, sees the Buddha, the body consisting of unsurpassable *dharma*(s).⁷⁸

Abiding as an unborn essential nature, dependent origination is permanent,⁷⁹ which “indicates that even the three times, because the ultimate has a single taste, are unchanging”⁸⁰ and ubiquitous (*khyab pa, vibhu?*).⁸¹ Contrary to the non-Buddhists’ (*bdag du smra ba, ātmavādin*) opinion, according to which “the self alone has life,”⁸² dependent origination has no essential nature by itself (*rañ gis bdag gi rañ bzin ma yin pa*), hence no life.⁸³ Additionally, dependent origination, which can be proved by reasons (*hetu*), is not imagined (*aparikalpita*), and fully authoritative (*tshad mas ma*).

such as ignorance, though conventionally appearing as mere illusions dependent on cause[s and] condition[s], by actually lacking an essential nature, are unborn [hole in paper] by that truth is the ultimate mode."

78 ŚŚū 72,10–17: *ya imāṇ pratītyasamutpādaṇ satatasamitam ajīvāṇ nirjīvāṇ yathāvad aviparītam ajātam abhūtam akṛtam asaṃskṛtam apratigham anālambanaṇ śivam abhayam anāhāryam avyayam avyupaśamasvabhāvam paśyati, sa dharmāṇ paśyati; yas tv evāṇ satatasamitam ajīvāṇ nirjīvāṇ <yathāvad aviparītam ajātam abhūtam akṛtam asaṃskṛtam apratigham anālambanaṇ śivam abhayam anāhāryam avyayam*> avyupaśamasvabhāvam dharmāṇ paśyati so 'nuttaradharmaśārīraṇ buddham paśyati, āryadharmaśābhisamaye samyagjñānād upanayenaiva.* *This is the reading corresponding to the Tibetan, which gives the whole list a second time; the Skt. simply reads: *ityādi pūrvavad, yāvad.* Translation Schoening 1995: I.240–241. This statement is quoted by Maitreya as an answer to the question (ŚŚū 72,9): *kathaṇ pratītyasamutpādaṇ paśyati /* “How does he see dependent arising?” For Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of this *logion*’s expressions, see ŚŚūT 475,9–483,8 (translation in Schoening 1995: I.245–264), of which some excerpts are provided below, nn. 79–88.

79 According to an interlinear gloss (quoted and translated in Schoening 1995: I.245, n. 3): *ma skyes pa'i rañ bzin du gnas pa ni rtag pa yin pas.*

⁸⁰ ŠSÜT 475,10–11: *dus gsum yan don dam par ro gcig pas*

Schoening 1995: I.245.

81 According to ŠSūT 478,14 (Schoening 1995: I.253–254).

(*nor par bsgrubs*). It was created neither by a permanent cause such as God, because such a cause “contradicts either gradual or instantaneous causal efficacy,”⁸⁴ nor by impermanent causes assembled in a complex, for these do not ultimately exist either since they are “subject to investigation and dispute”⁸⁵ and immovable (*g.yo ba myed pa, acala?*). Dependent origination is “empty of the aspects of grasped and grasper,”⁸⁶ objectless (*anālambana*), i.e., beyond conceptual proliferation (*spros pa myed pa, niṣprapañca?*) and knowable only through transmundane cognition (*'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye śes, lokottarajñāna*).⁸⁷ The ultimate mode of dependent origination is nothing but true reality (*tattva*), i.e., the self-luminous (*rañ bźin gyis 'od gsal ba, prakṛtyā prabhāsvaram?*) *dharmadhātu*, and as such provides “no occasion for adventitious (*āgantuka_{VE}*) defilements to arise, because one dwells in the nature of reality.”⁸⁸

Seeing dependent origination in its ultimate mode amounts to seeing the ultimate⁸⁹ Dharma, “because everything on the ultimate [level] has one taste,” and the Buddha, “because the just-mentioned ultimate has the essential nature of the body consisting of *dharma*(s) (*dharmaśarīra?*).”⁹⁰ Such is the ultimately true interpretation of the famous *logion* according to which “he who sees dependent origination [...] sees the Dharma, and he who sees the Dharma sees the Buddha.”⁹¹ For indeed,

[h]e who understands the ultimate Dharma possesses perfect wisdom. He who possesses perfect wisdom, because [he] dwells in the wisdom of sameness, does not conceive dependent arising, the Dharma, and the Buddha to be different. Thus, if the yogi, because of possessing perfect wisdom when the Noble Dharma is realized, sees the just-mentioned dependent arising, [he] will see the Dharma and the Buddha.⁹²

84 ŚŚūṭ 477,15–478,1: *rim dañ rim ma yin par don byed pa'i 'gal ba'i phyir ro* //. More generally, see ŚŚūṭ 477,12–478,2 (Schoening 1995: I.250–251).

85 ŚŚūṭ 478,6–7: *brtag ciñ brgal ba 'thun ba'i phyir ro* //. More generally, see ŚŚūṭ 478,3–10 (Schoening 1995: I.251–253).

86 ŚŚūṭ 479,6–7: *gzun ba dañ 'dzin pa'i rnam pas stoñ ba* [...]. Translation Schoening 1995: I.255.

87 ŚŚūṭ 479,9–10. Translation Schoening 1995: I.255.

88 ŚŚūṭ 483,1–2: *de kho na'i bdag ñid du gnas pas glo bur gyi ñon moñ pa 'byuñ ba'i skabs myed do* //. Translation Schoening 1995: I.263.

89 According to ŚŚūṭ 484,5: *don dam pa'i chos*.

90 According to ŚŚūṭ 483,10–13: [...] *chos mthoñ ste / thams cad kyañ don dam par ro gcig pa'i phyir ro // sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyañ ji skad gsuñs pa'i don dam pa chos kyi sku'i rañ bźin yin pa'i phyi ro* //. Translation Schoening 1995: I.265.

91 ŚŚū 70,7–9: *yo [...] pratityasamutpādañ paśyati sa dharmāñ paśyati; yo dharmāñ paśyati sa buddhāñ paśyati [...]*. The statement is presented as a *sūtra* in its own right in ŚŚū 70,7 and 10.

92 ŚŚūṭ 484,6–13: *gañ don dam pa'i chos khoñ du chud pa de ni yañ dag pa'i ye śes dañ ldan pa'o // gañ yañ dag pa'i ye śes dañ ldan pa de ni mñam pa ñid kyi ye śes la gnas pa'i phyir / rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba dañ chos dañ sañs rgyas rnams la tha dad du dmyigs pa myed do // de lta bas na 'phags pa'i chos mñon par rtogs na yañ dag pa'i ye śes dañ ldan pa'i phyir rnal 'byor pa des ji skad gsuñs pa'i rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba mthoñ na chos dañ sañs rgyas mthoñ ño [...]* //. Translation Schoening 1995: I.266–267.

The internal contradiction apparently involved if one interprets dependent origination as contaminated (*sāsrava*) *dharma*s being causes and effects, the Dharma as the path and *nirvāṇa*, and the Buddha as a set of uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) *dharma*s,⁹³ does not exist, “because the Blessed One spoke with regard to the intention for sameness and the allusion for the characteristic of the perfect (*pariniśpannalakṣaṇa*).”⁹⁴

But, one may ask, “[i]f this dependent arising, on the ultimate [level], is not the assembling [of] causes and conditions, why is it called ‘dependent arising’?”⁹⁵ The answer is to be found in the *sūtra* itself: “Objection: Why [the name] ‘dependent arising’? Answer: [It] possesses causes and possesses conditions, and is not causeless [nor] conditionless. Therefore, [it is called] ‘dependent arising.’”⁹⁶ The *sūtra* immediately goes on

93 Having heard the *sūtra* (see above, n. 91) and observed the Buddha’s subsequent silence, Śāriputra inquires about the meaning, i.e., the allusion (Schoening; *abhisandhi*) and the intention (*abhiprāya*) of the Buddha, for such an investigation is called for in case of a contradiction in a *sūtra*. The point is that “contaminated phenomena consisting of cause and result such as ignorance [the Blessed One] called ‘dependent arising’; the uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) path and the unconditioned, *nirvāṇa*, [the Blessed One] called ‘Dharma’; the uncontaminated phenomena that render Buddhahood [the Blessed One] called ‘Buddha’. If all these are mutually different in essential nature, how by seeing a dependent arising [that is] unlike [the Dharma] will the Dharma be seen? How by seeing a Dharma [that is] unlike [the Buddha] will the Buddha be seen? Therefore, just as perceiving form and sound and so forth [are different], this also will be different.” (ŚSūT 462,2–11: *ma rig pa las stsogs pa rgyu daṇ 'bras bur gyurd pa zag pa daṇ bcas pa'i chos rnam ni rten ciṇ 'brel par 'byuṇ ba'i sgrar gsuṇs / zag pa myed pa'i lam daṇ 'dus ma byas pa mya ḥan las 'das pa ni chos kyi sgrar gsuṇs / saṇs rgyas su byed pa zag pa myed pa ḥid kyi chos ni saṇs rgyas kyi sgrar gsuṇs te / de dag thams cad ni phan tshun raṇ bžin tha dad na ji ltar myi 'dra ba'i rten ciṇ 'brel par 'byuṇ ba mthoṇ bas chos mthoṇ bar gyur / ji ltar myi 'dra ba'i chos mthoṇ bas saṇs rgyas mthoṇ bar 'gyurd / de'i phyir gzugs daṇ sgra las stsogs pa mthoṇ ba bžin du 'di yan tha dad par 'gyur ro sñam du bsams pa'o //*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.218–219.) Somewhat later, Kamalaśīla defines “Dharma” as being twofold: “the Dharma of practice (*pratipattidharma*) and the Dharma of result (*phaladharma*). The Dharma of practice is the Noble Eight-fold Path. [...] The Dharma of result is two-fold by way of the distinction between conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). In that [connection], the conditioned, being the four fruits of wholesome practice, [has] the essential nature of the path of liberation. The unconditioned is *nirvāṇa* [with the] defining characteristic of being devoid of defilements.” (ŚSūT 468,2–9: *'dir chos kyaṇ rnam pa gñis su bṣad de / bṣgrub pa'i chos daṇ / 'bras bu'i chos so // bṣgrub pa'i chos ni 'phags pa'i lam yan lag bryad pa ste / [...] 'dus byas daṇ 'dus ma byas kyi bye brag gis 'bras bu'i chos kyaṇ rnam pa gñis su'o // de la 'dus byas ni dge sbyoṇ gi 'bras bu bži ste / rnam par grol ba'i lam kyi raṇ bžind no // 'dus ma byas ni ḥon moṇs pa spaṇ ba'i mtshan ḥid mya ḥan las 'das pa'o //*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.227–228.)

94 ŚSūT 484,14–15: *mñam pa la dgoṇs pa daṇ yoṇs su grub pa'i mtshan ḥid la ldem por dgoṇs par bcom ldan 'das kyiṣ gsuṇs pas [...] /*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.267. For a list of *abhisandhis* and *abhiprāyas*, see ŚSūT 461,13–20 (Schoening 1995: I.218).

95 ŚSūT 485,1–3: *gal te rten ciṇ 'brel par 'byuṇ ba 'di don dam par rgyu daṇ rkyen rnam 'dus byas pa ma yin na ji'i phyir 'di rten ciṇ 'brel par 'byuṇ ba žes bya ba [...] /*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.269.

96 ŚSūT 73,1–3: *pratityasamutpāda iti kasmād ucyate / sahetukāḥ sapratyayo nāhetuko nāpratyaya iti tasmāt pratityasamutpāda ity ucyate /*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.268.

quoting another widely celebrated *logion*, presented here as a brief characterization of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpādalakṣaṇa*) by the Buddha:

[This] is the result of this conditionedness: ‘Whether *tathāgatas* arise or not, this nature of *dharmas* remains.’ Up to: This which is the nature, the stability of *dharmas*, the invariable principle of *dharmas*, the conformity to dependent arising, thusness, unerring thusness, unique thusness, verity, truth, unerringness, and the right.⁹⁷

Let it just be reminded here that Buddhism consistently presents the Buddha as having “awakened” to, and subsequently revealed, the true nature of things, i.e., causality as the law governing phenomena independently of whether *buddhas* appear or not in the world to disclose it, and eternally so. Now according to Kamalaśīla, this oft-quoted statement is nothing but a description of the conventional mode of dependent origination, which he presents as follows:

Ultimately, this dependent arising is indeed an unborn thing, but nevertheless, conventionally, just like an illusion or reflection, that which depends on various, particular causes and conditions indeed exists as a conventional designation. Therefore, all the expositions [expounded] in scripture and [held] in the world are indeed not contradictory.⁹⁸

Kamalaśīla’s explanation is of course reminiscent of Mādhyamika and, more broadly, Mahāyāna ideas and examples we are now well acquainted with.

However, Kamalaśīla continues, the non-Buddhists (*tīrthika*) misinterpret dependent origination even at the conventional level by imagining (*pariKl.P-*) it to have the defining characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of being causeless (*nirhetuka?*), having wrong causes (*viśamahetu*), etc.⁹⁹ This is why

97 ŚSūT 73,5–9: *idampratyayatāphalam, utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sthitaivaiśā dharmāṇām dharmatā [iti yāvad yad idam] dharmatā dharmasthititā [dharmāpariṇāmatā] pratītyasamutpādānulomatā tathatāvitathatānanyatathatā bhūtattā satyatā tattvam aviparitataviparyastateti.* Translation Schoening 1995: I.268–269. For Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of this *logion*’s expressions, see ŚSūT 487,6–488,18 (translation in Schoening 1995: I.272–274).

98 ŚSūT 485,7–12: *don dam par ni rten ciṇ 'brel par 'byuṇ ba 'di ma skyes pa yin mod kyi / 'on kyaṇ kun rdzob du sgyu ma daṇ gzugs brñan lta bur rgyu daṇ rkyen sna tshogs so sor ḋes pa la bltos pa tha sñad btags par yod pa ñid de / de'i phyir gsuṇ rab daṇ 'jig rten du rnam par bżag pa mtha' dag myi 'gal ba ñid do sñam mo //.* Translation Schoening 1995: I.270. Note also ŚSūT 512,15–19: *de lta na 'di rten ciṇ 'brel par 'byuṇ bar ji ltar rigs sñam ba la // sgyu ma'i mtshan ñid gyi raṇ bżin dag la / žes bya ba gsungs te / dper na sgyu ma yarṇ don dam pa raṇ bżin myed mod gyi rgyu daṇ rkyen ma tshaṇ ba myed pa'i phyir skye ba yod pa de bżin du dños po thams chad 'gal ba myed do //.* “In that case, should [someone] wonder, ‘How is this dependent origination feasible?’ [Maitreya] said, ‘In those [dharmas] having the essential nature of the mark of illusion.’ For example, while indeed an illusion ultimately lacks essential nature, there is creation [of an illusion] because the causes and conditions are not deficient; similarly, all entities are without conflict [between their ultimate and conventional aspects].” Translation Schoening 1995: I.319.

99 According to ŚSūT 485,12–14 (Schoening 1995: I.270).

in order to refute all the non-Buddhist views, this [dependent arising] is established [to have] a fivefold defining characteristic: [1] the defining characteristic of arising from causes, [2] the defining characteristic of arising from many impermanent causes, [3] the defining characteristic of arising without a self, [4] the defining characteristic of arising from efficacious conditions, and [5] the defining characteristic of arising from agentless conditions.¹⁰⁰

As was to be expected, these five *lakṣaṇas* have strong polemical overtones. The first one “undermine[s] the view that [entities] are causeless,”¹⁰¹ a view ascribed to some non-Buddhists from *sūtras* onward. The second defining characteristic “undermines the incongruous cause called ‘permanent whole’ (*nityaika_{VE?}*),”¹⁰² whereas the third one dismisses the belief in a self and one’s own.¹⁰³ By the fourth *lakṣaṇa*, “those who assert that a result arises from a permanent [cause] that lacks potency are undermined.”¹⁰⁴ Finally, the fifth defining characteristic “undermine[s] those who

¹⁰⁰ ŚŚūT 485,14–486,6: *mu stegs can kyi lta ba ma lus par dgag pa'i phyir 'di la mtshan ñid rnam pa lña rnam par gžag ste / rgyu dañ bcas pa las 'byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid dañ / myi rtag pa du ma'i rgyu las 'byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid dañ / bdag myed par 'byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid dañ / nus pa'i rkyen las 'byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid dañ / byed pa myed pa'i rkyen las 'byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid do //*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.270. To be compared with AS 26,23–25 and ASBh 33,19–34,3 in Kritzer 1999: 54–56.

¹⁰¹ ŚŚūT 486,8: (*'dis ni*) *rgyu myed par lta ba bstsal* to //. Translation Schoening 1995: I.270.

¹⁰² ŚŚūT 489,4: (*'dis ni*) *rtag pa gcig pu žes bya ba myi 'thun pa'i rgyu* *seld* to //. Translation Schoening 1995: I.275.

¹⁰³ ŚŚūT 489,11–490,5: *de la byis ba rnams nañ gi skyed mched rnams la ni bdag du mñon par žend / phyi'i rnams la ni bdag gir mñon par žen te / gñi ga la yañ mñon par žend pa spañ ba'i phyir / rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ ba rnam pa gñis su bstand te / bdag myed pa dañ rten ciñ 'brel par 'byuñ bar phyi nañ mtshuñs pa'i phyir ro // bdag yod na ni phyi dañ nañ rten ciñ 'brel par myi ruñ ste / bdag byind kyis rlob par rtag du ñe bar gnas pa dañ / de'i ran bžin du gyurd pas / de bžin du rtag du yod par 'gyur ro //*. “In that [connection], the childish are attached to the internal sense-bases as if [they were] the self [and] are attached to the external sense-bases as if [they were whatever is referred to as] mine; in order to abandon attachment to both those, dependent arising is explained to be two-fold: because selflessness and external [and] internal dependent are the same. If the self existed, external and internal dependent arising would not be feasible because the self would abide permanently as the basis and [entities] would be permanent.” Translation Schoening 1995: I.275–276.

¹⁰⁴ ŚŚūT 490,12–13: *gañ dag rtag pa nus pa myed pa las 'bras bu 'byuñ bar brjod pa de dag bstsal* to //. Translation Schoening 1995: I.277. ŚŚūT 493,13–494,3: *dños po rnams kyi rgyu dbañ phyug las stsogs pa rtag pa ni / res 'ga' 'byuñ bas na myi 'thad de / rgyu ma 'tshañ ba myed pa'i phyir ro // rtag pa ni gžan la stod pa myed de / gžan kyis de la bstang myi dgos pa'i phyir ro // rgyu dañ rkyen de dag gi rgyu yañ dbañ las stsogs pa yin na ni ma tshañ bar myi ruñ ba'i phyir ro // de'i phyir res 'ga' 'byuñ bas dbañ phyug gis byas pa ma yin bar dgoñs pa'o //*. “[...] because [results] occur [only] sometimes, a permanent cause of entities, such as Íśvara, is not right because the cause is not deficient. A permanent [cause] does not depend on another [cause in order to produce a result], because another [cause] assisting that [permanent cause] is not necessary. [‘Not made by Íśvara’ is said] because of the unsuitability that [the cause] would [ever] be deficient should the cause of those causes and conditions be Íśvara and so forth; therefore, the [Buddha] intended that because [the result] arises [only] sometimes, [results] are not made by Íśvara.” Translation Schoening 1995: I.284.

maintain that the cause possesses an agent.”¹⁰⁵ This last aspect features repeatedly in the ŚŚū, according to which “it does not occur to the seed, ‘I produce the sprout.’ [...] However, when there is a seed, the sprout is produced and appears.”¹⁰⁶ Or else: “it does not occur to ignorance, ‘I produce conditioning factors.’¹⁰⁷ More generally, “the sprout is not made by itself, not made by another, not made by both, not made by Īśvara, not transformed by time, not arisen from essential nature, nor born without a cause.”¹⁰⁸ These and other (*ātman*, *puruṣa*, etc.) wrong causes¹⁰⁹ form a *topos* in Buddhist and non-Buddhist literature from around the beginning of the first millennium CE. In a Buddhist environment, the list features a number of metaphysical principles advocated by (largely idealized) opponents to account for the origin and the nature of the universe, all of which are seen as unreasonable alternatives to dependent origination.¹¹⁰

This has important consequences for the overall interpretation of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s religio-philosophical agenda in the TS(P). Remember that Śāntarakṣita’s introductory verses (TS 1–5a), which provide the topical matrix of the whole work, present the core of the Buddha’s dispensation, i.e., dependent origination, as “devoid of the [causal] operation of [metaphysical principles] such as *prakṛti*, *īśa*, both, [and] *ātman*.”¹¹¹ While commenting on these expressions, Kamalaśīla first explains that

among them, *prakṛti* is the primordial matter consisting of [the three *gunas*] *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, [as it is] imagined by the Sāṅkhyas; *īśa* is [the creator] God; ‘both’ [refers to] those two; *ātman* refers to the *puruṣa* that is the agent of creation and resorption and to the other, [individual] one, [the one] that transmigrates; ‘etc.’ includes [principles] such as time. Their operation [means] their being causes. ‘Free from it’ [means] devoid of their operation. Such is the meaning.¹¹²

Immediately after this word-for-word explanation, Kamalaśīla claims that

¹⁰⁵ ŚŚūT 491,15–16: (*des ni*) *gaṇ* *dag* *byed* *pa* *daṇ* *bcas* *pa’i* *rgyur* ‘*dod* *pa* *de* *dag* *bstsald* *to* //’. Translation Schoening 1995: I.281.

¹⁰⁶ ŚŚū 73,20–74,5: *bijasya* *naivam* *bhavati*: *aham* *aṅkuram* *abhinirvartayāmīti* [...] *atha* *punar* *bije* *saty* *aṅkurasyābhinirvṛttir* *bhavati* *prādurbhāvah* /. Translation Schoening 1995: I.278.

¹⁰⁷ ŚŚū 76,19–77,1: *avidyāyā* *naivam* *bhavati*: *aham* *sāṃskārān* *abhinirvartayāmīti*. Translation Schoening 1995: I.289.

¹⁰⁸ ŚŚū 75,6–8: *sa cāyam aṅkuro* *na svayaṅkṛto* *na parakṛto* *nobhayakṛto* *neśvarakṛto* *na kālapariṇāmito* *na caikakāraṇādhīno* *nāpy ahetusamutpannah* /. Translation Schoening 1995: I.284.

¹⁰⁹ According to ŚŚūT 494,6 (Schoening 1995: I.285).

¹¹⁰ See Eltschinger 2022: 95–97.

¹¹¹ TS 1ab₁: *prakṛtiśobhayātmādivyāpārarahitam...*

¹¹² TSP_K 10,25–11,1/TSP_S 11,18–20/TSP_T D ze 141b3–142a2: *tatra* *prakṛtiḥ* *sāṅkhyaparikalpitam* *sattvarajastamorūpam* *pradhānam* / *īśa* *īśvarah* / *ubhayam* *etad* *eva* *dvayam* / *ātmā* *sṛṣṭisamhārakāraka* *ekah* *puruṣas* *tadanyaś* *ca* *sāṃsārī* / *ādigrahaṇena* *kālādiparigrahaḥ* / *teṣām* *vyāpāraḥ* *kāraṇabhāvah* / *tena* *rahitaṁ* *tadvyāpāraśūnyam* *ity arthaḥ* /.

this is [what has been] stated by the Blessed One [himself]: 'And the sprout is not made by itself, not made by another, not made by both, not made by God, not arisen from Nature, nor dependent on a single cause, nor born without a cause.' With this, [Śāntarakṣita] alludes to [the chapters dealing with] the critical examination of primordial matter, God, both, the absence of cause, *śabdabrahman*, and the self.¹¹³

The Buddha's statement quoted by Kamalaśīla is none other than the ŚŚū *locus* referred to above.¹¹⁴ In the MA(V/P), the BhKs and the ŚŚūT, these wrong causes are consistently adduced as examples of erroneous convention (*mithyāsaṃvṛti*) and dismissed as illegitimate components of dependent origination in its conventional mode. From this, we can I think safely conclude that the *pratītyasamutpāda* Kamalaśīla and most likely Śāntarakṣita himself have in mind in the TS(P) is true conventional dependent origination, or, equivalently, true *saṃvṛti* inasmuch as it is characterized by dependent origination, causal efficacy, and provisionality, and ultimately consists in mind-only. This provides strong hermeneutic evidence for interpreting these two Mādhyamika philosophers' non-Mādhyamika work, the TS(P) first and foremost, in a Mādhyamika perspective, i.e., as a philosophical and polemical propedeutic to a Mādhyamaka understanding of reality.

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A = *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. See Renou 1966 and Vasu 1997.

AK(Bh) = *Abhidharmakośa(bhāṣya)*, ed. Prahlad Pradhan: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu*, Patna, 1975 (1967¹), Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.

AN I = *Ānguttaranikāya*, ed. Richard Morris: *The Ānguttara-Nikāya*, part I: Ekanipāta & Dukanipāta, London, 1882, Pali Text Society.

AS = *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, ed. Prahlad Pradhan: *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga*, Santiniketan, 1950, Visva-Bharati.

ASBh = *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*, ed. Nathmal Tatia: *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣyam*, Patna, 1976, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute.

BhK 1 = *First Bhāvanākrama*, ed. Giuseppe Tucci: *Minor Buddhist Texts, part II: First Bhāvanākrama*, Rome, 1958, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. For the Tibetan text, see Adam 2002.

BhK 1_T = *First Bhāvanākrama*, Tibetan version. D no. 3915, ki 22a1–42b7.

BhK 2 = *Second Bhāvanākrama*, ed. Kiyotaka Goshima: "The Tibetan Text of the Second Bhāvanākrama," Kyoto, 1983. See also Adam 2002.

¹¹³ TSP_K 11,1–3/TSP_S 11,21–23/TSP_T D ze 142a2–3: *tad uktam bhagavatā – sa cāyam aṅkuro na svayaṅkṛto na parakṛto* nobhayakṛto neśvaranirmito na kālapariṇāmito** na prakṛtisambhūto naikakāraṇādhīno nāpy ahetusamutpanna*** iti / etena pradhāneśvarobhayāhetukaśabdabrahmātmaparīkṣāṇām upa-*kṣepaḥ* /.*na parakṛto TSP_S: TSP_K om. na parakṛto. **na kālapariṇāmito TSP_T (dus yoṅs su gyur pa ma yin te), BCAP, ŚŚū: MSS, TSP_K, TSP_S om. na kālapariṇāmito. ***ahetusamutpanna TSP_S: TSP_K ahetuḥ *saṃutpanna*.*

¹¹⁴ See above, n. 108.

BhK 3 = Third *Bhāvanākrama*, ed. Giuseppe Tucci: *Minor Buddhist Texts, part III: Third Bhāvanākrama*, Rome, 1971, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. For the Tibetan text, see Adam 2002.

BhK 3_T = Third *Bhāvanākrama*, Tibetan version. D no. 3917, ki 55b6–68b7.

D = Derge (sDe dge). A.W. Barber: *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Taipei Edition*, Taipei, 1991, SMC Publishing Inc.

LAS = *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ed. Bunyiu Nanjo: *The Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, Kyoto, 1923, Otani University Press.

MA = *Madhyamakālaṅkāra*, ed. Masamichi Ichigo: *Madhyamakālaṅkāra of Śāntarakṣita with His Own Commentary Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*, Kyoto, 1985, Buneido.

MAP = *Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā*. See MA.

MAV = *Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti*. See MA.

MAv = *Madhyamakāvatāra*, éd. Xuezhu LI: “Madhyamakāvatāra-kārikā,” *China Tibetology* 18 (2012), 1–16.

MMK = *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, ed. J.W. de Jong: *Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, Madras, 1977, The Adyar Library and Research Centre.

MRP = *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, D no. 3854, *tsha* 259b3–289a7.

NBh = *Nyāyabhāṣya*. See NSū.

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NV = *Nyāyavārttika*, ed. Anantalal Thakur: *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*, New Delhi, 1997, Indian Council of Philosophical Research.

P = Peking. Daisetz T. Suzuki: *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto, Tokyo & Kyoto*, 1957, Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute.

PrP_{LVP} = *Prasannapadā*, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin: *Madhyamakavṛttiḥ. Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikāḥ (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, Saint Petersburg, 1903–1913, Bibliotheca Buddhica 4.

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PV 2 = *Pramāṇavārttika*, chapter 2, ed. (part.) Tilmann Vetter: *Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramāṇasiddhi-Kapitel*, Vienna, 1990 (1984¹), Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.

PVP = *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*, D no. 4217, *che* 1–326b4/P no. 5717, *che* 1–390a8.

PVT = *Pramāṇavārttikatīkā*, D no. 4220, *je* 1b1–ñe 282a7/P no. 5718, *je* 1b1–ñe 348a8.

SBhV I = *Saṅghabhedavastu*, ed. Raniero Gnoli: *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu, Being the 17th and Last Section of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin*, Rome, 1977, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.

SDA = *Satyadvayavatāra*. See Lindtner 1981.

SDV(P) = *Satyadvayavibhaṅga(pañjikā)*, ed. Ritsu Akahane: *A New Critical Edition of Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhaṅga with Śāntarakṣita's Commentary*, Vienna, 2020, Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.

SN II = *Samyuttanikāya*, ed. Léon Feer: *Samyutta-Nikāya*, part II: Nidāna-Vagga, London, 1888, Pali Text Society.

ŚŚU = *Śālistambasūtra*, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin: *Bouddhisme. Études et matériaux. Théorie des douze causes*, Gand, 1913, Librairie scientifique E. van Goethem.

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