

Zeitschrift:	Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie
Herausgeber:	Schweizerische Asiengesellschaft
Band:	77 (2023)
Heft:	1
Artikel:	Kamalala's interpretation and philosophy of the middle way
Autor:	Keira, Ryusei
DOI:	https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-1055079

Nutzungsbedingungen

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften auf E-Periodica. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen sowie auf Social Media-Kanälen oder Webseiten ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. [Mehr erfahren](#)

Conditions d'utilisation

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. La reproduction d'images dans des publications imprimées ou en ligne ainsi que sur des canaux de médias sociaux ou des sites web n'est autorisée qu'avec l'accord préalable des détenteurs des droits. [En savoir plus](#)

Terms of use

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. Publishing images in print and online publications, as well as on social media channels or websites, is only permitted with the prior consent of the rights holders. [Find out more](#)

Download PDF: 08.01.2026

ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, <https://www.e-periodica.ch>

Ryusei Keira*

Kamalaśīla's Interpretation and Philosophy of the Middle Way

<https://doi.org/10.1515/asia-2023-0006>

Received February 6, 2023; accepted October 23, 2023

Abstract: Madhyamaka philosophy is considered the philosophy of the middle way (*madhyamā pratipad*). Madhyamaka philosophers acknowledge that the middle way is free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence. However, when analyzing the way they understand the middle way, we encounter differing interpretations. In his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 24.18, Nāgārjuna says “precisely this [voidness] is the middle way (*pratipad ... madhyamā*)” (18d). According to Avalokitavrata, Bhāviveka interprets the term *pratipad madhyamā* in stanza 18d as referring to two types of middle way, i.e., a conventional type and an ultimate one, while Candrakīrti comments on stanza 18d that voidness is the middle way. When in his *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* Kamalaśīla comments on verse 18, he seems to interpret that term neither as voidness or the two types of middle way. His interpretation of the term seems to be different from Nāgārjuna's and his commentators'. In this article, in order to clarify his interpretation and philosophy of the middle way, we first analyze Kamalaśīla's comments on verse 18. Next is an examination of whether he accepts the conventional type of middle way and the ultimate type, that is, voidness (= ultimate reality) free from the two extremes, and a clarification of his central idea of the middle way and his systematization of the different types of middle way. After an analysis of his idea of the practice for eliminating the two extremes, we will lastly examine his philosophy of the middle way. These analyses will allow us to say that by means of his central idea of the middle way, Kamalaśīla systematized his Madhyamaka philosophy as the path (*mārga*) for fully achieving the understanding of the middle way.

Keywords: Kamalaśīla; middle way; *pratītyasamutpāda*; *apratiṣṭhitānirvāṇa*; *mārga*

*Corresponding author: Ryusei Keira, 2-17-1, Fujimi, Chiyoda-ku, 102-8160 Tokyo, Japan,
E-mail: r-keira@hosei.ac.jp

1 Introduction

Madhyamaka philosophy is considered the philosophy of the middle way (*madhyamā pratipad*), and how it is defined depends on the interpretation of the middle way. In Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, Madhyamaka philosophers acknowledge that the middle way is free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence. However, when analyzing the way they understand it, we encounter differing interpretations.

It is well known that in verse 18 of chapter 24 of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK), Nāgārjuna uses the term “middle way” (*pratipat ... madhyamā*); he only uses it once in the MMK. The exact quote is,

We declare dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) to be voidness (*śūnyatā*). It is dependent designation (*prajñaptir upādāya*); precisely this is the middle way.¹ (MMK 24.18)

An analysis of Nāgārjuna’s ideas and of his commentators’ interpretations reveals differences and historical developments in the interpretation of the term *pratipat madhyamā*.

Nāgārjuna characterizes the dependent origination taught by the Buddha as voidness and then says in stanzas 18cd: “It is dependent designation; precisely this is the middle way.” According to Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* (PsP), a commentary on the MMK, voidness is dependent designation; precisely this [voidness] is the middle way. That is, the voidness of intrinsic nature (*svabhāvaśūnyatā*) is dependent designation; dependent designation does not arise by intrinsic nature (*svabhāvenānutpatti*), and nonarising by intrinsic nature means voidness. Therefore, precisely this voidness characterized as nonarising by intrinsic nature (*svabhāvenāutpattilakṣaṇā śūnyatā*) is the middle way.² Nāgārjuna’s commentators such as Ch’ing-mu (青目 Pingala?) interpret this middle way as being free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence, and this interpretation seems to be

1 MMK_{Ye} 24.18: *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṁ tāṁ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //*. For an interpretation of MMK 24.18, especially stanza 18c *sā prajñaptir upādāya prajñapti* (dependent designation) amount to the same. As we will see immediately below, Candrakīrti explains in his *Prasannapadā* (PsP) that *śūnyatā* is *upādāya prajñapti*, and *upādāya prajñapti* is *śūnyatā*. See PsP: 504, 8–11 and fn. 2. Therefore, it seems possible to say that *śūnyatā* is equated with or equivalent to *upādāya prajñapti*.

2 PsP: 504, 8–11: *yā ceyāḥ svabhāvaśūnyatā sā prajñaptir upādāya / saiva śūnyatā upādāya prajñaptir iti vyavasthāpyate / cakrādīny upādāya rathāṅgāni rathāḥ prajñapyate / tasya yā svāṅgāny upādāya prajñaptih sā svabhāvenāutpattiḥ yā ca svabhāve[n]āutpattiḥ sā śūnyatā // saiva svabhāvenāutpattilakṣaṇā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipad iti vyavasthāpyate /*.

proper since this can be justified by Nāgārjuna's statements in the MMK.³ That is, when intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) is not established, extrinsic nature (*parabhāva*) is also not established, since extrinsic nature is said to be the intrinsic nature of another existent (MMK 15.3). When neither intrinsic nature nor extrinsic nature is established, there cannot be an existent (MMK 15.4ab). When the existent is not established, the nonexistent is also not established, since people say the nonexistent is the alteration of the existent (MMK 15.5).⁴ In verse 7 of the same chapter (MMK 15.7) Nāgārjuna explains that the Illustrious One (*bhagavat*) denies the two extremes of existence and nonexistence. He refers to the *Kātyāyanāvavāda*, which says that without approaching the two extremes of existence and nonexistence, the Tathāgata, by means of the middle (*majha*), gives his dharma, i.e., in this case, the teaching of the twelve-membered dependent origination (*dvādaśāṅgapratīyasamutpāda*).⁵

According to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, the term *pratipat madhyamā* used in verse 18 therefore refers to voidness (= dependent origination) in which the two extremes are eliminated.

The *Akutobhayā*, a commentary on the MMK, as well as Buddhapālita's commentary on the MMK seem to have interpreted the middle way as being established in ultimate reality (*paramārtha*).⁶ The following statements can be found at the end of the *Akutobhayā*'s comments on chapter 15 of the MMK, which are quoted as the concluding remarks at the end of the Buddhapālita's comments on the same chapter:⁷

Thus, because the view of things as existent and nonexistent will result in many faults, to see that things have no intrinsic nature is to see reality and is the middle way; and precisely this is the establishment of ultimate [reality].⁸

In his *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), a commentary on the MMK, Bhāviveka does not clearly comment upon what the term *pratipat madhyamā* used in verse 18 (MMK 24.18) refers

3 『中論』T 1564, 30, 33b18: 離有無二邊故名爲中道。For Nāgārjuna's idea of the middle way explained in MMK 24.18, See Saito 2017: 269(108)–259(118). See also Oetke 2007: 3–11.

4 MMK_{Ye} 15.3, 15.4 and 15.5: *kutah svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati / svabhāvah parabhāvasya parabhāvo hi kathyate // svabhāvaparabhāvābhāvām rte bhāvah kutah punah / svabhāve parabhāvē ca sati bhāvo hi sidhyati // bhāvasya ced aprasiddhir abhāvo naiva sidhyati / bhāvasya hy anyathābhāvam abhāvam bruvate janāh //*. See Siderits / Katsura 2013.

5 MMK_{Ye} 15.7: *Kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam / pratiṣiddhaḥ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvāvibhāvinā //*. The *Kātyāyanāvavāda* corresponds in the Pāli canon to the *Kaccāyanagotta* (SN (PTS) II: 16–17).

6 See Ye 2017: 163–170.

7 Saito 1984: 206.

8 *Akutobhayā* D61b7 (= Buddhapālita's commentary D226b3): *de ltar gang gi phyir dngos po rnams la yod pa nyid dang med pa nyid du lta ba skyon du mar 'gyur ba de'i phyir dngos po rnams ngo bo nyid med pa zhes bya ba de ni de kho na mthong ba ste / dbu ma'i lam yin la de nyid don dam pa 'grub pa yin no //*.

to. However, according to Avalokitavrata's subcommentary, i.e., *Prajñāpradīpaṭikā* (PPT), Bhāviveka does not assert that the term simply refers to voidness or ultimate reality free from the two extremes. Avalokitavrata says that the term refers to two types of middle way.

Conventionally, the middle way is [explained] in the following manner: "Whatever exists dependently on something [as a cause] is not on the one hand the same as that [cause], but neither is it different [from that cause]. Therefore, that [cause] is neither annihilated nor eternal. (MMK 18.10)" On the other hand, ultimately, the middle way is [explained] in the following manner: "Not to be attained by means of another, quiescent, not conceptualized in [various] terms, beyond conception, undifferentiated, these are the characteristics of reality. (MMK 18.9)"⁹

According to the PPT, there are two types of middle way: the conventional type and the ultimate one.¹⁰ This interpretation of Avalokitavrata does not seem to be his creation. Rather, it follows Bhāviveka's comments on verses 9 and 10 of chapter 18. In his PP, Bhāviveka regards verse 10 as explaining the characteristics of conventional reality (*kun rdzob pa'i de kho na*) and verse 9 as explaining the characteristics of ultimate reality (*don dam pa'i de kho na*).¹¹

9 PPT D242a1-2: *tha snyad du yang/gang las brten te gang 'byung ba// de ni re zhig de nyid min// de las bzhan pa'am ma yin phyir// de phyir chad min rtag ma yin// zhes bya ba'i tshul gyis dbu ma'i lam yin la/ don dam par yang/gzhan las shes min zhi ba dang// spros pa rnams kyis ma spros pa// rnam rtog med don tha dad min// de ni de nyid mtshan nyid do// zhes bya ba'i tshul gyis dbu ma'i lam yin no//. MMK_{Ye} 18.10 and 18.9: *pratītya yad yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat/ na cānyad api tat tasmān nocchinnam nāpi śāśvatam //* (MMK 18.10); *aparapratyayaṁ śāntaṁ prapañcair aprapañcitam / nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam //* (MMK 18.9). According to the PP, the term *para* (gzhan las in the verse 9a) means not only another person or others but also another means than nonconceptual wisdom. See PP D190a3 and D190a6: *de la gzhan las shes min zhes bya ba ni 'di la gzhan las shes pa med pa ste/ lung med par bdag gi mngon sum de 'gyur zhing bdag nyid kyis rang rig par bya ba zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go//* (D190a3); *gang gi phyir zhi ba de'i phyir rnam par mi rtog pa'i yi shes kyis spyod yul lo// gang gi phyir rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes kyi spyad yul yin pa de'i phyir/gzhan las* (P las: D la) *shes pa ma yin no//* (D190a6). For the meaning of *prapañca* in the MMK, see Saito 2019.*

10 See PPT D240b7-241a1: *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba bden pa gnyis kyi tshul du rnam par gzhag pa gang yin pa de stong pa nyid du bshad pa ...//*; D241b7-242a1: *rten cing 'brel par 'byung pa zhes bya ba stong pa nyid gang yin pa bten nas gdags par bya ba de nyid dbu ma'i lam ste/*. The two types of middle way seem to be established according to the two types of dependent originations established by relying on the two truths theory. See fn. 54.

11 See PP D190b1-2: *de ltar re zhig dom dam pa'i de kho na bstan pa'o// da ni kun rdzob pa bshad par bya ste/*. See also PPT D91a3-4: *de ltar re zhig don dam pa pa'i de kho na bstan to zhes bya ba ni/gzhan las shes min zhi ba dang// spros pa rnams kyis ma spros pa// rnam rtog med don tha thad min// de ni de nyid mtshan nyid do//* (MMK 18.9) *zhes bya ba de ni re zhig don dam pa pa'i de kho na'i mtshan nyid bstan pa yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro// da ni kun rdzob pa bshad par bya ste zhes bya ba la sogs pas ni/ kun rdzob pa'i de kho na'i mtshan nyid ston to//*.

Judging from verse 10 (MMK 18.10), the conventional type of middle way seems to be free from extremes such as the sameness and difference of cause and its result and the two views of annihilation (i.e., *ucchedadrṣṭi*) and eternity (i.e., *śāsvatadrṣṭi*). Conversely, verse 9 (MMK 18.9) implies that the ultimate type represents ultimate reality which is without conceptualization and free from concepts such as existence and nonexistence.

When Kamalaśīla comments on MMK 24.18 in his *Madhyamakālaṇkārapañjikā* (MAP), he, however, seems to interpret the term *pratipat madhyamā* neither as voidness free from the two extremes nor those two types of middle way. His interpretation of the term seems to be different from Nāgārjuna's and his commentators' ideas addressed above.

In this article, in order to clarify Kamalaśīla's interpretation and philosophy of the middle way, we first analyze his comments on verse 18 (MMK 24.18) quoted in Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṇkāravṛtti* (MAV) and Kamalaśīla's MAP. Next is an examination of whether Kamalaśīla accepts the conventional type of middle way and the ultimate type, that is, voidness (= ultimate reality) free from two extremes, in his texts such as *Madhyamakāloka* (MĀ), *Bhāvanākrama*(s) (BhK(s)) and *Śālistambasya Tīkā* (ŚST), and a clarification of Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the middle way. After an analysis of Kamalaśīla's idea of the practice for eliminating two extremes, we will lastly examine his philosophy of the middle way. These analyses will allow us to say that by means of his interpretation of the middle way or his central conception of it, Kamalaśīla systematized his Madhyamaka philosophy as the path (*mārga*) for fully achieving the understanding of the middle way.

2 Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of MMK 24.18

Śāntarakṣita quotes verse 18 of chapter 24 of the MMK in his auto-comment on *Madhyamakālaṇkārakārikā* (MAK) 64, which explains [correct] conventional (*kun rdzob pa; sāmvṛta*) things.¹² Although he does not comment on verse 18, Kamalaśīla's interpretation of this verse is found in his MAP. Commenting on stanzas 18ab "we declare dependent origination to be voidness," Kamalaśīla says:

It is said that dependently originated (*pratityasamutpanna*) entities themselves are void because they are without ultimate intrinsic nature, and this is not because they would have a

¹² MMK 24.18 quoted in MAV D71a1-2 P68b5: *rten cing 'brel par gang 'byung ba// de ni stong pa nyid du bshad // de ni rgyur (D rgyur: P bsgyur) byas gdags pa ste // de nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no //*. For MAK 64, see fn. 21.

nature similar to rabbits' horns. Therefore, [the voidness of the entities] is not contradictory with perceptually experienced things (*drṣṭa*) and so forth.¹³

Kamalaśīla interprets *pratīyasamutpāda* as the entities originated dependently upon causes and conditions. This interpretation shows that, just as he says in *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (TSP), *pratīyasamutpāda* and *pratīyasamutpanna* are identical.¹⁴ He goes on to say that dependently originated entities are void and not existent because they are without any ultimate intrinsic natures and not because they would have a nature similar to rabbits' horns, which are nonexistent even conventionally.¹⁵ Therefore, those entities are neither ultimately existent nor conventionally nonexistent.

13 MAP D115b1-2 P121b2-3: *rtēn cing 'brel bar 'byung pa'i dngos po rnams kho na don dam pa'i rang bzhin dang bral ba'i phyir stong pa zhes bya'i ri bong gi rwa dang 'dra ba'i bdag nyid kyi phyir ni mayin no // des na mthong ba la sogs pa dang mi 'gal lo //.*

14 For Kamalaśīla's important etymological explanation of *pratīyasamutpāda*, see Matsuoka 2019: 139–164, and see TSP_k: 15, 9–15 and TSP_{Sh}: 19, 10–16. Kamalaśīla, commenting on the term *samutpāda* of *pratīyasamutpāda* in TS 6ab, submits two kinds of interpretations: *samutpāda* as *samutpanna*, i.e., “[the entity] originated [dependently],” and *samutpāda* as *kartṛ* (agent), i.e., “[the entity which is] the producer [having depended on causes and conditions].” So, both interpretations signify an entity which stands here for all the elements of existence or dharmas. See Matsuoka 2019: 153–158 and 162–163.

15. See MĀ C217b1 D218b3-4 G303a3-4 N235b6-7 P242a2-3: *dngos po rnams rta'i rwa lta bur khas blangs pa ni mayin no // 'o na ci zhe na / sgyu ma la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid lta buryin te / de dag kyang sgyu ma la sogs pa bzhin du mngon sum kho na'o //.* For an English translation, see Keira 2004: 202, 15–18. See also MĀ C168b6-7 D169a3-5 G227b3-6 N176a4-6 P184a7-184b2: *[l'on kyang] gang la (CDP la: GN las) dus thams cad du kun rdzob tu yang rgyu med pa de ni tha snyad du yang mi skye ba nyid de / dper na ri bong gi rwa la (CDGN la: P om.) sogs pa lta bu'o // gang la yod pa de ni don dam par (GNP par: CD pa) ngo bo nyid med kyang skye ste dper na sgyu ma dang gzugs brnyan la sogs pa lta bu'o // sgyu ma la sogs pa 'di rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba yin yang dngos po nyid du thal ba ma yin te / grags pa dang tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir ro // de dang 'dra bar chos thams cad rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba yin yang dngos po nyid du thal ba ma yin pa kho na ste / tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir ro //.* For an English translation, see Keira 2004: 106, 3–107, 2: “[Rather,] [they recognize that] what never has a cause at all even conventionally would never arise, not even conventionally, just like [nonexistent things] such as rabbits' horns and the like. Whatever has [a cause] will arise even though it is ultimately without intrinsic nature, just like illusions, reflections and so forth. Although these illusions and so forth are produced depending on conditions, it does not follow that they are real entities, for that would be invalidated (*bādhita*) by what is commonly acknowledged (*prasiddha*) and by valid cognitions. Equally, although all [conventionally existent] dharmas are produced depending on conditions, it does not follow that they are real entities, as that would be invalidated by valid cognitions.” Cf. BK I: 218, 22–219 2. And see MĀ D237a1-2 P265a5-7: *sgyu ma la sogs pa bzhin du tha snyad pa'i skye ba khas blangs pas rnam pa thams cad du skye ba med pa'i phyir skye ba med par khas len pa yang ma yin la / yang dag pa pa yang ma yin pas de'i phyir mthong ba la sogs pa dang 'gal ba ma yin no //.* The voidness of entities is not contradictory with perceptually experienced things etc. because the Mādhyamikas accept the conventional arising of entities.

Next, he interprets stanzas 18cd as follows:

The phrase ‘it is dependent designation’ (18c) means that precisely this [*pratītyasamutpāda* (= dependently originated entities)] is conventional. This is because the terms ‘dependent’ and ‘designation’ are synonyms for ‘conventional [thing].’ This [phrase] (18c) is a clear indication (*khungs; jñāpaka*) that [the conventions of designation and so forth are consistent with the causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*) of those entities].¹⁶ The phrase ‘precisely this is the middle way’ (18d) means that it is said in this and that [scripture and treatise] that because one eliminates the two extremes of improper superimposition (*saṃāropa*) and improper denial (*apavāda*) [and enters the middle way], precisely this [*pratītyasamutpāda* (= dependently originate entities)] is the middle way.¹⁷

¹⁶ For the term *khungs* (*jñāpaka*), see AKBh: 245, 16–17: *kim atra jñāpakam / sūtraṇyuktiś ca /*; (AKBh_T D205a7:) *'di la khungs ci zhig yod ce na / mdo dang / rigs pa yod de /*. See also Keira 2016: 20 fn. 40.

For Śāntarakṣita’s purpose of quotation of verse 18 (MMK 24.18), see MAV ad MAK 64 D70b7-71a1 P68b3-5: *kun rdzob 'di (P 'di: D om.) ni sgra'i tha snyad tsam gyi (P gyi: D gyis) bdag nyid ma yin gyi / mthong ba dang 'dod pa'i dngos po rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba rnams ni brtag mi bzod pas yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ste / gdags pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa tha snyad de lta bur byas pa'i brda dag gis (D gis: P gi) tha snyad 'dogs par byed pa na de'i phyir don byed pa dang ci'i phyir 'gal te / 'di skad du / ... // zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o //*. “This ‘conventional [thing]’ [in MAK 64] is not of the nature of mere linguistic convention. Dependently originated entities which are perceptually experienced and determined (or desired) [according to perceptual experiences] are correct conventional [things] because [those entities] cannot endure analytical investigation [from the ultimate perspective]. When the conventions of designation (*prajñapti*) and so forth are applied according to the conventional agreements (*sanketa*) that apply [them] to such [entities], then because of the [agreements], how can [these conventions] be inconsistent with the causal efficacy [of those entities]? Thus, it is said [in MMK 24.18]” Śāntarakṣita interprets verse 18 (MMK 24.18) as showing that the conventions of designation, etc. are consistent with the causal efficacy of those entities, i.e., that the term “dependent designation” refers to correct conventional things. Kamalaśīla interprets stanza 18c as a clear indication of precisely this. According to him, the terms “dependent” and “designation” are synonyms for “conventional [things]” referring to dependently originated entities.

¹⁷ MAP D115b2-3 P121b3-5: *de ni rgyur byas gdags (D gdags: P ming gdags) pa ste // zhes bya ba ni kun rdzob de nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig ste / rgyur byas pa dang gdags pa'i sgra ni kun rdzob kyi rnam grangs yin pa'i phyir ro // 'di ni 'dir khungs yin no // de nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no zhes bya ba ni sgro 'dogs pa dang skur pa 'debs (D 'debs: P 'degs) pa'i mtha' gnyis spangs pa'i phyir / de nyid de dang de las dbu ma'i lam du gsungs so zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go //*.

For the phrase *de dang de las*, see MĀ D153b1 and Keira 2016: 42. The phrase in the MĀ can be interpreted to mean almost the same as *mdo de dang de las* (MĀ D156b7, D165a7). The phrase “this and that [scripture and treatise]” here seems to refer to scriptures and other texts which explain that dependent origination, dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) or dependently originated things are the middle way. See, for example, AMNS: 11, 26–28: *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba la 'jug pa, yod pa dang med pa dang gnyi ga'i mthar lta ba dang bral bas dbu ma'i lam du zhugs pa*. See also AMNT: 43, fn. 4: *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i lam dbu ma khong du chud pa ni rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba la 'jug pa zhes bya ba la sogs pas bstan te, rten cing 'brel bar 'byung bar 'jug ces bya ba ni de'i mtshan nyid khong du chud ces bya ba'i don to. ji ltar khong du chud ce na? yod pa dang med pa dang gnyis ka'i mtha' lta ba dang bral ba zhes bya ba smos te, chos rnams rgyu dang rkyen las byung zhing rang gis ma skyes te, ngo bo nyid med par rtogs pa'i phyir yod par lta ba dang bral ba yin la, rgyu dang rkyen gyis skyes pa tsam du med pa yang ma yin par rtogs pas med par lta ba*

One enters the middle way by eliminating the two extremes of *samāropa* and *apavāda*.¹⁸ Of the two, *samāropa* is used in the context of the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature (*nihsvabhāvatā*) of all dharmas as meaning the improper

dang bral te, gnyis ka'i mthar lta ba dang bral bas dbu ma'i lam du zhugs pa zhes bya'o. And see Kamalaśīla's comments on LAS II 191 and LAS X 150 (MĀ D152a2-153b1), in which he says that one eliminates the two extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial by understanding dependent nature. See Keira 2016: 41–42. In addition, the following sentences are found in the ASPP: 881, 4–7: *iyam Subhūte bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasyānta-dvaya-vivarjītā pratītyasamutpāda-vyavalokanā / evaṁ vyavalokayan Subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattvah pratītyasamutpādam anādy-anta-madhyam tam vyavalokayati /* According to the AAĀ, the phrase *anta-dvaya-vivarjītā pratītyasamutpāda-vyavalokanā* means the dependent origination free from the two extremes of eternity and annihilation, and the phrase *pratītyasamutpādam anādy-anta-madhyam* means the dependent origination without [ultimately] arising, existing, and ceasing. See AAĀ: 883, 20–23: *sāśvatocchedarahitatvenānta-dvaya-varjītā pratītyasm(sic!) utpāda-vyavalokanā. anādy-anta-madhyam tam iti mayopamatvena janma-nāśa-sthitivirahitam tam pratītyasamutpādaṁ vyavalokayati*.

For the Yogācāra explanation of *vastu* free from the two extremes of existence and nonexistence and the middle way, see BoBh_T: 89, 9–11: *yat punar ... bhāvābhāvābhyaṁ vinirmuktam dharmalakṣaṇasamgrhītam vastu tad advayam / yad advayaṁ tan madhyamā pratipad antadvavarjītā niruttarety ucyate //*. See also MVT: 237, 18–25.

The 大智度論 (*Da zhidu lum, *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*) translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva (350–409) quotes MMK 24.18 and offers an interpretation similar to that of Kamalaśīla: T1509, 25, 107a11–12: 因緣生法是名空相亦名假名亦名中道。“Dependently originated dharmas are said to be void of characteristics, said to be dependent designation, and said to be the middle way.” For a French translation, see Lamotte 1981: 396, 31–34.

For Ratnākaraśānti's comments on verse 18 (MMK 24.18), see MAVMPS D104b5–7 P120a7–120b3: *gang zhig rten cing 'brel par 'byung // de ni stong pa nid du bshad // de ni rgyur bcas btags pa ste // de ni dbu ma'i lam yin no // gang zhig gzhan kyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba yin la / de nyid la kun tu brtags (D brtags: P btags) pa'i ngo bo (D bo: P bos) med pa'i phyir ji ltar rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba la skur pa btab par 'gyur / nye bar len pa btags pa de nyid kyang rten cing 'brel par (D 'brel par: P om.) 'byung ba yin te / yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun tu rtog pa yod na / des nye bar len pa'i phung po la sogs pa rnams 'dogs pa'i phyir ro zhes dgongs payin no // gang zhig rten cing 'brel par 'byung / de nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no // zhes bya ba ni 'di ltar dgongs pa yin te / kun tu brtags pa'i bdag nyid thams cad med la / gzhan gyi dbang gi bdag nyid ni med pa ma yin te / de'i phyir dbu ma'i lam zhes bya'o //*. Ratnākaraśānti's interpretation of verse 18 is based on the Yogācāra idea of three natures (*trisvabhāva*). He interprets stanza 18d to mean that whatever originates dependently is the middle way.

18 See SDhNS D290b3–4 P336b5–6: *byang chub sems dpa' sgro 'dogs pa dang skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' spangs nas dbu ma'i lam la zhugs pa yin te /*. See also ŚST D151b6–152a1 P181b5–7. In his MAP D121a5–6 P128a6–7, Kamalaśīla, commenting on the YŚ k. 45, says that those who accept that dependently originated entities just like the moon on the water surface are neither real nor false will enter the middle way by eliminating the two extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial. See YŚ_{LY} k. 45: *upādāya tu ye bhāvān icchānty udakacandravat/nāpi tathyaṁ na cātathyaṁ hriyante te na drṣṭibhiḥ //*. “Those who accept that the dependently [originated] entities just like the moon on the water surface are neither real nor false will not be captured by [false] views.” See also MAP D121a5–6 P128a6–7: *gang gi tshe yang dag pa mthong ba dag yin snyam pa la / gang dag brten (D brten: P rten) nas dngos po rnams // zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so // de dag ltas mi 'phrogs zhes bya ba ni sgro 'dogs pa*

superimposition of real or ultimate nature and the like onto conventional things. In that proof, the Mādhyamikas prove the negation of the nature superimposed by others as being ultimately existent on conventional things.¹⁹ On the other hand, *apavāda* is used in his MĀ as meaning the improper denial of conventional intrinsic nature (*kun rdzob pa'i rang bzhin*), conventional dependent nature (*gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ...kun rdzob pa*), conventional arising and so forth.²⁰ Kamalaśīla asserts that those who improperly deny conventional dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) or conventional entities by erroneously understanding that they would be nonexistent even conventionally, fall into the extreme of denial. According to him, just those dependently originated entities, i.e., *pratītyasamutpāda* (= *paratantrasvabhāva*), are correct conventional things, which MAK 64 explains as “[the entities] which are acceptable only when any analytical investigation is not undertaken (**avicāraikaramaṇīya*), which possess the properties of arising and cessation and which have the capacity for causal efficacy.²¹” Those entities are correct

dang/skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' gnyis spang nas dbu ma'i lam du zhugs pa'i phyir ro (D ro: P om.)//. And see Keira 2016: 39, fn. 84.

19 See MĀ D179b5-7: *de la mn̄gon sum gyi spyod yul gyi don tha snyad pa rmi lam la sogs pa bzhin du brdzun par snang ba la yang byis pa rn̄ams kyis dngos su don dam pa pa'i ngo bo la sogs par sgro btags pa gang yin pa de la rjes su dpags pas gnod par byed kyi / mthong ba la sogs pa'i don tha snyad la yang gnod par byed pa ni ma yin no //.* For an English translation, see Keira 2004: 31. See also MĀ D214b6-7 P237b4-5: *[on kyang] gang dag ji ltar mthong ba de kho na nyid du khas len pa de dag gi log par sgro 'dogs pa bsal (D bsal: P gsal) ba'i phyir chos thams cad rmi lam lta bu nyid du sgrub pas 'gal ba med pa nyid do //* “In order to eliminate the false superimposition of them who accept things as they are seen as being real, [we = the Mādhyamikas] prove that all dharmas are just like dreams, and therefore [this proof] is not contradictory at all.”

20 MĀ C149b6-7 D149b7 G199a4 N153b3 P162b1: *kun rdzob pa'i ngo bo nyid la yang skur pa 'debs par byed pa ... /.* MĀ C153a3-4 D153a4-5 G203b6-204a1 N157a6-7 P166a7-8: *gang dag gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid ji skad bshad pa kun rdzob pa yang 'gog par byed pa de'i phyir gzhan gyi dbang ni yod pa yin no zhes gsungs so // gang zhig ji skad bshad pa'i mtha' 'di gnyis su rtog par byed pa de ni dbu ma'i lam la mi 'jug ste /* See Keira 2016: 41, 12–15. MĀ C153a7-153b1 D153a7-b1 G204a4-6 N157b3-4 P166b3-5: *gzhan gyi dbang kun rdzob tu skye ba'i phyir dang / de la brten nas sprul pas sprul pa bzhin du rnam par rtog pa gzhan skye ba'i phyir de bas na gzhan gyi dbang la brten nas su // mi rn̄ams kyis (DNP kyis) ni rnam rtog skye // zhes gsungs so // 'dis ni skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' bsal bayin te / kun rdzob pa'i skye ba la skur ba mi 'debs pa'i phyir ro //.* See Keira 2016: 42, 11–15.

21 In Kamalaśīla's Madhyamaka philosophy, *pratītyasamutpāda*, *paratantrasvabhāva* and *sāṃvṛta* ([correct] conventional [thing]) are all interpreted as referring to dependently originated entities (*vastu*). For his interpretation of *paratantrasvabhāva*, see MĀ C150a3-4 D150a4-5 G199b2-3 N153b7-154a1 P162b6-7: *de la dngos po ma brtags na (CDNP brtags na: G brtags na °brtags° na°) grags pa (CDGN pa: P om.) ji ltar snang ba (DGNP ba: C bar) sgyu ma bzhin du brten nas byung ba gang yin pa de ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yin no // de yang kun rdzob tu sgyu ma bzhin du gzhan gyi rkyen gyi dbang gis skye'i /* A parallel sentence can be found in the MMA_{LK}: 120, 9–11: *tatra yad avicāra-pratītaṃ yathādarśanam māyāvat pratītyasamutpannaṃ vastu sa paratantrāḥ svabhāvāḥ / tasya ca samvṛtyā māyāvat parapratyayabalenotpattir ... /.*

conventional things, not imagined (*parikalpita*) things and therefore are not false conventional [things] (*mithyāsaṃvṛti[sat]*); for example, *īśvara* (God) is imagined and not established even conventionally.²²

Kamalaśīla's interpretation of verse 18 (MMK 24.18) is based on his two truths theory and his interpretation of three natures (*trisvabhāva*), i.e., his idea that *pratītyasamutpāda* or *paratantrasvabhāva*, i.e., dependently originated entities, are correct conventional things and are void of ultimate intrinsic nature, and that both

For *sāṃvṛta*, see AAĀ: 637, 26–27: *kathaṇ tarhi sāṃvṛtam iti cet. arthakriyāsamartham eva hi *vastuvicāravimardākṣamatvāt sāṃvṛtam ity ucyate.* (* *vastuvicāravimardākṣamatvāt* should be emended to *vastu vicāravimardākṣamatvāt*); (AAĀ_T P292b4:) 'on na ji ltar kun rdzob yin zhe na / don gyi bya ba byed nus pa'i dngos po nyid rnam par dpyad pa'i sdungs mi bzod pa nyid yin pa'i phyir kun rdzob ces bya'o //'. See also MAK_I 64: *ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhin // skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa // don byed pa dag nus rnames kyi // rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //*.

For *tathyasamvṛti[sat]* (correct conventional [thing]), see MAV ad MAK 64 D70b7-71a1. See fn. 16. See also MĀ D230a5-6 P256b1-2: *gang yang rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba dang rjes su mthun pa rab tu brtags pa / dper na / 'dir ni (D 'dir ni: P 'di na) bdag gam sems can med // chos 'di rgyu dang bcas pa yin // zhes bya ba lta bu de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob tu yod ces bya'o /*. A parallel sentence can be found in the MMA_{KL1}: 154, 11–12: *yat punaḥ pratītyanusārataḥ prakalpitam, yathā – nāstīha sattva ātmā ca dharmās tv ete sahetukā iti, tat tathyasaṃvṛtisad ucyate /*.

For *tathyasamvṛtisatya* (correct conventional truth), see SDVK 8abc: *brtags pa'i don gyis dben gyur pa // dngos tsam brten nas gang skyes te // yang dag kun rdzob shes par bya //*. "A mere entity which is free from imagined things and arises dependently should be known as the correct conventional [truth]." See also SDVV ad k. 8abc D5b4: *de dag gis dben pa'o // dngos po tsam gang yin pa ni ji ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed nus pa'i phyir ro // rgyu dang rkyan rnames la brten nas skyes pa de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin par shes par bya ste /* "[Mere entities] are free from these imagined things. This is because the mere entities [free from imagined things] have the capacity for causal efficacy according to appearances. [Mere entities] originated dependently on causes and conditions should be known as the correct conventional truth."

22 For *mithyāsaṃvṛti[sat]* (false conventional [thing]), see MĀ D230a4-5 P256a8-b1: *bstan bcos byed pa kha cig gis grags pa las 'das te / dngos po rnames brtags (P brtags: D brtag) pa la sogs pa'i ngo bor nye bar brtags pa gang yin pa de ni log pa'i kun rdzob tu yod ces bya ste / de ni grags par yang med pa'i phyir ro //*. A parallel sentence can be found in the MMA_{KL1}: 154, 9–11: *yat punaḥ kaiścic chāstrakāraḥ pratītim ullaṅghya bhāvānām nityādirūpam upakalpitam tat mithyāsaṃvṛtisad ucyate / pratītito 'pi tasyāsattvāt /*. See also MAP D115a7-b1 P121a8-b1: *grags pa las 'das te rtogs pa dper na dbang phyug la sogs par rtogs pa gang yin pa de ni log pa'i (D log pa'i: P log pa pa'i) kun rdzob yin no //*. And see TĀ D272b3-4: *gang du grags pa las 'das te // dngos po'i ngo bo rtag la sogs // de dag rnames kyis brtags pa de // log pa'i kun rdzob nyid du 'dod // des na dngos po'i cig shos ni // yang dag kun rdzob yin par smra //*. "It is accepted that the things which deviate from common understanding and are imagined by the [authors of philosophical treatises] as being with permanent and other natures are false conventional [things]. Therefore, it is explained that the entities different [from those things] are correct conventional [things]."
Cf. SDVK 8d: *yang dag ma yin (SDVK ma yin: k. 8d of SDVV min ni) kun brtags yin //*. "Imagined things are not the correct conventional [truth]."

improper superimposition on these entities and improper denial of them should be eliminated.²³ Judging from this, it is *pratītyasamutpāda*, i.e., dependently originated entities, rather than voidness, that should be regarded as the main theme in his interpretation of verse 18. Kamalaśīla does not seem to interpret verse 18 as explaining the meaning of “voidness” (*śūnyatārtha*).²⁴

By eliminating the two extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial, one enters the middle way. So what does it mean to “enter the middle way?” Kamalaśīla says that to enter the middle way is to enter the middle way disclosed by eliminating the two extremes.²⁵ And according to *Akṣayamatinirdeśatīkā* (AMNT), a commentary on the *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra* (AMNS) from the standpoint of Yogācāra philosophy, to understand *pratītyasamutpāda*, i.e., the middle way, is explained by phrases such as “to enter *pratītyasamutpāda*,” and the phrase “to enter *pratītyasamutpāda*” means to understand the characteristic of *pratītyasamutpāda*.²⁶ Taking this explanation in the AMNT into account, it can be said that in Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamaka philosophy, to enter *pratītyasamutpāda* is to understand the characteristic or reality of *pratītyasamutpāda*, i.e., its reality of being neither ultimately existent/arising nor conventionally nonexistent/nonarising. Therefore, to enter or understand the middle way is to understand this reality of *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is disclosed by eliminating the two extremes and is considered the middle way.

23 See fn. 21 and fn. 31.

24 Candrakīrti interprets verse 18 as explaining the meaning of “voidness” (*śūnyatārtha*). See MMK 24.7 and PsP: 491, 8–18. See also Saito 1998: 31–40.

For Ratnākaraśānti’s interpretation of verse 18 (MMK 24.18) in his MAVMPS, see fn. 17. His interpretation of verse 18 is based upon the Yogācāra idea of three natures. In his interpretation of this verse, it is clear that *pratītyasamutpāda* or *paratantrasvabhāva*, not voidness, is the main theme. In this respect, his interpretation is similar to that of Kamalaśīla. Ratnākaraśānti interprets stanza 18d to mean that whatever originates dependently is the middle way.

25 See BhK I: 197, 8–9: *saṁāropāpavādāntavivarjanena madhyamā pratipad udbhāvitā* / . “By eliminating the [two] extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial, the middle way is disclosed.”

26 AMNT: 43, fn. 4. See fn. 17. For the authorship of AMNT, see Braarvig 1993b: cxxix, 15–17: “It may be asserted as a possibility, then, that [= AMNT] was written by Sthiramati or some Yogācāra adherent later than him, who was very well versed in the early Yogācāra literature.”

Since the AMNT says that the characteristic of *pratītyasamutpāda* is understood by eliminating the two extreme views of existence and nonexistence, in the AMNT it seems to mean its characteristic of being neither existent nor nonexistent. In his MVT, on the other hand, Sthiramati says that the two characteristics of [dependently originated] entities, i.e., being substantially (*dravyatas*) or ultimately nonexistent and [conventionally] existent in terms of designation (*prajñaptitas*), are the middle (*madhya*) between existence and nonexistence. See MVT: 237, 23–25: *ataś cāstitvanāstitvayor madhyam dravyataḥ paramārthataś ca nāsti prajñaptito 'stīti ubhayalakṣaṇam bhavati* / .

Kamalaśīla comments on stanza 18d that precisely this [*pratītyasamutpāda* (= dependently originated entities)] is the middle way. This comment should therefore be understood to mean that this reality of *pratītyasamutpāda* or these entities is the middle way.

3 Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of the Middle Way

Commenting on stanza 18d *de nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no* (MMK 24.18d), Bhāviveka says that the term *dbu ma* (*madhyamā*) refers to the elimination of extremes such as arising and nonarising, existence and nonexistence, permanence and impermanence, and voidness and non-voidness.²⁷ In contrast, Kamalaśīla, in his *Madhyamaka* texts, says consistently that by eliminating the two extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial, one enters the middle way.²⁸ Below, then, from the perspective of the elimination of superimposition and denial, we will examine whether he accepts the conventional type of middle way and the ultimate type, that is, voidness (= ultimate reality) free from the two extremes, and will clarify the characteristics of Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the middle way.

First, with regard to the conventional type of middle way, Avalokitavrata says that at the conventional level, extremes such as annihilation and eternity are both eliminated. Kamalaśīla also accepts that improper denial and some type of improper superimposition are both eliminated at the [correct] conventional level. Therefore, it is possible to say that he also accepts this conventional type of middle way.

The improper denial of conventional intrinsic nature and dependent arising can be eliminated by understanding correct conventional truth or entities' conventional dependent nature. In the MĀ, on the other hand, Kamalaśīla appears to assert that there are two types of improper superimpositions. Although he uses the term *samāropa* as meaning the superimposition of ultimate nature and the like on conventional things, he also uses the term to mean to superimpose an entity (*bhāva*) with permanence or another nature onto the completely deceptive things which do not exist even conventionally.²⁹ That is, he uses the term as meaning others' imagination

²⁷ See PP D230b5-6: *dbu ma ni skye ba dang/skye ba med pa dang/yod pa dang/med pa'i mtha' gnyis spangs pa'i phyir/'di lta ste/skyes payang mayin/ma skyes payang mayin/yod payang mayin/med payang mayin/rtag pa yang mayin/mi rtaq pa yang mayin/stong pa yang mayin/mi stong pa yang mayin pas/....*

²⁸ See SDhNS D290b3-4 P336b5-6, ŚST D151b6-152a1 P181b5-7. MAP D115b3 P121b4, MAP D121a5-6 P128a7 and BhK I: 197, 9–10. See fn. 18.

²⁹ MĀ C149b7-150a1 D149b7-150a1 G199a4-5 N153b3-4 P162b1-2: *dam pa ma yin pa'i bstan bcos mnyan pa la sogs pa la mngon par zhen pas blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur pa gang dag kun rdzob tu yod pa ma yin pa brdzun pa kho na la yang rtag pa la sogs pa'i dngos por sgro 'dogs shing ... //* “Those whose

of a permanent entity and the like, although these are completely deceptive or false conventional things. For the Mādhyamikas, false conventional things are unacceptable and negated not only at the ultimate level but also at the correct conventional level; as stated in Jñānagarbha's SDVV and Śāntarakṣita's SDVP, the mere entities (*vastumātra*) free from imagined (*parikalpita*) things are known as correct conventional truth.³⁰ Interpreting the absence of nature concerning characteristics (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*) of the three kinds of non-nature (*trividhā niḥsvabhāvatā*), Kamalaśīla also says "Establishing that the conventional dependent nature is void of imagined [permanent and impermanent] natures as explained earlier, he (= the Illustrious One) also shows undeniable conventional natures . . .".³¹

Kamalaśīla also says that one should not accept the views of annihilation and eternity. Those who accept that things have intrinsic natures characterized as not being made by causes and conditions, i.e., as permanent and unchanging, although accepting that things arise, change and cease, have inevitably a self-contradiction. That is, because of accepting intrinsic natures, they necessarily have the view that things would be eternal and unchanging or the view that things' permanent and unchanging intrinsic natures would be annihilated when things arise or cease, i.e., change from nonexistent to existent or from existent to nonexistent.³² These two views can be understood to be the two extremes caused by imagination or improper superimposition of intrinsic natures and therefore seem to be different from the two extremes consisting of improper superimposition and improper denial.

In the MAV on MAK 82, the eternity and annihilation of entities are negated not only at the ultimate level but also at the correct conventional level. That is, since both are established in dependence on entities, when entities are not established at the ultimate level, their eternity and annihilation are not ultimately established. Moreover, at the correct conventional level, their eternity is negated due to the fact that entities momentarily arise and cease, and their annihilation is negated because

minds became confused by their attachment to [things] such as the hearing of untrue treatises, superimpose permanent and [impermanent natures of] entities onto the completely deceptive things which do not exist [even] conventionally . . .".

³⁰ See SDVK 8abc and SDVV D5b4. See fn. 21. See also SDVP D23b2.

³¹ MĀ C151a6-7 D151a6-7 G201a5 N155a5 P164a5-6: *gzhan gyi dbang ngo bo nyid kun rdzob pa la ji skad bshad pa'i kun brtags pa'i bdag nyid kyis dben pa sgrub cing skur ba mi 'debs pa'i kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yang ston pa yin gyi / . . .* See Keira 2009: 17, 2016: 33.

³² See MMK_{ye} 15.10 and 15.11: *asti śāśvatagrāho nāstīti ucchedadarśanam / tasmād astitvanāstitve nāśrayeta vicakṣanāḥ / asti yad dhi svabhāvena na tan nāstīti śāśvatam / nāstīdānīm abhūt pūrvam ity ucchedaḥ prasajyate //*.

the continuous stream of their dependent origination or causality has neither beginning nor end.³³

Moreover, in his ŚST, Kamalaśila, commenting on the Śālistambasūtra's words *anyonyahetuko 'nyonyapratyayo* (different causes [and] different conditions), *na nityo* (not permanent), *naivānityo* (not impermanent), *na saṃskṛto* (not conditioned), *nāsaṃskṛto* (not unconditioned), *nāhetuko nāpratyayo* (not causeless, not conditionless), etc., explains the elimination of extremes at the [correct] conventional level.³⁴ At the end of that section, he says "Those words [of the sūtra] eliminate the extremes of superimposition, denial, eternity, and annihilation, and are suitably applied."³⁵ The sūtra's words *anyonyahetuko 'nyonyapratyayo, na nityo*, etc., explain the elimination of improper superimposition. The superimposition here means to imagine permanent or single entities such as *īśvara* (God) as the cause of everything and to imagine a permanent entity that exists eternally.³⁶ The sūtra's words

33 See MAV ad MAK 82 D76a3-4 P75a4-6: *don dam par rtag pa dang chad pa dag gi skabs med pa nyid de / de gnyis (D gnyis: P nyid) ni dngos po la brten pa yin pas dngos po med (P med: D yod) na de dag lta ga la yod / kun rdzob kyi bden pa la brten nas ni snga ma snga ma'i skad cig log na skad cig gzhān dan gzhān 'byung bas dngos po rnams la thog ma dang tha ma med de / phyi rol pa dag 'dod pa dang 'dra bas de gnyis shin tu yod par mi 'gyur ro //*. See also MAK, 82: *de phyi rtag chad lta ba rnams // gzhung 'di la ni ring du gnas // ldog dang rjes su 'jug pa yang // sa bon myu gu lcug sogs bzhin //*. "Therefore, the [two] views of eternity and annihilation are rejected in our [Mādhyamika] doctrine. [All entities' momentary] ceasing and momentary arising following [the ceasing] are just like [the relationship of things such as] a seed, a sprout and a branch." The MAK 82 explains only the negation of those two views at the correct conventional level. See MAP ad MAK 82 D125a2 P133a3-4: *de nyid kyi phyi kun rdzob tu yang rtag pa dang / chad pa med par yang 'grub (D 'grub: P grub) po zhes bstan pa'i phyi / de phyi rtag chod lta ba rnams // zhes bya ba smos te / ...*.

34 ŚST D160a1-160b2 P191b5-192a8. For an English translation, see Schoening 1995: 312, 10–314, 11. The English translation of *anyonyahetuko 'nyonyapratyayo* follows Kamalaśila's comment on these terms. See ŚST D160a2 P191b5-6: *rgyu gzhān dang gzhān las 'byung ba / rkyen gzhān dang gzhān las byung pa zhes bya ba ni rgyu mthun pa'i rnam pa dang mi mthun pa'i rnam pa tha dad pa mang po'i phyi /*. Kamalaśila says that *anyonyahetuko 'nyonyapratyayo* are stated because of the many different similar and dissimilar causes. See Schoening 1995: 312, 13–16. See also 大乘稻莘經隨聽疏 (*Da cheng dao gan jing sui ting shu*) written by Chos grub (法成), a Chinese subcommentary on ŚST: T2782, 85, 554a2-3: 言互相爲因互相爲緣者。爲有衆多相似因及不相似因故。 "[The sūtra] says: 'reciprocal causes and reciprocal conditions (互相爲因互相爲)' This is because the many different similar and dissimilar causes are existent."

According to 大乘稻莘經隨聽疏, this part of ŚST explains the elimination of two extremes (離二邊) at the conventional level (世俗). See Chos grub's analysis of the content of ŚST: (549a14-15) 總攝門第六明云何所知。文分爲二。一勝義。二世俗。(549c24-25) 次明第二世俗。而觀因緣文分爲二。初標。後釋。(550b12) 第二此明釋文二。初外(因緣法)。後內(因緣法)。(551c19-20) 第二明 內因緣法。文分爲二。一因相應。二緣相應。(552a17-20) 第二明緣相應義文八。一從種種無常因所生門。二從能成緣所生門。三從 無作者緣所生門。四辯體。五釋名。六續支。七離二邊。八束因。

35 ŚST D160b1-2 P192a7-8: *tshig de dag gis ni sgro btags pa (P pa: D ba) dang /* skur pa (P pa: D ba) dang / (P /: D om.) rtag pa dang chad pa'i mtha' sel te / ci rigs su sbyar ro // (* PT553 48b2 dang /: DP om.)*

nāsaṃskṛto, nāhetuko nāpratyayo, and others seem to mean the elimination of improper denial.³⁷

Next, with regard to the ultimate type of middle way, i.e., voidness (= ultimate reality) free from extremes, Kamalaśīla in the BhK I says that when neither the concept (*vikalpa*) of existence nor that of nonexistence arises for a yogin, the yogin sees ultimate reality. Therefore, Kamalaśīla accepts that ultimate reality is free from these two concepts.

In his BhK I, Kamalaśīla, quoting *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (LAS) X 258ab, describes the state of the yogin who, abiding in the nonappearance of all dharmas including nondual cognition (*advayajñāna*), sees ultimate reality.³⁸ Verse 258ab states, “The yogin’s state is effortless, quiescent (*sānta*), and purified by his vows.” Commenting on the term *sānta* in this verse, Kamalaśīla says:

It is said: [the yogin’s state is] quiescent. This is because conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) characterized by concepts such as existence and nonexistence has ceased.³⁹ That is, when the yogin, examining by means of wisdom, does not perceive any intrinsic natures of existent things, then for this [yogin], the concept of existence does not arise at all. The concept of nonexistence is also not established at all in this [yogin]. If an existent thing were to be seen [by this yogin] at a certain time, then by negating the [existent thing], the concept of nonexistence would arise [for this yogin]. When, however, in the three times [of past, present and future], the yogin, examining by means of the eye of wisdom, does not perceive any existent thing, then how could [the yogin], by negating it, produce the concept of nonexistence? In the same manner, no other concepts arise for the [yogin] in that case, because all concepts are pervaded by the concepts of existence and nonexistence and because when the pervader (*vyāpaka*) is negated, the pervaded things (*vyāpya*) are not established. The above is the supreme nonconceptual meditation.⁴⁰

36 See ŚST D160a2 P191b6: *rtag pa'am / gcig pu'am / dbang phyug la sogs pa rgyur sgro btags pa'i mtha' ... /* D160a3 P191b7-8: *ther zug tu gnas pa'i rtag par sgro 'dogs pa ... //*. Īśvara (God) is regarded as an improper cause (*viśamahetu*). For *viśamahetu*, see MV Bh and MV T ad MV 3-18cd: *punar hetuphalā-yāsānāropānapavādataḥ // (3-18cd)*. MV Bh: 45, 22: *tatra hetusamāropāḥ saṃskārādīnāḥ viśamahetu-kalpanāt /*. MV T: 148, 15-16: *tatra hetusamāropāḥ / avidyādīn hitvā puruṣeśvarāṇupradhānādīnāḥ hetutvakalpanāt /*. Kamalaśīla refers to the *viśamahetu* (*mi mthun pa'i rgyu*) in the ŚST D154b3 P185a1-2: *kun rdzob tu ji ltar mu stegs can rnams kyis 'di rgyu med pa dang / mi mthun pa'i rgyu la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid du yongs su brtags pa de ltar med pas ... /*.

37 See ŚST D160a4-5 P192a1-3: *'dus ma byas ma yin zhes bya ba ni sgyu ma ltar so sor nges pa'i rgyu dang rkyen dag tshogs pas byas pa'i phyir ro // rgyu med pa ma yin rkyen med pa ma yin zhes bya ba ni rgyu dang rkyen so sor nges pa la ltos (D ltos: P bltos) pa'i phyir ro //*. “The term ‘not unconditioned’ is used because [dharmas] like illusions are made by the complex of particular causes and conditions. The phrase ‘not causeless, not conditionless’ is used because [dharmas] depend on particular causes and conditions.”

38 When the yogin abides in the cognition where even nondual cognition itself does not appear, then due to his abiding in ultimate reality, he sees ultimate reality. See Kamalaśīla’s comment on LAS X 257cd, i.e., BhK I: 211, 19-23. See also Keira 2004: 76-77.

39 See MMK 18.9 which explains the characteristics of ultimate reality. For MMK 18.9, see fns. 9 and 11.

The concept of existence does not arise for the yogin examining things from the ultimate perspective, because the yogin does not see any intrinsic natures of existent things, i.e., improperly superimposed ultimate intrinsic natures. Therefore, it is clear that the yogin eliminates the improper superimposition of ultimate intrinsic natures.

Moreover, Kamalaśīla here says that for the yogin, the concept of nonexistence does also not arise at all. It is however not clear whether Kamalaśīla is saying that the yogin can eliminate an improper denial at the ultimate level. For, in his *Madhyamaka* philosophy, the elimination of an improper denial is explained in the following manner: since dependently originated entities appear conventionally and are accepted as existent at the correct conventional level, one can eliminate the improper denial of conventionally existent entities. It is not regarded as an improper denial to deny an improperly superimposed ultimate existent thing.

Therefore, although Kamalaśīla accepts that ultimate reality is free from the concepts of existence and nonexistence, it is not clear whether he here is saying that the ultimate reality is free not only from improper superimposition but also from improper denial.

In BhK I quoted above, the concept of nonexistence is eliminated by means of the view expressed in verses such as MMK 15.5ab: “When the existent is not [ultimately] established, the nonexistent is also not [ultimately] established.”⁴¹ In the later *Mādhyamika* texts, it is also said that when the object to be negated is not existent, its negation is also not existent.⁴² Therefore, the elimination of these two concepts at the

40 BhK I: 214, 10–21: *sānteti bhāvābhāvādivikalpalakṣaṇasya prapañcasyopasamāt / tathā hi yadā prajñayā nirūpayan na kiñcid bhāvavabhāvam upalabhatē yogī, tadāya naiva bhāvavikalpo bhavati / abhāvavikalpo 'pi tasya nāsty eva / yadi bhāvāḥ kadācid drṣṭo bhavati, evam sati tanniṣedhenābhāvavikalpaḥ pravartate / yadā tu kālatraye 'pi bhāvo yoginā prajñācakṣuṣā nirūpayatā nopalabdhāḥ / tadā kathaṁ tasya pratiṣedhenābhāvavikalpaṁ kurvīta / evam anye 'pi vikalpās tadā tasya na samutpadyanta eva bhāvābhāvavikalpābhyaṁ sarvavikalpasya vyāptatvād / vyāpakābhāve ca vyāpyasyāsambhavāt / ayam asau paramanirvikalpo yogah /.*

41 For MMK 15.5, see fn. 4. In the MĀ, Kamalaśīla states that attachment to nonexistence is preceded by attachment to existence. See MĀ C152b2-3 D152b2-3 G203a1-3 N156b3-4 P165b3-4: *dngos po med par mngon par zhen pa* (CDGN *zhen pa*: P *om.*) 'di *dngos por mngon par zhen pa sngon du* 'gro ba can yin *par mdo las brjod de* / *ji skad du* / 'phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las / *med pa* (CDNP *pa*: G *par*) *yod pa'i zlas drangs te* // *yod pa'ang med pa'i* (DGNP *pa'i*: C *pa'a*) *zlas drangs so* // *de phyir med par brjod mi bya* // *yod pa nyid du'ang mi brtag* (DGNP *brtag*: C *rtag*) *go* // *zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o* /. In the MAV D73b2-3 P72a1-2, Śāntarakṣita says about MMK 15.5: *gzhan yang dngos po ma grub na de la ltos* (D *ltos*: P *bltos*) *nas rab tu brtags pa bdag gi dngos po de kho na la* (D *dngos po de kho na la*: P *de kho na*) *dngos po med pa la sogs pa yang med pa nyid do* /. “Moreover, when existence is not [ultimately] established, the nonexistence and so forth of just that existence, which have a nature imagined dependently on [existence], are also not established at all.” Cf. Ichigo 1985: 236, 17–18.

42 See SDVK 9cd: *dgag bya yod pa ma yin pas* (SDVK *pas*: SDVV *phyir*) // *yang dag tu na bkag med gsal* /. A parallel verse can be found in the AAĀ: 45, 6: *niṣedhyābhāvataḥ spaṣṭaṁ na niṣedho 'sti tattvataḥ*. See also MAK_I 72ab: *yul med pa la dgag pa yi* // *sbyor ba legs pa yod ma yin* //.

ultimate level is established by eliminating only the improper superimposition of ultimate existent things like ultimate intrinsic natures.⁴³

The elimination of these two concepts at the ultimate level is established from understanding ultimate reality and not from an understanding of correct conventional reality. Therefore, in this elimination, because conventional reality is not taken into account, it is possible to say that the elimination of those two concepts at the ultimate level, i.e., ultimate type of middle way, is separated from conventional reality.

For Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, voidness is the middle way. In the MĀ, a similar idea is accepted when Kamalaśīla and, according to a Tibetan interpretation, Śāntarakṣita quote the following sentences of the *Ratnakūṭasūtra* and criticize the Yogācāra interpretation of the middle way:⁴⁴

Oh Kāśyapa! The idea of being permanent – this is one extreme.
 Oh Kāśyapa! The idea of being impermanent – this is a second extreme.
 Oh Kāśyapa! ...The idea of being existent – this is one extreme.
 Oh Kāśyapa! The idea of being nonexistent – this is a second extreme.⁴⁵

Interpreting the meaning of these sentences, Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita say:

The [sentences of the sūtra] ...explain the realm of truth (*dharmadhātu*), which is free from all [kinds of] paired extremes, is characterized as the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas, and is without conceptual proliferation.⁴⁶

43 See Ye 2017: 174, 5–9. In his PsP on the MMK 24.18, Candrakīrti also says that the extremes of existence and nonexistence are both eliminated by understanding nonarising by intrinsic nature (*svabhāvenānupatti*). See PsP: 504, 11–14: *yasya hi svabhāvenānupattis tasyāstivābhāvah / svabhāvena cānutpannasya vigamābhāvān nāstivābhāva iti / ato bhāvābhāvāntadvayaparahitavāt sarvasvabhāvānupattilakṣaṇā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipan madhyamo mārga ity ucyate //*. As explained earlier, Śāntarakṣita negates the eternity and annihilation of entities at the ultimate level, by showing that entities are not ultimately established, i.e., by eliminating the improper superimposition of ultimate entities. See fn. 33 and MAV D76a3. Kamalaśīla in the MAP says that the view of eternity is established by an attachment to the erroneous idea that entities would exist eternally, and the view of annihilation is established by an attachment to the idea that the view of eternity should be negated. See MAP D125a3-4 P133a5-6: *de gnyis (P gnyis: D nyid) ni dngos po la brten pa yin pas zhes bya ba ni rtag pa dang chad pa dag ste / 'di ltar dngos po rtag tu yod par mngon par shen pa 'di ni rtag par lta ba yin la / de nyid ldog par mngon par zhen pa'i phyir chad par lta ba yin pas de gnyis ni dngos po la brten pa yin no //*.

44 According to bsTan dar's *dBu ma snang ba'i brjed tho* (BNJ) and the Tibetan comments inserted in the GNP editions of the MMA, the MĀ D157a6-158b4 explains the ideas of Śāntarakṣita. See BNJ 93a5-93b1 and Keira 2016: 61, fn. 137. For the MĀ's criticism of the Yogācāra interpretation of the middle way, see MĀ D157b6-158b4 and Keira 2016: 64–73.

45 MĀ C157b5-6 D157b6-7 G210b2-3 N162b3-4 P171b5-6: *des na yang de nyid las / 'od srungs rtag ces bya ba 'di ni mtha' gcig go // 'od srungs mi rtag ces bya ba 'di ni mtha' gnyis pa'o // 'od srungs ...yod ces bya ba 'di ni mtha' gcig go // 'od srungs med ces bya ba 'di ni mtha' gnyis pa'o //*. See Keira 2016: 64, fn. 144.

Kamalaśīla and Śāntarakṣita explain that the realm of truth is free from all kinds of paired extremes. It is understandable that at the ultimate level, the realm of truth is free from improperly superimposed ultimate existence. However, it is not clear whether they are saying that at the ultimate level it is also free from the improper denial of conventional existence.

When they eliminate the extreme of nonexistence, they rely on the view expressed in verses such as MMK 15.5ab. When ultimately existent things are not established, neither is their nonexistence ultimately established.⁴⁷ Therefore, the elimination of the two extremes of existence and nonexistence is established by eliminating only the extreme of existence, i.e., improperly superimposed ultimate existence.

When these extremes are both eliminated at the ultimate level, because conventional reality is not taken into account, it is possible to say that the elimination of those extremes at the ultimate level, i.e., ultimate type of middle way, is separated from conventional reality.

As explained above, Kamalaśīla accepts both types of middle way, i.e., the conventional type and the ultimate one. However, while he accepts a conventional type of middle way, which is free from the two extremes of improper superimposition and

46 MĀ C157b7-158a1 D158a1-2 G210b5-6 N162b5-6 P171b7-172a1: *de ni ... chos kyi dbyings mtha' gnyis po thams cad dang bral ba / chos ma lus pa ngo bo nyid med pa'i mtshan nyid spros pa med pa rjod par byed pa yin no //*. See Keira 2016: 68.

47 MĀ C158a3-5 D158a4-6 G211a2-6 N163a1-5 P172a3-7: *gal te dbu ma la sems kyi rang gi ngo bo bdag nyid kyi dngos po don dam pa ci yang rung ba zhig yod par gyur na ni de'i tshe de la de yod pas rtag go zhes bya ba'am / mi rtag go zhes bya bar mngon par zhen pa yang ji ltar mthar 'gyur te / ... gal te dbu ma la dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo med na med do zhes bya bar 'dzin pa yang mthar mi 'gyur ro snyam du sems na / de yang rigs pa ma yin te / (CD te /: GNP te / med do zhes bya bar 'dzin pa yang rigs pa ma yin te /) med do zhes bya bar 'dzin pa yang yod par 'dzin pa med na med pa yin pa'i phyir ro //*. "If a certain ultimate entity consisting of the nature of mind were to be established with regard to the middle (*dbu ma*), then since the [ultimate entity] exists in that [middle], how would it be an [incorrect] extreme that one has attachment [to its existence] by thinking that it is permanent or that it is impermanent? ... If you say: 'When the nature of an [ultimate] entity does not exist in the middle, it could not be an [incorrect] extreme that one understands that it is nonexistent,' [then we reply that] it is not correct. This is because when it is not established that one understand that it is existent, it is also not established that one understands that it is nonexistent." See Keira 2016: 69–70. In his APDhT, Kamalaśīla, by quoting MMK 15.5, explains that the realm of truth is free from [the two extremes of] existence and nonexistence. See APDhT P172b4-7: *chos kyi dbyings kyi mtshan nyid med pa de la dngos por yang yang dag par rjes su mi mthong ba ni / de la yod pa'i ngo bo gang yang mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro // dngos po med par yang yang dag par rjes su mi mthong ba ni dngos po mi mthong ba ni dngos po mi dmigs pa'i phyir de rnam par bcad pas 'thob pa dngos po med pa'i ngo bo yang med pa'i phyir ro // yod pa las gzhān pa ni med pa'i mthan nyid yin pas yod pa ma grub na de yang ma grub pa nid de / dper na gal te yod pa ma grub na / med pa 'grub par mi 'gyur te / yod las gzhān pa'i dngos po ni // med pa'o zhes skye bo smra / (MMK15.5) zhes bshad pa lta bu'o //*.

improper denial, it is not clear whether he accepts that the ultimate type is free not only from improper superimposition but also from improper denial.

In addition to these two types of middle way, Kamalaśīla, as explained earlier, accepts another type of middle way consisting in the idea that dependently originated entities are neither ultimately existent nor conventionally nonexistent.

In Kamalaśīla's *Madhyamaka* philosophy which explains the path (*mārga*) leading to omniscience (*sarvajñatva*), it is characteristic that these three different types of middle way are systematically arranged. The following sentences in BhK III are important for understanding Kamalaśīla's central idea of the middle way and his systematization of those three types of middle way:

Although all these dharmas do not ultimately arise, nonetheless [these dharmas] just like illusions [conventionally] arise as the various things acceptable only when any analytical investigation is not undertaken, by the force of the complex of particular and various causes and conditions. Therefore, it does not follow that the view of annihilation [would be established], nor does it follow that the extreme of improper denial [would be established]. And because when by means of wisdom (*prajñā*), one analytically investigates [dharmas from the ultimate perspective], no [dharmas can] be perceived, it does not follow that the view of eternity [would be established], nor does it follow that the extreme of improper superimposition [would be established].⁴⁸

Dharmas do not ultimately arise but they do arise conventionally. By understanding their conventional arising or dependent nature, then, one does not have the view of annihilation, nor does one fall into the extreme of improper denial of conventional arising or dependent nature. In contrast, when one, by means of wisdom, investigates dharmas analytically from the ultimate perspective, because no dharmas can be perceived as being truly existent, that is, as having an ultimate or permanent intrinsic nature, one does not have a view of eternity, nor does one fall into the extreme of improper superimposition of ultimately existent things. As explained earlier, the view of eternity and one of the two types of improper superimposition, i.e., imagination of false conventional things, can also be eliminated at the correct conventional level. Therefore, from Kamalaśīla's text quoted above, it is possible to infer that his central idea as regards the middle way is that all dharmas do not ultimately arise but do arise conventionally and that he asserts on the basis of this that one can/should understand not only the elimination of improper superimposition and improper denial but also the elimination of the views of annihilation and eternity.

⁴⁸ BhK III: 11, 23–12, 5: *yadi nāmāmī dharmāḥ sarva eva paramārthato 'nutpannāḥ, tathāpi māyāvat pratinivatavividhahetupratyayasāmagrīvaśena vicitrā evāvicāraramāṇyāḥ pravartante / tena no-cchedadrṣṭiprasāṅgo nāpy apavādāntasya / yataś ca prajñayā vicāryamāṇā nopalabhyante, tena na śāśvatadrṣṭiprasāṅgo nāpi samāropāntasya /.*

Although Kamalaśīla does not mention here the two types of middle way, the conventional type and the ultimate one, it is clear that each of these two types can also be understood from central idea. That is, on the one hand, one can understand the conventional type of middle way, because one can eliminate not only improper denial of conventional dharmas by understanding their conventional arising and existence but also the imagination of false conventional things, i.e., improper superimposition, by understanding that correct conventional dharmas or entities themselves are free from imagined false conventional things. On the other hand, the ultimate type can also be understood, because when no dharmas are perceived ultimately, improper superimposition of ultimately existent things is eliminated.

Kamalaśīla thus systematically arranged three different types of middle way by establishing dharmas' conventional arising and ultimate nonarising as the central idea as regards the middle way and by thinking that each of the two types of middle way, the conventional type and the ultimate one, can/should be understood from that idea.⁴⁹

4 Practice for Eliminating Superimposition and Denial

4.1 Meditation on the Two Aspects of *pratītyasamutpāda*

In his ŚST, Kamalaśīla explains how one should meditate on *pratītyasamutpāda* in order to enter the middle way by eliminating the extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial.

One should understand *pratītyasamutpāda* in terms of its two aspects (*tshul*; **rūpa*), i.e., ultimate and conventional aspects, in order to eliminate the [two] extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial. If one meditates only on its ultimate aspect, one falls into the extreme of improper denial and abides in the view of annihilation or in the *nirvāṇa* of śrāvakas. If one meditates only on its conventional aspect, one falls into the extreme of

49 Three different types of middle way can be found in the 成實論 (*Cheng shi lun*, **Tattvasiddhi*) of Harivarman (A.D. 3-4c). First, for the middle way consisting in the idea of entities' ultimate nonexistence and conventional existence, see 成實論 T1646, 32, 316c10-11: 若第一義諦故說無。世諦故說有。名捨二邊行於中道。 Second, the ultimate middle way, i.e., voidness free from the views of eternity and annihilation, is explained in p. 317b9-10: 正修習空則無我見。我見無故則無二邊。 Lastly, the conventional middle way is explained in, for example, p. 327b18-21: 以世諦故得成中道。所以者何。五陰相續生故不斷。念念滅故不常。離此斷常名爲中道。如經中說。見世間集則滅無見。見世間滅則滅有見。 It is not clear whether just like Kamalaśīla, Harivarman systematically arranged these three types.

improper superimposition. By reason of these, if one meditates on both its aspects, one enters the middle way by eliminating both extremes.⁵⁰

The ultimate (*paramārtha*) and the conventional (*samvṛti*) represent the two aspects of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Of the two, it is its ultimate aspect that dharmas or entities do not arise in the three times of past, present and future. On the members of twelve-membered dependent origination, Kamalaśīla says:

Although ignorance (*avidyā*) and so forth [i.e., dharmas] just like illusions, reflections and the like are dependent upon causes and conditions, they do not [ultimately] arise in the three times [of past, present and future]. This is here the ultimate aspect. Thus, it is said [in the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra*]: the teaching of nonarising is true, and other teachings are false.⁵¹

In the explanation of the ultimate aspect of *pratītyasamutpāda*, the term *pratītyasamutpāda* can also be regarded as referring to *pratītyasamutpanna*, i.e., dharmas originated dependently upon causes and conditions, since the ultimate aspect of *pratītyasamutpāda* means the ultimate aspect, i.e., nonarising, of dependently originated dharmas.

In contrast, it is the conventional aspect of *pratītyasamutpāda* that dharmas originate dependently upon causes and conditions and are not causeless nor conditionless. It is said in the ŚST:

In order to explain the meditation on *pratītyasamutpāda* in terms of its conventional aspect, it is said [in the sūtra]: why is it said that it is *pratītyasamutpāda*? Here, the following answer is given: it is [*pratītyasamutpāda*] that has causes and has conditions and not [it] that is causeless

50 ŚST D151b6-152a1 P181b5-7: *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni don dam pa dang kun rdzob kyi tshul gnyis su shes par bya ste / sgro 'dogs pa dang skur pa'i mtha' spangs pa'i phyir ro // don dam pa'i tshul kho nar (P nar: D na) bsgoms (D bsgoms: P bsgom) na ni skur pa'i mthar ltung zhing chad par lta ba'am / nyan thos kyi mya ngan las 'das pa la gnas par 'gyur / (D: P om.) kun rdzob kyi tshul kho nar bsgoms na ni sgro 'dogs pa'i mthar ltung pas gnyi ga'i tshul du bsgoms na mtha' gnyis spangs pas dbu ma'i lam la zhugs par 'gyur ro //*. See Schoening 1995: 242–243. For the term *tshul* (**rūpa*), see BhK I: 216, 16–17. See fn. 54.

51 See ŚST D152a1-2 P181b7-8: *[de la] ma rig pa la sogs pa sgyu ma dang gzugs brnyan la sogs pa bzhin rgyu rken la (D la: P las) ltos pa yin mod kyi / dus gsum du yang gang ma skyes pa de ni 'dir don dam pa'i tshul te / de skad du mi skye ba'i chos ni bden gyi chos gzhan ni brdzun no zhes gsungs so //*.

In his explanation of the ultimate aspect, Kamalaśīla interprets the Śālistambasūtra's term "not made" (*ma byas pa; akṛta*) as not being made from another permanent cause such as *īśvara* (God). See ŚST D152b2-4 P182b3-4. For an English translation, see Schoening 1995: 250–251. Moreover, he also says that *pratītyasamutpāda* endowed with distinctive qualities such as "unborn" (*ma skyes pa; ajāta*) and "unarisen" (*ma byung ba; abhūta*) is to be understood by means of nondual transcendent wisdom which is void of both the grasped aspect (*grāhyākāra*) and the grasping aspect (*grāhakākāra*), which does not have any appearing objects (*dmigs pa med pa; anālambana*) and which is free from conceptual proliferation. And according to him, this is applied to the sentence of the *Dharmasāṅgītisūtra*: "Not seeing any dharmas, this is the seeing of reality." See ŚST D152b7-153a2 P183a1-4.

and conditionless.... Although ultimately these dependently originated [dharmas] (*rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba* 緣生之法) do not arise, nonetheless conventionally [the dharmas] just like illusions and reflections which depend on particular and various causes and conditions, indeed exist as conventional designations.⁵²

It should be noted that in his 大乘稻芊經隨聽疏 (*Da cheng dao gan jing sui ting shu*), a Chinese subcommentary on the ŚST, Chos grub (法成) interprets the ŚST's term *rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba* (P184b7-8) in the section cited above as dependently originated dharmas (緣生之法).⁵³ Therefore, it is possible to say that Kamalaśīla uses the term *pratītyasamutpāda* here to mean *pratītyasamutpanna*.

The ultimate (*paramārtha*) and the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) are thus two aspects of dependently originated dharmas or entities.⁵⁴ Because the same dharma or entity

52 ŚST D154b1-2 P184b6-8: *kun rdzob kyi tshul du rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba bsgom pa bstan pa'i phyir ci'i phyir* (P *ci'i phyir: D om.*) *rten cing 'brel par 'byung zhes bya zhes* (P *zhes bya zhes: D zhes bya zhes bya ba*) *gsungs te / 'dir lan du rgyu dang bcas rkyen dang bcas pa la bya'i / rgyu med rkyen med pa la ma yin te zhes bya ba gsungs so // ... don dam par ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba 'di ma skyes pa yin mod kyi / 'on kyang kun rdzob tu sgyu ma dang / gzugs brnyan lta bur rgyu dang rkyen sna tshogs so sor nges pa la ltos ba tha snyad btags par yod po nyid de* (D *de: P do*).

53 See 大乘稻芊經隨聽疏 T2782, 85, 550a5-7: 此則能除無因之見。此緣生之法。於第一義雖無有生。然約世諦如幻如化假因假緣有施設故。“That is, this eliminates the view of causelessness. This is because although these dependently originated dharmas do no ultimately arise, nonetheless in conventional truth, [the dharmas] just like illusions and magically created things which depend on causes and conditions exist as conventional designations.” See BhK III: 11, 23–12, 3: *yadi nāmāmī dharmāḥ sarva eva paramārthato 'nupannāḥ, tathāpi māyāvat pratiniyatavividhahetupratyayasāmagrīvaśena ... pravartante*.

54 Note that in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* (MAt) 6–23 and autocommentary (MAtBh), Candrakīrti says that all internal and external things have a dual nature (*rūpadvaya*; *ngo bo gnyis*; *rang gi ngo bo rnam pa gnyis*; *rang bzhin de gnyis*), i.e., conventional [reality] (*saṃvṛti*) and ultimate [reality] (*paramārtha*), according to correct or deceptive perception. See MAt_{Li} 6.23: *samyagmṛṣādarśanalabdhahabhāvaṇ rūpadvayaṇ bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ / samyagdrśām yo viṣayaḥ sa tattvaṇ mṛṣādrśām saṃvṛtisatyam uktam* //. See also MAtBh ad MAt 6.23: 102, 14–15: *nang dang phyi rol gyi dngos po thams cad kyi rang gi ngo bo rnam pa gnyis nye bar bstan te / 'di lta ste / kun rdzob dang don dam pa'o* //. On the other hand, in the *Tarkajvālā* (TJ) ad *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (MHK) 2.10cd, relying on the two truths theory, dependent origination (*pratītyotpāda*) is divided into two types. For MHK 2.10cd, see Gokhale 1972: 44, 18: *Pratītyotpādasāvitṛīm japan satyadvayāśrayām* //. See TJ D52b7-53a2: *bden pa gnyis la brten pa'i // (MHK 2.10d: satyadvayāśrayām) zhes bya ba la / kun rdzob la brten pa'i rten cing 'bral par 'byung ba ci lta bu zhe na / ma brtags na grags pa yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa brtags na med pa / rgyu dang rkyen tshogs pa las byung ba'i mtshan nyid de / ... don dam pa la brten pa'i rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni skye ba med pa ste / ...* “If it is said: ‘With regard to the phrase ‘[dependent origination] relying on the two truths (MHK 2.10d),’ what is the dependent origination relying on the conventional [truth]?,’ [then we reply that] only when it is not investigated [from the ultimate perspective], it is commonly acceptable as existent, nonexistent and so forth; when investigated, it does not exist; it is characterized as [conventionally] arising by [the force of] the complex of causes and conditions.... The dependent origination relying on the ultimate [truth] means nonarising.”

which originates dependently has these two aspects, the two should not be taken as being separated from each other. In the MĀ, Kamalaśīla says that the *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti* are neither the same nor different.⁵⁵

He also says that from different perspectives it is not contradictory that the same thing has both ultimate and conventional aspects. For example, the wisdom conducive to the understanding of ultimate truth (*paramārtha*), i.e., a *bahuvrīhi* interpretation of the compound *parama-artha*, is ultimate, while it is also conventional because it is not different from dependently originated illusions.⁵⁶

In the same manner, the same entity originated dependently can be understood from different perspectives to have both ultimate and conventional aspects. Dependently originated entities are not real because otherwise it would follow absurdly that dependently originated illusions are also real.⁵⁷ When one understands that just like an illusion, an entity arises dependently, then one understands its conventional aspect.⁵⁸ And when one understands that just like an

55 MĀ D234a3-4 P261a8-b1: *de kho na nyid gyi* (P *kyi*: D *kyis*) *don gyi mtshan nyid kyi don dam pa dang/ dus byas kyi mtshan nyid kyi kun rdzob pa dang lhan cig / gcig* (P *gcic*: D *cig*) *pa yang ma yin zhing tha dad par yang mi 'dod de / ... //*. “The ultimate (*paramārtha*) characterized as the reality (*tattva*) which is the object [of the supreme nonconceptual wisdom] and the conventional (*saṃvṛti*) characterized as conditioned [dharmas] are not the same nor can be accepted as being different.” For the three interpretations of the compound *parama-artha*, see Keira 2004: 28–29, fn. 61.

56 MĀ D234b6-7 P262a7-b1: *ye shes kyi bdag nyid kyi don dam pa ni sgyu ma la sogs pa dang khyad par med pa'i phyir yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi ngo bo nyid kyang yin la / de kho na nyid rtogs pa dang mthun pa'i phyir don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid kyang yin pas ltos* (D *ltos*: P *bltos*) *pa'i bye brag gis gcig la gnyis* (D *gnyis*: P *gnyi*) *ka'i ngo bo nyid mi 'gal lo //*. “The ultimate (*paramārtha*), which is of the nature of wisdom, has the correct conventional aspect because it is not different from illusions and the like. And because it is conducive to the understanding of reality (*tattva*), it also has the ultimate aspect. Therefore, from the different perspectives, it is not contradictory that the same thing has both [ultimate and conventional] aspects.” A parallel sentence can be found in the MMA_{KLZ}: 128 5–7: *māyādinirviś(sic!)iṣṭatvāc ca jñānātmakasyāpi paramārthasya tathyasaṃvṛtirūpatā tattvādhigamānukūtātavāc ca paramārtharūpatety apekṣābhedād ekasyobhayaṛūpatāpy avirodhinī /*.

57 MĀ C150b6-7 D150b7-151a1 G200b3 N154b4-5 P163b4-5: *gzhan gyi dbang gi* (CD *gi*: GNP *gis*) *ngo bo nyid ni yang dag pa'i ngo bo nyid du rigs pa mayin te / de lta na ni sgyu ma la sogs pa yang dngos po nyid du thal bar 'gyur te / de dag kyang rkyen la rag las par* (CDNP *par*: G om.) *khyad par med pa'i phyir ro //*. See fn. 15.

58 MĀ D223a5-6 P247b5: *'di ltar dngos po thams cad don dam par ngo bo nyid med pa kho na yin yang sgyu ma bzhin du rang gi rgyu dang rkyen tshogs pa'i gzhan gyi dbang kho na las 'byung ngo //*. MĀ D224b5-6 P249b1-2: *dngos po kun rdzob pa sgyu ma bzhin du rgyu dang rkyen la ltos* (D *ltos*: P *bltos*) *pa yang yod pa'i phyir ro //*.

illusion, the entity is not real and is without ultimate intrinsic nature, one then understands its ultimate aspect.⁵⁹

4.2 Prajñā and upāya

Kamalaśīla, when explaining his view of the middle way in the context of the bodhisattva path leading to the stage of buddhas, states that improper superimposition of ultimate things is eliminated by wisdom (*prajñā*) and that improper denial of conventional things is eliminated by the practice of the means (*upāya*) skillfully used by bodhisattvas for the sake of sentient beings (*sattva*).⁶⁰

BhK I explains *prajñā* as wisdom arising from hearing (*śrutamayī*), reflection (*cintāmayī*), and meditation (*bhāvanāmayī*). By means of wisdom arising from hearing, one understands the meaning of scriptural descriptions or teachings; and by means of wisdom arising from reflection, one determines whether the teaching has the definitive meaning (*nītartha*) that expresses ultimate reality or an interpretative meaning (*neyārtha*) articulating conventional things.⁶¹ And by means of wisdom arising from meditation upon the real meaning (*bhūtam artham*) or ultimate reality determined by wisdom arising from reflection, one directly understands ultimate reality.⁶² Bodhisattvas' wisdom, therefore, essentially consists in their determination and direct understanding of the ultimate aspect, i.e., nonarising or voidness, of dependently originated dharmas. Because bodhisattvas correctly understand this ultimate aspect, they can eliminate improper superimposition.

59 MĀ C170b2-3 D171a1 G230b2 N178a6-7 P186b1-2: *dngos po thams cad ri bong gi rwa dang 'dra bar shing tu med pa nyid du ni mi 'dod kyi /'on kyang sgyu ma la sogs pa bzhin du don dam par med pa nyid do //*. MĀ C152a1-2 D152a1-2 G202a4-5 N156a1-3 P164b8-165a2: *'di la yang ji skad bshad pa'i gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid kun rdzob tu rgyu dang rkyen sbyor ba'i stobs kyis skyes pa nyid kyi sgyu ma bzhin du ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir sbyor ba las byung ba zhes bya'o // de skad du 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las / sbyor ba las byung ba'i ngo bo nyid niyod pa mayin te / rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i phyir ro zhes gsungs so //*. See Keira 2016: 37, 2-7. MĀ D236a6 P264a7-8: *de'i phyir dngos po 'di dag ni yang dag par na sgyu ma bzhin du gzhan la rag las pa'i ngo bo nyid kyiis ngo bo nyid med pa kho na yin no //*.

60 See BhK I: 197, 7-10: *anayā ca prajñopāyasvarūpā pratipadā samāropāpavādāntavivarjanena madhyamā pratipad udbhāvitā / prajñayā samāropāntasya varjanād upāyenāpavādāntasya varjanād /*.

61 BhK I: 198, 10-12: *tatra prathamā tāvat śrutamayī prajñotpādanīyā / tayā hi tāvad āgamārtham avadhārayati / tataś cintāmayyā prajñayā nītaneyārthaṁ nirvedhayati / tatas tayā niścītya bhūtam arthaṁ bhāvayen nābhūtam /*. For Kamalaśīla's interpretations of *nītartha* and *neyārtha*, see Keira 2009.

62 BhK I: 204, 11-13: *tad evaṁ cintāmayyā prajñayā niścītya bhūtam arthādm tasya pratyakṣīkaraṇāya bhāvanāmayīm prajñām utpādayet /*.

In addition, BhK I explains that bodhisattvas' wisdom serves as the ground (*hetu*) for determining the use of nonerroneous means.⁶³

In contrast, *upāya* means five of the six perfections (*śad-pāramitā*), i.e., the five other than the perfection of wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*), the four means of attraction (*saṃgrahavastu*), and so on. In BhK I, Kamalaśīla describes *upāya* as the means of practicing all the good (*kuśala*) of gathering all the elements of prosperity (*abhyudaya*), including the perfect purification of [buddha]-fields (*kṣetrapariśuddhi*), possession of great wealth (*mahābhoga*), perfection of followers (*parivārasaṃpat*), spiritual maturation of sentient beings (*sattvaparipāka*), and manifestation of the transformed body (*nirmāṇakāya*).⁶⁴ Furthermore, he explains as *upāya* that bodhisattvas have great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) for all sentient beings and do not abandon them.⁶⁵ The *upāya* of bodhisattvas cannot be established without the existence of sentient beings and conventional dharmas such as merits (*puṇya*), impurity (*saṃklesa*), and purification (*vyavadāna*). Through the practice of *upāya*, bodhisattvas gradually deepen and develop their understanding of the conventionally existent things and the conventional aspect of dependently originated dharmas.

Thus, through practice utilizing wisdom and means, one gradually deepens and fully achieves understanding of the ultimate and conventional aspects of dependently originated dharmas, in other words, conventional and ultimate truths. It is said in BhK III:

Those who have the means, by relying upon wisdom, become proficient in correctly [understanding] conventional [truth] and ultimate truth.⁶⁶

By understanding both the ultimate and conventional aspects, one can eliminate the extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial. Therefore, understanding the two aspects serves as the grounds for asserting that by way of practice utilizing wisdom and means, one can eliminate these two extremes.

63 BhK I: 194, 20–21: *prajñā tu tasyaiva copāyasyā'viparītasvabhāvaparicchedahetuḥ* /.

64 See BhK I: 194, 17–20: *tatra prajñāpāramitāṁ tyaktvā dānādipāramitāsaṃgrahavastvādikāṁ sarvam eva kṣetrapariśuddhimahābhogaparivārasaṃpatsattvaparipākanirmāṇādikasakalābhuyadharmasaṃgrāhakāṁ kuśalam upāya ucyate /*. See also BhK I: 195, 2–3: *tathā coktam atraiva sūtre / upāyah saṃgrahajñānaṁ / prajñā paricchedajñānam iti /*.

65 See BhK II D53b1-2: *de bas na 'phags pa nam mkha' mdzod las kyang / de shes rab kyi shes pas ni nyon mongs pa thams cad yongs su 'dor ro // thabs kyi shes pas ni sems can thams cad yongs su mi gtong ngo shes bka' tsal to //*. See also BhK II D53b5-6: *'phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa las ji skad du / de la byang chub pa'i thabs ni gang / ... zhe na / gang gi phyir mnyam par gzhag pa na sems can la lta bas na snying rje chen po'i dmigs la sems nye bar 'jog pa de ni de'i thabs so //*.

66 BhK III: 17, 14–15: *upāyayuktah prajñāsevanataś ca samyak saṃvṛtiparamārthasatyakuśalo bhavati /*.

5 Kamalaśīla's Philosophy of the Middle Way

As we saw earlier, Kamalaśīla's central concept as regards the middle way consists in the understanding of the two aspects of dependently originated entities: the ultimate aspect and the conventional aspect. In reliance upon this central concept, he systematically arranges three different types of middle way.

Now, what is Kamalaśīla's philosophy of the middle way when Madhyamaka philosophy is considered the philosophy of it? To determine and clarify this, an analysis must be made of his interpretation of the bodhisattva path.

First, on the path leading to omniscience, bodhisattvas achieve a *nirvāṇa* different from that of śrāvakas. By way of practice consisting of wisdom and means, bodhisattvas attain non-abiding *nirvāṇa* (*apratiṣṭhitānirvāṇa*), i.e., *nirvāṇa* in which they abide neither in the defilement of transmigration (*samsāra*) nor in the *nirvāṇa* of śrāvakas. That is, on the one hand, they do not abide in the defilement of transmigration rooted in erroneous cognition (*viparyāsa*) because they eliminate all erroneous cognitions by means of wisdom which directly understands ultimate reality.⁶⁷ Nor do they abide, on the other hand, in the *nirvāṇa* desired by śrāvakas because they do not abandon all sentient beings and the world of transmigration by way of practicing the means that they establish on the basis of great compassion for sentient beings.⁶⁸ According to the passage quoted above from the ŚST, when one meditates only on the ultimate aspect of *pratītyasamutpāda*, one falls into the *nirvāṇa* of śrāvakas. The *nirvāṇa* established by this meditation should therefore be ultimately established completely without conceptual proliferation. In contrast to śrāvakas, bodhisattvas, by their great compassion, should not abide in this *nirvāṇa*; otherwise they will fall into the stage of śrāvakas.⁶⁹

Although Kamalaśīla does not explicitly state it in his BhK I, it is clear from his explanation that this non-abiding *nirvāṇa* is the middle way that one enters by eliminating the two extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial. This is because this *nirvāṇa* is established by practicing the path consisting of wisdom and means which eliminate those extremes.⁷⁰ That is, by eliminating improper

67 See BhK I: 197, 6–7: *prajñayā ca sakalaviparyāsaprahāṇān na samsāre 'vasthānam viparyāsa-mūlatvāt samsārasya /*.

68 See BhK II D53a7-53b1: *de lta bas na gang gi phyir byang chub sems dpa' thabs kyi stobs kyis 'khor ba mi 'dor ba de'i phyir mya ngan las 'das pa mi ltung ngo // gang gi phyir shes rab kyi stobs kyis dmigs pa mtha' dag spang ba de'i phyir 'khor bar mi ltung ste / de bas na mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa yang sangs rgyas nyid 'thob po //*. See also fn. 65.

69 BhK II D52b6-7: *byang chub sems dpas shes rab tsam bsten na ni nyon thos kyis 'dod pa'i nya ngan las 'das par ltung bas bching ba bzhin tu 'gyur te / mi gnas pa'i nya ngan las 'das pas grol bar mi 'gyur ro //*.

70 See SDhNS D290a7, P336a6-8: *de'i phyir shes rab kyi stobs kyis 'khor ba la mi gnas pa'i phyir dang / thabs kyi stobs kyis mya ngan las 'das par mi 'jug pa'i phyir byang chub sems dpa' rnam kyi lam thabs dang shes rab kyi ngo bo ni (P bo ni: D bo) mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa thob pa'i (D pa'i: P pa i) rgyu yin no //*.

superimposition, i.e., erroneous cognition, bodhisattvas do not abide in the defilement of transmigration, and by eliminating improper denial of conventionally established dharmas and sentient beings, they do not abandon sentient beings and therefore do not abide in ultimate *nirvāṇa*.

First, then, Kamalaśīla's philosophy aims to establish this non-abiding *nirvāṇa* that is the middle way, and not ultimate *nirvāṇa* characterized as “the calming of conceptualization” (*prapañcopaśama*) and “[ultimate] welfare” (*sīva*), which is shown as the purpose (*prajoyana*) of the MMK.⁷¹

Next, the bodhisattvas who have attained non-abiding *nirvāṇa* aim as the final goal of reaching the stage of buddhas. In his BhK I, Kamalaśīla explains the

71 PsP_M: 119, 1: *sarvaprapañcopaśamaśivalakṣaṇam nirvāṇam śāstrasya prayojanam nirdiṣṭham* //. For the meaning of *prapañca* in the MMK, see Saito 2019. For PsP's comment on *sīva* in the homage verse of the MMK, see MacDonald 2015: 43 and fn. 100. Cf. PP D47b1: *zhi (sīva) zhes bya ba ni gnod pa thams cad dang bral ba'i phyir ram/ ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa'i phyir ro* //. For an English translation, see Ames 2019: 25, 16–18. Bhāviveka seems to interpret *sīva* as meaning “tranquil” or “calm.”

The idea of non-abiding *nirvāṇa* can be found in the *Ratnāvalī* (RV). Although the RV 1.42, just as the MMK 25.4 and 25.7 say, explains the *nirvāṇa* free from attachment to existence and nonexistence (*bhāvābhāvaparāmarśakṣayo nirvāṇa*), the RV 5.85 says that bodhisattvas should remain in this world for the sake of sentient beings even though they have attained enlightenment. See RV 5.85: *yāvat caiko 'py amuktaḥ syāt sattvah kaścid iha kvacid / tāvat tadarthan tiṣṭheyān bodhiṇ prāpyāpy anuttarām* //. See also RV 4.65 and 4.66. The RV, however, does not connect the idea that bodhisattvas should remain in this world, with the idea of the middle way. In his MHK 1.20, 1.21 and so forth, Bhāviveka explains non-abiding *nirvāṇa*. See MHK 1.20 and 1.21: *na bhave doṣadarśitvāt kṛpāluttvāt na nirvṛtau / sthitās tiṣṭhanti ca bhave parārthodayadīkṣitāḥ* // (MHK 1.20): *bhedābhedena saṃsāranirvāṇānupalambhataḥ / na ca kvacana tiṣṭhanti sarvatra ca bhave budhāḥ* // (MHK 1.21). For an English translation, see Gokhale and Bahulkar 1985: 98, 19–24 and 99, 7–10. See also TJ ad MHK 1.21 D47a2: *des ni slob dpon gyis byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa bstan par 'gyur te / ...* //. And see MHK 3.294. It is however not clear at the present whether he connected this *nirvāṇa* with the idea of the middle way. Note that although Bhāviveka divided dependent origination into two types, dependent origination relying on conventional truth and one relying on ultimate truth, he does not seem to explain the two truths as the two aspects of dependent origination. See fn. 54. On the other hand, it might be possible to say that Candrakīrti in the MAt connected the idea of the middle way with the idea of non-abiding *nirvāṇa*, by means of the two of three types of compassion, “compassion toward [being seen as] dharmas and compassion that does not have an object” (*chos la dmigs pa dang dmigs pa med pa'i snying rje*). See MacDonald 2015: 356. See also MAtBh_{Skt}: 5, 15: *dharmālambanām anālambanām ca karuṇām*. The middle way here refers to the understanding that all things/living beings just like the moon reflected on water are without intrinsic nature but appear as impermanent dharmas. That is, in the PsP he says that voidness is the middle way and explains *nirvāṇa* as characterized by *prapañcopaśama* and *sīva*, while in the MAt he says: *antaścaladvāriṇi candravac calām svabhāvaśūnyaḥ ca jagad vipaśyataḥ* / (MAt_{Skt} 1.4ab); *bcom ldan thugs rjes khyod thugs zhi las bzlogs pas khyod la mya ngan 'da' mi mnga'* // (MAt 12.42d). “[I bow to the compassion] of [the person] who sees that living beings, just like the moon reflected in shimmering water, are impermanent and void of intrinsic nature. (MAt_{Skt} 1.4ab); Oh the Illustrious One! by compassion, you stop your mind from being in the state of quiescence and therefore you do not [enter] the *nirvāṇa*. (MAt 12.42d)” See MAtBh_{Skt} ad MAt 1.4ab: 6, 1: *yā karuṇā name tām ity anena sambandhah* /.

establishment of supreme nonconceptual meditation (*paramanirvikalpo yoga*) where conceptual proliferation characterized by concepts such as existence and nonexistence ceases completely.⁷² According to him, this meditation is the supreme path (*paramo mārga*) to eliminate two kinds of obstacles, i.e., the obstacle of defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and the obstacle to [the comprehension of] what is to be comprehended (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), and to obtain buddhas' omniscience.⁷³

In order to obtain buddhas' omniscience, bodhisattvas must eliminate those two obstacles. BhK I says that because all concepts pervaded by concepts of existence and nonexistence cease for the yogins who abide in the supreme nonconceptual meditation, they can correctly eliminate those two obstacles.⁷⁴ That is, first, they must eliminate the obstacle of defilements by establishing supreme nonconceptual meditation. This meditation can eliminate the erroneous cognitions which apprehend things that neither arise nor cease as being existent or nonexistent and which form the root cause of the obstacle of defilements. Inasmuch as they eliminate the concepts of existence and nonexistence through habituating themselves to this meditation, the yogins eliminate those erroneous cognitions that are the nature (*svabhāva*) of ignorance and are the root of that obstacle;⁷⁵ and because of removing the root, they can correctly eliminate that obstacle.⁷⁶

72 BhK I: 214, 10–22. See fn. 40.

73 BhK I: 216, 18–19: *ato 'yam evāvaraṇaprahāṇe sarvajñatvādhigame ca paramo mārgaḥ* /.

For *jñeyāvaraṇa*, see Schmithausen 2014: 564, 2–3. See also BoBh_T: 87, 9–10: *jñeye jñānasya pratighāṭā āvaraṇam ity ucyate* // For Kamalaśīla's explanation of *kleśāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*, see TSP_{Sh} ad TS 3337: 1052, 21–1053, 1: *kleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇato hi sarvajñatvam / tatra kleśa eva rāgādayo bhūtadarśanapratibandhabhāvāt kleśāvaraṇam ucyate / dṛṣṭhasyāpi heyopādeyatattvasya yat sarvākārāparijñānaṁ pratipādanāsāmarthyam ca taj jñeyāvaraṇam / tatra kleśāvaraṇasya nairātmyapratyakṣikaraṇāt prahāṇih / jñeyāvaraṇasya tu tasyaiva nairātmyadarśanasya sādaranirantaraṁ dīrghakālābhyaśāt* /. For an English translation, see McClintock 2010: 127.

74 BhK I: 214, 25–26: *atra sthitasya yogināḥ sarvavikalpānām astaṁgamāt samyak kleśāvaraṇam jñeyāvaraṇam ca prahīyate* /.

75 See MMK_{Ye} 23.22ab: *evaṇi nirudhyate 'vidyā viparyayanirodhāt* /. In his ŚST, Kamalaśīla says that incorrect understanding (*log par shes pa*; *mithyāpratipatti*), viz., erroneous cognition, is a synonym of ignorance. See ŚST: D158b2-3 P189b7-190a1: *gang zag gang dang chos la bdag med pa'i mtshan nyid kyi de kho na mi rtogs pa de ni ma rig pa'o// de yang shes pa med pa nyid ni mayin mod kyi/ phyin ci log gi tshul gyis shes pas na mi shes pa zhes brjod par 'dod de / log par shes pa'o zhes rnam grangs kyis bstan to //*. “Not understanding the reality characterized as the selflessness concerning persons and dharmas, this is ignorance. The [ignorance] is not the absence of understanding, but is accepted to be called ‘nescience’ because it understands [things] in an erroneous manner; [the ignorance] is explained by the synonym ‘incorrect understanding.’” Kajiyama says that erroneous cognition is the cause of ignorance. See Kajiyama 1980: 139.

76 BhK I: 214, 26–215 6: *tathā hi kleśāvaraṇasyānutpannāniruddhabhāveṣu bhāvādiviparyāśo mūlam kāraṇam ... / anena ca yogābhyaśena sarvabhāvādivikalpānām prahāṇāt sakalabhāvādiviparyāśasyāvidyāsvabhāvasya kleśāvaraṇamūlasya prahāṇam / tato mūlocchedāt kleśāvaraṇam samyakprahīyate* /.

All erroneous cognitions are pervaded by erroneous cognitions of existence and nonexistence. Through exclusion of the pervader, the pervaded things are also eliminated. Therefore, when supreme nonconceptual meditation eliminates erroneous cognition of them, it eliminates all erroneous cognition.⁷⁷ Therefore, by virtue of habituating themselves to this meditation, bodhisattvas can also correctly eliminate the obstacle to what is to be comprehended, because this obstacle is also characterized by erroneous cognition.⁷⁸

When the obstacle to what is to be comprehended is completely eliminated, because the yogins' cognition has no obstacles, it can illuminate all entities as they are; thus they obtain buddhas' omniscience.⁷⁹

This omniscience is obtained when supreme nonconceptual meditation which directly understands ultimate reality completely eliminates those two obstacles. Therefore, it is clear that this omniscience knows all entities as arising conventionally and not ultimately arising. Kamalaśīla says:

By completely understanding all entities as they are in terms of their conventional and ultimate aspects, one obtains omniscience.⁸⁰

As stated earlier, by understanding the conventional and ultimate aspects of dependently originated entities, one eliminates the two extremes of improper superimposition and improper denial and enters and understands the middle way disclosed by eliminating the two extremes. Therefore, buddhas' omniscience can be regarded as the understanding of the middle way and, furthermore, as the full achievement of the understanding of it. That is, this omniscience, which is the final goal of the bodhisattva path, has completely understood that all entities are neither ultimately arising nor conventionally not arising.

Lastly, we should clarify how one can establish cognition of the middle way. Kamalaśīla does not maintain that the middle way is just a conceptually established thing, instead asserting that one can directly understand the middle way. How is it possible, then, that one can directly understand both the ultimate and conventional aspects of entities simultaneously?

77 BhK I: 216, 6–8: *bhāvādiviparyāsena ca sakalaviparyāsasya vyāptatvāt tatprahāṇe sakalaviparyāsaprahāṇāt* /.

78 BhK I: 216,8–9: *jñeyāvaraṇam apy anena samyak prahīyate, viparyāsalakṣaṇatvād āvaraṇasya* /.

79 See BhK I: 216, 10–16: *jñeyāvaraṇe ca prahīne pratibandhābhāvād ravikiraṇavād apagatameghādyāvaraṇe nabhasi sarvatrāvyāhato yogipratyakṣo jñānālokaḥ pravartate / tathā hi vastu-svabhāvaprakāśarūpam vijñānam / ... / pratibandhābhāvē tu saty, acintyaśaktiviśeṣalābhāt kimiti sakalam eva vastu yathāvan na prakāśayet* /.

80 BhK I: 216, 16–18: *[ataḥ] saṃvṛtiparamārtharūpena sakalasya vastuno yathāvat pari�ñānāt sarvajñatvam avāpyate* /. A parallel sentence can be found in the SDhNS D290a5 P336a3-4.

In BhK I, Kamalaśīla discusses establishment of cognition of the middle way by showing that bodhisattvas can establish the path that leads [to the goal of omniscience] through the indivisible union of wisdom and means (*prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhī mārga*). He states:

Precisely this is the path of bodhisattvas that leads [to the goal of omniscience] through the indivisible union of wisdom and means, for even when they are seeing ultimate reality, they do not cut off conventional [things]. Those who do not cut off conventional [things], who are preceded by great compassion and whose [cognitions] are completely nonerroneous, take action for the benefit of sentient beings. In this case, although it is not possible that during their abidance in transcendental wisdom (*lokottaraprajñā*), they employ a means, nonetheless when they employ a means, because bodhisattvas like magicians have nonerroneous cognitions, [conceptual] wisdom (*prajñā*) does arise [in them] subsequent to their practice, from transcendental [nonconceptual] wisdom (*lokottarajñāna*), which is correctly fixed on [the object of this nonconceptual wisdom, i.e.,] ultimate reality of entities. Therefore, the path leading [to the goal] through the indivisible union of wisdom and means does indeed exist.⁸¹

During their abidance in the transcendental nonconceptual wisdom directly understanding ultimate reality, bodhisattvas cannot employ a means established on the basis of their great compassion. According to Kamalaśīla, however, by establishing the path mentioned above, they can apprehend ultimate reality without cutting off conventional things. That is, the bodhisattvas who have conceptual wisdom obtained subsequent to transcendental nonconceptual wisdom can directly understand both the ultimate and conventional aspects of entities simultaneously.⁸²

In his Madhyamaka texts such as MĀ and BhK(s), Kamalaśīla quotes the *Dharmasāṅgitisūtra* to illustrate that a magician does not have any attachment to magically created beings since he, unlike the spectators to his creations, already

⁸¹ BhK I: 221, 11–20: *ayam eva prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhī bodhisattvānām mārgo yat* (Tib: 'di ltar paramārthadarśane 'pi saṃvṛtiṃ nocchedayanti / saṃvṛtiṃ cānuccchedayanto mahākaruṇā-pūrvāṅgamā aviparyastā eva sattvārthakriyāsu pravartante / tatra yadi nāma lokottara-prajñāvasthāyām upāyasevanā na saṃbhavati / upāyasevanākāle tu bodhisattvasya māyākāravad aviparyastatvāl lokottarajñānāt prayogapṛṣṭhabhāvanīyathāvad vastuparamārthatattvābhiniveśanī prajñā saṃbhavaty eveti / bhavaty eva prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhī mārgaḥ /).

⁸² For *prṣṭhabhāvanī* ... *prajñā*, see Keira 2004: 79–80. The cognition or wisdom which occurs subsequent to a perception is conceptual, judges the object of the perception and can be non-belying (*avisaṃvāda*) when there is no cause for error. The subsequent cognition is also explained as being neither direct perception nor inference. That is, it is not a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) because it has as its objects the things already grasped by valid cognition. Moreover, the cognition which occurs subsequent to the yogic perception of the ultimate reality is called “conceptual cognition that is pure on a worldly level” or “judgment that is pure on a worldly level.” See TSP_K: 901, 16–17: *tatprṣṭhabhālabdhaiḥ śuddhalaukikaiḥ paramārthato nirviṣayair vastupratibandhād avisamvādibhir vikalpair*. TSP_K: 931, 11: *paricchedakah śuddhalaukiko vimarśapratyayah prṣṭhabhāvī*. TSP_K: 932, 6–7: *prṣṭhabhālabdhena ca śuddhalaukikena parāmarśapratyayena*.

understands their illusory nature.⁸³ According to the MĀ, magically created beings such as elephants also appear in the magician's direct perception, but his perception does not have any attachment to their intrinsic natures as existing in reality. Because he is not attached to these elephants appearing in his perception as having real intrinsic natures, his perception is the cause that gives rise to the determination that those appearing elephants really lack intrinsic natures. In the same manner, a bodhisattva who possesses conceptual wisdom which occurs subsequent to the transcendental nonconceptual wisdom directly understanding the ultimate reality, i.e., absence of ultimate intrinsic natures, does not have any attachment to the ultimate intrinsic natures of entities. Although in his direct perception, entities appear, however, because of this subsequent wisdom, it does not have any attachment to their intrinsic natures as existing ultimately. Because of his non-attachment, his direct perception causes the determination that there are no ultimate intrinsic natures.⁸⁴ Therefore, because the bodhisattva has that subsequent wisdom, his direct

83 See the quotation from the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* by BhK III: 29, 13–16: *māyākāro yathā kaścin nirmitaṁ moktaṁ udyataḥ / na cāsyā nirmite saṅgo jñātāpūrvo yato [sya saḥ] // (tri)bhavaṁ nirmitaprakyāṇ jñātvā saṁbodhipāragāḥ / sannahyanti jagaddhetor jñātāpūrve jage tathā /*. For an English translation, see Keira 2004: 108: “Just as a magician strives to free a magically created being and does not have any attachment to [this] magically created being since its [illusory nature] has already been understood [by him], in the same manner, people who have skillfully attained enlightenment, after having understood that the triple world is like a magical creation, will clad themselves in armor for the sake of living beings, since the [illusory nature of] living beings has already been understood.” This sūtra is also quoted in the BhK I p. 219, 16–19 and the BhK II D54a2-3. See also MĀ D169b3-4: *byis pa gang dag ltad mo pa'i skye bo bzhin du skye ba la sogs pa'i sgyu ma de dag ji ltar snang ba bzhin bden pa nyid du mngon par zhen pa de dag ni/phyin ci log tu mngon par zhen pa'i phyir byis pa dag ces bya'o //*. For an English translation, see Keira 2004: 109, 1–4: “Like spectators [to magician's creations], the infantile, who are attached to illusions of production and so forth being real as they appear, grasp [these illusions] erroneously, and thus it is for this reason that [these people] are termed ‘infantile.’”

84 See MĀ C217a4-6 D218a7-b2 G302b5-303a2 N235b2-4 P241b6-242a1: *'di ltar sgyu ma mkhan gyi shes pa glang po che la sogs pa'i rnam par sgro btags pa can yang yang dag par na de'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa med do // der mngon par zhen pa med pas yang dag par na des dben pa nyid rtogs pa nges par skye ba'i rgyu nyid kyis de'i yul can du rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) go // de dang 'dra bar rtog pa dang ldan pa rnam kyi mngon sum 'khrul pa'i rgyu mtshan yang dag par bsal (CD bstsal: GNP bsal) ba sgro btags pa'i rnam pa can gzhān yang skye ba na yang dag par de'i ngo bo nyid du mngon par zhen pa med par nges pa'i rgyu nyid kyis des dben pa'i yul can du rnam par gzhag (CD rnam par gzhag: GNP rnam par bzhag) pa nyid do //*. For an English translation, see Keira 2004: 201, 16–202, 5: “That is to say, a magician's cognition has superimposed aspects (*ākāra*) of elephants and so forth, but does not have any attachment to their intrinsic natures [as existing] in reality. Because [he] is not attached to these [appearances of elephants as having real intrinsic natures], [his cognition] is the cause that gives rise to the determination that [the superimposed images] really lack those [intrinsic natures]. Hence [the magician's cognition] is established as having [the absence of those real intrinsic natures] as its object. Similarly, when judicious people (*prekṣāvat*) give rise to

perception understands both entities' conventional aspect of dependently arising/appearing to consciousness and their ultimate aspect of being without ultimate intrinsic nature; his perception thus directly understands the middle way that one enters by eliminating improper superimposition and improper denial.

6 Conclusions

In the history of Madhyamaka philosophy, the starting point of the idea of the middle way is Nāgārjuna's statement in MMK 24.18d: "precisely this [voidness (= *pratītyasamutpāda*)] is the middle way." The *Akutobhayā* and *Buddhapālita*'s commentary seem to have interpreted the middle way as being established in ultimate reality. In the middle period of that history, according to Avalokitavrata, Bhāviveka in the PP ad MMK 24.18 interprets the term *pratipad madhyamā* as referring to two types of middle way, the conventional type and the ultimately one, while Candrakīrti in the PsP ad MMK 24.18 comments that voidness is the middle way. Separate from the interpretation of the term *pratipad madhyamā* in MMK 24.18d, however, they also accept another interpretation of the middle way which consists of the idea that entities are neither ultimately existent nor conventionally nonexistent. For example, Candrakīrti in the YŚV ad k. 45 says that dependent origination (*rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba*), like a reflection, is not real, nor is it false since in the world it is seen just like a real thing.⁸⁵ In the middle period, the systematization of different types of the middle way was not clearly made and seems to have not yet been completed. The later Mādhyamika philosopher Kamalaśīla systematically arranged the three different types of middle way, taking the position that the central idea of the middle way consists in the understanding of the two aspects of *pratītyasamutpāda* or dependently originated entities.

Kamalaśīla also accepts the ultimate type of middle way consisting of the idea that the realm of truth and voidness are ultimately free from the two extremes of

another perception, i.e., one which is completely exempt of causes for error but nonetheless has superimposed aspects, then as they are not really attached to those [intrinsic natures], [their perception] causes the determination [that there are no real intrinsic natures]. So that therefore it is indeed shown that [their perception] has the absence of those [real intrinsic natures] as its object."

⁸⁵ YŚV_r: 84, 23–85, 4: *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba ni dngos po yod pa ma yin la / gzugs brnyan lta bur gyur pa de'i phyir de yang dag pa ma yin no // yang dag par yod na gzhan du 'gyur mi srid par thal bar 'gyur ro // 'jig rten na yang yang dag pa dang 'dra bar snang bas log pa yang ma yin no //*. For a French translation, see Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 284, 16–285, 1. See also PP D50a4-5. Bhāviveka also says that although entities do not ultimately arise, they arise conventionally. See, for example, PP D230b2: *don dam par rkyen rnams las rten cing 'brel par ngo bo nyid kyis 'byung pa med de / mig la sogz pa'i skye ba ni tha snyad kyi bden pa la brten pa yin no //*.

existence and nonexistence. This type of middle way however consists not in the understanding of the two aspects of dependently originated entities but in the elimination of improperly superimposed ultimate existence, or in other words in the understanding of only the ultimate aspect of those entities. When ultimate reality is the middle way, this middle way is free from conceptual proliferation and is separated from the characteristics of conventional reality. It is therefore understandable that this middle way establishes ultimate *nirvāṇa* characterized by the terms in the homage verse of the MMK, namely “the calming of conceptualization” (*prapañcopaśama*) and “[ultimate] welfare” (*sīva*).⁸⁶ This cannot, however, itself establish non-abiding *nirvāṇa*. Moreover, it is likely that one criticizes this type of middle way by thinking that it is just a soteriologically established ultimate ideal benefiting oneself but separated from conventional reality and great compassion for sentient beings.

Kamalaśīla established the understanding of the two aspects of entities as the central idea as concerns the middle way and interpreted each of the two types of middle way, the conventional type and the ultimate one, as understood from that idea. In this case, it cannot be argued that his idea of the middle way is separate from conventional reality and great compassion, since the ultimate type of middle way should be understood only as one aspect of his idea of the middle way.

This central idea makes it possible for Kamalaśīla to explain not only that non-abiding *nirvāṇa* is the middle way but also that buddhas’ omniscience is the full achievement of the understanding of the middle way, thereby enabling him to systematize his Madhyamaka philosophy as the path for achieving the understanding of the middle way.

In addition, Kamalaśīla explains how direct perception of the middle way can be established. The direct perception of the bodhisattva who has conceptual wisdom obtained subsequent to transcendental nonconceptual wisdom can perceive entities as being like illusions which have no ultimate intrinsic natures and conventionally arise dependent on causes and conditions.

This transcendental nonconceptual wisdom is a necessary condition for establishing subsequent wisdom. For bodhisattvas, then, it is indispensable to establish transcendental wisdom. However, without the establishment of subsequent wisdom, direct perception of the middle way cannot be established. In his philosophy of the middle way, Kamalaśīla clearly shows his position that both transcendental wisdom and subsequent wisdom are equally important.

86 See fn. 71.

Bibliography

Primary Sources and Abbreviations

AAĀ: *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* of Haribhadra: U. Wogihara. *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā: The Work of Haribhadra*. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932. Reprinted in Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store LTD., 1973.

AAĀ_T: *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* Tibetan edition. P5189.

AKBh: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasbandhu: P. Pradhan. *Abhidharma Kośabhāṣya of Vasbandhu*. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.

AKBh_T: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Tibetan edition. D4090.

AMNS: *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra*. See Braarvig 1993a.

AMN_T: *Akṣayamatinirdeśāṭikā*. See Braarvig 1993b.

APDh_T: *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭikā* of Kamalaśīla. D4000, P5501.

ASPP: *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. See AAĀ.

ATBS: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.

BhK I: *First Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla: G. Tucci. *Minor Buddhist Texts, part 2: First Bhāvanākrama of Kamalaśīla, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with Introduction and English Summary*. Rome: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958.

BhK II: *Second Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla. D3916, P5311.

BhK III: *Third Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla: G. Tucci. *Minor Buddhist Texts, part 3: Third Bhāvanākrama*. Roma: Instituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1971.

BNJ: *dBu ma snang ba'i brjed tho* of bShad grub bsTan dar: Lokesh Chandra. *Works of bsTan dar sngags rams pa*. New Delhi: Sharada Rani, 1982.

BoBh_T: *Bodhisattvabhūmi* edition. See Takahashi 2005.

C: Co ne Tibetan Tripitaka.

D: sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka.

G: Golden Manuscript.

LAS: *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*: B. Nanjio. *The Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. Kyoto: The Otani University Press, 1923.

MAK: *Madhyamakālaṃkārakārikā* of Śāntarakṣita. D3884, P5284.

MAK_T: *Madhyamakālaṃkārakārikā* edition. See Ichigo 1985.

MAP: *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. D3886, P5286.

MAT: *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti. See MAtBh.

MAT_{Skt}: *Madhyamakāvatāra* Sanskrit edition of Chapters 1 to 5. See MAtBh_{Skt}.

MATBh: *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* of Candrakīrti: L. de la Vallée Poussin. *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti: Traduction tibétaine*. St.-Petersburg: Imprimerie de l'Académie Impériale des Sciences, 1907–1912. Reprinted in Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970.

MAtBh_{Skt}: *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* Sanskrit edition of Chapters 1 to 5. Horst Lasic, Xuezhu Li and Anne MacDonald, *Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya Chapters 1 to 5*. Beijing-Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House / Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2022.

MAT_L: *Madhyamakāvatāra* edition of Chapter 6. See Li 2015.

MAV: *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* of Śāntarakṣita. D3885, P5285.

MAVMPS: *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti-madhyamapratipadāśiddhi* of Ratnākaraśānti. D4072, P5573.

MĀ: *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla. C133b6-242a4, D3887, G3286, N3278, P5287.

MHK: *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* of Bhāviveka.

MMA: *Munimatālaṃkāra* of Abhayākaragupta. D3903, G3298, N3290, P5299.

MMA_{KL}: *Munimatālaṃkāra* Sanskrit edition of Chapter 1 (fol. 58r5-59v4). See Li / Kano 2017.

MMA_{KL1}: *Munimatālaṃkāra* Sanskrit edition of Chapter 1 (fol. 59v4-61r5). See Kano / Li 2017.

MMA_{KL2}: *Munimatālaṃkāra* Sanskrit edition of Chapter 1 (fol. 61r5-64r2). See Kano / Li 2018.

MMK: *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* of Nāgārjuna.

MMK_{ye}: *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* edition. Sh. Ye. *Zhonglun Song (Fanzanghan Hejiao, Daodu, Yizhu)* (中論頌 (梵藏漢合校·導讀·訳注) [*Mūlamadhyamakāriā (New Edition of the Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese Versions, with the Commentary and a Modern Chinese Translation)*]. Shanghai: Zhongxi Book Company, 2011.

MV: *Madhyāntavibhāga* of Maitreya. See MVBh.

MVBh: *Madhyāntavibhāgabhbhāṣya* of Vasubandhu: Gadjin Nagao. *Madhyāntavibhāgabhbhāṣya: A Buddhist philosophical treatise edited for the first time from a Sanskrit manuscript*. Tokyo: Suzuki Reserch Foundation, 1964.

MVṭ: *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* of Sthiramati: Susumu Yamaguchi. *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā: Exposition Systématique du Yogācāra- vijñaptivāda*. Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku, 1934. Reprinted in Tokyo: Suzukigakujutsuaidan 鈴木学術財団, 1966.

N: sNar thang Tibetan Tripitaka.

om.: omit; omitted.

P: Peking Tibetan Tripitaka.

PP: *Prajñāpradīpa* of Bhāviveka. D3853, P5253.

PPT: *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* of Avalokitavrata. D3859, P5259.

PsP: *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti: L. de La Vallée Poussin. *Mūlamadhyamakārikās (Madhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna: Avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*. St. Petersburg, 1903–1913. Reprinted in Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970.

PsP_M: *Prasannapadā* edition of Chapter I. See MacDonald 2015.

PT: Pelliot tibétain.

PTS: The Pāli Text Society.

RV: *Ratnāvalī* of Nāgārjuna: M. Hahn. *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī Vol. 1, The Basic Texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese)*. Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 1982.

SDVK: *Satyadvayavibhaṅgakārikā* of Jñānagarbha. D3881.

SDVP: *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* of Śāntarakṣita. D3883, P5283.

SDVV: *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* of Jñānagarbha. D3882.

SDhNS: *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* of Kamalaśīla. D3889, P5289.

ŚST: *Śālistambasya Ṭīkā* of Kamalaśīla. D4001, P5502. See Schoening 1995.

SN II: The part II of *Samyutta-Nikāya*: L. Feer. *Samyutta-Nikāya, Part II Nidāna-Vagga*. London: Oxford University Press, 1888.

T: Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, The Tripitaka in Chinese.

TĀ: *Tattvāloka*. D3888, P5288.

TJ: *Tarkajvālā*. D3856, P5256.

TS: *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita.

TS_k: *Tattvasaṃgraha* edition. See TSP_k.

TSP: *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla.

TSP_k: E. Krishnamacharya, ed. *Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita: With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*. Vol. I and Vol. II. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1926. Vol. I reprinted in 1984, Vol. II reprinted in 1988.

TSP_{Sh}; D. Shastri, ed. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita: With the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Shri Kamalaśīla*. Vol. I and Vol. II. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.

VÖAW: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

YŚ_{LY}: *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* edition. See Li and Ye 2014.

YŚ_T: *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* Tibetan edition. See Scherrer-Schaub 1991, 7–18.

YŚ_V: *Yuktiśaṣṭikāvṛtti* of Candrakīrti.

YŚ_{LV}: *Yuktiśaṣṭikāvṛtti* Sanskrit fragments. See Li and Ye 2014.

YŚ_{TR}: *Yuktiśaṣṭikāvṛtti* Tibetan edition. See Scherrer-Schaub 1991, 19–98.

Secondary Sources

Ames, William (2019): *The Lamp of Discernment: A Translation of Chapters 1–12 of Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa*. California: Institute of Buddhist Studies and BDK America, Inc.

Blumenthal, James (2013): *The Ornament of the Middle Way: A study of the madhyamaka thought of Śāntarakṣita*. Boston and London: Snow Lion.

Braarvig, Jens (1993a): *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra Volume I: Edition of existent manuscripts with an index*. Oslo: Solum Forlag.

Braarvig, Jens (1993b): *Akṣayamatinirdeśasūtra Volume II: The Tradition of Imperishability in Buddhist Thought*. Oslo: Solum Forlag.

Gokhale, VV (1972): “The second chapter of Bhavya’s *Madhyamakahṛdaya* (Taking the vow of an ascetic)”. *Indo-Iranian Journal* 14-1/2: 40–45.

Gokhale, V.V. / Bahulkar, S.S. (1985): “*Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā Tarkajvālā*, Chapter I”. *Miscellanea Buddhica*. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.

Ichigo, Masamichi (1985): *Madhyamakālamkāra*. Kyoto: Buneido 文英堂.

Ichigo, Masamichi 一郷正道 (1993): “Kamalashīla cho ‘Chūgan no hikari’ wayaku kenkyū (2)” カマラシ一郎著『中觀の光』和訳研究 (2). *Kyōto sangyō daigaku ronshū* (京都産業大学論集) 22-3, Jinbun kagaku keiretsu (人文科学系列) 20: 104–125.

Ichigo, Masamichi 一郷正道 (1994): “Kamalashīla cho ‘Chūgan no hikari’ wayaku kenkyū (3)” カマラシ一郎著『中觀の光』和訳研究 (3). *Kyōto sangyō daigaku ronshū* (京都産業大学論集) 24-1, Jinbun kagaku keiretsu (人文科学系列) 21: 301–316.

Ichigo, Masamichi 一郷正道 (1995): “Kamalashīla cho ‘Chūgan no hikari’ wayaku kenkyū (4)” カマラシ一郎著『中觀の光』和訳研究 (4). *Kyōto sangyō daigaku ronshū* (京都産業大学論集) 25-1, Jinbun kagaku keiretsu (人文科学系列) 22: 213–241.

Kajiyama, Yūichi 梶山雄一 (1980): “Chūghanha no jūnishiengi kaishaku” 中觀派の十二支縁起解釈. *Bukkyōshisōshi 3: Bukkyō naibu ni okeru tairon* 仏教思想史 3: 仏教内部における対論. Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten 平楽寺書店, 89–146.

Kano, Kazuo / Li, Xuezhu 加納和雄 / 李学竹 (2017): “Bonbunkōtei ‘Muniishushōgon’ daiichishō (fol. 59v4–61r5) (‘Chūgankōmyō’ sezoku no teigi kasho itsubun)” 梵文校訂『牟尼意趣莊嚴』第一章 (fol. 59v4–61r5) (『中觀光明』世俗の定義箇所佚文). *Mikkyō Bunka* (密教文化) 239: 160(7)–141(26).

Kano, Kazuo / Li, Xuezhu 加納和雄 / 李学竹 (2018): “Bonbunkōtei ‘Muniishushōgon’ daiichishō (fol. 61r5–64r2) (‘Chūgankōmyō’ sezoku to gonzetsu oyobi yuishinsetsu hihankasho itsubun)” 梵文校訂『牟尼意趣莊嚴』第一章 (fol. 61r5–64r2) (『中觀光明』世俗と言説および唯心説批判箇所佚文). *Mikkyō Bunka* (密教文化) 241: 136(31)–111(56).

Keira, Ryusei (2004): *Mādhyamika and Epistemology: A study of Kamalaśīla's method for proving the voidness of all dharmas; Introduction, annotated translations and Tibetan texts of selected sections of the second chapter of the Madhyamakāloka*. Vienna: ATBS.

Keira, Ryusei (2009): "The description of *niḥsvabhāvatā* and its intentional meaning (Kamalaśīla's solution for the doctrinal conflict between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra)". *Acta Tibetica et Buddhica* 2: 1–24.

Keira, Ryusei 計良龍成 (2016): "Chūgankōmyōron' (Madhyamakāloka) kōshuchō daiichishō 'Seiten ni yoru issaihō mujishōsei no shōmei' no kenkyū (1) (Wayaku, Chūkai, Tibettogo kōtei tekisuto)" 『中觀光明論』(Madhyamakāloka) 後主張第1章「聖典による一切法無自性性の証明」の研究 (1) (和訳・註解・チベット語校訂テキスト). *Acta Tibetica et Buddhica* 9: 1–121.

Lamotte, Etienne (1981): *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra)*. Volume 1. Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1944. Reprinted in Louvain: Peeters Publishers, 1981.

Li, Xuezhu (2015): "Madhyamakāvatāra-kārikā Chapter 6". *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 43: 1–30.

Li, Xuezhu / Kano, Kazuo 李学竹 / 加納和雄 (2017): "Bonbunkōtei 'Muniishushōgon' daiichishō (fol. 58r5–59v4) ('Chūgankōmyō' shitaisetsu sanshōsetsu kasho itsubun)" 梵文校訂『牟尼意趣莊嚴』第一章 (fol. 58r5–59v4) (『中觀光明』四諦說三性說箇所佚文). *Mikkyō Bunka* (密教文化) 238: 126(7)–106(27).

Li, Xuezhu / Ye Shaoyong 李学竹 / 葉少勇 (2014): *Liushi Ruli Song (Fanzanghan Hejiao, Daudu, Yizhu)* 六十如理頌 (梵藏漢合校・導讀・訳注) [Yuktisāṭikākārikā: Editions of the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese Versions, with Commentary and a Modern Chinese Translation]. Shanghai: Zhongxi Book Company.

MacDonald, Anne (2015): *In Clear Words (The Prasannapadā, Chapter One, Vol. 1, Introduction, Manuscript Description, Sanskrit Text)*. Vienna: VÖAW.

Matsuoka Hiroko (2019): *Introducing Introduction: A study, a critical edition & an annotated translation of Kamalaśīla's Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā on the initial statement (Ādīvākyā) of Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha*. PhD. dissertation submitted to the Leipzig University.

McClintock, Sara (2010): *Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason*. Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications.

Oetke, Claus (2007): "On MMK 24.18". *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 35-1: 1–32.

Saito, Akira (1984): *A Study of The Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti*. PhD. dissertation submitted to the Australian National University.

Saito, Akira 斎藤明 (1998): "Kū to kotoba ('Chūron' dainijūyonshō, dainanage no kaishaku wo megutte)" 空と言葉 (『中論』第二十四章・第七偈の解釈をめぐって). *Shūkyō kenkyū* (宗教研究) 72-1: 27–52.

Saito, Akira 斎藤明 (2017): "Nāgārjuna ni okeru kū to engi ('Chūronju' dainijūyonshō, daijūhachige no kaishaku wo megutte)" Nāgārjuna における空と縁起 (『中論頌』第24章・第18偈の解釈をめぐって). *Kokusai bukkyōgaku daigakuin daigaku kenkyū kiyō* (国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要) 21: 286(91)–257(120).

Saito, Akira (2019): "Prapañca in the Mūlamadhyamakārikā". *Bulletin of the International Institute for Buddhist Studies* 2: 1–9.

Scherrer-Schaub, Cristina Anna (1991): *Yuktisāṭikāvṛtti (Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maître indien Candrakīrti)*. Bruxelles: Institut Berge des Hautes Études Chinoises.

Schmithausen, Lambert (2014): *The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda: Responses and Reflections*. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.

Schoening, Jeffrey Davis (1995): *The Śālistambasūtra and its Indian commentaries*. Two volumes. Vienna: ATBS.

Siderits, Mark / Katsura, Shōryū (2013): *Nāgārjuna's Middle Way: the Mūlamadhyamakārikā*. Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications.

Takahashi, Koichi 高橋晃一 (2005): “‘Bosatsuji’ ‘Shinjitsugibon’ kara ‘Shōkeccchakubun chū bosatsuji’ eno shisō tenkai” 『菩薩地』 「真実義品」 から 「摂決択分中菩薩地」 への思想展開: *vastu* 概念を中心として. Tokyo: The Sankibo Press.

Ye, Shaoyong (2017): “To establish the middle position on one truth or two truths?: A survey based on the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* and its commentaries”. *International Journal of Buddhist Thought & Culture* 27-2: 149–180.