

Zeitschrift: Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie

Herausgeber: Schweizerische Asiengesellschaft

Band: 77 (2023)

Heft: 1

Artikel: On the omniscience of the Buddha and aeajñna as discussed in the final chapter of the Tattvasagrahapañjik

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-1055076>

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On the Omniscience of the Buddha and *aśeṣajñāna* as Discussed in the Final Chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*

<https://doi.org/10.1515/asia-2023-0005>

Received February 5, 2023; accepted November 21, 2023

Abstract: The final chapter of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (TSP) contains a lengthy discussion on omniscience. In this paper, I will first review the relationship between the idea that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*, as presented in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and the view of the omniscient one in the TSP. I will then examine the concept of “remainderless” (*aśeṣa*) discussed in Devendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (PVP) and in Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (PST) to show that the understanding of *aśeṣa* in the PVP and the PST is related to Kamalaśīla’s understanding of the omniscient one. Finally, I will propose that the concept of *aśeṣajñāna* can serve as key to considering Dharmakīrti’s understanding of the omniscient one.

Keywords: Kamalaśīla; Jinendrabuddhi; Devendrabuddhi; *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*; *sarvajña*; *aśeṣajñāna*

1 Introduction

The *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (TSP) by Kamalaśīla¹ is a commentary on his teacher Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṃgraha* (TS).

1 While no sources have been found that clearly indicate Kamalaśīla’s background, his teacher, Śāntarakṣita, belonged to the Nālandā monastery (Funayama 2011: 29). Considering that factor, as well as that Kamalaśīla was a knowledgeable person familiar with philosophical schools both inside and outside Buddhism, it is reasonable to assume that he studied at Nālandā, at the time the world’s

This paper is based on part of my doctoral dissertation “8 seiki Indo bukkyō ni okeru zenchisha shisō no kenkyū” 8世紀インド仏教における全知者思想の研究 (Research on Thought Regarding ‘the Omniscient’ in Eighth-Century Indian Buddhism). I would like to thank Dr. Margherita Serena Sacone for checking my paper and offering many suggestions. I am also indebted to a benevolent anonymous reviewer for furnishing me with the suitable English language expressions and the apt presentation style. However, all mistakes and errors are my own.

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Due to the many details found in the commentary, the TSP contains a large amount of information that is not found in the TS. It therefore serves as a valuable document for reconstructing eighth-century intellectual history, providing us a great deal of information from inside and outside the Buddhist circles of that time.²

The final chapter of the TSP contains a lengthy discussion on omniscience. The commentary on TS 3339 contains a passage on *pramāṇabhūta*³ and the omniscient one (see Appendix A).⁴

In this passage, the TSP states that the Well-Gone One (*sugata*) has a solid (*sthira*) and remainderless (*aśeṣa*) cognition (*jñāna*) of truth (*tattva*), namely, what should be discarded and what should be adopted, as well as their causes. It also explains that due to His cognition having these characteristics, the Well-Gone One is both *pramāṇabhūta* and omniscient. Furthermore, while the TSP holds that knowing something like the number of insects that exist is not a reason for the Buddha to be considered omniscient and *pramāṇabhūta*, it says that he may nonetheless perceive such things as well.

Kamalaśīla probably wrote this passage with verses from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PV) in mind: PV 2.31–33,⁵ which mentions the idea of perceiving the number of insects in the world and discusses the Buddha being a *pramāṇa*; PV 2.280,⁶ which contains the expression *tattvasthiraśeṣaviśeṣajñānasāadhanam*;⁷ and PV 2.141, which touches on *śeṣa*.

foremost Buddhist academy. There, monastics not only could study the various schools of Buddhism, but also the Vedas and Sanskrit grammar (Cf. Funayama 2011: 27–29). This assumption about Kamalaśīla is also supported by the fact that he follows the ideas of Vinītadeva (ca. 690–750), who is also held to have been active at Nālandā (Cf. Funayama 2011: 29).

2 Cf. Marks and Eltschinger 2019: 272, 275.

3 Regarding *pramāṇabhūta*, see Ono 2012.

4 TS 3339: *etac ca sugatasyeṣṭam ādau nairātmyakīrtanāt/sarvatīrthakṛtāṃ tasmāt sthito mūrdhni tathāgataḥ*/"And the above [the nature of the omniscient] is [only] recognized in the Well-Gone One. This is because [the Well-Gone One] first taught no-self. Therefore, the Tathāgata stands at the top of all saviors."

5 PV 2.31–33: *tasmād anuṣṭheyagataṃ jñānam asya vicāryatām/kīṭasaṅkhyāparijñānaṃ tasya naḥ kvopayujyate/heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ/yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ/dūraṃ paśyatu vā mā vā tattvam iṣṭam tu paśyati/pramāṇam dūradarśi ced eta gṛdhrān upāmahe*/"Therefore, his knowledge of what should be practiced should be considered; what use is his knowledge of the number of insects (*kīṭasaṅkhyāparijñāna*) to us? One who makes everything known is not [*pramāṇa*]. He who makes known, along with the causes, the truth, which is that which should be discarded and that which should be adopted, is recognized as *pramāṇa*. It does not matter if [he] looks far or not. [The World-Honored One] sees the desired truth (the Four Truths). [Therefore, the World-Honored One is *pramāṇa*.] If you say that one who can see far is *pramāṇa*, come, let us salute eagles."

6 Cf. Moriyama 2004: 190, which states that TSP ad TS 3339 is based on PV 2.280–282.

7 Cf. PV 2.280: *tāyāt tattvasthiraśeṣaviśeṣajñānasāadhanam/bodhārthatvād gamer bāhyaśaikṣāśaikṣādhikaḥ tataḥ*/"Based on salvation, [the Well-Gone One's] special cognition that is truth, solid,

In this paper, I will first review the relationship between the idea that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa*, as presented in PV 2.31–33, and the view of the omniscient one in the TSP. I will then examine the understandings of “truth” (*tattva*), “solid” (*sthira*), and “remainderless” (*aśeṣa*) in the *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* (PVP), a text by Devendrabuddhi (ca. 630–690⁸), who was a direct disciple of Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660⁹), and in the *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (PST), a text by Jinendrabuddhi (ca. 725–785/710–770¹⁰), who was a contemporary of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, to show that the understanding of *aśeṣa* in the PVP and PST is related to the TSP’s understanding of the omniscient one. Through this, I will propose that the concept of *aśeṣajñāna* can serve as a key when considering Dharmakīrti and his successors’ understanding of the omniscient one.

2 The Omniscient One and the Buddha as a *pramāṇa*

2.1 The Buddha as a *pramāṇa* and His Omniscience as Discussed in the TS/TSP

As is well known, in PV 2.31–33 Dharmakīrti argues that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* (a means of valid cognition) because he knows the Four Truths, but that the basis of this cannot be sought in his knowing everything. This well-known view of the Buddha is inherited by the TSP. An example of this is a statement in the TSP based on PV 2.31: *na tu kīṭasaṅkhyādiññānāt*.¹¹

and remainderless is demonstrated. This is because [the verb root] *gam* means to know. Therefore [the Well-Gone One] is superior to non-Buddhists, those who are still training, and those who are finished training.” The translation of *tattvasthirāśeṣaviśeṣajñāna* in this verse is based on the understanding of Devendrabuddhi.

8 Frauwallner 1961: 145. Kamalaśīla, in his own writings, makes use of texts by Devendrabuddhi, a disciple of Dharmakīrti (cf. Funayama 1992: 49). In addition, as is clear from the same paper, Jinendrabuddhi often follows the ideas of Devendrabuddhi. Funayama points out that Jinendrabuddhi may have been active at Nālandā (See Funayama 1995a: 54; 1995b: 198). From this information, we can presume that the Devendrabuddhi-style understanding of Dharmakīrti was mainstream at Nālandā in the eighth century. We should note, though, that Kamalaśīla sometimes criticizes Devendrabuddhi’s ideas (Cf. Matsumoto 1978: 137, n. 27).

9 Frauwallner 1961: 137.

10 Funayama 1995a: 54–58 and “Introduction” of PST 1 (xxxix–xlii).

11 TSP [S 1061.24]. “But it is not [appropriate to demonstrate that he is the omniscient and *pramāṇabhūta*] on the basis of perceptions such as the number of insects.”

The TS contains the following passage:

*svargāpavargamātrasya vispaṣṭam upadeśataḥ/
pradhānārthaparijñānāt sarvajña iti gamyate//* (TS 3527)

*samudrasikatāsaṅkhyāvijñānaṁ kvopayujyate/
tasyāsmākam ato 'nyārthajñānasamvedanena kim//* (TS 3528)

Due just to the heavenly realm and liberation being clearly explained, [it is the case that the] primary goal (*pradhānārtha*) [of humans] is completely known, [and] it is understood that [the Buddha] is the omniscient one. What would be the use of [his] cognition of the number of grains of sand in the sea? Therefore, it is useless for him to inform us of knowledge of an object different from that (primary goal of humans).

This passage says that the Buddha is omniscient because he knows the primary goal of humans in its entirety. It further states that it is not a problem if the Buddha does not teach things such as the number of grains of sand in the ocean, since this is redundant for the religious aim of human beings.¹² In this, it appears that Śāntarākṣita is not rejecting the idea that the Buddha knows things like the number of grains of sand in the ocean, but is rather emphasizing that what is important is the Buddha knowing and teaching things that pertain to human salvation.

This is supported by the following TSP passage.

TSP *ad* TS 3308 [S 1044.15–17]: *mukhyaṁ hi tāvat svargamokṣasamprāpakahetuḥjñatvasādhanaṁ bhagavato 'smābhiḥ kriyate. yat punar aśeṣārthaparijñātrtvasādhanaṁ asya, tat prāsaṅgikam.*

This is because, first of all, we carry out the primary task of demonstrating that the World-Honored One knows the causes which are the means of attaining the heavenly realm and liberation. On the other hand, to demonstrate that he (the World-Honored One) knows [all] objects without remainder is secondary.

In this context, Kamalaśīla asserts that the primary objective lies in establishing the Buddha's comprehensive understanding of all aspects pertaining to human salvation, encompassing the methods to attain the heavenly realm as liberation. Conversely, the secondary aim entails demonstrating the Buddha's knowledge of all objects without any omissions.¹³

¹² Candrakīrti, in his commentary on *Catuhśataka* 5.3, says for example that the Buddha is omniscient because he preaches according to people's ability to judge what to say and what not to say so they may progress toward good destinies and liberation (Cf. Ueda 1994: 71).

¹³ TSP *ad* TS 3312–3313 also discusses the importance of demonstrating *dharmajñāna*. Cf. TSP [S 1045. 20–21]: *na hy asmābhir dharmajñāviśayāṁ* cintāṁ muktvā sarvajñasādhane prayatnaḥ kriyate, kiṁ tarhi, pradhānabhūta dharmajñasādhana eva.* “This is because we (Buddhists) do not make an effort to demonstrate the omniscient one separately from reflections that take dharma-knower as their

In accordance with this TSP passage,¹⁴ the precedence accorded within the TS/TSP to such proofs can be summarized as follows:

High priority: demonstrating that the Buddha is *pradhānapuruṣārthajña* = *dharmajña* = *catuḥ [satya]jña*

Low priority: demonstrating that the Buddha is one who knows all things without remainder.

In other words, while the TS/TSP is primarily concerned with demonstrating that the Buddha knows things pertaining to the liberation of all beings, it also aims at, though secondarily, proving that he is the omniscient one who knows everything.

Considering this perspective, the aforementioned TS statement does not contradict the notion of the Buddha possessing knowledge regarding matters such as the number of insects in the world. Stated differently, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla have effectively reconciled the apparent conflict between the omniscient one in the former sense and the omniscient one in the latter sense, a distinction that Dharmakīrti has explicitly elucidated, affirming that a *pramāṇabhūta* pertains to the former rather than the latter.

In light of Dharmakīrti's conceptualization of the Buddha, it seems that the TS/TSP has formulated its own perspective regarding the Buddha and the omniscient one, drawing upon the knowledge of the Four Truths. This knowledge, serving as the foundation for being a *pramāṇa*, underlies the TS/TSP's understanding. The longer passage referenced in Appendix A conveys this idea when it states that the Buddha "is the omniscient one and *pramāṇabhūta* precisely because he is endowed with that cognition." The cognition being referred to is the "solid and remainderless cognition" of the Four Truths.¹⁵

2.2 Omniscience and the Four Truths in the Case of Dharmakīrti

As noted by numerous scholars, the notion of an "an omniscient one who knows all of the beneficial matters (*upayuktasārvajña*)" emerged among successors of Dharmakīrti in response to the aforementioned PV 2.31–33.¹⁶ In those passages, Dharmakīrti

object. Rather, [we make an effort] only to demonstrate one who knows the dharma, which is what is important." **dharmajña*]- em., *chos shes pa*] T; *sārvajña* JSK.

14 On the relationship between *pradhānapuruṣārthajña* and *dharmajña*, etc., I refer to Kawasaki 1992: 241 and Moriyama 2012: 237.

15 Cf. TSP [S 1061.22–24]: *tasyānaya deśānaya sābhyupāyaheyopādeyatattvasthirāśeṣajñānaṃ sādhyate.tajjñānayaogā evāsau sārvajñaḥ pramāṇabhūtaś ceti taduktapratipattikāmaiḥ sādhayitum yuktaḥ*.

16 Cf. Kawasaki 1992: 334, Inami 1996: 96–97, n. 18.

does not directly address the question of the Buddha's omniscience. Nevertheless, his statement paved the way for the modern interpretation that, according to Dharmakīrti, "the omniscient one" denotes the "knower of the Four Truths."¹⁷

This gives rise to the impression that a disparity exists between how the omniscient one was understood by Dharmakīrti on one hand, and by the Buddhists of the eighth century and beyond, such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who endeavored to establish the Buddha's omniscience.¹⁸

Devendrabuddhi's assertion in his PVP on PV 2.33 has been employed as substantiation for the proposition that Dharmakīrti perceived "the omniscient one" to signify the "knower of the Four Truths."

PVP [D 16a2–3, P 17b7–8]: *de bas na dbang po las 'das pa'i don mthong ba la sogs pa med du zin kyang/skyes bu'i don shes pa nyid kyi sgo nas tshad ma nyid du 'dod kyi don thams cad shes pas ni ma yin no//gang gi phyir bcom ldan 'das bdag nyid kyi kyang chos kyi 'khor lo la sogs pa dag la bden pa thugs su chud pa nyid kyi phyir/bdag nyid thams cad mkhyen par zhal gyis bzhes pa yin no*¹⁹//

Therefore, it is because [the Buddha] perceives the goal of humans even without, for example, seeing supersensory objects that (the Buddha) is recognized as *pramāṇa* – not because he perceives all objects. This is because the World-Honored One himself also claims in the Dharma wheel and elsewhere that he is the omniscient due to [his] having understood truth.

However, it would be unwise to judge from this statement that Dharmakīrti indeed considered "the omniscient one" to mean "the knower of the Four Truths." As has been noted by Inami [1996: 97], Devendrabuddhi's discussion is not directly concerned with the Buddha's omniscience. And as we will see below, Devendrabuddhi does not consider the Buddha to be merely the "knower of the Four Truths."

Moreover, Śākyabuddhi, who is held to have been a disciple of Devendrabuddhi, states the following in his PVT to introduce PV 2.30:

PVT [D 87a5–6, P 106a5–7]: *shes bya ma lus pa la khyab pa'i ye shes dang ldan pa'i phyir ram/nan tan du bya ba'i don gyi yul can gyi ye shes dang ldan pa'i phyir tshad ma nyid yin na de la dang po la ni snyam sems pa'i tshad ma yod du zin kyang 'di tshad mar 'gyur ba zhes bya ba 'di la 'dod pa ma yin gyi 'on kyang gnyis pa kho na yin no*//

17 Cf. Inami 1996: 87, McClintock 2010: 135–136. In an earlier study, Kajiyama 1967: 531, n. 4 notes, "Dharmakīrti says that the omniscient (*sarvajña*) is one who knows what to discard, what to obtain, and how to do so, in other words, one who has attained the religious truth of the Four Truths, not one who knows the number of ants in the world or is skilled in farsightedness."

18 Moriyama 2012: 239 describes this "gap" as "the work of eighth-century thinkers to rehabilitate the concept of the omniscient."

19 Cf. Vibh [21, n.3]: *puruṣārthajñatvena. yataḥ satyābodbhād dharmacakrāḍau bhagavān sārva-jñam pratijñātavān.*

If [the Buddha] is *pramāṇa* because of (1) having cognition that pervades [all] objects without exception, or (2) having cognition about the goal [of humans] to be practiced, with respect to the first of these [two choices], even if one has grounds to think that way, this [i.e., (1)] is not admitted with respect to the [word] *pramāṇabhūta*. Rather, only the second one [i.e., (2)] is [admitted].

Here, Śākyabuddhi presents two options as reasons for the Buddha to be a *pramāṇa*. He rejects the first – knowledge that pervades all objects – saying that “even if one has grounds to think that way,” it “is not admitted with respect to *pramāṇabhūta*.” In this statement, it appears that despite acknowledging the Buddha’s omniscience, he does not consider it the basis for the Buddha being a *pramāṇa*.²⁰

There are two more reasons for hesitating to maintain that Dharmakīrti considered “the omniscient one (*sarvajña*)” to mean only “the knower of the Four Truths”: Dharmakīrti’s own understanding, in PV 3.92–94, of the omniscient one as one who cannot be perceived,²¹ and the discussion of the final moment of an arhat’s mindstream in PVin 2, which McClintock [2010: 136] and others have highlighted as Dharmakīrti’s acceptance of the existence of the omniscient one.²²

It should also be noted that Maṇḍana Mīśra, a pre-Śāntarakṣita figure,²³ criticizes “the omniscient one” in his *Vidhiviveka*. Therein, the opponent is a Buddhist with knowledge of Dharmakīrtian epistemology and logic who argues that an omniscient being can exist.²⁴ However, the Buddhist interlocutor does not assert that the Buddha is “the omniscient one” in the sense that he knows the Four Truths.²⁵

²⁰ Cf. Sakai 2017: 916.

²¹ PV 3.92–94 (Tosaki 1979: 166–169 and Pecchia 2008: 175): *uktyādeḥ sarvavitpretyabhāvādipratīṣedhavaṭ/ atīndriyāṇāṃ arthānāṃ virodhasyāprasiddhitāḥ/bādhyabādhakabhāvaḥ kaḥ yady uktisaṃvidau/tādṛśo ’nupalabdheś ced ucyatāṃ saiva sādhanam/aniścayakaram proktam īdṛśānupalambhanam/tan nātyantaparokṣeṣu sadsattāvinīścayau*/Pecchia 2008: 175: “[This claim that non-perception is a means of knowledge is] like the denial of an all-knowing [person], the afterworld, etc., due to the act of speaking and so on. [Reply:] Since a contradiction concerning things that are inaccessible to the sense faculties is not established [as a proof], what might be the relation between invalidated and invalidator, if [the two terms of the relation] would be the act of speaking and thorough awareness [i.e., omniscience]? If [one argues that] the same [contradiction is stated] with regard to non-perception, precisely this [non-perception] should be said to be the prover [for you]. [Reply:] Non-perception of this kind (i.e., of imperceptible things) has been declared [by us] as unable to produce certainty. Therefore, there is no settled certainty concerning either being existent or being non-existent with respect to [objects] radically inaccessible to the sense faculties.”

²² The final sūtra of the *Santānāntarasiddhi* can also be interpreted as Dharmakīrti acknowledging that the Buddha is omniscient (Cf. Sakai 2017: 920). Also cf. Katsura 1983: 114.

²³ Cf. David 2020: 41–42.

²⁴ See David 2020: 45ff.

²⁵ Was this interlocutor a real person? If so, who? I will limit myself to raising this question. Indeed, it may affect our understanding of not only the seventh- to eighth-century debate between Buddhists

3 *tattva*, *sthira*, and *aśeṣa* in the PVP/PSṬ

Next, I will review how Devendrabuddhi and Jinendrabuddhi understood the three words truth (*tattva*), solid (*sthira*), and remainderless (*aśeṣa*), which qualify the cognition of omniscient Buddha.

3.1 Truth (*tattva*)

Dignāga first of all understands the meaning of “good” in the expression *su-* when the Buddha is described as *Su-gata* (Well-gone), in the sense of *praśasta*, ‘praised/splendid’. Jinendrabuddhi further bases this on the Buddha’s cognition of the truth.²⁶ Furthermore, Jinendrabuddhi states that the Buddha’s cognition of the truth is inferred from the fact that the path He thought is consistent with the means of valid cognition. In other words, from the consistency of His teaching it is inferred that His cognition is true, and therefore He is called “Well-gone” to be praised.²⁷

Furthermore, Jinendrabuddhi, based on Dignāga’s own explanation, contrasts this characteristic of the Buddha, who is splendid/praiseworthy (*praśasta*) because He knows the truth, with the non-Buddhist practitioners detached from desire (*bāhyavītarāga*). In other words, the Buddha is a “Well-gone one” (*Sugata*) to be praised because He knows the truth, as opposed to non-Buddhist practitioners who do not know the truth. It is this first characteristic, splendor, that makes the Buddha superior to practitioners outside Buddhism (see Appendix B).

and Mīmāṃsakas, but also Dharmakīrti’s view of the omniscient one. We eagerly await future research on Maṇḍana Mīśra.

26 Cf. PSV [1.5–8]: *svārthasampat sugatatvena trividham artham upādāya praśastatvārtham surūpavat, apunarāvṛttyartham sunaṣṭajvaravat, niḥśeṣārtham supūrṇaghaṭavat. arthatrayam caitad bāhyavītarāgaśaikṣāśaikṣebhyaḥ svārthasampadvīṣeṣanārtham*. “Perfection of one’s own benefit, as being the Well-Gone One, is premised on three meanings: [First,] the meaning of ‘splendor’ is just like good looks. [Next,] the meaning of ‘not coming back again’ is just like completely extinguished fever. [Finally,] the meaning of ‘no remainder’ is just like a completely filled pot. Moreover, these three meanings are to distinguish the perfection of one’s own benefit from the non-Buddhists free from desires, those who are still training, and those who are finished training.”

27 PSṬ [17.15–18.1]: *tatra praśastatvam tasya jñānasya tattvaviśayatvāt. tat punaḥ pramāṇasaṃvādāt taddeśitasya mārgasyānumīyate*. “Among those, [the Well-gone One is] “splendor” since his cognition takes truth as its object. Furthermore, this[, namely, that his cognition takes truth as its object,] is inferred from [the fact] that the path he taught is consistent with [other] means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*).”

3.2 Solidity (*sthiratva*)

Jinendrabuddhi then takes *Su-gata* to mean ‘He who was gone completely,’ i.e. ‘He who will never return.’ In other words, *su* means non-returning. He bases this characterization on the fact that the method of practice (path) determined by the Buddha is not refuted by any other means of cognition, and that there is consistency in His own teaching. In other words, the Buddha’s teaching is ‘solid’ (*sthira*) in terms of itself and in terms of any other means of valid cognition than the Buddha’s discourse.²⁸

Furthermore, like the first characteristic, Jinendrabuddhi depicts this second characteristic as the Buddha’s superiority over others. In this case, the Buddha is superior to those Buddhist in the process of learning who have not yet fully abandoned their natural ego, here specifically called *anabhisamṣkārika-satkāyadrṣṭi*, non-conceptually formed personalistic view. Because this innate ego still remains, there is still the possibility that they might return to *samsara* if it is triggered (see Appendix B).

3.3 Remainderness (*aśeṣatva*)

The meaning of ‘completely, without remainder’, which Dignāga mentions as the third meanings of *su*, is understood by Jinendrabuddhi in the sense of the Buddha being skillful in making others understand. In other words, ‘remainderless’ here means being adept at teaching others.²⁹

And, as above, Jinendrabuddhi understands this characteristic of the Buddha as the Buddha’s superiority, in this case over the *śrāvakas* who have finished learning and no longer need learning (*aśaikṣa*) (see Appendix B).

28 PST [18.1–3]: *apunarāvṛttitvaṃ sthiraṭvāt. tat punar mārgasya tanniścitasya pramāṇāntar-eṇābādhanād avasīyate, avicalasya vā pūrvāparavacanāvyāhatyā sarvatra pravacane caturāryasatyadeśanāyā ekavākyatvāt.* “[The Well-Gone One is] “never returning” since [His cognition] is solid. Furthermore, this (solidness) is (1), with respect to the path he determined, ascertained because of not being denied by any other means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), (2) or [is ascertained] with respect to the immovable [cognition]. The reason is that, with there being no contradictions in statements that follow each other, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths is consistent in all sermons.”

29 PST [18.3–6]: *śeṣaṃ punar atra caturṣv āryasatyeshv adhigateṣv api jñānasya pratipādanākauśalam. tadabhāvād aśeṣajñānam anumīyate. citrair upāyaiḥ satyaprakāśanāt. śrāvakāṇāṃ tu kiñcin-mātraṃ kauśalam. tad api tadanuśikṣanataḥ.* “Furthermore, as for “remainder” in the present case (i.e., the *pratiloma*-based interpretation), it is not being skillful in making [others] understand the knowledge (*jñāna*) [of one’s understanding of the Four Noble Truths,] even though [one] has understood the Four Noble Truths. Since [the World-Honored One] does not possess that (unskillfulness), it is inferred that [he has] “remainderless cognition.” This is because [the World-Honored One] illuminates the [Four] Truths by [using] various means. On the other hand, the *śrāvakas* have only a little skillfulness. As for this (only a little skillfulness), it is due to [them] having followed and learned from him (World-Honored One).”

3.4 Jinendrabuddhi's Intention

In this way, Jinendrabuddhi explains the superiority of Śākyamuni to non-Buddhists free from desires (*bāhyavītarāga*), those who are learning (*śaikṣa*), and those who no longer need learning (*aśaikṣa*) respectively, while equating these three characteristics with the three properties mentioned by Dignāga, namely splendor (*praśastatva*), non-returning (*apunarāvṛtti*), and remainderless (*niḥśeṣa*). Only the Buddha possesses the characteristics of a 'Well-gone' in these three senses.

	Truth	Solid	Remainderless
1. <i>bāhyavītarāga</i>	×	×	×
2. <i>śaikṣa</i>	○	×	×
3. <i>aśaikṣa</i>	○	○	×
4. <i>Buddha</i>	○	○	○

Jinendrabuddhi's understanding seems to be based on that of Devendrabuddhi, who in his commentary on PV 2.280, gives these three characteristics together with a similar explanation for each characteristic.³⁰

30 PVP [D 120a3–120b1, P 139b1–8]: *de kho na nyid mkhyen pa ni tshad mas mi slu ba dang/bṛtan* (P; *bṛten* D) *pa mkhyen pa ni lam nges pa'am bka' snga phyi'i 'gal ba med pa ste/gnod pa med pas 'gyur ba med pa bṛtan pa* (P; *bṛten ba* D) *las rjes su dpog pa yin no//ston pa'i bstan pa'i yan lag dgu dang theg pa gsum gyi yul can bstan pa sdug bsngal la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid can gyi bstan pa la yang gsung gcig nyid yin pa'i phyir/* ma lus par mkhyen pa'o//lus pa ni 'dir bden pa bzhi rtogs pa'i shes pa yang ji lta ba bzhin du bstan pa'i thabs la mi mkhas pa'o//bcom ldan 'das la de mnga' ba ma yin te/thabs sna tshogs pas bden pa bzhi ston pa mdzad pa'i phyir ro//phags pa dag gi mkhas pa cung zad tsam gang yin pa de yang de'i rjes su slob pa yin no//de kho na nyid dang bṛtan pa* (D; *bstan pa* P) *dang/ma lus pa'i khyad par mkhyen pa'i rgyu/de'i* (D; *de* P) *phyir phyi rol pa dang slob/mi slob las/bcom ldan 'das tshad mas yongs su gzigs pa'i don thugs su chud pa'i khyad par gyis/phyi rol gyi 'dod chags dang bral ba dag las lhag pa yin no//de bzhin du* (D; *de* *zhin du* P) *de rnam ni tshad mas mi slu ba'i (slu ba] em. ; slu pa D, bslu ba P) blang ba dang dor ba la sogs pa'i yul shes pa ma yin no//bṛtan pa shes pa'i khyad par* (D; *bṛtan pa dang ma lus pa'i khyad par* P) *nyid kyis slob pa las lhag pa yin te lhan cig skyes pa'i 'jig tshogs su lta ba ma spangs pa'i phyir ro//mi slob pa dgra bcom pa dang/rang sangs rgyas dag las lhag pa ni ma lus pa'i khyad par mkhyen pas so//*

"True cognition is consistent with means of valid cognition.** Also, solid cognition is the ascertainment of the path or the absence of contradiction in the statements that follow each other, and it is inferred, based on that which is solid, to be "immovable due to not being denied [by means of valid cognition].**** This is because the teachings of the nine divisions of the canon and the teachings dealing with the three vehicles, which are [both] the teachings of the teacher, are consistent also with regard to the teachings characterized by suffering, etc. [namely, the Four Truths]. Remainderless cognition: With regard to that [term] "remainder" (*śeṣa), [it is meant] not being skillful when it comes to the means of correctly teaching, even though [his] cognition has the understanding of the Four Truths. The World-Honored One does not possess that (remainder). This is because [the World-Honored One] taught the Four Truths by using various means.***** The sages have only a little skillfulness, and even that (skillfulness) they have learned according to him

In summary, the PST/PVP's comprehension of truth (*tattva*), solid (*sthira*) and remainderless (*aśeṣa*) can be encapsulated as follows.

- Truth (*tattva*): The Buddha's cognition has the truth as its object, because the path that he taught is consistent with a means of valid cognition. The non-Buddhists free from desires, on the other hand, have no cognition of the Four

(**tadanuśiṣṣaṇa*).***** Due to that cause that is [his] special (**viśeṣa*) cognition that is truth, solid, and remainderless, [the World-Honored One is superior] to non-Buddhists, those who are still training/those who are finished training. And due to the World-Honored One's special comprehension of objects that are apprehended by means of valid cognition, [therefore, he] is superior to the non-Buddhists free from desires. Likewise, these (non-Buddhists free from desires) do not have a cognition that has as [its] object "[the truths of what should be] accept[ed] and [what should be] discard[ed]," etc., which is consistent with the means of valid cognition. Due to the special nature of solid knowledge, [the World-Honored One] is superior to those who are learning. This is because [those who are still training] do not reject the inborn reifying view of entities. The superiority [of the World-Honored One] over the arhats, who are finished training, and the *pratyekabuddhas* is due to special cognition that is remainderless."

* This statement in PVP can be read as a reason related to the remainderless (*aśeṣa*) that follows. However, I judged it to be a reason related to solidness because of the following: (1) the PVT states that there is no contradiction in the World-Honored One's teachings because of the PVP's statement regarding the teachings of the nine divisions of the canon (PVT [D 150b2–3, P 186a2–3]); (2) the PST cites consistent teaching as a reason regarding "solidness" (PST [18.1–3]), and (3) the understanding of the TSP that corresponds to the passage in question.

** Cf. PVT [D 150a7–b1, P 185b7–8]: *gang gi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyi bka' tshad ma mi slu ba yin pa de'i phyir de'i mkhyen pa phyin ci ma log par rjes su dpog pa yin no*/"Since the teachings of the World-Honored One are consistent with the means of valid cognition, therefore it is inferred that His cognition is not distorted."

*** Cf. PVT [D 150b1–b2, P 185b8–186a2]: *lam nges pa'am zhes bya ba ni nges pa ste/the tshom med par ston pa las brtan pa'i mkhyen pa rjes su dpog pa yin te/shes bya gang la brtan pa'i shes pa yod pa ma yin pa gang yin pa de ni rnam pa gsal ba'i sgo nas ston par nus pa ma yin no/bka' snga phyi 'gal ba med pa zhes bya ba'i rnam par bshad pa ni gnod pa med pas zhes bya ba yin no/rnam pa des 'gyur ba med pa las* (D; *lam P*) *brtan pa* (P; *brtan D*) *bstan pa las brtan pa'i mkhyen pa rjes su dpog pa yin no zhes pa'i skabs yin no*/"The ascertainment of the path or' [means that the path is] ascertained[, in other words,] it is taught without uncertainty, and based on [that,] [the World-Honored One's] solid cognition is inferred. One who does not have solid knowledge regarding the knowable (*jñeya*) cannot teach that in a clear way. The explanation 'no contradiction in the statements that follow each other' is 'due to not being denied.' 'Based on being the "immovable" ('*gyur ba med pa las*) since it is such (not denied)' [means] based on the solid[, in other words,] that which is taught; and [this] is related to the contextual topic of inferring that [the World-Honored One's cognition] is solid cognition."

**** Cf. PVT [D 150b4–5, P 186a4–5]: *bcom ldan 'das la de mnga' ba ma yin te/thabs sna tshogs pas bden pa bzhi ston par mdzad pa'i phyir ro/de'i phyir ma lus pa mkhyen pa rjes su dpog pa yin no zhes bya bar sbyar ro*/"The World-Honored One does not have that (remainder). This is because [the World-Honored One] taught the Four Truths by using various methods.' Therefore, [this statement] is related to inferring that the World-Honored One's cognition] is remainderless cognition."

***** Cf. PVT [D 150b5, P 186a5]: *de'i rjes su slob pa yin no zhes bya ba ni bcom ldan 'das kyi rjes su slob pa'i phyir ro*/"[That they] have learned according to him' is due to have learned according to the World-Honored One."

- Truths (in the PSṭ: the truths of suffering and cessation), which are consistent with a means of valid cognition, so the World-Honored One is superior to them.
- Solid (*sthira*): The path ascertained by the Buddha is not denied by any other means of valid cognition. All sermons consistently teach the Four Truths. The World-Honored One is superior to those who are learning (namely, non-arhats who perceive the Four Truths and have not yet fully eliminated their afflictions) because he possesses solid cognition. Those who are learning, on the other hand, have not rejected the inactive reifying view of self, and therefore may return again.
 - Remainderless (*aśeṣa*): The term ‘Remainder (*śeṣa*)’ denotes the lack of proficiency in teaching, specifically referring to a teacher’s inability to effectively expound upon the Four Truths, despite possessing a comprehensive understanding of them. The disciples (*śrāvakas*), who have received teachings from the revered World-Honored One, devoid of any ‘remainder,’ possesses the adeptness to eloquently elucidate the Four Truths through various means. This state of remainderlessness, which implies completeness, elevates him above the arhats (those who have attained enlightenment and no longer require further instruction) and *pratyekabuddhas*, as stated in the PVP.³¹

Here, I wish to emphasize the comprehension of these texts regarding the concept of “remainderless (*aśeṣa*),” which constitutes the central theme of the present article.

Devendrabuddhi and Jinendrabuddhi identify this “remainder” as unskillfulness (*akauśala*) in instructing others, specifically pertaining to the deficiency in effectively expounding upon the Four Truths, despite possessing a comprehensive understanding of them. Moreover, by discerning the presence or absence of this “remainder,” they endeavor to delineate varying degrees of skillfulness in preaching, thus highlighting the distinction between Śākyamuni and arhats/*pratyekabuddhas*.³²

³¹ The PSṭ mentions only the *asaikṣas* who no longer need learning, i.e., *arhats*. This presumably follows the PSV, which does not directly refer to *pratyekabuddhas*.

³² Cf. PVV [107.4–8]: *bāhyaśaikṣāśaikṣādhikas*/(PV 2.280d) bāhyaśaikṣebhyo 'dhikaḥ. ye laukikabhāvanāmārgeṇa vitarāgā bāhyā atattvadarśinas, tebhyaḥ tattvadarśitvād adhikaḥ. ye śaikṣāḥ abāhyāḥ parihāṇidharmāṇaḥ, tebhyo 'punarāvṛtṭyā, ye cāśaikṣāḥ śrāvakā aprahīṇakleśavāsānā asāṅgātṛtasarvākāravastavaḥ, tebhyo niḥśeṣapratītyā.* “Therefore, [the World-Honored One] is superior to non-Buddhists, those who are still training, and those who are finished training. (PV 2.280d) [The World-Honored One] is superior to non-Buddhists and those who are still training. Due to [His] seeing the truth, He is superior to the non-Buddhists free from desires who do not see the truth by means of mundane meditative cultivation. Due to the [fact that he] does not come back again, [the World-Honored One is superior] to those who are still training, are not non-Buddhists, [and] have the habit of retrogression. Due to [His] remainderless cognition [The World-Honored One is superior] to those *śrāvakas* who are finished training that have not eliminated the afflictions’ habituated tendencies and do not directly perceive all facets (*sarvākāra*) of entities.” *PV 2.280d: *bāhyaśaikṣāśaikṣādhikas*, PVV: *bāhyaśaikṣādhikas tataḥ*.

In essence, the World-Honored One transcends the mere role of a knower and teacher of the Four Truths. Divergent from arhats and *pratyekabuddhas*, he adeptly imparts wisdom regarding the Four Truths through a diverse array of means.

3.5 Other Understandings of *śeṣa*

In his commentary on PV 2.141b–d,³³ Devendrabuddhi refers to remainder (*śeṣa*) as follows,³⁴

33 PV 2.141b–d: *śeṣam akleśanirjvaram/kāyavāgbuddhivaigunyaṃ mārgoktyapaṭutāpi vā*/[However,] [he] has defects, which are remainder (*śeṣa*), in bodily, speech, and thought [actions] without afflictions and fever. Or to not be skillful in preaching the path [is] also [remainder].” Eltschinger 2005 draws attention to PV2.141cd as related to Dharmakīrti’s view on omniscience. Using Kamalaśīla’s statements in the TSP [ad TS 3338] as a guide, Eltschinger 2005: 432–433 points out that this PV 2 passage may be referring to cognitive hindrances. On this basis, Eltschinger 2005: 434 also notes that Dharmakīrti may have inherited the traditional Buddhist view of omniscience. See TSP [S 1061.14–16]: *kāyavāgbuddhivaigunyaṃ lakṣaṇāyā doṣavāsanāyāḥ prahāṇāt siddham āvaraṇadvayaaprahāṇam. ataḥ sarvāvaraṇavimuktyā siddham sarvajñatvam*. “Because [he] eliminates the faults’ habituated tendencies, which are characterized by defects in bodily, speech, and thought [actions], the elimination of the two [types of] hindrances (i.e., afflictive hindrances and cognitive hindrances), is established. Therefore, by leaving all hindrances (i.e., afflictive hindrances and cognitive hindrances), omniscience is established.”

34 Cf. PVV [60.1–20]: *niḥśeṣaṃ vā gamanāt sugatatvam*[...]. *mārgasya kṣaṇikanairātmyabhāvanāder uktāv apaṭutāpi vā śeṣaṃ tatparityāgād aśeṣahānam abhyāsād iti niḥśeṣagamanāt sugatatvam. darśitaṃ triguṇaṃ sugatatvam. uktyāder doṣasaṃkṣayo nety eke vyatireko ’sya saṃdigdho vyabhicāry ataḥ* (PV 2. 142 b–d) *tad evaṃ sarvajñasya sambhavanūmānaṃ pratipādyā tadbādhakaṃ dūṣayitum āha. eke jaiminīyāḥ uktyāder heto rathyāpuruṣavat rāgādidoṣasaṃkṣayaḥ kasyacin nāsti ity āhuḥ. vyatireko vipakṣād vyāvṛttiḥ asya vakṛtvādiheṭoḥ saṃdigdhaḥ. ato vyabhicāry anaikāntiko ’yam iti vistarato vipaṇcayisyate*.

“Or, based on going (*gamana*) without remainder, [he] is the Well-Gone One. [...] Or, remainder is also not being skillful in preaching the path, that is, the cultivation of moment[ariness] or no-self. [He] is the Well-Gone One because he goes without remainder (*niḥśeṣagamana*): he leaves that (remainder), i.e., [the World-Honored One has] eliminated without remainder, due to [his] cultivating.’ The nature of the Well-Gone One, which has three virtues, was explained: ‘[So,] some people [i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas] [say] that faults are not annihilated based on speaking and [other reasons]. The negative concomitance of this (idea regarding the act of speaking) is doubtful. This is because it has a deviation. (PV 2.142b–d).’

Therefore, having demonstrated the inference of the possibility [of the existence] of the omniscient one, he speaks to refute those who deny that (the inference of the existence of the omniscient). Some people, in other words, the followers of Jaimini, said, ‘Like a person in the street, there is no annihilation of faults such as lust, etc., in any person because of [some person] speaking, etc.’ Negative concomitance, that is, the exclusion from negative examples, is doubtful with respect to this logical reasons such as ‘being a speaker’. Therefore, later it will probably be explained in detail that this (reason) is endowed with deviation, i.e., [it is] inconclusive.”

PVP [D 59a3–4, P 67b1–2]: *dus ring por rnam pa mang pos rnam pa du mar lam goms par ma byas pas lam de dang de'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs kyi yon tan dang skyon rnams khyad par du rtogs pa med pa'i phyir ro//yang na ji lta ba bzhin du rtogs pa'i lam yang rnam par phye ba dang/bshad pa la mi gsal ba ni lus pa yin no//*

This is because, with [them] not cultivating the path (i.e., the seeing of no-self) for a long time, numerous, and diversely,³⁵ there is no special perception of the merits and demerits of[, on the one hand,] that way (the seeing of no-self) and[, on the other hand,] the thing opposed to it (i.e., the seeing of self), [so there is remainder]. Or, remainder is non-clarity with regard to analysis and explanation of the path (i.e., the seeing of no-self) as correctly understood.

This passage asserts that because *arhats/pratyekabuddhas* have not cultivated the path (the seeing of no-self) for a long time, diversely, and numerous, they fail to perceive the merits of seeing no-self and the demerits inherent in seeing a self. Consequently, they are incapable of analytically clarifying the path, despite possessing an understanding of it.³⁶ According to the text, this state is referred to as “remainder (*śeṣa*).” A comparable passage can be found in PST.³⁷

35 Cf. TSP [S 1052.24–1053.1]: *tatra kleśāvaraṇasya nairātmyapratyakṣikarāṇāt prahāṇiḥ. jñeyāvaraṇasya tu tasyaiva nairātmyadarśanasya sādaranirantarādīrghakālābhyāsāt*. “Of these, the afflictive hindrances are eliminated due to directly perceiving no-self. On the other hand, cognitive hindrances [are eliminated due to] cultivating this very seeing of no-self (1) very carefully, (2) without interruption, and (3) over a long period of time.”

36 Regarding PV 2.137, Devendrabuddhi states that if the Buddha has eliminated habituated tendencies (*vāsanā*), then he is engaging in the long-term cultivation of the seeing of no-self. Devendrabuddhi also indicates that the Buddha is superior to arhats and *pratyekabuddhas* in that he has eliminated habituated tendencies (see Satō 2018: 275). It is important to note that here the PVP states that by eliminating habituated tendencies, the Buddha is superior to arhats and *pratyekabuddhas*; one finds examples of “eliminating habituated tendencies” meaning the elimination of the two hindrances, namely, afflictive hindrances and cognitive hindrances, especially the cognitive ones (cf. Funahashi 1965). For example, Ravigupta relates the state of having eliminated habituated tendencies to the elimination of the same two hindrances. Cf. PVV(R) [D 353b2–3]: *sdug bsngal gyi rgyu'i bag chags nyon mongs pas byas pa'i lus dang ngag dang blo'i nus pa nyams pa'i mtshan nyid can gyi spangs pa ni/ bcom ldan 'das gzhan gyi don du 'jug pa can bse ru la sogs pa las khyad par 'di nyid yin te/nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa spangs pa'i mtshan nyid can no//*

37 PST [13.12–14]: *atha vā tathāvidhasya mārgābhyāsasyābhāvenātyartham aparijñānān mārga-tadvipakṣayoḥ, adhigatasyāpi mārgasya vibhajyāprakāśanapāṭavaṃ śeṣam. tad api bhagavataḥ prahīṇam*. “Or, ‘remainder’ is not having the skill to analytically explain the path, despite understanding [it], due to not completely knowing the path and that which is opposed to it, a result of not having such ‘cultivation of the path.’ That, too, the World-Honored One has eliminated.” Cf. also PST [12.7–11]: *tasyaivaṃvidhād upāyābhyāsād ananyasādhāraṇād duḥkhahetor vāsanāpi nāvaśiṣyate. ayam eva ca bhagavataḥ khaḍgāder viśeṣaḥ. parārthapradhānavṛttinā cānenāvaśyam evaṃvidho 'bhyāsaḥ kartavyaḥ, aparijñātasakalavipakṣapratipakṣeṇa parebhyo vipakṣapratipakṣayor upadeṣṭum āśakyatvāt*. “Due to the unique [cultivation] that is the above kind of cultivation, not even the habituated tendency of suffering remains in him [the World-Honored One]. And this is exactly what makes the World-Honored One superior to the rhinoceros (*pratyekabuddha*). In addition, he who

4 The PVP/PSṬ's Understanding of *aśeṣa/śeṣa* and the TSP's Understanding of the Omniscient One

4.1 *aśeṣa* and *śeṣa* in the TSP

In the following, I shall demonstrate the impact of comprehension regarding *aśeṣa/śeṣa*, as encountered in the PVP/PSṬ, on Kamalaśīla's perception of the omniscient being.

The TSP passage quoted in Appendix A contains the following statement:

TSP [S 1062.9–11]: Also, since [He] clarifies the Four Truths by various means, His remainderless cognition (*aśeṣajñāna*) is inferred. This is because [the Well-Gone One] has eliminated the remainder (*śeṣa*), which is characterized by not cognizing all facets and not having the ability to explain [the Four Truths]. It is also because one who does not understand the merits and demerits of all facets, as well as one who is not skillful in explaining that (the Four Truths), does not teach in this way (using various means).

This posits that the teaching of the Four Truths is grounded in cognition devoid remainder (*aśeṣajñāna*). Furthermore, it comprehends the remainder (*śeṣa*) as the absence of perceiving the virtues and shortcomings encompassing all facets (*sarvākāra*), alongside a lack of proficiency in expounding upon the Four Truths.³⁸

4.2 *śeṣa* and Cognitive Hindrances, *aśeṣajñāna* and the Omniscient One

As has been pointed out by a number of scholars, the TSP understands remainder (*śeṣa*) to be cognitive hindrances (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).³⁹ Similarly, scholars have noted that

works primarily for the benefit of others will surely engage in the above kind of cultivation. This is because one who does not fully know all enemies (*ātmadarśana*) and opponents [of enemies] (*nairātmyadarśana*) cannot explain to others about the enemies (*ātmadarśana*) and opponents [of enemies] (*nairātmyadarśana*).” *Cf. PSṬ [12.1–6].

38 Basically, Kamalaśīla's understanding is consistent with that found in the PVP/PSṬ. However, the latter authors use a different formulation, as they, consider that the remainder (*śeṣa*) exclusively concerns seeing the no-self and seeing the self. This difference should not be overlooked when considering “the omniscient one.” As will be shown, this is because the TSP associates completion or “not having a remainder (*śeṣa*),” that is, being remainderless (*aśeṣa*), with omniscience. If we take this into account, this understanding of remainder (*śeṣa*) is probably connected to the TSP's understanding of “the omniscient one” and its view of the Buddha.

39 TSP [S 1052.22–24]: *tatra kleśā eva rāgādayo bhūṭadarśanapratibandhabhāvāt* kleśāvaraṇam ucyante. dṛṣṭasyāpi heyopādeyatattvasya yat sarvākārāparijñānaṃ pratipādanāsāmarthyam ca taj jñeyāvaraṇam*. “Among these, none other than the afflictions are attachment, etc., and these are

Mahāyāna Buddhists hold that the two vehicles of arhats and *pratyekabuddhas* aim at eliminating only afflictive hindrances, whereas the bodhisattva vehicle (the Mahāyāna) also aims at eliminating cognitive ones.⁴⁰ It has moreover been noted that the removal of cognitive hindrances is linked to omniscience.⁴¹

The TSP, too, connects eliminating cognitive hindrances with omniscience, holding that one becomes omniscient by removing both afflictive and cognitive hindrances.⁴² Moreover, it also states that *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are not omniscient because they do not eliminate cognitive hindrances.

TSP [S 1060.20–22]: *atā eva śrāvakāder nairātmyadarśane 'pi na sarvajñatvam. tathā-vidhāntarābhyāsaviśeṣābhāvena jñeyāvaraṇasyāprahāṇāt.*

For this very reason, even if *śrāvakas* and [*pratyekabuddhas*] see no-self, [they] are not omniscient. This is because with there being no such special cultivation of a different type, they (*śrāvakas*, etc.) do not eliminate the cognitive hindrances.

The stance of the TSP, which seeks to distinguish between *śrāvakas/pratyekabuddhas* and buddhas based on the elimination of cognitive hindrances, that is, remainder (*śeṣa*), is in line with the PVP/PST, which, as we have seen, attempted to show the difference between the World-Honored One and arhats/*pratyekabuddhas* based on the cognition of remainder (*śeṣa*). However, while the TSP adopts the understanding

called afflictive hindrances because they prevent seeing the truth. [It is said that] cognitive hindrances are not knowing all forms completely, even if [one] has already perceived the truth of what should be discarded and what should be adopted, and not having the ability to teach it.” * *-pratibandhabhāvāt*] em., *gegs su gyur pa'i phyir*] T; *-pratibandhā(ndha?)bhāvāt* K, *-pratibandhāt* J^{ac}, *-pratibandhabhāvāt* J^{pc} Ś. Cf. Moriyama 2012: 242.

40 Ogawa 1988: 33. Cf. also McClintock 2010: 125–126.

41 Kawasaki 1992: 151. Cf. TrBh [38.9–14]: *kleśajñeyāvaraṇāprahāṇam api mokṣasarvajñatvādhigamārtham. kleśā hi mokṣapṛāpter āvaraṇam ity atas teṣu prahīṇeṣu mokṣo 'dhigamyate. jñeyāvaraṇam api sarvasmiñ jñeye jñānapravṛttipratibandhabhūtam akliṣṭam ajñānam. tasmin prahīṇe sarvākāre jñeye 'saktam apratihatañ ca jñānaṃ pravartata ity atah sarvajñatvam adhigamyate.* “And furthermore, the reason for eliminating afflictive [hindrances] and cognitive hindrances is to attain liberation and omniscience. This is because the afflictions are hindrances to attaining liberation; therefore, when they are eliminated, liberation is attained. Furthermore, cognitive hindrances are undefiled ignorance (*akliṣṭam ajñānam*), which is what prevents cognition from arising regarding every knowable. When it(, i.e., undefiled ignorance,) is eliminated, unattached and unobstructed cognition begins to engage regarding the knowable having all aspects, thus the condition of the omniscient one is attained.”

42 TSP [S 1052.21–22]: *kleśajñeyāvaraṇāprahāṇato hi sarvajñatvam.* “This is because by eliminating afflictive [hindrances] and cognitive hindrances, [a certain person] has the nature of the omniscient one (i.e., by eliminating afflictive hindrances and cognitive hindrances, they become the omniscient one).”

of *śeṣa* found in PVP/PST, it differs from them in its use of the term “cognitive hindrances” when understanding *śeṣa*.⁴³

The TSP expounds that the attainment of omniscience is accomplished through the eradication of remainder (*śeṣa*), specifically referring to cognitive obstacles. It further posits that this eradication enables skillful instruction in the Four Truths using deverse methodologies.⁴⁴

In this way, the TSP establishes a connection between *aśeṣajñāna* with omniscience. Additionally, Prajñākaragupta asserts in his commentary on PV 2.280: “The special cognition that lacks remainder is *sarvākārajñāna*,⁴⁵ the remainderless cognition [referred to by Dignāga].”⁴⁶ Thus, he also positions “*aśeṣajñāna*” as a term encapsulating the Buddha’s omniscience.

As explained, from the eighth century onwards, Dharmakīrti’s followers associated *aśeṣajñāna* with the Buddha’s omniscience.⁴⁷

5 Conclusion

This study has centered its attention on specific passages from the TSP that pertain to *pramāṇabhūta* and the omniscient being. Building upon these excerpts, the analysis

43 McClintock 2010: 127 n.328 also mentions the relationship in the TSP between remainder (*śeṣa*) in PV 2.141 and “epistemic obscuration” (*jñeyāvaraṇa*, i.e., cognitive hindrances).

44 Cf. TSP [S 1052.15–19]: *etac ca sarvajñalakṣaṇaṃ bhagavatya evopalabhyate, nānyatra. vicitrair upāyair avikalacatuḥsatyalakṣaṇasābhyupāyaheyopādeyatattvaprakāśanād iti bhāvaḥ. na hy avidi-taṃ vastu tathābhāvais tathāvat tadaviparītaṃ avikalam upadeṣṭuṃ śakyate. yathoktaṃ “parokṣo-panyataddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram” iti. “Also, this characteristic of the omniscient one is found only for the World-Honored One, not for others. [In other words,] this means ‘because, by [using] various means, [he] makes the Four Truths clear without anything lacking, [in other words,] the causes (the truth of the arising of suffering and the truth of the path), as well as the truth, which is what should be discarded and what should be adopted (the truth of suffering and the truth of the cessation of suffering).’ This is because it is not possible to teach a non-perceived entity as it exists, as it is, without contradicting it (the entity) and without anything lacking. As it is said [in the *Pramāṇavārttika*], ‘This is because it is difficult for one who does not perceive what should be obtained and the causes of what [should be obtained] to speak of that (the Four Truths) (PV 2.132ab).’”*

45 The term *sarvākārajñatā* appears in TS 3353, but the TS/TSP clearly considers *sarvākārajñatā* and *sarvajñatā* to be synonymous. Cf. TS 3353: *sarvākārajñatāyās tu na kaścid api vidyate/sākṣād itarathā vāpi virodho jñeyatādibhiḥ* / “On the other hand, in *sarvākārajñatā*, there is no contradiction at all, either directly or indirectly, with being a cognitive object, etc.”

46 PVABh [164.27]: *aśeṣaviśeṣajñānaṃ sarvākārajñānaṃ niḥśeṣajñānaṃ*. Cf. Wakahara 1985: 68–69.

47 It appears that Haribhadra, when interpreting the meaning of “the Well-Gone One,” associates this with omniscience, understanding remainder (*śeṣa*) as “preventing cognition of all cognitive objects.” Cf. AAĀ [184.10–11]: *asaikṣāḥ punaḥ sarvajñeyesu jñānavibandhān na niḥśeṣagatāḥ*. “Furthermore, since there is a limit to what they can perceive with regard to all cognitive objects, those who have finished training are not those who go (understand) without remainder.”

has explored the correlation between the Buddha's status as *pramāṇa* and the TS/TSP's perspective on omniscience, as well as the relationship between remainderless cognition (*aśeṣajñāna*) and omniscience.

In PV 2.31–33, Dharmakīrti investigates the foundation of the Buddha being a *pramāṇa* in his knowledge of the Four Truths, rather than in omniscience. This well-established perspective on the Buddha's nature is inherited by the TS/TSP. By adhering to the viewpoint as the presented in PV2, the TS/TSP perceives both the Buddha and the omniscient being as grounded in their understanding of the Four Truths, which serves as the fundamental basis for being a *pramāṇa*.

Dharmakīrti's perspective on the Buddha, as expounded in PV 2.31–33, engenders the belief among contemporary scholars that, according to Dharmakīrti, the omniscient being is specifically the one who possesses the knowledge of the Four Truths. In light of this, scholars have identified a disparity between Dharmakīrti and post-Śāntarakṣita Buddhists thinkers concerning the notion of the Buddha's omniscience.

However, in light of PV 3.92–94 and the discussion in PVin 2 on the final moment of an arhat's mindstream, as well as Maṇḍana Miśra's critique of the omniscient one, it seems risky to conclude, without further evidence, that Dharmakīrti considered only "the omniscient one" as equivalent to the "knower of the Four Truths."

I researched the comprehension of *tattva*, *sthira*, and *aśeṣa* as elucidated by Devendrabuddhi, a direct disciple of Dharmakīrti. It is possible that Devendrabuddhi exerted an influence on scholar-monks at Nālandā monastery during the eighth-century. Furthermore, I scrutinized relevant passages authored by Jinendrabuddhi, who was a contemporary of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and conceivably engaged in activities at Nālandā. Additionally, I explored their interpretations of *śeṣa/aśeṣa* and demonstrated their correspondence with those in the TSP.

In my research, it has become evident that the TSP embraces a comprehension of *śeṣa/aśeṣa* that bears resemblance to that encountered in the PVP/PST, thereby implying a common understanding among the community Nālandā during the eighth century. Conversely, concerning the interpretation of "remainder" (*śeṣa*), I highlighted a subtle disparity in phrasing between the PVP/PST and the TSP.

The PVP, PST, and TSP all state that having remainderless cognition (*aśeṣajñāna*) makes it possible to skillfully teach the Four Truths through various means. In addition, they show the difference between the World-Honored One and *śrāvakas/pratyekabuddhas* based on the presence of remainderless cognition or lack thereof.

The TSP, which delineates the concept of remainder (*śeṣa*) in term of cognitive hindrances, posits that the attainment of omniscience is achieved through the elimination of remainder. The TSP establishes a connection between cognitive devoid of remainder (*aśeṣajñāna*) and the omniscience of Buddha. This association is likewise discernible in the works of Dharmakīrti's successors spanning from the eighth century onwards.

Given the observations presented thus far, it is imperative not to overlook their comprehension of cognition devoid of remainder (*aśeṣajñāna*) in the investigation of post-Dharmakīrti perspectives on the omniscient and the Buddha.⁴⁸

Appendix A

TSP [S 1061.22–1062.12]: *tasyāṇayā deśanayā sābhyupāyaheyopādeyatattvasthira-āśeṣajñānaṃ sādhyate. tajjñānayogā*⁴⁹ *evāsau sarvajñaḥ pramāṇabhūtaś ceti taduktapratipattikāmaiḥ sādhayitum yuktaḥ, na tu kīṭasaṅkhyādiññānāt. kiṃ tu kīṭasaṅkhyādāv api tasya jñānasambhavaḥ sādhyate. tattvasthiraśeṣajñānaṃ tv āhatya.*

*tathā hi pramāṇasaṃvādinairātmyadeśanayā tattvajñānaṃ yasya siddham, tasyaiva nairātmyasya pūrvāparāvyāhatadeśanayā sthiraññānaṃ, navāṅge 'pi śāstuḥ*⁵⁰ *pravacane triyānaviśayāyā*⁵¹ *api deśanāyāṃ duḥkhādilakṣaṇasatyadeśanāyā ekavākyatvāt.*

*vicitraś copāyais catuḥsatyaprakāśanād aśeṣajñānaṃ asyānumīyate. śeṣasya sarvākārājñānapratipādanāsāmarthyalakṣaṇasya*⁵² *prahāṇāt. na hy aviditasarvākāraguṇadoṣas tatprati-pādanākuśalaś ca tathā pratipādayati.*

This teaching [of His] proves that he (the Well-Gone One) has a solid (*sthira*) and remainderless (*aśeṣa*) cognition of truth (the Four Truths), which is that which should be discarded and that which should be adopted, along with their causes. It is appropriate for those who wish to reach (*pratipatti*) what is taught by Him to demonstrate that “He is the omniscient one and *pramāṇabhūta* precisely because he is endowed with that cognition.” But it is not [appropriate to demonstrate that He is the omniscient one and *pramāṇabhūta*] on the basis of cognitions of the number of insects and so on. However, that he may have knowledge of even things such as the number of insects is demonstrated. On the other hand, [his] solid and remainderless cognition of truth is directly (*āhatya*)⁵³ [demonstrated].

⁴⁸ As to whether Dharmakīrti's understanding of *aśeṣajñāna* is related to omniscience, no answer can be given at this time. Perhaps after considering his understanding—including the meaning of the word *niḥśeṣa*, which the PSV uses in its interpretation of the meaning of the “Well-Gone One,” an interpretation forming the backdrop for *aśeṣa* in PV 2.280—will we be able to draw a tentative conclusion.

⁴⁹ *tajjñānayogāt*] J, *ye shes de dang ldan pa'i phyir*] T; *(te)na jñānayogāt* K, *tena jñānayogāt* S. Cf. Saccone 2018: 151.

⁵⁰ *śāstuḥ*] J, *ston pa po*] T; *śāstra* SK.

⁵¹ *triyāna°*] J, *theg pa gsum*] T; *priyāna(nu ?)*° K, *priyānu°* S.

⁵² *sarvākārājñāna-*] em., *rnam pa thams cad mi shes pa*] T; *sarvākārājñāna-* JSK.

⁵³ Shiga 2007: 152 translates *āhatya* in chapter 18 (*Anumānaparīkṣā*) of the TSP as *chokusetsuteki* 直接的 (directly). Here, I have followed his translation. Cf. TSP ad 3308 [S 1044.15–17] (to be quoted later).

In other words, only he whose cognition of truth is proven by a teaching of no-self that is consistent with a means of valid cognition [is proven] as having a solid cognition based on [His] teaching regarding no-self, which is not contradicted before or after.

This is because the teaching of the [Four] Truths, which are characterized as suffering[, origin of the suffering, etc.,] is consistent in both the teachings (*pravacana*) of the nine divisions of the canon and the teachings (*deśanā*) dealing with three vehicles, [all of which are the words] of the teacher [i.e., the Buddha].

Also, since [He] clarifies the Four Truths by various means, His remainderless cognition is inferred. This is because [he] has eliminated the remainder (*śeṣa*), which is characterized by not cognizing all facets (*sarvākāra*) and not having the ability to explain [the Four Truths]. It is also because one who does not understand the merits and demerits of all facets, as well as one who is not skillful in explaining that (the Four Truths), does not teach in this way (using various means).

Appendix B

PST [18.6–11]: *atas tattvasthīratvāśeṣatvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭena jñānena bāhyaśaikṣā-śaikṣebhyo 'dhiko bhagavān.*

- (1) *tattvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭena jñānena bāhyavītarāgebhyo 'dhikaḥ. tathā hi na teṣāṃ pramāṇasaṃvādiheyopādeyaviśayaṃ jñānam.*
- (2) *sthīratvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭena śaikṣebhyaḥ, teṣāṃ anabhisaṃskārikāyāḥ satkāyadrṣṭer aprahāṇāt, tatsamudācārakāleṣu parāvṛttisambhavāt.*
- (3) *aśeṣatvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭeṇāśaikṣebhyaḥ, teṣāṃ yathoktaśeṣasambhavāt.*

Accordingly, the World-Honored One is superior to the non-Buddhists [free from desires], those who are learning, and those who no longer need learning due to cognition that is characterized by the [three] characterizations of truth, solidity, and remainderlessness.

- (1) Due to cognition identified by the identifying factor of truth, [the World-Honored One] is superior to non-Buddhists free from desires. In other words, they (non-Buddhists free from desires) do not have cognition that takes as its object “that which is to be discarded and that which is to be adopted (*heyopādeya*, i.e., the truth of suffering and the truth of cessation)”, which is consistent with a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇasaṃvādi*).
- (2) [The World-Honored One is superior] to those who are learning due to [cognition that is] identified by the identifying factor of solidity. This is because they (those who are learning) have not discarded the non-conceptually formed personalistic view (*anabhisaṃskārika satkāyadrṣṭi*) and therefore may return when it is active.

- (3) The [World-Honored One is superior] to those who no longer need learning due to [cognition] characterized by the characterization of “the remainderless.” Because they (those who no longer need learning) can have the kind of “remainder” mentioned above.⁵⁴

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- PVV(R): *Pramāṇavārttikavṛttināma* (Ravigupta): D 4224, P 5726.
- PS: *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga): See PSV.
- PSṬ: *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* 1 (Jinendrabuddhi): Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic (eds.) (2005): *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 1. Part I: Critical Edition*. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House/Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

⁵⁴ Cf. Kataoka 2007: 64–65.

PSV: Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (Dignāga): Steinkellner, E. (ed.): Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi's Ṭīkā. (www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf).

Other Abbreviations

J: Jaisalmer Mss of TS/P: J catalog no. 377 (TS) f. 186 omitted.; no. 378 (TSP).
 D: sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
 K: Sanskrit edition of TSP by E. Krishnamacharya.
 P: Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
 Pā: Patan Mss of TS/P: Pā catalog no.6679 (TS); no. 6680 (TSP).
 S: Sanskrit edition of TSP by D. Shastri.
 Vibh: Vibhūticandra's note on PVV. See PVV.
 em.: emended
 J^{ac}: J's uncorrected reading.
 J^{pc}: J's corrected reading.

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