

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| Zeitschrift: | Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie |
| Herausgeber: | Schweizerische Asiengesellschaft |
| Band: | 77 (2023) |
| Heft: | 1 |
| Artikel: | On verbal cognition : ntarakita's and Kamalala's treatment of vivak |
| Autor: | Sferra, Francesco |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-1055075 |

Nutzungsbedingungen

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften auf E-Periodica. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen sowie auf Social Media-Kanälen oder Webseiten ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. [Mehr erfahren](#)

Conditions d'utilisation

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. La reproduction d'images dans des publications imprimées ou en ligne ainsi que sur des canaux de médias sociaux ou des sites web n'est autorisée qu'avec l'accord préalable des détenteurs des droits. [En savoir plus](#)

Terms of use

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. Publishing images in print and online publications, as well as on social media channels or websites, is only permitted with the prior consent of the rights holders. [Find out more](#)

Download PDF: 08.01.2026

ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, <https://www.e-periodica.ch>

Francesco Sferra*

On Verbal Cognition: Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s Treatment of *vivakṣā*

<https://doi.org/10.1515/asia-2023-0018>

Received June 16, 2023; accepted November 24, 2023

Abstract: Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are those who, while putting the ‘intention of the speaker’ (*vivakṣā*) at the core of their analysis of verbal communication, opt for a formal and technical treatment of the topic. In order to prove through coherent arguments that *śābdajñāna* is inference and therefore to support Dignāga’s reduction of the valid means of correct knowledge, they all identify *vivakṣā* with the property-possessor (*dharmin*) or probandum (*sādhya*), and *śabda* (‘word’) with the logical mark (*liṅga*) or probans (*sādhana*). They do so to counteract the criticisms of the opponents (Kumārila first of all). Nevertheless, while Jinendrabuddhi, following Dharmakīrti, recognizes the sheer pragmatic value of verbal cognition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to follow Dignāga more closely and also recognize its epistemic value. The purpose of this article is precisely to describe the essential points of the arguments of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and show their most original aspects.

Keywords: Buddhist logic; philosophy of language; epistemology

Earlier versions of this paper were read at the University of Cagliari (17 May 2018), at the Rabindra Bharati University of Kolkata (4 February 2019), at the University of Manipal (11 February 2019), and during the symposium “Kamalaśīla’s Significance in the Intellectual History of Buddhism” held in Vienna 4–6 March, 2022, at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. I wish to thank all those friends and colleagues who organised these lectures, and who provided me with insights and comments, in particular (in alphabetical order), Maria Piera Candotti, Nirmalya Chakraborty, Pei-Lin Chiou, Hiroko Matsuoka, Mrinal Kaul, Tiziana Pontillo, and Madhuchanda Sen. I also owe my gratitude to Harunaga Isaacson, Horst Lasic, Margherita Serena Saccone, and Vincenzo Vergiani, who read this paper and provided me with useful corrections and suggestions, and to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, who kindly revised the English text.

***Corresponding author:** Francesco Sferra, Università degli Studi di Napoli L’Orientale, Dipartimento Asia Africa e Mediterraneo, Piazza San Domenico Maggiore 12, 80134 Napoli, Italy, E-mail: fsferra@unior.it

1 Introductory Remarks

It has already been noted that Dharmakīrti's introduction of the concept of *vivakṣā*, variously rendered in secondary literature as 'desire to speak', 'intention', 'intended meaning', etc., and of its synonyms, such as *abhiprāya* and *icchā*,¹ in the epistemological analysis of verbal cognition (*sābdajñāna*) was a decisive step in the Buddhist philosophy of language.² It is also known that the 'desire to speak' is often referred to in works by early grammarians, above all Patañjali and Bharṭṛhari,³ as well as by philosophers, in particular Kumārila Bhaṭṭa at various points in his *Ślokavārttika*.⁴ It is noteworthy, however, that none of these thinkers devoted a systematic treatment to this matter, even though it clearly played a crucial role in their understanding of linguistic communication. Dharmakīrti is no exception in this regard. In his works, the most important passages dealing with the 'intention to speak' are found in various parts of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, its *Svavṛtti*, and in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.⁵ To a large extent, Dharmakīrti's words mark the boundary within which investigations into the construction of meaning and its transmission were to develop among Buddhist philosophers. Following in his footsteps, Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla were those who opted for a formal and technical treatment of the topic, putting *vivakṣā* at the core of their analysis of verbal communication. In order to prove that *sābdajñāna* is inference through coherent arguments and thus to support Dignāga's reduction of the valid means of correct knowledge, they all identify *vivakṣā* with the property-possessor (*dharmin*) or *probandum* (*sādhya*), and *śabda* ('word') with the logical mark (*liṅga*) or *probans* (*sādhana*), doing so to counteract the criticism of various opponents (above all Kumārila). Nevertheless, while Jinendrabuddhi follows Dharmakīrti, recognizing the sheer pragmatic value of verbal cognition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to follow Dignāga more closely by also recognizing the epistemic value of verbal cognition. The purpose of this article is to provide a precise description of the essential points in the arguments of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and to present the most original aspects of their arguments. We note in passing that other Buddhist philosophers did not follow the same path. For instance, for both

¹ My impression is that in Dharmakīrti's works, these terms are synonyms (see also Nance 2012: 88). This does not mean that in other contexts or in the work of other authors there is not a difference among them, in particular between *abhiprāya* (lit. 'intention', 'purpose', etc.) and *vivakṣā*.

² See Eltschinger 2007: 135–138.

³ On *vivakṣā* in Bharṭṛhari, see Vergiani 2022.

⁴ See Yoshimizu 2008, Eltschinger 2007: 136, n. 90, and also Kataoka 2007.

⁵ See, for instance, *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pramāṇasiddhi* 18 (= PVin 3.74), *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 227, *Svārthānumāna*° 213, 229, 326–327 (= PVin 2.47–48), *Parārthānumāna*° 109 ff., 191 (= PVin 2.11), 193 (= PVin 2.13).

Ratnakīrti (c. 1000–1050) and Mokṣākaragupta (c. 1050–1202), *vivakṣā* has a limited role and is never used as part of a formal inference. In line with Dharmakīrti's presentation of the topic, the value of *śabdajñāna* as a means of reliable cognition is not stressed, or is even excluded. In his compendium of the main doctrines of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, Mokṣākaragupta, taking up some formulations of Ratnakīrti, limits himself to pointing out that words could give rise to non-deceptive knowledge only if they had a relationship with the objects/meanings they denote. But as he demonstrates, this relationship does not exist, neither in terms of identity (*tādātmya*) nor in terms of causality (*tadutpatti*).⁶

2 Dharmakīrti's Treatment of *vivakṣā*

We can conventionally say that the starting point in Dharmakīrti's treatment of this topic is *Svārthānumāna* st. 213 with its *Svavṛtti*. Here he clearly highlights the ultimate limit of words: In the absence of an invariable connection between them and their objects, words do not serve the purpose of establishing the existence of external reality. The only function they perform is to reveal the speaker's intention.

*nāntarīyakatābhāvāc chabdānām vastubhiḥ saha |
nārthasiddhis tatas te hi vaktrabhiprāyasūcakāḥ ||*

Because of the absence of an invariable connection of words with objects, there is no establishment of an [external] object from them, for they indicate [only] the intended meaning of the speaker.⁷

⁶ Kajiyama (1998: 32, n. 31) pointed out that § 4.2 of the *Tarkabhāṣā* follows Ratnakīrti's discussion in *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa* (ed. p. 99 ff.). On this regard, see, for instance, the following passage of Ratnakīrti's *Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa*: [...] *nibandhanām cāsyās tādātmyatadutpattibhyām anyan nopalabhyate, atatsvabhāvasyātadutpattes ca tatrāpratibaddhasvabhāvatvāt | na hi śabdānām bahirarthasvabhāvatāsti bhinnapratibhāsāvabodhaviśayatvāt | nāpi śabdā bahirarthād upajāyante, artham antareṇāpi puruṣasyecchāpratibaddhavṛtteḥ śabdasyotpādarśanāt |* (p. 99) '[...] And of this [connection] no other relationship is perceived apart from that of identity and causality, since what does not have the nature of *X* and what is not produced by *X*, by its own nature is not connected with *X*. Words, in fact, do not have the nature of external objects, since they are the object of a cognition that appears distinct [from them], nor do words arise on the basis of an external object, since words, whose function depends on the intention of the speaker, are seen to arise even without an [external] object.'

⁷ PV *Svārthānumāna* 213. English rendering quoted from Saccone 2019: 467, n. 42, who has translated this on the basis of Manorathanandin's commentary, where *tataḥ* is glossed with *śabdebhyaḥ*. Cf. also Kataoka 2007: 50, n. 31, and Krasser 2012: 84, n. 6.

Some important implications ensue if one shifts the focus from the relationship that others admit between words and the objects/meanings they denote, to the relationship between words and the subject of *vivakṣā*, namely, the speaker, and, implicitly, the listener, who grasps the link between the words of the former and the meanings these words conventionally denote.

2.1 The Limit of Language

The first implication is that by saying that *vivakṣā* (and not *artha*) is the referent of words, that is, that verbal communication does not refer to anything real and ultimately existent in the external world, it is also suggested that the entire process is purely mental.⁸ As Pārvadevaganī (13th c.) notes in passing in the *Nyāyapraveśakabhāṣyaṭīkā*, also the causal relationship admitted between a word and its meaning, if one thinks that a word derives from the desire to utter it and that this desire, in turn, derives from a real object, is valid only for common human interaction; it does not reflect the true reality of things.⁹ Consequently, language can neither be used to establish nor to deny *what exists*, nor to explain *what is* that which exists.

2.2 The ‘Weak Point’ of *vivakṣā*

The second implication concerns the epistemic validity of verbal cognition. In the *Svavṛtti* on the above-mentioned stanza, Dharmakīrti underlines the ‘weak point’ of *vivakṣā* in a very simple and direct way: Not only are the words of a speaker not bound to reality, but the speaker’s intention is not bound to reality either. Therefore, there is no guarantee that a speaker’s words are reliable.

na hi śabdā yathābhāvanṛ vartante yatas tebhyo 'rthaprakṛtir niścīyeta | te hi vaktur vivakṣāvṛttaya iti tannāntarīyakās tām eva gamayeyuḥ | na ca puruṣecchāḥ sarvā yathārthabhāvinyah, na ca tadapratibaddhasvabhāvo bhāvo 'nyam gamayati |¹⁰

⁸ In this regard, see for instance *Pramāṇavārttika* Pramāṇasiddhi 4: *vaktrvyāpāraviṣayo yo 'rtho buddhau prakāśate | prāmāṇyaṁ tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam* || ‘The validity of a word is [only] with respect to that thing which is the content of the speaker’s activity [and] which appears in the mind; [the validity of a word] is not based on the nature/reality of a [supposedly external/objective] thing.’ According to both Manorathanandin (ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana p. 4, ed. Pandeya p. 3) and Prajñākaragupta (ed. p. 7), ‘the speaker’s activity’ is *vivakṣā*.

⁹ [...] *yo 'pi ca “arthena vivakṣā janyate vivakṣayā ca śabdah” iti vivakṣayā kāryakāraṇabhāvah śabdārthayor abhyupagataḥ so 'pi saṃvyavahārārtham, na tu tattvataḥ* | (p. 119).

¹⁰ PVSV ad st. 213, p. 107, lines 22–25.

It is not the case that words have something to do with the true reality of things, so that thanks to them the nature of objects can be ascertained, since [words] are employed according to the intention of the speaker. Thus, being necessarily related to this [intention], they can make known only the latter. *Neither all man's intentions are in conformity with truth, nor can one thing make another known if its nature is not related to the latter.*¹¹

Dharmakīrti's words were echoed and in some cases elaborated on by others. For instance, this topic is touched upon by Arcaṭa (c. 730–790) in the first part of his *Hetubinduṭikā*, where, while discussing the validity of the *prayojanavākyā*, namely, the initial sentence stating the purpose of the treatise, he points out that words (and with them, sentences) only reveal the intention of the speaker, but this is not necessarily reflected by his/her actions in reality. A person can unintentionally, or even intentionally, say things that he/she does not mean.

na ca prayojanavākyasya prāmāṇyam asti, śabdānāṁ bahiarthe pratibandhābhāvāt | vivakṣāyāṁ prāmāṇye 'pi, tasyā yathā vastupravṛttiniyamābhāvān na tataḥ prakaraṇasya prayojanaviśeṣam praty upāyatāniścayah samasti | na hi ye yathā yam arthaṁ vivakṣanti te tathaiva tam anuṭiṣṭhanti, visamvādanābhiprāyāṇām anyathābhidhāyānyathāpravṛttidarśanāt, loke sarvatrānāśvāsāt |¹²

And there is [no] validity in the *prayojanavākyā*, because words have no relationship with an external object. Although [that sentence] is valid with regard to the intention of the speaker, since this [intention] is not bound to an action in accordance with reality, it cannot be ascertained on its basis [= on the basis of this sentence] that a treatise is a valid means towards a particular purpose. This is because those who intend to talk about a thing in a certain way do not [always] accomplish that thing precisely in that way, since it is common experience that those who do not intend to keep a promise behave differently from what they said, since not everyone in the world can be trusted.¹³

A few centuries later, Ratnakīrti also noted that there is no invariable concomitance between words and *vivakṣā*. As he states in passing in his *Sarvajñasiddhi*: 'It cannot be said that the use of words exists only in the presence of the desire to speak, since it is clear that a person speaks randomly while sleeping, even without wanting to, that is, since there is no pervasion between the simple act of speaking and the desire to speak.'¹⁴

The awareness that with *vivakṣā* we have entered very slippery ground is, no doubt, also shared by other authors, including non-Buddhist ones. On this point, we

¹¹ Emphasis mine. See also Yaita 1987 and Eltschinger 2007: 218.

¹² This passage has been re-edited, together with other unpublished passages from Arcaṭa's *Hetubinduṭikā*, in Sferra 2022.

¹³ On this passage, see also Funayama 1985.

¹⁴ *vivakṣābhāve kathāṁ vacanapravṛttir iti na vaktavyam | tadabhāve 'pi nidrāṇasya tattatpravyaktavacanasandarśanāt | vacanamātrasya vivakṣayā vyāpt̄er abhāvāt |* (*Sarvajñasiddhi* p. 25).

note for instance a convergence with some reflections made by Kumārila in the *Ślokavārttika*. Words, he says, reveal the meaning intended by the speaker only in the case of reliable people. In fact, a person may want to say something in a certain way while knowing that it is different in reality. Or, for various reasons, the meaning expressed by the speaker may not coincide with what he/she actually intended to express. It is only in the case of trustworthy people that the words used reveal the speaker's intention: [...] *vaktrdhīr āptavākyena gamyate 'nyatra viplutiḥ*, 'The thought of a speaker is understood when [his] statement stems from [his being] a trustworthy person; in the other case [i.e., if the speaker is not trustworthy,] there is confusion.'¹⁵

Since the validity of *śabdajñāna* depends on the reliability of the speaker, we deduce a principle that can be expressed with disarming simplicity: The words of a reliable speaker are reliable, namely, the words of a person who, due to his/her moral rectitude and pure wisdom, has no interest in deceiving others; those of an unreliable speaker are unreliable. In Ratnakīrti's *Sarvajñasiddhi*, the context is that of justifying why the Bhagavān would wish to teach despite being free of 'attachment'. In fact, the Mīmāṃsaka objection revolves around the contradiction between desire to speak and the fact that the Buddha is admitted as free from attachment.¹⁶ Later in the same text, taking up a topic already found in the Spitzer Manuscript (fragment 113)¹⁷ as well as in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasavavṛtti*,¹⁸ Ratnakīrti explains that the nature of *vivakṣā* in one who is driven by compassion is different from that of one who is driven by *rāga*:

To the one who says that the desire to speak does not exist in those who have completely achieved the ultimate goal, the answer is that it is not so, since [in this case] the desire to speak is aimed at the good of others. And if one were to reply that in one who is devoid of attachment, activity aimed at the good of others would also be difficult to explain since there is no attachment to any purpose, one would say that it is wrong, because even without attachment there is activity by virtue of compassion.¹⁹

¹⁵ Codanāśūtra, st. 162ab. The entire passage runs as follows: *anyathā saṃvidāno 'pi vivakṣaty anyathā yataḥ | tasmād ekāntato nāsti puṇvākyāt taddhiyām gatiḥ || bhrāntasyānyavivakṣyām anyad vākyam ca drśyate | yathāvivakṣam apy etat tasmān naiva pravartate || vaktrdhīr āptavākyena gamyate 'nyatra viplutiḥ |* (*Ślokavārttika* Codanāśūtra stt. 160–162ab; see Kataoka 2011: ed. p. 39, tr. pp. 401–403; see also ed. Ramanatha Sastri p. 84). In the edition by Ganga Sagar Rai (p. 70) we read *āptavākyeṣu* instead of *āptavākyena*. See also Yoshimizu 2008: 52, n. 8. Stanzas 160–161 are also quoted in the anonymous *Pramāṇāntarbhāva* (p. 11). See also below, note 44.

¹⁶ See *Ślokavārttika*, Codanāśūtra 137–140 (Kataoka 2011: ed. pp. 34–35, tr. pp. 366–373).

¹⁷ See Franco 2004a; 2004b: 111–112.

¹⁸ See PVSV p. 9. The same passage occurs in *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, chapter 3, pp. 109–110.

¹⁹ *niśpannasarvasampatter vivakṣāpi na yujyata iti cet | adoṣo 'yam, parārthatvād vivakṣyāḥ | vītarāge 'rthāsaṅgābhāvāt kathām parārthāpi pravṛttir iti cet | na, āsaṅgam antareṇa karuṇayāpi pravṛtteḥ |* (*Sarvajñasiddhi* p. 26).

With this aspect of *vivakṣā*, the discussion opens onto another topic of significant interest for epistemology and soteriology, that of omniscience. Since this has been the object of several recent contributions,²⁰ it will not be investigated further here. We will focus instead on another aspect connected to this second implication, namely, the impossibility of using words to establish an epistemic valid inference.

Words can reveal the intention of a speaker, but they are not the logical mark of an ultimately valid inference. It is not at all accidental that Dharmakīrti and his more faithful followers never apply the technical terms of *anumāna* to the ‘ingredients’ of verbal cognition/verbal testimony and scriptural authority (speaker, words/scripture, *vivakṣā*). Nor do they insert *vivakṣā* into a precise scheme of inference. Everything leads us to think that Dharmakīrti and some of his successors either believed that *śābdajñāna* is not part of an inference or are otherwise silent about it. In the words of Helmut Krasser in his explanation of Dharmakīrti’s point of view, ‘one cannot establish a pervasion between scripture and its reliability, and only such a pervasion could guarantee the certainty of the inference’ (Krasser 2012: 104). In this, Dharmakīrti tacitly yet decisively distances himself from Dignāga, who very likely believed that words, both those of scripture and those of ordinary communication, are the logical mark of a valid inference. Those who remained faithful to Dignāga – and we count Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla among them – believed that *śābdajñāna* is still part of inference. From this perspective, we might say that for Dharmakīrti and some of his followers *śābdajñāna* is subsumed under inference only from the conventional point of view, not from the absolute one.²¹ Words are valid – that is, they are useful – only pragmatically. While a speaker, from whose intention the validity of knowledge should derive, is not necessarily reliable, an epistemic valid *pramāṇa* must be undeceiving, namely, it should have constancy in the capacity of producing effects. This is never guaranteed by *vivakṣā*. As stated at the beginning of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* (see Katsura 1984), knowledge deriving from linguistic communication has its validity, but this must be understood from a pragmatic, conventional point of view; it does not reflect the true reality of things. In fact, unlike an epistemic valid inference, it does not invariably respect the criteria for validity of knowledge.

²⁰ Among the most recent, see, for instance, Kataoka 2023, McClintock 2010, Moriyama 2014, Saccone 2019 and 2023.

²¹ This is the result of the research of Helmut Krasser, according to whom Dharmakīrti does not admit verbal testimony/scripture (*āptavacana*) ‘as a separate means of valid cognition nor subsumes it under inference’ (Krasser 2012: 83). Cf. Gokhale 2013: 13–16.

2.3 Desire to Speak and Convention

The third implication concerns the intrinsic nature of *vivakṣā*, namely, its being inextricably linked to convention. This point was already investigated by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*. Although *vivakṣā* is an essential factor in the formation of a sentence, it cannot ‘ignore’ the context of linguistic exchange, its rules and functioning.²² Verbal communication implies a sort of double ‘action’: 1) when a speaker intends to express something, he/she uses a word, selecting only one of its many, virtually countless meanings, and he/she does so respecting linguistic conventions and the context. 2) These conventions and the context, for their part, represent a shared horizon of meaning that allows the listeners to understand what the speaker has intended to say. Dharmakīrti refers succinctly to this aspect of *vivakṣā* in *Svārthānumāna* st. 327ab and in its *Svavṛtti*.

vivakṣā niyame hetuḥ saṅketaḥ tatprakāśanāḥ |

The intention of the speaker is the cause of the restriction [of one word/sound to one meaning/object]. The convention is that which reveals this [speaker’s intention].²³

vivakṣayā hi śabdo 'rthe niyamyate, na svabhāvataḥ, tasya kvacid apratibandhena sarvatra tulyatvāt | yatrāpi pratibandhas tadabhidhānaniyamābhāvāt, sarvaśabdaiḥ karaṇānām abhidhānprasāṅgāt | tasmād vivakṣāprakāśanāyābhīprāyanivedanalakṣaṇāḥ saṅketaḥ kriyate |²⁴

In fact a word is restricted to a [particular] meaning/object (*artha*) by the intention of the speaker, not by [its] nature, because that [word] is the same with regard to any [*artha*], due to the absence of a relation [of the word] with a given [object]. Even if there is a relationship [between a word and the] phonatory organs, there is no restriction of the expression of those [phonatory organs by all words], because there would be the undesirable consequence that all words would express [only the] phonatory organs. Therefore, it is in order to reveal the speaker’s intention that a convention is established, consisting in revealing the intention.²⁵

22 As V. Vergiani writes very clearly about Bhartṛhari, ‘[t]he individual speakers can choose a higher or lower register, a plain or flowery style, a down-to-earth or polished vocabulary, etc., but they cannot change the morphology or syntax at will or use a word in a sense that is neither its primary meaning nor one of its conventional secondary meanings. [...] Bhartṛhari is acutely aware of this “communal” or “systemic” dimension of *vivakṣā*, which reflects the autonomy of language as a semiotic system and strictly determines the boundaries of individual freedom’ (Vergiani 2022: 1260).

23 See also Eltschinger, Krasser and Taber 2012: 57–61.

24 PVSV *ad* 327a, ed. p. 172, lines 19–23.

25 This rendering is based on Karṇakagomin’s interpretation (see ed. p. 606).

The circularity or mutual dependence of intention and convention is reaffirmed in another line of the *Pramāṇavārttika*:

saṅketasaṅśrayāḥ śabdāḥ sa cecchāmātrasaṅśrayāḥ | (Parārthānumāna 116ab).

Words are based on convention and the latter is based only and solely on the intention [of the speaker].

Words (like any sequence of sounds) convey a meaning only if their relationship is established by a convention: Whoever intends to convey a meaning cannot do so without respecting linguistic conventions. These conventions, in their turn, do not exist without an intention, that is to say, they cannot, by their nature, be established unless they follow someone's intentional decision.²⁶

2.4 Words and Reality

To summarize the main points presented so far, we can say that words allow us to know what a speaker intends to say in compliance with linguistic conventions. The speaker, in his/her turn, expresses an intention that is bound to the structures of the language he/she is using (lexicon, grammar, syntax, etc.). Nonetheless, the speaker is free to misrepresent his/her intention, or to hide it. In many cases, such misrepresentation is due to accidental circumstances independent of the will of the speaker. It is precisely for this reason that it is legitimate for people to have doubts about a speaker's veracity.²⁷ Words do not guarantee the authority or reliability of a speaker, nor – as we have seen – do they have authority with regard to external objects: 1) there can be absolute discrepancy between linguistic convention and reality; 2) words are never related to what appears to be external reality, either in terms of identity (*tādātmya*) or of production (*tadutpatti*), and thus they cannot establish its veracity; and for the same reason, 3) words cannot refute external reality either. In this respect it is significant that Dharmakīrti's position on this topic is adopted quite faithfully by the *bāhyārthavādin* Śubhagupta (c. 720–780), who in the first stanzas of his **Sarvajñasiddhikārikā* states 'that words, by

²⁶ See Manorathanandin's gloss on this line: *saṅketam antareṇa vācakādṛṣṭeh saṅketasaṅśrayāḥ śabdāḥ* | *sa ca saṅketaḥ puruṣecchāmātrasaṅśrayāḥ, tadatiriktasyāpekṣaṇīyasyābhāvāt* | (ed. Sāṅkṛtyāyana p. 453; ed. Pandeya pp. 384–385).

²⁷ As is stated at the end of the first chapter of the anonymous *Pramāṇantarbhāva*, only when the speaker's reliability and the established convention are perfectly known can the object/idea intended by the speaker be known (*abhrāntatve pariññāte abhyāsāder vikalpataḥ* | *saṁānasamayatve ca vivakṣārthaḥ pratīyate* ||, p. 11).

themselves, do not denote things, but indicate concepts in people's mind' (Saccone 2019: 466). Also his opinion regarding *vivakṣā* and its relation to convention matches Dharmakīrti's point of view perfectly.²⁸

3 The Logical Formalization of Verbal Knowledge

In light of these considerations, it is quite plausible that Dharmakīrti intentionally refrained from presenting verbal knowledge in terms of a formally valid inference or from describing *vivakṣā* as the logical mark of an inference, endowed with the 'three natures' or 'characteristics' (*trairūpya, trilakṣaṇa*) that were introduced into the philosophical discourse as early as the fourth century by the Buddhist Vasubandhu in his *Vādavidhāna*.²⁹

To be sure, the use of a formal scheme of inference to explain *sābdajñāna/āptavacana* is also absent in Dignāga's works. If compared to later developments, one could say that Dignāga's treatment is somewhat ambiguous. He deals with verbal cognition in two places in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: 1) in st. 2.5ab, where, in a passage on the authority of scripture, he says that the statement of a reliable person (*āptavāda*) is inference since, according to the most plausible interpretation, it is non-belying in the case of both transcendent objects and objects accessible to us (*āptavādāvisamvādasāmānyād anumānatā*),³⁰ and 2) in st. 5.1, where he introduces the *apoha* theory:³¹

*na pramāṇāntaram sābdam anumānāt tathā hi sah |
kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate ||*

Verbal cognition is not another means of valid knowledge with respect to inference. In fact, this [= a word] denotes its own object through the exclusion of others, as, for instance, 'being produced' [demonstrates the 'impermanence' of a word].

28 *de yañ kun la ruñ ba'i phyir || don gcig ñes la dbañ phyug min || de phyir brjod 'dod sgra rnams ni || don gcig gnas pa'i rgyu yin no || 10 || don gañ brjod par 'dod pa la || mi yis sgra de brjod pa ni || de ñid sgra de'i brjod bya žes || miñon par brjod par bya ba yin || 11 || de yañ brda las šes bya ste || '10. Also these [words of the statements regarding the burning of similar fires, etc.,] are not able to be restricted to one single meaning, since they [also] are fit [for referring] to all [objects whatsoever]. Therefore, the intention of the speaker is the cause for the abiding of the words in one single meaning. 11. Being there [his] intention of a meaning X, a person using that word could very well state: "precisely this is what is expressed by this word." 12a. And this [intended meaning] must be known through convention.' (ed. and tr. Saccone 2019: 471, 477–478).*

29 See Frauwallner 1933.

30 Cit. also in *Pramāṇavārttika* 3.214cd. See Krasser 2012: 99.

31 See Pind 2015: text p. 1, translation pp. 2–3.

Thus we can say that in the same way that *kṛtakatva* ('being produced') is the logical mark of a word's *anityatva* ('impermanence'), words are the logical mark of the inference that allows the listener to know an object through its concurrent absence, *vyatireka* (see Kataoka 2020). However, in Dignāga we find no clear formulation of the terms of inference that would lead to the following scheme:

dharmin = *āpta*

dharma = transcendent objects as well as objects that are accessible to us

liṅga = *vacana*

Indeed, this scheme is in some way implicit. But what Dignāga says is vague enough to be interpreted as Dharmakīrti then does, namely, as a generic parallelism with inference, valid only pragmatically (there is no clear contrast between the two masters). It can also be seen as in agreement with how Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla then interpreted Dignāga's words in the 8th century. In fact, the later masters, while arguing that *āptavāda* falls under *anumāna*, try to provide its logical formalization. Given the relevance and influence of Dharmakīrti's work, they are forced, so to speak, to reinterpret Dignāga in light of Dharmakīrti. They resort to the concept of *vivakṣā*, which never played a role in Dignāga's explanation of verbal communication, and implicitly attempt a sort of synthesis between the two earlier masters. It is precisely the introduction of *vivakṣā* that allows them to provide a formalization of inference and the application of *trairūpya*.

Despite differences in context, style, and structure, there are similar arguments in Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī* (ad *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5.1) and in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (stt. 1521–1524). In both texts, as well as in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, the sections presenting the formalization of *anumāna* are extremely clear.

The entire passage of Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*, of which here only a short excerpt is quoted, is rich in information and contains several arguments. Here we find the relevant passage describing the main structure of a formalized inference:

tatra cāsty eva śabdasya trairūpyam | tathā hi vivakṣāvān puruṣo dharmī | vivakṣā sādhyādharmāḥ | vivakṣāvaty evopalambhabhāvāc chabdasya pakṣadharmatvam | vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ sapakṣaḥ | tadyatireko vipakṣa iti kathām trairūpyam na sambhavati || (ed. Lasic, McAllister and Krasser forthc., p. 2)

And regarding this, a word has indeed three natures. To explain, the property-possessor is the person who has an intention to speak. The property that must be demonstrated is the intention to speak. The word [of which it is being examined here whether it is a valid inferential mark] is [indeed] a quality of the locus, since it is perceived only in one who has the intention to speak.

The one who possesses the intention to speak is the previously experienced *sapakṣa*. The *vipakṣa* is devoid of this. Thus how would [a word] not have the three conditions?

The following table summarizes the main points:

dharmin = speaker/mountain
dharma/sādhyā = *vivakṣā*/fire
liṅga/sādhana = *śabda*/smoke

The treatment of the same topic in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (and its *Pañjikā*) presents no substantial differences. However, his treatment is remarkable in its clarity and synthesis. It is also interesting from a historical point of view, since it clearly refers to an earlier debate.

vivakṣāyām ca gamyāyām vispaṣṭaiva trirūpatā |
pumṣi dharmiṇi sā sādhyā kāryeṇa vacasā yataḥ || 1520 ||
pādapārthavivakṣāvān puruṣo 'yam pratīyate |
vṛkṣaśabdaprayoktṛtvāt pūrvāvasthāsv ahaṁ yathā || 1521 ||
ato yatra parair bāhye trairūpyādi nirākṛtam |
śabdānām iṣyate tatra naivāsmābhiḥ pramāṇatā || 1522 ||
yatra tv eṣām abhīṣṭeyam vyaktam tatra trirūpatā |
vivakṣāyām tu sādhyāyām trailakṣaṇyam prakāśitam || 1523 ||

And when what is to be inferred is the desire to speak, the presence of the three characteristics [of inference] is quite clear, since in a person, who is the property-possessor, this [desire to speak] is that which must be proved by [its] effect, namely, the verbal statement[, which is the *probans*]. 1520

[For example:] This person is known to have had a desire to express the referent/object 'tree' because he utters the word 'tree', as I did in earlier circumstances. 1521

Therefore, we do not at all consider words a *pramāṇa* with regard to an external [object], with regard to which others denied that they possess the three characteristics of inference, etc.; 1522 however, in that [i.e., in the intention,] with regard to which they are admitted [by us] as a *pramāṇa*, the presence of the three characteristics is an evident fact. When it is the desire to speak that is to be established/proved, it has been shown that the three characteristics are present [in the words]. 1523

Regarding this passage, Kamalaśīla does not elaborate much on his teacher's words. The only significant addition is in the commentary on stanzas 1520–1521, where there is a short clarification of the possible case of the speaker not being perceived directly, or cases in which one perceives an echo or hears something inside a cave:

*puruṣo dharmī yatra vaktā drṣyate, sā vivakṣā sādhyā, svasantāne ca sambandhaḥ pūrvam
siddhaḥ | yatra tu vaktā na drṣyate tatra pradeśo dharmī puruṣaviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyāḥ | tathā hi –
pradeśasyāpi śabdakāraṇatvam asty eva | parvatakuharādāv anyādṛśaśabdaśravaṇāt ||*

Where there is direct experience of a speaker, it is the ‘person’ who is the ‘property-possessor’; ‘This’, that is to say the desire to speak, ‘is what must be proved’; and the relationship was previously established within one’s [= inferrer’s] own *continuum*. Where, on the other hand, there is no direct experience of a speaker, the possessor of quality is the place, which is the *probandum* characterised by [the presence of] a person. To put it differently, even the place is in fact the cause of the word, since in a mountain cave, etc., one feels that the words are different [from those heard elsewhere].

4 Verbal Cognition as Inference

The person referred to by Śāntarakṣita in st. 1522 with the word *paraiḥ* is undoubtedly Kumārila. Identifying the main antagonist with this philosopher is by no means incidental. With the evident intention of supporting the authority of the Veda and its being *apauruṣeya*, Kumārila was in fact one of those who most decisively re-thought the defence of *āptavacana* as an independent *pramāṇa*. Arguing against Bauddhas and Vaiśeṣikas, he critically distanced himself from other proponents of Brahmanic culture (notably the Sāṃkhyas and others not openly mentioned, *sāṃkhyādibhiḥ*) by pointing out that their defence of words as a separate *pramāṇa* is ineffective precisely because they did not take the three characteristics of inference into account.³²

Śāntarakṣita was aware that to justify *śābdajñāna* in *anumāna*, he had to take Kumārila’s hypothesis seriously. This is why in the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *Pramāṇāntarabhāvaparīkṣā*, he silently quotes several stanzas from the *Ślokavārttika* related to this topic.³³ Jinendrabuddhi, in his turn, also does not mention Kumārila explicitly, but it is probable that he had the same author in mind.

To summarise the main points of his thesis, Kumārila argues that authoritative testimony or verbal cognition is different from direct perception, although the latter is implicit in the experience of listening to the words of a speaker, and is also different from inference. This is because, first, it can refer to an object/meaning that is beyond the senses (since we can speak or hear about things that are in front of us, but also about things that are imperceptible); and second, it is not possible to

32 See *Ślokavārttika*, Śabdapariccheda 15–18.

33 *Ślokavārttika*, Śabdapariccheda 56, 83–88, 98 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1490–1497.

apply the three characteristics of the logical mark to it. In fact, a word (*śabda*), which should act as a logical sign to make the meaning known, does not respect any of the needed characteristics: 1) It is not a property of the place of inference, but is a property of the speaker (for example, when one proffers the word ‘tree’, this word does not belong to a tree, but rather belongs to the speaker). Moreover, between a word and its object, there is 2) neither a positive, nor 3) a negative invariable concomitance, because it is possible to name something nonexistent or absent at the moment of speaking and vice versa. To this Kumārila adds that it is not even possible to invoke the theory of a word’s eternity or omnipresence, because the absurdity would follow that every word would allow us to know all meanings at every time and place.³⁴ It is therefore precisely the absence of the three characteristics that justifies the status of *śabdajñāna* as an independent *pramāṇa*.

Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Jinendrabuddhi agree with Kumārila that there is no essential connection between objects and words based on identity of nature, because they are perceived by different sense organs, or based on causality, because between them there is a difference of time, place, etc. Indeed, an object can be present when the word is absent and vice versa. Therefore a word, by itself, cannot serve as a valid means of knowing the things it expresses. At the same time, due to their allegiance to Dignāga and the tradition preceding them, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla want to distance themselves from any point of view directly or indirectly supporting a necessary connection between word and meaning that is not based on convention. Thus they prefer to strictly follow the ‘*pramāṇasamuccaya*’ of Dignāga and bring the mechanisms of language and verbal testimony back within the safe domain of inference. This guarantees the verifiability of the cognitive process and a more accurate evaluation of its results. As we have seen, in order to do this, the two Buddhist logicians, in agreement with Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5.1, present a radical change of perspective: A word is the *probans* or logical mark of the intended meaning, not of the meaning (*artha*) as found in the *mīmāṃsaka* perspective (as well as in the perspective of other *darśanas*). This intended meaning is the *probandum*; it is always present in the place of inference, that is to say, in the speaker’s mind or, as Kamalaśīla points out, in the place occupied by the speaker. This is a kind of ‘revolution’ which, in perfect line with the Buddhist ontological view, does not support the material, external reality of objects.

34 See *Ślokavārttika*, *Śabdapariccheda*, stt. 87–88 = *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1495–1496.

5 Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla vs Bharṭṛhari

Still in the background of this whole discussion is the criticism of viewpoints maintaining the existence of a necessary and eternal connection between word and meaning. This topic was already examined in the Śabdārthaparīkṣā section of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and its *Pañjikā*. It is worth noting that it is precisely in this section that we find the first passage in these two works in which Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla deal with *vivakṣā*. In the introduction to verse 906, Kamalaśīla paraphrases and in part quotes verse 197[8]cd of Bharṭṛhari's *Vṛttisamuddeṣa*.³⁵ This citation is significant, because at first glance Bharṭṛhari's point of view largely coincides with that of the two Buddhist masters: Words allow one to infer the intention of the speaker.³⁶ More precisely, Bharṭṛhari says that there is nothing other than words which allows us to infer the intention of a speaker.³⁷

What they criticize in Bharṭṛhari (in stt. 906–907ab), as in all viewpoints considered in the relevant section of the Śabdārthaparīkṣā, is the assumption that between words and objects there is a necessary relation not based on convention. Specifically, the fact that words reveal the desire to express an *artha* would prove the fact that there is an absolute link between *artha* and *śabda*. The two Buddhist masters – in particular Kamalaśīla, who is explicit on this point – consider Bharṭṛhari a proponent of this point of view: *śabda* can reveal the desire to express an *artha* because it is related to it from an absolute point of view (*paramārthataḥ*). This – let us say in passing – is no doubt a simplification of Bharṭṛhari's opinion.

The difference from the Buddhist position is highlighted by Kamalaśīla precisely by the use of the word *paramārthataḥ*. The reply of the two Buddhist masters revolves around the lack of relationship between *śabda* and *artha* from an absolute point of view. Rather, this relationship exists only on a conventional level.³⁸ Since there is no necessary relationship between *śabda* and *artha*, even less may there be a relationship between *śabda* and the desire to express *artha* (*kva vivakṣā kva vā*

35 The table published in Giunta 2022: 541–542 can be integrated with this reference.

36 See *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1514.

37 *Vṛttisamuddeṣa* 197 [198 ed. Rau, p. 336] (= *Vākyapadīya* 3.11.197 [198]): *śabdād arthāḥ pratīyante sa bhedānāṁ vidhāyakaḥ | anumānaṁ vivakṣayāḥ śabdād anyan na vidyate ||*.

38 *yadi paramārthato vivakṣā pāramārthikaśabdārthavīṣayate, tad asiddham, svalakṣaṇādeḥ śabdārthasya kasyacid asambhavāt | ato na kvacid arthe paramārthato vivakṣāsti, anvayino 'rtha-syābhāvāt | nāpi tatpratipādakaḥ śabdo 'sti |* (p. 250) 'If from an absolute point of view it is admitted that the intention of the speaker has a real *artha* of the word as its object, [we reply that] this is not established, since no *artha* of a word is possible, starting with the particular. Therefore, from the absolute point of view, there is no intention of a speaker towards any *artha*, since there is no *artha* that is connected [with such an intention], nor is there a word that allows this [intention] to be known.'

śrutiḥ, TS 906d). There is no *artha* that is absolutely connected with śabda and the desire to express it. From Kamalaśīla's perspective (and that of Śāntarakṣita), Bharṭṛhari is wrong in believing that there is a necessary relationship between the meaning expressed by words and the intention to express this meaning. If this were the case, a word would allow us, among other things, to know automatically and with absolute clarity the intention of the speaker, but this is of course contradicted by experience.

The passage in question (namely, *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* 906–908) deserves special attention, but this is beyond the scope of the current discussion and thus will remain the subject of a future essay. Limiting ourselves to a few observations on the main points, we note that in the specific portion of the Vṛttisamuddeśa from which st. 197[8]cd is quoted, the question of the relationship between word and meaning is not raised from an ontological point of view. In this passage, the reflections on the speaker's intention are an aside in the course of a discussion on the *dvandva* compound, a discussion semantic in nature rather than grammatical.³⁹ The starting point is represented by the difficulty of attributing gender and number to a *dvandva*, above all due to the fact that in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.2.29, Pāṇini defines this compound as *cārthe*, 'in the meaning of *ca*' (*cārthe dvandvah*). The *dvandva* should therefore be an indeclinable, without gender and number, exactly as *ca*. If the Pāṇinian *sūtra* were interpreted literally, *dvandva* compounds should not be associated with gender and number, but it is evident that *dvandvas* are indeed associated with them; moreover, they are declined and serve as *kārakas*. According to Bharṭṛhari, *sūtra* 2.2.29 does not state that *dvandva* means *ca*; its intention is simply to indicate the similarity between a *dvandva* and a set of isolated words coordinated by the conjunction *ca* (see Vṛttisamuddeśa 192 [193]). As Helārāja points out in his commentary, the similarity is that in both cases the words depend on each other (p. 145). Since a *dvandva* refers to substances, it is completely normal that it conveys meaning in connection with a gender and a number (see Vṛttisamuddeśa 196 [197]). These are determined by the power of denotation proper to each word. They are also partly dependent on the words' suffixes. Indeed, the same thing can be expressed with different words, but there is no way to guess *a priori* which word a speaker will choose. He/she may mean 'water', but we cannot know in advance whether he/she will use a neuter word for water (*jalam*) or a feminine one (*ap*), etc. Thus, it is from this point of view that in Vṛttisamuddeśa 197 [8] Bharṭṛhari says we can infer a speaker's intention only from his/her words and not vice versa.

39 See Chaturvedi 2001: 64–70.

6 Differences with Jinendrabuddhi's Treatment of Verbal Cognition

As mentioned above, the arguments of Jinendrabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita (and Kamalaśīla) are largely equivalent. It is reasonable to think that one of the two authors modelled his work on that of the other, although it is difficult to say with certainty who on whom. Leaving aside stylistic and formal differences (the *Viśālāmalavatī* is in prose, while the *Tattvasaṃgraha* is in verse), we will focus here only on differences in structure and content. As we will see, these are probably interconnected. Both texts start with the *pratijñā*, which declares the reduction of *pramāṇas* to only direct perception and inference.

In the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, there is a quite elaborate *pūrvapakṣa* (stt. 1488–1498) followed by a critical response (stt. 1499–1514).⁴⁰ The *mīmāṃsaka* point of view is presented with verbatim quotations from the *Ślokavārttika*.⁴¹ The *Pañjikā* also contains a quotation from the *Śābarabhāṣya*.⁴² The response does not focus on the impossibility of applying the three characteristics to *śabda* if this is considered the logical sign of an external object, since on this point, as has been shown above, there is broad convergence on the part of the two Buddhist masters. It focusses rather on the two definitions of *śabdajñāna* presented by the *mīmāṃsakas* in the *pūrvapakṣa*, namely, knowledge deriving from the scriptures (= the *Veda*) and knowledge deriving from a reliable person.

In contrast, in the *Viśālāmalavatī* there is no *pūrvapakṣa*. After an explanation of verse 5.1 of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Kamalaśīla quotes and comments on the same verse⁴³), Jinendrabuddhi immediately goes on to show the application of *trairūpya* to *śabdajñāna* with the passage cited above (Section 3). This is immediately followed by the presentation of an objection (without a clear identification of the objector). We find the same objection in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, where however it is introduced before the stanzas relating to the formalization of the inference, as also cited and translated above (Section 3). From reading the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, we can see that this objector is Kumārila, since the stanza introducing the objection corresponds, with a slight but significant change, to Codanasūtra 161 (= *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1515).⁴⁴ As Kumārila implicitly argues in this verse, the desire to speak can be of two types: the desire to express something specific (*vivakṣāviśeṣa*), and a generic desire to speak

⁴⁰ For an English rendering, see Jha 1939: vol. II, pp. 746–755. See also Sferra 2018.

⁴¹ See above, note 33.

⁴² A few sentences from *Śābarabhāṣya* 1.1.5 are quoted *ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1488–1490.

⁴³ See *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* *ad* stt. 1513–1514.

⁴⁴ The two verses differ only in *pāda* b: *anyad vākyam ca drṣyate* (*Codanasūtra*) and *vākyam ced anyad iksyate* (*Tattvasaṃgraha*); see Kataoka 2011: ed. p. 39, tr. p. 402.

(*vivakṣāsāmānya*).⁴⁵ In neither case does it make sense to say that *śabda* is *pramāṇa* with regard to *vivakṣā*, since the words fail to reveal the speaker's desire. On one hand, there can be exceptions, as for example a person saying one thing and meaning another (= the weak point discussed above in Section 2.2). On the other hand, it is useless: the knowledge of mere generic intention is inefficient, that is, it brings no advantage in practical life.

In response, the three Buddhist masters show that words *always* reveal a specific desire to speak.⁴⁶ Even gestures – Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla underline this in particular – are part of language. Wise people know how to recognize the context as well as the reliability and authority of the speaker. In addition to presenting the above objection and its critique following the formalization of the inference, Jinendrabuddhi also reverses the treatment of *vivakṣāviśeṣa* and *vivakṣāsāmānya*. This inversion allows him to conclude his response by saying that what is revealed by words in an inferential process is the specific intention, which is pragmatically useful. It is practical utility that is close to his heart; the intention to speak in general is indeed manifested by words, but has no practical use. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, use the response to this objection as a premise for the formalization of the inference, serving them to debunk the 'weak side' of *vivakṣā*.⁴⁷ As all three Buddhist masters clearly say in the conclusion of their arguments, words are a valid logical sign, exactly like smoke. However, this statement has greater force in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and in its *Pañjikā* than in the *Viśālāmalavatī*. This is not only because Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla make this statement immediately following the formalization of the inference. It is also because the subsequent conclusion in both texts marks a significant difference between these two authors and Jinendrabuddhi. Śāntarakṣita ends his discussion on *śābdajñāna* with the following words:

evam sthite 'numānatvam śabde dhūmādivad bhavet |
trairūpyasahitatvena tādṛgvīśayasattvataḥ || 1524 ||

This being the case, the nature of the inference pertains to the word, such as to smoke, etc., because it is endowed with the three characteristics and because the nature of its object is of the same type.

Jinedrabuddhi instead remains more faithful to Dharmakīrti's approach. At the end of the passage addressing this question, he hastens to clarify that his description is not valid from an absolute point of view (*ataḥ pratipattur abhiprāyaviśeṣavaśād viśeṣe śabdasyānumānatvam, na punaḥ paramārthataḥ*, p. 4). This addition is

45 This distinction is made explicit only in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad* 1515–1519.

46 See *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1516–1519.

47 See also *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, p. 6, lines 1–3.

significant, for it marks a clear difference with Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who seem to lean towards a less ‘conventional’ line.

It is difficult to say who was the first to employ *vivakṣā* as the *sādhya* of an inference, whether Śāntarakṣita or Jinendrabuddhi. Most likely they were contemporaries, although Jinendrabuddhi was probably slightly older. However, it is certain that he was familiar with Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasaṃgraha*, perhaps when it was still a work in progress.⁴⁸ No firm conclusions can be reached at present, but the fact remains that in Śāntarakṣita’s text the confrontation with Kumārila represents the core of the entire discussion (references to opponents in the parallel section of Jinendrabuddhi’s text are quite vague or marginal). Moreover, in his conclusion there is nothing to indicate his possible distancing from Dharmakīrti; in this respect, Jinendrabuddhi immediately tried to run for cover. This suggests that the discussion of this topic first saw light in the work of Śāntarakṣita.

Appendix

Notes and corrections to the printed editions of the *Pramāṇantarabhāvaparīkṣāpañjikā ad* stt. 1486–1524

The following list is drawn up by consulting the available Sanskrit manuscripts of the text (see below, Bibliography) and the Peking, sNar than and sDe dge block prints of its Tibetan translation. Only those variant readings that seem useful for a more correct interpretation of the text are recorded here. Variants that seem the result of copyist mistakes or orthography are usually ignored.

1. *Ad st. 1488 (K) [1487 (Ś1 and Ś2)]*: Embar Krishnamacharya silently emends the text with the words *pramāṇadvayād anyasya pramāṇalakṣaṇam avisamvāditvam nāsty eva* (K vol. 1, p. 433; Ś1 vol. 1, p. 530; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 370) instead of the manuscripts’ reading *pramāṇadvayād anyasya pramāṇasya lakṣaṇam avisamvāditvam nāsty eva* (Jp fol. 171r₃; Pp fol. 128v₄). See also Tp: *tshad ma gñis* [P N; ñid D] *las gźan la tshad ma'i mtshan ñid mi slu* [P D; bslu N] *ba ñid med pa yin la* (P vol. YE, fol. 71v_{7–8}; N YE, fol. 66r₄; D vol. 'E, fol. 40v₇).
2. *Ad stt. 1489–1491 [1488–1490]*: Read with Jp (fol. 171r₄), Pp (fol. 128v₆), and with the parallel passage in the *Tarkarahasya* (p. 19) *śabdajñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe jñānam śābdam* instead of *śabdajñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthajñānam śābdam* (K vol. 1, p. 434; Ś1 vol. 1, p. 530; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 370).

⁴⁸ On Jinendrabuddhi’s dates, see Steinkellner, introduction to *Viśālāmalavatī*, vol. 1, pp. xxxviii–xlii, and the references therein.

3. *Ad* stt. 1489–1491 [1488–1490]: Read *śabdasvalakṣaṇagrahaṇād uttarakālam parokṣe ’rthe yad utpadyate jñānam tac chabdād āgatam* (Jp fol. 171r₄; Pp fol. 128v_{6–7}; K vol. 1, p. 434) instead of *śabdasvalakṣaṇagrahaṇād uttarakālam jñānam tac chabdād āgatam* (Ś1 vol. 1, pp. 530–531; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 370). The Tibetan translation (D vol. ’E, fol. 41r₃) and the parallel passage in the *Tarkarahasya* (p. 19) support the reading of the manuscripts.
4. *Ad* stt. 1489–1491 [1488–1490]: Read *taddharmatvena* instead of *taddharmatvana* (Jp fol. 171r₅), which is clearly a *lapsus calami*, and of *taddharmitvena* (Pp fol. 128v₉; K vol. 1, p. 434; Ś1 vol. 1, p. 531; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 370).
5. *Ad* st. 1493 [1492]: Read *°nirūpanāprayāsenā* (Jp fol. 171v₁; Pp fol. 128v₁₃) instead of *°nirūpanāprayāsenā* (K vol. 1, p. 434; Ś1 vol. 1, p. 531; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 371), which conveys the same meaning.
6. *Ad* st. 1495 [1494]: Read *yato* (Jp fol. 171v₂; Pp fol. 128v₁₆; Tp [gaṇ gi phyir, P vol. YE, fol. 72v₅; N YE, fol. 67r₁; D vol. ’E, fol. 41v₄]; K vol. 1, p. 435) instead of *tato* (Ś1 vol. 1, p. 532; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 371), even though the position of this word in the sentence is not the expected one from the syntactical point of view.
7. *Ad* st. 1497 [1496]: Read *na bhinnakālatā* (Jp fol. 171v₄; Pp fol. 129r₂; K vol. 1, p. 435) instead of *bhinnakālatā* (Ś1 vol. 1, p. 532; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 371). The Tibetan translation supports the reading of the manuscripts: *dus tha dad pa ma yin la* (P vol. YE, fol. 73r₁; N YE, fol. 67r₄; D vol. ’E, fol. 41v₇).
8. *Ad* st. 1497 [1496]: Read *sarvadeśāvaṣṭambhenāvasthiteḥ* (Jp fol. 171v₄; Pp fol. 129r₂) instead of *sarvadeśeṣv avasthiteḥ* (K vol. 1, p. 435; Ś1 vol. 1, p. 532; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 371). The Tibetan translation supports the reading of the manuscripts: *yul thams cad non par gnas pas* (P vol. YE, fol. 73r₁; N YE, fol. 67r_{4–5}; D vol. ’E, fol. 41v₇).
9. *Ad* st. 1497 [1496]: Read *yena kenacic chabdena* (Pp fol. 129r₃ [*kenaci* for *kenacic*]; K vol. 1, p. 435; Ś1 vol. 1, p. 532; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 371); it is worth noting that Jp’s reading *iyata* (*sic* for *iyatā*) *kenacic chabdena* (fol. 171v₄), less usual, is perhaps acceptable: ‘On the basis of all this, by means of any word [...]. Tp supports the reading of the published text: *sgra gaṇ yan ruṇ ba ’ga*’ [D N; ’gal P] *źig gis* (P vol. YE, fol. 73r₃; N YE, fol. 67r₆; D vol. ’E, fol. 42r₁).
10. *Ad* st. 1497bd [1496bd]: In correspondence with the word *vyatirekah* (K vol. 1, p. 435; Ś1 vol. 1, p. 532; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 372) in Jp (fol. 171v) and Pp (fol. 129r) there is the following marginal note: *vyatirekābhāvam āha*.
11. *Ad* st. 1499 [1498]: Read *bhavati svargo* (Jp fol. 172r₁; Pp fol. 129r₈; K vol. 1, p. 436) instead of *bhavati vā svargah* (Ś1 vol. 1, p. 533; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 372), equally possible and present in Śabara’s text (see Frauwallner 1968: 16₂₅).
12. *Ad* st. 1499 [1498]: Read *jñātum iti* (Jp fol. 172r₂; Pp fol. 129r₁₁; K vol. 1, p. 436) instead of *jñātum rte vacanāt* (Ś1 vol. 1, p. 533; Ś2 vol. 1, p. 372), equally possible and present in Śabara’s text (see Frauwallner 1968: 18_{5–6}). The Tibetan translation supports the reading of the manuscripts (cf. D vol. ’E, fols. 42r_{7–42v₁}).

13. St. 1500b [1499b]: Read *sambhavārthāv* (Jk fol. 76r₁; Pk fol. 28r₁₁; K vol. 1, p. 436; Š1 vol. 1, p. 533) instead of *sambhavavārthāv* (Š2 vol. 1, p. 372), which is clearly a typo.
14. *Ad* st. 1500 [1499]: In correspondence with the word *akartṛkasya* (K vol. 1, p. 436; Š1 vol. 1, p. 533; Š2 vol. 1, p. 372) in Jp (fol. 172r) and Pp (fol. 129r) there is the following marginal note: *akartṛkasya nityasya*.
15. *Ad* st. 1500 [1499]: Read *parokṣe 'rthe yaj jñānam ity asyāsambhavāt* instead of *parokṣe rthe ya jñātam ity asyāsambhavāt* (Jp fol. 172r₃; Pp fol. 129r₁₂₋₁₃), *parokṣo 'rtho 'yam jñāta ity asyāsambhavāt* (K vol. 1, p. 436) and *parokṣo 'rtho 'yam jñānam ity asyāsambhavāt* (Š1 vol. 1, p. 533; Š2 vol. 1, p. 372).
16. *Ad* st. 1501 [1500]: Read *yathā vikalakāraṇo* (Jp fol. 172r₅; Pp fol. 129r₁₇; K vol. 1, p. 436) instead of *yathā'vikalakāraṇo* (Š1 vol. 1, p. 534) and *tathā vikalakāraṇo* (Š2 vol. 1, p. 373). The Tibetan translation supports the reading of the manuscripts (see D vol. 'E, fol. 42v₆).
17. *Ad* stt. 1502–1503 [1501–1502]: Read *viparītārthatvena satyārthatvena vā* (Jp fol. 172r₅; Pp fol. 129r₁₇–129v₁) instead of *viparītārthatvena vā* (Pp fol. 129r₁₇–129v₁) and *aviparītārthatvena viparītārthatvena vā* (K vol. 1, p. 437 [the first compound is printed between parentheses]; Š1 vol. 1, p. 534; Š2 vol. 1, p. 373).
18. *Ad* stt. 1502–1503 [1501–1502]: Read *tasyāś ca dviprakārāyā apy* ('py in MS) *arthavattāyā guṇadoṣau kāraṇam* (Jp fol. 172r₅₋₆) instead of *tasyāś ca buddhaviprakārāyā apy arthavattāyā guṇadoṣau kāraṇam* (Pp fol. 129v₁) and *tasyāś ca buddher dviprakārāyā apy arthavattāyā guṇadoṣau kāraṇam* (K vol. 1, p. 437; Š1 vol. 1, p. 534; Š2 vol. 1, p. 373). There is no rendering of the word *buddher* in Tp (cf. D vol. 'E, fol. 42v₇).
19. *Ad* stt. 1502–1503 [1501–1502]: Read *tataś ca puruṣanivṛttau guṇadoṣanivṛttiḥ | guṇadoṣanivṛttau samyaktvamithyātvayor apy abhāvah |* (Jp fol. 172r₆; Pp fol. 129v₂₋₃; K vol. 1, p. 437; Š1 vol. 1, p. 534) instead of *tataś ca puruṣanivṛttau guṇadoṣayoh samyaktvamithyātvahetvor āśrayah puruṣah | tataś ca puruṣanivṛttau guṇadoṣanivṛttiḥ | guṇadonivṛttau* (sic) *samyaktvamithyātvayor apy abhāvah |* (Š2 vol. 1, p. 373). The Tibetan translation supports the reading of the manuscripts (cf. D vol. 'E, fol. 43r₁₋₂).
20. *Ad* stt. 1502–1503 [1501–1502]: Read *apauruṣeye* (Jp fol. 172r₇; Pp fol. 129v₃; K vol. 1, p. 437) instead of *apauruṣeya°* (Š1 vol. 1, p. 534; Š2 vol. 1, p. 373).
21. *Ad* stt. 1502–1503 [1501–1502]: In correspondence with the words *tataś ca deśa°* (K vol. 1, p. 437; Š1 vol. 1, p. 534; Š2 vol. 1, p. 373) in Jp (fol. 172r) and Pp (fol. 129v) there is the following marginal note: *nirhetutvaprasaṅgād eva*.
22. *Ad* st. 1504 [1503]: Read *drṣṭo* (Jp fol. 172v₂; Pp fol. 129v₁₀; K vol. 1, p. 438; Š1 vol. 1, p. 535) instead of *iṣṭah* (Š2 vol. 1, p. 373). The Tibetan translation supports the reading of the manuscripts (cf. D vol. 'E, fol. 43v₁).
23. *Ad* st. 1510 [1509]: Read *na hy asya* (Jp fol. 173r₁) instead of *na hy anya°* (Pp fol. 130r₉₋₁₀; K vol. 1, p. 439; Š1 vol. 1, p. 537; Š2 vol. 1, p. 375), which is the reading

supported by the Tibetan translation: *gžan gyi* (cf. P vol. YE, fol. 76r₂; N YE, fol. 70r₄; D vol. 'E, fol. 44v₁).

24. St. 1511d [1510d]: Read *pratyayitah*, which is also supported by the commentary, instead of *pratyayatah* (Jk fol. 76v₂; Pk fol. 28r₁₇; K vol. 1, p. 439; Š1 vol. 1, p. 538; Š2 vol. 1, p. 375).
25. *Ad* stt. 1511–1512 [1510–1511]: Read *na kṣīṇadoṣah* (Jp fol. 173r₂; Pp fol. 130r₁₂) instead of *ya kṣīṇadoṣah* (Š1 vol. 1, p. 537; Š2 vol. 1, p. 375). See also Tp (D vol. 'E, fol. 44v_{2–3}).
26. *Ad* st. 1513 [1512]: Read with Jp (fol. 173v₁) and substantially in accord with the Tibetan rendering (cf. D vol. 'E, fol. 45r_{6–7}) *svalakṣaṇabhede yādrśo* [...] *buddhibhedābheda* *hetutvenopādīyete* instead of *svalakṣaṇabhede yādrśo* *lakṣaṇabhede yādrśo* [...] *buddhibhedābheda* *hetutvenopādīyete* (Pp fol. 130v_{6–7}) and *svalakṣaṇabhede yādrśe* *lakṣaṇabhede yādrśo* [...] *buddhibhedābheda* *upādīyete* (K vol. 1, pp. 440–441; Š1 vol. 1, p. 539; Š2 vol. 1, p. 376).
27. *Ad* st. 1515 [1514]: In correspondence with the words *sā ca vivakṣā tatkāryatvād* (K vol. 1, p. 441; Š1 vol. 1, pp. 539–540; Š2 vol. 1, p. 376) in Jp (fol. 173v) and Pp (fol. 130v) there is the following marginal note: *tad vacanāṁ kāryāṁ yasyāḥ*.
28. *Ad* st. 1515 [1514]: Read with Jp and in accord with the Tibetan translation ([...]) *skyes bus ma byas pa ñid*, P vol. YE, fol. 77r₇; N YE, fol. 71r₇; D vol. 'E, fol. 45v₃) *ity apauruṣeyatvenāpy* (fol. 173v₂) instead of *iti pauruṣeyatvenāpy* (Pp fol. 130v₁₁; K vol. 1, p. 441; Š1 vol. 1, p. 539; Š2 vol. 1, p. 376).
29. *Ad* st. 1515 [1514] (*sā ca vivakṣā tatkāryatvād vacanāt pratīyate*): In a marginal note of Jp (fol. 173v) and of Pp (fol. 130v) it is specified that speaking is an effect of the [desire to speak] (*tad vacanāṁ kāryāṁ yasyāḥ*).
30. *Ad* st. 1515 [1514]: Instead of *sādhanavikalo* (Jp fol. 173v₄; Pp fol. 130v₁₃), the Tibetan translation presupposes the reading **sādhyavikalo* (*bsgrub bya ma tshañ ba[r]*), P vol. YE, fol. 77v₂; N YE, fol. 71v₃; D vol. 'E, fol. 45v₅), 'lacking [the quality] of the *probandum*', which, however, is not appropriate to the context.
31. *Ad* stt. 1518–1519 [1517–1518]: Read *ye tu punas* (Jp fol. 173v₆) instead of *yat punas* (Pp fol. 131r₂) and *ye punas* (K vol. 1, p. 442; Š1 vol. 1, p. 541; Š2 vol. 1, p. 377). This explanation points out that the indeclinable particle *tu* in st. 1518b [1517b] has an oppositional value (*punah*) and should not be understood as *pādapūrāṇa* or with a conjunctive function.
32. *Ad* stt. 1518–1519 [1517–1518]: In correspondence with the words *tasya hr̥di* (K vol. 1, p. 442; Š1 vol. 1, p. 541; Š2 vol. 1, p. 377) in Jp (fol. 174r) and Pp (fol. 131r) there is the following note: *vacasah* (marginal note in Jp and interlinear note in Pp).
33. *Ad* st. 1520 [1519]: Read *na ca* (Jp fol. 174r; Pp fol. 131r₇; K vol. 1, p. 442; Š1 vol. 1, p. 541) instead of *na ceha* (Š2 vol. 1, p. 377). Tp supports the reading of the manuscripts (cf. D vol. 'E, fol. 46v₂).

34. *Ad* st. 1520 [1519]: Read *yathākāmaṇ* (Jp fol. 174r₂; Pp fol. 131r₈; K vol. 1, p. 442; Š1 vol. 1, p. 541; cf. Tp, D vol. 'E, fol. 46v₂) instead of *tathākāmaṇ* (Š2 vol. 1, p. 378). See also *Ślokavārttika*, Codanāsūtra 138c (see Kataoka 2011: 34).
35. *Ad* st. 1520 [1519]: Read °*granthasyāsvādhyāyādikāle* instead of °*granthasvādhyāyādikāle* (Jp fol. 174r₂), °*graṇthāś cādhyāyādikāle* (Pp fol. 131r₉), °*granthaś cādhyāyā(svādhyāyā ?)dikāle* (K vol. 1, p. 442), °*granthasyādhyāyādikāle* (Š1 vol. 1, p. 541) and °*granthasyādhyayanādikāle* (Š2 vol. 1, p. 378); cf. Tp: *gžuṇ goms pa 'don pa'i dus na gžan rtogs par byed pa na yaṇ tshig daṇ goms pa 'don* [D; 'dor P N] *pa la sogs pa'i bya ba 'jug pa'i phyir te |* (P vol. YE, fol. 78v₁₋₂; N YE, fol. 72v₁; D vol. 'E, 46v₃).
36. *Ad* st. 1520 [1519]: Read *kāryalinge* (Jp fol. 174r₃; Pp fol. 131r₁₁) instead of *kāryalinga°* (K vol. 1, p. 443; Š1 vol. 1, p. 542; Š2 vol. 1, p. 378). The Tibetan translation confirms the reading of the manuscripts: *de lta bas na 'bras bu'i rtags thams cad la yul daṇ dus la sogs pa la ltos* [D; *bltos* P N] *pas 'khrul pa srid pa mayin no* (P vol. YE, fol. 78v₃; N YE, fol. 72v₂₋₃; D vol. 'E, fol. 46v₄).
37. *Ad* st. 1520 [1519]: Read *prāṇitādi°* (Jp fol. 174r₃; Pp fol. 131r₁₁; K vol. 1, p. 443) instead of *prāṇatādi°* (Š1 vol. 1, p. 542; Š2 vol. 1, p. 378).
38. Introduction of stt. 1521–1522 [1520–1521]: Read *katham vā sambandhāḥ* (Jp fol. 174r₄; Pp fol. 131r₁₂; K vol. 1, p. 443) instead of *vā sambandhāḥ* (Š1 vol. 1, p. 542; Š2 vol. 1, p. 378).

Bibliography

Manuscripts

Jk Jaisalmer, Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, MS 377, *Tattvasaṅgrahasūtra*.
 Jp Jaisalmer, Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, MS 378, *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikāvṛtti*.
 Pk Pāṭan, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, MS 6679, *Tattvasaṅgrahasūtra*.
 Pp Pāṭan, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, MS 6680, *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*.

Primary Sources

Aṣṭādhyāyī by Pāṇini
The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, ed., tr. by R. N. Sharma, 6 vols., New Delhi 1987–2003: Munshiram Manoharlal.
Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita and *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* of Kamalaśīla

K *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita With the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*, ed. E. Krishnamacharya, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30–31, 2 vols., Oriental Institute, Baroda 1926, vol. 1, pp. 125–131.

Š1 *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the 'Pañjikā' Commentary of Ācārya Kamalaśīla*, ed. by Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, Bauddha Bharati Series 1, 2 vols., Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi 1968, vol. 1, pp. 159–166.

Ś2 *The Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the ‘Pañjikā’ Commentary of Ācārya Kamalaśīla*, ed. by Dvārikādāsa Śāstri, Bauddha Bharati Series 1, 2 vols., Bauddha Bharati, Third Edition, Varanasi 1997, vol. 1, pp. 113–118.

Tk *De kho na ñid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa*, tr. by *Guṇākaraśrībhadra and Lha bla ma ži ba 'od: P = *The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition*, mDo 'grel, tshad ma, 'E, text No. 5764, fols. 1v₁–159r₂; D = *sDe dge*, tshad ma, ze, text No. 4266, fols. 1v₁–133r₆; N = *sNar thaṇ*, tshad ma, text No. 4555, 'E, fols. 1v₁–146r₅.

Tp *De kho na ñid bsdus pa'i dka' 'grel*, tr. by *Devendrabhadra and Grags 'byor śes rab: P = *The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition*, mDo 'grel, tshad ma, 'E–YE, text No. 5765, fols. 'e 159v₂–ye 405r₇; D = *sDe dge*, tshad ma, ze–'E, text No. 4267, fols. ze 133v₁–'e 331r₇; N = *sNar thaṇ*, tshad ma, text No. 4556, WE–YE, fols. we 146r₅–ye 385r₅.

Tarkabhāṣā by Mokṣākaragupta

Tarkabhāṣā [sic] and *Vādasthāna* of Mokṣākaragupta and *Jitāripāda*, ed. by Rangaswami Iyengar, Mysore 1952 (second edition): The Hindusthan Press.

Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākara Gupta, ed. by Embar Krishnamacharya, Baroda 1942: The Oriental Institute.

Bauddha-Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta [sic], ed. by B. N. Singh, Varanasi 1985: Asha Prakashan.

Tarkabhāṣā of Ācārya Mokṣākaragupta. Sanskrit and Tibetan texts critically edited by Norbu Śāstri, Blo bzang, Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series 54. Sarnath 2004: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies.

Tarkarahasya

Tarkarahasya, ed. by Paramanandan Shastri, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series 20), Patna 1979.

Tarkarahasya. In Hideomi Yaita, *Bukkyō Chishikiron no ganten kenkyū* – Yogaron inmyō, *Dharmottarātīppanaka*, *Tarkarahasya* [= Three Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist Pramāṇa-Tradition – The *Hetuvidyā* section in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Dharmottarātīppanaka*, and the *Tarkarahasya*]. (Monograph series 4) Narita: Naritasan Shinshoji 2005, pp. 261–407 (= 1*–72*).

Nyāyapraveśakabhāṣyātīkā by Pārvadevagāṇi

Nyāyapraveśāśāstra of Bauddh Ācārya Diṅnāga (*The father of the Buddhist Logic*): With the commentary of Ācārya Haribhadrasūri and with the subcommentary of Pārvadevagāṇi, critically edited by Muni Jambuvijaya, Delhi/Ahmedabad/Bhavnagar 2007.

Pramāṇavārttika by Dharmakīrti

PV *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan), ed. by MIYASAKA Yusho (宮坂宥勝), インド古典研究 [Indo koten kenkyū]/Acta Indologica 2, Naritasan Shinshoji 1971–1972.

Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti by Manorathanandin

Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* with a Commentary by Manorathanandin. Edited by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, published as appendices to the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, vol. 24 (1938) and vol. 26 (1940), Patna.

The Pramāṇavārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakīrti, with the Commentaries *Svopajñavṛtti* of the Author and *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin, ed. by Ram Chandra Pandeya, Delhi 1989.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti by Dharmakīrti

PVSV *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*, ed. by Raniero Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23, IsMEO, Roma 1960.

Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti by Karṇakagomin

Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Ācārya-Dharmakīrtiḥ *Pramāṇavārttikam* (svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) *svopajñavṛttyā*, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam. Ilāhābād: Kitāb Mahal 1943.

Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra by Prajñākaragupta

Pramāṇavārtikabhbhāṣyam or *Vārtikālaṃkāraḥ* of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikam*), edited by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series 1), Patna 1953.

Pramāṇaviniścaya by Dharmakīrti

PVin *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapters 1 and 2*, Critically edited by Ernst Steinkellner. Sanskrit Texts from Tibetan Autonomous Region 2. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2007.

Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya. Chapter 3, Critically edited by Pascale Hugon and Toru Tomabechi with a preface by Tom J.F. Tillemans. Sanskrit Texts from Tibetan Autonomous Region 8. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2011.

Pramāṇasamuccaya (chapter 5) by Dignāga

See Pind 2015.

Pramāṇāntarbhāva (Anonymous)

Pramāṇāntarbhāva, ed. by S.C. Nyayacharya with English Introduction by Gaurinath Sastri, Bibliotheca Indica 290, Calcutta 1969: Asiatic Society.

Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa by Ratnakīrti

Ed. in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti)* by Anantalal Thakur, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series 3), Patna 1957¹, reprint: 1975, pp. 96–105.

Vākyapadīya by Bhartṛhari

Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Prakīrṇakaprakāśa of Helārāja. Kāṇḍa III, Part ii, ed. by K. A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1973.

† Wilhelm Rau (ed.), *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya Versuch einer vollständigen deutschen Übersetzung nach der kritischen Edition der Müla-Kārikās*, hrsg. von Oskar von Hinüber, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz 2002: Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart.

Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā by Jinendrabuddhi

Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā, Chapter 1. Part I: Critical Edition*, by Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic. Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 1/I. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2005.

Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā, Chapter 2. Part I: Critical Edition, by Horst Lasic, Helmut Krasser, Ernst Steinkellner. Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 15/I. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press 2012.

Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā, Chapter 5: Critical Edition, by Horst Lasic, Patrick McAllister, † Helmut Krasser. Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Beijing/Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, forthcoming.

Śabarabhāṣya by Śabara

See Frauwallner 1939.

Ślokavārttika by Kumārila

Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with The Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra, edited and revised by Ganga Sagar Rai, Ratna Publications, Varanasi, 1993.

Ślokavārttika (Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika) = Ślokavārtikavyākhyā Tātparyāṭikā of Um̄veka Bhaṭṭa, edited by S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy, University of Madras (Madras University Sanskrit Series 13), Madras 1971 [revised 2nd ed., 1940¹].

See also Kataoka 2011.

Sarvajñasiddhi by Ratnakīrti

Ed. in *Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti)* by Anantalal Thakur, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Work Series 3), Patna 1957¹, reprint: 1975, pp. 1–31.

Secondary Sources

Chaturvedi, Mithilesh (2001): *Vrttisamuddesa of Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya: A Study*. Delhi: Shivalik Prakashan.

Eltschinger, Vincent (2007): *Penser l'autorité des Écritures. La polémique de Dharmakīrti contre la notion brahmanique orthodoxe d'un Veda sans auteur. Autour de Pramāṇavārttika I.213–268 et Svavṛtti*. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

Eltschinger, Vincent / Krasser, Helmut / Taber, John (2012): *Can the Veda speak? Dharmakīrti against Mīmāṃsā exegesis and Vedic authority. An annotated translation of PVSV 164,24–176,16*. Österreichische Akademie Der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Sitzungsberichte, 831. Band. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

Franco, Eli (2004a): "Did the Buddha Have Desires?". In: *Gedenkschrift J.W. de Jong*. Edited by H.W. Bodewitz and Minoru Hara. Studia Philologica Buddhica. Monograph Series xvii. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 39–47.

Franco, Eli (2004b): *The Spitzer Manuscript: The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 323. Band. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

Frauwallner, Erich (1933): "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārtikam". *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 40: 281–304.

Frauwallner, Erich (1968): *Materialen zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmamīmāṃsā*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Sitzungsberichte, 259. Band, 2. Abhandlung. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

Funayama, Tōru 船山徹 (1985): "Arcaṇa, Śāntarakṣita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Kamalaśīla on the Aim of a Treatise (prajñāna)". *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens/Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies* 39: 181–201.

Giunta, Paolo (2022): "Il rapporto di Śāntarakṣita con Bhārtṛhari. Edizione critica della Śabdabrahmaparīkṣā e dello Sphoṭavādakhaṇḍana". In: *'Verità e bellezza.' Essays in Honour of Professor Raffaele Torella*. Edited by F. Sferra and V. Vergiani. Series Minor 97. Napoli: Università di Napoli "L'Orientale", Dipartimento di Asia Africa e Meditarraneo, 487–542.

Gokhale, Pradeep (2013): "A Realist Buddhist Approach to Language and Verbal Testimony: An Exploration". *Journal of Buddhist Studies, Srilanka* 11: 111–128.

Jha, Ganganatha (1939): *The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*, translated into English by Ganganatha Jha, 2 vols. Gaekwad Oriental Series 83. Baroda [reprint: Delhi: Motilal BanarsiDass 1986].

Kajiyama Yuichi 梶山雄一 (1998²): *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy. An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta. Reprint with Corrections in the Author's Hand*. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 42. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien der Universität Wien [1st ed.: Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University 10, Kyoto 1966, 1–173].

Katsura Shōryū 桂紹隆 (1984): "Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth". *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12: 215–235.

Kataoka Kei 片岡啓 (2007): "Kumārila's Notion of Pauruṣeyavacana". *Rivista di Studi Sudasiatici* 2: 39–55.

Kataoka Kei 片岡啓 (2011): *Kumārila on truth, omniscience, and killing: Part 1: A Critical Edition of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāśūtra). Part 2: An Annotated Translation of Mīmāṃsā-Ślokavārttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanāśūtra)*. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Sitzungsberichte, 814. Band. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

Kataoka Kei 片岡啓 (2020): "Dignāga on Relation". In: *The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Indian Philosophy of Language*. Edited by Alessandro Graheli. London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 165–180.

Kataoka Kei 片岡啓 (2023): “Sāmaṭa, Yajñāṭa and Śāntarakṣita on how to cognize everything”. *Kyushu University Institutional Repository*, 出版情報: 哲學年報 82, 1–44.

Krasser, Helmut (2012): “Logic in a Religious Context: Dharmakīrti in Defence of *āgama*”. In: Eltschinger, Krasser and Taber 2012: 83–118.

McClintock, Sara (2010): *Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason: Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla on Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority*. Boston: Wisdom.

Moriyama Shinya 護山真也 (2014): *Omniscience and Religious Authority. A Study on Prajnākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikālāñkārabhāṣya ad Pramāṇavārttika II 8–10 and 29–33*. Zurich/Berlin: LIT Verlag.

Nance, Richard F. (2012): *Speaking for Buddhas: Scriptural Commentary in Indian Buddhism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Pind, Ole Holten (2015): *Dignāga's Philosophy of Language. Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V on anyāpoha*, Part. 1, ed. by Ernst Steinkellner, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 871. Band, Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Nr. 92. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

Saccone, Margherita Serena (2019): “Of Authoritativeness and Perception: The Establishment of an Omniscient Person (against the Mīmāṃsakas)”. In: *Wind Horses. Tibetan, Himalayan and Mongolian Studies*. Edited by Giacomella Orofino. Series Minor 88/SOR Nuova serie 23. Napoli: Università di Napoli “L'Orientale”, Dipartimento di Asia Africa e Mediterraneo, 455–483.

Saccone, Margherita Serena (2023): “Apology for Omniscience: An Eighth-century Demonstration of the Buddha's *Sarvajñatva*”. In: *Burlesque of the Philosophers: Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser*. Edited by Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu. Hamburg Buddhist Studies Series 19. Bochum/Freiburg: projekt verlag 2023, 571–594.

Sferra, Francesco (2018): “*Pramāṇāntarabhāvaparīkṣā* di Śāntarakṣita con il commento di Kamalaśīla (sezione 1)”. In: *Filosofie dell'India. Un'antologia di testi*. Edited by F. Sferra. Studi Superiori 1155. Roma: Filosofia, Carocci editore, 161–180 (introd. on pp. 41–46, notes on pp. 329–337).

Sferra Francesco (2022): “RAS MS Hodgson 67. Missing Pages of the *Hetubinduṭikā* by Arcaṭa”. In: *Italian Scholars on India, Vol. I: Classical Indology*. Edited by Raffaele Torella. Delhi: Motilal BanarsiDass, 357–387.

Vergiani, Vincenzo (2022): “Vivakṣā and the Formation of Meaning According to Bhartṛhari”. In: *'Verità e bellezza.' Essays in Honour of Professor Raffaele Torella*. Edited by F. Sferra and V. Vergiani. Series Minor 97. Napoli: Università di Napoli “L'Orientale”, Dipartimento di Asia Africa e Mediterraneo, 1253–1323.

Yaita Hideomi 矢板秀臣 (1987): “Dharmakīrti on the authority of Buddhist scriptures (*āgama*) – An annotated translation of the Pramāṇavārttika-svavṛttiḥ ad vv. 213–217”. *Nanto Bukkyō* 南都佛教 [Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies] 58: 1–17.

Yoshimizu Kiyotaka 吉水清孝 (2008): “The Intention of Expression (vivakṣā), the Expounding (vyākhyā) of a Text, and the Authorlessness of the Veda”. *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 158.1: 51–71.

