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What Is the *Tattvasaṅgraha* About? Kamalaśīla on the Fourteen Qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda*

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Abstract: The *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) has been considered a comprehensive encyclopedia of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical subjects. According to Kamalaśīla's *Vajracchedikāṭīkā*, however, the refutations of objections (**codyapar-ihāra*) by other systems of thought is merely a means to indirectly make the reader understand the topic (**abhidheya*) and ultimately achieve the purpose (**prayojana*) of the work. The topic of TS is “the true states [of things]” (*tattva*), which is interpreted by Kamalaśīla as “the various qualifiers of the entities that have arisen having depended on causes and conditions” (*pratītyasamutpāda=pratītyasamutpanna*) enumerated in TS 1–6ab. It is well-known that the first ten qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* in TS 1–4ab correspond to the topics of the first twenty-three chapters of TS, while the remaining elements in TS 4cd–6abc were known to be difficult to allocate to specific chapters. This paper sheds light on the possibility of analyzing the latter elements as well, suggesting that they form the qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. Consequently, the eleventh and twelfth qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, “which is free from all conceptual proliferation” and “which is not understood by others” in TS 4cd, qualify the *pratītyasamutpāda* as the object of the

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Buddha's cognition characterized by the negation of conceptual cognition and hea-then cognition. They summarize the first twenty-three chapters and all twenty-six chapters, respectively. Furthermore, the qualifications of the Buddha who teaches the *pratītyasamutpāda* in TS 5–6abc are convertible to the thirteenth and fourteen qualifications of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, “which is taught by [the direct seer] who does not depend on an autonomous Veda” and “which is taught by the Omniscient One for whom the great compassion became natural.” These paired qualities, wisdom (*prajñā*) and compassion (*dayā*), form the essential qualities of a qualified teacher of the *pratītyasamutpāda* and are described in Chs. 24–25 and Ch. 26, respectively.

Keywords: Kamalaśīla; *pratītyasamutpāda*; *Tattvasaṅgraha*; *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*; *ādivākya*

1 Introduction

The *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS) by the Mādhyamika Buddhist master Śāntarakṣita (c. 725–788) together with the *Pañjikā* (TSP) by his disciple Kamalaśīla (c. 740–795) is one of the most important works of Indian philosophy, especially in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. The work is monumental both in size – 3,645 verses with an extensive prose commentary – and in scope: It contains not only one of the most detailed, systematic and clearest expositions of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, but also an extensive overview, often accompanied by precise quotations from Brahmanical and Jaina sources and other minor works that have not survived. In short, it is one of the most important sources for understanding Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophies in the second half of the first millennium. Any author who synthesizes such a vast amount of material is confronted with the problem of how to arrange it in a meaningful structure. How did Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla tackle this problem?

The topic as such is not new. Several scholars have addressed it, to mention just the most relevant ones, Benoytosh Bhattacharyya (1926) in his foreword to the edition of the TS and the TSP by Embar Krishnamacharya; Shōkō Watanabe (1967) in his Japanese translation of a part of the opening chapter of the TS/P; and Sara McClintock (2010) in her influential study of the last chapter of the TS/P; Isabelle Ratié (2014) in her monograph on the Mīmāṃsā section of the TS Ch. 7, *Ātmaparīkṣā* (“the investigation of Self”); and, most recently, James Marks (2019) in his dissertation focused on *Aviddhakarṇa* and *Bhāvivikta* in the TS and in Marks & Vincent Eltschinger (2019).

Bhattacharyya 1926; Watanabe 1967 indicated that the initial statement (*ādivākya*) of the TS, consisting of six verses, is strategically arranged by the author as a “table of contents” for the entire work. Each word-group of the *ādivākya* reveals the content(s)

of one or more of the twenty-six chapters – called *parīkṣās* (investigations) – that comprise the work. In light of Bhattacharyya, both McClintock and Marks examined the overall structure of the TS. However, they reached contradictory conclusions: McClintock thinks that the structure contains two units, while Marks takes it as one unified whole.

McClintock examines the *ādivākya* in relation to the structure of the TS and argues as follows:

Despite their complexity, the verses can be easily analyzed into two distinct semantic units: one containing a praise to the Buddha along with important statements about him, and another containing a condensed description of his central teaching, dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Significantly, this division corresponds to an important division in the work itself. (McClintock 2010: 96–97)

She further points out that in the *ādivākya*, the first part, which corresponds to Chs. 1–23, is represented by the attributes of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and the second part, which corresponds to Chs. 24–26, is represented by the statements concerning the Buddha.¹ She also remarks that the first part of the work culminates in Ch. 23, *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* ('Investigation of external objects') because this chapter represents the highest explicit level of analysis in the work. She calls the common subject in Chs. 1–23 "Analysis of Dependent Arising."² She classifies the later part (Chs. 24–26) — whose main theme she calls "Analysis of Religious Authority" — as "a kind of 'appendix'" (McClintock 2010: 98).

Discussing the systematic character of the TS/P, Ratié 2014 points out that the systematicity of the text is not limited to the exhaustive character of its examination of all of the opposing doctrines – as McClintock argued.³ According to her, Śāntarākṣita also strives to demonstrate, while borrowing "scattered" (*viprakīrṇa*)⁴ arguments from Vasubandhu, Dignāga, or Dharmakīrti that target various issues, how these Buddhist arguments form a coherent system.⁵ Through examining the refutation of Kumārila's catoptric theory, she concludes that the system in the TS is an excellent expression of philosophical thought and the yardstick by which the quality of this thought is to be measured. She takes the sense of the word "systematic" as what is essentially concerned with a coherent conceptual totality.⁶ Following Ratié's argument on the coherent systematicity of the TS, Marks 2019 criticizes McClintock:

1 McClintock 2010: 97.

2 McClintock 2010: 97f.

3 Ratié 2014: 168.

4 See n.66 below.

5 Ratié 2014: 169.

6 Ratié 2014: 171.

Dependent origination is arguably the core Buddhist teaching, the most robust analysis of reality and experience, and the most broadly efficacious in impelling the practitioner towards enlightenment. Strictly speaking, any number of structures oriented on various aspects of dependent origination could have worked. What is most important is that we see that the text functions as a coherent yet fluid whole. (Marks 2019: 47)

His criticism is convincing, and I agree that the text should be consistent with the topic. However, the basis for this criticism is insufficient in terms of the source material. I see some problems that are common to McClintock and Marks: both leave some of the qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* out of the discussion of the roles of the various attributes in the initial statement, namely, “being entirely free of the mass of all conceptual proliferation” and “being not understood by others” in TS 4cd; and both regard “not depending on the autonomous Veda” in TS 5a and “being omniscient” in TS 6a as a pair of qualities belonging to the Buddha and not to the *pratītyasamutpāda*. Thus, this paper is an attempt to show that the various qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* and of the Buddha that are enumerated in the *ādivākya*, as well as the seemingly disconnected subordinate topics of the twenty-six chapters, converge into a single topic: “*tattva*.” For this purpose — and by revisiting the interpretation of Kamalaśīla — I shall explore “the meaning of [each] component” (*avayavārtha*) of the *ādivākya*, especially that of TS 4cd–6. In passing I shall reconsider what the TS is about and what is exactly referred to by the *tattva* in the title, and critically evaluate the general view of the TS as an encyclopedic work.

2 The First Ten Qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* in TS 1–4ab

Let us take a look at the first ten qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *ādivākya* of the TS:

prakṛtīśobhayātmādivyāpārarahitam calam /
karmatatphalasambandhavyavasthādisamāśrayam //
guṇadravyakriyājātisamavāyādyupādhibhiḥ /
śūnyam āropitākāraśabdapratyayagocaram //
spāṣṭalakṣaṇasamyuktapramādvitayaniścitam /
aṇīyasāpi nāṃśena miśrībhūtāparātmakam //
asaṅkrāntim anādyantam pratibimbādisannibham | (TS_B 1–4ab)

[The *pratītyasamutpāda*] (1) which is devoid of the operations (*vyāpāra*) of (1-1) primordial matter (*prakṛti*), (1-2) God (*īśa*), (1-3) both [primordial matter and God], (1-4) Self (*ātman*) (1-5)

and so on; (2) which is in flux (*cala*); (3) which is the basis for the allocations of the relation between action and its effect and so on; (4) which is devoid of the additional qualifiers (*upādhi*) of (4-1) quality (*guṇa*), (4-2) substance (*dravya*), (4-3) action (*kriyā*), (4-4) [the highest (*para*) and lower (*apara*)]⁷ universals (*jāti*), (4-5) inherence (*samavāya*), and so forth;⁸ (5) which is the object of words and cognitions that are endowed with superimposed images; (6) which is ascertained by the two means of valid cognition (*pramā*) [i.e., direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*)]⁹ that are endowed with clear characterizations (*spaṣṭalakṣaṇa*);¹⁰ (7) which does not have another nature that is mixed, even with [its] smallest part; (8) in which there is no transition [of the five agglomerations] through [the three times] (*asaṅkrānti*); (9) which has neither beginning nor end; (10) which is like a reflection and so forth; [...]¹¹

As prior studies rightly point out,¹² the first ten qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* simply reflect the title and theme of Chs. 1–23, as Table 1 shows.

7 Cf. TSP_B 14.17: *jātiśabdena param aparaṃ ca dvividham api sāmānyam grhyate*.

8 Viz., the particular (*viśeṣa*) abiding in the final substance and the more comprehensive kind of existence, *astitva*, of the six categories in contradistinction to *sattā*. Cf. TSP_B 14.17f: *ādiśabdena antyadravyavartinām viśeṣāṇām ye ca dharmivyatirekiṇo dharmāḥ kaiścid upavarṇyante yathā ṣaṇṇām api padārthānām astitvaṃ sadupalambhakapramāṇaviśayatvam ity evamādayas teṣāṃ grahaṇam*.

9 Cf. TSP_B 15.20f: *pramādvitayaṃ pratyakṣānumānakhyām [...]*

10 Kamalaśīla explains that the characterizations of the means of valid cognition are made “clear” by dispelling the “unclear” characterizations in four aspects, namely, the nature (*svarūpa*), the effect (*phala*), the domain (*gocara*) and the number (*saṅkhyā*) of the means of valid cognition that are asserted by the opponents of Śāntarakṣita. For discussion on each opponent, see Funayama 1992: 57–58. Cf. TSP_B 448.19f on TS_B 1212: *tatra pramāṇe svarūpaphalagocarasaṅkhyāsu pareṣāṃ vipratipattiś caturvidhā. tannirākaraṇena spaṣṭam pramāṇalakṣaṇam ādarśayitum spaṣṭalakṣaṇasamyuktapramādvitayaniścitam ity etatsamarthanārtham āha [...]* “Then, regarding the means of valid cognition, the opponents hold different views of four kinds concerning [its] nature, effect, domain and number. With a view to clearly explaining the characteristic of the means of valid cognition by refuting their [views], in order to establish [the qualifier of *pratītyasamutpāda*] ‘(6) which is ascertained by the two means of valid cognition that are endowed with clear characterizations’ [the master Śāntarakṣita] states [...]” This part was translated by Funayama 1992: 57.

Similarly, in PSV Dignāga explains his purpose of composing PS, “to establish valid cognition” (*pramāṇasiddhyai* PS I 1c) and “to refute the *pramāṇas* of the opponents” (*parapramāṇapratīṣedha* PSV 1.11) and “to reveal the good qualities of one’s own *pramāṇas*” (*svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvana* PSV 1.12). The translations of the Sanskrit terms follow Krasser (2004: 140).

11 The *ādivākya* of the TS was translated into English by Jha 1937: 1f, Kapstein 2001: 11f, McClintock 2010: 96, Coseru 2012: 126, and Marks 2019: 40, and into Japanese by Watanabe 1967: 60f. All or some of the interpretations of “*jagaddhitavidhitasayā*” (TS 5b), “*pratītyasamutpādam*” (TS 6’a), and “*tattva*” (TS 6’d) in the previous studies are somewhat problematic, as pointed out in n.42, § 4.1 and § 5 below.

12 E.g., Chatterjee 1988, Watanabe 1967; McClintock 2010. New mapping of the components to the chapters are attempted by Coseru 2012: 135–139 and Marks 2019: 44–47.

Table 1: Qualifiers 1–10 and Corresponding Chapters 1–23.

Qualifiers of the <i>pratītyasamutpāda</i>	Corresponding Chapters of TS	Relevant sūtra ^a
1 st (1) which is devoid of the operation of primordial matter (TS 1ab')	Ch. 1, Investigation of primordial matter	<i>Śālistambhasūtra</i> 6B.8 (=TSP _B 13.18f)
1 st (2) which is devoid of the operation of God (TS 1ab')	Ch. 2, Investigation of God	
1 st (3) which is devoid of the operation of both [primordial matter and God] (TS 1ab')	Ch. 3, Investigation of both [primordial matter and God]	
1 st (4) which is devoid of the operation of others [i.e., no cause, Word identified with the supreme, and Puruṣa] (TS 1ab')	Chs. 4–6, Investigations of having no cause, Word identified with the supreme, and Puruṣa	
1 st (5) which is devoid of the operation of Self (<i>ātman</i>) (TS 1ab')	Ch. 7, Investigation of Ātman	
2 nd which is in flux (TS 1'b)	Ch. 8, Investigation of continuous existence	<i>Paramārthagāthā</i> 5 (=TSP _B 14.1f)
3 rd which is the basis for the allocations of the relation between action and its effect and so on (TS 1cd)	Ch. 9, Investigation of the relation between action and its effect	<i>Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra</i> (SĀ 335) (TSP _B 14.10f)
4 th (1) which is devoid of the additional qualifier of substance (TS 2ab)	Ch. 10, Investigation of substance	<i>Sarvasūtra</i> (SĀ 319) (=TSP _B 14.21f)
4 th (2) which is devoid of the additional qualifier of quality (TS 2ab)	Ch. 11, Investigation of quality	
4 th (3) which is devoid of the additional qualifier of action (TS 2ab)	Ch. 12, Investigation of action	
4 th (4) which is devoid of the additional qualifier of the universals (TS 2ab)	Chs. 13 & 14, Investigations of the universal and the particular	
4 th (5) which is devoid of the additional qualifier of inherence (TS 2ab)	Ch. 15, Investigation of inherence	
5 th which is the object of words and cognitions that are endowed with superimposed images (TS 2cd)	Ch. 16, Investigation of the object of a word	<i>Bhavaśāṅkrāntisūtra</i> 2 (=TSP _B 15.13f)
6 th which is ascertained by the two means of valid cognition that are endowed with clear characterizations (TS 3ab)	Chs. 17, 18 & 19, Investigation of perception, inference and the other means of valid cognition	Unidentified sūtra “the triple assay of gold” (=TSP _B 15.23f, TS _B 3587)
7 th which does not have another nature that is mixed, even with [its] smallest part (TS 3cd)	Ch. 20, Investigation of the [Jaina] theory of perspectivism	<i>Śālistambhasūtra</i> 6B.8 (=TSP _B 17.10f)
8 th in which there is no transition [of the five agglomerations] through [the three times] (TS4a')	Ch. 21, Investigation of the [Vaibhāṣika theory of the existence of dharmas through] the three times	<i>Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra</i> (SĀ 335) (=TSP _B 17.17f)

Table 1: (continued)

	Qualifiers of the <i>pratītyasamutpāda</i>	Corresponding Chapters of TS	Relevant sūtra ^a
9 th	which has neither beginning nor end (TS 4'a)	Ch. 22, Investigation of the Lokāyata theory	<i>Samyuttanikāya</i> II (178,18) (=TSP _B 17.23f) / <i>Dhammapada</i> V 60cd (=TSP _B 18.1f)
10 th	which is like a reflection and so forth (TS 4b)	Ch. 23, Investigation of an external object	<i>Laṅkāvatārasūtra</i> X 154cd–155ab (=TSP _B 18.7f)

^a Since anchoring the qualifier in an appropriate *sūtra* as the authoritative testimony is an important factor in TSP (see § 2.1 below), I have listed the titles of and the locations in those *sūtras*. Among them the ŚS 6B.8, *Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra* (SĀ 335) and *Sarvasūtra* (SĀ 319), *Bhavaśāṅkrāntisūtra* 2 and *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* X 154cd–155ab are adaptively cited in PPU 53.26f, 54.7f, 54.18f, 14.10f, 40.16f and 44.12f, respectively. The first three *sūtras*, in particular, remain in the same order.

Kamalaśīla associates each of the components of the *ādivākya* with one or more of the twenty-six chapters of the TS and he does so on two occasions: first in the *avayavārtha* (“meaning of [each] component [of the *ādivākya*]”) section in the opening chapter;¹³ and second, in the introductions to the relevant chapters.¹⁴

2.1 The *avayavārtha* Section of the Opening Chapter

In the *avayavārtha* section the following elements are all found in common in the comment on the first ten and also the last two qualifiers:

- (i) Anticipating an objection from the perspective of an adversarial doctrine
- (ii) Introducing each component as the answer to that objection
- (iii) Rephrasing and analyzing the component
- (iv) Anchoring the qualifier in an appropriate *sūtra* as the authoritative testimony¹⁵
- (v) Connecting the component to the chapter(s) with a set phrase “*ayaṃ ca ... ° parīkṣapakṣepaḥ*” (“And this is the allusion to ‘the investigation of ...’”)

Let us take the qualifier, “(2) what is in flux (*calam* TS 1'b),” as a typical example. Kamalaśīla comments on it as follows:

¹³ The *samudayārtha* (“collective meaning [of the *ādivākya*]”) section (TSP_B 2.5–13.12) and the *avayavārtha* section (TSP_B 13.13–20.21) form the opening chapter of TSP.

¹⁴ TSP_B 20.22f; 51.15f; 74.10f; 78.20f; 101.17f; 166.20f; 207.16f; 231.12f; 488.7f; 448.19f; 593.8f; 613.20f; 633.15f; 670.17f; 712.6f; 987.17f.

¹⁵ See n.a above.

- (i) *atha sa tam evambhūtaṃ pratītyasamutpādaṃ kim akṣaṇikaṃ jagāda?*
 (ii) *nety āha — calam.* (iii) *calam iti*¹⁶ *asthiram, kṣaṇikam iti yāvat. anyasya calatvāyogād iti bhāvaḥ.* (iv) *tatredam uktaṃ bhagavatā —*
kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā asthirāṇāṃ kutaḥ kriyā /
*bhūtir yaiṣāṃ*¹⁷ *kriyā saiva kārakaṃ saiva cocyate*¹⁸ // *iti.*
 (v) *ayaṃ ca sthirabhāvaparīkṣopakṣepaḥ.* (TSP_B 13.20f on TS_B 1'b)
 (i) [Objection:] Did that [Blessed One] state that such *pratītyasamutpāda* [(1) which is devoid of the operations of primordial matter, etc.,] as described above is not momentary (*akṣaṇika*)?
 (ii) [Reply:] No. [The master Śāntarakṣita said] “[the *pratītyasamutpāda*] (2) which is in flux” (TS 1'b). (iii) [The word] “being in flux” (*cala*) means “unsteady” (*asthira*), more precisely, “momentary” (*kṣaṇika*). What is meant is that [the *pratītyasamutpāda* is in flux] because something different [from it] cannot be in flux. (iv) In relation to this the Blessed One stated:
 All conditioned things are momentary. How could unsteady things have action? The very arising of these [all conditioned things] is called “action” (*kriyā*) [in terms of result]¹⁹ and “the causal factor” (*kāraka*)²⁰ [in terms of cause].²¹
 (*Paramārthagāthā* 5)
 (v) And this is the allusion to “the investigation of permanent existence” (Ch. 8, *Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā*).

(i) The objection anticipated here is raised by non-Buddhists, as represented by Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, who refute the Buddhist theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*). (ii) The qualifier “what is in flux” forms the counterposition to them. (iii) Then the word “*calam*” is glossed. (iv) The *Paramārthagāthā* 5 is quoted as the authoritative testimony to prove this qualifier.²² (v) Lastly, this qualifier is connected to the chapter-titles.

16 *calam / calam iti* J Pa, *g-yo ba ste / g-yo ba zhes bya ba ni T*; *calam iti / calam* G B.

17 *yaiṣāṃ* J Pa PG_{MS} PPU, Watanabe (1967: 71 n. 8); *yeṣāṃ* G B PG; *'di dag T*; *gang dag* PG_T. For the detailed analysis of “*yaiṣāṃ*,” see Schmithausen (1987: 506 n. 1394).

18 *cocyate* Pa G B; *cocya* J.

19 PGV 341.39: *phalatvāt kriyā* [...]

20 Here it would not be interpreted as *kāraka*, which consists of the six categories, *apādāna*, *sampradāna*, *karāṇa*, *adhikarāṇa*, *karman* and *karṭṛ*, in grammatical theory.

21 PGV 341.39: [...] *hetutvāt kārakaḥ*.

22 PG 5 is cited in a number of Buddhist and non-Buddhist treatises as the earliest scriptural source for the Buddhist theory of momentariness. Although PG is included in the *Cintāmayībhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* with the *Paramārthagāthānibandha*, the authorship of PG is not ascribed to the author(s) of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. While Schmithausen (1987: 508 n.1401) considers the original source for PG as canonical literature which is traced back to Middle India, von Rospatt (1995: 17) points out the theory of momentariness which appears in PG 5 is not recorded in the Nikāyas and Āgamas and regards it as post-canonical. In many treatises, as in the case of the above quotation, PG 5 is quoted without mentioning the sūtra by name, although it is attributed to the Buddha. Exceptionally, Jñānaśrībhadra and Ratnākaraśānti attribute this to some Mahāśāṅghika work (cf. *ji ltar 'phags pa dge 'dun chen po pa dang klog pa* [...] LAV D118a2) and Ratnākaraśānti to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (cf. *uktaṃ*

In Kamalaśīla's comment, each qualifier is introduced with objections regarding the previous one. Common phraseology helps the reader to understand the close relationship between the preceding and following chapters of the TS and the overall flow of the text.

2.2 The Introductory Sections of the Chapters

In the beginning of Ch. 1, Kamalaśīla states:

tatra prakṛtivyāpārarahitatvapratipādanāya sāṅkhyamatam upadarśayann āha [...] (TSP_B 20.22f on TS_B 7)

Pointing out the Sāṅkhya's view in order to explain that (1) [the *pratītyasamutpāda*] is devoid of the action of primordial matter, [the master Śāntarakṣita] states [...]

Likewise, in most chapters Kamalaśīla introduce the first verse with the stock phrase: "In order to establish this qualifier 'X' of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, [the master Śāntarakṣita] states [...]" (*X ity etatpratītyasamutpādaviśeṣaṇasamarthanārtham āha [...]*).²³ In this manner Kamalaśīla reminds readers that the topics of each chapter converge in the *pratītyasamutpāda*.

3 The Eleventh to Twelfth Qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* in TS 4cd

The next two qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* continue in the *ādivākya*:

sarvaprapañcasandehanirmuktam agataṃ paraiḥ // (TS_B 4cd)

[The *pratītyasamutpāda*] (11) which is entirely free of the mass of all conceptual proliferation; [and] (12) which is not understood by others, [...]

Unlike the previous ten qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, the eleventh and twelfth are explained without associating them with a specific chapter in the TS or a specific statement in a sūtra literature.

cāryalaṅkāvatāre [...] PPU 54.7). However, no source can be found for the former, and the latter is not present in any of the available *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* editions.

²³ See n.14 above.

3.1 The *pratītyasamutpāda* Is Not an Object of Conceptual Cognition

Kamalaśīla expounds the eleventh qualifier:

*tad evaṃ yathoktāsadarthakalpanājālarahitavṃ pratītyasamutpādasya pratipādyopasaṃ-harann āha — sarvaprapañcetyādi. sarveṣāṃ yathoktānāṃ prakṛtihetutvādīnāṃ prapañcānāṃ sandehaḥ*²⁴ *samūhaḥ, tena nirmuktaḥ.* (TSP_B 18.10f on TS_B 4cd')

Having thus explained that the *pratītyasamutpāda* is devoid of the net of conceptual cognition (*kalpanājālarahita*) related to nonexistent objects as mentioned above [in TS 1–4ab], [the master Śāntarakṣita], summarizing [this], states “[which is entirely free of] all conceptual proliferation” and so on (TS 4cd). [The word “*sarvaprapañcasandehanirmukta*” means that] it is entirely free of the mass, i.e., the multitude, of all of the above-mentioned conceptual proliferation beginning with “having primordial matter as the cause.”

Considering the word “*kalpanājālarahita*” as the technical term referring to the Buddha or the Buddha’s cognition,²⁵ the following contrast is seen: all conceptual proliferation is the object of conceptual cognition (*kalpanā*), whereas the *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is entirely free of all conceptual proliferation, is the object of non-conceptual cognition by the Buddha. Namely, while ordinary or heathen people grasp things as “arising from either primordial matter, God, both, nothing, Śabdabrahman, or Self and so on” and as “external objects,” the Buddha grasps them as “not arising from any of them” and as “mind-only.” Therefore, the topics of Chs. 1–23 are summarized as the *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is not the object of conceptual cognition but only of the Buddha’s cognition.

The *ādivākya* of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) is known as the source of inspiration for the TS since both start with the salutation to the Buddha as the best of speakers who teaches the *pratītyasamutpāda* with its various qualifiers.²⁶ This eleventh qualifier is important in that it is the only one commonly employed in both the *ādivākyas* in the MMK and the TS. The *ādivākya* in the MMK reads:

I pay homage to the Fully Enlightened One who is the best of speakers that taught the *pratītyasamutpāda* [i.e., the entities that have arisen having depended on causes and conditions] which has neither cessation nor origination, neither annihilation nor eternity, neither

²⁴ *sandehaḥ* J Pa G; *sandohaḥ* B.

²⁵ For this concept, see Funayama 1992: 44; Funayama 2011: 106.

²⁶ Watanabe 1967: 70; 76 and McClintock 2010: 95 remark the structural similarity in the *ādivākya* in the MMK and the TS: the salutation to the Buddha as the best of speakers who teaches *pratītyasamutpāda* with many kinds of qualifiers.

singularity nor plurality, neither coming nor going, and which is the auspicious cessation of conceptual proliferation.²⁷

The qualifier “which is the auspicious cessation of conceptual proliferation” appears after the famous eight negations. The eight qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* in the MMK and the ten in the TS can both be regarded as concrete examples of conceptual proliferation.

Furthermore, a relation between conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*) and conceptual cognition (*kalpanā*), similar to the one noted by Kamalaśīla, is found in the MMK 18.5:

Liberation (*mokṣa*) is attained through the destruction of actions (*karma*) and defilements (*kleśa*); actions and defilements arise from conceptual cognition (*vikalpa*); these arise from conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*); but conceptual proliferation stops in emptiness (*śūnyatā*).²⁸

The arising and cessation of conceptual proliferation are the fundamental causes of transmigration and liberation, respectively. It is important to note that when one observes all entities as empty of their own nature, conceptual proliferation and conceptual cognition (and so on) cease.²⁹ Thus the cessation of conceptual proliferation is compatible for the Mādhyamika Buddhists with *śūnyatā* and *pratītyasamutpāda*.

3.2 The *pratītyasamutpāda* as Not Being the Object of Heathen Cognition

As for the twelfth qualifier of the *pratītyasamutpāda* “which is not understood by others” (TS 4’d), Kamalaśīla argues:

atha kim ayam anyair api hariharahiranyagarbhādibhir evaṃ abhisambuddhaḥ? nety āha — agataṃ parair iti. sarvatīrthānāṃ vitathātmadrṣṭyabhiniviṣṭatvād bhagavata evāyam āveṇiko ’bhisambodha iti darśayati. etac ca sarvaparīkṣāsu pratipādayiṣyati. (TSP_B 18.13f on TS_B 4’d)

27 MMK ādivākya: *anīrodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvatam / anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anīrgamam // yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcōpaśamaṃ śivam / deśayāṃ āsa saṃbuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam //*

28 MMK 18.5: *karmakleśakṣayān mokṣaḥ karmakleśā vikalpataḥ / te prapañcāt prapañcas tu śūnyatāyāṃ nirudhyate //*

29 Cf. PrP 350.16f: *sa cāyaṃ laukikaḥ prapañco niravaśeṣaḥ śūnyatāyāṃ sarvabhāvasvabhāva-śūnyatādarśane sati nirudhyate.*

[Objection:] Then, has anyone other [than the Buddha], such as Hari, Hara and Hiranyagarbha,³⁰ ever been awakened to this [*pratītyasamutpāda*] in the same manner?

[Reply:] No, that has not been the case. Therefore [Śāntarakṣita] says “[the *pratītyasamutpāda*] which is not understood by others” (TS 4’d). [He] explains that all the founders [of other religious traditions] (*tīrtha*) cling to the incorrect view of Self and hence this is an awakening unique to the Buddha alone. And this will be explained in all of the investigations.

Here the Buddha’s cognition, which grasps the *pratītyasamutpāda*, is contrasted with the cognition of heathens, which cannot. It is also to be noted that Kamalaśīla associates this qualifier of the *pratītyasamutpāda* not to a certain chapter but to “all the investigations.”³¹ Thus, the topic of all chapters is summarized as the *pratītyasamutpāda* which is not the object of the heathens’ cognition but only of the Buddha’s.

Again, terms similar to the eleventh and twelfth qualifiers are found as the first and the third of the four characteristics of the true state (*tattva*) of things defined in the MMK 18.9:

These are the characteristics of the true state [of things]:³² (i) not to be understood by others (*aparapratyaya*);³³ (ii) free [from intrinsic nature];³⁴ (iii) not proliferated due to conceptual proliferation, [namely,] not conceptually constructed; and (iv) having no various meanings.³⁵

30 Viz., Viṣṇu, Śiva and Brahman.

31 This view might rely on the following verses to define “the Omniscient One” (*sarvavit*) in Ch. 26 “the establishment of the Omniscience.” TS_B 3327–3329 (with the emendations by Satō 2020: 150): *asarvajñatvam evaṃ tu vispaṣṭam avagamyate / mithyājñānānuṣaṅgitvād viparītaprakāśanāt // sthāṇau nara iti bhrāntaḥ paripattā yathā paraḥ / sarvābhiś ca parīkṣābhir vijñeyā hetusiddhatā // samyak sarvapadārthānāṃ tattvajñānāc ca sarvavit / hetāvato na sambodhyā sandigdhavyatirekitā //* “On the other hand, in the same manner it is clearly understood that [Vardhamāna, Kapila, etc.,] are not the Omniscient One. For they teach [the teachings] incorrectly because they are endowed with false cognition. Just like another person who erroneously perceives a stake as a human being. And it is to be known through all the investigations that the logical reason [“being endowed with false cognition”] is established. And [he is] the Omniscient One (*sarvavit*) because he correctly perceives the true states of all entities. Therefore, negative concomitants should not be perceived as suspicious with respect to the logical reason.”

32 Cf. PrP 373.6f: *bhāvānāṃ yat svarūpaṃ tat tattvam*.

33 Note that Candrakīrti’s interpretation of “others” (*apara*) in “*aparapratyayaṃ*” (MMK 19.8a’) is different from Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of “others” (*para*) in “*agataṃ paraiḥ*” (TS 4’c). According to Candrakīrti, the true state of entities is not understood through the teaching of others but is to be attained only by oneself. Cf. PrP 373.1f: *tatra nāsmīn parapratyayo ’stīty aparapratyayaṃ paropa-deśāgamyāṃ svayam evādhigantavyam ity arthaḥ*.

34 Cf. PrP 373.8: *etac ca śāntasvabhāvam ataimirikakeśādarśanavat svabhāvavirahitam ity arthaḥ*.

35 MMK 18.9: *aparapratyayaṃ śāntaṃ prapañcair aprapañcitam / nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam //*; cf. PrP 373.9f: *ata eva tat prapañcair aprapañcitam. ... nirvikalpaṃ ca tat*.

Table 2: Qualifiers 11–12 and Corresponding Chapters.

	Qualifiers of the <i>pratītyasamutpāda</i>	Corresponding Chapters of TS	Relevant sūtra
11 th	which is entirely free of the mass of all conceptual proliferation (TS 4cd')	Summary of Chs. 1–23	∅
12 th	which is not understood by others (TS 4'd)	Summary of Chs. 1–26	∅

In sum, both the eleventh and twelfth qualifiers indicate that the *pratītyasamutpāda* is the object of the Buddha's cognition. The difference between the two lies in how the Buddha's cognition is defined. If the Buddha's cognition is defined through what is not the Buddha's cognition, what is not the Buddha's cognition is either conceptual cognition or the cognition of heathens. Just as these two overlap, the range of the TS that they cover also overlaps. It is thus reasonable to assert that these qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* are not associated with any particular chapter of the TS because their roles are different: they comprise summaries of, respectively, the first twenty-three chapters and of all the chapters, as Table 2 shows.

3.3 What is the TS About?

Now, what is the TS about? According to Kamalaśīla's description of the topic (*abhidheya*), the answer is: “the various qualifiers or the true states (*tattva*) of entities which have arisen in dependence on causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*)”,³⁶ or, one might also answer, by looking at the twelfth qualifier, which comprises the overall theme: “the denial of various heathen doctrines.”

The latter is also obvious from the dialectics throughout the TS/P, which might be closer to our general view of the TS as an encyclopedic work dealing exhaustively with possible ontological, epistemological, logical, and soteriological matters that may arise among the Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems. There are many discussions concerning the purpose of refuting the objections in the TS/P,³⁷ but here I shall reconsider it from a different perspective: Kamalaśīla's commentative method.

³⁶ See § 5.1 below.

³⁷ See e.g., Chatterjee 1988: i: “the *Tattvasaṅgraha* is not a single work. It is, on the contrary, a collection of several works severally dealing with all conceivable problems of Buddhism — metaphysical, epistemological, logical and ethical.”; Taber 2001: 73: “the *Tattvasaṅgraha* [...] exhaustively refutes the doctrines of competing systems, Hindu and Buddhist alike.”; Marks & Eltschinger 2019: 485: “In this treatise, he covers an enormous range of philosophical positions and topics, primarily focusing on non-Buddhist, mostly brahmanical, traditions. [...] The *Tattvasaṅgraha* can be regarded

In his sūtra-exegetical works, such as the **Vajracchedikāṭikā*, Kamalaśīla explains the sixfold method (*tshul*), which has been earlier established in the *Vyākhyāyukti*,³⁸ as follows:³⁹

- (1) Now, those who wish to explain a sūtra (*mdo sde*) should first state the purpose (*dgos pa*, **prayojana*) in order to lead the audience to take [it] up earnestly and so on. For, unless the purpose is understood, judicious people (*rtogs pa dang ldan pa*, **prekṣāvat*) would not undertake action (*'jug pa*, **pravṛtti*) towards anything.⁴⁰
- (2) Next, in order to show the means by which the purpose of the sūtra [is achieved], the topic (*brjod par bya ba*, **abhidheya*) should be stated. [For] a string [of words]

as an attempt to systematize, “topicalize” and update Dharmakīrti’s thought by anticipating objections and answering criticism.”; Eltschinger 2012: 478: “Kamalaśīla’s statement, moreover, strongly echoes the claim that dialectics is aimed at defending the Buddhist law.”; Ratié 2014: 168 (see n.4); Marks & Eltschinger 2019: 386: “The full import of seriously engaging false views is best understood in light of Śāntarakṣita’s overarching approach to Mahāyāna thought.”

38 Cf. VyY 1.13–16: *mdo don smra ba dag gis ni // dgos pa bsdus pa'i don bcas dang // tshig don bcas dang mtshams sbyor bcas // brgal lan bcas par bsnad par bya //* (cited in AAĀ 15.23: *prayojanaṃ sapiṇḍārthaṃ padārthaḥ sānusandhikah / sacodyaparihāraś ca vācyaḥ sūtrārthavāḍibhiḥ //*) (*Saṅgrahaśloka* 1) “Those who explain the meaning of a sūtra should state (1) the purpose (*prayojana*) along with (2) the collective meaning (*piṇḍārtha*), (3) the meaning of [individual] words (*padārtha*) along with (4) the [semantic] connection (*anusandhi*) and (5) the refutations of the objections (*codyaparihāra*).” Kamalaśīla faithfully adopts this fivefold method in the APDhT D123a4–6 and the ŚST 450.7–13 but modifies it to sixfold in the following VChT by adding “the topic” (**adbhidheya*) second. For the sūtra commentarial method common in the VyY and Kamalaśīla’s works, see Schoening 1995: 38–43 and Ueno 2009.

39 VChT D204a3–6=P209b8–210a3: *de la mdo sde 'chad par 'dod pas nyan pa dag nan tan (tan P; om. D) gyis len pa la sogs pa la gzud pa'i phyir dang por dgos pa de brjod par bya'o // dgos pa ma rtogs par ni rtog (rtog P; rtogs D) pa dang ldan pa dag gang la yang 'jug par mi 'gyur ro // de'i 'og tu mdo sde'i dgos pa'i thabs bstan pa'i phyir brjod par bya ba bsnad par bya ste / brjod par bya ba (ba P; om. D) bas stong pa'i mdo ni se'u bcu zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i tshig bzhin du dgos pa 'dod pa sgrub par mi byed do // de'i 'og tu brjod par bya ba de gzung sla ba'i phyir bsdus pa'i don brjod par bya'o // de'i 'og tu bsdus pa'i don rtogs par bya ba'i phyir tshig gi don brjod par bya'o // de'i 'og tu go rims (rims D: rim P) mi 'gal bar bstan pa'i phyir tshig rnam kyī mtshams sbyar ba bstan par bya'o // de'i 'og tu snga phyi (phyi em. (phyi APDhT D123a6): phyi'i DP) rigs pa dang 'gal ba bsal ba'i phyir rgol ba'i lan brjod par bya ste / tshul ni de lta bu'o //*

40 Cf. TSP_B 9.10f: *tathā saty apy (apy J Pa, yang T: om. G B) abhidheya kākadantāḍiparikṣāśāstravad abhimatprayojanarahitaṃ śāstraṃ prekṣāvantah śrotum api nāḍriyanta iti tatas tatpravṛttyartham āḍau prayojanaṃ abhidhāṇīyam*. “Likewise, even though the ‘topic’ is [stated], judicious people do not apply themselves to studying a treatise that is devoid of a desired ‘purpose,’ like a treatise that investigates the teeth of crows and so on. Thus, the ‘purpose’ should be stated at the beginning [of the treatise] in order to [lead people to] undertake the activity [of studying it].”; ŚV Pratijñāsūtra 12: *sarvasyaiva hi śāstrasya karmaṇo vāpi kasyacit / yāvat prayojanaṃ noktaṃ tāvat tat kena gṛhyate //* “Indeed, unless the ‘purpose’ of every treatise or some activity is stated, who will understand [their] purpose? [No one will].”

(*mdo*, **sūtra*) without a “topic,” such as the utterance “ten pomegranates” and so on (*se’u bcu zhes bya ba la sogs pa’i tshig*, **daśadāḍimādivākya*),⁴¹ cannot achieve the intended purpose.⁴²

- (3) Next, in order to make it easy to grasp the topic [of the *sūtra*], the collective meaning (*bsdus pa’i don*, **piṇḍārtha*) [of the *sūtra*] should be stated.
- (4) Next, in order to make [people] understand the collective meaning [of the *sūtra*], the meaning of [individual] words (*tshig gi don*, **padārtha*) [in the *sūtra*] should be stated.
- (5) Next, in order to show that the word order is not contradicted, the [semantic] connection (*mtshams sbyar ba*, **anusandhi*) [of the *sūtra*] should be stated.
- (6) Next, in order to refute the contradictions [of the meaning of words] with internal contradictions (*snga phyi*, **pūrvapara*) and reasoning (*rigs*, **yukti*), the refutations of the objections (*rgol ba’i lan*, **codyaparihāra*) should be stated.

Such is the [sixfold established] method (*tshul*, **vidhi*, **naya*) [for explaining a *sūtra*].

Each latter method forms the condition for the former, except the fundamental one, the purpose. It is possible that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla consciously applied this method to TS/P. The last, the refutations of the objections that shapes our general view of the TS/P, is a remote condition for understanding the purpose of the TS. As we shall see in § 5.2, the most essential purpose of the TS is to easily understand the true state of things.

From the point of view of establishing the Buddha’s cognition of the *pratītya-samutpāda* against that of heathens, the TS has a single structure. But from the point of view of establishing it in opposition to a conceptual cognition, its structure is twofold. As McClintock (2010: 97) remarks, it would be possible to divide the entire TS into two parts: the first would comprise the first twenty-three chapters, and the

41 This is a typical example of meaningless (*anarthaka*) words. Cf. MBh vt. 2 to A1.1.1: *loke hy arthavanti ca anarthakāni ca vākyaṇi drśyante. arthavanti tāvat, devadatta, gām abhyāja śuklām daṇḍena. devadatta, gām abhyāja kṛṣṇām iti. anarthakāni ca, daśa dāḍimāni, ṣaḍ apūpāḥ, kuṇḍam, ajājinam, palalapiṇḍaḥ, adhorukam etat kumāryāḥ, sphaiyakṛtasya pitā pratiśīna iti*. “Indeed, in the world meaningful and meaningless words are seen. To begin with, the meaningful words are: ‘Devadatta, bring the white cow by means of the stick! Devadatta, bring the black cow [by means of the stick]!’ And the meaningless words are: ‘Ten pomegranates, six pancakes, one vessel, one seed of cumin, one lump of ground sesame. This is a maiden’s petticoat. The father of Sphaiyakṛta is thin.’”

42 Cf. TSP_B 2.9f: *yady abhidheyam asya na kathyeta, tadonmattādivākyavad ānarthakyaṃ sambhāvayan prekṣāvān na pravartetāpi śrotum ity abhidheyam asyāvaśyavacanīyam*. “If the topic of this [treatise] were not stated, a judicious person might assume that [the treatise] would be useless, like the speech of an insane person and so on, and hence he would not even engage in studying [it]. Therefore, the topic of this [treatise] must be necessarily stated [at the beginning].”; TSP_B 787.12f: *ṣaḍ apūpā daśa dāḍimānīyādyunmattakavākyavad ānarthakyaṃ vedasya prāptam*. “The Veda would become unprofitable like the speech of an insane person on six pancakes, ten pomegranates and so on.”

second the last three chapters.⁴³ The difference between the two parts, however, does not lie in what McClintock describes as “the nature of reality” and “the Buddha” (McClintock 2010: 97), and “the body of the work” and “a kind of ‘appendix’” (McClintock 2010: 98). That difference relates to what the eleventh qualifier of the *pratītyasamutpāda* — “which is entirely free of the mass of all conceptual proliferation” — suggests concerning whether or not conceptual cognition is the full scope of the topic.

4 The Thirteenth to Fourteenth Qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* in TS 5–6abc

McClintock regards the second part (Chs. 24–26) of the TS as concerning “the Buddha, namely that he is the ‘omniscient one’ and that he ‘does not depend upon an autonomous scripture’” (2010: 97). Coseru takes this part as “the logical conclusion of the entire work” (2012: 134). The views of both McClintock and Coseru are due to the fact that the qualifications in TS_B 1–4 are attributed to the *pratītyasamutpāda*, while the latter ones in TS_B 5–6abc are attributed to the Buddha. However, the attributions of the Buddha are convertible into those of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. The verses continue:

- (a) ⁴⁴*svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅgo jagaddhitavidhitsayā /*
- (b) *anālpakalpāsaṅkhyeyasātmībhūtamahādayaḥ //*
- (c) *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ jagāda (d) gadatām varaḥ /*
taṃ (e) sarvajñaṃ praṇamya (TS_B 5–6abc)

Having paid homage to (e) the Omniscient One (d) who is the best of speakers (c) that taught the *pratītyasamutpāda* [i.e., the entities that have arisen having depended on causes and conditions]⁴⁵ due to the desire to bring about the benefit of the world,⁴⁶ (b) for whom the great

⁴³ Marks & Eltschinger 2019: 386 also divides the whole TS when summarizing each chapter. The first half is concluded in Ch. 23, and the second half, consisting of the last three chapters, focuses on Mīmāṃsā.

⁴⁴ The symbols (a)–(e) in the text correspond to those (a)–(e) in the translation. The reverse order of symbols in the translation is for the reader’s convenience.

⁴⁵ For this interpretation of the word *pratītyasamutpāda*, see Matsuoka 2022.

⁴⁶ Kamalaśīla gives two separate interpretations of “*jagaddhitavidhitsayā*” (TS 5b), one as the reason for the Buddha to teach the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and the other as the reason for Śāntarakṣita to compose the TS. See TSP_B 19.1f: *atha samadhigatāśeṣasvārthasampatter bhagavataḥ kimartham iyaṃ pratītyasamutpādadeśanety āha — jagaddhitavidhitsayeti. jagate hitam jagaddhitam. tat punar avi-paritapratītyasamutādāvabodhopāyam aśeṣakleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇam. tad vidhātum icchā jagaddhitavidhitsā. sā taddeśanāyāḥ kāraṇam*. “Why did the Blessed One who had attained the perfection of his own purpose (*svārthasampatti*) without remainder teach the *pratītyasamutpāda* in

compassion became natural through [practice] in many incalculably long eons, [and] (a) who does not depend on an autonomous Veda [...].

Five attributes of the Buddha (a)–(e) are enumerated. Kamalaśīla's explanation of each one follows.

4.1 The Attributions of the Buddha

Attribute (a) “who does not depend on an autonomous Veda” anticipates the objection by the Mīmāṃsakas that the Buddha taught the *pratītyasamutpāda* based on the Veda. By this attribute, Śāntarakṣita implies that the Buddha taught as the direct seer (*sākṣāddarśin*) without relying on the Veda at all. This is associated with both Ch. 24 “the Investigation of the Veda” and Ch. 25 “the Investigation of Intrinsic Validity.”⁴⁷

this way? [Śāntarakṣita] answers: “due to the desire to bring about the benefit of the world” (TS 5b). [The word] “*jagaddhita*” means “the benefit for the world.” Furthermore, this [benefit for the world consists in] abandoning obstacles consisting in afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and obstacles to the knowable (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) by means of the true awakening to *pratītyasamutpāda*. [The word] “*jagaddhitavidhitsā*” means “the desire to bring about this [benefit for the world].” This [desire] is the cause [for the Blessed One] to teach the [*pratītyasamutpāda*].”; TSP_B 11.19f: *jagaddhitavidhitsayety etasyottaratrānuvṛttes tad api darśitam eva. tathā hi — tadanuvṛttau* (n.e. T) *jagaddhitavidhitsayā tattvasaṅgrahaḥ kriyā ita vākyārtho jāyate*. “Because the phrase ‘due to the desire to bring about the benefit of the world’ continues to hold good, the [purpose] too is shown. To wit, when this [phrase] continues to hold good, the meaning of the sentence becomes ‘the compendium on the true states of things is composed due to the desire to bring about the benefit of the world.’”

In my translation I have adopted the former interpretation and construed “*jagaddhita-vidhitsayā*” (TS 5b) with “*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ jagāda*” (TS 6ab). Jha has the same interpretation, but McClintock, Coseru and Marks seem to take “*jagaddhitavidhitsayā*” as the reason for “*analpa-kalpāsaṅkhyeyasātmibhūtamahādayaḥ*” (TS 5cd). According to Kamalaśīla, however, “*analpa*” is rather the reason for “*jagad*.” See TSP_B 19.4f: *sāpi jagaddhitavidhitsā kuto 'sya jāyety āha — analpetyādi*. Cf. Jha 1937: 1: “[...] who, with a view to bringing about the welfare of the world, — propounded the Doctrine of the ‘Wheel of Intervolved Causation,’ — [...]”; McClintock 2010: 96: “who through his desire to benefit the world inculcated a nature of great compassion throughout many innumerable ages [...]”; Coseru 2012: 126: “[...] who, in wishing for the welfare of the world, developed great compassion over innumerable eons, [...]”; Marks 2019: 40: “[...] and after habituating great compassion over many countless eons out of his desire to benefit the world.” Kapstein's translation of “*jagaddhitavidhitsayā*” as “Who [...] moved to benefit the whole world” seems to regard it as another attribute of the Buddha. However, since none of the other attributes of the Buddha are shown in the dative form, it would be difficult to see it in this way.

This term “*jagaddhita*” could be adopted from PS I 1: *pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tēyine / pramāṇasiddhyai svamatāt samuccayaḥ kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ //* 47 Cf. TSP_B 18.16f on TS_B 5–6abc: *athāyam evambhūtaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ kiṃ svayam abhisambudhya gadito bhagavatā. āhosvit parābhimatāpauruṣeyavedāśrayeṇa, yathāhur jaiminīyāḥ — tasmād atīndriyārthānām sākṣād draṣṭā na vidyate, vacanena tu nityena yaḥ paśyati sa paśyatīti?*

Attribute (a) indicates the property of being a direct seer, while attribute (b) “for whom great compassion became natural [...]” indicates the property of possessing great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*). These two attributes of the Buddha form a pair and consist of the means for the right practice for the benefit of others (*aviparītaparahitānuṣṭhāna*). If one had wisdom (*prajñā*) but no compassion (*kṛpā*), one could not teach others; and if one had compassion but no wisdom, one could not teach others rightly. This right practice for the benefit of others is indicated by attribute (c) “who taught the *pratītyasamutpāda*.”

Attribute (d), “who is the best of speakers,” indicates the superiority (*atīśaya*) of the Buddha over the Śrāvakas and the Bodhisattvas. The Buddha is superior to them in two respects: in that he teaches the *pratītyasamutpāda* correctly relying only on himself; and in that he has abandoned both obstacles consisting in afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and obstacles to the knowable (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) together with their latent impression. These two are classified as the perfection of the benefit of others (*parārthasampad*) and the perfection of his own benefit (*svārthasampad*).

With regard to that superiority, the one who has abandoned both hindrances without remainder is called “the Omniscient One”⁴⁸ which is attribute (e). Attribute (e), together with attributes (b)–(d),⁴⁹ are associated with Ch. 26 “the Establishment of the Omniscient One.”

Considering the interrelations of the attributes and linking them with the contents of the last three chapters of the TS, attributes (a)–(e) can be divided into two partly overlapping groups:

naivam ity āha — svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅga iti svatantraśrutih svataḥpramāṇabhūto vedaḥ, nityaṁ vacanam iti yāvat. tasyā niḥsaṅgaḥ nirāsthah, tannirapekṣa eva sāksāddarśī pratītyasamutpādaṁ gādītavān ity arthaḥ. [...] ayaṁ ca śrutiparīkṣāyāḥ svatantraprāmāṇyaparīkṣāyāś copakṣepaḥ. “[Objection:] Did the Blessed One teach this *pratītyasamutpāda* as mentioned above after having been awakened to it by himself? Or [did he teach it] based on the Veda that is admitted by others [i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas] to be authorless? As the Jaiminīya [Mīmāṃsakas] state: ‘Therefore, there is no being who directly sees super-sensory objects. However, only that being who sees [supersensory objects] through the eternal word, sees [them correctly].’ (TS_B 3174) [Reply:] No, it is not the case. Therefore [Śāntarakṣita] states: ‘[The Omniscient One] who does not depend on an autonomous scripture’ (TS_B 5a). [The compound *svatantraśrutiniḥsaṅga* is to be analysed as follows:] ‘The autonomous scripture’ is ‘the Veda which is intrinsically valid,’ that is to say the eternal Word (*vacana*). [The Blessed One] does not depend on that [autonomous scripture (*śruti*)], i.e., he does not rely [on it]; without depending on it, [the Buddha] who is a direct seer (*sāksāddarśin*) [namely, he sees super-sensory objects directly] taught the *pratītyasamutpāda* [...] And this is the allusion to ‘the Investigation of the Veda’ (Ch. 24, Śrutiparīkṣā) and of ‘the Investigation of the Intrinsic Validity’ (Ch. 25, Svatantraprāmāṇyaparīkṣā).”

⁴⁸ Cf. TSP_B 1052.21: *kleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇato hi sarvajñatvam*.

⁴⁹ See § 3.2.

- (I) The direct seer (d) who is the best of speakers (c) that taught the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and (a) who does not depend on an autonomous Veda
- (II) (e) The Omniscient One (d) who is the best of speakers (c) that taught the *pratītyasamutpāda*, and (b) for whom the great compassion became natural through practice in many incalculably long eons

Groups (I) and (II) are associated with Chs. 24–25 and Ch. 26, respectively. The attributes of the Buddha (c, d) “who is the best of speakers that taught the *pratītyasamutpāda*” is the most essential among attributes (a)–(e) and the combined attribute (cd) should be included in both groups. In the *ādivākya* of the TS, the Buddha, despite being the basis for an unlimited number of good qualities (*aparimitaguṇagaṇa*), is praised only on account of being the best preacher of the *pratītyasamutpāda* because it forms the most essential part of the Buddha’s teaching.⁵⁰

Regarding the elements of the *ādivākya* that form the theme of Ch. 26, scholars differently explain:

- Attribute (e) only: “omniscience” (Kapstein 2001: 12, McClintock 2010: 97)
- Attributes (cd) and (e): “Dependent origination is taught by someone who is omniscient.”⁵¹ (Marks 2019: 45)
- Attributes (b), (cd) and (e): “the omniscience, compassion (salvation) and teaching of the *pratītyasamutpāda*” (“全知者・慈悲(救済)・縁起の説法” Satō 2020: 14)

Of these, I am closer to Satō’s interpretation. Attribute (b) “having a great compassion,” attribute (e) “being the Omniscient One,” and attribute (cd) “being the best preacher of the *pratītyasamutpāda*,” can be viewed causally in this sequence. In Ch. 26, Śāntarākṣita anticipates the objection that there is a contradiction in admitting that the Buddha is omniscient, i.e., in a non-conceptual (*avikalpa*) state, and, at the same time, a speaker (*vaktr*), which presupposes being in a conceptual (*vikalpa*) state.⁵² In response

⁵⁰ Cf. TSP_B 12.23f: *athāparimitaguṇagaṇādhāre bhagavati kim iti pratītyasamutpādadeśanayaiva stotrābhīdhānam? tad etad acodyaṃ [...] tena pratītyasamutpādadeśanāpradhānam idaṃ bhagavataḥ pravacanaratnam ity aviparītapratītyasamutpādābhīdhāyitvena bhagavataḥ stotrābhīdhānam*. “[Objection:] Why does one express praise (*stotra*) to the Blessed One who is the basis for an unlimited number of good qualities (*aparimitaguṇa*) only on account of his teaching of dependent origination? [Answer:] Here there is nothing to be criticized [...]. Therefore, this jewel of the words of the Blessed One has his teaching of the *pratītyasamutpāda* as the most essential part. Therefore, one expresses praise to the Blessed One only on account of his true teaching of *pratītyasamutpāda*.”

⁵¹ Based on this, Marks 2019 sets the general topic of Ch. 26 as “Defense of the Buddha’s omniscience.”

⁵² Cf. TS_B 3359ab: *vikalpe sati vatkr̥tvam sarvajñaś cāvikalpataḥ* / “The property of being a speaker [arises] when there is a conceptual cognition, whereas the omniscient one [arises] because he lacks conceptual cognition.”

to this, Kamalaśīla clarifies that the speech of the Omniscient One is driven by compassion (*karuṇā*),⁵³ not by desire.

4.2 The Attributions of the *pratītyasamutpāda*

In the opening of Ch. 26 Kamalaśīla quotes the TS 5cd–6 again:

analpakalpāsaṅkhyeyasātmībhūtamahādayaḥ //
yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ jagāda vadaṭāṃ varaḥ /
taṃ sarvajñaṃ praṇamyāyaṃ kriyate tattvasaṅgrahaḥ //

*ity anena yat sarvajñopadiṣṭatvaṃ pratītyasamutpādasya viśeṣaṇaṃ uktam, tatsamarthanā-r-
thaṃ prastāvamātraṃ racayann āha — evaṃ ityādi.* (TSP_B 987.17f on TS_B 3123)

Having paid homage to (e) the Omniscient One (d) who is the best of speakers (c) that taught the *pratītyasamutpāda*, (b) for whom the great compassion became natural through [practice] in many incalculably long eons, this compendium on the true states [of things] is composed. (TS_B 5cd–6)

With these [verses Śāntarakṣita] states “being taught by the Omniscient One” (*sarvajñopadiṣṭatva*) as a qualifier of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. Alluding to the introduction [of Chs. 26] only, in order to establish this [qualifier], [Śāntarakṣita] states “Thus” (TS_B 3123)⁵⁴ and so on.

Here it is to be noted that Kamalaśīla converts the qualifier of the Omniscient One into that of the *pratītyasamutpāda*. Namely, the phrase “(e) the Omniscient One is (c) the best of speakers, (d) who taught the *pratītyasamutpāda*” can be rephrased as “the *pratītyasamutpāda* is taught by the Omniscient One.” In the former expression Kamalaśīla omits attribute (b), but when it is supplemented, it becomes, “(cd) the *pratītyasamutpāda* is taught by (e) the Omniscient One (b) for whom the great compassion became natural [...]” This is the case also for another attribute of the Buddha, it becomes, “(cd) the *pratītyasamutpāda* is taught by [the direct seer] (a) who does not depend on an autonomous Veda.” In this manner the two attributes of the Buddha as the best preacher of the *pratītyasamutpāda* are converted to the thirteenth and fourteenth qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, as Table 3 shows. The

⁵³ Cf. TSP_B 1069.9f: *sā ca vaktukāmatā vītarāgasya karuṇayāpi sambhavati [...]*. “And its being desirous to speak is also possible through the compassion (*karuṇā*) of the one who is free from desires (*vītarāga*) [...]” For a discussion in PV 1.12, which is the premise of this argument, see e.g. Dunne 1996, Pecchia 2007, Taber 2011; Franco 2004; 2012.

⁵⁴ TS_B 3124: *evaṃ sarvapramāṇānāṃ pramāṇatve svato 'sthite / atīndriyārthavitsattvasiddhaye na prayatyate //* “Thus, it being established that not all trustworthy awarenesses are intrinsically trustworthy, one need not exert oneself to establish the existence of a person who knows super-sensible objects.” (Translation McClintock 2010: 148 n.368)

Table 3: Qualifiers 13–14 and Corresponding Chapters 24–26.

Qualifiers of the <i>pratītyasamutpāda</i>	Corresponding Chapters of TS	Relevant sūtra
13 th (cd) which is taught by [the direct seer] (a) who does not depend on an autonomous Veda (TS 5a+6ab)	Chs. 24–25, Investigations of the Veda and of the intrinsic validity	Dīghanikāya I (239.2) (=TSP _B 18.23f)
14 th (cd) which is taught by (e) the Omni- scient One (b) for whom the great compassion became natural (TS 6abc)	Ch. 26, The establishment of the Omniscient One / Investigation of the Seer of Supersensible Objects	Dhammapada XX 276ab (=TSP _B 19.21f)

thirteenth and the fourteenth qualifiers are distinguished in accordance with the two means, wisdom and compassion, by which the Buddha taught the *pratītyasamutpāda* to people rightly. Therefore, not only the first twenty-three chapters but the last three chapters too can and should be read as expounding on the qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* – which is the topic of the entire work.⁵⁵

5 All Fourteen Qualifiers as the True States (*tattva*) of Things

The *ādivākya* consists of two parts, *svaśāstrpūjāvidhi* (performing the act of worshipping [the author’s] own teacher) and *prayojanādivākya* (the statement of the purpose and the rest [i.e., the topic]).⁵⁶ The first part is assigned to the part up to the

⁵⁵ A possible background for this argument is Dharmakīrti’s theory of the property-expression (*dharmavāc*) and the property-possessor-expression (*dharmivāc*), which Kamalaśīla applied to the interpretation of the *pratītyasamutpāda* (see Matsuoka 2022: 224–226). Accordingly, one can express the same object conventionally, by the property-possessor-expression that “the Omniscient One teaches the *pratītyasamutpāda*,” or by the property-expression that “the *pratītyasamutpāda* is taught by the Omniscient One.”

⁵⁶ Cf. TSP_B 2.5f: *iha hi śāstre prekṣāvatām abhidheyaprayojanāvasāyapūrvikā pravṛttir mahatsu ca prasādaḥ sarvaśreyo ’dhigateḥ kāraṇaṃ prathamam ity ālocya bhagavati prasādotpādanārthaṃ śāstre cāsminn ādareṇa śrotuḥ pravṛttyarthaṃ svaśāstrpūjāvidhipūrvakam asya śāstrasya prakṛti-tyādhībhiḥ ślokaḥ tattvasaṅgraha ity etatparyantair abhidheyaprayojane prāha*. “Having perceived that indeed here [in this world] for judicious people the activity [of writing] a scientific treatise, which is preceded by the determination of its topic (*abhidheya*) and purpose (*prayojana*), and faith (*prasāda*) in the Great Beings are the primary cause for attaining all good fortunes, after performing the act of worshipping his own teacher (*svaśāstrpūjāvidhi*), [Śāntarakṣita] states the topic and purpose of this treatise by means of the *śloka*s beginning with ‘primordial matter’ (TS 1a’) and ending with ‘compendium on the true states [of things]’ (TS 6’d) in order to generate faith in the Blessed One and to make the listener respectfully undertake the activity towards this treatise.”

phrase “Paying homage to the Omniscient One,” (TS 1–6c), and the remainder (below) forms the statement of the purpose (*prayojana*) and topic (*abhidheya*) of the TS:

ayaṃ kriyate tattvasaṅgrahaḥ // (TS_B 6d)

This compendium on the true states [of things] (*tattvasaṅgraha*) is composed.

Let us look briefly at the topic and the purpose of the TS below.

5.1 The Topic of the TS “*tattva*”

According to Kamalāśīla, the topic of the TS is indicated by the word *tattva*, “the true states [of entities].” The true states of things refer to the fourteen qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda*.⁵⁷ If the TS had more than one topic, then it would be unsystematic (*asaṅgata*) and contradict the requirement of having a single meaning. As Kamalāśīla’s theory of the *ādivākya* stipulates, such a treatise would not be worth reading and is similar to “the speech of an insane person and so on” (*unmattādivākya*).⁵⁸

It seems that the word *tattva* in the title *Tattvasaṅgraha* has not been carefully examined in previous studies. The word has been translated as “true doctrines” (Jha 1937: 1), “true principles” (Coseru 2012: 126), “truths” (Marks 2019: 40), or simply left untranslated (Kapstein 2001: 11, McClintock 2010: 97). In any case, there is no mention of the possessor of the property *tattva*.

According to Kamalāśīla, the possessors of the various properties expressed by the word “*tattva*” are “all entities,” but limited to all the elements of existence (*dharma*) in Buddhism – the five agglomerates, the twelve sense-fields and the eighteen sense-elements – because they are the only things that have arisen in dependence on causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpanna*).⁵⁹ The six categories that the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya system considers real entities are excluded

57 Cf. TSP_B 9.16f: [...] *abhidheyam asya śāstrasya prakṛtyādivyāpārarahitatvādīni pratītyasamutpādaḥ saṅgāhāni tattvāni*. “[...] The topic of this treatise [i.e., the *Tattvasaṅgraha*] is the true states [of things] (*tattva*) which are the qualifications of the *pratītyasamutpāda*, ‘being devoid of the operations of primordial matter’ (TS 1a), and the rest.”

58 Cf. TSP_B 9.20f: *yady api vākyasamūhātmaṃ śāstram, tathāpi tāni vākyāni parasparavyapekṣāsambandhāvasthitāni, anyathonmattādivākyasamūhavad asaṅgatārtham eva syāt*. “Even though a scientific treatise (*śāstra*) consists of a collection of statements, those statements are arranged in a mutually dependent relationship. Otherwise, [the treatise] would have a truly incoherent meaning (*asaṅgatārtha*), just like the collection of statements of an insane person and so on (*unmattādivākya*).” See also n.43.

59 Cf. TSP_B 14.13f: *sa punar ayaṃ pratītyasamutpādaḥ skandhadhātuvāyatanānāṃ draṣṭavyaḥ, teṣāṃ eva pratītyasamutpannatvāt*. “Furthermore, this *pratītyasamutpāda* should be understood as [that]

from them.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the properties *tattvas* or “the true states of all the elements of existence” indicate all the fourteen qualifiers that converge into the particular property of arising, having depended on causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*).

Is the *tattva* in the TS the ultimate reality? No, as Vincent Eltschinger in this volume clearly points out, it is the “true conventional reality.” While the *pratītyasamutpāda*, the topic of the TS, is the conventional reality, the emptiness of intrinsic nature of all existing factors (**sarvadharmāṇiḥsvabhāvatā*),⁶¹ the topic of the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* is the ultimate true reality, within Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s *Madhyamaka* framework of the two truths. In the *ādivākyas* both Nāgārjuna and Śāntarakṣita (followed by Kamalaśīla) aimed to convey to the readers what the *pratītyasamutpāda* is; they did so through the disproof of the antonyms of the qualifiers, which they regarded as incorrect conventions.

5.2 The Purpose of the TS “*saṅgraha*”

The purpose of the TS is indicated by the word “*saṅgraha*.” Kamalaśīla classifies the purpose of the TS into three ascending levels: 1) to establish a compendium on the true states of things (*tattvasaṅgraha*); 2) to help readers easily understand the true states of things (*tattvasukhābodbha*); and 3), to help them attain prosperity and ultimate good fortune, [i.e., good rebirth and liberation] (*abhyudaya-niḥśreyasāvāpti*).⁶² Of these three purposes, the second is the most essential (*pradhāna*) because the author undertakes the activity of the first in order to make

of the [five] agglomerations, the [twelve] sense fields and the [eighteen] sense elements because only they have arisen dependently.”

60 The exclusion of six principles corresponds to the fourth qualifier of the *pratītyasamutpāda* and is authoritatively supported by the *Sarvasūtra*. The annotation method follows the pattern listed in § 2.1 above. Cf. TSP_B 14.15f: (i) *nanu dravyaguṇakarmādayo vastubhūtāḥ santi teṣāṃ kasmān na bhavati?* (ii) (Ø) J Pa T; add. *atra- G B āha — guṇetyādi. [...]* (iv) *tatredam uktam bhagavata — sarvaṃ sarvam iti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva pañca skandhā dvādaśāyatanāny aṣṭādaśa dhātava iti.* (v) *ayaṃ ca śaṭpadārthaparīkṣopakṣepaḥ.* “(i) [Objection:] Substance (*dravya*), (ii) quality (*guṇa*), (iii) action (*karma*) and the rest [i.e., the six principles of existence] exist as real entities. Why is [this *pratītyasamutpāda*] not [that] of those [six principles]? (ii) [Reply:] [The master Śāntarakṣita answers] “[the *pratītyasamutpāda*] (4) which is [devoid of the additional qualifiers of] quality and so on (TS 2abc’).” [...] (iv) In relation to this the Blessed One stated: ‘O Brahmin, [what is] ‘all’ (*sarva*)? To be precise, ‘all’ is the five agglomerations, the twelve sense fields and the eighteen sense elements.’ (*Sarvasūtra*) (v) And this is the indication of “the investigation of six categories” (Chs. 10–15, *Ṣaṭpadārthaparīkṣā*).”

61 MAP 15.6: *’dir brjod par bya ba ni chos thams cad rang bzhin med pa nyid do //*

62 For more details about the three purposes of a scientific treatise in general and the TS, see Funayama 1995a; Funayama 1995b.

the second possible,⁶³ while the third is common to all scientific treatises, with the exception of those of the Cārvākas, who deny the existence of the other world.⁶⁴ Kamalaśīla explains the second purpose as follows:

tad api saṅgrahaśabdena prakāśitam eva. ekatra hi saṅkṣiptasya tattvasya pratipattuḥ sukhe-nodgraho jāyate. duḥkheṇa tu viprakīrṇasyeti kṛtvā sukhodgrahakāraṇaṃ saṅgrahaṃ saṅ-grahaśabdena pratipādayaṃs tattvasukhābodbhārtham idam ārabhyata iti prakāśayati. (TSP_B 11.6ff on TS_B 6d)⁶⁵

That [second purpose] too is verily made clear by the word “compendium” (*saṅgraha*). For, having thought “The comprehension [of the true states of things] occurs with ease to the perceiver of the true states [of things] when collected together in one place. On the other hand, [such comprehension] occurs with difficulty [to the learners] of the true states [of things], when scattered [in several treatises],” [the master Śāntarakṣita] makes it clear that the treatise is composed in order to [bring about for the readers] the easy comprehension of the true states [of things] inasmuch as he explains, by [using] the word “compendium,” that the compendium is the cause of easy comprehension.

Kamalaśīla here emphasizes that ease of understanding – and not understandings as such – of the truth, is the benefit of the TS. For the target audience of the TS is those dull-witted (*mandadhī*) people who found difficulty in understanding the truth in other highly technical treatises.⁶⁶ In light of its doctrinal role, in the TSP there is no

63 Cf. TSP_B 10.19f: *phalākhyam tu prayojanaṃ pradhānam, tadarthatvāt kriyārambhasya*. “However, the primary purpose is the one called ‘the effect [of an action]’ because undertaking activity [i.e., the first purpose] aims at [obtaining] that [effect, i.e., the second purpose].”

64 Cf. TSP_B 11.18f: *tac cātipratītam eveti noktam, tattvajñānād abhyudayaniḥśreyasāvāptir bha-vatīti sarvāstikānāṃ prasiddhatvāt*. “And the [third purpose] is very well-known and hence it is not mentioned [in the *ādivākya*] because it is well established for all the schools that believe [in the other world] (*āstika*) that one obtains prosperity and ultimate good fortune from knowledge of the truth.”

65 The translation of this part into French was done by Ratié in 2014: 169 n.438.

66 Cf. TSP_B 11.11f: *tasmāt pūrvācāryaiḥ pratipāditāny api tattvāni, yo mandadhīr ativiprakrīṇatayā sukhāṃ avadhārayitum aśaktaḥ, taṃ prati sukhābadhāraṇāya tattvasaṅgraha ārabhyamāṇo na viphalatām eṣyati [...]*. “Therefore, even though the true states [of things] have been already explained by the old teachers, a dull-witted person cannot easily determine [the true states of things] since [their explanations] are widely scattered. In order to let [him/her] determine [the true states of things] easily, it is not regarded as useless to undertake the compendium on the true states [of things, ...].”

McClintock 2010: 49–62 discusses the audience of the TS from the perspective of classifying it into the actual intended one and the ideal one. I agree that the former is not limited to Buddhist monks (McClintock 2010: 52), but from the quote from the TSP above I disagree that the latter is “an intellectual elite with whom they share a common dialectical idiom” (McClintock 2010: 62) based on the interpretation of the word *prekṣāvat* as “judicious people who espouse formal reasoning.”

particular mention of whether the purpose of the TS is to establish a Madhyamaka or a Vijñānavāda final standpoint.

6 Concluding Remarks

I have shown here that, not only the first ten qualifiers, but also the next four are to be counted as qualifiers of the *pratītyasamutpāda* in the *ādivākya*, and all of them are involved in the structure of the TS, according to Kamalaśīla. The eleventh and twelfth qualify the *pratītyasamutpāda* as being grasped by the Buddha's cognition, which is characterized by the negation of conceptual cognition and heathen cognition, respectively. They summarize the first twenty-three chapters and all twenty-six chapters. The thirteenth and fourteen qualifiers qualify the *pratītyasamutpāda* as being taught by the Buddha equipped with a pair of properties, that is, being the direct seer and possessing compassion; these are discussed in Chs. 24–25 and Ch. 26, respectively.

Despite its significance, Śāntarakṣita employs the word *pratītyasamutpāda* only once in this massive work and never mentions it again. Kamalaśīla's achievement is to provide a bird's-eye view of the TS as “one big statement” (*mahāvākya* TSP_B 9.23) by showing that the fourteen different qualifiers in the *ādivākya*, and the seemingly different topics in each chapter, converge into the *pratītyasamutpāda* as a single coherent topic. He also specifies that these qualifiers represent the various aspects of the true states of things, *tattva*. In this respect, he reminds his audience of the topic at key points in the text.

Primary Literature and Abbreviations

- AAĀ *Abhisamayālaṃkāṛāloka* (Haribhadra): Ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo 1932–1935.
 APDhT *Avikalpapraśadhāraṇīṭikā* (Kamalaśīla): D no. 4000, ji 123a5–145b5.
 D J. Takasaki, et al., comps. *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, bsTan 'gyur: preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kanko Kyokai, 1981–1984.
 J cat. Muni Jambuvijay, comp. *A Catalogue of Manuscripts in Jaisalmer Jain Bhaṇḍāras*. Delhi-Jaisalmer: Motilal Banarsidass, 2001.
 LAV *Laṅkāvatāravṛtti* (Jñānaśrībhadrā): D no. 4018, mdo 'grel, ni 1a1–262a7.
 Māl *Madhyamakāloka* (Kamalaśīla): P no. 5287, dbu ma, sa 143b2–275a4; D no. 3887, mdo 'grel, sa 133b4–244a7.
 MAP *Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): see Ichigō 1985.
 MBh *Mahābhāṣya* (Patañjali): Ed. F. Kielhorn. 3rd ed. Revised and furnished with additional readings, references and select critical notes by Kashinath Vāsudev Abhyankar. 3 vols. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1962–1972.

- MMK *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (Nāgārjuna): Ed. J. W. de Jong. *Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikāḥ*. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre. 1977.
- MŚS *Madhyamaka Śālistambhasūtra* (Nāgārjuna): Ed. V. V. Gokhale. In: P. L. Vaidya, ed. *Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha*. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 17. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute. 107–116.
- P D.T. Suzuki, comp. *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University*. Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki Research Institute, 1955–1961.
- Pā cat. Muni Jambuvijay, comp. *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Pāṭāṇa Jain Bhaṇḍāra*. 4 pts in three vols. Ahmedabad 1991.
- PG *Paramārthagāthā*: see Wayman 1984: 335–341.
- PG_{MS} The Facsimile Edition of the “*Śrāvaka bhūmi*.” Sanskrit Palm-leaf Manuscript.
- PG_T Tibetan Translation of PG. P no. 5536, sems tsam, dzi, 235a–242a; D no. 4035, sems tsam, tshi 204b–210b.
- PGV *Paramārthagāthāvyākhyāna*: see Wayman 1984: 341–344.
- PPU *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (Ratnākaraśānti): Ed. L. Hong. *Ratnākaraśānti's Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, Sanskrit texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region*. Forthcoming.
- PrP *Prasannapadā* (Candrakīrti): Ed. L. de la Vallée Poussin. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti*. 1903–13. Reprint, Tokyo, 1977.
- PS I *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (Dignāga), chapter 1: Ed. E. Steinkellner. http://ikga.oeaw.ac.at/-Mat/Dignaga_PS_1.pdf (last accessed 2022 September 1).
- PSV *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), chapter 1: see PS I.
- PV *Pramāṇavārttika* (Dharmakīrti): See PVV.
- SĀ Chinese translation of *Samyuktāgama* 雜阿含經.
- ŚS *Śālistambhasūtra*: See Schoening 1995: 389–448.
- ŚST *Śālistambhasūtraṭīkā* (Kamalaśīla): See Schoening 1995: 449–532.
- ŚV *Ślokavārttika* (Kumārila): Ed. D. Śāstrī. *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*, Varanasi: Tara Publications. 1978.
- T Tibetan translation (D=P)
- TS_B, B *Tattvasaṅgraha* (Śāntarakṣita): Ed. S. Śāstri. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary “Pañjikā” of Shrī Kamalaśīla*. Bauddha Bharati Series 1–2. 2 Vols. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1981/82.
- TS_B, B *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla): See TS_B, B.
- TS/P_D, D *Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā*: Tibetan trans. of TS/P: D no. 4266 ze 1–133a6 (TS); D no. 4267 Ze 133b1–’e 331a7 (TSP).
- TS/P_G, G *Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā*: Ed. E. Kṛṣṇācārya. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla*. Gaekward’s Oriental Series 30–31. 2 Vols. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1926.
- TS/P_J, J *Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā*: Jaisalmer manuscripts. J cat.nos. 377/378.
- TS/P_P, P *Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā*: P nos. 5764/5765. Tibetan trans. of TS/P: P no. 5764 ’e 1–159a5 (TS); P no. 5765 ’e 159b2–’ye 495a7 (TSP).
- TS/P_{Pā}, Pā *Tattvasaṅgraha/-Pañjikā*: Pāṭāṇa manuscripts. Pā cat. nos. 667980.
- VChT *Vajracchedikāṭīkā* (Kamalaśīla): P no. 3207, sher phyin, ma, 209b4–285b5; D no. 3817, sher phyin, ma 204a1–267a7.
- VyY *Vyākhyāyukti* (Vasubandhu): See Lee 2001.

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