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Heroes Sung and Unsung: Explorers' Narratives of Mongolia, 1890s to the 1930s

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Abstract: Petr Kuzmich Kozlov and Roy Chapman Andrews were well known figures in the world of popular culture, exploration, and science of their respective homelands, Imperial Russia and America. In the early years of the twentieth century, both were famous for spectacular discoveries in the deserts of Mongolia – Kozlov in archeology and Andrews in paleontology. Both were celebrity explorers in their native countries when they met in Mongolia in 1922, and both kept field journals and notes from which they produced popularly published accounts of their travels and exploits. Like all the great explorer-adventurers, Andrews and Kozlov made themselves the hero of their own narratives (Maclulich 1977). And yet, neither could have achieved what he did, nor likely have met, had it not been for a third individual, one who was indispensable to both explorers, but an individual who has nearly disappeared from the historical record. Tsokto Garmaevich Badmazhapov, a native of Buryatia, in Siberia, acted as an intermediary for both Kozlov and Andrews. He played a central role in the stories of the two explorers, the unsung hero in their narratives, but he was a remarkable individual in his own right – a successful and polyglot commercial agent, a go-between, an explorer, and a Mongolian government official. In the early 1920s all three individuals were prominent figures in Mongolia, and yet by the mid-1930s, all three had been excluded from the lands that drew them. This article explores the interaction of these three, the visions of Inner Asia that motivated and separated each, and the circumstances – scientific, geo-political, and personal – that both produced and then discarded these remarkable people.

Keywords: Buryatia-Mongolia, exploration, Petr Kozlov, Roy Andrews, Russian revolution

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"For me ... the greatest goal is glorious adventure-travel." P. K. Kozlov, 1917

"The Man who writes his own journey is under a necessity ... of making himself the hero of his own tale." Ives 1773.

"By perhaps universal agreement the journey plot, whether real or allegorical, is the most nearly basic in imaginative literature." Adams 1983

In September, 1924, two explorer adventurers, one Russian, one American, met in Mongolia. The Russian, Petr Kuzmich Kozlov (1863–1935), was leading a scientific expedition, supposedly to explore the archeology and history of the area, but he also had a secret diplomatic mission to move into Tibet and make contact with the Dalai Lama. The American, Roy Chapman Andrews (1884–1060), also headed a multi-disciplinary scientific expedition, but also with secret instructions from the U.S. War Department to survey the political and military situation in Mongolia and China, and the natural resources of the country. Both Kozlov and Andrews were well known figures in the popular culture and scholarship of their respective countries. Each was famous for spectacular discoveries in the deserts of Mongolia – Kozlov in archeology and Andrews in paleontology. Both were celebrity explorers in their native countries when they met, and both kept field journals and notes from which they produced popularly published accounts of their travels and exploits.

Like all the great explorer-adventurers, Andrews and Kozlov made themselves the hero of their own narratives. And yet, neither could have achieved what he did, nor likely have met, had it not been for a third individual, one who was indispensable to both explorers, but an individual almost completely overlooked in the narratives of the two hero explorers, and one who has nearly disappeared from the historical record.

At first glance, Tsokto Garmaevich Badmazhapov (1879–1937), a native of Buryatia, in Siberia, seems to fit the role often found in the genre of exploration literature of the local guide. Indispensable but rarely recognized, this kind of individual makes a necessary appearance in many colonial texts and tales, a local resident who acts as guide, interpreter, or in some other facilitating capacity. This kind of go-between or intermediary was often crucially important to the fulfillment of the explorers' destined task. Intermediaries were sometimes acknowledged, but more often not, except casually or incidentally in their role as loyal friends or assistants.

At times, Badmazhapov did act in the role of guide and interpreter, but he was much more. Kozlov would not have "discovered" the lost city of Khara-Khoto, the event that brought him international fame, without Badmazhapov. It was Badmazhapov who, on a trading trip in 1907, tracked down local rumors of a city covered over in the sands of the Gobi desert. Badmazhapov photographed,

and described Khara-Khoto, a full year before Kozlov arrived to “discover” it. Andrews would not have been able to mount his 1922 Mongolian expedition without Badmazhapov’s intervention at high levels of the Mongolian government, and it was Badmazhapov who, during that same expedition, steered Andrews south toward the range of low lying bluffs known as the “Flaming Cliffs” in the southern reaches of the Gobi desert. It was there that Andrews stumbled onto a spectacular trove of preserved dinosaur eggs. That discovery secured Andrews’ fame, and the fame of his central Asiatic expeditions. Andrews gave public credit to Badmazhapov in his published accounts. Kozlov never acknowledged the Buryat’s role, although he remained Badmazhapov’s patron and, as discussed below, eventually paid his due to Badmazhapov.

Badmazhapov played a central role in the stories of Kozlov and Andrews, the unsung hero in the narratives of the two explorers. He was the link that connected the two, and he was the catalyst for much of what happened to each of them separately, and in their interactions with each other. This article deconstructs the narratives produced by Kozlov and Andrews, and reconstructs them to include the missing but key role played by Badmazhapov. Badmazhapov, in fact, was one of a remarkable generation of Buryat intellectuals and educated elites who played a shaping role in early twentieth-century Mongolian history. He was a businessman and trader who represented major European firms in the Transbaikal region, in Mongolia, and in trade with the Chinese. Badmazhapov was comfortable in Russia’s European cities as well as Mongolian villages. He was from the Russian empire and had a Russian education. He spoke at least three languages and, in the early 1900s, worked as a special assistant to the Russian military governor in the Transbaikal. Between 1901 and 1917, Badmazhapov also gathered intelligence for the Russian military’s General Staff on his various trade ventures. After the collapse of the Tsarist empire, he became active in pan-Mongolian nationalist movements, and rose to a prominent position in the first Mongolian government in the 1920s. Badmazhapov took a keen interest in ethnography, geography, history and archeology and, during his various business sojourns, he kept his own travel accounts. In other words, Badmazhapov was an explorer in his own right, and not just a “local” guide. He fit more the role that Dane Kennedy has identified in discussing Indian pundits sent as independent agents by the British Raj to explore Central Asia. “In cases such as these,” Kennedy writes, “the ‘native’ could actually become the ‘explorer,’ thereby destabilizing the very categories that sustained exploration as a European endeavor.”¹ Kozlov did his best to maintain the boundaries of colonial hierarchy in his relations with Badmazhapov, but, as this article shows, Badmazhapov indeed destabilized those hierarchies.

¹ Kennedy 2014: 12. See also Shaffer et al. 2009: 39–57.

Badmazhapov's correspondence and his accounts are worth examining, both in their own right, and as a counterpoint to those produced by Andrews and Kozlov.²

Kozlov and Andrews lived lives larger than themselves, in the vein of the great nineteenth-century explorer adventurers, and they became two of the last great celebrities in that genre. By the time Kozlov and Andrews met, that era – the era of the explorer adventurer – was already giving way to a different kind of exploration, one increasingly dominated by academically trained and specialized scientific groups. Kozlov and Andrews were, by no means, simple anachronisms. Both helped pioneer techniques of the modern era of multi-disciplinary scientific exploration, what Andrews called “correlated work.”³ Still, and despite their innovations, and despite each’s status, both explorers were frustrated in repeated efforts to return to Mongolia after their initial meeting. Though feted as national heroes, both became marginalized within their respective scientific communities and in government circles, and both were eventually barred from the lands that so infatuated them. Badmazhapov also fell victim to changing geo-political fortunes in that part of the world, though his fate was far more tragic than that of the Russian and American.

Kozlov and Andrews were explorers and adventurers. Badmazhapov acted as a commercial agent, a go-between, an explorer in his own right, and a government official. Yet, despite their different lives and activities, each of these three individuals were motivated by a certain view of inner Asia, each different than the other, and these too proved vulnerable to the course of events during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Kozlov, though he worked for the Soviet government, retained a traditional nineteenth-century view of Asia as a place to be colonized and territorially incorporated into a Russian centered empire. Andrews came to Mongolia with no territorial ambitions, but nonetheless with a colonial view of the world. His was more a new-world centered view of global capitalist domination, still exploitative, but in the intangible ways of financial and geo-political dependence, not by physical occupation. In contrast, Badmazhapov envisioned and worked toward creation of a pan-Mongolian nationalist state that would unite similar cultures from the shores of Lake Baikal south to the foothills of the Himalayas. The history of inner Asia in the first decades of the 1900s precluded all three of these images, creating a new

² Badmazhapov is better known to the Eurasian than to the Anglophone scholarly world. Articles and accounts of Central Asia highlight his role, but he, like others of his generation, are still understudied. On Badmazhapov, see, especially, Andreev 1997: 61–87; Lomakina 1998: 186–203.

³ American Museum of Natural History (AMNH). MSS. A53. Central Asiatic Expedition, vol. 9, p. 30, letter to Mrs. Froelick, May 23, 1925; Andrews 1932: 9.

kind of Soviet socialist empire. There was no room in that new empire for those such as Kozlov, Andrews, or Badmazhapov. This article explores the conjunction of circumstances that produced and then discarded these three remarkable individuals.

1 Time and place

Kozlov, Andrews, and Badmazhapov met in Mongolia in the early 1920s, during two of the most significant geo-political events of the early twentieth century: the collapse and revolutionary reorganization of the Russian and Chinese empires, and the re-opening of central Asia, Mongolia specifically, to foreign intervention. Exploration and science, in the forms of ethnography, paleontology, anthropology, and geography, played an important part in the “re-discovery,” – the “new conquest” – as Andrews described it, of these areas by European and North American audiences. The Russian imperial state, especially, and its successor state, the Soviet Union, possessed strong interests in the volatile and contested regions of central Asia. As a result, the Russians and then the Soviets, more so than other Europeans (with the exception of the British), channeled their keen interest into a combination of outright conquest, trade, influence, and organized scholarly study of the lands and peoples of central Asia. The goals of empire and revolution, and of commerce, militarism, and science merged in the specific form of numerous exploratory expeditions: to map these areas, to understand and systematize the languages and cultures of indigenous populations, to study the mineral deposits, geological formations, flora and fauna, and the archeological and paleontological history of the regions.

The Russian Geographical Society, the RGO, became increasingly involved in the process of exploring the Asian areas. Its main task before the 1870s focused on documenting lands, people, and resources within imperial boundaries, but after 1870, it began to send expeditions increasingly to areas outside the empire’s borders.⁴ From then until World War I, Central Asia became the area of most intense scientific exploration. There were several reasons for this, all of which overlapped. Even until the 1870s, and the expeditions by Nikolai Przheval’skii, and others, little was known about the topography, natural conditions, and population and economy of southern Mongolia and northern Tibet, and little was also known about large areas of Mongolia, itself. The absence of

⁴ Hirsch 2005.

information not only stimulated scientific interest, and the interest of adventurers and explorers, but also the strategic interests of the Russian military and diplomatic establishment. Religion also played a significant role. Tibet was the seat of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Buddhists, and yet Tibet was under increasing pressure from the British Raj in India. Buddhism, and related forms of language and culture extended into Mongolia, and into the Russian imperial lands, especially into Buryatia and the Transbaikal, and Russian political leaders and scholars alike, gave a significance to these connections that were both geo-strategic and academic. After the defeat of Russia to Japan in 1904, the Tsarist regime turned its attention even more intensely to Central Asia, especially to Mongolia and Manchuria. These were now the areas of greatest challenge to Russia, by pressure from the British from the south, Japanese expansion into Korea and Manchuria from the east, and China's increasingly intense efforts to colonize Mongolian areas.⁵

2 Kozlov

Petr Kuzmich Kozlov (1863–1935), was one of the most famous of the late Russian and early Soviet explorers. He began his career as a protégé of the famous explorer Nikolai Przheval'skii, and came into his own right in the 1890s and early 1900s. Like Przheval'skii, and nearly all the great nineteenth-century Russian explorers, Kozlov was both a commissioned military officer and an esteemed member of a scientific society – the Imperial Russian Geographic Society (RGO). Kozlov's expeditions, through parts of Kazakhstan, Buryatia, the Altai, Mongolia, and northern Tibet, were funded by both the military and RGO and he, like other explorers, mixed science with aggressive military exploration and mapping. Kozlov's published accounts also shaped popular views of central Asia as an exotic and adventurous place, a place destined for Russian domination.⁶ Kozlov led his first expedition in the 1890s, to the Altai, through Mongolia, and to the edge of Tibet. In 1908, he uncovered and excavated many of the remains of the “lost city” of Khara Khoto, the fortress trading city that flourished in the eleventh century, and described in the accounts of many early travelers, including Marco Polo. Kozlov gained world recognition for his discovery. Kozlov led his last expedition from 1923 into 1926, not as a Russian Imperial explorer, but under the aegis of the revolutionary Bolshevik government, which

5 Andreev 2006: 52–75; Sergeev 2013, especially chapter 5, “Strategic Stalemate, 1886–1903.”

6 For anti-colonial views among Russian scientists, see Tolz 2013.

had seized power in 1917, following the collapse of the tsarist imperial regime. It was during this last expedition that Kozlov crossed paths several times with Andrews.

Kozlov was an explorer in the nineteenth-century mold of legends such as Petr Semenov Tian-Shansky, Przheval'skii, Mikhail Pevtsov, and Grigorii Potanin. Like most of the Russian explorers of the nineteenth century, Kozlov had training first and foremost as a geographer, this being the most practical and in some ways the most encompassing of the exploration sciences at the time, especially of those who came out of the military. The popular accounts and official reports of these explorers to both the RGO and the military included detailed descriptions of terrain, roads, trade routes, astronomical readings, weather and the like. This made sense as an aide to later travelers, prospective missionaries, and, of course, to military strategists and potential colonial administrators. Many explorers had a knowledge of botany and zoology, even to the point of recognizing, naming, preserving and bringing back literally thousands upon thousands of new species and plant varieties. Still, botany and zoology were not primary specializations. Some had language training, such as Potanin, but some of the most famous – Przheval'skii and Kozlov, most notably – never learned any Eurasian languages. They relied on Cossack, Buryat, or Kazakh guides from inside the Russian empire who knew both Russian and Mongolian, some Turkic dialects, or Chinese. Many of these came from the middle ranks of the imperial Cossack regiments, and they played a key role in Russia's ability to move in and around Central Asian lands. Russian explorers relied on their "own" indigenous guides to assist in negotiations with local princes for safe passage or in the hiring of local guides and escorts.⁷

Przheval'skii and Kozlov were cut from the same mold, but they were motivated by different passions. Przheval'skii, although an avid explorer, was at heart a sincere imperialist. He was, truly, a "Russian Cortez," once boasting that he could hold the whole of Asia from Lake Baikal to the Himalayas with a thousand troops.⁸ Kozlov, was also a commissioned military officer, and also fulfilled assignments for the Russian General Staff, just as did Przheval'skii and other explorer naturalists. Kozlov fulfilled his tasks thoroughly, whether writing

⁷ One of the best accounts of the course of study at the Russian General Staff's academy is in the diary of the Russian-Kalmyk officer, Naran Erentsynovich Ulanov (1867–1904), *Arkhiv Vostokovedov, Institut Vostochnikh Rukopisei, Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk (AV) razryad 3, opis 1, delo 16*. Ulanov, the first Kalmyk commissioned officer, died from exposure in the Tian Shan Mountains on a mission to reach Lhasa, personally sponsored by Tsar Nicholas II (Dmitriev 2013: 48–58).

⁸ Shimmel'pennink van der Oie 1997: 207–226, here 217–218.

reports for the military or cataloging and managing the huge numbers of plants, animals, birds, insects, and artifacts that he amassed on his expeditions. He did all of this in neatly written detail, but none with passion.

Kozlov was possessed of two passions: himself and travel, *puteshestvie*, in this case travel-adventure. His involvement in orientology, as well as his military commission, was not the result of an innate inclination toward either, although he came to love the scale, beauty, and harsh challenges of Mongolia and Tibet. His career as an orientologist and a military officer arose out of a chance meeting with his mentor Przheval'skii. The latter, while staying in the Smolensk area, met Kozlov in 1882, and found in him an astute and eager young man, someone who he sensed would make a good assistant. Przheval'skii sponsored Kozlov on the latter's first expedition, under the tutelage of the great explorer, who then became Kozlov's patron. Przheval'skii supported Kozlov in his studies, grooming him and molding him in his own image.

Kozlov was willing to be molded. Przheval'skii was Kozlov's ticket out of the constant sameness of daily life, as Kozlov confided, "life that grinds away like some clockwork machine, where [people] ... like ants ... do the same today as yesterday, and last year."⁹ Kozlov's letters to his mentor are filled with the obsequious etiquette of the day – of subaltern to patron – but these letters are also filled with the effusive fancies of an energetic youth who has seen something grand and exotic, something wholly different from the life he could have on his own merits, and who longs desperately for more.

Kozlov did not disappoint his mentor. He kept Przheval'skii apprised of his progress in his studies, his concentrated work, and his academic successes, but always with the reminder of other aspirations, of once again joining his mentor in the exploration of exotic landscapes. "It is time," he wrote in the same awkward vein as above, "to live again the life that few live ...

in distant and tempting deserts; when recalling them, unbidden pictures arise of the 'happy past'; and as one gives himself to these [memories] the whole of nature appears, showing one corners of paradise such as Chertyn-tang, Lob-nor, and all these oases beckon ... Will we really not have a chance again; will we have enough strength to deny nature – no, it is not possible. It will not happen. We will see again the vast valleys; the Tibetan plateau with its primitive pictures again will appear; we will see ourselves again among the reeds of Tsaidam and Lob-nor, birds will soon be our candies. Oh! Dreams, dreams!¹⁰

Throughout his career, Kozlov corresponded prolifically with many academics and officials about the various aspects of his finds, his collections, their possible

⁹ Letter from June 13, 1887. Kozlov 1963: 441.

¹⁰ Letters from May 14, 1886. Kozlov 1963: 440.

implications, where they should go, how and where and when they should be exhibited; about the administrative and financial details of his work and his expeditions. In all this correspondence, Kozlov wrote professionally, sometimes diplomatically, sometimes forcefully. He was deferential when necessary, cordial when appropriate, but never really passionate, not about science, not about his discoveries, not about the knowledge he was uncovering. Kozlov reserved his emotional excitement only for those he considered fellow traveler-explorers, fellow *puteshestvenniki*.

In an early letter to Przheval'skii, while dreaming of further adventure, Kozlov again revealed himself, relating to his mentor how he described the adventures of travel and exploration to a rapt audience of Kozlov's fellow cadet students: "Two, three hours," he wrote, "the whole evening ... afterwards not being able to sleep, just lying for a long, long time envisioning all those wonders ... my thoughts flying to the lakes [we discovered and named] "Russian" and "Expedition," relishing now what I did not fully appreciate at the time."¹¹

Such lines, of course, revealed the ungainly enthusiasm of youth, but they also exemplify what motivated Kozlov, which was, certainly, a love of adventure and travel – *puteshestvie* – but also a kind of visual conquest of landscape. Kozlov's descriptions, whether as a student or as a seasoned explorer, reflect the kind of "imperial gaze" about which Mary Louise Pratt writes.¹² It was not the militarized kind of imperialism of a Przheval'skii, but a personal kind of conquest. The landscapes of Mongolia and Tibet, including living things, were there for Kozlov to discover, to prove over and over again his sense of self worth.

A photograph of Kozlov from the early 1920s shows well this kind of imperial gaze. The photograph shows a mature Kozlov, by then in his 60s, seated at a table, legs crossed at the knees, flanked by two colleagues, one standing, one seated. Kozlov wears a semi-military outfit, tunic – high boots, and jodhpurs. Kozlov's eyes are fixed straight ahead at the camera. His right arm rests on a table, specifically on top of a large book, which itself rests on top of a large map, presumably of Central Asia. The photograph reveals the imperial gaze, with the hand of mastery, resting on the instruments of that mastery – the book and the map.

¹¹ 2 July 1886. Kozlov 1963: 440.

¹² Pratt 2007.

3 Andrews

Roy Chapman Andrews (1884–1960) was most famous for his various expeditions into the Mongolian dessert in search of fossil remains. He was responsible for some of the most spectacular natural history discoveries of the twentieth century, but Andrews, like Kozlov, possessed only a modest education in natural sciences.¹³ He worked his way up in the American Museum of Natural History in New York, starting in 1906 as a janitor. Through intelligence, arduously hard work, and no lack of charm, Andrews advanced himself. He became proficient at fossil collection and, beginning in 1908, worked on several Arctic expeditions to collect sea mammals and fossils. After working on expeditions to Japan, and touring Korea, he came to head the Museum's division of Asiatic exploration. Not one to sit in an office, Andrews sought ways to return to Asia, and in 1915, he found his opportunity. At the time, Andrews subscribed to the "out of Asia" theory of mammal and primate origins, in opposition to the current ideas about Africa as the origin of the human species. Andrews' ideas coincided with those of the head of the Natural History Museum, Henry F. Osborn, and Andrews convinced Osborn to fund a series of expeditions to China, Tibet, and eventually Mongolia in order to find fossil proof for this theory.¹⁴

In 1916 and early 1917, basing himself in Peking, the flamboyant explorer and naturalist traveled through Yunnan Province, into the Tibetan mountains, and down to Burma. In 1919, he was back again in Peking and, traveling with a group in three cars, made the trip through Inner to Outer Mongolia, up to the Russian border, and to the capital of Mongolia, Urga. Ostensibly documenting and collecting various mammal species, Andrews was also likely collecting information on events in Siberia after the 1917 revolution, Japanese movements in Manchuria, and the chaotic situation in China.¹⁵ It was during this trip that he met Frans Larsen, the Swedish businessman who became so instrumental in helping Andrews establish local contacts.

Urga, both the political and religious capital of Outer Mongolia, overwhelmed Andrews with its hurly burly mixing of modern cars "careering" past camel caravans, and of the incongruous flow of Mongolians, Buryats, Chinese, and Russians. Andrews' description of the city as it was in 1919 is rich and detailed, even given all its orientalist overtones. Urga, he wrote in his 1921 account, *Across Mongolian Plains*, was a city of "barbaric splendor." His

¹³ Andrews took courses at the Masters level at Columbia University in anatomy and zoology. Gallenkamp 2001: 20.

¹⁴ Gallenkamp 2001: 60–62.

¹⁵ Gallenkamp 2001: 76.

description composes in words a cacophonous symphony of life and conflicting cultures all raucous, raw, simultaneously “primitive” and “modern,” each culture merging with others, and yet still distinct, each still showing off its brilliant colors and unique traits. This was a place, Andrews wrote, where the northern forest peoples met the desert nomads, and both collided and mixed with the commercially driven Chinese from that empire’s world-trading ports. All mingled. Andrews spent only ten days in Urga, but it impressed him enough to devote a whole chapter to it in his popular book.¹⁶

Remarkably, Andrews encountered few difficulties in his 1919 Mongolian travels, although civil war was waging in nearby Russia, and was spilling over into Mongolia and Manchuria. Andrews reported no trouble with the Chinese, who occupied Urga with a force of 4,000 troops. Neither with the Russians. According to Andrews, the Bolshevik consul in Urga, A. Orlov, went out of his way to help Andrews, his wife, who was traveling with him, and his other two traveling companions. In 1919, anti-Bolshevik forces, along with a contingent of the Czechoslovakian army, had taken Omsk, in Russia, threatening to drive the ousted Bolsheviks into Mongolia. The Japanese supported the anti-Bolshevik nationalist movements in Buryatia and Manchuria, and White forces under the notorious general Grigoryi Semyonov operated out of Chita, in the Transbaikal area. His irregular and undisciplined Cossack forces ranged throughout the border areas of southern Russia, Mongolia, and Manchuria. Andrews kept abreast of events as best he could, but none of the turmoil seemed to have affected him. At least, he made nothing of all this in *Across Mongolian Plains*. Andrews titled his later biography *Under a Lucky Star*, and it seems that he, indeed, traveled under a lucky star, at least during this particular foray.¹⁷

Returning to New York in 1920, Andrews convinced Osborn that Mongolia was a fossil hunters’ paradise. From their conversations emerged the idea of a series of central Asiatic expeditions to be funded by both the Museum and by wealthy patrons and public donations. These expeditions, five between 1922 and 1930, became the stuff of legend, not only for their paleontological discoveries, which became the prize of the New York museum, but for their innovative use of motor cars instead of camel caravans. Andrews convinced Osborn to assemble the largest scientific enterprise ever to be launched from America. Through

¹⁶ Andrews 1921: 64–88.

¹⁷ Not so, Badmazhapov, who was in Chita, Russia, in 1919 as part of the first Mongol-Buryat national congress. When the Bolsheviks retook the area, in 1920, he moved to Urga, only to be imprisoned by Chinese forces as a Mongol-Buryat nationalist. Fortunately, his family and influential friends bought his freedom from the Chinese, but not before he took serious chills from the damp prison that later turned into rheumatoid arthritis.

Osborn's contacts, Andrews assembled a fleet of reinforced Dodge trucks – five to fifteen in all – to carry the main scientific groups. These would be supplied by a separate caravan of camels and horses to deposit fuel and supply dumps along the routes. The other major innovation was to bring together a variety of highly trained specialists in different sciences. The three senior scientists in the group were Walter Granger, the curator of mammals at the Natural History Museum and Charles Berkey and Frederick Morris, both geologists from Columbia University. Andrews' idea was to divide the expedition into groups, each with a cohort of several scientists whose expertise complemented each other. These groups could operate independently in an area, supplied periodically from a base camp. When necessary or desirable, the camp and satellite groups would move to a new area, and start anew.¹⁸

Andrews and Osborn spent more than a year planning and purchasing supplies for the Central Asiatic Expeditions, and as much time raising the necessary funds for such an enterprise. By early 1921, Andrews and the Museum had raised over two hundred thousand dollars. Some of this money came from modest donation, but giving to the expedition became something of an elite fashion, and Andrews received large donations from the likes of J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, among a number of other luminaries. In February he, his wife, and other members of the expedition started for Peking, and by the spring, members of the expedition were ready to depart from Kalgan, the border city separating China from Mongolia. The camel caravans set out in March to set up the supply depots, and the motorized scientists crossed the border in late April 1922. Andrews' greatest adventure had begun.

4 Composing narratives

The published accounts of Kozlov and Andrews follow a pattern already well established in explorer literature by the late 1800s and early 1900s.¹⁹ Their narratives mix discussion of science – mostly descriptions of flora and fauna – with passages and observations about terrain and local people. Both authors mix these elements with requisite passages about extremes of weather, the rigors and routines of the road, and the beauty and majesty of exotic landscapes. Of course, their stories always held the promise of danger, a necessary part of adventure, and each described confrontations and near confrontations with

¹⁸ Gallenkamp 2001: 85–86.

¹⁹ For two excellent recent studies, see Driver 2001 and Kennedy 2014.

brigand bands and nomadic groups. Both explorers had runs-ins with bandit gangs in Mongolia, and both of them recorded these incidents with the requisite reserve and coolness that befitted an intrepid explorer. In his popular 1932 account, Andrews described run ins with bandits as “lively fights.” He peppered his account with references to “bandit” activities, and to the constant lookout for robbers and brigands. He lessened the real danger by dismissing bandits as largely incompetent, cowardly, and even comical, writing that, in general, twenty bandits to one determined “foreigner” was a “proper ratio for anything like a good fight.”²⁰ Anderson evoked the image of the “former frontier days in America,” in describing bandit conditions in China and Mongolia. In one incident, Andrews described bandits shooting at the trucks. He noted that the hostiles, not used to the speed of the vehicles did not fire with a proper lead on their target, and so the rounds hit harmlessly behind the vehicles, as expedition members returned fire and sped away to safety. In another incident, Andrews depicted a more serious encounter in which brigands and expedition members exchanged fire until one of the bandits’ horses was hit, and the rest retreated.²¹

Newspaper accounts reported these kinds of incidents and accompanying dangers using the present tense, and in the tenor of an ongoing novel. *The New York Times*, for example, described Andrews’ decision to head into bandit controlled territory in April of 1925. Poised at the border of China, and eager to begin his season of fossil hunting in Mongolia, Andrews ignored the advice of the Chinese “Christian” warlord Feng Yü-hsiang not to cross out of his territory. On the nineteenth, the paper ran a story of this decision with the headline “Museum Party Moves, Defying Chinese Bands.” The paper reported that the expedition was “heavily armed,” each member carrying pistols and rifles. The excitement of the story, of course, lay in the present tense of the reporting. The reader had a vicarious sense of being in the moment, the outcome still not clear, and leaving the reader in anticipation of the next installment of the story.²²

Kozlov’s adventures followed a remarkably similar script to those of Andrews. During the course of his early expeditions, Kozlov found himself confronted on several occasions with bandit nomads, the most serious in the mountains in and close to Tibet. These were not the small-scale run-ins

²⁰ Andrews 1932: 33, 239.

²¹ Andrews 1932: 241, 452.

²² *New York Times*, 19 April, p. E2. On the effect of seriality to create a sense of reader immediacy in explorer writing, see Pettit 2014: 80–108, especially 92–97. Pettit details Henry Morton Stanley’s masterful use of newspaper reporting to create a sense of “eventfulness” and anticipation in readers.

described by Andrews of Chinese bandits in Mongolia. On at least two occasions, in 1895 and 1901, Kozlov and his expeditions faced marauding groups of two hundred to 250 riders. Moreover, these encounters took place in narrow mountain passes, one at 15,000 feet. In his official reports, Kozlov did not play up the frontier-esque aspects of his expeditions, and Badmazhapov once commented to Kozlov that the American were much better outfitted with weapons than the Russians.²³ In his serialized accounts, however, Kozlov gave full rein to his literary sensibilities. In the April and May 1911 issues of the popular travel and adventure journal *Russkaya Starina*, Kozlov described the “wild and overwhelming” impressions that the Tibetan mountain terrain imposed on those who passed through it. In relating the April 1900 incident, Kozlov described the “eerie tension” that kept expedition members constantly checking and rechecking their weapons. Kozlov wrote the text of this adventure, but the articles’ editorial narrator intervened at times to set the stage, or add additional color. When an attack finally came, the narrator described the cool decisiveness of Kozlov as he ordered the caravan to a protected area of the pass. And then, Kozlov picked up the account, again. He described how he and his “small band of Europeans” (including Tsokto Badmazhapov) advanced in a steady firing line on the disorganized pockets of bandits. Using the terrain to their advantage, the Russians distributed their fire across the entire field of play. Outmaneuvered and panicked, the overwhelming bandit force scattered back across the pass and down into a rocky valley. The Russians suffered no casualties, but left at least a score of dead in their wake. In a foreshadow of Andrews’ later accounts, Kozlov noted that, given the small hand full of “Russians,” the odds were just about equal to the 250 some bandits that they faced. Kozlov drew out this account over nearly four pages of the magazine. He made it sound thrilling and full of colorful detail.²⁴

In the central regions of Asia during the late 1800s and early 1900s, there was no lack of adventure and danger, and expeditions did, in fact, suffer losses. Fortunately, for Kozlov and Andrews, neither lost any expedition members. That singular lack of tragedy allowed depiction of the hostile encounters that did occur to take on the aura of high adventure, even drama, without the tragic consequences of real loss, at least for the Russians and Americans, which was

²³ Badmazhapov made the comment in a letter requesting that the Russian Geographical Society present him with a firearm in exchange for his services. RGO 18.3.36 papka 18.1. 15, January 5, 1928. Kozlov received a commendation and promotion after the 1895 incident. RGO f. 18, op. 2, d. 85, l. 12.

²⁴ *Russkaya Starina*, No. 4 (April, 1911): 17, 19–21. For an official account of the incident, see AVPRI f. 188, op. 761, d. 716, ll. 17–19, 29–30, 44–45.

what really mattered.²⁵ The *Times* article about Andrews crossing into hostile bandit territory reported the comment of the Chinese warlord likening Andrews to the American pioneers in crossing “Indian” territory in the American West. Certainly, the *Times* highlighted the analogy to strike an adventurous cord of danger and daring-do in the *Times*’ readers, and it is equally certain that Andrews relayed the analogy made by the Prince in order to excite exactly that kind of image.

Heroic stoicism in the face of danger was a requisite trope in the narrative of explorers, and it was one of the qualities that made for celebrity, as was hunting. Both Andrews and Kozlov hunted with a vengeance, which they did to collect specimens, to supply food, and for sport. Both explorers filled their narratives with accounts of hunting expeditions, and of shooting different kinds of species. Descriptions of hunting were a *de rigueur* requirement of all explorers’ narratives from this time, and photographs of Andrews, especially, often show him with rifle at ready, or with revolver holstered on his hip. Hunting made up a significant part of Kozlov’s expeditions, as well. In his *Russkaya Starina* narratives, Kozlov described the “unexpected exhilaration” of hunting and fishing in the Mongolian forests and lakes. “The voices of the beaters grows louder. One has to stand at the ready, watchful, tense, listening.”²⁶ In August, 1926, Mongolian authorities officially complained about the Russian expedition for over-hunting, to the point of threatening the food sources of the local population, and trespassing on sacred grounds.²⁷

The journals and published accounts produced by Andrews and Kozlov include many of the tropes and stereotypes of orientalist writings of the period. The journals left by Badmazhapov of his travels show a different way of writing. Kozlov and Andrews made themselves the center of their narratives, but the subject in Badmazhapov’s one account places the landscape and the road at the center. The longest of Badmazhapov’s journeys occurred in the spring of 1907, a trade journey that took him from Alashan, in the southern part of Inner Mongolia, north through Outer Mongolia into the Russian Transbaikal regions, then south through Manchuria, down to Peking, and back west to Alashan. The purpose of the account was to provide a continuous round-trip description of how the different parts and roads of Mongolia and Manchuria were connected. This was an important account, since even by this late date, most explorers’ accounts of Mongolia were of a single region, giving little sense of how different parts of the Mongolian plateau were connected by topography and roads. As a

²⁵ Loss of life on the other side did not count, of course.

²⁶ *Russkaya Starina*, No. 4 (April, 1911): 18.

²⁷ AVPRF 0183, op. 4, p. 107, d. 28, l. 9.

result, nearly every paragraph in this account began with a topic sentence about the lay of the road, how it turned, its composition, the landscape and travel conditions, how much distance a caravan could cover in a day, and placement of wells, and villages. There are no stories about hunting, or the kinds of arms the expedition carried, although his trade caravan would have hunted for game food, and certainly needed arms for protection. The tone of the description is straight forward, even mundane, with little of the adventure or self reflection characteristic of the classic explorers accounts. Badmazhapov described the regions through which they passed, but with little comment about the people they encountered, except where settlements were located, and the language the people spoke. For him, a Buryat, and a professional trader, these travels by camel caravan through the Mongolian steppes were not the stuff of adventure and self discovery; they were the everyday activities of a commercial trading agent. At only one point in the narrative, did Badmazhapov indulge in comments about a particular group of mixed Mongolian, Kalmyk, and Altai villages. These groups, the “Torgoud” (Torgout), lived in near complete isolation, he noted, in very primitive conditions. He thought it “stupid” that no one in these villages knew Chinese or Manchurian.²⁸

5 Badmazhapov

Badmazhapov never published popular accounts of his travels, but he did produce accounts of a different sort, for the Russian military’s General Staff, and for his own reference. The intelligence reports contained much of the usual kind of information desired by the Russian General Staff office, the agency that coordinated intelligence gathered by traveling agents. In his first reports, from March and then May 1907, Badmazhapov reported which Mongolian princes in the Alashan area seemed inclined toward the Chinese and which toward Russia. Badmazhapov noted that the Chinese were beginning to collect statistics on the population, very possibly for tax and conscription reasons, and had sent one hundred wagons to reinforce the Ile region in northern Mongolia.²⁹

It was during his return journey from Peking, in early spring 1907, that Badmazhapov discovered the remains of Khara-Khoto in the Gobi desert, based on rumors and stories he heard from local inhabitants about a city covered over

²⁸ “35 dnevnaya poezdka ot rezidentsii knyaza Alasha vana do stavka torgoud-beile”. In Badmazhapov 2006: 22–35.

²⁹ RGO f. 18, op. 3, d. 36, papka 7, ll. 5–7, 11–12.

by sand. Following local directions, Badmazhapov found and made a cursory tour of several chambers that were accessible, and photographed the towers still visible above the dunes. He included this in his diary and, in May, sent a description to Kozlov, the Russian Geographic Society, and to the military General Staff.³⁰ As a result of Badmazhapov's report, the RGO hastily assembled an expedition under Kozlov. Badmazhapov assisted the expedition, which left Petersburg at the beginning of winter, in November 1907, reaching the site only in March, 1908. Badmazhapov acted as guide, and he was able to smooth negotiations with local Chinese authorities, since he was already well acquainted with them through his trading activities.

The discoveries at Khara-Khoto were of world significance, and have been described in many texts. The scrolls and artifacts were exhibited with great fanfare by the Russian Geographical Society in 1910, and the Khara-Khoto collections remain some of the prized possessions of the Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg. Kozlov's fame was secured as the “discoverer” of the ancient city, and in 1911 he partially serialized his expedition in the St. Petersburg monthly journal *Russkaya Starina*. Neither in 1911, nor in any publications or lectures since, did Kozlov mention the role Badmazhapov played in discovering the city, except in his 1911 article in a reference to Badmazhapov's “invaluable” assistance, and to his “valuable contribution to science.”³¹

By late 1909, it was clear to Badmazhapov that his role in the Khara-Khoto discovery had been suppressed, and he reacted in a bitter letter to Kozlov in December. “I am surprised,” he wrote

that the GO [Geographic Society] has expressed dissatisfaction with me, and I completely fail to understand what the [General] Staff finds in me that is so disrespectful, and besides that, you write as if I tried to go behind your back. Really, all I did was to discover Khara-Khoto for them, and provide some preliminary information ... I [had] no ulterior motive, but wanted simply to inform the Society and the [General] Staff. I am deeply offended that, having discovered Khara-Khoto, I now stand accused ... of what?³²

Badmazhapov apologized for the “sharp tone” of his words, but he threatened to contact newspapers with his version of events. In a return letter from January 1910, Kozlov strongly advised Badmazhapov not to “argue” with the Geographic Society, or to make more trouble with the General Staff.³³ “Conversation about you in the General Staff is rather reserved, (*ves'ma sderzhanno*),” he wrote.³⁴

³⁰ For letters to Kozlov, 15 and May 16, 1907, see RGO f. 18, op. 3, d. 36, papka 7, ll. 7–12.

³¹ Kozlov 1963: 58.

³² RGO f. 18 op. 3, d. 36, papka 9, ll. 1–2.

³³ RGO f. 18, op. 2, d. 52, ll. 1–2. Lomakina 1998: 196.

³⁴ RGO f. 18, op. 2, d. 52, l. 2.

Kozlov never offered an explanation why there was such bad feeling about Badmazhapov, but the cover up permitted the Geographic Society to maintain the fiction that it was a Russian, and an officer, who had made one of the most sensational archeological discoveries of the day. Badmazhapov let the matter drop, but his relationship with Kozlov changed with that December 1909 letter. In prior years, Badmazhapov wrote to Kozlov as a supplicant. His letters nearly always began with greetings of “Deeply respected Petr Kuzmich,” or “Deeply respected Excellency.” He often expressed the desire and the hope of working with Kozlov, but his letters were never insistent, and the tone was always as a loyal assistant addressing a person in a superior position. After 1907, and especially after 1909, Badmazhapov’s letters more often than not began with a simple “Dear Petr Kuzmich.” His tone of writing was straightforward. Most important, nearly every letter involved some kind of request for Kozlov’s assistance or intervention on Badmazhapov’s part. In what may have been an attempt to soften the insult of Khara-Khoto, for example, Kozlov offered, in the late summer of 1909, to help secure a position for Badmazhapov. Badmazhapov expressed his gratitude and, in a letter, requested that Kozlov find him a position in the officer corps or in the military administration. (“Then, I won’t be just a simple Cossack sergeant, but a person of a completely different category.”)³⁵ Kozlov made good on his offer, and by June 1910, Badmazhapov had moved to Chita. He began work for the Military Governor of the Transbaikal oblast in Chita (at that time, V. I. Kosov), in the Special Chancery that handled secret matters. Badmazhapov began studying for the state ministerial examinations, which he needed to pass in order to advance within the state bureaucratic ranks.

A particularly transparent letter from June 1910 expressed the new tone of Badmazhapov’s relationship with Kozlov. Badmazhapov began by expressing his “deep” gratitude to Kozlov “for everything” that Kozlov had done for him, especially in paving the way for his state administrative work. He noted that he was studying for the state examinations, and had entered into the ninth rank of the administrative bureaucracy. He added that the stipend was very small. Badmazhapov, again, fell into the role of supplicant by writing “You try with all your might to show me the [proper] road,” he declared, “I understand that completely.” Without transition, then, in the next sentence, Badmazhapov continued “Now, please write to the governor a private letter to thank him for taking on your companion traveler (*sputnik*), and making arrangements for his future. He is very proud that he knows you. Your letter will have great value for

³⁵ RGO f. 18 op. 3, d. 36, papka 9, l. 7.

[furthering] my affairs.”³⁶ In his popular accounts, Kozlov rarely referred to Badmazhapov by name. The latter was always included anonymously as one of a number of companion travelers (*sputniki*), or at most, as one of Kozlov’s assistants. The correspondence between the two men, however, shows a different, more complex and intertwined, relationship, especially after the Khara-Khoto excavations.

In Badmazhapov’s correspondence with Kozlov, the “sputnik” steps out from the shadow of the “great explorer.” That correspondence reveals a sophisticated individual with blunt and astute views of the world, and an individual unafraid to articulate those views. In 1911, Kozlov was preparing to mount another expedition to Mongolia, with the never dying dream to reach Tibet. Early in the year, he wrote to Badmazhapov of these preparations, and asked Badmazhapov to join the expedition as his assistant. The plans were still preliminary, and Kozlov asked for Badmazhapov’s discretion in making inquiries about equipment, animals, and local translators and guides. Plans for the upcoming expedition took up much of the correspondence over the coming months, as did Badmazhapov’s efforts to move up in the state’s administrative bureaucracy, but that correspondence also took place against the backdrop of increasing tensions in Mongolia. The Japanese were moving from their occupation of Korea into Manchuria and eastern Mongolia, while the Chinese were renewing efforts to colonize Mongolia and integrate it more closely into the Chinese provincial system. At the same time, a Mongolian government had formed in Urga and, with Russia’s support and recognition, had declared its independence from China. Russia had also annexed parts of Manchuria as a protectorate against both Japanese and Chinese moves.

As Badmazhapov went about the business of organizing Kozlov’s expedition, he often expressed his views on the possibilities of war. He kept Kozlov updated on events and trends and several times lamented that the Mongolians did not organize in an uprising against China. “Everyone talks about war,” he wrote to Kozlov in February. “Many believe there will be war between China and Japan, and some think between Russia and China.” The Chinese, he wrote, were preparing seriously, and were sending 3,000 regular troops to Urga under command of a full general. In addition, the Chinese had replaced Mongolian border guards with Chinese along the Russian Mongolian border, and had passed a new law allowing Chinese to marry Mongolians. “They want to colonize Mongolia using this new law,” he wrote. “The colonization of Mongolia is being decided in Peking.”³⁷ Badmazhapov wrote that soon Manchuria and Mongolia

36 RGO f. 18 op. 3, d. 36, papka 10, l. 25.

37 RGO f. 18 op. 3, d. 36, papka 11, ll. 41–42.

could become a theater of war, and the “sad historical remnant of the [Mongolian] people will be ruined for many years, and possibly forever.”³⁸

Throughout 1911, Badmazhapov continued to move up in the military and state ranks of the Transbaikal region. He rose to become a major advisor to the Governor General on the situation in Mongolia and Manchuria, and he continued to press Kozlov for assistance, even as he offered unvarnished and rather acerbic comments about Russia. Badmazhapov commented on Russia’s vacillation in supporting Mongolian independence, which, in Badmazhapov’s view, reflected the increasingly dysfunctional system of Russia’s foreign policy formation. In a February letter, Badmazhapov noted that a strong and Russian oriented Mongolia was in Russia’s interests, but the Russians “apparently” did not want to take on the obligation of being Mongolia’s protector. This, he wrote, was “partly justifiable.” It would be “dangerous” for Russia to play the role of Mongolia’s “guardian – such a large country – until such time as Russia [could] sort out its own governmental administrative system.” “Nonetheless,” he continued, “the Russians, who love to meddle in everyone’s business, will not back off, but will come to some arrangement about Mongolia.” Given this, Badmazhapov then requested that Kozlov continue to intercede to promote Badmazhapov within the state administrative ranks.³⁹

In writing about Kozlov’s proposed exploration expedition, Badmazhapov put his finger on the complex of motives that surrounded such “scientific” enterprises. In March, he wrote to Kozlov for clarification:

The goal of the expedition is still not clear [to me]. Will it be just a ceremonial procession (*pochetnoi svity*), or have a military-political character in order to provoke the Chinese, or will it be scientific, and partly diplomatic, or, as I suspect, will it have a little of all of these characteristics, but be primarily political? ... In any case, whatever its character, [the expedition] will create great interest, and will figure prominently in discussions in both the West and the East, the more so given current relations with China.

Badmazhapov concluded his letter with a plea that Kozlov help the explorer’s “fellow traveling companions” should war break out and the planned expedition be canceled. “Everyone is being called up to the active forces,” Badmazhapov wrote. He noted that at least he was safe, since he had been assigned to the reserves.⁴⁰

Kozlov’s expedition did not happen, and war was averted mainly because the Chinese empire fell apart in the revolution of late 1911. In that situation, a

³⁸ RGO f. 18 op. 3, d. 36, papka 11, l. 36.

³⁹ RGO f. 18 op. 3, d. 36, papka 11, 38–39.

⁴⁰ RGO f. 18 op. 3, d. 36, papka 11, 34.

coalition of Buddhist religious leaders and noble princes in what was then Outer Mongolia, declared independence. The new Chinese republic refused to accept this, although there was little they could do to prevent it. In 1912, Russia, while not supporting full independence, came to a *de facto* agreement with the Chinese to recognize Outer Mongolia as an autonomous region within the new Chinese republic.

Badmazhapov continued to thrive. He accepted a position as a trade representative with the Nobel firm, based in Verkhneudinsk (present day Ulan Ude). He continued to rise within the Transbaikal military government administration, and continued work for the Russian General Staff. In 1913, he traveled to St. Petersburg as part of the official Buryat delegation to celebrate the tri-centennial of the Romanov dynasty. He worked, again, with Kozlov in 1915 and 1916 when the latter headed an expedition to purchase beef cattle, sheep, and other products in Mongolia for the Russian military in World War I.⁴¹ As part of the Transbaikal military governor's staff, Badmazhapov was appointed as a special representative to the expedition in 1914–1916 to Mongolia, under command of P. A. Vitte. The expedition was charged to assess the economic development potential of Mongolia, especially in the areas of animal husbandry.⁴²

In 1917, with the collapse of the Russian imperial state, Badmazhapov joined other Buryat intellectuals in forming a pan-Mongolian-Buryat national democratic movement. He participated in the founding congress of that movement in Chita in 1917. In 1920 and 1921, as Bolshevik power came to the Transbaikal, Badmazhapov and other Buryats relocated to Urga to work for an independent Mongolia. He arrived just in time to be imprisoned first by the Chinese military, who had occupied Urga, and then by Russian White forces under the white general, Baron Ungern von Sternberg. During both the Chinese and White occupations, Badmazhapov was one of a number of people who established secret communications with the underground revolutionary government, located in Altan-Bulak, just on the Mongolian side of the Russian border near Kyakhta. Badmazhapov, along with others, provided information about the Chinese and then the White Russians, all the while under threat of re-arrest and execution.⁴³

After the defeat of the Whites, Badmazhapov emerged as part of the new governmental party in Mongolia. He worked as a consultant to the Ministry of

⁴¹ Described in detail by the Mongolian specialist and entrepreneur, A. V. Burukov, as “disastrous.” *K deyatel’nosti voennoi ekspeditsii polkovnika Kozlova po zakupke skota v Mongolii dlya nuzhd deistvuyushchikh armii.* AVPRI f. 188, op. 491, d. 740, ll. 13–20.

⁴² Pershin 1999: 231, n. 106.

⁴³ Pershin provides one of the best contemporary accounts of this period in Urga. For an discussion of Buryat- Mongolian nationalist movements, see Sablin, 2018.

Justice, and as a member of the Mongolian Central Cooperative Council, *Montsenkoop*. It was in 1922, in Urga, that the Swedish businessman, Frans August Larsen – the self-styled “Prince of Mongolia” – introduced Badmazhapov to the American, Andrews. Larsen, a long-time resident in Mongolia, had worked with the Buryat on previous business ventures, and Andrews took an immediate liking to Badmazhapov. Badmazhapov, along with Larsen, had helped Andrews secure visas for travel into Mongolia, and then acted as go-between in Andrews’ negotiations with the Mongolian government about the terms of the Americans’ 1922–1923 expedition. In *The New Conquest of Central Asia*, Andrews was generous in acknowledging the “indispensable” help of Badmazhapov.⁴⁴

6 Kozlov and the Bolsheviks

In Russia, the collapse of the Romanov dynasty also affected Kozlov’s life. He was able to keep his apartment in what had become Petrograd, but the new Bolshevik regime confiscated much of his expedition equipment and the provisions he had compiled to begin another expedition. Kozlov shared little sympathy for the politics of the Bolsheviks, but his approach to Central Asia, Mongolia in particular, fit easily within the geostrategic interests of the new regime’s leaders. Despite the egalitarian and anti-colonial rhetoric of the Bolshevik government, the Moscow-based Bolsheviks soon retook control of many of the former colonial areas of the empire, and even beyond, especially in Mongolia. The revolutionary urge, combined with traditional geo-political considerations, reinforced this trend. The new Bolsheviks hoped to extend their revolutionary influence into central Asian areas, China, and even to Tibet and India, in order to challenge British hegemony in the area.

For a nineteenth-century imperial explorer such as Kozlov, such goals were understandable, even if they were being carried out by a Marxist revolutionary government. Marxist anthropologists and geographers might have historicized what they perceived as backwardness in peripheral areas of the new Bolshevik controlled state. They discussed backwardness in a socio-economic rather than a racialist way, but they, like Kozlov, accepted as natural that a Russian

⁴⁴ Andrews 1932: 9, 57, 61. In his memoir, Frans Larsen claimed credit for “convincing” Badmazhapov of Andrews’ sincerity, and for recruiting him to accompany Andrews. Michael R. Drompp (ed.), “The Memoir of Frans August Larson,” transcribed by James Larson (Drompp (ed.) 2007: 36).

dominated and European oriented government, motivated by a European civilizing mission, should guide the evolution of supposedly less advanced non-European civilizations.

It was in this context that the new Bolshevik government initially welcomed Kozlov's proposal in 1922 to mount a scientific-cum-diplomatic and political expedition through Mongolia to Tibet. The plan was for Kozlov to act as a secret liaison with the Dalai Lama, the Buddhist leader, while also carrying out geographic work in Tibet. At first, the foreign affairs commissar, Georgii Chicherin saw a golden opportunity in Kozlov's proposal, since Kozlov had met and made a favorable impression on the Dalai Lama as early as 1905. At that time, the young Dalai Lama had fled Tibet, due to the British punitive expedition of Francis Younghusband, and was living in exile in Urga. Favorably disposed toward Russia against Britain, the Dalai Lama was seeking Russian protection, and Kozlov was one of a number of Russian diplomats and orientologists who met and negotiated with the Buddhist leader. The Dalai Lama's plan did not work out, and Britain and Russia came to an agreement about non-interference in Tibet. Denied Russian sanctuary, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa as the British withdrew their forces, but Kozlov's cordial relations with the Tibetan leader were well known to the new Bolshevik government. Chicherin believed that Kozlov's previous tie to the Dalai Lama would be a plus in the new regime's attempt to woo the religious leader away from British influence.⁴⁵

Kozlov never made the journey to Tibet. As he was assembling his expedition in Petrograd, and then Urga, the Soviet political police, the OGPU, became suspicious of his anti-Soviet political leanings. Several of the members of Kozlov's expedition were also suspected of anti-Bolshevik leanings, and were denied permission to join the expedition. For a time, Kozlov came under direct suspicion that he would reach Tibet and go over to the British. Kozlov had his defenders in the government, in particular, N. P. Gorbunov, a powerful member of the scientific liaison commission of the Council of Commissars, Sovnarkom. Gorbunov's sister, Elena, traveled with Kozlov. The head of the OGPU, however, Feliks Dzherzhinsky, convinced Chicherin that there was cause for concern about the mission, and this political doubt was compounded by academic opposition from powerful members of the Academy of Sciences. Kozlov arranged his expedition through the Russian Geographic Society, his traditional institutional patron, but communicated little with the Academy of Sciences, then under the leadership of the well known Buddhist scholar and orientologist, Sergei Ol'denburg. Ol'denburg objected that the Geographic Society had become

⁴⁵ Andreev/Yusupova 2001: 51–74; Andreev 2006: 132–153. For Kozlov's account of his meetings with the then young Dalai Lama, see Kozlov 1920: 67–86.

antiquated as a scientific institution. He argued that the Academy was the primary organization to launch truly scientific research ventures, instead of traveling expeditions by amateur adventurers. In Ol'denburg's view, Kozlov's expedition was organized in the traditional style of heroic adventure and geographic reconnaissance, instead of in the modern mold of specialized thorough study of the resources of particular regions. As early as the turn of the century, and especially after the 1917 revolution, the Academy of Sciences pioneered the latter style of situational, in-depth study by academically trained scientists, even as adventure exploration began to wane, along with the fortunes of societies such as the Geographic Society.⁴⁶

Ol'denburg's objections carried some truth, but were not entirely accurate. Kozlov had, after all, included several trained archeologists, geographers, geologists, entomologists, and botanists in his group. Personal animosity likely played a role in Ol'denburg's assessments, as well, but most likely his criticisms were more institutional than scientific in nature, and especially a matter of money. Kozlov's expedition was initially funded with an amount some ten times the amounts given to the Academy's recent expeditions. Whether Ol'denburg's objection carried any weight is unclear, but political concerns led the government to cancel the expedition, even after Kozlov had arrived in Ulan Bator, the renamed Urga, in late 1923. Despite the cancelation, Kozlov continued his preparations, and carried on with local field work. In the end, and after much hesitation, Kozlov was permitted to remain in Mongolia, but not to proceed to Tibet. Instead, he headed a team of scientists who, based in Urga, explored the natural resources and archeology of northern Mongolia from 1923 through 1926.⁴⁷

7 Noin Ula

It was during this time, in the spring of 1924, that Kozlov made his second major career discovery in the hill area of Noin Ula, north of the capital. Retracing the steps of a 1912 gold mining expedition, one of Kozlov's assistants, Sergei Kondrat'ev, rediscovered a series of ancient burial mounds in a forested area. These sites dated from the turn of the Common Era, and were aristocratic burial sites of the Xiongnu, a Central Asian nomadic steppe people. In the end, over two hundred mounds covering timber-reinforced chambers were discovered, one at least of which belonged to

⁴⁶ Andreev/Yusupova 2001.

⁴⁷ A different, secret, mission was sent to Tibet, but with little result. Andreev 2006: 247–271.

the ruler Uchjulü-Jodi-Chanuy, who reigned from 8 BCE to 13 CE.⁴⁸ News of this discovery played in Kozlov's favor in his effort to keep his expedition alive, but the criticism of his methods continued to haunt him. Worried that Kozlov had no trained archeologist, Ol'denburg once again stepped in, this time to demand that Kozlov be prohibited from disturbing the site until trained specialists could be sent to conduct excavations. Two academic archeologists, G. I. Borovka and S. A. Teploukhov, under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences, finally reached Ulan Bator only in the autumn of 1924, by which time Kozlov had already visited the burial sites on at least several occasions. One of these new scholars, Teploukhov, still a young man, went on to a successful career, specializing in Mongolia, but he was especially critical of Kozlov. In one report to Ol'denburg, he complained that Kozlov's messing about in the graves had had the effect of ransacking them, making it very difficult to conduct a systematic survey.⁴⁹

This was not the first time that Kozlov's lack of expertise caused trouble, and it highlighted Ol'denburg's criticism of Kozlov as an outdated explorer amateur. Similarly, the trained paleontologists on Andrews' expeditions forbade him to dig at excavation sites, noting that his impatience and lack of expertise often resulted in damaged fossils.⁵⁰ In the case of Andrews, his rough methods became a standing joke. In Kozlov's case, however, it carried serious implications.

Despite Kozlov's interference, the finds at Noin Ula were arguably as sensational if not as extensive as those from Khara Khoto. Also, despite the criticisms, Kozlov received due credit for the discovery, along with high praise from a special commission established in 1925 to assess the future of Kozlov's expedition. Even Ol'denburg acknowledged the value of the finds, and Kozlov's initiative in bringing them to light. Still, the head of the Academy of Sciences could not resist a dig at Kozlov by emphasizing how crucial it was that the mounds were excavated by academically trained archeologists. Otherwise, he declared, the artifacts would have been "almost completely useless" as historical evidence.⁵¹

Despite the recognition given Kozlov, that very recognition set off another controversy that brought the traditional Kozlov into conflict with the new ways. Kozlov did not weigh in on the historical significance of the finds, in itself an interesting debate, but he assumed and argued that, as in the past, the bulk of the discoveries would go to the Orientological Department of the Russkii Muzei, the Russian Museum. Sergei Nikolaevich Troinitskii, the director of the Hermitage

⁴⁸ Yusupova 2010: 26–67.

⁴⁹ "Istoriya odnogo ne sovsem obychnogo puteshestviya," 67.

⁵⁰ Gallenkamp 2001: 152.

⁵¹ AVPRF f. 0183, op. 4, papka 107, d. 28, ll. 62–63.

Museum objected. In a note to N. P. Gorbunov, Troinitskii argued that the collections should be housed in the still relatively new Hermitage Museum.⁵²

Troinitskii made his argument on two grounds. The Hermitage, he argued, first, was already a museum of international prestige, and the new republic had plans that it would become as important as institutions such as the Louvre and the Prada in Western Europe. Before the revolution, the Russkii Muzei had played something of that role, but was increasingly eclipsed by the state's plans for the Hermitage. According to Troinitskii, the finds from Noin Ula were of such international importance that they should end up in the Hermitage, rather than in an increasingly specialized museum such as the Russkii Muzei.

Troinitskii's second reason went to the heart of the interpretation of the findings, which he argued showed the strong Hellenistic influence on ancient steppe cultures. This argument carried two significant implications. It bolstered the desire by many to highlight the occidental rather than Asian influences on steppe and therefore Russian culture, and it reinforced the argument that the collections did not fit the profile of the Asian oriented collections of the Russkii Muzei. Even the foreign affairs commissar, Chicherin, weighed in in favor of the Hermitage.⁵³ Despite Kozlov's attempts for several years, the great bulk of the Noin Ula collections were eventually housed in the Hermitage.

8 Kozlov and Andrews

It was during these years, 1923 and 1924, that Kozlov encountered the American paleontological expeditions to Central Asia, led by Andrews. Upon hearing, in October 1923, that Andrews was camped not far from his own site, Kozlov expressed admiration in his journal for the American expedition, and for Andrews. Kozlov was impressed by what he heard about the thoroughness with which the Americans had prepared for their sojourn in the deserts and hills of Mongolia. By thoroughness, Kozlov no doubt had science in mind, but what struck him most to note in his journal was that the Americans had brought with them a mess tent, eating tables, and white tablecloths, on which they dined in the evenings, waited on by local servants, to whom they referred as "boizs."⁵⁴

Kozlov gained his intelligence about Andrews from Badmazhapov, who had acted as guide and official Mongolian liaison on Andrews' 1922 expedition. In fact,

⁵² AVPRF f. 0183, op. 4, papka 107, d. 28, ll. 28–29.

⁵³ AVPRF f. 0183, op. 4, papka 107, d. 28, ll. 26–27.

⁵⁴ Kozlov 2003: 42.

Badmazhapov acted as more than a go-between. Mongolian officials were extremely suspicious of the Americans. Andrews was convinced that such animosity was because the Mongolians were under the influence of the “accursed” Russian Bolsheviks, who Andrews lambasted as the lowest of the low.⁵⁵ More likely, and with some justification, the Mongolians felt that Andrews had essentially stolen many artifacts from his 1919–1920 and then 1922 expeditions, and that he was in Mongolia in large part to spy and assess the mineral and commercial potential of the country.⁵⁶ According to Andrews, it was Badmazhapov, yet again, who interceded on behalf of the American during difficult negotiations in September 1924. Based in Beijing, Andrews had traveled to Urga, by then renamed Ulan Bator, attempting to acquire permissions and visas for his planned 1925 field work. As Andrews told the story, the Mongolians were even more hostile and suspicious than they had been in 1922. Several ministers had been executed and replaced, and the Mongolian government had come under increasing control of the Russian Bolsheviks, and their Buryat surrogates. There now existed a scientific committee supposedly just to deal with Andrews, and once again suspected him of spying and conducting secret mineralogical surveys.⁵⁷ The Mongolian government’s scientific committee may not have been formed just to deal with Andrews, but he was correct in noting that it was composed almost entirely of Russians and Russian-Buryats, including Kozlov and his wife, the Buryat scholar, Zhamzarano, and the Russian mystic-adventurer-businessman, Nikolai Roerich and his son.⁵⁸ According to Andrews, it was thanks to Badmazhapov’s keen diplomatic skills, his authority, and his commitment to the scientific mission of the Americans, that Andrews was able to secure the required permissions and guarantees.⁵⁹

Kozlov was also in Ulan Bator in September 1924, and his version of these events differs considerably, and in greater detail, from that written by Andrews. Kozlov recalled meeting Andrews on several occasions during that month, and described the warm and generous feeling that developed between them as kindred “travelers.” Being the hero of his own narrative, however, Kozlov placed himself, not Badmazhapov, at the center of the intrigues to facilitate Andrews’ expedition. According to Kozlov, it was Zhamzarano who was most angry with Andrews, telling Kozlov openly that Andrews was a liar, and had violated the agreements that governed the 1922 expedition. Specifically, Andrews had taken artifacts and paleontological remains out of the country without clearing this with the Mongolian

⁵⁵ AMNH, MSS .A53. Vol. 4, 32, Vol. 9, 135.

⁵⁶ AMNH, MSS .A53. Vol. 4, 28; Gallenkamp 2001: 130–132.

⁵⁷ Gallenkamp 2001: 189–190.

⁵⁸ A photograph of the committee showed only three Mongol officials.

⁵⁹ Gallenkamp 2001: 190; Andrews 1932: 235.

government. Worse yet, Andrews had benefitted in a crass and commercial fashion by selling items “stolen” from Mongolia in public auctions in the United States.⁶⁰ This proved to Zhamzarano that Andrews was not seriously interested in science, but was a showman, commercial exploiter, and interested only in making business and spying. Zhamzarano was adamant that the American group would not be permitted to continue work.⁶¹

Kozlov sympathized with the Americans’ plight. According to Kozlov, then, he made it his personal mission to try to smooth over relations between Andrews and Zhamzarano, and to convince other members of the Mongolian government that Andrews was engaged in a legitimate scientific enterprise. Toward this end, Kozlov arranged a two day trip, to include Andrews and Zhamzarano, to the excavations at Noin-Ula. Kozlov produced a detailed account of their sojourn, Andrews’ enthusiasm and delight at the site of the burial mounds, and even more detail than one might want to know about Zhamzarano’s rheumatism, which apparently kept him in considerable pain. Nonetheless, in Kozlov’s telling, Andrews and Zhamzarano developed a mutual respect during this trip, encouraged by Kozlov, which greatly helped Andrews in his negotiations. In describing his role, Kozlov recalled that he “thought through all this” in close consultation with Badmazhapov, but it was his doing, working behind the scenes, that secured a successful outcome for the American expedition.⁶²

Kozlov expounded at length in his journal about his “good American friend.” He described their mutual enthusiasm and even exchange of photographs. Andrews in turn wrote warmly of Kozlov in his published account, but he mentions Kozlov only briefly, and in passing, in his field journals, and even that was in reference to a casual meeting with Kozlov while having dinner with Badmazhapov. In his account, Andrews reserved nearly all his praise for Badmazhapov. In contrast, Kozlov’s passages about Andrews portray their relationship as that of equals, with Kozlov as much the worldly explorer as Andrews, and even with the right to see himself as the senior of the two. At the same time, there is something too effusive about Kozlov’s compliments toward the American. These passages evoke an excess of expression that, if not born of inferiority, are certainly tinged by exaggerated admiration.

60 In 1923, Andrews did, indeed, publicly auction eggs found in 1922 to raise money for further expeditions. Gallenkamp 2001: 182–183.

61 Kozlov 2003: 300.

62 Kozlov 2003: 297–303. Andrews recounts this “delightful” visit, but says nothing about it in the context of relations with Zhamzarano or negotiations with the Mongolian government (Andrews 1932: 235).

Indeed, Kozlov followed on his complements about Andrews with a kind of written reverie, a long passage in which he reflected on the approach to research taken by the Americans. It is clear from these sections that what most impressed Kozlov about Andrews were not tablecloths or motor cars (although he did note, after taking a spin with Andrews in Ulan Bator, that Andrews was an excellent driver), but the way the Americans approached the local population in aide of their research. In his field journal, Kozlov expressed his astonishment that the Americans simply asked local people where to find remains and landmarks. He even rehearsed the way he thought Andrews might ask the questions. As if repeating to himself in wonder, he wrote “Do you know where there are bones of old large animals?” In his journal, Kozlov castigated the old approach, in fact, *his* approach: “How the Russians have ignored the Mongols,” he lamented, “Mongolian curiosity, Mongolian self knowledge. It is even shameful,” he wrote. Citing the American’s forthrightness, he commented: “This is the way to approach everything in an expedition. And this is the way the American expedition does it under Andrews.”⁶³

This is an astonishing passage in Kozlov’s journal, revealing much about Kozlov’s world-view – that indigenous populations could have no knowledge useful to the outside explorer, that they were invisible as people, and were there to be “discovered” and cataloged by the European, just as were unusual species of plants. New consciousness does not come quickly, of course, and, even with this dawning revelation, Kozlov could not help but revert to his cultural evolutionism by adding that Mongolians might know where old bones are buried, but they could not really conceive of anything about the history of their country, or about the importance of excavating remains. Kozlov, in discussing Mongolian historical ignorance, used a verb form – *smyslit’*, in Russian – that connotes more than just lack of knowledge, almost an inability to conceive of such an abstract concept as history.⁶⁴

Still, Kozlov was so taken with this idea of native informants that he engaged in a written fantasy of investigating the Gobi desert by simply asking directions from locals. This was what the Americans were doing, he wrote, noting that, based on this kind of information, the Americans had moved south west and established their base at the foot of the Baga-Bogdo massif. It was, in fact, true that Andrews was led to his most famous discoveries by following local lore. It was true that the Americans found the famous dinosaur eggs at the mountain plateau Andrews called the “Flaming Cliffs” by listening to local inhabitants talking about the bones of old animals and birds. It was not Andrews, however, who asked the

⁶³ Kozlov 2003: 42–43.

⁶⁴ Kozlov 2003: 42.

crucial question of locals, leading the expedition to the dinosaur site that secured Andrews' fame and future. According to Andrews, it was Badmazhapov who, riding into camp one day, "delighted us with information that he had heard from the Mongols of a region, eighty miles to the south, where fossil bones were to be found; bones 'as big as a man's body,' they said."⁶⁵ Now, for the second time, Badmazhapov had helped foreigners uncover artifacts or remains of world scientific significance in Mongolia. At least this second time, Andrews acknowledged Badmazhapov's contribution.

9 Kozlov's "retirement"

Kozlov returned to Leningrad in September 1926, and he began preparations almost immediately to return to Mongolia and eventually to Tibet. He put forward several proposals for a multi-disciplinary expedition to start in 1928 and, no doubt in an attempt to adapt to the new world of science exploration, he signed his proposals not just as *puteshestvennik* (explorer-traveler), but as "*puteshestvennik-issledovatel'*" (traveler-researcher). Kozlov was a celebrated explorer, but the process for putting together expeditions was, by this time, very different from what he had known. The influence of his patron organization, the Geographical Society, had declined, and decisions about expeditions were now handled through an officially established government commission for scientific study of Mongolia and Tibet. In fact, that commission had been established in 1925 to assess the progress of Kozlov's expedition. N. P. Gurbunov headed the commission. Gorbunov had supported Kozlov, but the assistant Chair was Sergei Ol'denburg, the head of the Academy of Sciences and Kozlov's staunchest critic, who took over the commission in May 1927. The commission was also moved from Sovnarkom to the Academy of Sciences, Ol'denburg's fiefdom. Kozlov was given a position on the commission and a pension of two hundred rubles a month, but his proposals for further expedition work were not accepted. Younger, academically trained specialists were already in the field conducting the kind of situational long-term studies that Ol'denburg favored. Many of these involved large numbers of technicians to map geological and mineralogical formations for purposes of economic development. These were far different from the kind of adventurous caravan trekking that had made Kozlov famous. The new kind of scientific exploration did not make for

⁶⁵ Andrews 1932: 90.

thrilling popular stories but, despite the popularity of Kozlov's accounts, his kind of hero-adventure exploration was, by the late 1920s, already an anachronism.⁶⁶

“Anachronism” was how the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs described Kozlov's proposal. In a letter to Sovnarkom from late February 1928, the assistant head of the Oriental Department, Mel'nikov, declared that the logistics, cost, and time involved in finding, digging, and shipping artifacts and samples from the mountainous regions of Tibet was outdated. Given Soviet influence in Mongolia, there was no longer any need to send the kind of expeditions for which Kozlov was famous: “cumbersome, costly slow-moving convoys, heavily armed and outfitted to the hilt, in the outdated mold of military-intelligence collection.” According to Mel'nikov, to examine the areas proposed by Kozlov required the kind of “stationary” and “rationalized” investigations pioneered by the American expedition under Andrews in Mongolia. Mel'nikov explained further that, in the current international climate, neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans would approve travel passports for such a heavily armed caravan expedition. Moreover, the great potential for conflicts with marauding nomads would only play into the hands of the British and Chinese, and would discredit any scientific accomplishments. The era of Kozlov and his style of exploration had passed. In current conditions, it was “completely inappropriate.”⁶⁷

If the foreign affairs commissariat was direct, the OGPU was damning. In a curt letter from late December 1927 to Gorbunov, the deputy head of the OGPU, Mikhail Trilisser, stated that the OGPU also regarded it as “completely inappropriate” to allow Kozlov to travel again to Mongolia. Trilisser did not refer at all to Kozlov's purported anti-Soviet inclinations, which had tainted his 1923–1926 expedition. Neither did he refer to the outdated style of Kozlov's expeditions, as did the foreign affairs commissariat. Rather, Trilisser bluntly cited the “odious opinion” of Kozlov on the part of the Mongols and, “generally, the Buddhist populations in the regions where the Przheval'skii and Kozlov expeditions had worked.” The Soviet regime was trying to cultivate relations with these groups,

66 See for example the five-year plan for scientific study of Mongolia, drawn up between the Mongolian Scientific Committee and the Soviet Academy of Science in GARF f. 8429, op. 3, d. 25; GARF f. 8429, op. 4, d. 31. See also the five-year plan for 1930–1935 in *Orient* 2–3 (St. Petersburg, 1998): 236–237. This new model stressed settled, in place, deep exploration, such as a network of medical-scientific clinics, vs. “flying” discovery. In *Geography Militant*, Felix Driver contrasts the image of explorer and anthropologist, as described by Claude Levi-Strauss, as the difference between sensationalism and science. Driver 2001: 2–5.

67 GARF f. 8429, op. 1, d. 93, ll. 9–12. Mel'nikov noted, also, that the famed Swedish explorer Sven Haydin had also changed over to the “new, stationary” methods, but, in a seeming contradiction, he acknowledged that Kozlov had adopted the same methods in his 1923–1926 expedition.

and the political police clearly believed that Kozlov's well-known and condescending views of Mongolian and Tibetan people were not conducive to that goal.⁶⁸

Trilisser's short note is difficult to assess. It is impossible to know if he was simply projecting an official anti-colonial ideology onto Kozlov's pre-revolutionary background, or whether he based his assessment on specific information. Either alternative, or both, is plausible, especially the latter. Kozlov's patronizing arrogance toward non-Russian populations runs throughout his accounts and his field diaries. Regardless of what information the OGPU possessed, Trilisser did not have to invent Kozlov's proclivities. Whether Trilisser invented or exaggerated Mongolian attitudes is another matter. Kozlov, of course, considered himself a great friend of, and benefactor to, the Mongolian people. Moreover, Kozlov's cordial relations with the Dalai Lama were touted by many observers. Those observers, however, were invariably Russian. It is not clear what the Dalai Lama may have actually thought about Kozlov. In the end, each of Kozlov's several expeditions over the years were denied entrance to Tibet. In the 1920s, Kozlov received honorary medals from the Mongolian government to acknowledge his contributions to Mongolian science and history, but Andrews also received formal commendations, though most Mongolian officials privately despised the American.

Kozlov tried three more times in late 1928 and early 1929 to find a way back to Mongolia and to Tibet. He attempted to bypass Ol'denburg and the Academy, even the Geographic Society, appealing directly to his former patron, Gorbunov, who continued as deputy chair of Sovnarkom. These appeals took the form of personal, handwritten letters. In them, Kozlov begged that he be allowed to travel again: "Nikolai Petrovich, can you really send this 'free bird' nowhere?" he asked, "neither to Tibet, nor to Afghanistan?" Kozlov abandoned any pretense to science. He exposed raw emotion. "You, now, [also], are a traveler (*puteshestvennik*), so, you more than any other understand the longing, my longing, for cherished lands."⁶⁹ And in yet another letter, "Please, give me the chance [again] to see the Mongolian vastness, and breathe its air. You, more deeply than anyone, understand the languor of my nomad desire."⁷⁰

Kozlov understood that he had been bought off with a pension. "My friends congratulate me," he wrote, "but say that I should not yet be sent to the archive ...

68 GARF f. 8429, op. 1, d. 93, l. 8.

69 Letter dated November 19, 1928. GARF f. 5446, op. 37, d. 11, l. 25. Kozlov's reference to Gorbunov as a fellow traveler-adventurer stemmed from the latter's participation in the 1928 German-Soviet expedition to the Pamir Mountains. Parkhomenko 1991: 408–423.

70 Letter dated March 17, 1929. GARF f. 5446, op. 37, d. 11, l. 26.

They tell me that I must travel again. One more time. [I] must fulfill the last bidding of my teacher.”⁷¹ Kozlov reminded Gorbunov of their purported long discussions about traveling to Tibet, that “cherished region” by air, “perhaps in an airplane, something like a Junker.” Inspired by the feats of Roald Amundsen, Kozlov suggested that he and Gorbunov fly from “Urga” (Ulan Bator) to Lhasa by dirigible.⁷² Kozlov enthused that it would take only forty-eight hours, “setting a course south and west.” A dirigible would not ice up over the mountains, and would obviate the logistical necessity to set up supply bases all along the way. They could take the Khambo-Lama, Dorzhiev. It would be an “enviable project,” and far more feasible than flying across the North Pole, as Amundsen had done. “Our country needs such a flight,” Kozlov wrote, “with you at the head, the explorer, Gorbunov (*s puteshestvennikom Gorbunovym*).” In a final plea, Kozlov wrote: “This is the only possibility for me to visit that mysterious center of Tibet. So, there,” concluded Kozlov, “I have poured out all my dreams about Tibet to you, dear Nikolai Petrovich, only to you.”⁷³ With this letter, Kozlov returned to himself. Neither a scientist, nor a diplomat. An explorer, a traveler, a *puteshestvennik*. The flight and the expedition, of course, did not happen.⁷⁴

10 Andrews’ “retirement”

Andrews suffered an analogous fate. The American explorer did not return to independent Mongolia after 1925, although he conducted expeditions in southern China and Inner Mongolia in 1928 and again in 1930. Controversy remains whether Andrews was expelled from Mongolia, for engaging in survey activities inconsistent with his scientific mission, or whether he left of his own accord. In either case, he was denied access to the country again. In 1930, he was forced to leave China over disputes with the government authorities about the conduct of his expeditions. Disappointed, Andrews nonetheless returned to the United States already a celebrated hero explorer. His 1932 account, *The New Conquest of Central Asia*, only enhanced his fame. Andrews, like Kozlov, hoped to lead more expeditions, but was turned away at each chance. The Chinese refused his return, and war broke out in Inner Mongolia in 1932, just before he hoped to launch an expedition from Japanese occupied Manchuria, then renamed Manchuko. A

⁷¹ ГАРФ ф. 5446, оп. 37, д. 11, л. 25. By teacher, Kozlov meant Przheval’skii.

⁷² In 1926, Amundsen and a crew crossed the North Pole in a dirigible.

⁷³ Letter dated January 19, 1929. ГАРФ ф. 5446, оп. 37, д. 11, лл. 23–24об.

⁷⁴ On Kozlov’s proposed dirigible flight and objection by the foreign affairs commissariat, see also Yusupova 2003: 52–56.

proposed joint venture with the Soviets to explore and map Russian Turkestan also collapsed in 1932. To his regret, Andrews never led another expedition, but instead attempted to make the transition from explorer to scientific administrator, heading the New York Museum of Natural History in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Andrews, however, found himself ill-suited to that kind of work. He did not like the position. He did not follow administrative work carefully and, under pressure, resigned in 1942.⁷⁵

Although he wanted “desperately” to return to the Gobi desert and Mongolia, Andrews seemed to understand that the era of hero-explorer, which he personified, was coming to an end. In a 1932 talk to an exclusive audience at the New York Wells College Club, Andrews declared that adventure should have no place in a scientific expedition, noting that “adventures in exploration are a mark of incompetence.” He remarked that, “now” the organization of big expeditions was similar to the “mechanics” of big business, with the same kind of detailed planning and attempts to minimize or eliminate risk altogether. He went on to say that few spots on the globe remained unexplored. In words reflecting Ol’denburg’s philosophy, he declared that the goal of science now was to study places “intensively,” in depth.⁷⁶ Andrews was, no doubt, being somewhat disingenuous in these remarks. In 1932, when he made these pronouncements, he still harbored hopes to continue the kind of exploration that had made him a paragon of the very adventures he disavowed. As the historian Felix Driver notes, eschewing adventure is a key element in the creation of the explorer-adventurer image.⁷⁷ Publicly, Andrews disavowed the image of the adventurer. At heart, however, that is what he was. An adventurer explorer, just as Kozlov.

11 Badmazhapov’s tragedy

To Kozlov and Andrews, trekking across the Mongolian deserts, plains, and mountains was the stuff of exploration and adventure. To Badmazhapov, traveling in that part of the world was part of every-day life. His sojourns with Kozlov and Andrews were not so much a matter of adventure as livelihood, and he proved indispensable to both men. He played a key part in the discoveries that made each famous, and yet

⁷⁵ Gallenkamp 2001: 302–303.

⁷⁶ *New York Times*, January 27, 1932, p. 23.

⁷⁷ In his 1936 book, *Across Asia’s Snows and Deserts* zoologist William Morden made similar remarks before launching into a truly frightening account of capture and arduous hardship at the hands of Mongol soldiers (Morden 1936: 293–294). Morden did not include this statement in the shorter version of his journey in the *National Geographic Magazine*, from October 1927.

he remained in the shadows of each man's fame. Andrews acknowledged him more publicly than did Kozlov, but it was Kozlov who acted as his patron for more than four decades. Kozlov slighted Badmazhapov by suppressing his role in the discovery of Khara-Khoto, but Kozlov more than paid a debt of gratitude. The Russian not only helped Badmazhapov gain positions and advance in his business. Perhaps his last and most important gesture of friendship was to act as guardian to Badmazhapov's step-daughter, Vera, who studied in Leningrad in the late 1920s. By then, Badmazhapov had fallen under suspicion by the increasingly Stalinist controlled government of Mongolia. In 1930, he lost his government positions and his property. In 1931, he was deported, along with Zhamzarano and other members of the Buryat intelligentsia. Back in the Soviet Union, Badmazhapov's fortunes turned tragic. In the same year, he was convicted as a Buryat-Mongolian nationalist and lived in exile in Syktyvkar in the Komi republic for five years. During this time, Kozlov continued to help him and his daughter and family, even though Kozlov's own health was failing. In 1937, Badmazhapov was rearrested as part of a supposedly Japanese-supported Buryat nationalist organization, a reference to his earlier democratic nationalist activities. He was convicted and executed during the Stalinist purges of those years.⁷⁸ Fortunately, his step daughter, Vera, was able to resettle in Ulan Ude, near her mother, Badmazhapov's second wife, where she found work as a librarian.⁷⁹

Badmazhapov fell victim to the peculiarities of Soviet history, but he personified the life of many such cultural go-betweens. As Kapil Raj notes, "cultural translators" were successful often because they did not belong indigenously to one or another culture, but could move effortlessly between cultures. Badmazhapov, a Buryat, fit this description, living and working in both Russia and Mongolia. He was both indigenous and not indigenous to the Russian and Mongolian cultures. This was key to his success as a trader, a spy, and as a necessary facilitator who furthered the goals of imperial exploration. At the same time, his very in-betweenness barred Badmazhapov from being fully accepted in either culture. As Raj notes, the characteristic of being both in but not of two different cultures gave those such as Badmazhapov an advantage, but

⁷⁸ Zhamzarano, had fared better in Leningrad, at least initially, working in the Academy of Science Orientological Institute, but he too was arrested, and died in a Soviet labor camp in 1942.

⁷⁹ Badmazhapov's second wife, Ida Pavlovna, remained in Ulan Ude, and raised her children. She had four from a previous marriage and two with Badmazhapov. Ida Pavlovna passed away in 1963.

also placed them in a precarious position, and one that could often lead to tragedy. Badmazhapov's fate exemplified this observation.⁸⁰

12 Conclusion

Andrews and Kozlov consciously and carefully crafted their public images as great explorers and adventurers. They made themselves into the heroes of their own stories. Their reputations were genuinely deserved, but they as much as anyone, sang their own praises. Badmazhapov played more than a modest role in each of the explorers' tales, and he was indispensable to both narratives. He was indispensable to both Kozlov and Andrews, and to their stunning achievements. Badmazhapov was the unsung hero in the stories of both explorers.

If Badmazhapov fell victim to a changing world, so too did Kozlov and Andrews, although both escaped the physical tragedy that befell the Buryat. Unable to return to Central Asia, Kozlov fell, instead and rapidly, into failing health and then death in 1935. Andrews escaped into a comfortable but enforced retirement in the United States, and he never again traveled to the lands that sparked his earlier imagination. All three were barred from their adopted land of Mongolia for being on the wrong side of history. The rise of Stalinism sealed Badmazhapov's fate, while other changes outdated Kozlov and Andrews. By the 1920s, the changing character of scientific exploration made less and less room for explorer adventurers such as Kozlov and Andrews. Moreover, both Kozlov and Andrews belonged to an era of imperialistic adventure that was also passing. A sense of dangerous travel and oriental exoticism pervaded their accounts, and contributed to their celebrity status, but that kind of orientalism had no place in the anti-colonial, communist, and nationalist revolutions that swept Russia and Asia in the first decades of the twentieth century. The very celebrity of the two explorers also nullified any effectiveness in their efforts to gather economic, military, and political intelligence for their governments. The world of intelligence gathering was also changing, passing to more specialized institutions and professionals. Kozlov and Andrews were traveler adventurers from the nineteenth century. Neither fit the twentieth-century world of organized science, revolution, and anti-colonialism.

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⁸⁰ Raj 2016: 39–57, 45. Quotation from Subrahmanyam 2011: 10.

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