

**Zeitschrift:** Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie

**Herausgeber:** Schweizerische Asiengesellschaft

**Band:** 68 (2014)

**Heft:** 1-2

  

**Artikel:** Traveling sayings as carriers of the philosophical debate : from the intertextuality of the Yucong to the dynamics of cultural memory and authorship in Early China

**Autor:** Krijgsman, Rens

**DOI:** <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-681643>

### **Nutzungsbedingungen**

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften auf E-Periodica. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen sowie auf Social Media-Kanälen oder Webseiten ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. [Mehr erfahren](#)

### **Conditions d'utilisation**

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. La reproduction d'images dans des publications imprimées ou en ligne ainsi que sur des canaux de médias sociaux ou des sites web n'est autorisée qu'avec l'accord préalable des détenteurs des droits. [En savoir plus](#)

### **Terms of use**

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. Publishing images in print and online publications, as well as on social media channels or websites, is only permitted with the prior consent of the rights holders. [Find out more](#)

**Download PDF:** 27.08.2025

**ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, <https://www.e-periodica.ch>**

Rens Krijgsman

## Traveling sayings as carriers of philosophical debate: From the intertextuality of the \**Yucong* 語叢 to the dynamics of cultural memory and authorship in Early China

**Abstract:** This article presents an analysis and a typology of traveling sayings commonly encountered in Early Chinese texts. Building on examples from both excavated and transmitted texts, and focusing on the Guodian \**Yucong* 1–3 in particular, it argues that some of these sayings travel from text to text because they were more likely to be remembered and transmitted than others. Much like the Wanderanekdote and lines from the Odes, these traveling sayings appear in alternated form across a variety of early texts. They were remembered because they provide a brief, highly structured and esthetically pleasing expression of an important philosophical problem. As a common resource in the cultural memory of Early China, traveling sayings were adapted to meet different argumentative agendas and tapped into a wide network of remembered, intertextual, associations to imbue them with meaning. I argue that the different ways in which these sayings were integrated into arguments, either through adaptation or by using definitions, reveal differences in interpretive strategy and changes in the mode in which early authors engaged with cultural memory. The paper concludes with implications for the study of early collections and the conceptualization of authorship and audience in Early China.

---

**Rens Krijgsman:** University of Oxford. E-mail: [rens.krijgsman@orinst.ox.ac.uk](mailto:rens.krijgsman@orinst.ox.ac.uk)

---

I want to thank Dirk Meyer, Paul van Els, Barend ter Haar, Mercedes Valmisa Oviedo, Ulrich Schmiedel and the anonymous reviewers and editor for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

# 1 Introduction

Studies on Early Chinese anecdotes and other short narratives have shown that many stories use largely the same narrative material and basic structure. Some stories merely change their protagonist and setting, others spin the narrative in a different direction.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, research into the origins and composition of texts such as the *Lunyu* 論語 has likewise revealed that many of the sayings that were held to be the sacred words of master Kong also appear in entirely different contexts, with no attribution to the master, or attributed to a different figure altogether.<sup>2</sup> The insight that much of the narrative material changes while the structure remains recognizably similar, and that authorial attribution of text is fluid, is often combined with the observation that many Warring States and Early Imperial texts were composed of freely moving “building blocks”,<sup>3</sup> and that within composition, it was perfectly valid to adapt text to its new context in order to fit a novel argument.<sup>4</sup> These insights have challenged the ideas held about questions of authenticity, our understanding of the meaning and value of authorship, and the way texts interrelate.<sup>5</sup>

In addition, Paul Fischer, in his broad survey of early Chinese intertextuality, has drawn up 24 types of borrowing from previous works ranging from an “acknowledged, intentional quote from a text with a known author” to unacknowledged quotation from a text without known authorship, keeping different forms of reference such as (mis-)quotation, paraphrase, and allusion in mind.<sup>6</sup>

Accordingly, while studies describing the breadth of adaptation and shared narrative in Early China abound, many questions are left unanswered. What were the reasons for using shared text for instance? If, as Fischer argues, this is because of the ease of reuse and the economy of tapping into a cultural literacy,<sup>7</sup> then why did certain snippets of text lend themselves more easily to adaptation than others? How do these shared texts interact with an established body of cultural memory,<sup>8</sup> and why were they so successful? What are the ways of integrating text into an argument, and, what does this tell us about the ways in which early authors dealt with their cultural heritage? To what extent is the meaning of an

---

1 See Schaberg 2001, 2011 and the essays in van Els/Sabattini 2012, esp. van Els 2012.

2 Weingarten 2009; Hunter 2012.

3 Boltz 2005; Schwermann 2005.

4 Fischer 2009: 34.

5 Kern 2005b; Fischer 2008–2009; Meyer 2012.

6 Fischer 2009: 10.

7 Fischer 2009: 9.

8 In this discussion I build on the concept of cultural memory as advocated by Assmann 2011, I discuss this more fully below.



intertextual reference mediated by cultural memory, and what does this imply for our understanding of authorship and readership?

In this article, I explore these questions by examining gnostic sayings that travel from text to text, and can thus be called traveling sayings.<sup>9</sup> These sayings form a substantial part of what is often called “Masters Literature”.<sup>10</sup> I start from a traveling saying seen in the Guodian \**Yucong* 語叢 1 and the *Biaoji* 表記, and examine their structural and mnemonic characteristics, and the ways in which they were integrated into arguments. These aspects, I argue, can be used to explain the occurrence of similar cases in Early Chinese literature from texts such as the \**Wuwang Jianzuo* 武王踐阼 manuscript texts to the *Lunyu*. They reveal the influence of memory culture in early composition and how early authors engaged

---

<sup>9</sup> Mieke Bal 2002 pioneered the term “traveling concepts” to describe concepts that literally and figuratively travelled between disciplines in the humanities. In their travel, these concepts change and get imbued with new meaning but also influence the discipline they attend. I choose the term “traveling saying” to distance myself from the use of problematic terms such as “quotation” or “citation” because the origin of these phrases is often not clear, both for modern researchers and their contemporary users alike. Nonetheless, some of them are attributed to authorial figures, traditions or collections, but it is pertinent that this is by no means done consistently.

<sup>10</sup> The term Masters Literature, as the name for a particular genre of discourse employed by Warring States “Masters” has been developed most extensively by Tian Xiaofei 2006 and Denecke 2010. The strength of the term is that it seeks to understand the intellectual heritage of the Warring States period from a literary perspective, and that it recognizes, among other factors, the generic quality in the literary representation of this material (albeit indiscriminant regarding the different sub-genres), rather than only focusing on the philosophical aspects. The major problem of the term is that it willfully re-imposes the Master (and by extension, his school or lineage) as an interpretive category for early narrative. As Petersen 1995 and Csikszentmihalyi/Nylan 2003 have shown, the category of the Master and its connotations are an early imperial and bibliographical construct. As such, one can only properly speak of a Masters literature from the mid-former Han onwards when the construct of the master was used to create, compile and identify previously “free” textual material into neat intellectual and literary categories. This is borne out by the fundamental differences exhibited between excavated and transmitted texts. Although the lack of a grand survey of these differences, and the preservation bias in the excavated record necessarily make any claims on these differences “experiential” rather than quantifiable, I believe they show the need for a different approach in generic classification. For insightful observations on these differences see Meyer 2012 and Richter 2013. It appears that many of the characteristics used to substantiate the term Masters Literature, including a predilection for presenting narrative through the voice of masters, the dialogue or teaching scene as narrative structure, and the use of para-textual elements in the organization of the material such as titles, the material presentation of text and the way it is integrated (or rather not) with other material as seen in transmitted literature is not as prominent in excavated material. A notable exception seems to be the near ubiquitous use of “Master” to refer to sayings attributed to Kong and his disciples. For a similar point see Meyer *forthcoming*. For reviews of Denecke’s work see Weber 2013, Guo Jue 2014 and especially Weingarten *forthcoming*.



with their heritage. To be sure, this article by no means attempts to present a complete account of the dynamics of shared narrative, but rather describes a number of interpretive keys that can be employed to further our understanding of early Chinese intertextuality.

## 2 \**Yucong* 1 and traveling sayings

The Guodian \**Yucong* (YC) material is notoriously difficult to reconstruct.<sup>11</sup> Some of the bamboo slips have broken off, resulting in the loss of at least a dozen graphs. In addition, the relatively large number of broken fragments identifiable as belonging to the YC indicates that likely several slips are either completely missing or damaged beyond reconstruction.<sup>12</sup> Nonetheless, advances in the reconstructions of the texts enable some tentative claims with regard to its content. YC 1 and parts of 3 share several characteristics such as scribal hand, similar and identical phrasings in several lines, and have a broad overlap of themes. For these reasons, it is justified to read the texts as complementary.<sup>13</sup> While many have suggested that YC 1 in its entirety is a mere collection of sayings (hence the title, *Thicket of Sayings*),<sup>14</sup> I suggest that there are several parts that can be related on the basis

---

11 The Guodian corpus contains four texts collectively labeled \**Yucong* or “Thicket of Sayings” by modern editors. It has been convincingly argued that whilst the four texts share roughly similar (short) slip lengths, the YC 4 is a text that is vastly different from the other three in argumentative patterning, content and in material features such as calligraphy and number of binds (two instead of three). The \**Yucong* 1–3 deal with issues such as “human nature” (*xing* 性) and “human responses” (*qing* 情) (YC 2); ritual propriety, human behavior, “humaneness” (*ren* 仁) and “propriety” (*yi* 義), social roles and non-purposive action (*wu wei* 無為) (YC 1 and 3).

12 For an overview and transcription of the broken fragments see Li Ling 2007: 233–234.

13 But not as far as Tu/Liu 2001 suggest, who read the two as if they are parts of the same text, which they then divide anew into two thematically roughly similar texts. Material features such as differences in slip length and the spacing between binding strips rule this out. Cf. Pang Pu 1999 who suggests that the two texts be read as if YC 3 comments on issues in YC 1 using a “canon – commentary” (*jing shuo* 經說) pattern.

14 Harbsmeier 2011 for instance presents the argument that the YC 1 is composed of propositions engaging in logical analysis. I agree that the text provides many analytical statements that come close to something like logical analysis of problems, but I do not agree with the implicit assumption that the text deals with logical problems for the sake of logic. Many of the so-called “statements” of the text can in fact be grouped into longer arguments and do not represent isolated propositions. Furthermore, I argue that the YC 1 as well as 3 offer detailed analyses of several current philosophical problems in order to engage in contemporary debate and that as such they cannot be seen as if abstracted from this discursive context.



of structural, textual, and material features to form small blocks of argument.<sup>15</sup> These blocks are often composed of a traveling saying and are accompanied by definitional and analytical expressions that interpret the sayings in order to make a specific argument. It must be noted that the reconstructions of these blocks and the order amongst the blocks are necessarily tentative. A highly corrupt text such as the YC 1 is difficult to reconstruct as it involves supplementing missing graphs and because the material evidence does not allow for a reliable reordering of the slips. As I show below, certain elements of this text can still be reconstructed on the basis of parallelism, shared themes, and intertextual relations.

The following example is a composite argument in two blocks from YC 1. It starts out with a combination of two definitions and a traveling saying:

**1**<sup>16</sup>

(c8) 仁，人也。義，[道也。]|<sup>17</sup>

(77) [厚於仁，薄]<sup>18</sup>於義，親而

(82) 不尊；厚於義，薄於仁

(79) 尊而不親。|

Humaneness is to be human, propriety is the Way.

When one is substantial in one's humaneness and slight in one's propriety, then one is familiar but not revered; when one is substantial in one's propriety and slight in one's humaneness, then one is revered but not familiar.

This passage starts with two definitions. The first employs a paranomastic gloss, a rhetorical figure that suggests a meaningful relation on the basis of similar

**15** In my reconstruction of the material, I base myself largely on Li Ling's (2007) reconstruction which is thus far the most reliable in terms of the textual arrangement. Liu Zhao 2003 adds valuable insights on paleographic reconstructions of the material. Tu/Liu 2001 advocates many untenable reconstructions and is flawed in many regards but does provide original readings for numerous problematic areas.

**16** Bold numbers represent separate building blocks in the reconstruction. Numbers between parentheses indicate the original slip numbering in *Jingmen Shi Bowuguan* 1998. Bold lines "|" represent punctuation, or rather, reading marks on the slips.

**17** Chen Wei 2003: 215 inserts this broken slip before slips 77/82/79 on the basis of similar material qualities and the near parallel occurrence in the *Biaoji*. He further argues that 道 and 義 must have been reversed in the extant edition of this chapter, basing himself on Zheng Xuan's commentary which reads them the other way around. He also mentions YC 1 slip 22 which reads, 仁生於人，義生於道， further justifying this reading. Note however that this line could also be reconstructed as "Propriety is what is fitting" 義，宜也 as Li Ling 2007: 236 does on the basis of a similar phrase in YC 3 slips 35–37. Note that this would be another paranomastic gloss: yi \*ŋaj-s 義 and yi \*ŋaj 宜.

**18** Chen Wei 2003: 215.



pronunciation.<sup>19</sup> It grounds the scope of “humaneness” (*ren* \*ŋin 仁<sup>20</sup>) in the near homophone “human” (*ren* \*njin 人), thus stipulating its indebtedness to a set of human relationships. In the latter, “propriety” (*yi* 義) is glossed as related to the “Way” (*dao* 道). In this case, it likely refers to a standardized and normative relationship contrastive to the human element in the first definition.

This apparent dichotomy is played out in the traveling saying. It differentiates between the allotment of humaneness and propriety resulting in a difference of “familiarity” (*qin* 親) and “reverence” (*zun* 尊) that characterizes the relationship between humans. Note that the saying is short and comprises of only 22 graphs that can be described as two parallel lines each composed of 3+3+4 graphs featuring a topic comment construction:

When X and Y → this entails Z

Because these two lines are antithetical, they represent a dichotomy as well. Either one is familiar or one is revered. The juxtaposition of these two contrastive types of human relations necessitates a mediation of these two qualities. Both “humaneness” and “propriety” were important concepts and desired qualities in Warring States philosophical discourse.<sup>21</sup> The foil set up in this saying that one could only have either of the two would be dissatisfying and requires further clarification. As such, the saying presents a philosophical problem that needs to be resolved. When it is treated as if standing on its own,<sup>22</sup> or when it is presented in the wrong order,<sup>23</sup> crucial interpretive context is lost. I argue that in order to understand this saying and many others within the \**Yucong* 1, both the internal structure of building blocks, as well as the intertextual relations of the sayings need to be taken into account. Because the specificity of the definitions in the other building blocks are best explained when framed against the intertextual relations of the saying, we first need to take a detour into two other texts that

<sup>19</sup> Behr 2005: 28.

<sup>20</sup> Manuscript evidence where *ren* \*njin 仁 is written with the phonophores *shen* \*ŋin 身 (as in this case), or *qian* \*s.ŋin 千, suggests that the two words were not etymologically related or homophonous. See Gassmann/Behr 2005: 57. I thank the editor for this reference.

<sup>21</sup> Here and in the following, I use the terms “philosophy” and “philosophical” in the sense adumbrated by Defoort 2001: 403 to describe intellectual activity that deals with “questions of deep human concern while substantiating [these] ideas with examples and argument”. As such, I do not suggest that in the context of the Warring States we are talking about philosophy as a separate discipline, peopled by self-proclaimed philosophers, but rather that there were authors who partook in a discourse about those questions of “deep human concern”, whether these questions were culturally specific or not.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Harbsmeier 2011: 39–40.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the original reconstruction in *Jingmen Shi Bowuguan* 1998: 197.



engage with the same philosophical problem, one using the traveling saying, the other referencing its core elements.

The *Biaoji* 表記 chapter of the *Liji* contains an exposition of the problem that uses a near identical articulation of the traveling saying:

仁者，人也，道者，義也。

厚於仁者，薄於義，親而不尊；

厚於義者，薄於仁，尊而不親。<sup>24</sup>

Humaneness is to be human; the Way is to be proper.

Those substantial in humaneness are slight in propriety, they are familiar but not revered; those substantial in propriety are slight in humaneness, they are revered but not familiar.

The main difference in this articulation is that it strengthens the juxtaposition between humaneness and propriety both in the definitions and the traveling saying by subordinating them in a nested topic comment construction marked by the use of the particle *zhe* 者.<sup>25</sup>

*X entails Y → this entails Z*

In addition, this instance of the traveling saying is distantly integrated by attaching a number of qualifications and general principles to the main concepts used within the saying. While the *Biaoji* as a whole appears to be compiled from a diverse number of sayings lacking in tight organization, the distant echoes to various facets of the traveling saying imbues it with at least a semblance of thematic unity. In short, the argument of the *Biaoji* builds up from a number of statements qualifying the different facets of humaneness and the ruler after which it presents the traveling saying as quoted above. In the following paragraphs, a set of general principles are attributed to the ruler, the Way, humaneness, and propriety using quotations from the Odes and other sayings. Only after this lengthy digression into the web of associations relating to the key concepts of the argument, more instances of the dichotomy between familiarity and reverence are presented. These are expressed in terms of members of the family and a wide range of other entities such as fire, heaven and ghosts which are all related to either the father or the mother through a similar attribution of the formula “revered but not familiar” 尊而不親 (father) and “familiar but not revered” 親而不尊 (mother).<sup>26</sup> Because the dichotomy is represented through so many different elements that occur across the text, the argument gains in unity and the audience is brought back to its pressing nature. After all, if all these different qualities can be sharply distinguished as

<sup>24</sup> *Liji* 1980: 1639.a.

<sup>25</sup> I thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.

<sup>26</sup> *Liji* 1980: 1641.b–1642.a.



either embodying the quality of reverence, or that of familiarity, it is presented as constituting a fundamental problem. And since each individual element of these binaries represents a desirable quality, the need to mediate the dichotomy thus becomes progressively pressing. From a rhetorical perspective, when these antithetical elements are finally brought together in the person of Shun, it presents a climactic conclusion that resolves the mounting tension of the argument:

虞帝[...]君天下，生無私，死不厚其子。子民如父母，有憐怛之愛，有忠利之教。親而尊，安而敬，威而愛[...]<sup>27</sup>

Emperor Yu's (i.e. Shun 舜) rule over the All Under Heaven [was such that] in life he was selfless, in death he did not favor his sons. He treated the people as if he was their father and mother, as if they were his children, his care was sorrowful and worried, his teachings were faithful and beneficial. He was familiar yet revered, at ease yet respected, awesome yet cared for.

In this conclusion to the argument, Shun is presented as embodying all the desired qualities of a ruler. He can both act the part of father and mother in his treatment of the people, and importantly, is both familiar and revered. The point of this passage is thus that a sage ruler like Shun is able to transcend the dichotomy presented in the traveling saying. As a “model” (*biao* 表) for good rule, Shun presents an ideal that can be reached if the audience is willing to accept the premises of the argument and strives to transcend the dichotomy itself.

That this issue was commonly debated in early philosophical literature can be seen from another occurrence of the dichotomy and its mediation in the *Wenwang Shizi* 文王世子 chapter of the *Liji* and in a passage from the *Xiaojing* 孝經. These chapters, while not containing the traveling saying itself, do contain some of its elements and can thus be seen as referring to the same debate. The *Wenwang Shizi* stresses that in educating the heir apparent, two different roles come into play. Here it is not the father and mother, but father and ruler that are the object of discussion. The aspect of familiarity is relegated to the role of the father in this chapter, whereas reverence is an attribute accorded to the ruler. Again, in order to rule successfully, the two aspects are ideally combined in one person:

君之於世子也，親則父也，尊則君也。有父之親，有君之尊，然後兼天下而有之。<sup>28</sup>

With regard to the heir, if the ruler is familiar then he is the father, if he is revered then he is the ruler. Only when [the heir] has the familiarity of the father and the reverence of the ruler can he bring the All Under Heaven together and hold on to it.

<sup>27</sup> *Liji* 1980: 1642.b.

<sup>28</sup> *Liji* 1980: 1407.b.



To paraphrase the medieval distinction between the king's two bodies, the ruler in this passage is presented as having a "body politic" and a "body family".<sup>29</sup> In order to imbue his heir with the necessary qualities to rule, he needs to simultaneously show him the quality of familiarity as his father and inspire the political quality of reverence as his ruler. When these two divergent aspects are successfully brought to bear on the heir by the ruler, he will be able to rule successfully. A permutation of this formula is present in the *Xiaojing*:

故母取其愛而君取其敬，兼之者父也。<sup>30</sup>

This is why the mother has his care and the ruler his respect, the one combining them is the father.

On the surface, this passage is rather different. It features "care" instead of "familiarity", "respect" instead of "reverence", and it foregrounds the father rather than the ruler as the role that unifies these different qualities. From a structural perspective however, it is clear that a similar dichotomy is resolved using semantically equivalent terms. In other words, each of the passages analyzed above refers back to the same basic philosophical problem, the difference being that it is developed along different lines and in different contexts. Where the *\*Yucong* 1 and the *Biaoji* present the problem through a traveling saying, the *Wenwang Shizi* and the *Xiaojing* refer to it without quoting the traveling saying verbatim. Even though the correspondences between these passages might be explained by referring to influence from a written *Vorlage*, the possibility for variation rather suggests that the contrastive pair of familiarity and reverence situated in the ruler as parent was a *remembered* and culturally significant problem in early political discourse. It could thus equally be explained as deriving from oral transmission.

Traveling sayings constitute the most memorable and adaptable articulations of such a problem, and thus they can be seen as the central nodes in the debate surrounding it. When composers of text made use of a traveling saying, they engaged in a discourse that, whether consciously or not, triggered a set of culturally coded intertextual and memorized connotations. In other words, they engaged in a debate. It would be too much to argue that the audience or recipient of a traveling saying was aware of all its different articulations, but any "culturally literate" recipient would be aware of the *cultural significance* of the debated issue.<sup>31</sup> This

<sup>29</sup> See the discussion in Kantorowicz 1997 on the medieval distinction between the body politic and the body natural as having different political theological aspects.

<sup>30</sup> *Xiaojing Zhushu* 1980: 2548.b.

<sup>31</sup> The observation that these issues were often phrased in traveling sayings cannot be explained just by reference to common language habits. While certain types of phrasing come more readily to mind than others when discussing a certain problem, it is pertinent to remember that it is



awareness of engagement in a debate across an extended situation, i.e. a debate that consists of known earlier pronouncements on the same topic, is one of the key features that Assmann highlights in his discussion on the formation of cultural memory and we shall come back to this below.<sup>32</sup>

To illustrate how a traveling saying represents an articulation within a debate, we now return to the \**Yucong* which uses definitions to distance itself from other instances in the debate, by limiting the scope of applicability and interpretation of the dichotomy enclosed within the traveling saying.

### 3 Block 2: solutions and definitions

The second building block in the argument of the YC 1 takes up where the traveling saying left off: the problematic dichotomy between reverence and familiarity. Ironically, the text is damaged exactly in the place wherein this paradox is mediated (slip 78). Nonetheless, the context of this passage provides several clues that point to a plausible solution. Block 2 provides several definitions delineating the scope of the first block. These definitions relate social roles to the quality of familiarity, reverence, or choice. As such, they delineate the number of possible interpretations that can be attached to the traveling saying.

#### 2

(78) [君猶]<sup>33</sup>父，有親有尊；

(80) 長悌，親道也<sup>34</sup>。友君臣，<sup>35</sup>

(81) 毋親也。|

(87) 君臣、朋友，其擇者也。|<sup>36</sup>

in fact the same philosophical problem that is being reiterated. In other words, the problem is significant, and one of the apt modes of expression is the traveling saying.

<sup>32</sup> Assmann 2011: 255–267.

<sup>33</sup> This slip is broken at the top. One would expect three more graphs as that would total to eight, the average number of graphs per fully filled slip. However, there is only enough space for two graphs, due to the large space after the graph “father” (*fu* 父). Qiu Xigui in *Jingmen Shi Bowuguan* 1998: 200 argues that “not revered” (*bu zun* 不尊) should be added, which would not make sense in terms of parallelism and is likely the result of wrongly appending s79 after this slip.

<sup>34</sup> Compare *Yucong* 3 s.6–7: 長悌，孝之方也。 (“Older and younger brother, these are the means of filial piety.”). See Tu/Liu 2001: 256.

<sup>35</sup> Compare *Yucong* 3 s.6: 友，君臣之道也。 (“Friendship is the way of ruler and minister.”).

<sup>36</sup> Because of the parallel structure in this passage, and the intertextual link with the *Biaoji*, the original Wenwu reconstruction in *Jingmen Shi Bowuguan* 1998: 200, wherein this slip follows s.77 and precedes s.79, does not make much sense. Moreover, because this slip is broken off,



A ruler is like a father, he has both familiarity and reverence.  
 Respecting the older and caring for the younger brother is the way of familiarity.  
 In befriending ruler and minister avoid familiarity!  
 Ruler and minister, comrades and friends, these are electives.

In this block, the hierarchy amongst brothers is defined in terms of familiarity whereas the relation between ruler and minister is defined as a form of friendship which should not be familiar. The text further explains this statement in the definitional clause by arguing that the relation between ruler and minister is one of choice and can therefore not be familiar. As shown in the examples above, these qualities are oppositional but can be mediated by combining them in one person. This occurs on slip 78. In the original reconstruction two graphs are missing and it merely states “the father has both familiarity and reverence”.<sup>37</sup> The two missing graphs can be supplemented with phrasing seen in \**Yucong* 3, a text that shares near identical definitional expressions and appears closely related,<sup>38</sup> to read as “when a ruler is like a father, he has both familiarity and reverence.” ([君猶]父, 有親有尊).<sup>39</sup> This reconstruction provides logical coherence between the saying and its definitions.<sup>40</sup> In addition, it tallies with the other texts under discussion by mediating the dichotomy through combining the roles of ruler and father. The father is the head of the family and thus represents the most revered aspect of familiar relations. Likewise, the ruler as the head of the state is an obvious object of reverence, but he can also be perceived as familiar in the way he treats his people for instance.

Despite the ruler being equated to the father, the definitional expressions stipulate the scope of both his familiarity and reverence. While the hierarchy be-

---

two graphs are missing at least, and in addition the line does not end with a punctuation mark. As such, it is a serious possibility that not just two graphs are lost to us but that in fact one or more complete bamboo slips are missing. Not wanting to reconstruct on too speculative grounds however, I chose to tentatively supplement two graphs, and read this line in tandem with the next block.

<sup>37</sup> *Jingmen Shi Bowuguan* 1998: 197.

<sup>38</sup> Not only are the definitions similar to those of YC 1, in addition, all text in YC 3 that has overlap or comments on elements from YC 1 is written in the same hand and using similar types of argument.

<sup>39</sup> Compare *Yucong* 3 s.1.

<sup>40</sup> Logical coherence, for instance the structure of the passage, and the fact that two qualities are brought together in one person, rule out the suggestions of Qiu Xigui 1998: 200 “Do not revere . . .” (*bu zun* 不尊) and Li Ling 2007: 209 “Distinguish the ruler . . .” (*bie jun* 别君); textual parallels from the closely related \**Yucong* 3 “The ruler is like a father” (*jun you fu ye* 君猷父也) provide a sensible solution to the problem and thus have preference over the unsubstantiated “Show piety to . . .” (*xiao qi* 孝其) suggested by Tu/Liu 2001: 263.



tween older and younger brothers is explicitly characterized as being an aspect of familiarity, the definitions depart from the traditional relation between ruler and minister, as seen in the other texts, by stressing that it is imperatively non-familiar. This significant element has been taken up by Yuri Pines in an excellent article describing the changing nature of the notion of loyalty and the relationship between rulers and ministers from the Spring and Autumn period through the early Empire. He argues for the prevalence of the ruler-minister debate focusing on the way to conceptualize loyalty. Within this debate, the traveling saying discussed above and related passages in the *\*Yucong* materials present a position favoring equality between ruler and minister and reflects the higher status of late Warring States *Shi* 士. He further states that “the Guodian authors evidently preferred to emphasize the reciprocal rather than the hierarchic nature of ruler-minister ties”.<sup>41</sup>

I agree with Pines’ argument that the material from *\*Yucong* 1 and 3 favors the conceptualization of ruler-minister relations in terms of friendship.<sup>42</sup> What I want to stress is that this difference in conceptualization is explicitly framed against the traveling saying representing a common understanding of hierarchical relationships. In other words, the traveling saying carries the predominant connotations, the framework as it were, of this debate and it is this set of connotations that the definitions attempt to limit and thus redefine. When the definitions stipulate that the hierarchy of familiar relationships does not apply to the minister, the logic of the traveling saying necessitates that the hierarchy of reverential relations is still in place. The difference between these two types of relationships is thus further refined in the YC. Whereas both can be understood as hierarchical, the crucial difference lies in the fact that familial, i.e. blood relations cannot be severed, whereas reverential relations can be broken off. Redefining ruler-minister relations in terms of friendship that is elective thus underscores the element of choice in these relations and opens the way for a different attitude to service.

As Pines has shown, the possibility to sever a relationship based on friendship paves the way for the late Warring States shift towards loyalty to an ideal rather than a person. When the ruler is no longer representative of that ideal, the

---

<sup>41</sup> Pines 2002: 41.

<sup>42</sup> It should be noted however that it is imprecise to speak of “Guodian authors” as if the materials from Guodian present a unified position regarding topics such as loyalty. The different positions and arguments in the different texts speak against this. Likewise, the notion that these texts represented the view of the tomb owner are difficult to sustain, see Meyer 2012: 7.



minister can choose to serve a new ruler.<sup>43</sup> Again, I agree with Pines that this is a break with traditional forms of loyalty modeled on family relationships.<sup>44</sup> What needs to be stressed is that reference to this traditional model is in itself implied in the remembered connotations of the traveling saying and its intertextual relations. The traveling saying thus carries this problematic into the discussion. It operates as a mnemonic key, referring as an index to this very debate and it is in redefining and limiting the import and scope of key terms in the saying that the YC turns the semantic charge of the traveling saying towards a radically different agenda. As Li Ling observes, the picture of Early Chinese philosophical debate which then emerges, at least in part, is indeed not so much “who is quoting who”,<sup>45</sup> but rather how each text appropriates a share of commonly acknowledged and remembered notions and problems, and integrates them into a specific argument.

When traveling sayings are thus described as carrying culturally important, remembered articulations of philosophical problems, this raises the question of how to qualify their relations to cultural memory. Does mere reference to a particular concept invoke all its intertextual relations anytime anywhere? Or do different types of reference have different relations with cultural memory and do they therefore need to be explained in different ways? Why are traveling sayings so particularly memorable? How are they carriers of the debated problematic with its associations instead of mere references to elements of a debate?

## 4 Traveling sayings: a typology

The following presents a typology delineating the dominant aspects common to traveling sayings: their intertextuality, structure, relation to spoken contexts and, importantly, their mnemonic qualities.

---

<sup>43</sup> See also other statements to this effect in \**Yucong* 3: (1)父亡惡，君猶父也，其弗惡(2)也，猶三軍之旌也，正也。所(3)以異於父，君臣不相存也，(4)則可已；不悅，可去也；不(5)義而加諸己，弗受也。| (“A father is not disliked; a ruler is like a father. That he is not disliked is because he is like the feathered flag of the three armies, he is straight. That in which the ruler differs from the father, lies in the fact that when ruler and minister don’t support each other, they can end the relationship. If not pleased, one can take leave of each other. If improper behavior is forced upon one’s person, one does not have to accept it.”). Interestingly enough, this passage is followed by highly similar definitional phrases to those in building block 2: (8)父孝子愛，非有為也。(6)友，君臣之道也。長悌，孝(7)之方也。| (“Piety for the father and love for the son, these are without deliberate act. Friendship is the way of ruler and minister. (Differentiating) elder and younger brother is the means of piety.”).

<sup>44</sup> Pines 2002: 40–41.

<sup>45</sup> Li Ling 2004: 204, n.3.



First, from the fact that the sayings appear in different contexts, it is clear that they “travel”. Not unlike anecdotes, quotations, and proverbs, these sayings share a tendency to appear in different texts and contexts across time and space. Traveling text is quite common in Early Chinese materials, a historical anecdote might first appear in written form in the *Zuozhuan* 左傳, resurface in the *Hanfeizi* 韓非子 and even later appear as cultural lore in the form of an “idiom” (*chengyu* 成語). Similarly, a popular line from the Odes might travel through the *Lunyu*, included in an early commentary on poetics and become absorbed in a collection such as the *Mao Odes* 毛詩 to finally be used to cap an anecdote in the *Hanshi Waizhuan* 韓詩外傳.<sup>46</sup>

A second feature shared by traveling sayings is that even though they are structurally stable, their wording and content may be slightly and in some cases heavily altered to suit the circumstances whilst remaining recognizably the “same” figure. As such they are adaptable to a number of circumstances, which favors their remembrance and transmission. The abandoned courtesan for instance, can be used both to express the pains of political rejection or as a symbol of romantic love, depending on the context.<sup>47</sup> As seen in the examples above, simple changes such as the use of particles can be made, but more often than not, the whole conclusion or comments on the saying are altered to meet new circumstances.

A third common characteristic of traveling sayings is their close relation to a spoken context, hence “saying”. Although the example from the YC above is not framed as a quote – the YC distinctly lacks such meta-textual elements – its patterned language is ideally suited for rhetorical delivery. Other sayings feature rhymes, assonances or a proverbial and apodictic style that are suggestive of a spoken context. This is not to say that these sayings need to have been composed or transmitted orally, but rather that they evoke the same characteristics that are suited to such an oral context. This particular mode of expression is similar to maxims and proverbs which are presented as referring back to common knowledge by virtue of having been pronounced by generations of people before.

Fourth, and most importantly, traveling sayings are memorable. In order for these sayings to travel they have to be remembered. That this is true for an oral context goes without saying, but it certainly also applies to cases of written transmission. One has to remember a saying – or at least the vague notion that it was worth remembering – in order to look it up and quote or adapt it. This point

<sup>46</sup> I follow Meyer in that I refer to pre-canonized *shi* 詩 as “Odes” to illustrate their fluid nature during the Warring States whilst the “Odes” refer to a fixed, canonized selection of Odes. Meyer 2012: 23.

<sup>47</sup> Idema 1991: 12.



may appear obvious, but in a textual culture without physical index systems, the value of memory cannot be overstated. It is the communicative power enabled by a shared, cultural memory (be it enshrined in text or mnemonics) that enables a discourse to emerge across space and time.

In a number of important contributions, Martin Kern has developed theories of cultural memory by the Egyptologist Jan Assmann, and shown how certain texts, tropes, and poems relate to a shared cultural understanding of identity.<sup>48</sup> Li Ling and William Boltz have similarly discussed the source reservoirs of cultural lore that early composers tapped into to generate new texts.<sup>49</sup> These source reservoirs, when consisting of philosophical or gnomic rather than just historiographical text also contribute to a shared cultural memory. Traveling sayings, by virtue of intertextually linking to earlier and contemporaneous pronouncements, form what Assmann refers to as a “hypoleptic” discourse, wherein one statement builds up on previous statements by virtue of engaging in the same, extended debate.<sup>50</sup> These intertextual reservoirs thus formed a body of cultural wisdom that, whether explicitly or not, resonated within a culturally conversant group of participants. In absence of clearly voiced authorial identification and textual stratification that would clarify the actors and the heritage of the ideas within this extended discussion, we can at least establish the fact that certain ideas and their formulations were remembered, and in the end, written down by a group of people. The wider a textual unit, trope, or indeed a traveling saying is spread throughout the corpus of Early Chinese textual material, the more likely it is to have been commonly remembered and considered culturally significant. As such these reservoirs of material are closely related to cultural memory and memory culture. They formed on the one hand the basic materials that were predominantly used to talk and write about specific subjects, while at the same time providing a framework structuring knowledge.

An understanding of some of the basic aspects conducive to memorization may thus help to explain why the sayings described above were remembered and chosen to be reused in different contexts. Studies on memory culture have argued

---

<sup>48</sup> Assmann 1999 [Transl. 2011] developed this term (*kulturelles Gedächtnis*) to describe the meaningful frameworks of cultural capital that structure knowledge and identity in early cultures. The concept has been used by Kern 2000, 2005a, 2009 and Meyer 2012 among others to describe the memorized and predominantly orally transmitted troves of cultural knowledge such as the Odes and the Documents.

<sup>49</sup> For a discussion of “reservoirs” of “common resources” see Li Ling 2004: 204, n.3; Boltz 2005: 63; Fischer 2009: 2.

<sup>50</sup> Assmann 2011: 255–267.



that memorization is influenced by at least the following three factors: brevity, structure and meaning.<sup>51</sup>

Brevity is an important aspect of memorization. In general, the shorter the message the easier it is to remember.<sup>52</sup> Griffiths describes the ideal length of such short “gobbets” that can be easily stored in long-term memory to be limited to roughly fifteen to twenty units. These units can be words, graphs or sounds and signs.<sup>53</sup> Gobbets such as this correspond roughly to the length of a Tang poem in regulated verse or a stanza from the Odes. The first example from YC 1 contains 26 graphs, of which 12 unique. This of course does not mean that longer text was not remembered, but rather that for ease of recall, it needs to be divided into shorter gobbets. Accordingly, longer texts such as the several stanzas that make up an Ode or a lengthy anecdote can likewise be easily remembered by dividing it into such smaller gobbets and remembering the way these relate to each other. This is where structure comes in.

Structuring devices such as rhyme, repetition, melody, meter or simple rhetorical devices such as parallelism, juxtaposition, a turn or *volte*, and well established narrative conventions,<sup>54</sup> all serve to fix a particular message to memory.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, structures like repetition and juxtaposition effectively decrease the number of units to remember because they either fall into the same category (word, rhyme group, type of word), or they are “something opposite to”, thus working as a short index to a larger number of units.<sup>56</sup> The structure of the examples above bears out this point: each saying is constructed from highly parallel units, featuring extensive repetition wherein main concepts are juxtaposed in a predictable, and thus memorable, pattern.

Lastly, as a matter of course, these messages are all charged with meaning and esthetic quality that makes them especially worthwhile of remembrance.

---

<sup>51</sup> For studies on different aspects of memory culture see Griffiths 1999; Carr 2005; Carruthers 2008; Clanchy 2013.

<sup>52</sup> Carruthers 2008: 98 quotes the famous medieval memory theorist Hugh of St. Victor as stating: “the memory rejoices in shortness” (“*memoria brevitatem gaudet*”).

<sup>53</sup> See Griffiths 1999: 54–55, and also Beecroft 2009: 27 for further references to neurological literature describing the mnemonic processes of the brain.

<sup>54</sup> The evil stepmother always, and cross-culturally, drives away the virtuous daughter in favor of her own treacherous children. Tang poetry generally features a break, both in rhyme and content, in the third line or stanza and many maxims feature a simple juxtaposition that is resolved such as sunshine coming after the rain, the sweet after the sour or bitter, and fruits only appearing after labor spent.

<sup>55</sup> For a convenient overview of classical rhetorical devices also occurring in Early China, see Unger 1994.

<sup>56</sup> See Farmer et al. 2000 for further references on how structure and indexicality help in memorization, see also Richter 2013: 157–170.



Because of their regular patterning, these sayings adhere to the rhetorical and esthetic value of *wen* 文, described extensively by Schaberg and Kern.<sup>57</sup> As a result of their literary patterning, these sayings provide an especially apt mode of expression and are useful in adorning an argument, or operating as a major structuring device linking different textual units.<sup>58</sup> Moreover, because of their pithy and apodictic mode of expression, these sayings provide a matter of fact, and thus authoritative, but also an opaque and eminently reinterpretable statement on a commonly used concept or problem. This powerful mode of expression is especially meaningful within the context of a debate. Either the saying is used as a foil to present one's own arguments, or the saying is adapted, and thus reinterpreted, to meet new argumentative needs. In both cases, the reuse of a particular saying suggests that it was perceived as a particularly apt and efficacious mode of expressing an argument related to its topic. In other words, with each articulation, the relation between the saying and the topic becomes closer and more proverbial. In that sense, the saying in itself thus operates as a portal, referring to a large web of meaningful intertextual relations informing a particular topic or problem of philosophical debate. The more "culturally literate" the recipient, the more these intertextual relations are activated in interpreting a saying. It is because of these qualities that traveling sayings are an ideal vehicle to represent certain philosophical problems; they constitute the intertextual nodes at the center of the debate.

In this respect, traveling sayings are different from the references as seen in the *Wenwang Shizi* chapter and the *Xiaojing*. By using the same concepts, but integrating them into an argumentative structure instead of preserving the saying in full, they represent a more oblique reference to the debate. The difference is one in degree and can be likened to the difference between direct quotation and paraphrase. Compare the following example, seen in YC 3:

(48) 思亡彊, 思亡期,<sup>59</sup> 思亡邪;<sup>60</sup> 思 (49) 亡不由我者。<sup>61</sup> ■<sup>62</sup>

Think without obstruction, without yearning, without bad intent: in thinking, nothing does not originate from myself.

<sup>57</sup> Schaberg 2001: ch.2, Kern 2001.

<sup>58</sup> Schwermann 2013.

<sup>59</sup> I follow Li Ling 2007: 194 and Chen Wei 2002: 223 who read 其 as 期 on the basis of the parallel in the Odes.

<sup>60</sup> Chen Wei 2002: 224 transcribes this graph as 糸 + 牙, a graphic loan for *xie* 袞 which is later written as *ye* 邪.

<sup>61</sup> Chen Wei 2003: 223–224 reads 我 as 我 contra Li Ling 2007: 194 who reads 義.

<sup>62</sup> This thick block signifies the end of a statement in a typologically distinct section of \**Yucong* 3 where the bamboo slips are written in two equidistant columns on the bamboo.



This saying is patterned in a manner reminiscent of traveling sayings. It features extensive repetition in a tight formulaic structure followed by a comment that breaks the pattern and presents the conclusion. While it thus structurally exhibits many of the features that make for a memorable saying, the way it refers to cultural memory and philosophical debate is rather different. In fact, the first three isocola all refer to the Ode *Jiong* 駒 currently preserved in the Hymns of Zhou (*Zhou Song* 周頌) section in the *Mao* 毛 edition of the *Odes*.<sup>63</sup> In this Ode, the isocola occur at the beginning of the third line of the first, second and fourth stanza of the ode, respectively.<sup>64</sup> Accordingly, the elements of the phrase above refer intertextually to an Ode ostensibly about horses,<sup>65</sup> instead of forming the locus of debate. It was the Ode that echoed in the cultural memory of the Warring States when encountering this phrase, not the other way around. It is also the language of the Ode that is reinterpreted, or rather, reconstrued to meet the language habits of later text users. As van Zoeren has argued, the “meaningless particle” *si* 思 takes on full verbal meaning in the reuse of these lines in later sayings.<sup>66</sup> What this suggests is a stabilized trope in linguistic expression but not a stable semantic entity, which could indeed be “remembered” as meaning something else entirely. This can be seen in the following passage from *Lunyu* 2.2. Like the YC 3, which turns the snippets from the Ode into apodictic statements about thought, *Lunyu* 2.2 contains a saying where the master is framed as summarizing the whole of the Odes by reference to a line from *Jiong*:

子曰：“詩三百，一言以蔽之，曰：‘思無邪。’”<sup>67</sup>

The master said: “The Odes number three hundred, but they can be covered in a single phrase: ‘Think without bad intent.’”

Where the YC 3 example picked the structuring formula from the Ode to make the argument that ultimately all thought comes from – and is thus restricted by – oneself, the *Lunyu* saying turns it into a hermeneutical statement on the nature of the Odes.<sup>68</sup> While not going into what this means for early Odes interpretation,

<sup>63</sup> *Maoshi Zhengyi* 1980: 609–610.

<sup>64</sup> The third stanza of *Jiong* also contains the phrase “Pondering without weariness” 思無斁 which is not included in the YC 3.

<sup>65</sup> But taken to be a hymn, allegorically praising Duke Xi of Lu’s good character and care for his people by the influential *preface*, where the care and thought devoted to his horses are taken to represent the duke’s care of his people. Cf. *Maoshi Zhengyi* 1980: 609.a.

<sup>66</sup> Van Zoeren 1991: 38. Van Zoeren’s contention that this reading is undisputed is however not tenable, compare Dobson 1968: 123–124 for instance who reads *si* 思 as a demonstrative used anaphorically, leading him to read the phrase *si wu jiang* 思無疆 as “They [travel] unendingly”.

<sup>67</sup> *Lunyu Zhushu* 1980: 2461.c.

<sup>68</sup> See van Zoeren 1991: 37–38, Kern 2010: 47.



the point here is that the referent, in other words, the mnemonic anchor of the sayings, is the Ode, and not the individual sayings. True, in the case of the *Lunyu* example, the saying gained an interpretive history of its own (and thus became a referent). But in doing so, it bore no direct relation to the Ode in question anymore. In both the case of the *Lunyu* and the YC 3 saying it appears likely that the reference to the Ode as a focal point in cultural memory was one that resonated with familiar language and cultural prestige rather than remembered meaning per se.

To illustrate this difference, the following traveling sayings present a relatively stable configuration of *meaningful* juxtapositions, even when key concepts or the order of the lines are exchanged. The earliest attested form of this traveling saying occurs in two different texts from the Shanghai Museum corpus, referred to as *\*Wuwang Jianzuo* A and B.<sup>69</sup> They are both written on the same manuscript dated to roughly 300 BCE.<sup>70</sup> The traveling saying is composed of a simple structure of rhymed, paralleled antitheses exemplifying the difference between controlled behavior and laxity and desire.

(3) 怠(4) 勝義則喪 \*s-m<sup>5</sup>an-s, 義勝怠則長 \*tranʔ.

義勝欲則從 \*dzon, 欲勝義則兇 \*q<sup>h</sup>on. <sup>71</sup>

When laxity prevails over propriety there will be loss, when propriety prevails over laxity there will be growth. When propriety prevails over desire there will be adherence, when desire prevails over propriety there will be calamity.

(13) 志勝欲則(14) [昌] \*thjan, 欲勝志 – 則喪 \*s-m<sup>5</sup>an-s –

志勝欲則從 \*dzon – 欲勝志則兇 \*q<sup>h</sup>on.

敬勝怠則吉 \*C.qit – 怠勝敬 – 則滅 – \*met. <sup>72</sup>

When will prevails over desire there will be flourishing, when desire prevails over will there will be loss. When will prevails over desire there will be adherence, when desire prevails over will there will be calamity. When respect prevails over laxity there will be fortune, when laxity prevails over respect there will be destruction.

<sup>69</sup> Ma Chengyuan 2008: 149–168.

<sup>70</sup> Ma Chengyuan 2001: 2.

<sup>71</sup> *\*Wuwang Jianzuo* A s.3–4. I follow the reconstruction in *Fudan Dushuhui* 2008; phonological reconstructions follow Baxter/Sagart 2011. Compare also the received version: *Dadai Liji* 1919: 123, “Wuwang Jianzuo 武王踐阼”: “When respect prevails over laxity there will be fortune, when laxity prevails over respect there will be destruction. When propriety prevails over desire there will be adherence, when desire prevails over propriety there will be calamity.” (敬勝怠者吉 \*C.qit, 怠勝敬者滅 \*met, 義勝欲者從 \*dzon, 欲勝義者凶 \*q<sup>h</sup>on. ).

<sup>72</sup> *\*Wuwang Jianzuo* B s.13–14. On the rhyme \*-it and \*-et see Baxter 1992: 399. Note that this rendition of the traveling saying is marked with punctuation that facilitates reading the passage out loud, ensuring correct attention to pauses and rhymes. In this text, only the traveling saying



To paraphrase Kern's conclusion on the stability of the Odes in manuscript quotations,<sup>73</sup> these two instances of the traveling saying illustrate a pattern of variation in wording, while being stable in meaning. The basic structure of each line of the saying is made up of two contrastive concepts. If controlled behavior, variously expressed as propriety (*yi* 義), respect (*jing* 敬),<sup>74</sup> or will (*zhi* 志), prevails over laxity (*dai* 怠) or desire (*yu* 欲) the result will be positive and vice versa. Each individual line has an AA rhyme pattern, and the saying can consist of as many as three rhymed pairs, AA/BB/CC that can be organized in any order. What distinguishes the different articulations of this saying from regular use of formulaic language is that the meaningful relations between the individual concepts are stable. Even though the concepts themselves can be exchanged, they present a functional similarity in their juxtaposition to either laxity or desire;<sup>75</sup> they belong to the same semantic field. Accordingly, the basic meaningful antonym structure is stable even though the wording is different in each instance. The same process of placing functionally similar concepts into an existing structure, and using either of the three end rhymes above occurs in the other instances of this saying, such as in the *Huainanzi*, the *Liu Tao*, and the *Xunzi*:

故情勝欲者昌<sup>thjan</sup>, 欲勝情者亡<sup>\*man</sup>.<sup>76</sup>

This is why it is the case that when responses prevail over desire, there will be flourishing, when desire prevails over responses there will be loss.

and its rhyming denouement that is used to integrate the saying in the text are marked by punctuation. This suggests that it is especially these parts that had to be intoned correctly. In light of textual differences between *\*Wuwang Jianzuo* A and B this is even more striking, where the text of A continually makes a point of the *documentary* nature of ancient lore, viz. the traveling saying, text B instead emphasizes the *oral-performative* nature of the delivery of the saying. These differences bear out a different appreciation of the function and usage of these texts and their sayings, and this is expressed in the different material manifestation of the text on the manuscript. For a broader study of these marks see Richter, forthcoming.

73 “[...] for the late pre-imperial and early imperial period, we witness the double phenomena of a canonical text that is as stable in its wording as it is unstable in its writing.” (Kern 2005c: xxi).

74 Note that the graphic forms of *jing* 敬 [see Fig. A] (s.7.18) and *yi* 義 [see Fig. B] (s.4.2) are similar in Chu script, even leading some to believe that in fact the scribe made an error. Cf. Tomoko 2009. The two can nonetheless be distinguished quite clearly. Her argument is moreover problematic as it is based on an attempt to harmonize the manuscript text to the received text. For this tendency see the discussion in Richter 2013.

75 See Schaberg 2001: 40–50 who has shown a similar process occurring in *Zuozhuan* judgments.

76 *Huainanzi* Jijie 1998: 755 “Miucheng Xun 繆稱訓”.



Fig. A



Fig. B



故義勝欲則昌 $thjan$ , 欲勝義則亡 $*man$ ;  
敬勝怠則吉 $*C.qit$ , 怠勝敬則滅 $*met$ .<sup>77</sup>

This is why it is the case that when propriety prevails over desire there will be flourishing, when desire prevails over propriety there will be loss. When respect prevails over laxity there will be fortune, when laxity prevails over respect there will be destruction.

故敬勝怠則吉 $*C.qit$ , 怠勝敬則滅 $*met$ ;  
計勝欲則從 $*dzoŋ$ , 欲勝計則凶 $*q^hŋ$ .

This is why it is the case that when respect prevails over laxity there will be fortune, when laxity prevails over respect there will be destruction. When planning prevails over desire there will be adherence, when desire prevails over planning there will be calamity.<sup>78</sup>

These examples clearly show that in the transmission of this saying, be it oral or written, the basic meaningful structure, that is the antonym structure juxtaposing functionally equivalent forms of controlled behavior versus laxity or desire, and the three rhyme pairs  $*an//an$ ,  $*on//on$ , and  $*it//et$  were remembered. As long as the basic structure was kept intact, the concepts could be exchanged, while maintaining a functional similarity. This semantically stable block is then integrated into different arguments. In the different *Wuwang Jianzuo* texts and the *Liu Tao* it is presented as the essential wisdom of the sage kings on how to rule, in the *Huainanzi* chapter it features in a discussion on the role of self-cultivation of virtue and the gradual decline of the ages, and in the *Xunzi* it is used to describe the value of respect in being a good general. The concepts, though functionally equivalent and stable in their general import, exhibit slight changes in each manifestation of the saying. Whether consciously or unconsciously, these sayings were “worked” into the argument and each text engages with different elements and adapts the saying to its own argumentative program. In other words, as opposed to the examples where elements from the Ode *Jiong* were coopted, the sayings here are flexible in their use of language, while its basic meaning remained stable.

As such, the reason these sayings travel between texts is not because they are the exact answers, ideas or definitions, i.e. the very words of a particular master that needed to be quoted for authority or to show intellectual heritage. Rather, these sayings travel because they present a particularly eloquent and memorable way of presenting an important *problem* or *topic* that different texts could then integrate in different ways. This is reflected in the way the sayings are introduced in the text as well. The saying in the *Wuwang Jianzuo* and *Liu Tao* texts is presented as old wisdom transmitted by the figure of Taigong Wang, but is by no means ex-

<sup>77</sup> *Liu Tao* 1919: 17 “Mingzhuan 明傳”.

<sup>78</sup> *Xunzi Jijie* 1988: 278.



plicitly associated with this character. The incipit 故 *gu* “this is why” in *Huainanzi*, *Xunzi*, and the *Liu Tao*, rather frames the traveling saying as a commonly known part of cultural memory that can be appropriated by anyone.

## 5 Integrating and interpreting the sayings

Conceived in this way, the adoption and reworking of, or the commenting upon a traveling saying is a substantial aspect of early philosophical debate. The merit of this practice does not just lie in the potential to convince an opponent by careful argumentation, but also because it appropriates a commonly used and well-phrased saying and adapting it to a specific argumentative agenda.

The meaning of each different manifestation of a traveling saying is then negotiated in a dialogic movement between the semantic range of the saying and the argumentative program of the text. In other words, the saying offers a number of likely and suitable interpretations from which the text amplifies some and downplays others. In the first group of examples above, all manifestations deal with the particular issue of how to resolve the tension between familiarity and reverence, in the second group, a particular type of desired social conduct is juxtaposed to undesired behavior. The argumentative space for meaningfully integrating such a saying is thus limited to pronouncing a particular verdict or specification of this philosophical problem carried in the saying. The different stance in the debate is thus reflected in the different way a saying is adapted and woven into the rest of the argument to amplify a specific interpretation.

Where the traveling saying carries a certain issue into the discussion, different interpretations develop different elements of this problematic. Because many of these traveling sayings are relatively opaque, they invite interpretation. As Schaberg has shown for the use of concepts in patterned arguments, these are often left ambiguous to allow for openness of interpretation.<sup>79</sup> However, that does not mean that their interpretation is completely unrestricted as he also notes that certain themes are recurrently presented through a fixed set of concepts, anecdotes and literary tropes. Thus the cultural importance of literary patterning (*wen* 文) for instance, is recurrently stressed by employing anecdotes related to its paranomastic and historiographical ancestor, King Wen 文王.<sup>80</sup> As such, more often than not, the interpretations share certain common aspects. On the one

<sup>79</sup> Schaberg 2001 develops Eno 1990's notion of the purposefully vague definition of concepts in Warring States texts. Because of their unfixed nature, these concepts could be harnessed to suit a variety of arguments while still remaining within a traditional scope of reference.

<sup>80</sup> Schaberg 2001: 40–50.



hand this is due to similar exegetical purposes (for example when dealing with a tradition), on the other hand this is a result of the traveling saying dictating the range of interpretation.

In the examples above, different ways of integrating the traveling sayings occurred. The example from YC 1 used definitions to delineate the scope of the saying, while in the *Biaoji* the same saying was worked into a compilation of arguments that distantly tied in different aspects to the core problem of the traveling saying. The last group of examples from texts such as the *Wuwang Jianzuo* showed the possibility for variation in wording and the adaptation of sayings to meet different arguments while still containing the same problem. Within these different modes of integration, the use of definitional expressions as seen in \**Yucong* 1 stands out. This mode of interpretation bears many similarities to the glosses later seen in commentarial traditions that work similarly to definitions in their interpretation of a specific passage.<sup>81</sup> As such, in these cases, the sayings regularly associated with authoritative remembered tradition are not allowed to merely speak on their own authority, but are rather woven in clearly defined argumentative webs. Meyer has argued that in the late Warring States period (roughly from 350 BCE onwards), a manuscript culture characterized by an increased availability and circulation of written material allowed for a different, more abstract, mode of reflection on philosophical argumentation. These argument-based texts are characterized by an increase in fixing textual meaning within the text itself instead of only relying on outside authority.<sup>82</sup> In these texts, definitional phrases and intratextual structures are used to carefully disambiguate and specify conceptual meaning to suit the individual argument. Relatively late texts such as the *Xunzi* and *Hanfeizi* contain proportionally more text-internal specifications and often explicitly formulate these as definitions.<sup>83</sup> This relates to Assmann's description of hypoleptic discourse. When texts increasingly engage in a discussion with "the already said" they need argumentative strategies that critically engage with, and differentiate from, this heritage.<sup>84</sup>

Such an attempt to specify not only reveals a tendency towards stricter text-internal determination of meaning but also suggests a clear awareness of the defined as having multiple possible meanings and associations. The careful use of definitions to reinterpret certain aspects of a philosophical problem while reaffirming others suggests that authors were at least partially aware of the larger

<sup>81</sup> See Henderson 1991 for a comprehensive and comparative study on commentarial traditions.

<sup>82</sup> Meyer 2012: ch.5.

<sup>83</sup> Formula such as "X is what is called Y" ("X之謂Y也") abound in these texts.

<sup>84</sup> Assmann 2011: 274 describes a similar development of a "critical intertextuality" for classical Greece.



web of intertextual relations (be they localized in written form or remembered) that was activated when using a traveling saying.<sup>85</sup> In other words, appropriating this intertextual web in a memory culture meant engaging with its remembered associations and thus necessitated a clear delineation of the scope of one's argument. This shows that in some cases, the proliferation of a saying stabilized its import, and sometimes even its wording, and thus fixed its connotations in the cultural memory of the debaters. One strategy to cope with the increased rigidity of such a saying was to define how it should be interpreted. To refer back to the analogy of commentarial traditions, when the wording and remembered associations of a text stabilize, other modes of interpretation become necessary to make an authoritative statement adhere to one's own philosophical agenda. Not unlike commentarial glosses, definitions demarcate the interpretive space between what was said and what was supposedly meant by a text, and thus reinterpret these troves of shared cultural memory.

This process shows one of the ways in which Warring States authors grappled with their cultural heritage. On the one hand the authority of remembered, hypoleptic, tradition had to be dealt with, while on the other hand the import of established interpretations had to be renegotiated in order to suit a new argument. This dynamic of interpreting a stabilizing body of cultural memory is closely related to the nature of *\*Yucong* 1–3. Instead of being a mere collection of sayings, logical arguments for argument's sake, or teaching materials reiterating existing philosophical positions,<sup>86</sup> the texts represent specific interpretations to commonly shared problems. Like the *\*Kongzi Shilun* 孔子詩論 which stipulates the meaning and applicability of individual Odes and their emblematic lines,<sup>87</sup> the *\*Yucong* material provides interpretations and definitions for text that was well known to a late Warring States audience.

Following Meyer's distinction between argumentative and authoritative, or context dependent texts,<sup>88</sup> the *\*Yucong* appears to occupy a position somewhere

---

<sup>85</sup> See Carruthers 2008: 21–30 who has written extensively on this phenomenon in Medieval Europe. She argues that even with the presence of written texts, they only became meaningful once internalized through memory, and importantly, ordered alongside other pronouncements on similar topics. She describes how in producing commonplaces on a certain topic, medieval writers actively recollected other memorized texts relating to this topic and used these associations to build a new saying.

<sup>86</sup> For these interpretations cf. respectively Li Ling 2007; Harbsmeier 2011; Allan/Williams 2000: 122.

<sup>87</sup> See Kern 2010 for a discussion of the interpretive strategies of this manuscript text and how it can be placed within the history of Odes exegesis at large.

<sup>88</sup> Meyer 2012: ch.5.



in-between. While it does not let authoritative references to tradition speak on their own account, and in fact steers the interpretation by using definitions, neither does it advance systematic and self-contained frameworks of argumentation. The material in the *\*Yucong* is better characterized as a collection of building blocks and short arguments. While many of these blocks focus on certain philosophical problems, it would be too much to say that the texts were meant to be read as a linear argument or that they present one complete and sustained argument. The common denominator of the arguments in the three *\*Yucong* is rather the way in which they critically reinterpret, and reflect on, sayings and concepts that form part of the late Warring States intellectual heritage.

As many theorists on the relation between writing, memory, and the canon have argued, the stabilization in writing of a body of cultural memory is often combined with heightened reflection on this tradition.<sup>89</sup> Writing down and fixing tropes of memory break them loose from the stream of tradition and necessitate different ways of interpretation. This different engagement is characterized by interpreting the meaning of stabilized phrasing, rather than adapting or rewriting the sayings. To be sure, this is not a neat linear process of development, and indeed many of the sayings were still rewritten well into the imperial period. One of the obvious cases is the stabilization of sayings ascribed to Kongzi in the formation of the *Lunyu* as the authoritative collection of his master's voice, a process that culminated in the Early Han period.<sup>90</sup> It was only after this stabilization of a canon of Kongzi sayings that verbatim quotation of the book *Lunyu* and definitional glosses in commentarial form started to emerge.

## 6 Further implications and concluding remarks

In this article I have examined how traveling sayings carry philosophical issues as troves of cultural memory from one text to the other. Indeed they resemble vehicles in that they transport a particular issue or philosophical problem from text to text but need an author to steer their meaning in a particular direction. Traveling sayings were often not adapted verbatim, not only because memorization of text favors structure and general meaning rather than specifics, but also

---

<sup>89</sup> Henderson 1991; Olson 1994; Kern 2009; Assmann 2011; Meyer 2012.

<sup>90</sup> Extensive research by Makeham 1996, Weingarten 2009, and Hunter 2012 have shown that prior to its composition as a book in roughly 150 BCE, many of the sayings now ascribed to the master were in fact in common use, or so substantially edited and decontextualized to meet new ideological demands, that the individual sayings by no means offer a direct view into the thought of a certain Master Kong.



because different texts fit the sayings within their own argument. This is possible because the sayings in themselves did not “belong” to any specific author. When a purported author or tradition is named as the source of the saying, it is likewise a device for imbuing an argument with authority and should be seen as an argumentative strategy. While the authorship of a cultural authority like Master Kong could be attributed to traveling sayings in the *Lunyu* for instance, it was not a necessary requirement nor did it necessarily bar people from rewriting them. Traveling sayings could be rewritten and reinterpreted without violating modern notions of copyright. As such, traveling sayings should not be considered as transcription of speech, but rather as a particular articulation of a culturally significant philosophical problem. The interpretation of this problem meant engaging both with the intertextual webs and remembered associations that frame these sayings, while simultaneously having the saying “speak” for one’s own argument. This appropriation of cultural memory to a specific argument imbues it with familiarity, traditional patina, and authority, while allowing for adaptation.

From this perspective, the analysis of traveling sayings contributes to the emerging discussion on the status of the sayings in the *Lunyu* and many other early collections by providing a model for how at least some of these sayings could have been remembered, transmitted and adapted before they became fixed in the form of a book.<sup>91</sup> Sure enough, the traditional model of disciples taking notes and transmitting text could explain the remembered quality of traveling sayings, but it would not explain the occurrence of these sayings over a wide variety of texts with no mutual affiliation. Instead of this purely vertical model of textual development,<sup>92</sup> implying questions such as “who is quoting who”, “who is influenced by whom”, and “who was the student of which school or master”, I suggest that a horizontal plain of textual engagement should be taken into account as well.

Individual authors of texts, or textual communities operated within a space where much of their material consisted of the “already said”. Instead of the creative *genius*,<sup>93</sup> the individual first to utter a creative pronouncement on a certain topic, authorship in Early China should be conceived as including the praxis of engaging with, and adapting of, a set of relatively stable tropes, dominant narratives, and important philosophical problems that occupied the shared cultural

<sup>91</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, could well be taken to apply to other collections of sayings such as the *Laozi* which is also thought to have been garnered together from a set of remembered sayings, although it started to stabilize as a collection much earlier. See LaFargue 1994.

<sup>92</sup> Targeted by Csikszentmihalyi/Nylan 2003.

<sup>93</sup> Barthes 1967 has argued the author as inspired genius to be a post-medieval construct coinciding with the “discovery of the individual”.



memory of the period.<sup>94</sup> Just as the *Kongzi Shilun* tells, or reaffirms to its audience that filial piety is best expressed by the Ode *Liao'e* 蓼莪 for instance,<sup>95</sup> and a plethora of anecdotal material tells and retells culturally important narratives by drawing on the same stock of exemplars,<sup>96</sup> so are certain philosophical issues commonly expressed by drawing on traveling sayings. This is of course not to say that this was the only way of engaging with philosophical problems, rather, it was one of the stocks of rhetorical and argumentative material that early authors could draw from.

The production of meaning in narrating philosophy, be that written or oral, was a complex process, involving engagement with a large intertextual, and to a great extent memorized cultural heritage. In the same way that genre framed and molded spoken and written discourse, so did cultural memory operate as a mold for recognizable and acceptable discourse. In historiographical genres, this meant for example engaging with a number of recognizable and stable tropes in the form of anecdotes and paradigmatic figures. In philosophical discourse, this involved using popular articulation of certain problems in the form of traveling sayings, quotations and references to the Odes for instance. From the perspective of genres of discourse this means that certain turns of phrase and the use of formulae represent a common use of language. The traveling saying is more complex in that it not only informs the language of articulation but also the debated problem, or philosophical issue. As such, using or reusing a traveling saying is not simply a matter of authorial choice in the sense that someone combed a storehouse of tropes and selected the most apt phrasing, but also predicated on a culturally informed philosophical praxis. That is to say, some sayings occupied a more dominant position in the cultural memory of the early period and were thus more prone to be employed when philosophizing about a certain topic.

For the audience too, this implies an awareness of dominant tropes in cultural memory. Whether hearing an oral recitation, or reading from bamboo, intertextuality as a meaningful dimension, as stressed by Barthes and others,<sup>97</sup> only

<sup>94</sup> Compare Fischer's 2009: 9 term "cultural literacy" and the discussion in Meyer 2012: 22.

<sup>95</sup> Ma Chengyuan 2001: 156. 蓼莪有孝志 ("Liao'e expresses filial piety"). For a discussion of this phenomenon see Kern 2010.

<sup>96</sup> For example: "In times yore, Jie killed Guan Longfeng and Zhou killed Wangzi Bigan." (昔桀殺關龍逢而紂殺王子比干。). Variations of this phrase appear in *Han Feizi* 韓非子 "Shi Guo 十過", *Shuo Yuan* 說苑 "Zheng Jian 正諫", "Jing Shen 敬慎" and "Zayan 雜言", *Hanshi Waizhuan* 韓詩外傳 1.26, 7.6; *Xinxu* 新序 "Jieshi 節士"; *Kongzi Jiayu* 孔子家語 "Xianjun 賢君"; *Zhuangzi* 莊子 "Renjianshi 人間世"; *Shiji* 史記 "Lisi Liezhuan 李斯列傳", "Mengtian Liezhuan 蒙恬列傳", *Wuyue Chunqiu* 吳越春秋 "Shisan Nian 十三年", *Yuejueshu* 越絕書 "Qingdi neizhuan 請羅內傳"; and *Lun Heng* 論衡 "Shuxu 書序".

<sup>97</sup> Barthes 1967.



works if it resonates in the recipient. The authority and familiarity of arguments referring to cultural memory is rests on a cultural literacy, i.e.: an awareness of what certain statements imply, and in what way these shared narratives, debates, esthetics, and genres of discourse, inform and mediate the possibilities of interpretation. It is from this angle of reception that the use of figures such as definitions can be better understood. The difference between a saying interpreted through definition rather than extensive rewriting concerns a different appreciation of the stability and rigidity in the reception of a particular saying. Arguably, certain sayings such as those from the \**Yucong* acquired such stability with regard to their wording and remembered interpretive connotations to the extent that redefining the saying as a whole, rather than rewriting was called for in order to reinterpret their meaning. This process of interpretation through definition suggests an understanding of the saying as being fixed, and is related to a different engagement with one's cultural heritage. A common corollary to the stabilization of cultural heritage in writing is a trend to attribute stable tropes of discourse to author figures.

What this implies for authorship in Early China comes down to two different aspects: the author as interpretive category on the one hand,<sup>98</sup> and the author as writer, composer, performer and so forth on the other hand.<sup>99</sup> These two aspects of authorship are all too often conflated, in the study of Early China as elsewhere. The fact that we can no longer say that Kongzi's disciples wrote the *Lunyu* and that we can use this as a source to study the transcription of his words and thought, does not mean that the text preserved in collections such as these, albeit heavily edited and rewritten, was not written or pronounced by an author or group of people at some point in time. Likewise, although we are hard pressed to find the original utterance or written source for many traveling sayings or other shared narratives, they were at some point created and then reused by performers, composers or even *writers* of philosophy. What I have tried to show in this article is that instead of clearly recognizable figures of authority, featuring biography bordering on hagiography, these authors rather were anonymous, culturally conversant people engaging with their heritage in a way common to their stratum. While not a means for unlocking authorial intention, their role as agents in a memory culture underscores some of the basic principles of the functional category of authorship and textual composition in the period. Perhaps not a genius of

---

<sup>98</sup> This is the author "killed" by Roland Barthes in his famous 1967 essay.

<sup>99</sup> While dealing extensively with the author as interpretive category, Foucault's 1977 notion of the author function explicitly opens up the possibility for different modes and conceptualizations of authorship for different periods in history, see pp.125–126.



individual creative inspiration, the author still channeled once created text and creatively integrated it.<sup>100</sup>

In other words, the sayings that ended up in collections ascribed to Kongzi, Mozi, Laozi and other “masters” were rather a commonly available resource in the cultural memory of the period. Attributing authorship to these successful articulations of philosophical problems shows an attempt to appropriate this cultural heritage to the agenda of a specific group. Rewriting, interpreting and editing these sayings into a collection assigned to a author figure thus reflects not what “the master said”, but rather what the group thought what the master would, could, or even should have said when dealing with a particular issue that in many cases indeed did have broad currency during the Warring States. With the construction of master figures as the prime sources of philosophical discourse, their invented legacy was cast back onto this shared cultural heritage and framed in their voice. In a sense, the masters killed the myriad authors, philosophers and teachers of Early China by giving them a name and biography

## Bibliography

### Primary sources

*Dadai Liji* 大戴禮記 (1919): Dai De 戴德 (ed.). In: *Sibu Congkan Chubian* 四部叢刊初編, vol. 48. Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan.

*Huainanzi Jijie* 淮南子集解 (1998): He Ning 何寧 (ed.). In: *Xinbian Zhuzi Jicheng* 新編諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

*Liji Zhengyi* 禮記正義 (1980): Ruan Yuan 阮元 (ed.). In: *Shisanjing Zhushu* 十三經注疏. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

*Liu Tao* 六韜 (1919): In: *Sibu Congkan Chubian* 四部叢刊初編, vol. 343. Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan.

*Lunyu Zhushu* 論語注疏 (1980): Ruan Yuan 阮元 (ed.). In: *Shisanjing Zhushu* 十三經注疏. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

*Maoshi Zhengyi* 毛詩正義 (1980): Ruan Yuan 阮元 (ed.). In: *Shisanjing Zhushu* 十三經注疏. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

*Xiaojing Zhushu* 孝經注疏 (1980): Ruan Yuan 阮元 (ed.). In: *Shisanjing Zhushu* 十三經注疏. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

*Xunzi Jijie* 荀子集解 (1988): Wang Xianqian 王先謙 (ed.). In: *Xinbian Zhuzi Jicheng* 新編諸子集成. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju.

---

<sup>100</sup> Compare the discussion in Meyer 2012: 22: “Authors in antiquity were not artists. Their works were not copyrighted. Crucially, the authors of antiquity remained anonymous. [...] they were part of a productive intellectual tradition in which the ideas they worked with were the collective property of an élite community. Ideas were taken up, changed, and used purposefully according to the needs of the moment.” See also Finnegan 1977: ch.3, esp. 52–58 who makes a similar point about the creative and selective actualization of memorized material.



## Secondary literature

- Allan, Sarah / Williams, Crispin (eds.) (2000): *The Guodian Laozi: proceedings of the International Conference, Dartmouth College, May 1998*. Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China.
- Assmann, Jan. 1999. *Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen*. Munich: C. H. Beck.
- Assmann, Jan (2011): *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bal, Mieke (2002): *Traveling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Baxter, William H. (1992): *A Handbook of Old Chinese Phonology*. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Baxter, William H. / Sagart, Laurent (2011): "Baxter-Sagart Old Chinese Reconstruction (Version 1.00)". <http://lodel.ehess.fr/crlao/document.php?id=1217> (23.9.2013).
- Barthes, Roland (1967): "The Death of the Author". *Aspen* 5.6.
- Beecroft, Alexander (2009): "Oral Formula and Intertextuality in the Chinese 'Folk' Tradition (Yuefu)". *Early Medieval China* 15: 23–47.
- Behr, Wolfgang (2005): "Three sound-correlated text structuring devices in pre-Qín philosophical prose". In: *Bochumer Jahrbuch für Ostasiatische Forschung* 29: 15–34.
- Boltz, William G. (2005): "The Composite Nature of Early Chinese Texts". In: *Text and Ritual in Early China*. Edited by Martin Kern. Seattle/London: University of Washington Press, 50–76.
- Carr, David M. (2005): *Writing on the Tablet of the Heart: Origins of Scripture and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carruthers, Mary (2008): *The Book of Memory: A Study Of Memory in Medieval Culture* (Second Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chen Wei 陳偉 (2003): *Guodian Zhushu Bieshi* 郭店竹書別釋. Wuhan: Hubei Jiaoyu Chubanshe.
- Clanchy, M. T. (2013): *From Memory to Written Record: England, 1066–1307 (Third Edition)*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Csikszentmihalyi, Mark / Nylan, Michael (2003): "Constructing Lineages and Inventing Traditions through Exemplary Figures in Early China". *T'oung Pao* 89.1–3: 59–99.
- Defoort, Carine (2001): "Is There Such a Thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate". *Philosophy East and West* 51.3: 393–413.
- Denecke, Wiebke (2010): *The Dynamics of Masters Literature: Early Chinese Thought from Confucius to Han Feizi*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dobson, W.A.C.H. (1968): *The Language of the Book of Songs*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- van Els, Paul (2012): "Tilting Vessels and Collapsing Walls – On the Rhetorical Function of Anecdotes in Early Chinese Texts". In: van Els/Sabattini (2012): 141–166.
- van Els, Paul / Sabattini, Elisa (eds.) (2012): *Political Rhetoric in Early China*. Special issue of *Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident* 34.
- Eno, Robert. (1990): *The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Farmer, Steve / Henderson, John B. / Witzel, Michael (2000): "Commentary Traditions and the Evolution of Premodern Religious and Philosophical Systems". *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities* 72: 48–90.



- Finnegan, Ruth (1977): *Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fischer, Paul (2008–2009): “Authentication Studies (辨偽學) Methodology and the Polymorphous Text Paradigm”. *Early China* 32: 1–43.
- Fischer, Paul (2009): “Intertextuality in Early Chinese Masters-Texts: Shared Narratives in *Shi Zi*”. *Asia Major* 22.2: 1–34.
- Foucault, Michel (1977 [1969]): “What is an Author?” Trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. In: *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*. Edited by Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 113–138.
- Fudan Dushuhui 復旦讀書會 (2008): “Shangbo Qi ‘Wuwang Jianzuo’ Jiaodu” 上博七武王踐阼校讀, [http://www.guwenzi.com/SrcShow.asp?Src\\_ID=576](http://www.guwenzi.com/SrcShow.asp?Src_ID=576) (23.9.2013).
- Gassmann, Robert / Behr, Wolfgang (2005): *Antikchinesisch – Ein Lehrbuch in drei Teilen: Teil 1: Eine propädeutische Einführung in fünf Element(ar)gängen*. Bern: Peter Lang.
- Griffiths, Paul J. (1999): *Religious Reading: The Place of Reading in the Practice of Religion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guo Jue (2014): “Review Article of Wiebke Denecke, *The Dynamics of Masters Literature* (2010).” Forthcoming in *Philosophy East and West* 64.1: 240–249.
- Harbsmeier, Christoph (2011): “A Reading of the Guōdiàn 郭店 Manuscript *Yǔcóng* 語叢 1 as a Masterpiece of Early Chinese Analytic Philosophy and Conceptual Analysis”. *Studies in Logic* 4.3: 3–56.
- Henderson, John B. (1991): *Scripture, Canon, and Commentary: A Comparison of Confucian and Western Exegesis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hunter, Michael J. (2012): *Sayings of Confucius, Deselected*. Princeton University: PhD dissertation.
- Idema, Wilt L. (1991): *Spiegel van de Klassieke Chinese Poëzie van het Boek der Oden tot de Qing Dynastie*. Amsterdam: Meulenhof.
- Jingmen Shi Bowuguan 荊門市博物館 (ed.) (1998): *Guodian Chumu Zhujian* 郭店楚墓竹簡. Beijing: Wenwu Chubanshe.
- Kantorowicz, Ernst H. (1997 [1957]): *The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kern, Martin (2000): “*Shi jing* Songs as Performance Texts: A Case Study of ‘Chu ci’ (‘Thorny Caltrop’)”. *Early China* 25: 49–111.
- Kern, Martin (2001): “Ritual, Text, and the Formation of the Canon: Historical Transitions of *Wen* in Early China.” *T’oung Pao* 87.1–3: 43–91.
- Kern, Martin (2005a): “The Odes in Excavated Manuscripts”. In: *Text and Ritual in Early China*. Edited by Martin Kern. Seattle/London: University of Washington Press, 149–193.
- Kern, Martin (2005b): “Quotation and the Confucian Canon in Early Chinese Manuscripts: The Case of ‘Zi yi’ (Black Robes).” *Asiatische Studien* 59.1: 293–332.
- Kern, Martin (2005c): “Introduction”. In *Text and Ritual in Early China*. Edited by Martin Kern. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Kern, Martin (2009): “Bronze Inscriptions, the Shangshu, and the Shijing: The Evolution of the Ancestral Sacrifice During the Western Zhou”. In: *Early Chinese Religion, Part One: Shang Through Han (1250 BC to 220 AD)*. Edited by John Lagerwey and Marc Kalinowski. Leiden: Brill, 143–200.
- Kern, Martin (2010): “Lost in Tradition: The Classic of Poetry We Did Not Know”. In: *Xiang Lectures on Chinese Poetry*. Edited by Grace S. Fong. Montreal: Centre for East Asian Research McGill University.



- LaFargue, Michael (1994): *Tao and Method: A Reasoned Approach to the Tao Te Ching*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Li Ling 李零 (2004): *Jianbo Gushu yu Xueshu Yuanliu* 簡帛古書與學術源流. Beijing: Sanlian.
- Li Ling 李零 (2007): *Guodian Chujiang Jiaodu Ji* (rev. ed.) 郭店楚簡校讀記 (增訂本). Beijing: Renmin Daxue Chubanshe.
- Liu Zhao 劉釗 (2003): *Guodian Chujiang Jiaoshi* 郭店楚簡校釋. Fuzhou: Fujian Renmin Chubanshe.
- Ma Chengyuan 馬承源 (ed.) (2001): *Shanghai Bowuguan Cang Zhanguo Chu Zhushu (Yi)* 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書 (一). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe.
- Ma Chengyuan 馬承源 (ed.) (2008): *Shanghai Bowuguan Cang Zhanguo Chu Zhushu (Qi)* 上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書 (七). Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe.
- Makeham, John (1996): "The Formation of *Lunyu* as a Book." *Monumenta Serica* 44: 1–24.
- Meyer, Dirk (2012): *Philosophy on Bamboo: Text and the Production of Meaning in Early China*. Leiden: Brill.
- Meyer, Dirk (forthcoming): "The *Gù mìng* 顧命 (Testimonial Charge): The Construction of Memory in Warring States Politico-philosophical Debate". In: *The Classic of Documents and the Origins of Chinese Political Philosophy*. Edited by Martin Kern and Dirk Meyer. Leiden: Brill.
- Olson, David R. (1994): *The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pang Pu 龐樸 (1999): "Guodian Yucong Yishuo 郭店語叢臆說". In: *Zhongguo Zhexue* 中國哲學 20. Shenyang: Liaoning Jiaoyu Chubanshe.
- Petersen, Jens Østergård (1995): "Which Books Did the First Emperor of Ch'in Burn? On the Meaning of *Pai Chia* in Early Chinese Sources". *Monumenta Serica* 43: 1–52.
- Pines, Yuri (2002): "Friends or Foes: Changing Concepts of Ruler-Minister Relations and the Notion of Loyalty in Pre-Imperial China". *Monumenta Serica* 50: 35–74.
- Richter, Matthias L. (2013): *The Embodied Text: Establishing Textual Identity in Early Chinese Manuscripts*. Leiden: Brill.
- Richter, Matthias (forthcoming): "Punctuation". In: *Reading Early Chinese Manuscripts: Texts, Contexts, Methods*. Edited by Wolfgang Behr, Martin Kern and Dirk Meyer. Leiden: Brill.
- Schaberg, David (2001): *A Patterned Past: Form and Thought in Early Chinese Historiography*. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Schaberg, David (2011): "Chinese History and Philosophy". In: *The Oxford History of Historical Writing Volume 1: Beginnings to AD 600*. Edited by Andrew Feldherr and Grant Hardy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 394–414.
- Schwermann, Christian (2005): "Collage-Technik als Kompositionsprinzip klassisch chinesischer Prosa: Der Aufbau des Kapitels 'Tāng wèn' (Die Fragen des Tāng) im *Liè zǐ*". In: *Bochumer Jahrbuch für Ostasiatische Forschung* 29: 125–160.
- Schwermann, Christian (2013): "Rhetorical Functions of Quotations in Early Memorials". Paper presented at the workshop "Masters of Disguise? Conceptions and Misconceptions of 'Rhetoric' in Chinese Antiquity", Einsiedeln. September 4<sup>th</sup>–6<sup>th</sup>, 2013.
- Tian, Xiaofei (2006): "The twilight of the Masters: Masters Literature in early medieval China". *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 126.4: 465–486.
- Tomoko, Kusano 草野友子 (2009): "Guanyu Shangbo Chujiang Wuwang Jianzuo Zhong Wuxie de Kenengxing 關於上博楚簡《武王踐阼》中誤寫的可能性". [http://www.gwz.fudan.edu.cn/ SrcShow.asp?Src\\_ID=915](http://www.gwz.fudan.edu.cn/ SrcShow.asp?Src_ID=915) (10.10.13).
- Tu Zongliu 涂宗流 / Liu Zuxin 劉祖信 (2001): *Guodian Chujiang Xianqin Rujia Yishu Jiaoshi* 郭店楚簡先秦儒家佚書校釋. Taipei: Wanjuan Lou.



- Unger, Ulrich (1994): *Rhetorik des klassischen Chinesisch*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Weber, Ralph (2013): "Review Article of Wiebke Denecke, *The Dynamics of Masters Literature* (2010)". *Asiatische Studien* 69.3: 1018–1024.
- Weingarten, Oliver (2009): *Textual Representations of a Sage: Studies of Pre-Qin and Western Han Sources on Confucius (551–479 BCE)*. Cambridge: PhD dissertation.
- Weingarten, Oliver (2013): "Coming to Terms with the Masters", Review article of Wiebke Denecke, *The Dynamics of Masters Literature* (2010). Forthcoming in *Archiv Orientalní* 81.3.
- van Zoeren, Steven (1991): *Poetry and Personality: Reading, Exegesis, and Hermeneutics in Traditional China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.



