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WHAT IS *CAITANYA* – ETERNAL OR NON-ETERNAL ? *

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The concept of *caitanya* (consciousness, sentience, spirituality) is deeply concerned with the notion of the soul or self (*puruṣa*, *ātman*) which is always a fundamental issue of the Indian philosophy. Generally speaking the *caitanya* belongs to the *cetana* (conscious, sentient, spiritual), i.e. the soul or self. This *caitanya* (or *cetana*) is a keyword to understand the Sāṃkhya-philosophy. Also there are different views on *caitanya* among the schools of Indian philosophy.

The Sāṃkhya-philosophy is a kind of dualism which consists of the soul (*puruṣa* = *cetana*) and the Matter (*acetana* = *prakṛti* and its evolutes). This *puruṣa* (soul) is said to be *cetana* (conscious, spiritual being) and the *prakṛti* (Matter) is *acetana* (non-conscious, non-spiritual being). And so the *puruṣa* has *caitanya* (consciousness, spirituality) in its essence. According to the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* (SK) and its commentaries, the *prakṛti* (*pradhāna*, Matter or Nature) changes into *buddhi* (intellect, *mahat*), *buddhi* changes into *ahaṃkāra* (I-principle), *ahaṃkāra* changes into *manas* (mind), *indriyas* (sense-organs) and *tanmātras* (subtle elements), the last of which change into *mahābhūtas* (gross elements). Thus the *prakṛti* is not only active and changeable but also inclusive in itself of these mental elements or faculties; however, it is said to be insentient and non-conscious (*acetana*), that is it can not perceive pleasure and pain. On the other hand the *puruṣa* (soul) is, though, sentient and conscious (*cetana*), it is devoid of even these mental elements and faculties. The soul (*puruṣa*) in the SK is indifferent, isolated and deprived of all kinds of activities. It is not an agent of any activities, though it is a spectator, enjoyer of experience (*draṣṭṛ*, *sākṣin*, *bhokṭṛ*). Though the subtle and delicate relationship (association or union) of the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa* is explained in several similes such as the lame man and the blind man, a dancing girl and the spectators, this relationship and especially the process of cognition of the Sāṃkhya-philosophy is not so easy for us to understand. What is then the conscious (*cetana*, *caitanya*)? What is the reason why the mental elements and faculties of the intellect,

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the I-consciousness (or I-principle) and the mind are insentient and non-conscious (or unconscious, *acetana*)? This is a problem.

1. The meaning of *cetana* and *acetana* in the *Maitri-upaniṣad*

The dualistic concept of *cetana* and *acetana*, and a number of philosophical terms can be found in the *Maitri-upaniṣad* (MU, 2nd century B.C.). Here a question arises about the *cetana* (sentient, living):

This body (*śarīra*) is insentient (*acetana*, inanimate) like a cart. To what supersensuous being belongs such a great power by which this sort of thing (body) is made to be like sentient (*cetanavat*, animate, living) ? Or who is its driver ? (MU. 2.3).

This is a question why a living body is different from a dead body. A dead body is, of course, insentient and inanimate (*acetana*) and senseless (*jaḍa*, according to the commentator Rāmātīrtha). A living body (person) is said to be made like a sentient (*cetanavat*), or possessed of sentience or life (*cetanāvat*, according to Rāmātīrtha). The answer to this question is, in short, that because of the spirit or life (*puruṣa*, *kṣetrajña*, *ātman*) this body (person) is alive and sentient.

By this sentient being (*cetana*) this body is made to be like sentient (*cetanavat*), or this is the driver (*pracodayitr*) of this (body). (MU. 2.5)

This sentient being is said to be pure, clean, void, tranquil, breathless, egoless (*nirātman*), endless, undecaying, steadfast, eternal, unborn, independent, and desireless (*aniṣṭha*). It is a part (*aṁśa*) of the subtle, ungraspable, invisible *puruṣa* (spirit, soul). It is a pure spirit (*cetā-mātra*, = *cetanā-mātra* according to Rāmātīrtha), an individual soul (*kṣetrajña*, knower of the body) in every person, and Prajāpati under the name of individuality (*viśva*). (MU. 2.4-5)

And the creation of creatures is narrated. In the beginning Prajāpati (the lord of creatures) creates the lifeless (*aprāṇa*) bodies and then enters into them as five-fold vital airs (*prāṇa*, *apāna*, *samāna*, *udāna*, *vyāna*) which serve bodily functions of breathing, digestion, etc. The bodily warmth is the *puruṣa* (soul, life) that is the universal fire by means of which the food that is eaten is digested. It is His noise that a man hears

when he closes his ears. When He (*puruṣa*) is about to depart, no one hears His noise. He (*puruṣa*) pierces these openings (apertures of the senses), comes out and enjoys objects with five reins. These reins of His are the organs of perception. His horses are the organs of action. The body is the chariot. The charioteer is the mind (*manas*). The whip is made of Nature (*prakṛti-maya*).

By Him (*puruṣa*) thus driven, this body goes round and round like a wheel (driven) by the potter. So this body is made to be like sentient or He is also its driver. (MU. 2.6)

The parable of the chariot seems to be borrowed from the *Kāṭha-upaniṣad* 3.3-4, in which the soul (*ātman*) is the rider in the chariot, the body is the chariot, the intellect (*buddhi*) is the charioteer, the mind (*manas*) is the reins, the sense-organs are the horses, the objects of sense are the path. This parable tells us that the soul (*ātman*, *puruṣa*) is inactive and non-agent (*akartṛ*), which is almost identical with the concept of the *puruṣa* (soul) of the SK.

In the MU. 6.10 the *puruṣa* (soul) is the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) of the food made of Nature (*prākṛta*). And this enjoyer is without constitutive attributes or elements (*nirguṇa*), so he possesses sentience (*caitanya*). Here we can see a prototype of the Sāṃkhya-philosophy. But the concept of the *cetana* (sentient, living) of the MU. 2.3-6 is a little different from that of the SK and its commentaries.

2. The meaning of *cetana* and its cognate and synonymous words in the SK and its commentaries

We have seen in the MU that the *cetana* (sentient = *puruṣa*) is closely related to life, in other words no body can live without the *cetana* (*puruṣa*). In the classical Sāṃkhya of the SK and its commentaries the concept of the *cetana* (sentient, conscious) is not directly associated with life. The five vital airs, for instance, do not belong to the *puruṣa*, these vital airs are the common functions of the organs (SK. 29).

The primordial Matter (*pradhāna*, *prakṛti*, *avyakta*) and its evolutes (*vikāra*, *vyakta*) are composed of the three constitutive attributes or elements (*guṇas*, qualities, = *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*), are indiscriminative, objective, common, non-conscious (*acetana*) and active. The soul (*puruṣa* =

puruṣa) is the reverse of these (SK. 11). According to the commentaries *Gauḍapada-bhāṣya* (G) and *Māthara-vṛtti* (M) ‘*acetana*’ (non-conscious) means “it does not perceive pleasure, pain and delusion (or insensibility)” (*sukha-duḥkha-mohān na cetayati*). Almost the same explanation is given in the *Sāṃkhya-vṛtti* (V2), *Sāṃkhya-saptati-vṛtti* (V1) and *Jayamaṅgalā* (J) (though these three commentaries use ‘*vedayati*’ instead of ‘*cetayati*’). The *puruṣa* is, of course, conscious and perceives pleasure, pain and delusion. Why then does the *puruṣa* (soul) perceive them? Only Vācaspatimiśra (latter half of 10th century) comments in his *Tattva-kaumudī* (TK) as follows:

Again there must be the *puruṣa* (soul) “because of the existence of an enjoyer” (*bhokṛbhāvāt*, because there must be some one to experience, SK. 17c). “The existence of an enjoyer” indicates the objects of enjoyment (experience) which are pleasure and pain. The objects of experience are pleasure and pain, which are experienced by everyone as to be felt as agreeable and disagreeable respectively (*anukūla-pratikūla-vedanīye*). So it must be also something other than these (pleasure and pain) that is to feel these as agreeable or disagreeable. The intellect (*buddhi*) etc. are not to feel these as agreeable or disagreeable. For, if so, a contradiction would occur that they operate upon themselves (*svātmani vṛtti-virodhāt*), as these (intellect etc.) are in themselves composed of pleasure and pain (*sukha-duḥkhātmakatvena*). Therefore that which is not in itself composed of pleasure etc. (*asukhādyātman*) is to feel as agreeable or disagreeable – that is the soul (*ātman*). (TK ad SK. 17)

The intellect (*buddhi*) and other organs and their functions are composed of *sattva* (good element), *rajas* (active element) and *tamas* (dark element), so they are composed of pleasure, pain and delusion, for *sattva* is of the nature of pleasure, *rajas* is of the nature of pain, and *tamas* is of the nature of delusion or insensibility. It is asserted that pleasure can not feel pleasure itself, and the pain is not able to be conscious of the pain itself. Some modern sub-commentaries explain this theory as follows:

The edge of a sword does not cut itself, nor does fire burn itself. (BĀLARĀMA UDĀSĪNA’s *Vidvattoṣiṇī*, ŚIVANĀRĀYAṆA ŚĀSTRĪ’s *Sārabodhinī*)

As it is contradictory for the one thing to be both the object and the subject (of enjoyment) (*karma-karṭṛ-bhāva-virodhena*), and also the self can not be the object of the self, it should not be possible for the intellect (*buddhi*) and others to be the enjoyer (*bhokṛtva*). (*Sārabodhinī*)

Here we are reminded of the similar simile of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* of the Sarvāstivādin which shows that knowledge does not know itself:

A finger can not touch itself, a sword can not cut itself, an eye can not see itself, and a wrestler can not shoulder himself, in the same way the own-being (of knowledge) does not know itself. (Vol. 9, T. 27. 43a)

Here is suggested that knowledge can not be conscious of itself, and what is known by knowledge is different from knowledge. In other words “the outer object is endowed with the image or form (*ākāra*), but knowledge is without the image” (*nirākārā buddhiḥ. Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā*, GOS, p. 101). This is usually called “the theory of knowledge without an image or form” (*nirākāra-jñāna-vāda*). Of course, however, I do not say that the Sāṃkhya-philosophy is *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda*, but I would take notice of the important difference between knowledge and consciousness as well as experience and its objects; that is to say knowledge can not know itself. Knowledge is one of the forms (*rūpa*) or dispositions (*bhāva*) of the *buddhi* (intellect) which is defined as perceptual judgment or decision (*adhyavasāya*). The soul (*puruṣa*) is a knower (*jñā*, SK. 2d) and a conscious being (*cetana*), but it is not knowledge (*jñāna*), nor judgment, nor intellect. All the functions of the *buddhi*, including knowledge, are the objects of the *puruṣa*. So the *puruṣa* is essentially without knowledge, without intellect. Accordingly the *puruṣa* can not be a knower without the functions of the *buddhi* (intellect), as the TK shows as follows:

But also at that time (when the right knowledge is attained and the functions of the *buddhi*, except knowledge, have turned off), the *puruṣa* continues to be in slight touch (*sambheda*) with the *buddhi* which is abounding in *sattva*; as otherwise no such vision of the Matter would be possible (*prakṛti-darśanānupapatteḥ*). (ad SK. 65)

The relationship of the conscious (*cetana*, *puruṣa*) and the non-conscious (*acetana*, *prakṛti*, *buddhi* etc.) is simply explained in the SK as follows:

Thus from the association (*saṃyoga*) of that (*puruṣa*) the non-conscious symbol (*liṅga*, the *buddhi* and the rest, psychic organism) appears as if it were possessed of consciousness (*cetanāvat*), and similarly, though the constitutive attributes are agents (*guṇa-kartṛtve*), the indifferent (*puruṣa*) seems as if it were an agent (*kartr*). (SK. 20)

For the vision of the Matter (*pradhāna*) by the soul (*puruṣa*) and for the isolation of the soul (from the Matter), there is association of both, like that of a lame man and a blind man; and from this (association) the evolution is brought about. (SK. 21)

According to the TK this vision and isolation are the experience (*bhoga*, enjoyment) and the deliverance (*apavarga*) respectively. And both are called the goal or purpose of the soul (*puruṣārtha*, SK. 31, 42, 63, 69). The deliverance or liberation (*mokṣa*) is acquired through the knowledge (SK. 44c) which is especially defined as the knowledge of the difference between the primordial Matter and the soul (*pradhāna-puruṣāntara-jñāna*, J), the discriminative cognition (*viveka-khyāti*, TK ad SK. 44), or the knowledge of the difference between the constitutive attributes and the soul (*guṇa-puruṣāntara-jñāna*, V2, Y, J). How can this knowledge be acquired by ourselves ? Or how is the process of this cognition made clear ? This problem shall be solved by careful consideration of the relationship between the soul and the Matter (*prakṛti*, *buddhi* or *liṅga*), and especially of the functions of the *buddhi* (intellect).

3. The relationship between the soul and the Matter.

There are two fundamental problems: (a) how the insentient and unconscious *buddhi* (intellect) and the rest are able to perform mental functions and activities, and (b) how and why the inactive and indifferent *puruṣa* can be an enjoyer, seer, knower and controller (*adhiṣṭhātr*, SK. 17b: *adhiṣṭhāna*). The solution to these problems should be brought about by the exposition of this relationship (association) between the *puruṣa* and the Matter (especially *buddhi* and the rest). So generally and roughly speaking the problem (a) should be settled by a kind of spiritual influence (or reflection) of the *puruṣa* on the *buddhi* and the rest, and the problem (b) should be solved by a kind of influence (reflection) of the *buddhi* and the rest on the *puruṣa*.

Though the SK itself does not give an indication of the influence of the *puruṣa*, it mentions frequently the purpose of the soul (*puruṣa-artha*) which is the only motive for the activities of the Matter (or the *buddhi* and the rest):

These (external and internal organs = the *buddhi* and the rest) perform their respective functions incited by mutual impulse. The purpose of the soul is only the motive [of their action] (*puruṣārtha eva hetur*); by nothing else is any organ caused to function. (SK. 31)

For the sake of the purpose of the soul (*puruṣārtha-hetuka*) the subtle body (*liṅga*, the *buddhi* and the rest, psychic organism together with subtle elements) acts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of causes (merit and the rest) and their effects, and because of its association with the all-embracing power of the Nature (*prakṛti*, primordial Matter). (SK. 42)

The Nature binds herself by herself by means of seven forms (of the *buddhi* = merit, demerit, ignorance, non-attachment, attachment, supernatural power, absence of supernatural power); she causes deliverance (*vimocayati*) for the purpose of the *puruṣa* by means of one form (of the *buddhi* = knowledge). (SK. 63)

It is not certain whether this purpose of the soul means the spiritual influence or not. But I do not think this purpose alone is enough to clear up the problem (b). For why are the non-sentient and unconscious *buddhi* and the rest able to be as if sentient, and perform mental functions ? Or, anyway, Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the SK, seems to make the spiritual influence (reflection) of the *puruṣa* vague and less outstanding. The SK does not mention the energy or potentiality (*śakti*) of the *puruṣa*, though it expounds the energy of the Matter (SK. 15b). On the other hand, the commentaries hint or indicate that the *puruṣa* is possessed of some energy or potentiality which shows the influence or reflection on the *buddhi* and the rest.

According to the commentaries the *puruṣa* is compared to the light of the sun, the moon, etc., the blazing fire, or a magnet, all of which hint or indicate a kind of potential energy of the *puruṣa*. And moreover the energy of the *puruṣa* is referred to as the energy (power) of consciousness (*cetanā-śakti*). For example the G comments on the SK. 20ab as follows:

Here the *puruṣa* is possessed of consciousness (*cetanā-vat*); so the *liṅga* (psychic organism), viz., *mahat* (*buddhi*) and the rest, becomes as if possessed of consciousness, on coming into contact with the light of consciousness (*cetanāvabhāsa*). Just as in the world a jar becomes cold when it comes into contact with the cold (water), and becomes hot when it comes into contact with the hot (fire), so the *liṅga*, viz., *mahat* and the rest, becomes as if possessed of consciousness, on account of the association with that *puruṣa*.

And nearly the same exposition is given in other commentaries (V2, V1, M, *Suvarṇa-saptati* = P). The simile of a magnet is used also in the M:

Just as a magnet (*cumbaka*) is the cause of the movement of iron, so is this (*puruṣa*) the cause of the movement (activity) of the senseless (*jada*) Matter (*pradhāna*). (ad SK. 2)

The spiritual energy (power) of consciousness (*cetanā-śakti*) is frequently referred to in the *Yuktidīpikā* (= Y, ed. by A. WEZLER and S. MOTEGI, Stuttgart 1998) as well as in the TK. And this energy is often likened to the reflected image (*pratibimba*, *chāyā*) of the sunlight, moonlight, etc. on the water (or a mirror), or to the refraction of the light (colour) through a crystal ball (*sphaṭika-maṇi*). The Y, raising the question why consciousness is associated with only the *buddhi* and the rest (cognitive organs) and not with material objects like a jar etc., brings forward the following argument:

(The opponent) says: ... if the *buddhi* (intellect) and the rest are metaphorically taken to be possessed of notions (*pratyayavad upacārah*) due to their association with the conscious (*puruṣa*) (*cetana-saṃyogāt*), then because of its (*cetana*'s) all pervasiveness (*vyāpītvāt*) its association with the jar etc. also is not prevented, and hence these (jar etc.) are also metaphorically taken to be possessed of notions – so is involved (the undesirable contingency) ...

(The proponent) replies: that undesirable contingency does not arise, because its (association) needs the potentiality as is in the case of a crystal etc. (*śaktyapekṣatvāt sphaṭikādivat*). Just as the sky and the crystal are equally associated with a cushion (*upadhāna-saṃyogāviśeṣe*), only the crystal appears as (having) the same colour of the cushion due to its potentiality, but not the sky. Similarly, the association of the *puruṣa* with the *buddhi* (intellect) and the jar is common (without difference), only the *buddhi* is perceived as if having had the colour of consciousness (*cetanā-rūpāpannā*), but not the jar. (Y. p. 181 ¹³⁻²¹)

Here the *buddhi* (intellect) is likened to a crystal and the *puruṣa* to a colourful cushion. Just as the colour of the cushion is reflected on the crystal by refraction, so is consciousness of the *puruṣa* reflected on the *buddhi*. Here the potentiality (*śakti*, power) of the *buddhi* is mentioned. But the potentiality or energy of the *puruṣa* is not referred to, though it is implied in the context. The energy of consciousness (*cetanā-śakti*) is mentioned rather when the influence or reflection of the *buddhi* (intellect or cognitive function) on the soul (*puruṣa*) is explained by the analogy with the reflection or the refraction of light as we shall see later.

The influence of the energy of the *puruṣa* on the cognitive organ is implied also by Vindhyavāsin who is a predecessor of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and a senior contemporary of Buddhist Vasubandhu (4-5th century), and who asserts that the *manas* (mind) is the only inner organ instead of the three (*buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, *manas*) of the SK (Y. p. 187). According to his fragment which is found in the Vaiśeṣika and Jaina sources (Vyomaśiva's *Vyomavatī*, ChSS. pp. 521-522, Mallisena's *Syādvādamāñjarī*, BSPS. p. 97, etc.), he also elucidates the relationship between the *puruṣa* and the *manas* by the reflection of colour on a crystal as follows:

The *puruṣa* (soul) is unchanged in himself, but makes the *manas* (mind) conscious by making it appear similar to himself through his proximity, (just as) the adjunct (makes) the crystal appear not to be such. (*puruso 'vikṛtātmaiva sva-nirbhāsenā cetanaṃ manaḥ karoti sānnidhyād upadhiḥ sphaṭikam atad. Vyomavatī* pp. 521-522. There are a few variants but the meaning is almost the same.)

Although the *manas* (mind) itself is unconscious (*acetana*), because of the *puruṣa*'s proximity, it is made conscious (*cetana*) by the *puruṣa* that, even if unchanged in his essence, makes the *manas* appear similar to himself.

Vācaspatimiśra also explicates the influence of the *puruṣa* on the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) by the analogy of the reflection of light which explains, at the same time, the influence of the *buddhi* on the *puruṣa* too. He says:

The decision or judgment of the *buddhi* is the reflection (projection of shadow) of consciousness. (*citi-cchāyāpattir buddher adhyavasāyaḥ. TK ad SK. 6*)

Because of its proximity to the *puruṣa*, and by this (*puruṣa*'s) reflection (projection of shadow), the *buddhi* (intellect) appears as if having this (*puruṣa*'s) form, and causes the *puruṣa* to have the enjoyment of all things (*buddhir hi puruṣa-sannidhānāt tacchāyāpattiyā tad-rūpeva sarva-viṣayopabhogaṃ puruṣasya sādhayati*). The enjoyment is an experience of pleasures and pains, and this (experience) takes place in the *buddhi* (intellect, or will) (*sa ca buddhau*). (TK ad SK. 37)

According to the TK all of the *puruṣa*'s experience takes place in the *buddhi*, as the reflection of the *puruṣa*'s consciousness is placed on the *buddhi*. And this kind of reflection had been explained more in detail not only in the Sāṃkhya-school but also in the Yoga-school etc. For instance, just as the reflected image of the sun etc. on the water is to quiver when the water quivers, so the inactive soul (*puruṣa*) reflected on the cognitive organ

(*buddhi*) seems to do the functions of the latter, as we shall see in the following.

4. The influence of the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) on the soul (*puruṣa*)

The experience which is ascribed to the soul is variously explicated also by analogy of reflection (*pratibimba*, *chāyāpatti*). According to tradition the Sāṃkhya-philosophy was founded by Kapila, and his philosophy was handed down to Āsuri, who taught it to Pañcaśikha (SK. 70). A fragment which is ascribed to Āsuri in the Vaiśeṣika and Jaina sources runs as follows:

This (*puruṣa*'s) experience is said (to go) when the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) has the development apart from the seer (*puruṣa*), just as the reflected image of the moon appears on the clear water. (*vivikta-drk-parinatau buddhau bhogo 'sya kathyate / pratibimbodayaḥ svacche yathā candramaso 'mbhasi. Vyomavatī* p. 521, cf. *Syādvādamañjarī* p. 97)

There are detailed explanations of this quotation in the *Vyomavatī* and *Syādvādamañjarī*, which I do not touch here. Instead, I have to deal with more examples of the reflection of the soul which is variously elaborated in the Yoga-school also. The *Yoga-sūtra* (YS) often suggests the reflection of the soul, and its commentary, viz. Vyāsa's *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya* (YSBh) explains this reflection moderately. Its subcommentaries, viz. Śaṅkara's *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa* (Vv) and Vācaspatimiśra's *Tattva-vaiśārādī* (TV) give explanations more in detail. And especially the TV gives more lucid explanations as follows:

The (soul's) consciousness (*citi*) is aware of its own cognitive organ (*buddhi*, intellect), when the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) passes into the form of that (consciousness), i.e. passes into a resemblance of that (consciousness), in so far as it (*buddhi*) is a receptacle for the reflection of consciousness (*citeḥ sva-buddhi-saṃvedanaṃ buddhes tad-ākārāpattau citi-pratibimbādhāratayā tad-rūpatāpattau satyām*). For just as the clear water, into which the reflection of the moon has passed over, makes the moon appear to be quivering, like a swan in the pond, although the moon has even no activity nor is itself quivering, so similarly, even in the absence of any operation of consciousness (*citi-vyāpāra*), the mind (*citta*) into which the reflection of consciousness has passed over (*upasaṃkrānta-citi-pratibimba*) makes by its own activity the energy of consciousness (*citi-śakti*) appear to have activity, and also makes that (consciousness) appear to have

attachment, even when that (consciousness) is without attachment. It (mind), making itself be the experienceable, makes that (energy of consciousness) be an experiencer (*bhoktr-bhāva*). (TV ad YS. 4.22)

This should be a full explanation of the above mentioned Āsuri's fragment. Here is the energy of consciousness of the soul (*puruṣa*) compared to the moon, and the clear water into which the reflected image of the moon passed over is likened to the cognitive organ (*buddhi*, or *citta*). The soul's experience takes place only in the cognitive organ which is compared to the reflected image of the moon on the water. A similar instance is observed also in the TV:

The passing of the soul's reflection (*puruṣa-pratibimba-saṁkrānti*) into the mirror of the cognitive organ (*buddhi-darpaṇa*) is itself the soul's awareness of the cognitive organ (*buddhi-pratisaṁveditva*). And so the sound etc. become touched on the cognitive organ which has been changed into the reflection (or shadow) of the energy of (the soul's) sight (*dṛṣi-cchāyāpanna*), i.e. they become objects of sight (*dṛśya*). (TV ad YS. 2.20)

Here is the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) compared to a mirror instead of the clear water, anyhow the meaning in these similitudes is almost the same. And the theory which is illustrated by the reflection of light is generally called the reflection-theory (*pratibimba-darśana*, *pratibimba-vāda*).

The reflection-theory is illustrated also by the refraction of light, i.e. the reflection of colour on a crystal as in the above mentioned Vindhyavāsin's fragment. Many examples of crystal are given in the Yoga-school (YSBh, Vv, TV). For instance the Vv says as follows:

(Question:) when (the soul is) in connection with conformity (resemblance) to the mental functions (*vr̥tti-sārūpya-yoge*), as (the soul is) in connection with a different state, then such defects as (the soul's) changeability (*pariṇāmitva*) etc. must be entailed?

(Answer:) no, for (such defects are) obviated, because of the fact that the objects have been displayed to (the soul). As that (soul's conformity to the mental functions) is not intrinsic but superimposed on by the mental functions of the mind (*citta-vr̥tty-adhyāropita*), just as a crystal etc. appear as taking on the colour of the cushion (*sphaṭikādy-upadhānoparāgavat*). (Vv. p. 14¹⁵⁻¹⁷, ad YS. 1.4)

Here the soul is compared to a crystal and the cognitive organ (*citta*) is likened to a coloured cushion. Just as the red colour of the crystal is not real but only superimposed on, so is the soul's experience in no means real but only superimposed on. This passage reminds us of the fundamental concept

of superimposition (*adhyāsa*, *adhyāropa*) of the Advaita Vedānta School which was founded by Śaṅkara (8th century) viz. the author of the *Brahma-Sūtra-Bhāṣya* (BSBh). According to him, this superimposition which is another name for ignorance (*avidyā*) means the superimposed erroneous notion of one thing onto another thing, and the superimposition of Self (*ātman*) onto not-self (*anātman*) and vice versa is the most fundamental to our empirical experience. He also referred to the superimposed colour of the crystal and the reflected image of the sun on the water in his BSBh on explaining the superimposition and the related concepts. Whether he is also the author of the Vv or not is, though, an unsettled question, I am not inclined to be in the negative.

The analogy of a crystal with the soul is often used in the TV in a quite similar meaning to that of the above quoted Vv.

The soul's (*puruṣa*'s) consciousness (*caitanya*) is its own essence (*svarūpa*) and is not subject to its limiting adjunct (*anaupādhika*), nor yet it is the cognition of the cognitive organ (*buddhi-bodha*) which has the various forms tranquil and other, and which is so subject to its limiting adjunct (*aupādhika*) just as the crystal that is, though, in its own nature transparently white (is subject to its limiting adjunct), and whose redness is its limiting adjunct (*upādhī*) of its proximity to the flower of hibiscus. And when the limiting adjunct ceases, there is no cessation of the thing limited by the limiting adjunct (*upādhī-nivṛtti*). (TV ad YS. 1.3)

The soul is compared to a crystal and the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) is compared to a red flower of hibiscus. And nearly the same analogy is also used in Śaṅkara's BSBh (1.3.19, 3.2.11) to explain the limiting adjunct (*upādhī*) which is also a keyword in his philosophy. The TV also runs as follows:

Just as (the difference between the colour of) the crystal (which is as if coloured red) and of the (red) flower of hibiscus (is not grasped), so is the difference between the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) and the soul (*puruṣa*) not grasped, because of nearness to each other, when superimposing the functions of the cognitive organ (*buddhi-vṛttiḥ*) on the soul, he judges: "I am tranquil, I am in pain, I am deluded", likewise just as looking into his reflected face on the dirty (surface of a) mirror, he superimposes dirtiness on himself and grieves (to think) "I am dirty". Although the superimposition of the soul (*puruṣa-samāropa*) is (in reality) also the function of the cognitive organ (*buddhi-vṛtti*), like the cognition of sound etc., and although it (the function of the cognitive organ) is to be experienced as devoid of the form of consciousness (*acid-rūpatā*), because it is evolved from the primordial Matter (*prākṛtatvena*); nevertheless, making the cognitive organ appear as the soul

(*buddheḥ puruṣatvam*), it appears as if it were the function of the soul (*puruṣa-vṛtti*) and as if it were the experience (*anubhava*) (of the soul). (TV ad YS. 1.4)

The soul's experience is explained by way of a comparison of the reflected image of his face on a dirty mirror. Though his face is not dirty, its reflected image appears as if it were dirty. Thus it is here hinted that the soul's experience is not real but only the reflection of the function of the cognitive organ. Vācaspatimiśra explains the gist of the reflection theory very briefly in his TK as follows:

The intellect-principle (*buddhi-tattva*, entity of cognitive organ) is unconscious (*acetana*), because it is evolved from the primordial Matter (*prākṛtatvāt*); and its judgment (*adhyavasāya*) is also unconscious like a jar etc. And also pleasure etc., which are the varieties of transformation of the *buddhi-tattva*, are unconscious too. The soul (*puruṣa*) is, however, conscious (*cetana*), without clinging to pleasure etc. Thus this (soul) is reflected on that (*buddhi*) by knowledge and pleasure etc. which are contained in the *buddhi-tattva*. And (the soul) becomes as if possessed of knowledge and pleasure etc. by virtue of the reflected image (or shadow) of that (*buddhi*). In this way the conscious (soul) is influenced (favoured) by the *buddhi* (*so 'yam buddhi-tattva-vartinā jñāna-sukhādinā tat-pratibimbītas tac-cchāyāpattyā jñāna-sukhādimān iva bhavātīti cetano 'nugrhyate*). And also the unconscious *buddhi* as well as its unconscious judgment become as if they were conscious, by virtue of the reflected image (shadow) of the consciousness (*citi-cchāyāpattyā 'cetanā 'pi buddhis tad-adhyavasāyo 'py acetanaś cetanavad bhavati*). (TK ad SK. 5)

This brief exposition can be easily understood with the help of the above-quoted passage of the TV, though no example of reflection is shown in the TK. According to ŚIVANĀRĀYAṆA ŚĀSTRĪ's *Sārabodhinī*, this passage is expounded by the simile of the sun reflected on the water of the pond. The soul is compared to the sun and the *buddhi* is compared to the water which reflects the sun. In short, according to Vācaspatimiśra, the influence of the soul's energy of consciousness on the cognitive organ (*buddhi*, intellect) must be real, for it must function as if it were conscious, i.e., our cognition or experience must be real. On the other hand, the influence of the function of the cognitive organ on the soul should not be real, for the soul should, in its essence, be isolated and devoid of any activities and changes. In the latter case its influence on the soul is just as though the reflected image of the sun (or the moon) on the water is subject to undergo changes, due to the movement of the water on which the sun (or the moon) is reflected. Though the reflected image is subject to move and change or to appear

dirty, the sun (or the moon) is not subject to move and change or to appear dirty.

The reflection theory is more elaborated by Vijñānabhikṣu (16th century) who comments on the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* (SS) as well as on the YS. He elucidates the reciprocal reflection (*paraspara-pratibimba*), i.e. of the soul on the cognitive organ and vice versa (ad SS. 1.87, 1.99; YS. 1.4). But in short the central conception of his reflection theory is not so different as in the above mentioned explanations.

Bhoja-deva (11th century) who writes a commentary on the YS entitled *Rājamārtanḍa* (RM), elucidates the reflection theory from a new angle. He also compares the cognitive organ (*citta*, *sattva*) to a crystal or a mirror, on which the soul is reflected. According to his RM (ad YS. 4.23) the pure (or good) element (*sattva*) of the cognitive organ (*citta*, mind), which is compared to a crystal, mirror, etc., can catch the reflected image (shadow) of consciousness (*cicchāyā-graṇa-samartha*). The energy of consciousness (*cic-chakti*) is divided into two: one is eternally arisen (*nityoditā*) which is the soul (*puruṣa*), and the other is potential to appear (*abhivyāṅgyā*) which is of the pure (good) element of the cognitive organ (*sattva*, i.e. *citta-sattva*, *buddhi-sattva*). The soul has the eternally arisen energy of consciousness (*nityodita-cic-chakti*). The pure (good) element of the cognitive organ has the potential consciousness which is to appear (*abhivyāṅgya-caitanya*) due to the proximity of the soul. This is the potential energy of consciousness which is to appear (*abhivyāṅgyā cic-chakti*) in the pure element of the cognitive organ. And it runs as follows:

The chief, clean, pure element of the cognitive organ (*cittasattva*) is, on one hand, endowed with the reflected image (shadow) of consciousness which is transferred to it (*pratisaṃkrānta-cicchāyā*); on the other hand, by means of the cognitive organ which has grasped the form of object, due to the transference of consciousness (*cit-saṃkrānti-balāt*), perceiving the presented form (of object) itself, he (*puruṣa*) undergoes experiences of pleasure and pain, who is in reality even not possessed of consciousness (*vāstava-caitanyābhāve 'pi*). On account of not grasping the discrimination (of the soul and the cognitive organ) owing to the absolute nearness (to each other), the same experience (*bhoga*, enjoyment) is denoted to be the experience of the soul (*puruṣa*), that is (in reality) no experiencer (*abhoktr*, no enjoyer). (RM ad YS. 4.23)

According to him the soul (*puruṣa*) is in reality not possessed of consciousness (*caitanya*) as well as not even an experiencer (*bhoktr*, enjoyer). He seems to be deviating a little from the traditions of the schools

of Sāṃkhya and Yoga that the soul (*puruṣa*) is conscious and an experiencer (enjoyer). Rather his notion of consciousness (*caitanya*) is nearer to that of the Vaiśeṣika School. He compares the soul to a magnet, and likens the potential consciousness which is to appear (*abhivyaṅgya-caitanya*) to the movement of iron. Thus he is also aware of the energy of the *puruṣa*, that is to say, the energy of consciousness (*cic-chakti*).

The concept of the soul (*puruṣa*) that is inactive and no agent is illustrated in the G (ad SK. 20): as a man who is not a thief, but being taken up along with thieves, is suspected to be a thief also, in a similar manner, the three constitutive attributes are agents, and the soul connected with them, even though not itself an agent, is taken to be an agent on account of the contact with the agents. Similar explanations are found in the M, V1, V2, etc. The same conception is explained by the simile of crystal in the Vv, TV and Yv (*Yoga-vārttika*).

Although the soul is inactive, indifferent and devoid of any functions, it is indispensable to our cognition. According to the SK. 5a : “the perceptive judgment (or determination) of each object is perceptive cognition (*prati-viśayādhyavasāyo dr̥ṣṭam*)”. The Y comments as follows:

The illuminating mode (*prakāśa-rūpa*) (of the *buddhi*), because of the preponderance of the pure (good) element (*sattvodrekād*), is without the active and dark elements (*arajas-tamaska*), accompanying the functionings (*vṛtti*) of the sense-organs which have grasped their objects (*upātta-viśaya*); that is, so to say, the perceptive cognition (*dr̥ṣṭa*), and the perceptive cognition means perception (*pratyakṣa*). This is the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). And the influence (*anugraha*) on the energy of consciousness (*cetanā-śakti*) is its result. (Y. p. 77⁶⁻⁹)

The TK also expresses almost the same meaning that the result of cognition, i.e. right cognition (*pramā*) or awareness (*bodha*) is the influence of the means of cognition on the soul's energy of consciousness (*cetanā-śakti*); and the influence is illustrated by the analogy of the reflection of light as seen already.

5. What is he who is to attain the deliverance (liberation) ?

This problem involves another question: What is ‘I’ ? Or which is ‘I’, the *buddhi* (intellect, cognitive organ) or the *puruṣa* (soul) ? To this question is related the I-principle (*ahamkāra*, I-consciousness) which is one of the

three inner organs (*antaḥ-karaṇa*), and which is evolved from the intellect (*buddhi*). The I-principle is defined as self-conceit (*abhimāna*, self-consciousness, SK. 24a), i.e. such a notion as “I (am entitled), I am learned, I am good looking” and so on with regard to the colour, taste and odour (M, V1). And it is the notion that “this is I” that is of the nature of reflecting upon his own self arising in the agent (*kartuḥ svātma-pratyavamarśātmako yo 'yam aham iti pratyaya utpadyate*, Y. p. 193⁴). This I-principle, I-consciousness or self-consciousness is in itself unconscious (*acetana*) entity, i.e. object of the soul (*puruṣa*). The self-consciousness is not able to be conscious of itself. And moreover the I-principle or I-consciousness (*ahamkāra*) can not be conscious of the soul, i.e., it is not even the knowledge of the soul (*puruṣa*).

As above mentioned the knowledge leads to deliverance, and this knowledge is, so to speak, the knowledge of the soul (*puruṣa*), i.e. ‘the intuitive perception of the self’ (*ātma-sākṣāt-kāra*, *Sāṃkhya-candrikā* = C ad SK. 44). The Sāṃkhya-philosophy begins with the desire to know (*jijñāsā*) the means of terminating the pain or suffering (*duḥkha*) in this world (SK. 1). And it is repeated that the activities of the Matter (*prakṛti*, *pradhāna*) are for the purpose of the liberation of the soul (*puruṣa-vimokṣārtha*, SK. 56-58). But on the other hand the soul is from the beginning free from any kind of pleasure and pain, i.e. it is always isolated and liberated (*kaivalya*).

Therefore, not any (soul) is bound or liberated, nor does any one transmigrate; it is the Matter that transmigrates and is bound and liberated. (SK. 62)

Bhāviveka (6th century, *Prajñāpradīpa*, Tohoku No. 5853, 184a⁵) refers to two opinions on liberation in the Sāṃkhya-school: one says that the Matter liberates itself, the other says that the soul liberates itself. The SK. 64 seems to be involved in this problem. It runs as follows:

Thus, from the study of the principles (*tattvābhyāsāt*), there arises the knowledge (*jñāna*), viz., “I am not, nothing is mine, not I” (*nāsmi, na me, nāham*), which is complete, pure because of being free from error, and absolute (*kevala*).

This definition of the knowledge is ambiguous and apt to give rise to diverse interpretations of the meaning of ‘I’. If ‘I’ is denied absolutely and this ‘I’ refers to the Matter, i.e. the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) or the psychic organism (*liṅga*) or the body; what becomes of the ‘I’? Is there no ‘I’ and

no ‘mine’? And is there no room for another ‘I’ or ‘myself’? If so, what is the use of the *puruṣa* (soul) ? We shall have nothing to do with the *puruṣa*. (We can not find such an explanation in the commentaries on the SK). If not so, then there must be a mental and subjective change of ‘I’ from the Matter to the soul, i.e. there must be room for affirming another ‘I’ which is the soul (*puruṣa*). In short, this is the explanation in the commentaries. For instance:

I am not the principles (*nāsmi tattvāni*). The principles are not mine (*na me tattvāni*). I am not the possession of the principles (*nāham tattvānām*). (M ad SK. 64)

I am not in the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) and in the elemental (body), rather there is the Matter... This (body) is not mine but is the possession of the Matter... And the Matter is not I. (J ad SK. 64)

Other explanations are almost similar, but the TK adds as follows:

The (sentence) “I am not” means that I am the *puruṣa* (soul), not of the productive quality. And because of having no productive quality (*aprasava-dharmitvāt*) (the *puruṣa*) is no doer or no agent (*akartṛtva*). So one says: “it is not I” (that is a doer). And because of being no doer (the *puruṣa*) is no possessor. So one says: “nothing is mine”. (ad SK. 64)

Thus the knowledge is on the part of the *puruṣa* not on the part of the Matter, though the knowledge itself is a function of the *buddhi* (intellect) which is a product of the Matter. By means of this knowledge one attains the perfect liberation that is definite and absolute isolation (*kaivalya*) of the *puruṣa*, in this state the Matter that has formed one’s body, senses and mental functions, perishes forever. In the state of liberation there is no Matter of one who attains it, there remains only the *puruṣa* (soul). This final liberation (or deliverance) takes place only after death of one who has attained the above mentioned discriminative knowledge. Then what becomes of the consciousness (*caitanya*) which is said to be eternal? For without the Matter, i.e. the cognitive organ (*buddhi*, intellect) etc., there should be no possibility for the *caitanya* to become manifest forever; it seems as if there were no more *caitanya* after the final liberation. This is another problem.

6. The concept of *caitanya* (consciousness) in the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika

According to these schools the *caitanya* (consciousness) is not eternal, i.e., no *caitanya* is possible in the state of liberation (or deliverance). Vātsyāyana (4th century) refers to the false knowledge of one who does not prefer such a liberation which is a destruction of all pleasure and a state of unconsciousness (*acaitanya*) (ad *Nyāya-sūtra* = NS. 1.1.2). And also he denies the assertion that a great pleasure is manifest in the state of liberation (ad NS. 1.1.22). The liberation is a destruction of all the special attributes (*guṇa*), i.e. intellect or cognition (*buddhi*), pleasure, pain, desire, hatred, volition, merit, demerit and mental impression, after the death of one who has acquired the true knowledge. The *caitanya* (consciousness) belongs to the soul (*ātman*), but it is not eternal. On this point Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9-10th century) remarks as follows:

Although it is maintained that the soul (*ātman*) is of itself possessed of its own conscious nature (*cetana-svabhāvatva*), nevertheless it is also not valid. This (soul) is conscious (*sacetana*) on account of association with consciousness (*cit*); and it is unconscious (*jada*) without association with consciousness. For we do not admit that there is consciousness (*caitanya*) other than the being manifest of the object (*arthāvabhāsa*). (*Nyāya-mañjarī* = NM, KSS. 2. p. 6²⁶⁻²⁸)

He also remarks on the *caitanya* in the state of liberation of the Sāṃkhya-philosophy:

But if the soul's *caitanya* (consciousness) is said to be only the mere suitability for the potentiality of seeing (*darśana-śakti-yogyatā-mātra*), then such an isolation (*kaivalya*) (of the soul) is similar to our liberation. For even if such a mere suitability is possible, in the state that is deficient in the full collection of causal factors (*sāmagrī*), i.e., without association etc. of the sense organs with the object to perceive, it is impossible for the soul to be a seer (*draṣṭṛtva*), and it is also denied that there is another *caitanya* (consciousness) which is devoid of seeing. (NM. 2. p. 81¹⁵⁻¹⁸)

In this way Jayanta points out the impossibility of the soul's consciousness in the liberation of the Sāṃkhya-philosophy. He repeats:

The consciousness (*citi*, awareness) is called the cognition of object (*artha-vijñāna*), but that (cognition) which belongs to the (soul, *ātman*) is incidental (*kādācitka*). There is no other consciousness (*caitanya*) than the awareness of object. And as that (*caitanya*) depends upon the full collection of causal factors

(*sāmagry-adhīnatvāt*), why shall there be that (*caitanya*) in the state of liberation (*mokṣe*)? (NM. 2. p. 81²⁻⁴)

He concludes that there is no consciousness (*caitanya*) in the liberation. Of course he knows the opponents' challenge, he quotes their opinions.

On this point the advocates of the Vedānta-philosophy remark: such a liberation like this is not possible to be the goal of efforts for a man of intelligence. For who will endeavour to make his soul (*ātman*) deprived of all enjoyment of receiving pleasures like a stone or a potsherd (*śilā-śakala-kalpa*)? ... But if the soul (*ātman*) in the state (of deliverance) is insentient (*jaḍa*, unconscious) just not different from a stone (*pāṣāṇa-nirviśeṣa*), then there is no use of the deliverance (*apavarga*). (NM. 2. pp. 77-78)

According to the opponents the soul (*ātman*, Self) is possessed of eternal pleasure (*nitya-sukha*), which is not experienced in the state of the cycles of life (*saṃsāra*) due to the obscuration by the ignorance (*avidyā*). But Jayanta criticizes them pointing out that there is no means of valid cognition to know the soul's eternal pleasure. In the same way Śrīdhara (A.D. 991, *Nyāya-kandalī*) also brings forward the opponents' challenge:

The unconscious soul (*acetana ātman*) is not different from a stone, even if it is liberated (*mukta*). For it does not feel pleasure, nor feels pain. (GOS. p. 636¹²)

But he does not refute this opinion. Anyhow the eternal *caitanya* must be sentience or spirituality but not consciousness, for there will be no consciousness without the cognitive organ and its object as Jayanta remarks.

7. The Buddhist concept of the *caitanya* (consciousness)

Jayanta also remarks on the Buddhist *nirvāṇa* (extinction of life and death):

The Buddhists (*Saugatāḥ*) maintain that the deliverance (*apavarga*) which is called by the word '*nirvāṇa*' or the like is the destruction of the (mental and organic) stream (*santaty-uccheda*) or the transparent stream of cognition (*viññāna-santati*). ... But the opinion that (the deliverance is) the destruction of the (individual) stream (*santaty-uccheda-pakṣa*) is more lamentable than the opinion of the Nyāya-school, for nothing remains there, nor even one (soul) that is like a stone. (NM. 2. p. 81¹⁹⁻²⁴)

There should be no eternal *caitanya* there. But it seems that only a few Buddhists use '*caitanya*', '*cit*' or '*citi*', with the exception of '*cetanā*' which means faculty of will, conscious effort, or volition, but not consciousness as we have seen above. Some works of Sāṃkhya-school repudiate the Buddhist concept of consciousness. The Y refers to the Buddhists' opinion that only the *viññāna* (cognition) can perceive object and therefore it is no use supposing the soul (*puruṣa*), and develops a long argument on this problem. The Buddhists think that the cognition (*citta*, *viññāna*) is conscious (*cetana*). But the author of the Y denies this and says:

As (the visual cognition) is an evolute of the unconscious (Matter), it follows that the (cognition) is unconscious (*acetana*) like a jar etc. Therefore it is only a pure fantasy that the consciousness (*cetanā*) is an attribute or quality of the cognitive organ (*mano-dharma*). (Y. p. 170²³⁻²⁴)

Vācaspatimiśra also says:

Not that the consciousness (*caitanya*) belongs to the cognitive organ (*buddhi*) as the Buddhists say (*vaiśiṣṭikavat*). (ad SK. 11)

The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti (6-7th century) sometimes brings forth arguments on the *caitanya* (consciousness) of other schools, and he also uses this word in explanation of his philosophy too:

Because it is understood that another person has consciousness too (*para-caitanya-pratipatteḥ*), two kinds of valid cognition (*pramā*, perception and inference) are ascertained. And this judgment (that another person has consciousness) is ascertained by his use of daily verbal expression (*vyavahāra*) etc. (*Pramāṇa-vārttika* 3. 68)

This *caitanya* should mean the consciousness or mental functioning (thinking, feeling etc.) or the intention to speak, which is to be inferred from his words and deeds. According to him nothing is eternal, i.e., everything that is existing and has causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā*) should be momentary (*kṣaṇika*) but not eternal; any eternal thing has no causal efficiency. Accordingly there should be no eternal soul (*ātman*, *puruṣa*) as well as no eternal consciousness (*caitanya*). The consciousness should belong to the mind (*citta*, *manas*, *viññāna*) together with mental elements (*caitta*, *caitasika*), all of which are momentary to vanish and to occur. Buddhists also admit the transmigration (*saṃsāra*) of living beings till the attainment of deliverance. In Buddhism an ever-changing and discontinuing

but continuing mind together with mental elements (*santāna*, *santati*, stream) should stand for the soul which should undergo transmigrations till the time of deliverance.

8. Conclusional remarks

From all these considerations we may conclude that there are two conceptions of '*caitanya*' : (1) eternal *caitanya* (consciousness, spirituality, sentience) which is the essence of the eternal unchanging soul (*ātman*, *puruṣa*) as in the schools of Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Vedānta, (2) non-eternal (incidental, occasional) *caitanya* (consciousness, intelligence, mental functioning) which belongs to the eternal soul (*ātman*) as in the schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. In the latter case the released soul (in the state of deliverance from the recurring births) is said to be insensitive (*acetana*) like a stone or a potsherd. The Buddhist concept of *caitanya* is similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but it has nothing to do with the eternal soul, it belongs to the momentary mind only. Whether there is an eternal *caitanya* (consciousness) or not, this problem depends mainly on each philosophical system. And accordingly the concept of *caitanya* is different among the schools of Indian philosophy.

