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PRAKŖTI AS SĀMĀNYA

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The elaboration of sāṃkhyistic teachings as a philosophical system seems to have been closely related to the doctrine of (avyakta) prakṛti or pradhāna, of a singular causal realm. This stands in contrast to pre-SK texts, in which evolutionary processes are described by assuming a plurality of creative powers, i.e. seven or eight prakṛti.¹ It is this singular cause, which manifests the visible world through self-transformation (pariṇāma) and aggregation (saṃghāta) of its three "subtle powers", the guṇa.² A corollary of this assertion is the thesis that agency and causal capacity are in prakṛti alone. Therefore, causality is self-organized and does not need the productive interference of a conscious entity.³ That the interpretation of prakṛti as a singular cause in kārikā-Sāṃkhya implied changes in the

- Cf. JOHNSTON (1937: 25 ff.) for references. In SK the earlier concept of plural *prakṛti* reappears in the seven so-called *prakṛti-vikṛti-tattva*. In the YS und YBh, *prakṛti* is frequently used in plural, whereas the singular causal realm is often designated as *pradhāna* (YS 1.45; 2.19; 2.23; 3.18; 3.47 cum YBh for *pradhāna* compared with YS 1.19 and 1.51 for *prakṛti* in singular; and YS 3.25; 3.44; 3.47: 4.2-3 for *prakṛti* in plural).
- This rendering of "guṇa" as "subtle powers" (sūkṣmāḥ śaktayaḥ) is based on the interpretation given in YD (for example ad SK 9, p. 109, 15-17; ad SK 16, p. 164, 27-28). This interpretation takes into account one specific feature of the satkārya-doctrine which will be relevant in the following discussion: The presence of an existent creative potential, which might or might not be manifest, i.e. be transformed into an effect. The equation of guṇa with śakti does, however, not solve the problem, how the relationship between pradhāna and the three guṇas has to be understood. This problem becomes obvious in the discussions on the implications of translating guṇa as "constituent" (as advocated by GARBE 1917: 273) or "quality" respectively (as preferred by JACOBI 1895 in his critique of GARBE). FRAUWALLNER (1953: 306, passim; 1992: 107) sticks to "quality" (as do HACKER 1985 and RAO 1963). LARSON (1987: 65 ff.) proposes to interpret the guṇa along the lines of "reductive materialism" which according to him constitutes the core-doctrine of Sāṃkhya. Thus, he translates triguṇa as "tripartite constituent process [...] which is primordial materiality."
- It does however need the teleological relation to the *puruṣa*, which provides activity with a purpose. This relation is not presented as a variation of "causality", i.e. as the causa finalis, but as a predisposition of *avyakta-prakṛti*: In the YD this predisposition is called *adhikāra*. Vide infra.

position of the conscious entity can be corroborated by early usages of plural prakrti: The doctrine of a plurality of prakrti or self-acting causes is often combined with the presence of an acting (i.e. causally efficient) consciousness, which provides the activity of those causes with liveliness, order and purpose. Thus, in BhG 7.4 the "eightfold prakrti" (astadhā prakṛti) is dependent on Kṛṣṇa, who directs her as the entering jīva. Similarly, an active function is ascribed to the purusa in some passages of the Carakasamhita.⁴ The development of the doctrine of prakrti as a singular cause seems to go along with opposing her to the non-acting purusa. Moreover, as far as it can be reconstructed from the available textual sources, the necessity of such a singular and common cause had to be proved from the very start. Therefore, the Sāmkhya-teachers offered a theoretical construction of the term as well as of the entity "prakrti". In doing this, they used certain techniques of inference (anumāna) as all philosophical schools arguing for "invisible entities" (as e.g. the ātman) did. However, in asserting a singular cause, which acts independently from self-reflective intentionality but is nevertheless receptive to its presence, they had a hard time in the debates with the other philosophical schools, which rejected the whole concept.⁵

The analysis of the conceptualization of *prakṛti* may thus help to assess the philosophical intentions as well as the value of the construction of the term for the systematic coherence of Sāṃkhya. It might also shed some light on the attractiveness the concept had not only in systematic presentations of Yoga teachings, but also in theological contexts. Such an analysis can be undertaken by scrutinizing the available texts not only for the proofs for *prakṛti* but also for those terms, which serve to define or specify the concept under consideration. In the following I shall deal with sāmānya (general, common) as one of those terms of specification and point to two contexts, in which the term is used. In these contexts the term serves to define *prakṛti* (1) as opposed to *puruṣa* and (2) as the cause (avyakta) vis-à-vis her products (vyakta). Although sāmānya and the opposite term viśeṣa do not play the prominent role as particular categories

⁴ For the juxtaposition of Vaiśeṣika- and Sāṃkhya-interpretations of *puruṣa* or *ātman* in Carakasaṃhitā compare COMBA (1978).

⁵ Cf. KUMAR (1983) for a survey of the refutations of Sāṃkhya in what he calls the "brahmanical systems"; for Śaṅkara's refutation see PODGORSKI (1975) and LARSON (1979: 209-235). For the refutation in Tattvasaṃgraha compare LIEBENTHAL (1934).

as for example in Vaiśeṣika, both qualifications are relevant also in Sāṃkhya. This holds especially true for the second context, when the terms are employed for describing causality and thus for specifying *satkāryavāda*. Evidence for this can be furnished from YD, YBh, and a text outside the Sāṃkhya tradition, in Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādin's doxography (Dvādaśāranayacakra), the Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī (Nyāg).

1. Avyakta and vyakta as sāmānya

The term $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ is in SK employed, when $pradh\bar{a}na$ and the manifest world are both opposed to the puruṣa. This qualification appears in SK 11 and is thus part of a set of attributes, which are called $sar\bar{u}pa$, e.g. which describe the characteristics avyakta-prakrti shares with her products. These stand in contrast to the so-called $vir\bar{u}pa$ -attributes in SK 10, which distinguish prakrti from her products. These $vir\bar{u}pa$ -characteristics imply that prakrti shares certain characteristics with the puruṣa. One consequence of this distribution is, that the three objects of knowledge enumerated in SK 2 (vyakta, avyakta and $j\tilde{n}a$) are defined as embedded in a triadic frame of reference. Therefore, the puruṣa for example is opposed to prakrti only with regard to those aspects, which the prakrti shares with her products.

Most commentaries explain "sāmānya" as that which is common to all *puruṣas* (sometimes *sādhāraṇa* is used as synonym). As examples serve an actress or a female slave, who might be looked at or used by many *puruṣas*, or at least by all *puruṣas* around.⁷ Thereby it is asserted, that the *puruṣa* is

- hetumad anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritaṃ lingam / sāvayavaṃ paratantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītam avyaktam //SK 10/ triguṇam aviveki viṣayaḥ sāmānyam acetanaṃ prasavadharmi / vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ tadviparītas tathā ca pumān //SK 11/ On the function of this distribution of attributes in the context of SK 9-15 cf. MALINAR 1998: 116-127. On sārūpya and vairūpya as qualifications of hetu in the context of yuktivāda compare OBERHAMMER (1963: 82).
- Compare ad SK 11:
 for the female slave: SSV (p. 21,26-27): sāmānyam vyaktam sarvapuruṣānām, yathā malladāsī sarvveṣām eva mallānām / sāmānyaviṣayatvād vyaktam sarvvapuruṣānām, sāmānyam tathā pradhānam api viṣayatvāt sarvapuruṣasāmānyam / (similarly: SV, p. 17,9-10; JM p. 14,16-17: sāmānyam vyaktam, sarvapuruṣopabhogyatvān malladāsīvat / tathā pradhānam api; GBh, p. 13,1: sāmānyam vyaktam / mūlyadāsīvat sarvasādhāranatvāt)

always entangled in a structure, which is the same for every self-deceived consciousness. Thus, the material and the basic formations of the cognitive and physical apparatus are identical for all manifest beings, which become objects (viṣaya) of puruṣa. Consciousness incites the production of general formations, but has no influence for example on the sequence, in which these formations appear, e.g. that buddhi always appears before ahamkāra and not vice versa. Thus, prakṛti is a cause, which not only produces a variety of things and their material basis, but also provides the assembly of manifest things with orderliness, homogenity, predictability and repeatability. Even Yogins, when they gain access to the natural powers (aiśvarya), seem to be restricted by these prākṛtic predispositions. They can open the creative channels of prakṛti, but they are not reported to have created their private universe.

Avyakta-prakṛti is able to react to various degrees of karmic delusion by a mechanism, which is not explained by the Sāṃkhya teachers. At least the YD testifies that one realized the problems, which this lack of explanation might provoke. Thus, the commentator states that the performance offered by prakṛti is happening according to "adhikāra", i.e. resulting from authorization or duty respectively. The first appearance of guṇa-configurations resulting in the manifestation of buddhi happens

for the actress-dancer: STK (p. 108,3-5): sāmānyam sādhāraṇam. vijñānarūpatve tv asādhāranyād vijñānām vṛttirūpāṇām te 'py asādhāraṇāh syuh. tathā ca nartakībhrūlatābhanga ekasmin bahūnām pratisaṃdhānam yuktam anyathā tan na syād iti bhāvah.

for a courtesan: MV (p. 20,6-7): sāmānyam vyaktam / gaṇikāvat sarvapuruṣāṇām / tathā pradhānam api /

⁸ As described in YS 4.2-3 with YBh. In this passage *prakṛti* is used in plural.

On adhikāra see LARIVIERE (1988) and HALBFASS (1991: 66-74). Adhikāra is especially referred to in YD ad SK 21 and 52. The term is also used in YBh ad YS 1.5, 1.50, 51; 2.24 and 3.55, where it is ascribed to the guṇa and the citta or buddhi respectively. Adhikāra is preferably used, when the binding activity of the guṇa is described, thus the adhikāra of the guṇa and the citta consists in entangling the puruṣa, whereas the practice of Yoga results in dispositions, which obstruct the performance of adhikāra. Correspondingly, deliverance means the end of adhikāra. Cf. for example the contrast between "buddhi with adhikāra" (sādhikārā), which "comes back", and buddhi, which gained knowledge of puruṣa and does not return as the adhikāra is gone. (caritādhikārā; cf. YBh ad YS 2.24; pp. 233-234). See also the definition of kaivalya as the termination of the (fixed) sequence (of transformation of the guṇa) according to their adhikāra (YSBh ad YS 4.34, p. 454: guṇādhikārakrama-samāptau kaivalyam uktam).

according to this "adhikāra". 10 Even the association (samyoga) of purusa and prakrti is due to adhikāra as the YD-kāra explains in commenting on the mutual dependence between the two spheres (samyogam adhikārabandham āhur ācāryāh; YD ad SK 21, p. 185,3-4). The production and reproduction of the elements and the matrices of corporal existence, which are common to all purusas, thus seems to be ascribed to prakrti's own creative potential, which is, to a certain degree, self-organized. It is stated, that the guna are not dependent on the purusa with regard to the manner, in which they fulfill their duty. Correspondingly, it is maintained, that the manifestation of tattva is a process, which follows a fixed course or sequence (krama)11 and depends solely on the very "being" of creative powers, the guna.¹² This is corroborated in YBh ad YS 4.3, where it is stated that the success of Yoga-practice is not the cause for the incitement of the natural powers (prakrti, pl.). Yogic practice can only remove the barriers, which withheld prakrti from acting, it can not influence the structure of her activity, because an effect cannot "cause" the activity of the cause. 13

- Thus, it is declared in the context of explaining the mutual dependency between *linga* and *bhāva*: *guṇasamanantaraṃ tv adhikāralakṣaṇaḥ / tasmād dvividhā sargo 'dhikāralakṣaṇo lingākhyo> bhāvākhyaś ca /* (YD ad SK 52, p. 255,20-21). In employing this term, the YD-kāra refers to a discussion among Sāṃkhya teachers about the status of *bhāva* (as disposition of *buddhi*) and *adhikāra* with regard to creation (*sarga*).
- The krama of the guṇa is also referred to in YS and YBh in descriptions of pariṇāma (YS 3.15 with YBh) and of cosmology (cf. YS 2.19 with YBh). In YBh ad 2.19 it is stated that the "vertical", i.e. hierarchical, division of the guṇa is dependent on the "rule of the sequence of transformation" (pariṇāmakramaniyamāt). This "krama" can not be transgressed (cf. YBhVi ad 2.19, p. 188, 12-13: kramānatipatteḥ is explained as kramānatikramāt, and then it is stated: na hi loke kasyacid utpadyamānasya kramātilanghanam asti (For in this world nothing, that comes into being, can transgress the fixed sequence [of origination]).
- "The manifest is only a specific formation of those (subtle powers), which in fufilling their task operate through (self-) transformation as they form aggregates, whose appearance follows a (fixed) sequence, which is determined only by the very being of (those powers)." (tāsām adhikārasāmarthyād upajātapariṇāmavyāpārāṇām sanmātrānukrameṇa pracayam upasampadyamānānām sanniveśaviśeṣamātram vyaktam, YD ad SK 9, p. 109,17-19).
- 13 na hi dharmādi nimittam prayojakam prakṛtīnām bhavati, na kāryyeṇa kāraṇam pravarttyate, kathan tarhi varaṇabhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavad. (YBh ad YS 4.3, p. 395).

The independence from the causal chain allows for the *puruṣa*'s singularity. When opposed to $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ as the $sar\bar{u}pa$ -attribute of prakrti and her products, the *puruṣa* is qualified as $as\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ or $niḥs\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$. The commentators seem to have been careful not to qualify him as "viśeṣa"; perhaps in order to make sure, that he is not part of any causal relationship and is thus never identical with anything except himself. Conversely, to maintain individuality or distinctness in a realm which is "common" ($s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$) to all *puruṣa* is only a sign of ignorance and error. Although individual beings (*bheda*) appear as a result of the specific delusion of *puruṣa* with regard to *prakṛti*, there exist no absolute distinct beings, which might be comparable to Vaiśeṣika's *atyanta-viśeṣa*. Rather, the individuality of manifest things documents according to Sāmkhya their dependency on the common cause. All specifications are relative. They appear and disappear, but never affect the "distinct" *puruṣa*s.

This line of argument is touched upon in the YD in a passage, in which the individuality of effects is contrasted with the "distinctness" of puruṣa. In the explanation of the last of the five reasons (hetu) for proving the satkārya-doctrine given in SK 9 (pp. 124-125), the opponent asks why the puruṣa should exist although there is no cause for him, whereas the "hare's horn" should not exist, although there is no cause neither. In this argument the opponent tries to equate "existence" with "being part of a causal relationship", i.e. with being either cause or effect. With this thesis the very possibility of a puruṣa as defined in Sāṃkhya philosophy, i.e. as being neither cause nor effect, is rejected. The author of the YD refutes this definition of "existence" as "causal". In this connection, the causal relationship is defined by using the terms sāmānya and viśeṣa. The "effect" is defined as saṃsthānaviśeṣa, as a special formation or aggregation of the causal powers. This expression is used besides sanniveśaviśeṣa¹⁵ in YD and also in YBh instead of the term saṃghāta found in SK 16.¹⁶

- 14 SSV and SV ad SK 12 give "niḥsāmānyaḥ", JM, GBh and MV "asāmānyaḥ".
- 15 Cf. YBh ad YS 4.13, which quotes the following definition: sarvam idam guṇānām sanniveśaviśeṣamātram iti. Saṃsthānaviśeṣa is used in YBh ad YS 1.43 besides pracayaviśeṣa. While the latter compound is used for describing visible and specified things (as cow, pot) as being "special agglomerations of atoms" (anupracayaviśesātmā gavādir ghaṭādir vā lokaḥ), the "special formation" of the elemental subtles (bhūtasūkṣma, i.e. the subtle matrices of the elements), which preceeds the appearance of visible things is called saṃsthānaviśeṣa. Saṃsthāna appears again in a quotation in YBh ad YS 3.13. In this passages it is maintained that the "configuration" is finite,

What is relevant in the present discussion is the statement that the puruṣa is existent, although he is not an effect, because he exists apart from the causal relationship, i.e. he is no sāmānyaviśeṣa (sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvāt). Although there are strong indications, that Vaiśeṣika terminology¹⁷ is commented upon while using sāmānya and viśeṣa for qualifying the causal relationship, in the present context it is not the absence of the Vaiśeṣika-category of sāmānyaviśeṣa which is referred to. Rather, a "tatpuruṣa"-interpretation of the compound is suggested: The puruṣa is not an effect because he is not a "specification of sāmānya", he is no saṃsthāna. This latter interpretation is based on following definition of saṃsthāna: "For, formation is when the general takes a specific form" (sāmānyasya hi viśeṣaparigrahaḥ saṃsthānam, p. 125,2-3). According to satkāryavāda, causality is the manifestation of the cause as the effect.¹⁸ In the passage

while its constituents are not (saṃsthānam ādimad dharmamātraṃ śabdādīnāṃ vināśyavināśinām, evaṃ lingam ādimad dharmamātraṃ sattvādīnāṃ vināśyavināśinām tasmin vikārasaṃjñeti). This statement is also cited in Nyāg 323,12-13 in the Sāṃkhya refutation of the thesis of the opponent, that because the effects can be destroyed, the cause has also to be regarded as destructible.

- On the conceptual implications and the historical background of this terminology compare WEZLER (1985).
- Cf. MOTEGI (1994) for other Vaiśesika concepts referred to in YD. The Vaiśesika concept of sāmānya seems also to have been commented upon indirectly in YD ad SK 15, in the explanation of the hetu "samanyaya": "Here it is known that being(-ness) [of an entity], by which the different things are pervaded. As the clay [pervades] the pots etc. Similarly, words etc. are pervaded by happiness, pain and confusion. Therefore, they do also exist. And when these, happiness etc., have lost their specification, that is the unmanifest. Therefore the unmanifest exists." (iha yena bhedānām samanugatis tasya sattvam drstam tadyathā mrdā ghatādīnām / asti ceyam sukhaduhkhamohaih śabdādīnām samanugatih / tasmāt te 'pi santi / ye ca sukhādayo 'stamitaviśesās tad avyaktam / tasmād asty avyaktam / YD ad SK 15, p. 144,1-3). This comes close to Praśastapāda's definition of sāmānya in PDhS: yad anugatam asti tat sāmānyam iti ([361], p. 81). The highest sāmānya is sattā, the being-ness. As sāmānya constitutes "own form" (svarūpa) of things, it arouses the same recognition (anuvrttipratyaya). In the case of sattā, it is the recognition "sad, sad". For a detailed analysis of these concepts see HALBFASS (1992: 139-168). Cf. also NBh ad NyS 2.2.69. This connection between sāmānya and its dependence on a corresponding perception or recognition is also stressed in the explanation of dharmisvarūpa in YD ad SK 16. Vide infra 2.1.
- 18 Cf. the refutation of the interpretation of *satkārya* as a "container-doctrine" in YD ad SK 9 (115,18-22): The effect is not contained in the cause like the fruits of the cotton-

under discussion this is transposed into the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* terminology and thus causality might be defined as "specification of the general" or the "specific formation of the common elements or matrices" respectively.

In proposing both formulations the implications of translating "sāmānya" with either "general" or "common" shall be pointed out as well as the necessity to retain both translations as possible interpretations in the different contexts of Sāmkhya teachings. Sāmānya as the "general" (das Allgemeine) corresponds rather to the status of prakrti as a singular, homogenous causal realm, as the potentiality and the structure of a diversity, which has not yet taken shape. With regard to the function of prakrti as a special mode of being of the causal powers, this would mean, that the common cause would not only exist as the potentiality of manifold configurations, i.e. specifications, but would also provide their appearance with a certain order, with what is for example called in YBh and YD krama. The process of entering into or of changing "configuration" is then to be connected with the parināma-model of causality. The translation "common" (das Gemeinsame) would indicate something more graspable, as for example the guna, the causal powers, which are common to all manifest things, when they interact with each other in a relationship based on dominance and then become manifest as saṃsthānaviśeṣa. This implies that the "common" elements, which appear as "specified" when they enter into a certain constellation, are still detectable, even if one element is dominated by another. This interpretation would correspond to the samghāta-model of causality. Both levels of interpretation mark aspects of the usage of the qualification "sāmānya". They can be connected with the two modes of causality, which are employed for explaining the activity of prakrti. Both can be used to assert the continuity between cause and effect as well as a difference between them, i.e. the "general" appears as specified and the "common" as individualized. In addition to this, it is also helpful to consider both interpretations, when sāmānya serves for connecting the singularity of prakrti, as the "state of non-difference", with the plurality of her causal powers, which remain present as the "common" efficiency in all manifest things.

shrub are contained in a jar. Rather: The effect is just the cause (*kāraṇam eva kāryam ity anumanyāmahe*).

The freedom from this causal bondage distinguishes the *puruṣa* from the *prakṛti* realm. In this realm *viśeṣa* is defined in relation to *sāmānya*. Therefore, the sāṃkhyistic *puruṣa* can not be a *viśeṣa* in this sense. Thus, his distinctness has to be seen as numerical distinctness in the first place. Before the second context is dealt with, is should again be emphasized, that the application of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in describing causality, makes it possible to interpret *satkāryavāda* in terms of "differenciation" or "specification of a general". This function seems to be specific for the sāṃkhyistic interpretation of *sāmānya*. Moreover, it seems to be closely related (1) to the causal hierarchy implied in the *tattva* scheme and (2) to the proofs for *prakṛti*.

2. Sāmānya and viśeṣa as "internal" qualifications in the realm of prakṛti-tattva

In what has been called the "second context", *sāmānya* is used in order to distinguish *prakṛti* as the common cause from the variety of her products. The *sāmānya-viśeṣa* terminology is employed in order to describe causal relationships in the *tattva*-scheme, which is characterised by hierarchical or vertical sequence as well as by horizontal arrangement.¹⁹

It seems, that for the Sāṃkhya teachers this usage stood in no conflict with qualifying both avyakta (prakṛti) and the vyakta-realm as sāmānya, when opposed to the puruṣa. This indicates, that causality and the structure of the prakṛti-cosmos were, to a certain extent, explained independently from the existence of the puruṣa. Not only that: Seen from the angle of proving the "objects of knowledge" in Sāṃkhya, one might even say, that the puruṣa is a derivate of the prakṛti realm. The unity of the cosmos constituted by prakṛti implies those general features, which serve as hetus for or provide the basis for infering puruṣa in SK 17.²⁰

¹⁹ For the distinction between "horizontal" and "vertical" cosmology cf. HALBFASS (1992: 54-56).

Thus, it is not a matter of chance, that in SK the *hetu* for infering *puruṣa* are listed after the enumeration of the *hetu* for the *satkārya*-thesis and for *prakṛti*. Rather, this arrangement shows, that Īśvarakṛṣṇa aimed at some systematic plausibility in his presentation of Sāmkhya. Cf. MALINAR (1998: 111-127).

2.1 Sāmānya and viśeṣa in descriptions of causal hierarchy

Both terms are used for describing evolutionary and involutionary processes in the context of what might be called "causal hierarchy". 21 One of the special features of the satkārya-doctrine is the thesis, that prakrti, apart from her being the "highest" cause, is present in the effects as their very efficiency. This holds true firstly, for the productivity of the tattva, especially the so-called "prakrti-vikrtayah", which are capable of producing "other tattva" (tattvāntara). Secondly, this can be observed in the realm of vikāra, the world of individualised, manifest entities: although they cannot produce other, i.e. new tattva, they can reproduce themselves according to genera and species and thus testify that they belong to prakrti.22 In SK this employment is hinted at in kārikā 38, when the terms "avišesa" and "višesa" are used for distinguishing the "non-specified elements" (tanmātra) from the "specified" elements (mahābhūta). Most commentators explain the appearance of the gross elements as "differenciation" of the "non-specified elements". This differenciation implies not only the transformation of the tanmātra into the respective mahābhūta, but also a successive accumulation of qualities in the manifest elements.

This description can be interpreted as an attempt to combine two modes of causality, i.e. pariṇāma and saṃghāta. A sequence, and as such a transformation (pariṇāma) of tanmātra is indicated, when it is declared, that e.g. ākāśa results from śabda-tanmātra. Addition or conglomeration (saṃghāta) takes place, when the next mahābhūta (tejas), which arises from the rūpatanmātra, has also the quality (here called guṇa) of the śabda-tanmātra. ²³

- 21 Cf. YD ad SK 3, p. 65, 12 or YBh ad YS 2.19, p. 211. This distinction between *prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ-tattva* and *vikāra-tattva* will be dealt with in an article under preparation.
- 22 For this see 2.2.
- 23 CHAKRAVARTI (1975: 244) summarizes this theory, which is attested in YD, YBh and its sub-commentaries as follows: "[...] everywhere it is found that a gross element inherits the respective property or properties of the tanmātra from which it evolves and that one tanmātra independent of another tanmātra gives rise to a gross element." The systematic difficulties, which arise from this combination are pointed out by CHAKRAVARTI (ibid.: 245 ff.) and BRONKHORST (1994: 312-315). Vārṣagaṇya postulates a special kind (bhāva) of "sambandha" between tanmātra and mahābhūta, the "mātra-mātrika-bhāva". Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 45-46). For different

Subsequently, the *mahābhūta* (or rather their qualities), once manifest, interact with each other according to the principle of sanniveśaviśesa or samghāta. They are not capable of "productive" transformation into another tattva, but change only (parināma) with regard to the constellation of their qualities. If one asks, however, what is interacting with what, and what remains constant in these interactions, so that the elements entering "configuration" remain identifiable, in short, how can change be mediated with stable configurations, some difficulties arise for the interpreters. It seems, that the above-mentioned combination of two models of causality is one reason for the difficulties, which arise, especially in interpreting the relationship between dharmin and dharma, substratum and qualities.²⁴ The mahābhūta as vikāra (modification) of the preceding tattva (the tanmātra) remain stable, they serve, for the time being, as dharmin, while the configuration of their qualities, which interact with the qualities of the other elements, might change. Nevertheless, the stability of the elements as vikāra does not imply, that they exist as substances apart from their qualities. This has already been pointed out by WEZLER in his interpretation of the statement "gunasamdrāvo dravvam" in the context of Sāmkhya: According to him, the individual material object (dravya) "is [...] defined to be always, i.e. at each and every point of time, nothing but a gunasamdrāva, no matter which qualities 'come together' to constitute it at a particular point of time. The fact that the gunas change, or even permanently change, does not in the least affect the nature of the dravva as such, i.e. its being nothing but a samdrāva of gunas at every moment of its - finite - existence." (1985: 18). However, the identity of the dravya, or to be more precise, the stability of the configuration of their qualities, has also to be accounted for. This is suggested by BRONKHORST, who explains the co-existence of satkārva-doctrine and samghāta-model as the result of a historical development: "In order to accommodate the doctrine of satkāryavāda, classical Sānkhya views the world as a continuous series of

interpretations of the manifestation of the *mahābhūtas* see YD (ad SK 22, p. 187; ad 38, p. 225).

²⁴ The often quoted point of reference for the problem and its interpretation is the definition of parināma given in YD ad SK 9 (p. 111,21-22) and 16 (p. 163,12-13): jahad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādatte yadā param / tattvād apracyuto dharmī parināmaḥ sa ucyate //
(When a substratum takes up a different quality after abandoning a former quality without loosing its identity, this is called transformation.).

modifications (pariṇāma) of substrates which do not lose their essence." (1994: 316). Yet, how can one describe this "substantialist" aspect of Sāmkhya, without revoking the sāmkhyistic rejection of the scheme of substance and accidens of Vaiśeṣika? Or put it otherwise: How can one account for the limitation of possible changes of a dravya, i.e. the stability of a manifest configuration? A consideration of the sāmānya-viśeṣa terminology, which is employed for describing causal relationships in the hierarchy of tattva might offer some additional perspective on the problem.

In the YD this hierarchy is referred to in the commentary ad SK 16, in the context of a discussion of the above-mentioned definition of parināma.²⁵ The opponent rejects the definition with the argument, that one cannot speak of an essential form (i.e. the identity) of a substratum (dharmisvarūpa), if Sāmkhya (1) holds the dharmī not to be different from the qualities (dharma), and (2) teaches the appearance and disappearance of dharma.26 Moreover, the alleged dharmisvarūpa can not be conceived of as neither sāmānya nor viśesa. With regard to this objection, the YD-kāra states, that the dharmisvarūpa should be regarded as sāmānya. This statement is in the following explained by proposing an epistemological perspective, which connects this position with the definition of sāmānya in NBh as well as in PDhS²⁷: Sāmānya has to be regarded as existent as long as the idea or perception (pratyaya) of it remains, i.e. it is perceived as that which remains constant while changes occur with regard to the dharmaconfiguration. In this way, the question of an ontological continuity of the substratum as sāmānya (as the common "thing") with regard to the hierarchy of causal realms is brushed aside. Instead, an ontological relativism is postulated, which is based on the epistemological conditions pointed out before. The commentator explains:

If, however, it is declared, that the general $(s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya)$ is with reference to another general a specification, than we reply: It is not so, because $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ remains

- 25 See above note 24.
- 26 YD ad SK 16, p. 163,28-31.
- Vātsyāyana states in his comment on the NyS-definition of *jāti* as that which produces the same, that *sāmānya* is that "thing" (*artha*) which is operative in producing the same perception or idea with regard to different objects (*yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittaṃ tat sāmānyam*; NBh ad NyS 2.2.69, 693,3.). For a parallelism to PDhS and YD see above note 17.

present as long as the idea²⁸ of it is not abandoned and therefore the 'own form' of the substratum is ascertained. As long as this idea 'earth' does not vanish the general is the earth, the specification is the pot etc. Thus, that [the earth] is the substratum, because the existence of [her] own form is ascertained from the arising of the idea of a form with regard to that [object], while other qualities come and go; the pots etc. are the qualities. When, however, the idea of "earth" vanishes, then the element-matrices are the general and being a substratum [like earth has been before] is a specific quality – [in this way] it is to be explained up to pradhāna. This [pradhāna], however, is indeed permanent, because another general is not obtained. When all specifications are absent, that is pradhāna. If, however, earth etc. were always undifferenciated, thus existing in the form of the general, they would also attain permanency. Therefore, the essential form of a substratum is not non-existent. And [an 'own form' is accepted] also because capacity (causal power) is accepted as general. Likewise the causal powers 'happiness, pain and confusion' indeed transform themselves into the subtle body, starting with 'great' (mahat, i.e. the buddhi), ending with the elements. And they are substrata because they continuously cause common ideas [or the idea of a general], as they do not deviate from their essential form; and the subtle body is the qualification.²⁹

Pradhāna is here interpreted as the only permanent sāmānya, while in the causal hierarchy of tattva, the respective cause is seen as the general with regard to its effect, which is treated as its specification. Sāmānya as the preceding state of the cause is present in the effect as its svarūpa. As such it is, however, embedded in the hierarchy of causal relationships and therefore finite and relative. The perception and idea of sāmānya or svarūpa vanish, when a higher level in the causal hierarchy is reached. In

- 28 *Pratyaya* seems to imply more than mere attention (*ālocana*) as it signifies the perception of something as something, thus a perception accompanied by verbalization or conceptualization (*savikalpa*). Therefore, the term is translated with "idea".
- yat tūktam (...) sāmānyam sāmānyāntarāpeksam višesatvam iti <atra brūmah:> na pratyay<ā>nivrttau sāmāny<a>bhāvāvasthites tataś ca dharmisvarūpasiddheh / yāvat prthivīty ayam pratyayo na nivartate tāvat prthivī sāmānyam ghatādir viśesah <dravyatvam> cāsau dharmāntaraparivartesu tadākārapratyayotpattitah rūpāvasthānasiddher dharmā ghaṭādayaḥ / yadā tu pṛthivīpratyayanivṛttis tadā tanmātrānām sāmānyabhāvo dravyatvam ca višeso dharma iti yāvat pradhānam / tasya tu sāmānyāntarānupapatteḥ kauṭasthyam eva / yatra sarvaviśeṣābhāvas tat pradhānam / yadi tu pṛthivyādīnām nityam avyāvṛttam syāt sāmānyarūpam evam sati kautasthyam esām prāptam / tasmān na dharmisvarūpābhāvāh / śakter vā sāmānyabhāvābhyupagamāt / athavā sukhaduhkhamohasaktaya eveha mahadādinā viśesāntena lingena parināmam pratipadyante / tāsām ca satatam sāmānyapratyayanimittatvāt svarūpād apracyuter dravyatvam lingasya <ca> dharmatvam / (YD ad SK 16, 164,17-30).

this way the *dharma-dharmin*-terminology is transposed into the *tattva*-scheme and reinterpreted along the lines of a sequence of specifications of the (preceding) general or common element. The "substratum" is defined and perceived according to its rank in the *tattva*-scheme and is thus relative although it functions as *svarūpa* with regard to the specific configuration of its attributes. At the same time it seems to be responsible for the stability of a specific configuration of qualities.

Further light is shed on this relationship in those passages in the YBh, in which causal hierarchy and, along with this, the scheme of tattva is explained. However, while on the hand the relevance of the terminology under consideration can be corroborated, on the other hand, one has to be aware of the differences between the two texts with regard to the interpretation of Sāmkhya. Reasons for this can be sought in the different scholastic context of both texts and in different intentions. While in YBh Sāmkhya is used quite selectively, the YD aims at an exposition of the whole system as it is presented in SK. Also, different scholastic affiliations (i.e. guru-committment) have to be taken into account, although they have to remain uncertain for the time being. This might explain some differences in the interpretation of the tattva-scheme and the respective tattva, which distinguish the Sāmkhya presented in the YBh from kārikā-Sāmkhya (as for example the reference to paramānu as parts of the tanmātra in YBh ad YS 3.43). In YS 2.19 the transformation of the guna is divided into the following stages (ascending): viśesa, aviśesa, lingamātra, alinga.³⁰ The YBh explains, that the transformation into specifications (viśesaparināma) implies 16 viśesa: The five bhūtāni and the 11 indriva (together with the manas). These proceed from the group called "sadaviśesa" (five tanmātra and the asmitālaksana[sya] aviśesa[sya]). These aviśesas are again transformations of the "sāttāmātrasva ātmano mahatas" (the mighty self, which is mere being), which is dependent on pradhāna, the alinga (without characteristics). As such it is exempt from all ontological specifications (it is called being neither sad nor asad). At the end of this explanation it is stated, that there are no other tattva beyond, or rather below, the group of viśesa, i.e. the gross elements. Modification or change (parināma) in their case does not result in "self-transformation" of cosmic, i.e. general relevance: They are only affected by changes with regard to dharma (qualities), laksana (characteristics) and avasthā (state), which is the subject

of YS 3.13.³¹ Thus, in YBh *pariṇāma* is not the same for all *tattva*, but is defined according to the position of the respective *tattva* in the causal hierarchy. The introduction of the forms of *pariṇāma* in YS 3.13 thus also indicates the necessity to restrict *tattvāntara-pariṇāma*. Only this restriction allows for presenting a completed *tattva* scheme, i.e. a cosmos, which is not open to further or even open-ended evolution.

This scheme as well as the sequence (krama) of the modification of the guna is further specified in a description of the conquest of the elements (bhūtajaya) ad YS 3.44. The sūtra states that this conquest can be achieved through "samyama" of the following five aspects (YBh calls them "rūpa") of the bhūta: sthūla, svarūpa, sūksma, anvaya, arthavattva. In the context of the present discussion, the first three aspects are especially relevant. The commentator explains, that the gross (sthūla) form of the elements consists in the specifications, which belong to the elements together with their qualities as form [etc.] (pārthivādyāh śabdādayo viśesāh sahākārādibhir dharmaih).32 In contrast to this, the svarūpa-form is explained as "sāmānyam", i.e. as that, which remains constant in the changing configurations of the qualities of the elements (asya sāmānyasya śabdādayo viśesāh). These are: shape $(m\bar{u}rti)$ for earth; viscidity (sneha) for water; heat (uṣṇatā) for fire; bending (pranāmī) for wind and omnipresence (sarvatogati) for aether.33 These sāmānya are regarded as the jāti, so that different configurations arise only with regard to the qualities. Before the author of the YBh proceeds with the explanation of the sūksma-aspect, the subtle form (i.e. the tanmātra as causes of the mahābhūta) he describes the structure of a dravya, in this case apparently, the concrete, perceptible thing. It is stated, that a dravva is an aggregate of sāmānya and viśesa (sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāyo 'tra dravyam). After the commentator has distinguished between different "aggregates" or configurations, he quotes a definition of Patañjali, that a dravya is an aggregate, whose parts are not

- It is stated, that this *pariṇāma* does not affect the *svarūpa* of the *dharmin*, which is called the *svarūpa* of the *mahābhūta* (e.g. *mūrti* in case of the earth; cf. YBh ad 3.44 and 4.14). Cf. YBh ad YS 3.13: *ete dharmalakṣaṇāvasthāpariṇāmā dharmisva-rūpam anatikrāntā ity...* (p. 307).
- The latter qualities are also mentioned in YD ad SK 38, where, however, a *svarūpa* of the *mahābhūta* is not mentioned. Only a list of qualities is given, which also appears in TV ad YBh 3.44. These qualities, according to the YD-kāra, support each other mutually (*parasparānugrahakāh*, p. 225,22).
- 33 Cf. the list in YBh ad YS 4.14, with a slightly different terminology.

separable from each other.³⁴ This inseparability is the reason for the stability, the essential form (*svarūpa*) of the *dravya*. The author of the YBh does not explain, how the first definition of the *svarūpa* of the elements is connected with the explanation "*sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāya*". Nevertheless, one can at least try to interprete the description, if one again takes into account (1) the causal hierarchy and (2) the necessity to give an explanation for the stability of a specific configuration of qualities.

First of all, the description in YBh shows, that the application of the sāmānya-viśesa-terminology is bound to the respective subdivision (parvan) of the transformation of the guna and can as such be repeated at each stage. The other specific feature of the employment of this terminology is, that the sāmānya remains discernable after its causal transformation into the next tattva: the general is specified but does not dissolve in specification. This also implies, that aviśesa (as the tanmātra) are not necessarily beyond perception; to the contrary, as both the YD passage quoted above and YBh ad YS 3.47 testify.³⁵ While the YD seems to be closer to the discussions in NBh and PDS, the YBh offers a different explanation: perceptible objects (called dravya ad YS 3.44 and grahya ad YS 3.47) are aggregates of sāmānya and viśesa. What this is supposed to mean can be shown by taking up the example of the earth: The author of the YBh accepts that the earth, while having "smell" (gandha) as tanmātra, shares as the last element all the qualities (guna) of the other tanmātra. Smell as tanmātra is unspecified, it is smell in general, whereas the element earth is always manifest as an object of perception with a concrete smell (as such the earth as an object – grahya – is also a combination of sāmānya and viśesa according to YBh ad YS 3.47). Nevertheless, smell as the causal matrix remains present in all specifications, as the very smell which is specified. On the next level, the author ascribes to earth a svarūpa or sāmānya of her own: mūrti (shape, form). This svarūpa seems to be different from the sāmānya-viśeṣa relationship between tanmātra and mahābhūta, as it is that feature of earth, which allows for its recognition in diverse objects (dravya): It is maintained, that wherever there is shape, there is earth; and with regard to this, the specific appearance of form, its weight etc. are mere qualifications,

³⁴ For the reference to Patañjali compare HALBFASS (1992: 106, Note 8) and BRONKHORST (1994: 318, Note 18).

³⁵ Cf. BRONKHORST (1994: 312, especially note 8), who refers to SK 34, in which it is stated, that both, the *viśesa* and the *aviśesa* are the objects of the *buddhīndriya*.

which might change. As long as form remains perceptible, earth is present in a *dravya*. Thus, the manifestation of the elements is connected with the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* terminology in two ways: First, the elements appear as specifications of the unspecified, general *tanmātra*; second, with regard to their aggregation as objects (*dravya*) they remain discernable as *sāmānya*, i.e. in their essential form (*svarūpa*) although they are in the configurations of qualities undergo change.

This might account for the double-sidedness not only of the elements in their appearance as configurations of qualities but also of the *tanmātra* as the preceding causes. They are stable and relative at the same time, because their status is defined with regard to the preceding *tattva*. Thus, in interpreting the division of the stages of *guṇa*-transformation, the causal hierarchy has to be taken into account: It provides the respective configurations with a certain stability according to their rank and as long as this rank is kept. Another consequence of this way to describe causality in terms of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* is, that the cause, which functions as the *sāmānya* with regard to its specifications might reappear on the next stage as its own specification. Thus, the "substantialist" aspect of the *satkārya*-doctrine can be accounted for by embedding it in the causal hierarchy of Sāṃkhya; at the same time an entity can, according to its rank, be defined as a changeable configuration of qualities.

2.2 Sāmānya and viśeṣa in proofs for pradhāna

The usage of $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ and visesa for describing "internal" differences in the causal realm of prakrti is also connected with another implication of the $satk\bar{a}rya$ -thesis in combination with the doctrine of prakrti: On the one hand the effect is explained as the result of a $parin\bar{a}ma$ of prakrti, who is able to appear as her own effect, i.e. as something which is different but still herself. On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish prakrti as a singular, common causal realm from her manifest existence. This makes it necessary to define the difference, which is implied in the causal relationship, in such a way that the continuity between cause and effect can be maintained, and even more: can be stressed. Seen from this angle, the qualification $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ mediates between the poles of "identity" and "difference" as it indicates the possibility of differenciation, and thus, similarity-cum-difference. The interpretation of causal activity as

differenciation makes it possible to view the products as *viśeṣa*, which depend on a preceding *sāmānya*. This interpretation has also consequences for the attempts of proving *prakṛti* as the existent cause of all manifest things: This common cause is inferred by the general or common characteristics (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*), which have been observed in the different manifest things (*bheda*).

If one scrutinizes the proofs presented quite comprehensively in the Nyāg,36 the following connection between this interpretation and the type of proof chosen for the inference of prakrti (the śesavat sāmānyato drstam anumānam) can be observed: As all manifest products are, according to the satkārya doctrine, related to the cause (i.e. to the previous state of the causal powers), they display certain characteristics, which indicate the presence of the cause in the effect. These characteristics have to be the same in all effects, if one aims at proving that they all have a common singular cause. Thus, if one has to infer a common cause for all effects, one has to show, that the fact, that e.g. all manifest beings can be classified according to species, can only be explained, if one assumes that they have a common cause. Consequently, Sāmkhya teachers used such general characteristics of the effects as reasons (hetu) for infering a cause like that. Correspondingly, the hetus listed in SK 15 as operative in proofs for prakrti are such characteristics of the effects: They are limited (parimāṇāt), they are generically related with each other (samanvaya), their efficiency depends on their capacity (śaktitah pravrtteh) etc. Seen from this perspective, the creation of proofs to be classified as "sesavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumānam", 37 presumably by Vārṣagaṇya, for inferring prakṛti gains some

- Although the Nyāg seems to be quite authentic in its presentation of the contents of non-Jaina philosophical systems, sometimes Siṃhasūri presents the proofs as if to lay open the difficulties, which are implied in them (thus, for example, when he presents the whole scheme of sāṃkhyistic cosmology as the example for the *hetu* "parimāṇāt"). A critique might also be implied in the "gap", which time and again appears in each proof, when the inference of a singular cause, the *pradhāna* fails.
- Contrary to NyS 1.1.5, in which a "threefold inference" (trividham anumānam) is taught, Vārṣagaṇya sets up a two-fold classification of anumāna as (1) viśeṣato dṛṣṭam and (2) sāmānyato dṛṣṭam. The second type is subdivided into pūrvavad- and śeṣavad-anumāna. The latter allows for proving entities "beyond the sensual powers" (atīndriya) and can be carried out as "direct" (vīta) and "indirect" (āvīta). Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 46-47). For a discussion of this classification and its connection with the seven "constant relations" (saptasambandha), which might serve as a basis for inference, cf. MALINAR (1998, ch.5).

plausibility: It might have been a designation for a special type of inference, which had to be created for proving a type of cause like "prakṛti": One could not use a specific effect for tracing a specific cause, as it is done in "ordinary" śeṣavad anumāna, 38 rather, one had to use characteristics, which were postulated as being common to all causal relationships in order to trace a "common cause". Therefore it is claimed: (1) that all manifest things are effects, (2) that these effects have general characteristics, and (3) that these characteristics result from their being differenciations, i.e. formations of a common cause.

This kind of proof is not detailed in the SK, although one can trace this line of argument if one analyses the arrangement of the $k\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$, especially the connection between SK 9 and 15. Neglecting this aspect in the present discussion, I shall exemplify these observations by turning to the second *hetu* listed in SK 15 "bhedānām samanvayāt": Prakṛti exists, because individual things are causally (i.e. generically) related to each other. By means of this hetu it is asserted that prakṛti is the unmanifest cause, because manifest things are bound together as cause and effect (anvaya or samanvaya, both appear in the text of Nyāg), which means in this context, they always belong to a certain species. This interpretation is given in the Nyāg, where this proof for prakṛti is presented in some detail. The gist of the proof is to infer prakṛti as the only genus (jāti), i.e. the only cause, from the observable fact that manifest things share the same species, if they are related to each other as cause and effect. The text runs as follows:

There exists a main cause (*pradhāna*) [for all manifest things], because a causal [generic] relationship between individual things is perceived. It is observed that individual things, which exist as cause and effect [for each other], are [generically] related to each other because [they share] the same genus (*ekajātisamanvaya*). As for example the sandalwood-tree and the piece of sandalwood. Thus it has been taught, that individual things depend on [something] common.³⁹

The argument is then shifted to the context of the *guṇa*-doctrine: The perception of generic relationships is the basis for tracing the common

³⁸ If one follows the first of two definitions of *śesavad anumāna* in NBh ad NyS 1.1.5.

³⁹ asti pradhānam bhedānām anvayadarśanāt, ādhyātmikānām bhedānām kāryakāraṇātmakānām ekajātisamanvayo dṛṣṭa iti candanaśakalādidṛṣṭāntam vakṣyati / sāmānyapūrvakānām ca bhedānām ity [...]. (Nyāg 314,7-10).

origin of all things back to the *ekajāti*, the one and only genus of the *guna*. As the reason (hetu) for this inference functions the observation, that all manifest things have a similar efficiency, as they produce invariably happiness, suffering and indifference.⁴⁰ Thus, the three guna are proposed as the ekajāti, the common cause of all things, which can still be traced in the effects in the same way as one can identify a piece of wood as belonging to one tree-species or the other. The individual is thus (1) as a representative of a species and (2) as producing invariably pleasure, pain and indifference identifiable as a product of *prakrti*, i.e. as a specification of her causal powers. Prakrti is sāmānya, because she is the ekajāti, which unfolds into distinct genera and species. Conversely, the variety of manifest things can only be explained by postulating a general, a common $j\bar{a}ti$, which unfolds and appears as this ordered manifoldness. (sam)anvaya, as generic relationship is postulated as a general characteristic of all individual beings, and therefore can be used to infer prakrti as the common cause. Correspondingly, prakrti is proved to be a cause, whose mode of production is in itself "(sam)anvaya". That is to say: Whatever prakrti produces appears as being stamped by the characteristics of a species. Thus, sāmānya and jāti are in Sāmkhya first and foremost not defined as a specific formation of elements, 41 but as a general causal efficiency, which becomes manifest in a sequence of effects. Sāmānva serves to qualify the causal realm and allows for describing the transition from sāmānya to viśesa as a specification of the former, in which the causal power as the specified sāmānya remains present and discernable.⁴²

This function of qualifying $pradh\bar{a}na$ and its effects as $s\bar{a}m\bar{a}nya$ and $vi\acute{s}e\dot{s}a$ respectively is corroborated by the indirect $(\bar{a}v\bar{\iota}ta)^{43}$ proof, in which prakrti is inferred through a refutation of alternative explanations. These proofs have fortunately also been preserved by Simhasūri.⁴⁴ As already

⁴⁰ ekajātisamanvayapradarśanārthasukhāditriguņaikajātisamanvayam kāryātmakānām tat sanniveśaviśesatvam (Nyāg 314,8-9).

For a discussion of this explanation in contrast to the interpretation offered in NyS 2.67-69 and in the commentaries compare MALINAR (1998: 156-161).

This is also corroborated in the summary of Simhasūri's account of the proofs for *prakṛti*, where *sāmānya* is listed as that qualification of *prakṛti*, which corresponds to the observable *samanvaya*-relations in the manifest world (cf. Nyāg p. 320,6-7).

⁴³ On *avīta* and *āvīta* see the paper of Eli FRANCO in the present volume.

These indirect inferences do not appear in SK and are only briefly referred to in YD ad SK 6 (p. 106,17-107,10). Viewed from what has been transmitted in the Nyāg, one

indicated, in an indirect proof the necessity of pradhāna as an existent cause, and of qualifying it as sāmānva is demonstrated ex negativo. It is argued, that, if one does not postulate a general or common cause, it is not possible to explain difference. This is ascertained through a refutation of the opposite position. The opponent asserts that effects arise from something, which does not or no longer exist. This is denied by pointing to an unwelcomed implication (prasanga) of this thesis, the so-called ekatvaprasanga, i.e. the false implication of identity of all things: If a nonexistent (asat) is the cause, then everything should be the same, because no qualifications or distinctions can be ascribed to something non-existent or to non-existence as such. Therefore, all manifest beings should be nirviśesa, without differences. This is obviously not the case as there are differences everywhere. These can, however, only exist as such, when something general precedes or produces them and then remains with them as that, which is common to them, as their sāmānya. Thus, as in the direct proof, it is again stated: sāmānyapūrvakatvād viśesānām. 45

These observations on the functions of using the terms "sāmānya" and "viśeṣa" in the context of proving prakṛti, shall be supplemented by pointing to a "theoretical gap". This gap increases the difficulties already implied in the proofs discussed before 46: Not only in the proofs for prakṛti, but also in explanations of the satkārya doctrine, it is the manifest world, the world of effects, which is the exclusive point of reference. Thus, the proofs belong to the śeṣavat sāmānyato dṛṣṭam type of inference: They prove a cause by starting from common characteristics of the effect, by "wrapping back" the visibile into the invisible. However, as the deduction

can say that they are at least hinted at in the two negative *hetu* in SK 9 (*asadakaraṇāt* and *sarvasambhavābhāvāt*). As all indirect proofs presented by Siṃhasūri aim at proving the thesis "*pradhānaṃ karaṇam*" by refuting the opposite position "*asat karaṇam*" through *prasaṅga*, one might say that the indirect proofs are, basically, variations of the first (negative) *hetu* of SK 9. Nevertheless, this does not make up for the loss or the suppression of these proofs in what Īśvarakṛṣṇa presents as the "abstracted" version of what he refers to as "Sastitantra".

⁴⁵ yadi vyaktasyāsata utpattir yonyabhāvād ekatvaprasangaḥ, pradhānābhāvāt sāmānyamātram idaṃ vyaktaṃ nirviśeṣam ity etat prasajyeta / kasmāt ? sāmānyapūrvakatvād viśeṣānām, sāmānyapūrvakā hi loke viśesā drstāh / (Nyāg 321,10-13).

The major difficulty is, that the common characteristics of effects could be used for infering several common causes, but not necessarily a singular and permanent common causal realm.

of the effect from the cause has been declared as unreliable (vyabhicāra) from quite early times, the Sāmkhya teachers did not care for proving their unique cause by postulating for example "causal laws", by taking up research in the realm of prakrti in order to make the "unwrapping", the (predictable) evolution of the effects from the cause a strong argument for prakrti's existence. This lack of interest in the laws of natural agency, 47 which seems to be also a consequence of rejecting proofs of the effect from the cause as unreliable, produced in the Sāmkhya system the following "theoretical gap": One can only explain the necessity of a concept and an entity like prakrti by postulating common and repeatable characteristics of all effects, by maintaining for example that human beings have always been and will be produced by human beings, in short by tracing cosmology back to its cause. Therefore, the manifest world, which is produced time and again, is always "complete". According to Sāmkhya, no other tattva can appear, there is no "open future" or an ever advancing evolution. The Sāmkhya teachers were, however, not in a position to explain this completeness from the "being" of the cause, to explain, why there are only 14 genera, five elements etc. Instead, it was argued, that the common and repeatable characteristics of manifest things can only be explained, if one postulates a permanent, singular and common cause for them.

Nevertheless, to deal with "sāmānya" as a qualification of prakṛti might help to understand how prakṛti as a concept as an entity is constructed. It shows that the terminology of sāmānya and viśeṣa is relevant also in Sāṃkhya, especially when it serves to describe causal hierarchy. In addition to this, the study of the systematic function of the prakṛti-concept might help to answer the question, why other philosophical traditions as Yoga accepted such a singular cause of the manifest world. In a pragmatic perspective and with regard to the extant texts, one reason might be seen in the advantages the concept offered for the requirements of the respective school. As an example of such an advantage might serve the following aspect of the description of yogic "success" (siddhi) or "state of power"

OETKE (1994: 148, Note 83) traces this absence of an experimental approach and "Ursachenforschung" back to what he calls "Vergangenheitsorientierung" of the *anumāna*-doctrine. The *anumāna* first and foremost tries to explain phenonema, which are felt to deserve explanation, by placing them in already accepted frames of reference or contexts of knowledge. – In the case of Sāṃkhya, the disinterest in accounting for *prakṛti*'s agency is also a consequence of defining her activity as being teleologically bound to the "purpose of the *puruṣa*".

(aiśvarya): The definition of prakrti as a singular and nevertheless common cause makes it possible to explain yogic "success" as the power over the productivity of nature, which is common to all victorious Yogins, which might also influence destructive or creative processes in the manifest world (as in the case of yogic manifestations of gods). At the same time the display of yogic power indicates the entanglement with the world and as such the distance from kaivalva. The latter aspect results in rejecting the acquisition of aiśvarya as an aim in itself. On the other hand, there seems to be no way to avoid the siddhis during the yogic conquest of the prakrti (pl.). Therefore, it is, at least in YBh, interpreted as a "test" for the detachment of the Yogin. Insight in the productivity of prakrti is only ascribed to gods and Yogins. This is one implication of what is designated as aiśvarya. They alone are able to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, transgressing the scope of "natural", prākṛtic possibilities: Thus, they can appear for example as Narasiṃha by creating a specific arrangement of generically bound "forms", but they would not create a sixth element or a "new" universe. Correspondingly, yogic conquest of natural powers can, because of their being sāmānya, be observed by other inhabitants of the universe. However, neither gods nor Yogins shared their insight into these powers by giving a philosophical or theoretical discourse on natural agency.

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NBh = Nyāyabhāsya, see NyS

Nyāg = Nyāyāgamānusārinī see Dvadasāram Nayacakram

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SK = Sāmkhyakārikā, see STK.

SSV = Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (1973). Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (V 1) edited by E. A. Solomon. Ahmedabad: Gujarat University.

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