

Prakti as smnya

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PRAKṚTI AS SĀMĀNYA

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The elaboration of sām̐khyistic teachings as a philosophical system seems to have been closely related to the doctrine of (*avyakta*) *prakṛti* or *pradhāna*, of a singular causal realm. This stands in contrast to pre-SK texts, in which evolutionary processes are described by assuming a plurality of creative powers, i.e. seven or eight *prakṛti*.¹ It is this singular cause, which manifests the visible world through self-transformation (*pariṇāma*) and aggregation (*samghāta*) of its three “subtle powers”, the *guṇa*.² A corollary of this assertion is the thesis that agency and causal capacity are in *prakṛti* alone. Therefore, causality is self-organized and does not need the productive interference of a conscious entity.³ That the interpretation of *prakṛti* as a singular cause in *kārikā*-Sām̐khya implied changes in the

- 1 Cf. JOHNSTON (1937: 25 ff.) for references. In SK the earlier concept of plural *prakṛti* reappears in the seven so-called *prakṛti-vikṛti-tattva*. In the YS und YBh, *prakṛti* is frequently used in plural, whereas the singular causal realm is often designated as *pradhāna* (YS 1.45; 2.19; 2.23; 3.18; 3.47 cum YBh for *pradhāna* compared with YS 1.19 and 1.51 for *prakṛti* in singular; and YS 3.25; 3.44; 3.47: 4.2-3 for *prakṛti* in plural).
- 2 This rendering of “guṇa” as “subtle powers” (*sūkṣmāḥ śaktayah*) is based on the interpretation given in YD (for example ad SK 9, p. 109, 15-17; ad SK 16, p. 164, 27-28). This interpretation takes into account one specific feature of the *satkārya*-doctrine which will be relevant in the following discussion: The presence of an existent creative potential, which might or might not be manifest, i.e. be transformed into an effect. The equation of *guṇa* with *śakti* does, however, not solve the problem, how the relationship between *pradhāna* and the three *guṇas* has to be understood. This problem becomes obvious in the discussions on the implications of translating *guṇa* as “constituent” (as advocated by GARBE 1917: 273) or “quality” respectively (as preferred by JACOBI 1895 in his critique of GARBE). FRAUWALLNER (1953: 306, passim; 1992: 107) sticks to “quality” (as do HACKER 1985 and RAO 1963). LARSON (1987: 65 ff.) proposes to interpret the *guṇa* along the lines of “reductive materialism” which according to him constitutes the core-doctrine of Sām̐khya. Thus, he translates *triguṇa* as “tripartite constituent process [...] which is primordial materiality.”
- 3 It does however need the teleological relation to the *puruṣa*, which provides activity with a purpose. This relation is not presented as a variation of “causality”, i.e. as the *causa finalis*, but as a predisposition of *avyakta-prakṛti*: In the YD this predisposition is called *adhikāra*. Vide infra.

position of the conscious entity can be corroborated by early usages of plural *prakṛti*: The doctrine of a plurality of *prakṛti* or self-acting causes is often combined with the presence of an acting (i.e. causally efficient) consciousness, which provides the activity of those causes with liveliness, order and purpose. Thus, in BhG 7.4 the “eightfold *prakṛti*” (*aṣṭadhā prakṛti*) is dependent on Kṛṣṇa, who directs her as the entering *jīva*. Similarly, an active function is ascribed to the *puruṣa* in some passages of the Carakasamhitā.⁴ The development of the doctrine of *prakṛti* as a singular cause seems to go along with opposing her to the non-acting *puruṣa*. Moreover, as far as it can be reconstructed from the available textual sources, the necessity of such a singular and common cause had to be proved from the very start. Therefore, the Sāṃkhya-teachers offered a theoretical construction of the term as well as of the entity “*prakṛti*”. In doing this, they used certain techniques of inference (*anumāna*) as all philosophical schools arguing for “invisible entities” (as e.g. the *ātman*) did. However, in asserting a singular cause, which acts independently from self-reflective intentionality but is nevertheless receptive to its presence, they had a hard time in the debates with the other philosophical schools, which rejected the whole concept.⁵

The analysis of the conceptualization of *prakṛti* may thus help to assess the philosophical intentions as well as the value of the construction of the term for the systematic coherence of Sāṃkhya. It might also shed some light on the attractiveness the concept had not only in systematic presentations of Yoga teachings, but also in theological contexts. Such an analysis can be undertaken by scrutinizing the available texts not only for the proofs for *prakṛti* but also for those terms, which serve to define or specify the concept under consideration. In the following I shall deal with *sāmānya* (general, common) as one of those terms of specification and point to two contexts, in which the term is used. In these contexts the term serves to define *prakṛti* (1) as opposed to *puruṣa* and (2) as the cause (*avyakta*) vis-à-vis her products (*vyakta*). Although *sāmānya* and the opposite term *viśeṣa* do not play the prominent role as particular categories

4 For the juxtaposition of Vaiśeṣika- and Sāṃkhya-interpretations of *puruṣa* or *ātman* in Carakasamhitā compare COMBA (1978).

5 Cf. KUMAR (1983) for a survey of the refutations of Sāṃkhya in what he calls the “brahmanical systems”; for Śaṅkara’s refutation see PODGORSKI (1975) and LARSON (1979: 209-235). For the refutation in Tattvasaṃgraha compare LIEBENTHAL (1934).

as for example in Vaiśeṣika, both qualifications are relevant also in Sāṃkhya. This holds especially true for the second context, when the terms are employed for describing causality and thus for specifying *satkāryavāda*. Evidence for this can be furnished from YD, YBh, and a text outside the Sāṃkhya tradition, in Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādin's doxography (Dvādaśāranayacakra), the Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī (Nyāg).

1. *Avyakta* and *vyakta* as *sāmānya*

The term *sāmānya* is in SK employed, when *pradhāna* and the manifest world are both opposed to the *puruṣa*. This qualification appears in SK 11 and is thus part of a set of attributes, which are called *sarūpa*, e.g. which describe the characteristics *avyakta-prakṛti* shares with her products. These stand in contrast to the so-called *virūpa*-attributes in SK 10, which distinguish *prakṛti* from her products.⁶ These *virūpa*-characteristics imply that *prakṛti* shares certain characteristics with the *puruṣa*. One consequence of this distribution is, that the three objects of knowledge enumerated in SK 2 (*vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā*) are defined as embedded in a triadic frame of reference. Therefore, the *puruṣa* for example is opposed to *prakṛti* only with regard to those aspects, which the *prakṛti* shares with her products.

Most commentaries explain “*sāmānya*” as that which is common to all *puruṣas* (sometimes *sādhāraṇa* is used as synonym). As examples serve an actress or a female slave, who might be looked at or used by many *puruṣas*, or at least by all *puruṣas* around.⁷ Thereby it is asserted, that the *puruṣa* is

6 *hetumad anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritam liṅgam /
sāvayavam paratantram vyaktam viparitam avyaktam //SK 10/
triguṇam aviveki viśayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasavadharmi /
vyaktam tathā pradhānam tadviparitas tathā ca pumān //SK 11/*

On the function of this distribution of attributes in the context of SK 9-15 cf. MALINAR 1998: 116-127. On *sārūpya* and *vairūpya* as qualifications of *hetu* in the context of *yuktivāda* compare OBERHAMMER (1963: 82).

7 Compare ad SK 11:

for the female slave: SSV (p. 21,26-27): *sāmānyam vyaktam sarvapuruṣānām, yathā malladāsī sarvveśām eva mallānām / sāmānyaviśayatvād vyaktam sarvapuruṣānām, sāmānyam tathā pradhānam api viśayatvāt sarvapuruṣasāmānyam /* (similarly: SV, p. 17,9-10; JM p. 14,16-17: *sāmānyam vyaktam, sarvapuruṣopabhogyatvān malladāsīvat / tathā pradhānam api*; GBh, p. 13,1: *sāmānyam vyaktam / mūlyadāsīvat sarvasādhāraṇatvāt*)

always entangled in a structure, which is the same for every self-deceived consciousness. Thus, the material and the basic formations of the cognitive and physical apparatus are identical for all manifest beings, which become objects (*viṣaya*) of *puruṣa*. Consciousness incites the production of general formations, but has no influence for example on the sequence, in which these formations appear, e.g. that *buddhi* always appears before *ahamkāra* and not vice versa. Thus, *prakṛti* is a cause, which not only produces a variety of things and their material basis, but also provides the assembly of manifest things with orderliness, homogeneity, predictability and repeatability. Even Yogins, when they gain access to the natural powers (*aiśvarya*), seem to be restricted by these *prākṛtic* predispositions. They can open the creative channels of *prakṛti*,⁸ but they are not reported to have created their private universe.

Avyakta-prakṛti is able to react to various degrees of karmic delusion by a mechanism, which is not explained by the Sāṃkhya teachers. At least the YD testifies that one realized the problems, which this lack of explanation might provoke. Thus, the commentator states that the performance offered by *prakṛti* is happening according to “*adhikāra*”, i.e. resulting from authorization or duty respectively.⁹ The first appearance of *guṇa*-configurations resulting in the manifestation of *buddhi* happens

for the actress-dancer: STK (p. 108,3-5): *sāmānyam sādharmaṇam. vijñānarūpatve tv asādhāranyād vijñānām vṛttirūpānām te 'py asādhāraṇāḥ syuh. tathā ca nartakībhrūlatābhaṅga ekasmin bahūnām pratisamdhānam yuktaṃ anyathā tan na syād iti bhāvah.*

for a courtesan: MV (p. 20,6-7): *sāmānyam vyaktam / gaṇikāvat sarvapuruṣāṅgām / tathā pradhānam api /*

- 8 As described in YS 4.2-3 with YBh. In this passage *prakṛti* is used in plural.
- 9 On *adhikāra* see LARIVIERE (1988) and HALBFASS (1991: 66-74). *Adhikāra* is especially referred to in YD ad SK 21 and 52. The term is also used in YBh ad YS 1.5, 1.50, 51; 2.24 and 3.55, where it is ascribed to the *guṇa* and the *citta* or *buddhi* respectively. *Adhikāra* is preferably used, when the binding activity of the *guṇa* is described, thus the *adhikāra* of the *guṇa* and the *citta* consists in entangling the *puruṣa*, whereas the practice of Yoga results in dispositions, which obstruct the performance of *adhikāra*. Correspondingly, deliverance means the end of *adhikāra*. Cf. for example the contrast between “*buddhi* with *adhikāra*” (*sādhikārā*), which “comes back”, and *buddhi*, which gained knowledge of *puruṣa* and does not return as the *adhikāra* is gone. (*caritādhikārā*; cf. YBh ad YS 2.24; pp. 233-234). See also the definition of *kaivalya* as the termination of the (fixed) sequence (of transformation of the *guṇa*) according to their *adhikāra* (YSBh ad YS 4.34, p. 454: *guṇādhikārakrama-samāptau kaivalyam uktam*).

according to this “*adhikāra*”.¹⁰ Even the association (*samyoga*) of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is due to *adhikāra* as the YD-kāra explains in commenting on the mutual dependence between the two spheres (*samyogam adhikāra-bandham āhur ācāryāḥ*; YD ad SK 21, p. 185,3-4). The production and reproduction of the elements and the matrices of corporal existence, which are common to all *puruṣas*, thus seems to be ascribed to *prakṛti*'s own creative potential, which is, to a certain degree, self-organized. It is stated, that the *guṇa* are not dependent on the *puruṣa* with regard to the manner, in which they fulfill their duty. Correspondingly, it is maintained, that the manifestation of *tattva* is a process, which follows a fixed course or sequence (*krama*)¹¹ and depends solely on the very “being” of creative powers, the *guṇa*.¹² This is corroborated in YBh ad YS 4.3, where it is stated that the success of Yoga-practice is not the cause for the incitement of the natural powers (*prakṛti*, pl.). Yogic practice can only remove the barriers, which withheld *prakṛti* from acting, it can not influence the structure of her activity, because an effect cannot “cause” the activity of the cause.¹³

- 10 Thus, it is declared in the context of explaining the mutual dependency between *liṅga* and *bhāva*: *guṇasamanantaram tv adhikāralakṣaṇaḥ / tasmād dvividhā sargo 'dhikāralakṣaṇo <liṅgākhyo> bhāvākhyas ca /* (YD ad SK 52, p. 255,20-21). In employing this term, the YD-kāra refers to a discussion among Sāṃkhya teachers about the status of *bhāva* (as disposition of *buddhi*) and *adhikāra* with regard to creation (*sarga*).
- 11 The *krama* of the *guṇa* is also referred to in YS and YBh in descriptions of *pariṇāma* (YS 3.15 with YBh) and of cosmology (cf. YS 2.19 with YBh). In YBh ad 2.19 it is stated that the “vertical”, i.e. hierarchical, division of the *guṇa* is dependent on the “rule of the sequence of transformation” (*pariṇāmakramaniyamāt*). This “krama” can not be transgressed (cf. YBhVi ad 2.19, p. 188, 12-13: *kramānatipatteḥ* is explained as *kramānatikramāt*, and then it is stated: *na hi loke kasyacid utpadyamānasya kramātilaṅghanam asti* (For in this world nothing, that comes into being, can transgress the fixed sequence [of origination]).
- 12 “The manifest is only a specific formation of those (subtle powers), which in fulfilling their task operate through (self-) transformation as they form aggregates, whose appearance follows a (fixed) sequence, which is determined only by the very being of (those powers).” (*tāsām adhikārasāmarthyād upajātapariṇāmavyāpārāṇām sam-mātrānukrameṇa pracayam upasampadyamānānām sanniveśaviśeṣamātram vyaktam*, YD ad SK 9, p. 109,17-19).
- 13 *na hi dharmādi nimittam prayojakam prakṛtīnām bhavati, na kāryyeṇa kāraṇam pravarttyate, kathan tarhi – varaṇabhedas tu tataḥ kṣetrikavad.* (YBh ad YS 4.3, p. 395).

The independence from the causal chain allows for the *puruṣa*'s singularity. When opposed to *sāmānya* as the *sarūpa*-attribute of *prakṛti* and her products, the *puruṣa* is qualified as *asāmānya* or *niḥsāmānya*.¹⁴ The commentators seem to have been careful not to qualify him as “*viśeṣa*”; perhaps in order to make sure, that he is not part of any causal relationship and is thus never identical with anything except himself. Conversely, to maintain individuality or distinctness in a realm which is “common” (*sāmānya*) to all *puruṣa* is only a sign of ignorance and error. Although individual beings (*bheda*) appear as a result of the specific delusion of *puruṣa* with regard to *prakṛti*, there exist no absolute distinct beings, which might be comparable to Vaiśeṣika's *atyanta-viśeṣa*. Rather, the individuality of manifest things documents according to Sāṃkhya their dependency on the common cause. All specifications are relative. They appear and disappear, but never affect the “distinct” *puruṣas*.

This line of argument is touched upon in the YD in a passage, in which the individuality of effects is contrasted with the “distinctness” of *puruṣa*. In the explanation of the last of the five reasons (*hetu*) for proving the *satkārya*-doctrine given in SK 9 (pp. 124-125), the opponent asks why the *puruṣa* should exist although there is no cause for him, whereas the “hare's horn” should not exist, although there is no cause neither. In this argument the opponent tries to equate “existence” with “being part of a causal relationship”, i.e. with being either cause or effect. With this thesis the very possibility of a *puruṣa* as defined in Sāṃkhya philosophy, i.e. as being neither cause nor effect, is rejected. The author of the YD refutes this definition of “existence” as “causal”. In this connection, the causal relationship is defined by using the terms *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. The “effect” is defined as *saṃsthānaviśeṣa*, as a special formation or aggregation of the causal powers. This expression is used besides *sanniveśaviśeṣa*¹⁵ in YD and also in YBh instead of the term *saṃghāta* found in SK 16.¹⁶

14 SSV and SV ad SK 12 give “*niḥsāmānyaḥ*”, JM, GBh and MV “*asāmānyaḥ*”.

15 Cf. YBh ad YS 4.13, which quotes the following definition: *sarvam idaṃ guṇānām sanniveśaviśeṣamātram iti. Saṃsthānaviśeṣa* is used in YBh ad YS 1.43 besides *pracayaviśeṣa*. While the latter compound is used for describing visible and specified things (as cow, pot) as being “special agglomerations of atoms” (*anupracaya-viśeṣātmā gavādir ghaṭādir vā lokah*), the “special formation” of the elemental subtles (*bhūtasūkṣma*, i.e. the subtle matrices of the elements), which precedes the appearance of visible things is called *saṃsthānaviśeṣa*. *Saṃsthāna* appears again in a quotation in YBh ad YS 3.13. In this passages it is maintained that the “configuration” is finite,

What is relevant in the present discussion is the statement that the *puruṣa* is existent, although he is not an effect, because he exists apart from the causal relationship, i.e. he is no *sāmānyaviśeṣa* (*sāmānya-viśeṣābhāvāt*). Although there are strong indications, that Vaiśeṣika terminology¹⁷ is commented upon while using *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* for qualifying the causal relationship, in the present context it is not the absence of the Vaiśeṣika-category of *sāmānyaviśeṣa* which is referred to. Rather, a “tatpuruṣa”-interpretation of the compound is suggested: The *puruṣa* is not an effect because he is not a “specification of *sāmānya*”, he is no *saṁsthāna*. This latter interpretation is based on following definition of *saṁsthāna*: “For, formation is when the general takes a specific form” (*sāmānyasya hi viśeṣaparigrahaḥ saṁsthānam*, p. 125,2-3). According to *satkāryavāda*, causality is the manifestation of the cause as the effect.¹⁸ In the passage

while its constituents are not (*saṁsthānam ādimad dharmamātram śabdādīnām vināśyavināśinām, evaṁ liṅgam ādimad dharmamātram sattvādīnām vināśyavināśinām tasmīn vikārasaṁjñeti*). This statement is also cited in Nyāg 323,12-13 in the Sāṁkhya refutation of the thesis of the opponent, that because the effects can be destroyed, the cause has also to be regarded as destructible.

- 16 On the conceptual implications and the historical background of this terminology compare WEZLER (1985).
- 17 Cf. MOTEGI (1994) for other Vaiśeṣika concepts referred to in YD. The Vaiśeṣika concept of *sāmānya* seems also to have been commented upon indirectly in YD ad SK 15, in the explanation of the *hetu* “samanvaya”: “Here it is known that being(-ness) [of an entity], by which the different things are pervaded. As the clay [pervades] the pots etc. Similarly, words etc. are pervaded by happiness, pain and confusion. Therefore, they do also exist. And when these, happiness etc., have lost their specification, that is the unmanifest. Therefore the unmanifest exists.” (*iha yena bhedānām samanugatis tasya sattvaṁ dr̥ṣṭam tadyathā mṛdā ghaṭādīnām / asti ceyam sukhaduḥkhamohaiḥ śabdādīnām samanugatiḥ / tasmāt te 'pi santi / ye ca sukhādayo 'stamitaviśeṣās tad avyaktam / tasmād asty avyaktam / YD ad SK 15, p. 144,1-3*). This comes close to Praśastapāda’s definition of *sāmānya* in PDhS: *yad anugatam asti tat sāmānyam iti* ([361], p. 81). The highest *sāmānya* is *sattā*, the being-ness. As *sāmānya* constitutes the “own form” (*svarūpa*) of things, it arouses the same recognition (*anuvṛttipratyaya*). In the case of *sattā*, it is the recognition “*sad, sad*”. For a detailed analysis of these concepts see HALBFASS (1992: 139-168). Cf. also NBh ad NyS 2.2.69. This connection between *sāmānya* and its dependence on a corresponding perception or recognition is also stressed in the explanation of *dharmisvarūpa* in YD ad SK 16. Vide infra 2.1.
- 18 Cf. the refutation of the interpretation of *satkārya* as a “container-doctrine” in YD ad SK 9 (115,18-22): The effect is not contained in the cause like the fruits of the cotton-

under discussion this is transposed into the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* terminology and thus causality might be defined as “specification of the general” or the “specific formation of the common elements or matrices” respectively.

In proposing both formulations the implications of translating “*sāmānya*” with either “general” or “common” shall be pointed out as well as the necessity to retain both translations as possible interpretations in the different contexts of Sāṃkhya teachings. *Sāmānya* as the “general” (das Allgemeine) corresponds rather to the status of *prakṛti* as a singular, homogenous causal realm, as the potentiality and the structure of a diversity, which has not yet taken shape. With regard to the function of *prakṛti* as a special mode of being of the causal powers, this would mean, that the common cause would not only exist as the potentiality of manifold configurations, i.e. specifications, but would also provide their appearance with a certain order, with what is for example called in YBh and YD *krama*. The process of entering into or of changing “configuration” is then to be connected with the *pariṇāma*-model of causality. The translation “common” (das Gemeinsame) would indicate something more graspable, as for example the *guṇa*, the causal powers, which are common to all manifest things, when they interact with each other in a relationship based on dominance and then become manifest as *saṃsthānaviśeṣa*. This implies that the “common” elements, which appear as “specified” when they enter into a certain constellation, are still detectable, even if one element is dominated by another. This interpretation would correspond to the *saṃghāta*-model of causality. Both levels of interpretation mark aspects of the usage of the qualification “*sāmānya*”. They can be connected with the two modes of causality, which are employed for explaining the activity of *prakṛti*. Both can be used to assert the continuity between cause and effect as well as a difference between them, i.e. the “general” appears as specified and the “common” as individualized. In addition to this, it is also helpful to consider both interpretations, when *sāmānya* serves for connecting the singularity of *prakṛti*, as the “state of non-difference”, with the plurality of her causal powers, which remain present as the “common” efficiency in all manifest things.

shrub are contained in a jar. Rather: The effect is just the cause (*kāraṇam eva kāryam ity anumanyāmahe*).

The freedom from this causal bondage distinguishes the *puruṣa* from the *prakṛti* realm. In this realm *viśeṣa* is defined in relation to *sāmānya*. Therefore, the sāmṅkhyistic *puruṣa* can not be a *viśeṣa* in this sense. Thus, his distinctness has to be seen as numerical distinctness in the first place. Before the second context is dealt with, it should again be emphasized, that the application of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in describing causality, makes it possible to interpret *satkāryavāda* in terms of “differentiation” or “specification of a general”. This function seems to be specific for the sāmṅkhyistic interpretation of *sāmānya*. Moreover, it seems to be closely related (1) to the causal hierarchy implied in the *tattva* scheme and (2) to the proofs for *prakṛti*.

2. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as “internal” qualifications in the realm of *prakṛti-tattva*

In what has been called the “second context”, *sāmānya* is used in order to distinguish *prakṛti* as the common cause from the variety of her products. The *sāmānya-viśeṣa* terminology is employed in order to describe causal relationships in the *tattva*-scheme, which is characterised by hierarchical or vertical sequence as well as by horizontal arrangement.¹⁹

It seems, that for the Sāmṅkhya teachers this usage stood in no conflict with qualifying both *avyakta* (*prakṛti*) and the *vyakta*-realm as *sāmānya*, when opposed to the *puruṣa*. This indicates, that causality and the structure of the *prakṛti*-cosmos were, to a certain extent, explained independently from the existence of the *puruṣa*. Not only that: Seen from the angle of proving the “objects of knowledge” in Sāmṅkhya, one might even say, that the *puruṣa* is a derivate of the *prakṛti* realm. The unity of the cosmos constituted by *prakṛti* implies those general features, which serve as *hetu* for or provide the basis for inferring *puruṣa* in SK 17.²⁰

19 For the distinction between “horizontal” and “vertical” cosmology cf. HALBFASS (1992: 54-56).

20 Thus, it is not a matter of chance, that in SK the *hetu* for inferring *puruṣa* are listed after the enumeration of the *hetu* for the *satkārya*-thesis and for *prakṛti*. Rather, this arrangement shows, that Īśvarakṛṣṇa aimed at some systematic plausibility in his presentation of Sāmṅkhya. Cf. MALINAR (1998: 111-127).

2.1 *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in descriptions of causal hierarchy

Both terms are used for describing evolutionary and involutory processes in the context of what might be called “causal hierarchy”.²¹ One of the special features of the *satkārya*-doctrine is the thesis, that *prakṛti*, apart from her being the “highest” cause, is present in the effects as their very efficiency. This holds true firstly, for the productivity of the *tattva*, especially the so-called “*prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ*”, which are capable of producing “other *tattva*” (*tattvāntara*). Secondly, this can be observed in the realm of *vikāra*, the world of individualised, manifest entities: although they cannot produce other, i.e. new *tattva*, they can reproduce themselves according to genera and species and thus testify that they belong to *prakṛti*.²² In SK this employment is hinted at in *kārikā* 38, when the terms “*aviśeṣa*” and “*viśeṣa*” are used for distinguishing the “non-specified elements” (*tanmātra*) from the “specified” elements (*mahābhūta*). Most commentators explain the appearance of the gross elements as “differentiation” of the “non-specified elements”. This differentiation implies not only the transformation of the *tanmātra* into the respective *mahābhūta*, but also a successive accumulation of qualities in the manifest elements.

This description can be interpreted as an attempt to combine two modes of causality, i.e. *pariṇāma* and *saṃghāta*. A sequence, and as such a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *tanmātra* is indicated, when it is declared, that e.g. *ākāśa* results from *śabda-tanmātra*. Addition or conglomeration (*saṃghāta*) takes place, when the next *mahābhūta* (*tejas*), which arises from the *rūpatanmātra*, has also the quality (here called *guṇa*) of the *śabda-tanmātra*.²³

21 Cf. YD ad SK 3, p. 65, 12 or YBh ad YS 2.19, p. 211. This distinction between *prakṛti-vikṛtayaḥ-tattva* and *vikāra-tattva* will be dealt with in an article under preparation.

22 For this see 2.2.

23 CHAKRAVARTI (1975: 244) summarizes this theory, which is attested in YD, YBh and its sub-commentaries as follows: “[...] everywhere it is found that a gross element inherits the respective property or properties of the *tanmātra* from which it evolves and that one *tanmātra* independent of another *tanmātra* gives rise to a gross element.” The systematic difficulties, which arise from this combination are pointed out by CHAKRAVARTI (ibid.: 245 ff.) and BRONKHORST (1994: 312-315). – Vārṣaganya postulates a special kind (*bhāva*) of “*sambandha*” between *tanmātra* and *mahābhūta*, the “*mātra-mātrika-bhāva*”. Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 45-46). For different

Subsequently, the *mahābhūta* (or rather their qualities), once manifest, interact with each other according to the principle of *sanniveśaviśeṣa* or *saṃghāta*. They are not capable of “productive” transformation into another *tattva*, but change only (*pariṇāma*) with regard to the constellation of their qualities. If one asks, however, what is interacting with what, and what remains constant in these interactions, so that the elements entering “configuration” remain identifiable, in short, how can change be mediated with stable configurations, some difficulties arise for the interpreters. It seems, that the above-mentioned combination of two models of causality is one reason for the difficulties, which arise, especially in interpreting the relationship between *dharmin* and *dharma*, substratum and qualities.²⁴ The *mahābhūta* as *vikāra* (modification) of the preceding *tattva* (the *tanmātra*) remain stable, they serve, for the time being, as *dharmin*, while the configuration of their qualities, which interact with the qualities of the other elements, might change. Nevertheless, the stability of the elements as *vikāra* does not imply, that they exist as substances apart from their qualities. This has already been pointed out by WEZLER in his interpretation of the statement “*guṇasamdrāvo dravyam*” in the context of Sāṃkhya: According to him, the individual material object (*dravya*) “is [...] defined to be always, i.e. at each and every point of time, nothing but a *guṇasamdrāva*, no matter which qualities ‘come together’ to constitute it at a particular point of time. The fact that the *guṇas* change, or even permanently change, does not in the least affect the nature of the *dravya* as such, i.e. its being nothing but a *saṃdrāva* of *guṇas* at every moment of its – finite – existence.” (1985: 18). However, the identity of the *dravya*, or to be more precise, the stability of the configuration of their qualities, has also to be accounted for. This is suggested by BRONKHORST, who explains the co-existence of *satkārya*-doctrine and *saṃghāta*-model as the result of a historical development: “In order to accommodate the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*, classical Sāṃkhya views the world as a continuous series of

interpretations of the manifestation of the *mahābhūtas* see YD (ad SK 22, p. 187; ad 38, p. 225).

- 24 The often quoted point of reference for the problem and its interpretation is the definition of *pariṇāma* given in YD ad SK 9 (p. 111,21-22) and 16 (p. 163,12-13):

*jahad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādatte yadā param /
tattvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate //*

(When a substratum takes up a different quality after abandoning a former quality without losing its identity, this is called transformation.)

modifications (*pariṇāma*) of substrates which do not lose their essence.” (1994: 316). Yet, how can one describe this “substantialist” aspect of Sāṃkhya, without revoking the sāmkyistic rejection of the scheme of substance and accidens of Vaiśeṣika? Or put it otherwise: How can one account for the limitation of possible changes of a *dravya*, i.e. the stability of a manifest configuration? A consideration of the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* terminology, which is employed for describing causal relationships in the hierarchy of *tattva* might offer some additional perspective on the problem.

In the YD this hierarchy is referred to in the commentary ad SK 16, in the context of a discussion of the above-mentioned definition of *pariṇāma*.²⁵ The opponent rejects the definition with the argument, that one cannot speak of an essential form (i.e. the identity) of a substratum (*dharmisvarūpa*), if Sāṃkhya (1) holds the *dharmī* not to be different from the qualities (*dharmā*), and (2) teaches the appearance and disappearance of *dharmā*.²⁶ Moreover, the alleged *dharmisvarūpa* can not be conceived of as neither *sāmānya* nor *viśeṣa*. With regard to this objection, the YD-kāra states, that the *dharmisvarūpa* should be regarded as *sāmānya*. This statement is in the following explained by proposing an epistemological perspective, which connects this position with the definition of *sāmānya* in NBh as well as in PDhS²⁷: *Sāmānya* has to be regarded as existent as long as the idea or perception (*pratyaya*) of it remains, i.e. it is perceived as that which remains constant while changes occur with regard to the *dharmā*-configuration. In this way, the question of an ontological continuity of the substratum as *sāmānya* (as the common “thing”) with regard to the hierarchy of causal realms is brushed aside. Instead, an ontological relativism is postulated, which is based on the epistemological conditions pointed out before. The commentator explains:

If, however, it is declared, that the general (*sāmānya*) is with reference to another general a specification, than we reply: It is not so, because *sāmānya* remains

25 See above note 24.

26 YD ad SK 16, p. 163,28-31.

27 Vātsyāyana states in his comment on the NyS-definition of *jāti* as that which produces the same, that *sāmānya* is that “thing” (*artha*) which is operative in producing the same perception or idea with regard to different objects (*yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratyayānuvṛttinimittam tat sāmānyam*; NBh ad NyS 2.2.69, 693,3.). For a parallelism to PDhS and YD see above note 17.

present as long as the idea²⁸ of it is not abandoned and therefore the ‘own form’ of the substratum is ascertained. As long as this idea ‘earth’ does not vanish the general is the earth, the specification is the pot etc. Thus, that [the earth] is the substratum, because the existence of [her] own form is ascertained from the arising of the idea of a form with regard to that [object], while other qualities come and go; the pots etc. are the qualities. When, however, the idea of “earth” vanishes, then the element-matrices are the general and being a substratum [like earth has been before] is a specific quality – [in this way] it is to be explained up to *pradhāna*. This [*pradhāna*], however, is indeed permanent, because another general is not obtained. When all specifications are absent, that is *pradhāna*. If, however, earth etc. were always undifferentiated, thus existing in the form of the general, they would also attain permanency. Therefore, the essential form of a substratum is not non-existent. And [an ‘own form’ is accepted] also because capacity (causal power) is accepted as general. Likewise the causal powers ‘happiness, pain and confusion’ indeed transform themselves into the subtle body, starting with ‘great’ (*mahat*, i.e. the *buddhi*), ending with the elements. And they are substrata because they continuously cause common ideas [or the idea of a general], as they do not deviate from their essential form; and the subtle body is the qualification.²⁹

Pradhāna is here interpreted as the only permanent *sāmānya*, while in the causal hierarchy of *tattva*, the respective cause is seen as the general with regard to its effect, which is treated as its specification. *Sāmānya* as the preceding state of the cause is present in the effect as its *svarūpa*. As such it is, however, embedded in the hierarchy of causal relationships and therefore finite and relative. The perception and idea of *sāmānya* or *svarūpa* vanish, when a higher level in the causal hierarchy is reached. In

28 *Pratyaya* seems to imply more than mere attention (*ālocana*) as it signifies the perception of something as something, thus a perception accompanied by verbalization or conceptualization (*savikalpa*). Therefore, the term is translated with “idea”.

29 *yat tūktam (...) sāmānyam sāmānyāntarāpekṣam viśeṣatvam iti <atra brūmah:> na pratyay<ā>nivṛttau sāmāny<a>bhāvāvasthites tataś ca dharmisvarūpasiddheḥ / yāvat pṛthivīty ayam pratyayo na nivartate tāvat pṛthivī sāmānyam ghaṭādir viśeṣaḥ <dravyatvam> cāsau dharmāntaraparivartesu tadākārapratyayotpattitaḥ svarūpāvasthānasiddher dharmā ghaṭādayaḥ / yadā tu pṛthivīpratyayanivṛttis tadā tanmātrānām sāmānyabhāvo dravyatvam ca viśeṣo dharmā iti yāvat pradhānam / tasya tu sāmānyāntarānupapatteḥ kautasthyam eva / yatra sarvaviśeṣābhāvas tat pradhānam / yadi tu pṛthivyādinām nityam avyāvṛttam syāt sāmānyarūpam evam sati kautasthyam eṣām prāptam / tasmān na dharmisvarūpābhāvāḥ / śakter vā sāmānyabhāvābhyupagamāt / athavā sukhaduḥkhamohaśaktaya eveha mahadādinā viśeṣāntena liṅgena pariṇāmam pratipadyante / tāsām ca satataḥ sāmānyapratyayanimittatvāt svarūpād apracyuter dravyatvam liṅgasya <ca> dharmatvam / (YD ad SK 16, 164,17-30).*

this way the *dharma-dharmin*-terminology is transposed into the *tattva*-scheme and reinterpreted along the lines of a sequence of specifications of the (preceeding) general or common element. The “substratum” is defined and perceived according to its rank in the *tattva*-scheme and is thus relative although it functions as *svarūpa* with regard to the specific configuration of its attributes. At the same time it seems to be responsible for the stability of a specific configuration of qualities.

Further light is shed on this relationship in those passages in the YBh, in which causal hierarchy and, along with this, the scheme of *tattva* is explained. However, while on the hand the relevance of the terminology under consideration can be corroborated, on the other hand, one has to be aware of the differences between the two texts with regard to the interpretation of Sāṃkhya. Reasons for this can be sought in the different scholastic context of both texts and in different intentions. While in YBh Sāṃkhya is used quite selectively, the YD aims at an exposition of the whole system as it is presented in SK. Also, different scholastic affiliations (i.e. *guru*-commitment) have to be taken into account, although they have to remain uncertain for the time being. This might explain some differences in the interpretation of the *tattva*-scheme and the respective *tattva*, which distinguish the Sāṃkhya presented in the YBh from *kārikā*-Sāṃkhya (as for example the reference to *paramāṇu* as parts of the *tanmātra* in YBh ad YS 3.43). In YS 2.19 the transformation of the *guṇa* is divided into the following stages (ascending): *viśeṣa*, *aviśeṣa*, *liṅgamātra*, *aliṅga*.³⁰ The YBh explains, that the transformation into specifications (*viśeṣapariṇāma*) implies 16 *viśeṣa*: The five *bhūtāni* and the 11 *indriya* (together with the *manas*). These proceed from the group called “*śaḍaviśeṣa*” (five *tanmātra* and the *asmitālakṣaṇa*[*sya*] *aviśeṣa*[*sya*]). These *aviśeṣas* are again transformations of the “*sāttāmātrasya ātmano mahatas*” (the mighty self, which is mere being), which is dependent on *pradhāna*, the *aliṅga* (without characteristics). As such it is exempt from all ontological specifications (it is called being neither *sad* nor *asad*). At the end of this explanation it is stated, that there are no other *tattva* beyond, or rather below, the group of *viśeṣa*, i.e. the gross elements. Modification or change (*pariṇāma*) in their case does not result in “self-transformation” of cosmic, i.e. general relevance: They are only affected by changes with regard to *dharma* (qualities), *lakṣaṇa* (characteristics) and *avasthā* (state), which is the subject

30 *viśeṣāviśeṣaliṅgamātrāliṅgāni guṇaparvāṇi //YS 2.19/*

of YS 3.13.³¹ Thus, in YBh *pariṇāma* is not the same for all *tattva*, but is defined according to the position of the respective *tattva* in the causal hierarchy. The introduction of the forms of *pariṇāma* in YS 3.13 thus also indicates the necessity to restrict *tattvāntara-pariṇāma*. Only this restriction allows for presenting a completed *tattva* scheme, i.e. a cosmos, which is not open to further or even open-ended evolution.

This scheme as well as the sequence (*krama*) of the modification of the *guṇa* is further specified in a description of the conquest of the elements (*bhūtajaya*) ad YS 3.44. The *sūtra* states that this conquest can be achieved through “*saṃyama*” of the following five aspects (YBh calls them “*rūpa*”) of the *bhūta*: *sthūla*, *svarūpa*, *sūkṣma*, *anvaya*, *arthavattva*. In the context of the present discussion, the first three aspects are especially relevant. The commentator explains, that the gross (*sthūla*) form of the elements consists in the specifications, which belong to the elements together with their qualities as form [etc.] (*pārthivādyāḥ śabdādayo viśeṣāḥ sahākārādibhir dharmaiḥ*).³² In contrast to this, the *svarūpa*-form is explained as “*sāmānyam*”, i.e. as that, which remains constant in the changing configurations of the qualities of the elements (*asya sāmānyasya śabdādayo viśeṣāḥ*). These are: shape (*mūrti*) for earth; viscosity (*sneha*) for water; heat (*uṣṇatā*) for fire; bending (*praṇāmī*) for wind and omnipresence (*sarvatogati*) for aether.³³ These *sāmānyā* are regarded as the *jāti*, so that different configurations arise only with regard to the qualities. Before the author of the YBh proceeds with the explanation of the *sūkṣma*-aspect, the subtle form (i.e. the *tanmātra* as causes of the *mahābhūta*) he describes the structure of a *dravya*, in this case apparently, the concrete, perceptible thing. It is stated, that a *dravya* is an aggregate of *sāmānyā* and *viśeṣa* (*sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāyo 'tra dravyam*). After the commentator has distinguished between different “aggregates” or configurations, he quotes a definition of Patañjali, that a *dravya* is an aggregate, whose parts are not

31 It is stated, that this *pariṇāma* does not affect the *svarūpa* of the *dharmīn*, which is called the *svarūpa* of the *mahābhūta* (e.g. *mūrti* in case of the earth; cf. YBh ad 3.44 and 4.14). Cf. YBh ad YS 3.13: *ete dharmalakṣaṇāvasthāpariṇāmā dharmisvarūpam anatikrāntā ity...* (p. 307).

32 The latter qualities are also mentioned in YD ad SK 38, where, however, a *svarūpa* of the *mahābhūta* is not mentioned. Only a list of qualities is given, which also appears in TV ad YBh 3.44. These qualities, according to the YD-kāra, support each other mutually (*parasparānugrahakāḥ*, p. 225,22).

33 Cf. the list in YBh ad YS 4.14, with a slightly different terminology.

separable from each other.³⁴ This inseparability is the reason for the stability, the essential form (*svarūpa*) of the *dravya*. The author of the YBh does not explain, how the first definition of the *svarūpa* of the elements is connected with the explanation “*sāmānyaviśeṣasamudāya*”. Nevertheless, one can at least try to interpret the description, if one again takes into account (1) the causal hierarchy and (2) the necessity to give an explanation for the stability of a specific configuration of qualities.

First of all, the description in YBh shows, that the application of the *sāmānya-viśeṣa*-terminology is bound to the respective subdivision (*parvan*) of the transformation of the *guṇa* and can as such be repeated at each stage. The other specific feature of the employment of this terminology is, that the *sāmānya* remains discernable after its causal transformation into the next *tattva*: the general is specified but does not dissolve in specification. This also implies, that *aviśeṣa* (as the *tanmātra*) are not necessarily beyond perception; to the contrary, as both the YD passage quoted above and YBh ad YS 3.47 testify.³⁵ While the YD seems to be closer to the discussions in NBh and PDS, the YBh offers a different explanation: perceptible objects (called *dravya* ad YS 3.44 and *grahya* ad YS 3.47) are aggregates of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. What this is supposed to mean can be shown by taking up the example of the earth: The author of the YBh accepts that the earth, while having “smell” (*gandha*) as *tanmātra*, shares as the last element all the qualities (*guṇa*) of the other *tanmātra*. Smell as *tanmātra* is unspecified, it is smell in general, whereas the element earth is always manifest as an object of perception with a concrete smell (as such the earth as an object – *grahya* – is also a combination of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* according to YBh ad YS 3.47). Nevertheless, smell as the causal matrix remains present in all specifications, as the very smell which is specified. On the next level, the author ascribes to earth a *svarūpa* or *sāmānya* of her own: *mūrti* (shape, form). This *svarūpa* seems to be different from the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* relationship between *tanmātra* and *mahābhūta*, as it is that feature of earth, which allows for its recognition in diverse objects (*dravya*): It is maintained, that wherever there is shape, there is earth; and with regard to this, the specific appearance of form, its weight etc. are mere qualifications,

34 For the reference to Patañjali compare HALBFASS (1992: 106, Note 8) and BRONKHORST (1994: 318, Note 18).

35 Cf. BRONKHORST (1994: 312, especially note 8), who refers to SK 34, in which it is stated, that both, the *viśeṣa* and the *aviśeṣa* are the objects of the *buddhīndriya*.

which might change. As long as form remains perceptible, earth is present in a *dravya*. Thus, the manifestation of the elements is connected with the *sāmānya-viśeṣa* terminology in two ways: First, the elements appear as specifications of the unspecified, general *tanmātra*; second, with regard to their aggregation as objects (*dravya*) they remain discernable as *sāmānya*, i.e. in their essential form (*svarūpa*) although they are in the configurations of qualities undergo change.

This might account for the double-sidedness not only of the elements in their appearance as configurations of qualities but also of the *tanmātra* as the preceding causes. They are stable and relative at the same time, because their status is defined with regard to the preceding *tattva*. Thus, in interpreting the division of the stages of *guṇa*-transformation, the causal hierarchy has to be taken into account: It provides the respective configurations with a certain stability according to their rank and as long as this rank is kept. Another consequence of this way to describe causality in terms of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* is, that the cause, which functions as the *sāmānya* with regard to its specifications might reappear on the next stage as its own specification. Thus, the “substantialist” aspect of the *satkārya*-doctrine can be accounted for by embedding it in the causal hierarchy of Sāṃkhya; at the same time an entity can, according to its rank, be defined as a changeable configuration of qualities.

2.2 *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* in proofs for *pradhāna*

The usage of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* for describing “internal” differences in the causal realm of *prakṛti* is also connected with another implication of the *satkārya*-thesis in combination with the doctrine of *prakṛti*: On the one hand the effect is explained as the result of a *pariṇāma* of *prakṛti*, who is able to appear as her own effect, i.e. as something which is different but still herself. On the other hand, it is necessary to distinguish *prakṛti* as a singular, common causal realm from her manifest existence. This makes it necessary to define the difference, which is implied in the causal relationship, in such a way that the continuity between cause and effect can be maintained, and even more: can be stressed. Seen from this angle, the qualification *sāmānya* mediates between the poles of “identity” and “difference” as it indicates the possibility of differentiation, and thus, similarity-cum-difference. The interpretation of causal activity as

differentiation makes it possible to view the products as *viśeṣa*, which depend on a preceding *sāmānya*. This interpretation has also consequences for the attempts of proving *prakṛti* as the existent cause of all manifest things: This common cause is inferred by the general or common characteristics (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*), which have been observed in the different manifest things (*bheda*).

If one scrutinizes the proofs presented quite comprehensively in the Nyāg,³⁶ the following connection between this interpretation and the type of proof chosen for the inference of *prakṛti* (the *śeṣavat sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam anumānam*) can be observed: As all manifest products are, according to the *satkārya* doctrine, related to the cause (i.e. to the previous state of the causal powers), they display certain characteristics, which indicate the presence of the cause in the effect. These characteristics have to be the same in all effects, if one aims at proving that they all have a common singular cause. Thus, if one has to infer a common cause for all effects, one has to show, that the fact, that e.g. all manifest beings can be classified according to species, can only be explained, if one assumes that they have a common cause. Consequently, Sāṃkhya teachers used such general characteristics of the effects as reasons (*hetu*) for inferring a cause like that. Correspondingly, the *hetus* listed in SK 15 as operative in proofs for *prakṛti* are such characteristics of the effects: They are limited (*parimāṇāt*), they are generically related with each other (*samanvaya*), their efficiency depends on their capacity (*śaktiḥ pravṛtteḥ*) etc. Seen from this perspective, the creation of proofs to be classified as “*śeṣavat sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam anumānam*”,³⁷ presumably by Vārṣaganya, for inferring *prakṛti* gains some

36 Although the Nyāg seems to be quite authentic in its presentation of the contents of non-Jaina philosophical systems, sometimes Siṃhasūri presents the proofs as if to lay open the difficulties, which are implied in them (thus, for example, when he presents the whole scheme of sāmkhystic cosmology as the example for the *hetu* “*parimāṇāt*”). A critique might also be implied in the “gap”, which time and again appears in each proof, when the inference of a singular cause, the *pradhāna* fails.

37 Contrary to NyS 1.1.5, in which a “threefold inference” (*trividham anumānam*) is taught, Vārṣaganya sets up a two-fold classification of *anumāna* as (1) *viśeṣato dr̥ṣṭam* and (2) *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*. The second type is subdivided into *pūrvavad-* and *śeṣavad-anumāna*. The latter allows for proving entities “beyond the sensual powers” (*atīndriya*) and can be carried out as “direct” (*vīta*) and “indirect” (*āvīta*). Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1958: 46-47). For a discussion of this classification and its connection with the seven “constant relations” (*saptasambandha*), which might serve as a basis for inference, cf. MALINAR (1998, ch.5).

plausibility: It might have been a designation for a special type of inference, which had to be created for proving a type of cause like “*prakṛti*”: One could not use a specific effect for tracing a specific cause, as it is done in “ordinary” *śeṣavad anumāna*,³⁸ rather, one had to use characteristics, which were postulated as being common to all causal relationships in order to trace a “common cause”. Therefore it is claimed: (1) that all manifest things are effects, (2) that these effects have general characteristics, and (3) that these characteristics result from their being differentiations, i.e. formations of a common cause.

This kind of proof is not detailed in the SK, although one can trace this line of argument if one analyses the arrangement of the *kārikā*, especially the connection between SK 9 and 15. Neglecting this aspect in the present discussion, I shall exemplify these observations by turning to the second *hetu* listed in SK 15 “*bhedānām samanvayāt*”: *Prakṛti* exists, because individual things are causally (i.e. generically) related to each other. By means of this *hetu* it is asserted that *prakṛti* is the unmanifest cause, because manifest things are bound together as cause and effect (*anvaya* or *samanvaya*, both appear in the text of Nyāg), which means in this context, they always belong to a certain species. This interpretation is given in the Nyāg, where this proof for *prakṛti* is presented in some detail. The gist of the proof is to infer *prakṛti* as the only genus (*jāti*), i.e. the only cause, from the observable fact that manifest things share the same species, if they are related to each other as cause and effect. The text runs as follows:

There exists a main cause (*pradhāna*) [for all manifest things], because a causal [generic] relationship between individual things is perceived. It is observed that individual things, which exist as cause and effect [for each other], are [generically] related to each other because [they share] the same genus (*ekajātisamanvaya*). As for example the sandalwood-tree and the piece of sandalwood. Thus it has been taught, that individual things depend on [something] common.³⁹

The argument is then shifted to the context of the *guṇa*-doctrine: The perception of generic relationships is the basis for tracing the common

38 If one follows the first of two definitions of *śeṣavad anumāna* in NBh ad NyS 1.1.5.

39 *asti pradhānam bhedānām anvayadarśanāt, ādhyātmikānām bhedānām kārya-kāraṇātmakānām ekajātisamanvayo dṛṣṭa iti candanaśakalādidṛṣṭāntam vaksyati / sāmānyapūrvakānām ca bhedānām ity* [...]. (Nyāg 314,7-10).

origin of all things back to the *ekajāti*, the one and only genus of the *guṇa*. As the reason (*hetu*) for this inference functions the observation, that all manifest things have a similar efficiency, as they produce invariably happiness, suffering and indifference.⁴⁰ Thus, the three *guṇa* are proposed as the *ekajāti*, the common cause of all things, which can still be traced in the effects in the same way as one can identify a piece of wood as belonging to one tree-species or the other. The individual is thus (1) as a representative of a species and (2) as producing invariably pleasure, pain and indifference identifiable as a product of *prakṛti*, i.e. as a specification of her causal powers. *Prakṛti* is *sāmānya*, because she is the *ekajāti*, which unfolds into distinct genera and species. Conversely, the variety of manifest things can only be explained by postulating a general, a common *jāti*, which unfolds and appears as this ordered manifoldness. Thus, (*sam*)*anvaya*, as generic relationship is postulated as a general characteristic of all individual beings, and therefore can be used to infer *prakṛti* as the common cause. Correspondingly, *prakṛti* is proved to be a cause, whose mode of production is in itself “(*sam*)*anvaya*”. That is to say: Whatever *prakṛti* produces appears as being stamped by the characteristics of a species. Thus, *sāmānya* and *jāti* are in Sāṃkhya first and foremost not defined as a specific formation of elements,⁴¹ but as a general causal efficiency, which becomes manifest in a sequence of effects. *Sāmānya* serves to qualify the causal realm and allows for describing the transition from *sāmānya* to *viśeṣa* as a specification of the former, in which the causal power as the specified *sāmānya* remains present and discernable.⁴²

This function of qualifying *pradhāna* and its effects as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* respectively is corroborated by the indirect (*āvīta*)⁴³ proof, in which *prakṛti* is inferred through a refutation of alternative explanations. These proofs have fortunately also been preserved by Siṃhasūri.⁴⁴ As already

40 *ekajātisamanvayapradarśanārthasukhāditriguṇaikaajātisamanvayaṃ kāryātmakānāṃ tat sanniveśaviśeṣatvaṃ* (Nyāg 314,8-9).

41 For a discussion of this explanation in contrast to the interpretation offered in NyS 2.67-69 and in the commentaries compare MALINAR (1998: 156-161).

42 This is also corroborated in the summary of Siṃhasūri’s account of the proofs for *prakṛti*, where *sāmānya* is listed as that qualification of *prakṛti*, which corresponds to the observable *samanvaya*-relations in the manifest world (cf. Nyāg p. 320,6-7).

43 On *avīta* and *āvīta* see the paper of Eli FRANCO in the present volume.

44 These indirect inferences do not appear in SK and are only briefly referred to in YD ad SK 6 (p. 106,17-107,10). Viewed from what has been transmitted in the Nyāg, one

indicated, in an indirect proof the necessity of *pradhāna* as an existent cause, and of qualifying it as *sāmānya* is demonstrated ex negativo. It is argued, that, if one does not postulate a general or common cause, it is not possible to explain difference. This is ascertained through a refutation of the opposite position. The opponent asserts that effects arise from something, which does not or no longer exist. This is denied by pointing to an unwelcomed implication (*prasaṅga*) of this thesis, the so-called *ekatvaprasaṅga*, i.e. the false implication of identity of all things: If a non-existent (*asat*) is the cause, then everything should be the same, because no qualifications or distinctions can be ascribed to something non-existent or to non-existence as such. Therefore, all manifest beings should be *nirviśeṣa*, without differences. This is obviously not the case as there are differences everywhere. These can, however, only exist as such, when something general precedes or produces them and then remains with them as that, which is common to them, as their *sāmānya*. Thus, as in the direct proof, it is again stated: *sāmānyapūrvakatvād viśeṣāṅām*.⁴⁵

These observations on the functions of using the terms “*sāmānya*” and “*viśeṣa*” in the context of proving *prakṛti*, shall be supplemented by pointing to a “theoretical gap”. This gap increases the difficulties already implied in the proofs discussed before⁴⁶: Not only in the proofs for *prakṛti*, but also in explanations of the *satkārya* doctrine, it is the manifest world, the world of effects, which is the exclusive point of reference. Thus, the proofs belong to the *śeṣavat sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam* type of inference: They prove a cause by starting from common characteristics of the effect, by “wrapping back” the visible into the invisible. However, as the deduction

can say that they are at least hinted at in the two negative *hetu* in SK 9 (*asadakaraṇāt* and *sarvasambhavābhāvāt*). As all indirect proofs presented by Siṃhasūri aim at proving the thesis “*pradhānaṃ karaṇam*” by refuting the opposite position “*asat karaṇam*” through *prasaṅga*, one might say that the indirect proofs are, basically, variations of the first (negative) *hetu* of SK 9. Nevertheless, this does not make up for the loss or the suppression of these proofs in what Īśvarakṛṣṇa presents as the “abstracted” version of what he refers to as “*Ṣaṣṭitantra*”.

45 *yadi vyaktasyāsata utpattir yonyabhāvād ekatvaprasaṅgaḥ, pradhānābhāvāt sāmānyamātram idaṃ vyaktaṃ nirviśeṣam ity etat prasajyeta / kasmāt ? sāmānyapūrvakatvād viśeṣāṅām, sāmānyapūrvakā hi loke viśeṣā dr̥ṣṭāḥ* / (Nyāg 321,10-13).

46 The major difficulty is, that the common characteristics of effects could be used for inferring several common causes, but not necessarily a singular and permanent common causal realm.

of the effect from the cause has been declared as unreliable (*vyabhicāra*) from quite early times, the Sāṃkhya teachers did not care for proving their unique cause by postulating for example “causal laws”, by taking up research in the realm of *prakṛti* in order to make the “unwrapping”, the (predictable) evolution of the effects from the cause a strong argument for *prakṛti*'s existence. This lack of interest in the laws of natural agency,⁴⁷ which seems to be also a consequence of rejecting proofs of the effect from the cause as unreliable, produced in the Sāṃkhya system the following “theoretical gap”: One can only explain the necessity of a concept and an entity like *prakṛti* by postulating common and repeatable characteristics of all effects, by maintaining for example that human beings have always been and will be produced by human beings, in short by tracing cosmology back to its cause. Therefore, the manifest world, which is produced time and again, is always “complete”. According to Sāṃkhya, no other *tattva* can appear, there is no “open future” or an ever advancing evolution. The Sāṃkhya teachers were, however, not in a position to explain this completeness from the “being” of the cause, to explain, why there are only 14 genera, five elements etc. Instead, it was argued, that the common and repeatable characteristics of manifest things can only be explained, if one postulates a permanent, singular and common cause for them.

Nevertheless, to deal with “*sāmānya*” as a qualification of *prakṛti* might help to understand how *prakṛti* as a concept as an entity is constructed. It shows that the terminology of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* is relevant also in Sāṃkhya, especially when it serves to describe causal hierarchy. In addition to this, the study of the systematic function of the *prakṛti*-concept might help to answer the question, why other philosophical traditions as Yoga accepted such a singular cause of the manifest world. In a pragmatic perspective and with regard to the extant texts, one reason might be seen in the advantages the concept offered for the requirements of the respective school. As an example of such an advantage might serve the following aspect of the description of yogic “success” (*siddhi*) or “state of power”

47 OETKE (1994: 148, Note 83) traces this absence of an experimental approach and “Ursachenforschung” back to what he calls “Vergangenheitsorientierung” of the *anumāna*-doctrine. The *anumāna* first and foremost tries to explain phenomena, which are felt to deserve explanation, by placing them in already accepted frames of reference or contexts of knowledge. – In the case of Sāṃkhya, the disinterest in accounting for *prakṛti*'s agency is also a consequence of defining her activity as being teleologically bound to the “purpose of the *puruṣa*”.

(*aiśvarya*): The definition of *prakṛti* as a singular and nevertheless common cause makes it possible to explain yogic “success” as the power over the productivity of nature, which is common to all victorious Yogins, which might also influence destructive or creative processes in the manifest world (as in the case of yogic manifestations of gods). At the same time the display of yogic power indicates the entanglement with the world and as such the distance from *kaivalya*. The latter aspect results in rejecting the acquisition of *aiśvarya* as an aim in itself. On the other hand, there seems to be no way to avoid the *siddhis* during the yogic conquest of the *prakṛti* (pl.). Therefore, it is, at least in YBh, interpreted as a “test” for the detachment of the Yogin. Insight in the productivity of *prakṛti* is only ascribed to gods and Yogins. This is one implication of what is designated as *aiśvarya*. They alone are able to manipulate the common causal potency and to change the arrangement and the formation of the effects, of individual things, without, however, transgressing the scope of “natural”, *prākṛtic* possibilities: Thus, they can appear for example as Narasiṃha by creating a specific arrangement of generically bound “forms”, but they would not create a sixth element or a “new” universe. Correspondingly, yogic conquest of natural powers can, because of their being *sāmānya*, be observed by other inhabitants of the universe. However, neither gods nor Yogins shared their insight into these powers by giving a philosophical or theoretical discourse on natural agency.

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NBh = Nyāyabhāṣya, see NyS

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SK = Sāṃkhyakārikā, see STK.

SSV = Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (1973). Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti (V 1) edited by E. A. Solomon. Ahmedabad: Gujarat University.

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