

Zeitschrift: Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie

Herausgeber: Schweizerische Asiengesellschaft

Band: 52 (1998)

Heft: 1

Artikel: Bhoja's rñgrapraka and the problem of Rasa : a historical introduction and annotated translation

Autor: Pollock, Sheldon

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-147416>

Nutzungsbedingungen

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften auf E-Periodica. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen sowie auf Social Media-Kanälen oder Webseiten ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. [Mehr erfahren](#)

Conditions d'utilisation

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. La reproduction d'images dans des publications imprimées ou en ligne ainsi que sur des canaux de médias sociaux ou des sites web n'est autorisée qu'avec l'accord préalable des détenteurs des droits. [En savoir plus](#)

Terms of use

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. Publishing images in print and online publications, as well as on social media channels or websites, is only permitted with the prior consent of the rights holders. [Find out more](#)

Download PDF: 24.04.2026

ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, <https://www.e-periodica.ch>

BHOJA'S ŚRĪṄĀRAPRAKĀŚA AND THE PROBLEM OF *RASA*
A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
AND ANNOTATED TRANSLATION

Sheldon Pollock, Chicago

In Memory of Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy

History has been unfair to the *Śrīṅgāraprakāśa* (ŚP), the greatest of the two dozen works of Bhoja, the Paramāra king who during the first half of the eleventh century ruled widely in what is the present-day state of Madhya Pradesh and presided over a literary court that, like the king himself, was later to become the stuff of legend.¹ Despite the fact that it is the most comprehensive and sustained body of literary analysis in premodern India, in some ways the most germane – in view of the range of issues treated that are pertinent to reading actually existing Sanskrit literature – and in its organization, style, and plethora of citations and analyses perhaps the most fascinating, the ŚP attracted no commentarial attention that we know of. Although it was read widely in south India and in Bengal,² only a few

- 1 I refer to Bhoja as the author of the ŚP not as shorthand (for “the literary circle of Bhoja”) but literally. The work throughout is unmistakably marked by the voice of a single author, and it is hard not to hear this as Bhoja’s, as for example in his comment on the first *kārikā*: “It is not just anyone who enunciates this verse, but a particular man, [who is in fact] a great king,” etc. (see below p. 140). Later rulers view Bhoja as the model of the cultured king. Kṛṣṇadevarāya of Vijayanagara, for example, referred to himself as “King Bhoja of All Art” (*sakalakalābhoja*) both in his inscriptions and in his drama, the *Jāmbavatīpariṇaya*.
- 2 Though almost certainly not Kashmir. The *Sāhityamīmāṃsā*, which cites Bhoja extensively, has been attributed to the twelfth-century poet and scholar, Maṅkhaka, in a new edition of the work (edited by Gaurinath Shastri [Varanasi: Sanskrit University 1984]), but on very weak grounds. Bhoja was however known to the great Tibetan scholar Sa-skya Paṅḍita (1182-1251), who studied under the Kashmiri Śākyaśrī-bhadra. He tell us in the prologue to his “Entryway into Scholarship” that he mastered two poetic treatises, *Kāvyaḍarśa* and *Sarasvatikaṅṭhābharāṇa* (Matthew KAPSTEIN, personal communication). For Bengal, see BHATTACHARYYA 1963 and DELMONICO 1989. Bhoja was a central authority for the thirteenth-century Sanskritizing commentator on the *Tirukkural*, Parimēlaḷakar of Kāñcīpuram; he refers to the ŚP itself (cf. François GROS in Nalini BALBIR, ed., *Genres littéraires en Inde* [Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1994], p. 357). It may seem odd that his literary-critical work is not mentioned in the later Paramāra world itself; Arjunavarman, for example, king of

(four?) incomplete manuscripts of the work are available today, two of which appear to be transcripts of a third. Even after the entire extant text was edited by the heroic efforts of G. R. JOYSER and printed in Mysore,³ the work seems hardly to have been read by scholars; basic misinformation (regarding for example Bhoja's relationship to Ānandavardhana) continues to be transmitted.⁴ The bibliography of scholarship on the ŚP stands in a proportion precisely inverse to the text's physical mass and intellectual weight. Almost nothing has been written that gives evidence of sustained engagement with the work, and none of it seems to have been found worthy of translating into any South Asian or Western language, one index of such an engagement.⁵

The sole exception to this universal neglect is the monograph of V. RAGHAVAN.⁶ This is unquestionably a worthy monument to a great masterpiece. By providing detailed background information for most of the questions Bhoja discusses it has with justice become basic reading for students of Sanskrit literature. But in the very success of RAGHAVAN's study lay a certain kind of failure: its effect has been, not to open the door to Bhoja but to nail it shut. Sanskrit scholar friends of mine in Mysore, for example, are typical in regarding any research interest in the ŚP as *piṣṭapeṣaṇa*.⁷ But the long anticipated publication of RAGHAVAN's edition

Dhārā ca. 1215, never cites Bhoja in the *Rasikasamjīvanī*, his learned commentary on the *Amaruśataka*. It is not impossible that the looting of the royal library by Jayasiṃha Siddharāja ca. 1140, while enabling Hemacandra to make such extensive use of the ŚP, deprived Bhoja's own heirs of it.

- 3 Mysore: Coronation Press, 1955 - ca. 1969. Four vols.
- 4 Many scholars, for example, continue to believe that Bhoja is ignorant of the *dhvani* doctrine, thus reproducing DE's old error despite RAGHAVAN's correction (1978: 150-51 = 1963: 153). See below, *kārikā* 5 of the ŚP, and ad R 397.4ff.
- 5 Add to the references in Gerow 1977: 269-71, Chapter 4 of DELMONICO 1989. While DELMONICO correctly acknowledges, in a couple of places, Bhoja's focus on the literary character as the locus of *rasa*, which I emphasize below, he does not apply this in his exegesis of the work. In the rest of his analysis I cannot follow him.
- 6 *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (Madras: Punarvasu, 1978).
- 7 I profited however from discussions with them, especially the late Dr. K. KRISHNA-MOORTHY, dean of modern-day *ālankārikas*, and Vidvān H. V. Nagaraja RAO. I am also much indebted to my friend Prof. Ashok AKLUJKAR (Vancouver) for his careful reading of this essay, and for suggesting several good textual emendations. I also want to thank my student Lawrence MCCREA for his criticisms.

of the ŚP in the Harvard Oriental Series⁸ provides a good occasion to return to Bhoja, and to consider just how much of his grain has in fact been ground. The present article is the first in what I hope will be a series of annotated translations preparatory to a larger study of the architecture, argument, and discursive art of Bhoja's monumental work. Since in its very structure the text builds toward the propositions regarding *rasa* in Chapter Eleven, it is with a translation of the passages on *rasa* in that chapter, along with the introductory *kārikās* and the author's commentary on them in Chapter Seven, that I start my reconsideration.⁹ By way of preface I want to look at some of the historical and conceptual questions concerning *rasa* that necessarily bear on the translation. I begin with some simple schematic distinctions and key discursive developments before looking in more detail at Bhoja himself and two texts that I believe crucially supplement our understanding of the ŚP, namely, Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha's commentary on Chapter Five of the *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharana*, and the *Daśarūpaka* of Dhanamjaya (with the commentary *Avaloka* of Dhanika). Both of these clarify the assumptions of the theory with which Bhoja operated whether by positive description (Narasiṃha) or negative critique (Dhanamjaya-Dhanika). I end the introduction with some speculations about what this discursive history may suggest for the domain of cultural politics in late-medieval South Asia.

Sivaprasad BHATTACHARYYA was in many ways correct when a generation ago he remarked that Bhoja's discourse on *rasa* is the most detailed and provocative we have, and the most unusual, differing often essentially from both Bharata and those who follow him.¹⁰ Bhoja's argument with Bharata is explicit in the ŚP itself (see below, R 681.13ff., J. 440.21ff.),¹¹ though it is not clear to me that BHATTACHARYYA acknowledged or perhaps even recognized the depth of this disagreement. As for those who followed Bhoja in time, what neither BHATTACHARYYA

8 *The Śrīngāraprakāśa* of Bhoja, vol. 1. Ed. V. RAGHAVAN. Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1997. Harvard Oriental Series 53.

9 It should be noted that many of the important passages dealing with *rasa* have long been available in RAGHAVAN's monograph (1978: 487-509).

10 BHATTACHARYYA 1963: 106.

11 I provide page numbers for both editions of the ŚP: R = ed. RAGHAVAN (n. 8); J = ed. JOYSER (n. 3). The translation is based on R's text, and except where noted I have not systematically contrasted his readings with those of J.

nor anyone else has clearly spelled out is just how fundamental the differences between them are. Bhoja's views are complicated; he has a very capacious project, which includes on the one hand reproducing, re-ordering, and expanding an older paradigm of literary analysis, and on the other scrutinizing and, as he believed, correcting its logical and categorical deficiencies. This already places large demands on our understanding. But the later theorists of *rasa* present another, as it were external, impediment to understanding Bhoja, for the very dominance their ideas eventually achieved makes it difficult to understand different (potentially radically different) theorizations. Despite the crucial importance of the concept of *rasa* in South Asian cultural history in general and literary history in particular, a comprehensive account of its tangled history remains to be written. A number of important Sanskrit texts pertinent to this history have never been assessed (let alone translated), and the development of some primary concepts has not been examined with the care they deserve. I hope to provide this assessment and examination on another occasion; here I can offer only a schematic overview of some elementary notions, and a sketch of their history, by way of preface to a consideration of Bhoja's position on some key aspects of this discourse and why it sometimes seems so difficult to determine what this position is.

It is easiest to begin with the tripartition of literary modalities of beauty (*alankāra* in the widest sense) that Bhoja himself introduces (below, p. 168 and n. 120). Here he distinguishes *rasokti* or the "expression of *rasa*" from two other aspects of the literary text. One of these is *svabhāvokti*, "expression of the thing itself". This modality, conceived of as pure (hypothetically non-rhetorical) description, derives its literariness from the aesthetic dimension of language itself, which the category of the *guṇas* – the phonetic, semantic, and syntactic features of language – was devised to account for. The second is *vakrokti*, "indirect expression", also called *alankārokti*, the "expression of figures of speech" considered as context-free formal devices. *Rasokti*, for its part, is concerned neither with the language-stuff that constitutes the literary text nor with its rhetorical organization; instead it works at the level of the text's content and thus pertains to its existence as an affective phenomenon. But what exactly does it mean to speak of the literary text as an "affective phenomenon", and in what does the work of *rasa* consist? It is in these two closely related problematics – and the "duck-rabbit" perspectival instability that, as we

shall see, they comprise that much of the complex historical development of the idea of *rasa* resides.

As an affective phenomenon the literary text can be analyzed either internally or externally, on the one hand, that is, as representations *of* men and women, on the other, as representations *for* men and women. In the first case it is the characters (called variously the *pātra*, *anukārya*, *mukhyaloka*, in short the hero and heroine, *nāyaka* and *nāyikā*) who are taken to experience the primary (or “stable”) emotions (*sthāyibhāvas*) in response to certain objects (*ālambanavibhāvas*) and under certain external conditions (*uddīpanavibhāvas*) that awaken pre-given dispositions (*vāsanās*, *saṃskāras*); these emotions are nuanced in any given case by more transient feelings (*vyabhicāribhāvas*) and made manifest by physical reactions (*anubhāvas*) including the utterances the characters’ emotions prompt them to make (*vāgārambhaṇānubhāvas*). But the literary text, to move to our second case, is always representation for readers (and listeners and viewers). The simple phenomenological fact that the reality of literary communication exists solely in a reader’s response to it – that it is only in reading/hearing a text that it can have meaning and come to life¹² – suffices to show this. Readers participate in the emotional life of the characters, and this participation would not be possible unless they themselves in some sense shared the primary emotions, for example, and partook of the predisposition to respond in similar ways to similar objects and conditions. Obviously the reader’s response to a character cannot be absolutely identical to the character’s response itself, but, just as obviously, it is intimately related.

Thus as an affective phenomenon the text can be analyzed from the inside – how are the various components organized that are necessary to provide a rich representation of human emotion? – or from the outside – how is it that readers do in fact respond to such representations? And depending on the analytical stance taken, our understanding of how this phenomenon is actually operationalized by the text will differ. Considered at the level of an external process *rasokti* may primarily be seen as a form of language that “brings forth” (*bhāvanā*) in readers an emotional state that did not exist as such prior to its articulation in a specific literary form; or, at the level of an internal process, as one that “manifests” (*vyañjana*) such

12 As Wolfgang Iser might put it (cf. Iser 1978: 19-20).

states in the character who must already have experienced them, as it were, or was experiencing them in some realm of imaginative reality.

Theoretically, therefore, *rasa* can be regarded in three dimensions: as a property of a textual object, as a capacity of a reader-subject, and as a transaction between the two. The whole process, in fact, exists as a totality even while its moments can be analytically disaggregated. (In this, *rasa* is indeed precisely like the “taste” it metaphorically references, which may be regarded as existing in the food, in the taster, and in the act of tasting.) Something of this totality is I think captured by the phenomenologist of aesthetics, Mikel DUFRENNE, when he writes of the “primordial reality of affective quality, wherein that part belonging to the subject and that belonging to the object are still indistinguishable.... It is for this reason that we have been led to say that the affective is in the work itself, as well as in the spectator with whom the work resonates. Feeling is as deeply embedded in the object as it is in the subject, and the spectator experiences feeling because affective quality belongs to the object.”¹³

The history of the discourse on *rasa* in the Sanskrit tradition is a history of working toward this comprehensive view. There may not be any simple linearity in the progress, in large part because the various aspects of *rasa* are deeply imbricated the one with the other and therefore are always potentially available for analysis at any given point. But a history exists. Not everyone seems to have been talking about the same thing when they talked about *rasa*; their focal points and emphases changed over time.

Bhoja holds in common with all other participants in the *rasa* discourse, both predecessors and successors, its basic components. There is full agreement on the nature and range of human emotion, the analytical components of literary representation, the procedures of argument and proof – this entire discursive package was stable for over a millennium. A major difficulty in understanding his account springs from uncertainty about the focal point of the discourse: who we are talking about when we talk about who has *rasa* (and, concomitantly if subordinately, by what literary-aesthetic process is it caused to be located in the person who has it)? But comprehending this dimension of his analysis – what he understands the focal point of *rasa* to be, and to what degree the other dimensions of the *rasa* process are accordingly disregarded – is something

13 See DUFRENNE 1973: 455.

both his own exposition, and the history of the discourse in which we later readers find it to be embedded, render problematic.

Prior to Bhoja thinking about *rasa* appears to have been characterized by a preoccupation with *rasa* as internal to the literary text, that is, with the mechanisms by which language is able to create the representation of affective states, the various moods, in literary characters. According to Abhinavagupta (ca. 1000) this was the position of the (ninth century?) scholar Lollaṭa, whose own works have disappeared. Abhinava associates him with the views of the “most ancient” authorities on the subject of *rasa*, and summarizes his doctrine as follows: “*Rasa* is nothing more than what in its initial stage is a stable emotion, after this has combined with the transitory feelings and so on to become fully developed; and it is located in the character and there alone.”¹⁴ For how long before Lollaṭa this view in fact prevailed, how widely it was shared, how restricted its perspective may have been – was the readerly dimension totally excluded from consideration? – are questions very hard to answer. We have virtually no substantial account of *rasa* prior to this, save of course for Bharata’s *Nāṭyaśāstra*, and this awaits investigation according to the three aspects of *rasa*-analysis signaled above. It is not certain that any definitive assessment of its position is attainable, however, given the irreducible incoherence that characterizes much of the work, especially the *rasa* chapter.¹⁵ Although there is no explicit discussion of the matter, Bharata’s language often suggests that his analytic focus is *rasa* in the character: *hāsyā* (the comic), for example, “is seen to exist for the most part in women characters and characters of low status”, *strīnīccaprakṛti* (NŚ 6.51, p.308),¹⁶ and it is reasonably certain that he is not referring here (as he is usually taken to be referring) to the response of the viewer.¹⁷ Moreover, his conception of the causal process – emotions (*bhāvas*) are the factors that manifest the *rasa* of a literary text (*kāvyaarasābhivvyaktihetu*, p. 342) – implies, or at least later is

14 *purvāvasthāyāṃ yaḥ sthāyī sa eva vyabhicārisaṃpātādinā prāptaparipoṣo ’nukārya-gata eva rasaḥ*, DhĀ p. 184. See also below n. 91.

15 So argued in detail in SRINIVASAN 1980.

16 *strīnīccaprakṛtau eṣa bhūyiṣṭhaṃ drśyate rasaḥ*. *Hāsyā* is accordingly *ātmastha* or “in oneself”, that is, when the character experiences the humor himself, or *parastha*, “in another”, when another character’s humorous reaction to something funny make one laugh oneself.

17 Thus for example MASSON & PATWARDHAN 1970: vol. 1: 51, vol. 2: 89.

taken to imply the pre-existence of *rasa* in the character and an analytic primacy awarded to that locus (cf. n.69 below). On the other hand, one well-known passage would seem to speak against his sharing Lollaṭa's perspective: "Sensitive viewers enjoy the stable emotions when manifested by various [transitory] emotions [and] accompanied by language, movement, and physical reactions. And this brings them pleasure" (p.282f.).¹⁸ Aside from the fact that we do not know how old this prose passage of the text is, and that not much else in the sixth chapter supports a concern with reader response, the passage itself does not disallow the assumption that for Bharata the *sthāyibhāvas* and the *rasas* they produce are located in the character (though "tasted" by the audience). Later authors seem to have read him this way.¹⁹ As for the gustatory metaphor, in and of itself it determines little; to be sure, "taste" may be said to exist as such only when tasted (a kind of secondary quality), but it nonetheless can be considered to be a property of the object (a kind of primary quality).

What is certain, at all events, is that the perspective attributed to Lollaṭa, where primacy is granted to character in the analysis of *rasa*, was abandoned by Kashmiri thinkers in the course of the tenth century. A new shift of attention from modes of literary production (writer-centered, prescriptive theory) to processes of literary cognition (reader-centered, descriptive theory) brought with it a growing concern with the affective response to literary representations, whereby the principal locus of *rasa* – the site of its effect and the realm of its investigation – was transferred from the text to the reader. The beginnings of this epistemic shift can be detected in the new concerns of Ānandavardhana (ca. 850). In the *Dhvanyāloka* emphasis was for the first time placed on how readers

18 *nānābhāvābhivyañjitān vāgaṅgasattvopetān sthāyibhāvān āsvādayanti sumanasah prekṣakāḥ harṣādīṃś cādhigacchanti.*

19 For the ND transitory feelings and reactions (*vyabhicāribhāvas*, *anubhāvas*) become themselves objective causes (*ālambanavibhāvas*) when analyzed in terms of the *rasa* experience of the audience (so DR 4.38-39, see below), whereas in Bharata's system, as the ND itself puts it, they "are to be understood exclusively in reference to the female and other characters under description [in a literary text] or imitated [in a drama]" (*anubhāvā vyabhicāriṇaś ca stryādivarṇanīyānukāryāpekṣayaiva draṣṭavyāḥ* (p. 161). This suggests that the ND understood the NŚ as exclusively a character-centered account of *rasa*. On the other hand, Bhoja certainly knew Rudraṭa, who once refers to readers as "possessing *rasa*": "These *rasas* delight men who have *rasa* (*rasavataḥ*), when they are properly differentiated/deployed and composed beautifully by a skilled poet" (*Kāvyaḷaṅkāra* 15.21).

understand a literary text, which for its part was now regarded as an entity whose parts are in fact parts of a whole, the dominant *rasa*.²⁰ Nowhere, however, does Ānanda provide a coherent account of how *rasa* works. We learn that *rasa* is something to be “revealed” by the text and so presumably is waiting there to be revealed, that the writer “composes” it (*rasam bandhum*), and that narrative elements possess it (*rasavanti hi vastūni*) (DhĀ pp.221-22). In fact the one time Ānanda mentions the locus of *rasa* he identifies it as the character (*raso 'pi kathānāyakāśrayas tadvipakṣāśrayo vā*, p.318), and it is otherwise clear to his most recent translators that he often uses *rasa* “in its old sense of a particularly vivid emotion (*bhāva*)” rather than in its emergent sense of “aesthetic delight” (INGALLS et al., 1991: 413; an important distinction that nonetheless does not seem to figure in their analysis of Ānanda's theory).

A more fundamental transformation was sparked by certain tenth-century theoreticians, especially Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Bhaṭṭa Tauta. These scholars and their followers – with whose works Bhoja does not seem to be familiar (cf. e.g. n.57) – directed their analysis of *rasa* rather toward its external dimension – to the commonalities of reader, writer, and character, for example (such as Tauta's formula, *nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuḥ samāno 'nubhavaḥ*, cited by Abhinava with the distinct implication that the doctrine is something new, DhĀ p.92); to the processes of response (such as Abhinava's *hrdayasamvāda*, by which the hearts of readers are “in communion” with the text); or to the language operations underlying this response and the specificity of its epistemological status (such as Nāyaka's *bhāvakatva* and *bhogakṛttva*, whereby the text “brings into being” in the reader the previously non-existent *rasa*, which he experiences in a way unique to the literary) – and thereby inaugurated an explicit and protracted controversy over many of the key questions of *rasa*. Although this history is well-known,²¹ the actual historicity, as it were, of the contestation as well as its substance are not always borne in mind in contemporary scholarship. And accordingly the presuppositions derived from the justly admired Kashmiri tradition, especially as promulgated by its most sophisticated representative, Abhinavagupta, who was contemporary with but unknown to Bhoja, are often taken to represent *rasa*-doctrine *tout court* and

20 The U. of Chicago dissertation of Lawrence MCCREA, “The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir” (1998), charts the history of this shift in detail.

21 See most recently INGALLS et al. 1990: 16ff., 35ff.

transhistorically. It is mainly for this reason, I think, and not so much because of the magnitude and complexity of his arguments that Bhoja's own doctrine has seemed so odd to those who have bothered to read him.

If indeed analytical emphasis on the affective phenomenon inside rather than outside the text is what we find in Bhoja – we shall consider the matter in some detail below – his work would more rightly be viewed as the culmination of a tradition rather than a departure from it. But there is something very new going on in Bhoja's big project and main argument, and about this, at least, there need be no serious confusion. As the title announces, the focus of the ŚP is *śṛṅgāra*, and in much of the text this term is understood in the sense common to other literary theory: "In this treatise passion will be discussed. It is of two sorts, passion enjoyed and passion frustrated" (R 400.1, J 253-54). What is new is Bhoja's insight – and this prompts a re-organization of the entire logic of his analysis – that the forces and principles operative in "passion" may be extrapolated to the entire range of affective states, as what in essence they all share or what underlies them. This higher-order Passion (distinguished in the translation below by capitalization from the lower-order phenomenon), to which Bhoja also refers by the words "sense of self" (*abhimāna*), "ego" (*ahankāra*), "love" (*prema*), and *rasa* (singular), is what enables a person to experience the world richly. It represents the capacity for emotional intensity as such, and hence may be taken as the origin of all other affective states, or *rasas* (plural).²²

At first glance and especially in view of the contemporary and later developments in theory we have just summarized, it may appear that Bhoja is in the first instance concerned with the passions and Passion of the readers of Sanskrit poetry. At the most general level, however, this seems hard to accept. As the prologue to the work tells us, the ŚP is about *sāhitya*, or the processes by which words and meanings unite to produce the peculiar kind of communication called literature (*kāvya*). *Rasa* is of concern to Bhoja precisely because of its status as an instance of this unity; Chapter Eleven itself in fact is an exploration of the last and most important of the twelve forms of *sāhitya*, *rasāvīyoga* or the "non-absence of *rasa*". And this overriding purpose constantly redirects our attention back toward the text,

22 The erotic desire that underlies passion is the paradigmatic emotion, *samastabhāva-mūrdhābhīṣikta* [*sthāyibhāva*] and hence may stand, metonymically, for them all (cf. below, R 675, J 436 and n. 107; cf. R 687, J 444).

toward the literary process itself and the production of literary communication. This is what Bhoja is above all concerned to analyze, not literary reception, and that is what his discourse on *rasa* appears to be designed to address. Although the various positions on *rasa* may not be mutually exclusive in theory, there was clearly variance among thinkers with respect to which aspect of the *rasa* problematic they invested with analytical primacy. For Bhoja this seems to be the character, as the primary and “real” (and not metaphorical) participant in the *rasa* experience.

It is only a highly textured analysis of Bhoja's entire discourse that would allow such an argument to be sustained, and this is what the translation that follows is meant to encourage (and I have hence sought to translate, to the degree possible, in such a way that the matter is not predetermined). But a few exemplary passages may be examined here in order to suggest the possibility of this interpretation. Consider first an objector's argument, in discussing a fine point of grammatical analysis (the possible meanings of the possessive suffix *matup* in the word *rasavat* [*vacanam*], “an utterance ‘that has *rasa*’”): “*Rasas*”, his argument goes, “are states of pleasure or pain, which pertain to conscious embodied beings. Literature, however, consists of words and meanings, is therefore not itself conscious,” and accordingly it cannot “have *rasa*” (in any of the usual senses of *matup*). The reference here is not to “embodied beings” in general or even “cultured” beings, as might seem to be the case at first glance. It is rather to the literary character, as Bhoja proceeds to make clear: “Someone like Rāma [i.e., the character] has *rasa*, and his speech, since its source lies in [his very] *rasa*, may itself be said to ‘have *rasa*’ (*rasavat*); when a writer represents [such a person], by virtue of the complete identification [between the real person and the character] the representation of [his speech] may likewise be said to ‘have *rasa*.’”²³

It is the characters alone, the *nāyaka* and *nāyikā*, whom Bhoja shows to be implicated in the process of *rasa* production. They alone experience the activation of “latent memories” by the objective and other factors relevant to the experience of *rasa* and *bhāva* (*vibhāvaiḥ prabuddha-saṃskārasya nāyakādeḥ*, R 1045.1, J 679.1; cf. R. 678.10ff., J 438.26ff.; R

23 *rasavato rāmāder yad vacanam tadrasamūlatvād rasavad abhedasamadhyāropāc ca kavinānukriyamānasya tasyānukaranam api rasavat*. His speech therefore can with grammatical justification be said to “possess” something that only a sentient being may possess.

688.11, J 444.24). It is they for whom the stable emotions (*sthāyibhāvas*) arise:²⁴ Udayana feels erotic desire and its *rasa* of passion (*vatseśvarasya ratau sthāyibhāve... śṛṅgārarasād*) (R 679.1), Aja feels grief and its *rasa* of pity (*karuṇarasavato nāyakasya*) (R 681.4), the god Hari possesses the *rasa* (*rasavataḥ*) of *śṛṅgāra* when observing Satyabhāmā's anger (R 708.1 [J. 458.16]), and other literary characters experience the various other affective states (R 679.1ff.). A “developed *rasa*” is accordingly “that which the protagonist, [the one] who occupies the chief role in the narrative, comes to have in reference to a commensurate object (*yaḥ [rasaḥ] kathāsarīravypinaḥ uttamanāyakasya tathāvidhe viṣaye jāyate*)” (R 665.13).²⁵ This explains why so many of the illustrative verses are first-person utterances (this is especially evident in Bhoja's account of the stages of the production of *rasa*, R 687ff., where all but one of the verses are first-person; and cf. SKĀ pp. 526ff., cited below p. 189), or why Chapter Eleven itself introduces the discussion of *rasa* with three verses describing the mind of the literary character in love (to a character of Passion all the ways of the beloved, whether love, indifference, or pain, bring a kind of joy, R 663.1ff.). Thus it is the character who is the true *rasika*, he who “has *rasa*”.²⁶ (In fact, once we acknowledge this counterintuitive usage of *rasika* – counterintuitive at least for a post-Nāyaka or -Abhinava aesthetic – it is hard to locate the word used anywhere in the ŚP unambiguously in

24 That the *sthāyins* are located instead in the audience is insisted upon by first by the DR (see below, p. 135), probably following Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. Abhinavagupta for his part is the first clearly to assert that all nine *sthāyins* are necessarily present in the reader (INGALLS et al. 1990: 231 n. 41) – something expressly denied by Bhoja in the passage translated below (= R 665) – and to introduce the *sahṛdaya*'s *vāsanās* into the equation (e.g., DhĀ pp. 187, 205). What is thus a relatively late innovation has been given canonical status by modern students of the subject. Thus P. V. KANE: “There are certain permanent and dominant propensities or basic moods in the minds of all theatre-going people or readers of poetry which are ordinarily dormant, but when appropriate stimuli such as dialogues... are employed, they are roused and evolve a pleasurable state of the mind of the spectator or reader. These permanent moods are called *sthāyibhāva*” (*History of Sanskrit Poetics* [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, third edition, 1961], p. 361).

25 Cf. Bhavabhūti's well-known line, *puṭapākapratikāśo rāmasya karuṇo rasaḥ* (*Uttararāmacarita* 3.1).

26 Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha will accordingly distinguish between a “primary” and a “secondary” sense of *rasa*, the first referring to the character's experience, the second the reader's (see below p. 133).

reference to anyone else.) *Rasa*, insofar as it pre-exists in the character, can therefore be “manifested” (*vyañjita*) by the affective components of literary communication (the female love-object, the description of the scene, etc.); the emotional response of the reader is outside this causal process and ignored by it.²⁷

In view of the complexity of *rasa* as inherently a quasi-intersubjective phenomenon – something subsisting between the subject represented and the subject reading – and given the concerns of the later Kashmiri theorists, we might still be inclined to assume in a number of passages that Bhoja is simultaneously speaking of readers. Theoretically, as I have suggested already, these are by no means mutually exclusive perspectives to adopt, though historically, as we shall see momentarily, they may well be. I wish to leave this matter open, in fact. But I am inclined to suggest that even in these passages Bhoja may have other concerns in mind than those the later history of the discourse would prompt us to suppose at first blush. Consider the first two expository *kārikās*, 3 and 4:

3. “Passion” they say is a particular quality of the ego in a person; it is the very essence of love. Insofar as a person has the capacity to “taste” it, it is [called] “taste” (*rasa*). One who is endowed with this [capacity to taste *rasa*] is said to “have *rasa*” (*rasika*).

4. It is an indescribable transformation [of primal matter] consisting of the sense of self that awakens in the heart of those in whom *sattva* predominates; a transformation born from a special kind of pure *dharma*, arising by way of memory-traces fashioned by experiences in past lives, [and functioning as] the single cause of the appearance and intensification of the entire range of [qualities] of the self.

Though on the face of things we might be prone to understand this first verse in terms of later theory, I see nothing to contradict an interpretation agreeing with the *rasa*-analysis that the many other passages of the ŚP cited above indicate. In vs. 4, by contrast, it is not easy to assume that it is the reader’s good deeds and moral status itself that concern Bhoja. He nowhere suggests a reader becomes a *rasika* through good works or that his capacity

27 Such is the whole logic of the exemplification in SKĀ 5.138ff. Dhanika speaks directly to this point from the opposite perspective: since *rasa* exists in the reader and not in the character it cannot be spoken of as “manifested”; words, which *produce* *rasa*, cannot at the same time *manifest* them (DR pp. 217-18). See also n. 69 below.

to be moved by literature requires a developed “sense of self”, *abhimāna*.²⁸ The *dharma* and Passion at issue in the *kārikā* seem instead to belong to those individuals selected for representation in a work of literary art. Even the discussion near the beginning of Chapter Eleven can be understood in this sense:

Do these stable emotions, arising each by reason of its particular primary cause, arise the same for everyone or only for some? If for everyone, then the whole world would be said to “have *rasa*”, which is patently not the case, since we can see for ourselves that some individuals have *rasa* and some do not (*nīrasa*). And no postulate that is contradicted by perception is admissible. So erotic desire and the other stable emotions do not come into play for everyone (*na sarvasya ratyādayo jāyante*), but only for some, and for this we have to identify some cause. It will have to be either something empirically verifiable or something transcendent, and it cannot be the former since there is nothing observable there. As for a transcendent cause, it must be either common or unique, and if it is common, we are back with the first problem, namely, that the whole world would “have *rasa*”. If, however, this causal condition is a unique transcendent thing, what could it be but some moral component (*dharmakārya*), to which the individual’s beginningless memory-traces (*vāsanā*) are related? And it is precisely this that we define to be the “particular quality of the ego” (vs. 3), [which we simultaneously refer to as] Passion (*śṛṅgāra*), sense of self (*abhimāna*), and *rasa*. It is in consequence of this that the stable emotions, erotic desire etc., come into play. And it is only those persons endowed with Passion who can taste (*svadate*) this [*rasa*] when it comes to be manifested by the fully developed [stable emotions, etc.]; it is the same as [the element of] fire [that pre-exists, and is only manifested, and not created,] by the mass of flames. (R 665, J 430)

Bhoja nowhere in the ŚP ascribes stable emotions to the reader, or factors the reader’s memory-traces into the process of *rasa* production (on the contrary they are typically described in terms of the hero, e.g., R 688.11; and cf. n.24). Once again, therefore, it may be the character under description here. The “whole world” may refer to the world of the literary work (in which some characters do and so do not have *rasa*),²⁹ and even the

28 This is the position of Abhinavagupta (ad NŚ p.281): *ye kāvyābhyāsaprāktana-puṇyādihetubalādibhiḥ sahrdayāḥ* (cf. p. 284), and I find little warrant to generalize it backward to Bhoja.

29 This recalls the famous verse of Ānandavardhana’s (DhĀ p.498) which Bhoja cites twice (ŚP 706.15 and SKĀ 5.3): *śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvyē jātaṃ rasamayam jagat*. The following interpretation, though not the most obvious, is perfectly possible: If the poet is a man of passion, the world of the poem [*kāvyē... jagat*] that he creates has *rasa* (cf. also Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha, below p. 134). Abhinava naturally understands this verse very

“tasting” may refer to the character’s capacity for experiencing, by way of the epiphenomena that manifest it (erotic desire and all the other factors), the primal Passion that otherwise “transcends the plane of the coming-into-being of feeling (*bhāvanā*)” (vs. 10).³⁰

Given later, and contemporaneous but unrelated, developments, coupled with the ambiguity of Bhoja’s exposition and the absence of a tradition of commentary on the ŚP, it is perhaps to be expected that a conception of *rasa* potentially at odds with those later views and with subtle implications of its own would remain as elusive as it has been to modern scholarship. Yet we can turn for help to two other texts in which Bhoja’s position is more clearly articulated, whether directly as an object of exegesis or indirectly as an object of criticism. In view of Bhoja’s prolixity – we have after all 1800 printed pages of text – it may seem odd to require external clarification. But Bhoja never explains his views on the location of *rasa* in the terms that would later be adopted, or in contrast to other positions, for the simple reason – if my analysis so far has been correct –

differently, in connection with his analysis of NŚ 6. 38 (p. 288): It is *rasa* that leads to moral education mediated by pleasure; it is in the consciousness of the poet and is shared by the actor, and comes to inhabit the mind of the audience. The foundational *rasa* then is that of the poet, but this equals that of the audience. In Bharata’s tree simile, the root is *rasa*, the tree is poetry, the flowers are the actor’s modes of representation, and the fruit is the audience’s pleasure. “This whole complex, then, ‘consists of *rasa*.’” It is worth noting, in passing, that Bhoja is as uninterested in the *rasa* of the writer as in that of the reader (not to speak of the actor). The one time the status of *rasa* in the poet arises in the ŚP is in a verse borrowed from another theoretician. The so-called “expression theory of art”, which posits a “*necessary* link between the qualities of the art work and certain states of the author” is encoded in the founding myth of Sanskrit poetry: Vālmīki personally experienced *karuṇa rasa* of the sort that lies at the heart of his work. Whether or not Bhoja’s silence about the *rasa* of the author implies that he recognized the difficulties of this theory, they are considerable (cf. for example the critique in Alan TORMEY, *The Concept of Expression* [Princeton: Princeton U. Press 1971]; the citation is found on p. 104).

30 The “tasting” of *rasa* (*√svad*) is mentioned in *kārikas* 5, 10, and at R 664.20, 666.1, 728 (where the last two instances alone refer to events outside rather than inside the text). The prologue to the ŚP may be similarly analyzed: “It is difficult to specify what precisely this *rasa* is, since it is knowable only experientially, and is not universally accessible. When displayed by skilled actors in correctly performed dramatic presentations it can be determined by the audience; when properly declaimed by great poets in their compositions it can become accessible to the minds of the learned” (R 5.16, J 2.12). This need not mean that the affective phenomenon is not primarily a matter of the inside of the text, something not in us but graspable by and accessible to us.

that those terms and positions were not yet dominant, if they were clearly articulated as alternative positions at all. An important reconstructive analysis made after these later developments and when their irreconcilability had become obvious is provided by the first of the texts in question, Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha's commentary on the first few *kārikās* of SKĀ Chapter Five.³¹ His account merits translating at some length (I omit what I find to be non-essential elaborations):

[On SKĀ *kārikā* 5.1] “Literature becomes beautiful by connection with *rasa*”.... *Rasa* is located in the character who is the subject of the work, Rāma for example (*tasya [rasasya] pratipādyarāmādipātragatasya*), and when that *rasa* is “connected” with or incorporated in (*anvaya, yojana*) a poem about Rāma via appropriate literary composition, it delights the hearts of the audience.³² Objection: *Rasa* cannot be located in the character, since the character is dead and gone; it must be in the audience, who are alive and present (*na pātragato rasas tasyātivṛttatvāt kiṃtu sāmājikagata eṣāṃ vartamānatvāt*). Moreover, the main point of a literary work is not [the character] (*kāvyaśyātatparatvāt*). Writers do not make literature so that characters long dead and gone can “have *rasa*” (*rasikāḥ syuḥ*), but so that the audience can enjoy *rasa* (*rasabhājah*). Therefore the *rasa* must be in the audience (*sāmājikagato rasah*), not in the character. Answer: Not in the least. If the *rasa* were in the audience, [the literary work] would have had either to produce it in them or to make them aware of it [when it already exists in them].³³ Which is it? Objection: The literary work does both: The work of a good writer seems almost in actuality to transfer (*sākṣād iva samarpayati*) to the audience the full array of the factors of *rasa*, the objective cause and so on, which as an aggregate bring about *rasa* in their hearts. [Bharata's *rasasūtra* is cited here (omitted by RAGHAVAN).] Because it communicates this aggregate the literary work can be said to produce *rasa*. At the same time it makes the audience aware of *rasa* by revealing the causal factors that underlie it. Answer: This is incorrect. How can the aesthetic factors communicated by the literary work be the cause of a *rasa* located in the audience? Causes must necessarily pre-exist their effects, and when one is listening to a literary work, those factors do not actually exist at all, let alone exist as necessarily prior [i.e., the real *Sītā*, the objective cause that really produced passion in Rāma, is

- 31 The text is given in RAGHAVAN 1978: 412.16ff. from the single manuscript of the work extant, which I have also examined (Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras: R 2499, an early twentieth-century transcript). We know nothing about the date or place of this scholar, cf. also n. 40.
- 32 For RAGHAVAN's *saṃvidhānena (au)cityavaśena* I read (against the ms.) *saṃvidhānaucityavaśena* (cf. p. 414.2), for *tasmād anvayāt* I read *tasyānvayāt*, and for *sāmājikaḥṛdayānukārī*, I read *sāmājikaḥṛdayānuhlādi*.
- 33 Contrast Abhinava ad DhĀ p. 158: the *vibhāvas* etc. are neither *kāraka* nor *jñāpaka* of *rasa* (cf. n. 69), a postulate that readers will recall from Mammaṭa's summary of Abhinava's theory in *Kāvyaṣaṅkṣa* 4.

not actually present to the audience]. And as for their making the audience aware of *rasa*, what difference does that make? *Rasa* does not come about as a result of being aware of these factors, but rather it essentially *is* those factors themselves, as it has been stated [in the *rasasūtra*], “*Rasa* is produced from a conjunction of objective causes, reactions, and feelings.”³⁴ ... “*Rasa*” in the primary sense of the term is what is located in the character (*pātragata eva mukhyo rasah*); the prevailing sense of the word [*sāmayika*] [i.e., with respect to the audience] is only a secondary meaning (p. 412).

Moreover, a single verbal function cannot both produce something and make us aware of it. That which makes one aware of something must exist after that thing has been produced, and words, having once ceased [after putatively producing *rasa*], no longer have the capacity to function [in order to inform us of it]. Therefore *rasa* exists only in the character, it is communicated by the literary text, and experienced (*anubhūyate*) by the audience. Objection: But if it is the characters alone, such as Rāma, that are [properly to be called] *rasikas*, how can the term be applied to the audience? How, that is, does a literary work go about engendering *rasa*? Answer: Although *rasa* exists only in the character, a writer is able, by the use of words appropriate to that *rasa*, almost in actuality to transfer it to the mind of the audience. They experience the *rasa* thereby transferred... and so acquire the designation *rasika*. And the whole point of literature is to produce that [experience].

Objection: But what about literary texts with totally imaginary plots [as opposed to what is taken to be the factual plot of a work like the *Rāmāyaṇa*]? No real character exists that can function as the locus of *rasa*, but only someone invented by the writer’s craft. Answer: There is no law that a writer must talk only about things that really exist; that’s not to the point. He can talk about non-existent as well as existent things. All that really matters is that the character presented as the locus of *rasa* should delight the hearts of a receptive audience. It is similar to the problem of the literary “quality” called “clarity of meaning” [*arthavyakti*]. If clarity exists, that is, if the essence of a thing is clearly communicated, it is of no concern to the writer if that thing itself exists in actuality; the only thing of concern is whether, in communicating it, real or not, he is giving the audience pleasure. What is identical in the two cases is that reality attaches to something that is generically similar to what is being communicated. Thus the effective communication of the *rasa* that exists in

34 The passage that follows is a little uncertain in the ms. (though I find RAGHAVAN’S emendations, with the one exception noted, to be unwarranted), and not wholly clear to me. A tentative translation: “Objection: It is only insofar as they are objects of awareness that the objective causes and the rest bring about [*rasa*]. Answer: But the same argument would have to apply to the stable emotions themselves. Were that the case, then – since the objective causes and the rest, while affecting someone altogether different [i.e., the character], would become sources of pleasure in the minds of the audience when they are made aware of them in a literary text – even a text devoid of *rasa* could still be considered a piece of literature [inserting *kāvya*, with RAGHAVAN] [i.e. (?), because *ex hypothesi* it is not the literary text that ‘has *rasa*’ but the audience]. Objection: So what? The grounds for using the word ‘*rasa*’ in reference to

the character and there alone, with the purpose of bringing the audience pleasure, is what it means for there to be the “presence of *rasa*” (*rasānvaya* [= ŚP’s *rasāvīyoga*, cf. n. 76 below]) in a literary work (p. 413)....

[Summary comment on SKĀ *kārikā* 5.2, p. 414.1]: Thus [*rasa*, cf. p. 413.18-19] is above and beyond all these [other forms of “*rasa*”]. It is singular, and experiential (*svādātmā*). It is that which activates (*udbhavaḥetu*) the qualities in the self, and by these [reactions which are its] effects manifests itself to others. Itself proved to exist by the person’s own experience of it [*svānubhavasiddha*], being located in the character it is experienced by the audience [when communicated] through an appropriate literary composition. [On SKĀ *kārikā* 5.3, *śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ kāvyē jātam rasamayam jagat.*]³⁵ Objection: If the literary work only communicates the *rasa* that is in the character, how can one say that some works “have *rasa*” (*sarasa*) and some do not (*nīrasa*) [since it is the character who *ex hypothesi* has *rasa*]? Answer: [While the *rasa* does exist in the character] its presence or absence in a literary work depends on whether the writer producing the work has or does not have *rasa* (*sārasyaḥvairasye*). The reality or irreality of the *rasa* in the character is immaterial. [This is the reason why the *kārikās* that follow proceed to address the nature of literary language.]

What Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha describes as Bhoja’s position is what, I believe, the logic of the ŚP eventually forces us to accept, and as we can see even in the little debate he provides, this is a position seriously at odds with *rasa* theory after Bhoja – or I should say, even theory contemporaneous with him, that of the *Daśarūpaka*, the second of our ancillary texts. One of the intellectual-historical complexities of the whole question of Bhoja’s *rasa* doctrine is its relationship to Dhanamjaya’s work, which I want briefly to examine before concluding this introduction. The DR fundamentally contests a position of the sort Bhoja seems to maintain, and contests its most crucial point, the nature of the *rasa* experience. A translation and précis of the key passage should suffice to reveal the most important points of disagreement:

4.1 (*Avaloka*): It is the transformative stable emotion within the viewers [of dramas] and listeners/readers [of prose and verse literature] that... becomes *rasa* (*śrotṛprekṣakāṇām antar viparivartamāno*³⁶... *sthāyī... rasaḥ*).... Therefore the audience members are the *rasikas*, and literature can be said to “have *rasa*” only because it is the cause for the manifestation of the blissful consciousness earlier

a literary text is the joy brought about in the hearts of the audience. Answer: That would be a conventional signification [*pāribhāṣika*] of the word ‘*rasa*’, given the possibility of its being used [*prayogasambhavāt*, so ms.] in a secondary sense.”

35 Cf. n. 29.

36 On this term see GNOLI 1968: 56n.

because it is the cause for the manifestation of the blissful consciousness earlier described [to be the heart of the *rasa* experience]. It is thus a manner of speaking similar to the Vedic statement, “ghee is life”.

Laghuvṛtti (p. 168): This statement refutes the tenet that the “possessors of *rasa*” [*rasabhājah*] are [the characters] Rāma and so on.³⁷ The way of referring to a literary text as “having *rasa*” is meant to show [as per the Vedic statement] that we can validly refer to a thing X that is the cause of something else Y as Y itself.

4.37 *kārikā*: A verbal action, whether expressed or implied by the context, and in connection with the oblique cases, constitutes sentence-meaning. The stable emotion, in conjunction with the other factors, is likewise [a sentence-meaning]. [A restatement of Nāyaka's theory of *rasa* production as *bhāvanā*.]

4.38 *kārikā*: That [*sthāyibhāva*] itself is *rasa*, because it is that which is tasted; it belongs to the *rasika* [i.e., the reader/specator] because he is alive-and-present (*rasikasyaiva vartanāt*), not to the character, since he is dead-and-gone (*nānukāryasya vṛttatvāt*) [and] because that could not be the point of poetry (*kāvyaśyātatparatvataḥ*).

Avaloka here notes that the character is “present” but in only an illusory form and available only to our experience. Whereas in this illusory presence the character himself can have no experience of tasting he is perfectly capable of functioning as an *ālambanavibhāva* for *our rasa*. “Moreover, poets do not write poetry in order to produce *rasa* for Rāma and so on (*rāmādīnām rasopajananāya*), but to delight sensitive readers....” He goes on to give Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's arguments, that if the *śrīngāra* belonged to the character (*yadi cānukāryasya rāmādeḥ śrīngāraḥ syāt*) we would, when watching a play, experience only what we experience in a real-life context, namely the sense that the fellow in question feels passion – we would not have a *rasa* experience – and we would, if we were good people, feel shame at that experience, if we were bad people, we would feel envy, etc.

Accordingly, for Dhanamjaya and Dhanika (4.38-39) Sītā and Rāma become objective causes not for each other but *for the audience*, since it is their (the audience's) *sthāyibhāva* that is to be activated. The obvious objection this raises – how can Sītā, who is a goddess (and thus an object of worship to the audience, and not of desire) be an *ālambanavibhāva* if the locus of *rasa* is not Rāma but the audience? – is answered by the argument that the literary character loses the uniqueness and specificity he or she has in history (*prāṭisvikīṃ... avasthām itihāsavad*), and becomes a generalized imaginative construction (4.40). “Sītā” thereby becomes a signifier of woman in general (*strīmātravāci*). Yogins may see

37 Bahurūpamiśra, in his commentary on the DR, remarks, “Some scholars maintain that the *rasa* communicated by a literary text is in the character alone, and that the ‘*rasa*’ of the audience is actually counterfeit *rasa*” (*kecit tu rāmādigata eva rasaḥ kāvyapratipādyah sāmājikādīnām rasas tu rasābhāsa iti pratijānate*, text cited by VENKATA-CHARYA in his introduction to the DR, p. lxxvii).

the past in all the particularity with which they see the present, but that is not how poets make poetry (p. 219).

Dhanamjaya was associated with the court of Vākpati Muñja, Bhoja's uncle. He states explicitly at the end of the work that he "participated in the sophisticated assemblies of King Muñja" (*muñjamahīśagoṣṭhīvaidagdhyabhāk*). Muñja came to the throne of the Paramāras around A.D. 975.³⁸ About twenty years later, some time between 994 and 997, he was captured by Tailapa Cālukya, taken to Kalyāni and executed. He was succeeded in the kingship by Bhoja's father, Sindhurāja, who ruled for about a decade, and by Bhoja, whose long reign extended from ca. 1011-1055. Now, if Dhanamjaya's treatise had been composed at the courts of Muñja, Sindhurāja, or Bhoja, it is hard to imagine that Bhoja would have been ignorant of it. But this in fact is the case.³⁹ From the viewpoint of intellectual history there seems to me no easy way to explain such fundamental disagreement if the DR preceded the ŚP and if both texts were produced in Dhārā. It is not very credible that Dhanamjaya outlived Bhoja and wrote after 1055. Perhaps the DR was composed away from Dhārā and so remained unknown to the king, for conceivably some intellectuals associated with Muñja may not have been retained by Bhoja, although we know that some certainly were. (Dhanapāla, for example, had won fame at Muñja's court and later dedicated his work to Bhoja, cf. *Tilakamañjarī* vss. 50, 53.)

I must reserve for another occasion further comment on these historical difficulties, as on the passage itself and its elaboration of the doctrine of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in Dhanika's commentary on 4.37 – with which Bhoja's views are so thoroughly in opposition – and the striking if minor fact that the commentator on Dhanika's *Avaloka* is undoubtedly the same Bhaṭṭa Nṛsimha who presented precisely the opposite views in his

38 Muñja's first charter was issued in (VS 1031 =) A.D. 974-75 (*Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum* Vol. 7 Part 2, pp. 10ff.). The last grant of his predecessor Sīyaka was issued in A.D. 969 (*CII* pp. 8ff.), however, and thus Muñja could well have been king as early as then.

39 He ignores, for example, Dhanamjaya's tripartite division of *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* that was to exercise later scholars such as Śiṅghabhūpāla (see Venkatacharya's introduction to DR, pp. lxx-lxxi). Neither Dhanamjaya nor Dhanika is ever mentioned in the ŚP or the SKĀ, and there is no citation from either work (cf. RAGHAVAN 1978: 667-68 [correcting his earlier statement, p. 89]), or so far as I can see, even allusion.

commentary on the SKĀ.⁴⁰ The simple point I want to make in citing the DR, however, should be clear enough. The critique itself attests to the historical reality and coherence of a theory of the sort I would ascribe to Bhoja's ŚP, for no one attacks the tenability of a view that no one holds, or the reasonableness of a view that no one believes to make sense. By the same token, the DR's critique becomes less intelligible to the degree a doctrine like Bhoja's is merged into the later, homogenized paradigm as is done in most discussions of his work.⁴¹

Indeed, it was the success of this critique that ultimately rendered the earlier theory less interesting and increasingly incomprehensible. Some later authors, to be sure, especially in southern India continued to promulgate the view that Bhoja seems to represent, Vidyānātha for example: "The locus of *rasa* is the literary character alone [*raso nāyakaśraya eva*]). If however through an actor's art or from hearing an artful poem it is vividly brought into being for the audience, then it is perfectly logical that by this process of 'bringing into being' [*bhāvanā*], the *rasa* even though located elsewhere can produce aesthetic pleasure in the audience."⁴² But the entire problematic was raised to a new level by the

40 Venkatacharya questions the identity of the two, but I see no good reason to doubt it. The contradiction in the views Nṛsiṃha presents on the locus of *rasa* (DR p. 217, where the SKĀ commentary is repeated almost word for word) results from the contradiction in the texts he is commenting on (contrast Venkatacharaya p. lxxv).

41 I am referring hereby, above all, to the analysis of V. RAGHAVAN himself. In general he adopts what I would call an ecumenical position that is actually an anachronistic hodgepodge of theories. He argues, for example, that "It will be plain when we go into the new Ahaṃkāra theory of *Rasa* of Bhoja that the cultured individual as such is the seat of *Rasa*.... The Rasika may be the spectator and the connoisseur, the poet or the characters like Rāma in the story. Thus primarily sentient and cultured beings are the seat of *Rasa*" (cf. 1978: 423ff., 454, 467). The other serious reader of Bhoja, S. BHATTACHARYYA, shares RAGHAVAN's view: "[Bhoja] has, however, shown a good deal of acumen in conceiving the unitary basis of the aesthetic experience of *rasa*... The function of the Ego rousing up *our* prenatal instincts... is described as the outcome of the undefiled process of the mind," etc. (1963: 109; emphasis added).

42 *Pratāparudrayaśobhūṣaṇa* (edited by V. RAGHAVAN [Madras, 1979]), p. 205. There are complications in this passage, to be sure, as in the final verse of the section, p. 210, which I must leave for another occasion, as I must leave the subsequent history of the problem. Let me only note two things. Writers fully aware of the Kashmiri tradition such as Guṇacandra and Rāmacandra (ca. 1250) continue to maintain something of what I take to be Bhoja's position: "It is commonsense that the *rasa* we cognize must exist in someone else [the character]" (*sarvalokasiddhā parasthasya rasasya prati-*

Kashmiri theorists. There is little point denying that the Kashmiri innovation produced an analysis of literary experience more engaging both to medieval and contemporary readers. It is probably more compelling to ask – to put the problematic in the simplest possible terms – how and why we get pleasure from sad stories than how stories are made sad in the first place. But is it really a “glaring fault” of those who ask this second question that they “leave out the audience”?⁴³ Or does it represent, on the contrary, another and a no less serious order of analysis, which awards conceptual primacy to the textual organization of aesthetic effects rather than to those effects themselves?

We should remember that the analysis of the reader’s subjectivity – bringing the audience back in, as it were – did not enter centrally into European aesthetic philosophy until the eighteenth century, and this under the very peculiar conditions that produced British empiricism, a new social class that universalized its particular values, and, not unrelatedly, colonialism. And even then, the question of how emotion is “objectified” or “embodied” in a work of art continued to preoccupy thinkers for a good part of the present century. Indeed, it is not much of a stretch to compare the movement of thought from Bhoja to Abhinava to that of the New Critics and Reader Response school. A well-known early text of the former, the “Affective Fallacy” (WIMSATT & BEARDSLEY 1949), actually argued that focusing on the reader’s response to a literary text is to confuse the work with its effect, the poem in itself with its result. The New Critics were interested in not what poetry does to the reader, but how it seeks to do at all, in their words, “How poetry makes ideas thick and complicated enough to hold onto emotions,” how it “fix[es] emotions, making them

pattiḥ), but though “*rasa* is in the chief characters (*mukhyalokagata*)” it is also, indirectly, “in the spectator [in the case of play], and in both the listener and the [private] reader” (*kāvyaśya śrotranusandhāyakadvayagataḥ*) in the case of a literary text (ND p. 159). Moreover the conception remains alive even later insofar as it continues to be a target of attack, cf. *Sāhityadarpana* 3.17 (edited by Krishnamohan Shastri [Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1967]), *anukāryasya... na raso bhavet*, because the passion involved would be limited to the character (and not generalizable), related to the real world (and not to the imaginary world of the audience), and “obstructed” either by the fact that it is in the past or, being real to the real characters, not something to be witnessed by others in a play or poem. See also *Rasagaṅgādhara* (edited by Mathuranath Shastri [Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1939]), p. 57: *rasasya sāmājikavṛttitvena nāyākādyavṛttitvāt*.

43 See INGALLS et al. 1991: 18.

more permanently perceptible.” To be sure, in the western version of this debate, what was thereby put under interrogation was the objectivity of meaning: For the New Critics the affective impact of the work, to the degree it was relevant to them at all, was an entailment of the work as an objective entity; for Reader Response theorists it was precisely the instability of the text as a signifying object, as evinced by the variety and variability of response, that was of interest. If in view of all this there is a glaring fault to be found in the Indian tradition – though I prefer to think of it, again, as a different set of concerns in a different universe of discourse – it may rather be that of the Kashmiri thinkers. For what they left out in their analysis of reader response was the possibility of difference – the problem that preoccupied Kant, how a judgment of taste is rationally justified, cannot be asked if all *sahṛdayas* qua *sahṛdayas* respond the same, as they appear to do for Abhinava – and all the troublesome issues, such as authorial intention and the conflict of interpretations, that hang on such difference.

At all events it is that other order of analysis that had interested the best minds in Indian literary theory for centuries (though Bhoja's may be the only explicit and detailed account we have of it), and it is what interests Bhoja exclusively: His entire treatise is devoted to exploring the different ways in which components of language function together (*sahita*) in the peculiar manner that produces the literary (*sāhitya*). With respect to *rasa* in particular, precisely the same analytical orientation is maintained. Bhoja wants above all to understand how literary characters can be shown to experience and express the emotions they do, what that tells us about their special psychosocial qualities, and by what means specific to it a work of literature produces the sense of a feeling. Ultimately, to be sure, this entire account implicitly subserves readerly competence, which no doubt interested Bhoja both for the phenomenological reasons I mention above, and for the political one I mention below. But his principal focus is inside the text; neither the *rasa* chapter nor anything else in the ŚP directly and unambiguously addresses the aesthetics of reception (let alone the metaphysics of reception, Tantric or other).⁴⁴ And unless we suspend the

44 To get a sense of the radical difference in perspective between Bhoja and, say, Abhinavagupta, one may compare with the translation that follows Edwin GEROW's recent version of Abhinava on the NŚ, “Abhinavagupta's Aesthetics as a Speculative Paradigm”, JAOS 114. 2 (1994): 186-208.

presuppositions of that other aesthetic, what is moreover almost certainly a later aesthetic, the ŚP will be even harder to make sense of than it already is. Such at least is the conclusion at which I have gradually – and, I must stress, very hesitantly – arrived, and which the literal translation (sometimes perhaps painfully literal translation) that follows is intended to allow the reader to test.

Bhoja's method and vision are, to a large degree, those of the maker of literature he was (*Campūrāmāyaṇa* 1-5, *Śṛṅgāramañjarīkathā*, and perhaps other texts). The more one works through his complex analysis, and the stunning range of examples that he seems so effortlessly, and always so appositely, to adduce in support of his argument, the stronger is the impression one gets that, while Kashmiri speculation on the philosophical and theological aesthetics of reader-response is all very fine, it may be Bhoja who best tells us how literature was made to work in premodern India. At this point in the history of the study of his treatise, a close reading of the text, which RAGHAVAN's magisterial edition finally makes possible, is of primary importance. We need to examine the kind of terminology he is using and to follow the course of his argument as closely as possible. A translation of his work – tentative as all first translations of Sanskrit texts must be, especially in the absence of any tradition of exegesis – is therefore the first requirement. This alone enables us to confront the larger questions that his whole literary-critical project raises: why the “greatest king of the Hindus” (as Persian-language historians such as Gardizi came to refer to him) found the production of a *summa poetica* so important; what the project meant for him, who was “not just anyone”, as he himself tells us in his commentary on the first *kārikā*, but “a great king appointed by his elders to protect all that has been inherited, and who in this verse beseeches God that there should be no violation against the established order (*sthita*) and practices of estates and stages of life while he is engaged in the composition of this book” (R 405.10ff, J 257.15ff.); what a ratiocination of sentiment meant for the great world outside the text; what, in short, *rasa*-talk is talking about besides *rasa*, and why this talk began to change so dramatically around the beginning of the second millennium.

One speculative answer to this, which I hope on another occasion to spell out at length, may have to do with the changing sociality of the Indian aesthetic. The world of the text and the world itself are as mutually intertwined for Bhoja as they were for all other *ālankārikas* before him.

Even if Indian thinkers do not often thematize the matter and concentrate instead on the formal or language-philosophical dimensions of the literary, the criticism of poetry remains for all of them fundamentally a criticism of life, since in the last analysis the correct reading of Sanskrit literature requires a correct understanding of and subscription to a larger social theory. The whole point of the ŚP, for its part, is to discipline and correct the reading of Sanskrit literature, and by creating readers who thereby come to understand what they should and should not do in the peculiar lifeworld constituted by this literature, it aims to create politically correct subjects and subjectivities. As Bhoja himself says in his own comment on *kārikā* 3 (R 398.23, J 253.5), “The purport [in this *kārikā*] is to encourage readers who seek to fulfill the four human ends to apply themselves to this [i.e., the ŚP]” (*ataś caturvargārthino 'tra pravartantām*) (cf. R 471.21, J 304.2). For the purpose of the ŚP is to help us learn to read literature better, and it is the purpose of literature – through the “sense of the literary work as a whole” (the *mahāvākyaikārtha*) that provides specific insight into what one should and should not do (*vidhiniṣedhapratibhāviśeṣa*) – to help us develop a comprehensive moral imagination. Good readers make good subjects.

It was this old civic ethos of the literary that was gradually eroding in the troubled political sphere of eleventh-twelfth century Kashmir. This was a world rocked by royal deprivations, impiety, madness, and suicide, where poets were forced to seek patronage outside the Valley (such as Bilhaṇa, who found it in the Karnataka of Vikramāditya VI, *Vikramāṅka-devacarita* 18.87ff.), or if they remained, began to ridicule the very idea of writing for the court (so Maṅkhaka, bureaucrat though he was to become, *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* 25.6-9). And it was a world that would eventually, after the twelfth century, permanently terminate Sanskrit literary creativity in Kashmir. One may well ask whether it was this erosion that contributed to the production of the more inward-looking, even spiritualized Indian aesthetic, one that, despite the fact that historically it constitutes a serious deviation in the tradition, has succeeded in banishing all other forms from memory.

In his recent book on the rise of a discourse on aesthetics in modern Europe, the English literary critic Terry EAGLETON argues that “At the very root of social relations lies the aesthetic, source of all human

bonding.”⁴⁵ This is correct, I think, as far as it goes. But there are particular aesthetics for particular social relations. If we are to understand the social world of premodern India we must understand this aesthetic, and no one is a better guide than Bhoja.

Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of King Bhoja⁴⁶

Introduction (R pp. 1-6; J pp. 1-3)

1. May the body of Śiva, Enemy of the Triple City, provide protection – a body that seems to know at once enjoyment and frustration: It is fused with the beloved but cannot loosen her belt or gain an embrace or obtain a kiss or see her glowing face.
2. May Ganeśa the blessed Lord of hosts remove all obstacles, the dust of whose lotus feet burnishes the mind so that it becomes as clear as a metal mirror to reflect the more luminously the full wealth of word and meaning.
3. “Passion” (*śṛṅgāra*),⁴⁷ they say, is a particular quality (*guṇa*) of the ego (*ahankṛta*)⁴⁸ in a person; it is the very essence of love (*jīvitam ātmayoneḥ*).

45 EAGLETON 1990: 24, though I would prefer to put it that the social and the aesthetic share the same “roots”.

46 Parentheses in the translation are used for material in the Sanskrit itself that is of a parenthetical nature; editorial additions are provided in square brackets. I make note of only those quotations and parallels that RAGHAVAN ignores in his forthcoming edition, or for which I use a different text.

47 As noted in the Introduction, “Passion” upper-case will be used to translate *śṛṅgāra* in the wider sense in which Bhoja uses the term; and “passion”, lower-case, in the narrower sense of one of the limited number of *rasas* as traditionally conceived.

48 “A particular quality”, *guṇaviśeṣa*, or perhaps instead: the superior quality, i.e., *sāttvikagūṇa*. In Chapter Four of his handbook on Śaiva-Sāṅkhya philosophy, the *Tattvaprakāśa* (edited by Kameshwar Nath Mishra [Varanasi: Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1976]), Bhoja describes two three-fold categorizations of *ahankāra*: It can have the aspect of *garva*, of *saṃrambha*, or of *jīvana* (roughly these signify, respectively, the sense of personhood, engagement with the world, and the brute will-to-live). “It is through connection with *ahankāra* existing [in these different forms] that phenomena enter into one’s experience [the way they do]” (vs. 53). *Ahankāra* is also (and symmetrically with the first division) three-fold according to the predominance of one of the three *guṇas*; it is consequently given three different technical names: “luminous” (*taijasa* [see the secondary interpretation of Śrikumāradeva ad loc.]), “transformative”

Insofar as a person has the capacity to “taste” it, it is [called] “taste” (*rasa*). One who is endowed with this [capacity to taste *rasa*] is said to “have *rasa*” (*rasika*).⁴⁹

4. It is an indescribable transformation [of primal matter] consisting of the sense of self (*mānamaya*)⁵⁰ that awakens in the heart of those in whom *sattva* predominates; a transformation born from a special kind of pure *dharma*, arising by way of memory-traces fashioned by experiences in past lives, [and functioning as] the single cause of the appearance and intensification (*udayātiśaya*)⁵¹ of the entire range of [qualities]⁵² of the self.

5. What is above all savored (*svadate*) in ordinary language (*vacaḥ*) is its “purport” (*tātparyā*), in a literary work, suggestion (*dhvani*), among all the qualities of a lover his firm devotion (*saubhāgyam*), in a woman’s body her charm (*lāvanyam*) – and what is above all savored is Passion and Passion alone in the heart of man with a deep sense of self (*mānavato janasya*).⁵³

6. Authorities traditionally reckon ten *rasas*, namely, the passionate, heroic, pitiful, wonderful, violent, comic, loathsome, affectionate, terrible, and tranquil (*śrīngāra*, *vīra*, *karuṇa*, *adbhuta*, *raudra*, *hāsya*, *bībhatsa*, *vatsala*, *bhayānaka*, *śānta*). We, however, admit only one *rasa*, *śrīngāra*, insofar as it alone is what is tasted (*rasanāt*).

7. The conventional wisdom that “*rasa*” refers to the heroic, wonder, and the remaining [eight items] has come out of nowhere and is hardly more

(*vaikārika*), and “elemental” (*bhūtādi*) (vs. 54). These are related in the next verse to cognitive, motor, and generative activities.

49 On the referent of *rasika* see the Introduction above, and translation and note on R 665 below.

50 *māna*- = *abhimāna* (cf. below R 398.21, J 252.28); the reading *mānamayo*, rather than *mānavato* as in next verse, is supported by the citation on R 398.22, J 253.3, and R 674.3, J 436.6.

51 R 398.14ff. (p. 32) shows that the compound is to be taken as a *dvandva*.

52 Glossed below (R 663, J 429): “the ‘source of intensification’ of the various [capacities] of the self, i.e., awareness (*buddhi*), pleasure, pain, predilection, aversion, volition, memory-traces, etc.” Cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.4 (*sukha*, *duḥkha*, *icchā*, *dveṣa*, *prayatna* are signs allowing us to infer the existence of the self, so *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.10, adding *jñāna*; in *VS* 1.1.6 they are likewise listed as qualities of substances).

53 Cf. below, R 674.1, *abhimāninām manasi*, where, as the examples that follow show, the phrase is used in reference to the character.

than a superstition, like the belief that some banyan is haunted by a goblin. It has only been accepted because of the intellectual conformity typical of the world, and our intention in this work is to put it to rest.

8. The sense of self (*abhimāna*) that produces the experience of the consciousness of pleasure and the rest [of the emotions] as [all] agreeable to the mind⁵⁴ is what we should understand to be *rasa*, for that is what is “tasted” through the power of the self. To apply the term [as per the conventional theory] to emotions such as erotic desire and so on when fully developed (*ratyādibhūmani*),⁵⁵ is erroneous.

9. The forty-nine emotions, erotic desire and the rest, which arise from the various causal factors, encompass (*parivārayantaḥ*) the element (*tattva*) of Passion, and augment it (*vardhayanti*) [i.e., so as to make it manifest], in the same way that the mass of flames augment [and so make manifest the elemental form of] fire.⁵⁶

10. An “emotion” (*bhāva*) is what is felt in the mind (*manasi*) by the process of the coming-into-being of feeling (*bhāvanā*) on the part of a person who during this process thinks of nothing else while that feeling arises. That, however, which transcends the plane of the coming-into-being of feeling and in transfigured form (*vivartamāna*)⁵⁷ is savored totally in a heart endowed with ego (*sāhamkṛtau hr̥di*) is *rasa*.

54 *aprātikūlikatayā manaso mudādeḥ*, etc., cf. below R 664.6, J 430.9, *mano ’nukūleṣu sukhaduḥkhādiṣu*, etc. (cf. n. 86) Bhoja cites this *kārikā* below (R 663.12, 429.17) as confirming the argument that indifference and even pain bring pleasure to the man of Passion (also below text at n. 161). See also Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha’s explanation of *rasa*: *yena anukūlavedanīyatayā duḥkham api sukhatvena abhimanyate* (text in RAGHAVAN 1978: 412).

55 For this sense, compare p. 681.12, *aṣṭāv eva bhūmānam āpannāḥ śṛṅgāravīrādivyapadeśam labhante*.

56 That this likely refers to fire (and not the sun, pace BHATTACHARYYA 1963: 109) is indicated by the analogy below: just as the element of fire is manifested by the flames (*saptārcir arcīścayair iva prakāśamānaḥ*), so *śṛṅgāra* is manifested by the stable emotions (R 665.10, J 431.4).

57 That is, not as a feeling but as what underlies feeling (see also the text at n. 87), though I am by no means certain of the translation. Whereas Bhoja was of course familiar with the Mīmāṃsā concept of *bhāvanā*, it is not clear that he was aware of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s reapplication of it in his theorization of *rasa*, even in its formulation by Dhanika (DR pp. 211-12). Moreover, Bhoja’s views are at odds with Nāyaka’s and with the DR that develops them. The “similarity” between Bhoja and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka

11. If erotic desire and the other [stable emotions] are to be counted *rasas* when they achieve full development, then what is wrong with joy (*harṣa*) and the rest [of the transitory feelings that they should not get the name *rasa*], since they are no different from erotic desire and the rest [insofar as they are also affects]? If it is because they are ephemeral, then tell us how long fear, grief, anger, the comic and the rest [of the “stable” emotions] actually last.

12. If an emotion's “stability” is held to derive from the prominence of its subject matter (*viṣayātiśaya*),⁵⁸ or by virtue of the temperament (*prakṛter vaśena*) [of the character],⁵⁹ then what about [“transitory” feelings such as] worry and the like? [As for the hero's temperament] it is precisely the same [in the case of both “stable” emotions and “transitory” feelings] with respect to his self; and [as for the prominence of treatment,] if it is because [stable emotions] have the capacity to awaken memory-traces (*vāsanāyāh samdīpanāt*),⁶⁰ that is something identical in the case of both [“stable” emotions and “transitory” feelings].

It is proven, then, that erotic desire and the rest of the forty-nine emotions and feelings themselves derive from Passion; the doctrine that these others [besides *śrīngāra*], *vīra* and so on, are *rasas* is erroneous. Moreover, Passion alone is *rasa*, [and] the sole means of fulfilling the four human ends. It is difficult to specify what precisely this *rasa* is, since it is knowable only

that RAGHAVAN discerns – the “threads of thought in the fabric of Bhoja's theory [that] show affinities to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory” (1978: 469) – is thus quite imperceptible to me. Their views on *rasa* seem to be dead opposites; cf. Dhanika's restatement given in the Introduction above p. 135, and below, n. 69. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that Bhoja knew nothing of Nāyaka's works. The taxonomy *śabda-pradhāna*, *arthapradhāna*, *ukti-* or *ubhayapradhāna* in ŚP 376-77 recalls Nāyaka's (though obviously it need not have originated with Nāyaka, since it is already implicit in Bhāmaha's definition), as does Bhoja's *Yogasūtravṛtti* 1.17, to which GNOLI and others have drawn attention (cf. GNOLI 1968: 47-8 n.).

58 That is, if the feeling is sufficiently developed in the literary work. In SKĀ p. 431, when discussing the heightening of *rasa* (*rasapūṣṭi*), Bhoja distinguishes the beauty of the subject matter, the temperament of the loci of the feelings (i.e. the characters), and the intensity of the latent memories (*viṣayasaundarya*, *āśrayaprakṛti*, *samskārapātava*). A possible alternative translation: “intensity of experience”. Cf. Bhaṭṭa Nara-siṃha on DR p. 167: *samskāradvāreṇa*, which favors the second.

59 Cf. R 664.11, J 430.14: *samskārotpattiś ca viṣayātiśāyān nāyakaprakṛteś ca*.

60 On the functioning of “memory-traces” see further below, R 688.11, J 444.24.

experientially, and is not universally accessible. When displayed (*pradarśyamāna*) by skilled actors in correctly performed dramatic presentations (*abhinaya*), it can be determined (*avadhāryate*) by the audience; when properly⁶¹ declaimed (*ākhyāyamāna*) by great poets in their compositions, it can become accessible to the minds of the learned. However, [there is a difference between these two modes of experience:] things are not so sweetly savored when they are actually perceived as when they are cognized through the language of masters of language. Cf.:

A subject does not expand the heart
so powerfully when we see it portrayed
as when it flashes forth from the words
of great poets declaimed with art.⁶²

Therefore we prize poets far more than actors, and poetry more than dramatic representations.

People traditionally define literature as the “unity” (*sāhitya*) of word and meaning, cf. “Words and meanings *unified* (*sahitau*) constitute poetry” [*Bhāmahālaṅkāra* 1.16]). What, however, does “word” mean? It is that through which, when pronounced, meaning is understood, and is of twelve sorts [they are listed, starting with base and affix and ending with sentence, section, work]. “Meaning” is what a word gives us to understand, and it is of twelve sorts [starting with action and tense and ending with word-meaning and sentence-meaning]. Finally, “unity” means a relationship of word and meaning, and it also is of twelve sorts [starting with denotation and implication and ending with absence of faults, presence of [language]

61 Read *yathāvat* for *yāvad*.

62 I follow the readings of KULKARNI 1989: 43. (Unfortunately many of Bhoja’s Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa citations remain in their corrupt state in RAGHAVAN’s edition.) Bhoja’s sentiment is expressed (indeed, almost quoted) by Śrīdhara on the *Kāvya-prakāśa* (edited by Sivaprasad BHATTACHARYYA [Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 1959]), vol. 1 p. 81. He also cites a verse (of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s?) to the same effect: “Poetic language and dramatic representation are the two ways [of expressing *rasa*]. The former is superior in this because of the range of its narrative power” (*vastuśakti-mahimnā*).“ One cannot show sexual intercourse, for example, on the stage, but it can be described in poetry. Contrast the view of Vāmana (*Kāvyaḷaṅkārasūtra* [*Kāvyaḷaṅkārasūtra* and *Vṛttii* of Vāmana. Ed. Ratna Gopal Bhatta, Benares, Vidya Vilas Press, 1908] 1.3.30), reasserted by Abhinava (NS p. 285) that drama is the paradigmatic form of literature.

qualities (*guṇas*), connection with “ornaments” (*alaṅkāra*),⁶³ and presence of *rasa* (*rasāvīyoga*).

Bhoja's Comments on *kārikās* 3 and 4

(R 397.4, J 251.23) We have already argued that *tātpārya* or purport [is a kind of sentence meaning that] pertains to ordinary language (*vacaḥ*), whereas *dhvani* or suggestion is restricted to literature (*kāvya*). What is the difference between “suggestion” in literature and “purport” in ordinary language? Earlier we asserted that

[Ordinary] language is the direct (*avakra*) language of scholarship (*śāstra*) and everyday life; the indirect (*vakra*) language found in “declarative statements” (*arthavādas*)⁶⁴ and the like has the designation “literature” [*kāvya*]. Purport (*tātpārya*) is a feature of meaning, namely, when the essential intention of a speaker is understood from his utterance; suggestion (*dhvani*) by contrast is a feature of words. Of these two, purport is an internal quality of the Goddess of Speech, like a woman's power over her lover [*saubhāgya*]; suggestion is [the Goddess's] external quality, like a woman's radiant physical beauty [*lāvanya*].⁶⁵ Because the difference between them is slight, both are [sometimes] called by both names, just as the two months Surabhi [= Caitra] and Vaiśākha [may be referred to] by either of the names [for spring], Madhu and Mādhava. (R 351, J 221; cf. *kārikā*. 5a)

True, one might say, this has been asserted, but it has yet to be expounded with exemplification. Listen, then, it will now be expounded.

[In what follows Bhoja explains his understanding of levels of meaning in ordinary discourse by adducing his own introductory verses as examples.]

The entire preceding passage [i.e., the discussion of the third level of meaning begun on R 388.23, J 246.8], should be understood as relating to suggestion (*dhvani*) in literature. “Purport” (*tātpārya*) in ordinary language

63 “Ornaments” in quotes because one of Bhoja's concerns is to expand the definition of the term to include all things that are “factors of beauty” in a poem (as indeed Daṇḍin had done centuries earlier). See below p. 158 and n. 96, and R 673.2ff. (pp. 161-2).

64 Taking this is the broadest Mīmāṃsā sense of propositions, accounts, descriptions (all contrasting with commandments), and not in accordance with Bhoja's earlier definition (see R 483.14, where he glosses “‘*arthavāda*’ as hyperbole employed for praise or blame,” *stutinindārtham atiśayoktir arthavādaḥ*).

65 Cf. DhĀ p. 49, which likens *dhvani* to *lāvanya* and takes the latter as a feature of physical beauty. Yet Bhoja's correlation of *tātpārya* and *dhvani* as “internal” and “external” qualities of speech respectively is not altogether clear to me.

is of two sorts depending on whether it is the language of scholarly discourse or of everyday life.⁶⁶ An example of the former is found in *kārikā* 3 of the introduction. The first sentence there – “‘Passion’ (*śṛṅgāra*) they say, is a particular quality (*guṇa*) of the ego in a person; it is the very essence of love” – is based on received knowledge (*āgama*) of the type known as an “authoritative communication”. The second sentence – “Insofar as a person has the capacity to ‘taste’ it, it is [called] ‘taste’ (*rasa*)” – is based on personally verifiable perception conforming to the technical name (*saṃjñārthānugāmi*) [or: etymological meaning] [of *rasa*]. The third sentence – “One who is endowed with this [capacity to taste *rasa*] is said to ‘have *rasa*’ (*rasika*)” – is an inference of the sort known as “necessary assumption” (*arthāpatti*). That is to say, the perfectly just, everyday description of a few exceptional persons as “having *rasa*” (*rasika*) in the sense that they have a connection with *rasa* (*raso 'syāsti*), when this has nothing to do with [their ability to taste] flavorful foods, could never be made unless we assume that a relationship with an existent thing called *rasa* obtained that could be personally validated [this is the argument from reasoning, *yukti*].⁶⁷ It is this sentence-meaning as located in the

66 RAGHAVAN asserts that for Bhoja, “Tātparya is of... more than one kind. It may be expressed, ‘implied’ or ‘suggested’” (1978: 154). This I find obscure, or at least hard to reconcile with what Bhoja has said on R 388.23, J 246.8. Bhoja first introduces *tātparya*, then explains that it can apply only to sentences, and that the content of a sentence (*vākyapratipādyam vastu*) is explicit, implicit, or “*dhvani*”. He uses this last term instead of *tātparya* because what he goes on to discuss is literature. When he proceeds to address “ordinary language” (R 397) he explicitly says that the preceding section dealt with literature and so he used the term *dhvani*; in reference to ordinary language the third level of meaning is *tātparya*. Equally unclear, thus, is RAGHAVAN’s statement, “[Bhoja] reconciles Ānandavardhana to the Tātparya-vādin and makes the equation that Tātparya is identical with Dhvani” (1978: 154). RAGHAVAN sees that there is a difference between the two, and cites the passage in question, but concludes, “Therefore a more graceful name for Tātparya is Dhvani” (p. 161). Bhoja’s verse cited above (R 351, J 221) is admittedly somewhat confusing (as is his analysis of certain *dhvani* poems under the rubric of *tātparya*) but the discussion and illustrations that follow here below are intelligible enough. In his summary of Bhoja’s position (1978: 164) RAGHAVAN ignores what seems to be the signal distinction drawn in the ŚP between *tātparya* as a feature of ordinary language and *dhvani* as a feature of expressive language. (It may incidentally be noted that Dhanika rejects *dhvani* as a separate verbal function, subsuming it under *tātparya*; cf. DR p. 212, where he cites his own lost *Kāvyanirṇaya*.)

67 On possible meanings of “tasting” *rasa*, see the Introduction, pp. 130-1.

communication⁶⁸ of the intended meaning by means of the three sources of valid knowledge [*āgama, pratyakṣa, yukti*] that constitutes the *explicit* sentence-meaning (*vākyārtho 'bhidhīyamānaḥ*).

There are three kinds of people with whom one may communicate [and whom one may instruct]: one who has no understanding of a given matter at all, one who has a contrary view, or one who is uncertain. Now, just as one arranges [a meal] on the assumption that, between a sick and a healthy man, it is the healthy man who is going to take food, so here it is out of consideration for the man who has no understanding that received knowledge is introduced first of all even to the other two as well. These latter, the man of contrary views and the man of doubt, will of course not accept received knowledge, and for them a proof stronger than all the others, namely perception, is accordingly adduced. But the man of opposing views will not accept even that because of his contrariety, and so to instruct him the ultimate weapon, universally applicable reasoning (*brahmāstrarūpā sārvalaukikī yuktiḥ*), is adduced. This very intention of the author's, which leads him to bring to bear the three means of knowledge, is what is *implicit* (*pratīyamāna*) [the second level of meaning]. The fact that he resorts to the Sāṅkhya view – this is something indicated by adducing the three different forms of argument [which Sāṅkhya alone accepts] – makes the *purport* (*tātparya*) of the statement [i.e., the third level of meaning] the following: (a) that Passion becomes manifest, being pre-existent, (b) that it is not something previously non-existent that then comes into being, and (c) that it has three sources of valid knowledge.⁶⁹ For the

68 The emendation *pratipādane* (for *pratipādanam*) was suggested by A. AKLUJKAR.

69 I read *trividhapramāṇāśrayaḥ* for R's *trividha* (*pramāṇāśrayaḥ*) *śreyān*. The ontology, epistemology, and location of *rasa* are intimately related problems. DR is clear about the linkage, see pp. 212, 216, 217ff., where it is almost certainly the *vyāṅgyatva* of *rasa* as understood by Bhoja (cf. *passim*), or someone very much like him, that is under attack. Restating the discussion (especially DR 217.15ff.) with this problem in mind the implications are as follows: If *rasa* is something that is “manifested” (*vyajyate*) it is going to be a phenomenon located in the character, because it already exists there [having gotten its state of existence from elsewhere, like a pot from clay] and is only being brought to light [like a pot by means of a lamp]. [For Dhanika the “manifestation” hypothesis entails that the reader could not have *rasa*, for if it were in him, then one and the same entity, the literary text, would have had both to create it in him and “manifest” it to him; and “something cannot derive its being from the elements taken to be manifesting it at the very same time.”] If some other epistemological/causal process is involved, like [Nāyaka's] *bhāvanā*, where *rasa*

Sāṅkhyas explain as follows: Only something already existent can “come into being”; primal matter alone is active, spirit is passive, and matter approaches spirit, passive though the latter is, to furnish experience.

(R. 398.7, J. 252.19) It may be objected that the Sāṅkhyas typically adduce their proofs in the order perception, inference, and authoritative communication, and that we should therefore explain our “purport” in adducing received knowledge first. We have of course already stated that we do so out of consideration for the man lacking all knowledge of the matter. But we might add that adducing it first is meant to suggest our belief that things grasped by perception do not please so much as they do when grasped through the words of masters of language.⁷⁰ And by abandoning the traditional order of proofs we also want to indicate that we are not one-hundred-percent Sāṅkhyas,⁷¹ for literary theory (*sāhitya*) is thoroughly non-sectarian (*sarvapārṣada*).

In *kārikā* 4 we indicate the causes that help manifest Passion as well as the effects of Passion, another term for which is “sense of self” (*abhimāna*). Passion is the “very essence of love” [cf. vs. 3], the third human end and the reward of the other two, *dharma* and *artha*. It is moreover a “particular quality of the ego” [vs. 3] subsisting in the self by way of reflection (*pratibimba*). Thus: it arises in consequence of undiluted good karma from past lives,⁷² and once arisen it is the cause of the “appearance” (*udaya*) of the “entire range of qualities [or capacities] of the

is actually brought into existence by the words (a literary text being what Dhanika calls *vākyapadīyam*, where the stable emotion is as it were the sentence-meaning, and the objective causes and so on the word-meanings, DR p.211), then it cannot be something that exists in the character but rather must exist in the reader. This whole argument is answered by Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha, cf. Introduction, pp. 132 ff. (and contrast Abhinava cited at n. 33).

70 Bhoja is quoting his own observation from the beginning of his treatise (p. 146.)

71 *sarvathā sāṅkhyadarśanāśrayinaḥ*. (Less likely should we understand *sarvathāsāṅkhyā-*: “By no means do we intend to suggest by abandoning the traditional order of proofs that we do not accept Sāṅkhya doctrine.” The peculiar mix of Śaivism and Sāṅkhya that is Bhoja’s is best displayed in his *Tattvaparakāśa*, Chapter 4 in particular providing a Sāṅkhya evolutionary account of the world. See also the tripartite division of *ahāṅkāra* cited above, n. 48.

72 Reading *anupahatebhyo* (so the parallel passage R 664.17, J 430.20) with R instead of *anugatebhyo* with J.

self”⁷³ that will be defined below. Passion is something enhanced (*utkr̥ṣyate*) by the latent memories (*saṃskāra*) produced by the experiences of countless past lives, and when thus enhanced it becomes the cause of the “intensification” (*atiśaya*) of the entire range of qualities of the self. Passion is the “single” thing of this kind, it is a “transformation” of primal matter that consists of a developed “sense of self”; and in exceptional individuals it awakens, in the form of reflection, as if from sleep at places where darkness (*tamas*) is breached.⁷⁴ Such is the *explicit* meaning of the sentence.

(R 398.17; J 252.29) With the phrase “single cause” we indicate that there exists no other cause of the entire range of qualities [or capacities] of the self and so mean to say that Passion alone is the means of [fulfilling] the four human ends.⁷⁵ By using the figure of waking after sleep in the verb “it awakes”, we mean to suggest that Passion subsists in suspended animation (*stimitarūpeṇa*) even when as yet unmanifested, and thereby to deny that it does not exist then. Our indicating its miraculous character by the word “extraordinary” in the *kārikā* intends to suggest how difficult it is to describe [Passion’s] exceptional quality even if one had a thousand lifetimes to try. “Consisting of a developed sense of self” indicates that the foundation of Passion, which is in essence awareness, is awareness itself, and thereby excludes any other ground for it. Such is the *implied* sentence-meaning. The *purport* of the sentence is to encourage readers who seek to fulfill the four human ends to apply themselves to this [i.e., the ŚP], since this fact [namely, that Passion is the means to achieve the *puruṣārthas*] is the sort of thing we have striven to communicate. In the same way one can analyze the explicit and implicit meaning and the purport of non-scholarly, everyday utterances.

73 The correct reading here, which was perceived by A. AKLUJKAR, is *utpannaś ca sarvasyā ātmagūṇa*, for *utpannasya sarvasyātmā ātmagūṇa*-.

74 *tamonirbhedasthāneṣu*. Cf. Ratneśvara ad SKĀ p. 57: “When under the right causal circumstances memory-traces manifest themselves, consciousness awakens as if in places where darkness (*tamas*) is breached. On its first appearance it is unmixed with any stable emotions and is called *ahaṅkāra*.”

75 Elsewhere (especially Chapters 18-21 where Bhoja discusses the four subtypes of *śrīngāra*, *dharmaśrīngāra*, *arthaśrīngāra*, *kāmaśrīngāra* and *mokṣaśrīngāra*) it becomes clear that this refers to the psychic state of the character in the literary work that enables him to achieve his ends.

The foregoing explains those rare instances where literature and ordinary language, and [thus] “suggestion” and “purport” are actually mixed together [in a single text], as for example in *kārikā* 1 of the introduction.

[Bhoja goes on to analyze this *kārikā*, and *kārikā* 2 as well, as “literature” with three levels of meaning, and as “ordinary language” with three levels of meaning. Interesting though they are, these exegeses are omitted since they are not directly relevant to his understanding of *rasa*.]

Chapter 11, Discourse on the Non-Absence of *Rasa* (*rasāviyogaprakāśanaprakāśa*)

(R 662, J 429) The body of the poem, like that of a beloved, must [in accordance with what has been said up to this point] be without fault, possessed of the [phonemic, semantic, syntactical] “qualities”, and ornamented with figures of speech. [But] it is the non-absence of *rasa*⁷⁶ that is the principal means to its possessing real beauty (*śobhātiśaya*). That is,

All a woman’s adornment – her lovely form, good family, youth, beauty, firm devotion, affability, character, sophistication, modesty, breeding – all counts for nothing if she does not have deep love for her lover.⁷⁷

76 The double negative may in part be the standard Sanskrit litotes that produces a very strong positive (as in the traditional *nyāya*, *dvau nañau prakṛtārtham dardhayataḥ*), “the definite presence of *rasa*”; note the rephrasing, *rasānvaya*, in SKĀ 5.1, cited in the Introduction, p. 132. Note, however, the care with which Bhoja differentiates among the terms he uses for his four main principles of *sāhitya*: literature must be “without faults” (*nirdoṣa*), that is, faults, which are a congenital threat (being co-present with language), must be eliminated; “qualities” (*guṇas*) must be “used” (*guṇopādāna*), that is, the linguistic (phonetic, semantic, and syntactic) character of the literary utterance must be carefully constituted with due attention paid to *mārga* and *rasa*, otherwise there will be *doṣas* (this is not optional but required [*niyama*, R 528]); “figures [of sound and sense]” (*alaṅkāra* in the narrow sense) may or may not be joined to the work (*alaṅkārayoga* is optional, *kāmacāra*, R 528); similarly, there must be nothing to obstruct the manifestation, *abhivyakti*, of *rasa*, there must be “non-separation of *rasa*” (*rasāviyoga*).

77 *Pāda* d: *tat premārdram praṇayini mano nāsti cen nāsti kiṃcit*. Although it would be to stretch the language, one might have preferred: if there does not exist, in the lover, a heart filled with passion [for his beloved]. If one has no feeling for a woman all her outward adornments mean nothing. But such an interpretation is impossible if the simile is to construe with the preceding prose (recall that *prema* is for Bhoja a synonym of *rasa*). One implication here as in the next verse, is that, while the reader

And,

[My] lady may be adorned with good birth, character, and jewelry, but I don't find her attractive unless in a crowd of women she holds her head high with the pride [derived from being] honored as a hero's wife.⁷⁸

Now, in this context *rasa* is defined as love (*prema*). For all forms of emotion, erotic desire and the rest, once they reach their full development [and so according to standard theory would become *rasas*], ultimately turn out to be nothing but this. Thus people are said to “love sex” (*ratipriya*), to “love quarreling” or anger or joking.⁷⁹ [This Passion is fundamental, as the following verses indicate:]

There is no counteracting unmotivated partiality;
it is a thread of affection (*sneha*) that knits beings together from within.

(R 663.1, J 429.13) Thus,

A man who loves a woman thinks she does everything to please him,
unaware that he finds pleasing whatever it is she does.
He need do nothing, the pleasure
of just being with him drives sadness away.
What a treasure
is the person one loves.
A person one loves gives pleasure even when causing pain.
Breasts thrill with delight even while throbbing from a lover's scratches.⁸⁰

This is something we have already argued:

[8.] The sense of self (*abhimāna*) that produces the experience of the consciousness of pleasure and the rest [of the emotions] as agreeable to the mind is what we should understand to be *rasa*, for that is what is “tasted” through the power of the

(the lover) is not (cannot be) totally ignored, his experience is of another order; for Bhoja *rasa* is of interest as it exists in the literary work (the lovely woman).

78 A literary work must be able to represent powerful human emotion, and this requires (on the part of the character) “pride” or “self-confidence”, here *garva* (cf. above n. 48), elsewhere “sense of self”, *ahānkāra*, etc., which for Bhoja is the same as *rasa*.

79 That is, all these different emotions are in the last analysis resolvable into “love” or affective intensity. Note that *priya* is the adjectival form of the substantive *prema*.

80 The three verses again indicate that all other emotions – pleasure, indifference/apathy, even pain – are epiphenomenal upon *śrīngāra*. Passion ensures that even something like anger can be pleasurable (thus one can “love anger”).

self. To apply the term [as per the normal theory] to emotions such as erotic desire and so on when fully developed is erroneous.

Objection: You just said that, given such expressions as “to love sex” (*ratipriya*), “to love quarreling” or anger or joking, all emotions, when fully developed, ultimately turn out to be nothing but love (*prema*), and therefore that in this context *rasa* itself is defined as this love. How can you then say that “To apply the term [*rasa*] to the fully developed emotions such as erotic desire and so on is erroneous”?⁸¹

Answer: *Rasa* is not “the fully developed emotions such as erotic desire and so on,” but precisely instead the Passion (*śṛṅgāra*) [that underlies them all]. What we mean by “Passion” is a particular quality of the ego. It is the cause of any heightened state of “the entire range [of qualities] of the self” [vs. 4] [which are never visible in themselves by only when] making manifest the particular preferences, views, and acts [of the self]; [in other words,] Passion is the “cause of intensification” [vs. 4] of the various capacities [of the self, i. e.] awareness, pleasure, pain, predilection, aversion, volition, latent memories, etc.⁸² When this Passion is “tasted” by the mind⁸³ it is called *rasa*; when it exists, a person is said to “have *rasa*” (*rasika*); when it does not, he is said to “lack *rasa*” (*nīrasa*).⁸⁴ The “emotions” (*bhāva*), which make Passion manifest, are in fact derived from it. They are forty-nine in number: erotic desire, joy, shivering, firmness, pride, the comic emotion, intoxication, longing, worry, recollection, reflection, speculation, feeling energetic, anger, impatience, resentment, jealousy, ferocity, disgust, amazement, sleep, dreaming, waking, fickleness, torpor, fear, doubt, terror, trembling, shame, dissimulation, paralysis, fatigue, perspiration, sickness, madness, exhaustion, grief, pallor, depression, breaking of the voice, shock, weeping, delusion, fainting, insensibility, profound indifference, peacefulness.

81 Bhoja’s objector is arguing that to equate fully developed emotions with *prema* and *prema* with *rasa* should in fact mean that we can equate those emotions with *rasa*.

82 Cf. above n. 52.

83 Read [-*viśeṣaḥ*.] *sa cetasā* (for *sacetasā*). I owe this emendation to A. AKLUJKAR.

84 Note that *nīrasa* is not typically used in reference to lack of aesthetic receptivity. I take it that Bhoja is talking here about characters who are “men of feeling” or not, especially since this *rasa* is, as we are told in the next sentence, taken to be the source of the “emotions” characters feel.

(R 664.3, J 430.6) On this point some have argued that Passion originates from erotic desire; in our view, Passion itself is the origin of erotic desire and the other stable emotions. Erotic desire and so on, after all, arise only in the man of Passion (*śrīngārin*), not in the man lacking it; it is only the man of Passion who experiences erotic desire (*ramate*), humor (*smayate*), energy (*utsahate*), affection (*snihyate*).⁸⁵ [Erotic desire and] the others are emotions or feelings (*bhāva*) and not *rasas* precisely because they are things that one feels (*bhāvvyamāna*). No matter how deeply they are felt through this process of feeling, they are still called feelings [and not *rasas*]; *rasa* goes beyond being felt [cf. *kārikā* 10], since it is the self's awareness of experiencing pleasure (*sukhānubhavābhimāna*) in the face of pain and the like [insofar as these have become, to the man of Passion] not disagreeable to the mind.⁸⁶ Since these [stable emotions], when fully developed, are a source of pleasure indirectly (*pāramparyeṇa*), the name *rasa* [which is the true source of affective response] is applied to them in a secondary sense (*upacāreṇa*). They are, accordingly, not themselves *rasa* but rather precisely feelings/emotions [*bhāva*], because they are subject to being felt [*bhāvanā*].⁸⁷

The assertion that *rasa* occurs when [only] a stable emotion like erotic desire is brought to its full development is also without substance. For that can apply to [any of the thirty-three transitory feelings, too, such as] torpor (*glāni*), which can be “brought to full development” through overexertion and the like. And these [transitory feelings] are as “stable” as the others, since they too activate⁸⁸ powerful latent memories. Now, such latent memories can be activated in consequence of the amplitude of the subject matter (*viṣayātiśaya*),⁸⁹ and in consequence of the character's temperament.

85 The four verbs connote four “stable emotions” which themselves are related to four species of *rasa*: *rati* -> *śrīngārarasa*; *hāsa* -> *hāsyarasa*; *utsāha* -> *vīrarasa*; *sneha* -> *vātsalyarasa* (*sneha* is not listed above among the forty-nine *bhāvas*, but as Bhoja indicates elsewhere, that should really be viewed as an open list). The “man of Passion”, who alone can feel the *sthāyibhāvas*, is discussed again below, R 686.3ff.

86 *mano 'nukuleṣu*, which glosses *aprātikulikatayā manaso* in *kārikā* 8. Also, given *mudādeḥ* there, I accept here the reading *sukhaduḥkhādiṣu*. See also n. 54.

87 Again, I am not altogether certain of this translation. Cf. n. 57.

88 Read *utpannatīvrasaṃskāratvāt* for *utpannatīvrasaṃskārāt*. *√utpad* (along with *tīvra*) here refers back to *saṃdīpana* in *kārikā* 12. This may also be the case in R 678.12, *saṃskāro janyate*.

89 Less likely “intensity of experience”; cf. also n. 58.

[The first condition could easily apply to transitory feelings. As for the second] a character's temperament is one of the three kinds, "pure", "passionate", or "impure", and by virtue of this there will arise [in him] the feeling of a corresponding experience (*tathāvidhānubhavabhāvanotpatti*) [regardless of the nature of the *bhāva*, whether "stable" or "transitory"]. Accordingly, these [transitory feelings, too,] may be referred to as "stable".⁹⁰

There is actually no warrant to the view that there are eight stable emotions, eight physical responses, and thirty-three transitory feelings, since any one of these factors [*bhāvas*] can be accomplished by [that is, can have its function executed by] any of the others. A given emotion can be now stable, now transitory; in fact, depending on the circumstances, all can be stable or transitory feelings or even [involuntary] physical responses (*sāttvika*), because they all derive from the mind, and an unobscured (*anupahata*) mind is nothing other, in fact, than *sattva*.

It is also foolish to assert that it is only a stable emotion that becomes *rasa* through its conjunction with objective causes, physical responses, and transitory feelings, since you can find the same conjunction in any of the transitory feelings, such as joy (*harṣa*) and so on. Therefore all [the "stable"] factors, erotic desire and the rest, are nothing more than feelings, whereas Passion and it alone is the sole *rasa*. And this *rasa*, when brought to light by these factors in combination with [their full complement of] objective causes and reactions, can be savored especially intensely.

(R 665.1, J 430.24) With respect to this point some⁹¹ have argued that the *rasa* called *śrṅgāra* is not, [as is here argued,] something [already existing and only] brought to manifestation (*abhivyajyate*)⁹² by erotic desire and the other emotions; rather, they say, erotic desire – and this

90 Cf. Abhinava ad NŚ 6.21, p. 262: "Some have noted that while Bharata enumerates all the other components of aesthetic affect – eight *rasas*, 33 transitory feelings, eight physical responses, four forms of representation [*abhinaya*] – the stable emotions are not explicitly enumerated. This suggests that these transitory emotions can also be counted as stable."

91 Possibly the reference here is to the ninth- or early tenth-century thinker Lollaṭa: *sthāyy eva vibhāvānubhāvādibhir upacito rasaḥ*, as Abhinava puts it, NŚ p. 266, where he also identifies this as "the position of the most ancient" authorities (he cites KĀ 2.279, 281).

92 Basically Bharata's position: the *bhāvas* are *kāvyarasābhivyaktiḥetavaḥ* (NŚ 7.6+, p. 342).

would hold true for the other [stable] emotions – having first arisen by reason of the objective cause and reached intensification through the physical setting and other contributory causes, itself turns into *rasa* (*rasībhavan*) and so acquires the name *śrīngāra*. But those who hold this view may be asked the following: Do these stable emotions, arising each by reason of its particular primary cause, arise the same for everyone or only for some? If for everyone, then the whole world would be said to “have *rasa*”, which is patently not the case, since we can see for ourselves that some individuals have *rasa* and some do not (*nīrasa*). And no postulate that is contradicted by perception is admissible. So erotic desire and the other stable emotions do not come into play for everyone (*na sarvasya ratyādayo jāyante*), but only for some, and for this [variance] we have to identify some cause. It will have to be either something empirically verifiable or something transcendent, and it cannot be the former since there is nothing observable there. As for a transcendent cause, it must be either common or unique, and if it is common, we are back with the first problem, namely, that the whole world would “have *rasa*”. If, however, this causal condition is a unique transcendent thing, it would have to be some moral component (*dharmakārya*, cf. *kārikā* 4), to which the individual’s beginningless memory-traces (*vāsanā*) are related. And it is precisely this that we call the “particular quality of the ego” (vs. 3), [which we simultaneously refer to as] Passion (*śrīngāra*), sense of self (*abhimāna*), and *rasa*. It is in consequence of this that the stable emotions, erotic desire etc., come into play. And it is only those persons endowed with Passion who can taste (*svadate*) this [*rasa*] when it comes to be manifested by the fully developed [stable emotions, etc.]; it is the same as [the element of] fire [that pre-exists, and is only manifested, and not created,] by the mass of flames.⁹³

Rasa, conditioned by such factors and thus becoming activated (*upajāyamāna*), is specified as being of three sorts: developed (*prakṛṣṭa*), remaining in the form of an emotion (*bhāvarūpa*), and a semblance of *rasa* (*ābhāsa*). A “developed” *rasa* is that which the leading character, [the one] who occupies the chief role in the narrative, comes to feel in reference to a commensurate object (*yaḥ [rasaḥ]... uttamanāyakasya... jāyate*). That which “remains in the form of an emotion” is that which a supporting character (*madhyama*) comes to have, and which is not fully developed.

93 Cf. *kārikā* 9.

That which the antagonist comes to have, or is ascribed to an animal, is a semblance of *rasa*.

The “non-absence” of *rasa* is twofold: at the level of the individual passage (*vākyaviṣaya*) and at the level of the whole composition (*prabandhaviṣaya*). So far we have discussed, in a discontinuous way as occasion demanded and according to the logic of the work (*tantrayukti*),⁹⁴ the non-absence of *rasa* at the level of the passage via [1] the avoidance of faults such as reference to what is indecent, inauspicious, disgusting, vulgar, etc.; [2] the presence of language qualities such as luminosity (*kānti*), “wherein the *rasa* appears with great brilliance” (*dīptarasa*),⁹⁵ and so on; and [3] the conjunction with “ornaments” (*alaṅkāra*)⁹⁶ such as the “romantic” and other dramatic modes (*kaiśikī* [*vṛtti*]), and the “southern” and other verbal styles (*vaidarbhī* [*rīti*]). But the non-absence of *rasa* in a passage actually reaches its full development only when these various ornaments exist in combination, since it is produced by a special constellation of language qualities and ornaments. Generally speaking, we never see the language qualities, or the figures of sound, of sense, or of both sound and sense (these are, respectively, alliteration etc., naturalistic description [*jāti*] etc., and metaphor etc.) existing singly in the body of a poem,⁹⁷ any more than we see only single pieces of jewelry – bangles, armlets, earrings – on a woman’s body. It is only in combination that they

94 Not, I think, used here in the technical sense known from the *Arthaśāstra* ch. 15 (though becoming popular only from about the ninth century onward, with the *Kāvya-alaṅkārasūtra*, *Viṣṇudharmottara*, and especially the *ayurveda* tradition).

95 That Bhoja is defining *kānti* here is clear from R 529ff., J. 341ff. (cf. also Vāmana 3.2.15). For *dīptarasa*, see also Ratneśvara ad SKĀ p. 56: “[This signifies] the highest development of *rasa*, that is, when Passion or self-awareness becomes intensified by means of the stable emotion when the latter is fully provided with its objective causes, etc.”

96 In a move central to his doctrine of the “combinations” that make literature what it is, Bhoja here and elsewhere uses the word *alaṅkāra* both in the general sense of something that makes literature beautiful, and in the narrower sense of a figure of speech (what later scholars call *vācyopaskāraka*). This bivalence is familiar already from Daṇḍin (KĀ 2.1, cited below by Bhoja).

97 “Existing singly”: I take this to mean that the items are not used singly. Less likely but possible: in becoming aware of beauty we do not perceive them as single, but only in combination. Note, with reference to the three categories of *alaṅkāras*, that Bhoja has a special category of *ubhaya* or *bāhyābhyantara*, wherein sense is inseparable from its expression (cf. also RAGHAVAN 1978: 379-80).

are considered to be fully developed ornamentation. In the case of prepared food it is the combination of sweet, sour, salty, and the “six-spice” substance (*ṣāḍava*); in the case of dress, the combination of garments, creams, garlands, jewelry; in the case of incense, the combination of sandalwood, aloe, camphor, and sal-tree resin (*siddhaka*); in the case of musical performance, the combination of dance, instrumental music, [singing],⁹⁸ and recitation; in the case of love, the combination of anger, repentance, forgiveness, and the pleasure of being together; in the case of family life (*gārhasthya*) the combination of acts fulfilling *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*, and *mokṣa* – so in the body of the poem it is the combination alone of [the three forms of figures such as] metaphor and the rest [along with *guṇas*] that, because it is the thing savored most, is the cause of the non-absence of *rasa*.⁹⁹ Thus though we mentioned “combination” earlier, we want to elaborate on it here with careful deliberation.

[Having defined *rasa*, Bhoja turns now to his main objective in the rest of Chapter Eleven, which is to show that *guṇas*, *rasa*, *rasābhāsa*, and *bhāvas* are all “ornaments” of a poem,¹⁰⁰ and, in accordance with the above, that *rasāviyoga* or the “non-separation of *rasa*” consists in their “combination” (*samsrṣṭi*).]

(R 666.3, J 431.17) “Combination” [*sā (samsrṣṭiḥ)*] is of two sorts, depending on whether one factor predominates or all factors are in equilibrium. As [Daṇḍin] says,

There are two procedures to be defined in the combination of figures:
one, where some are dominant and some subordinate, the other, where all are in equilibrium.

A factor is considered “subordinate” insofar as it subserves a dominant factor, and the latter is defined as what is subserved by a subordinate factor. For example,

These lotuses, my sweet girl, challenge the beauty of your face.

98 The sets of four in the similes before and after this demand this otherwise reasonable addition, despite the fact that the *upameya* itself is not clearly stated to be fourfold (I take this to be the *guṇas*, *śabdālaṅkāras*, *arthālaṅkāras*, and *ubayālaṅkāras*, as per the above, *guṇālaṅkārasanniveśa-viśeṣajanvyatvāt*).

99 Perhaps read *svadamānā* for *svadamāno* (R 666.1, J 431.16), though it may be that the participle is attracted into the gender of *-hetu*; but at all events *sā [samsrṣṭiḥ]* must be read in the next line.

100 Compare the end of the discussion, R 693.15, J 448.11: *evam avasthāpīte guṇarasa-tadābhāsabhāvānām alaṅkāratve ṣaṭprakāro 'laṅkārasaṅkaraḥ saṁbhavati*.

There is nothing they dare not do who have both *kośa* [calix / wealth] and *daṇḍa* [stalk / power].

The first half of the verse contains [an implicit] simile [“her face is like a lotus”], the second half is a “substantiation” with a subordinate pun. Lotuses have both *kośa* and *daṇḍa* and thus are all-powerful since these two things are the means of military victory. Because the pun provides the things that are the means of substantiation, whereas the simile specifies the thing itself that is substantiated [the lotuses’ challenge to the woman’s face], both figures are subordinate over against the substantiation.¹⁰¹

[R 666.13 - 669.9, J 431.25 - 433.11: Here follows a long discussion of a fine point of grammatical / rhetorical analysis regarding the use of the genitive case in the example cited. Earlier, at R 543-44, J 350-51, Bhoja said that one could violate grammatical rules to aesthetic effect provided the violation had some intention, and he cited this verse. It is this he proceeds to exemplify,¹⁰² returning then to the question of “combination”.]

(R 669.10, J 433.12) Objection: It is logical that there is “combination” in a relationship of dominant and subordinate, since the simile and pun, on the one hand, and the substantiation on the other are respectively the things subserving and the thing subserved. The so-called combination of “equilibrium”, however [*tu*, sic leg.], is not logical. If there were to be equilibrium among the words of a sentence they would all be dominant or all subordinate. The first case is not possible since there could then be no syntactic connection, all of the items being independent of the others. If on the other hand all are subordinate, they would similarly have no connection with each other since they cannot be dependent on each

101 In his comment on KĀ 2.359 where this verse also appears, Ratnaśrijñāna takes the *arthāntaranyāsa*, with an embedded *śleṣa*, to be subordinate to the *upamā*. For him the *upamā* is the *sādhyā*; for Bhoja it is *sādhyaviśeṣaka*. It strikes me as odd, however, that a *gamyopamā* should be considered the *aṅgi*, and in fact no one else seems to share Bhoja’s view; cf. for example Hemacandra, who cites this verse at *Kāvyaṅuśāsana* 6.31 (edited by R. C. Parikh and V. M. Kulkarni [Bombay, Sri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1964.], second edition, p. 399).

102 Bhoja argues that the use of the genitive for the instrumental is a solecism intentionally used to increase the beauty of the verse (thus in R 666.18, J 431.28 we should probably read *saubhāgyātyāgahetuvivakṣā* [in place of *saubhāgyatyāgahetuvivakṣā*], “an intention that provides the reason why [the solecism] does not render the verse un-beautiful”; cf. R 543, J 350 infra, *śabdahīnasya kvacid vivakṣāto guṇatvam*, followed by a citation of KĀ 3.151 (where Daṇḍin has, *na ca saubhāgyam ujhati*.) So far as I can see, however, Bhoja never gets around to telling us what the “intention” is.

other, being [by definition] dependent on some dominant items [which are not present]. Thus the statement, “[Since subordinate items are subservient to something else] there can be no relationship among themselves, since all are equally [subordinate to something else]” [*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 3.1.22.] How then can you claim that there exists such a thing as “[combination] of equilibrium”?

Answer: Here is my view: Equilibrium is indeed possible when figures of speech – poetic fantasy, simile, etc. – become [equally] components of *rasa* insofar as they are all directed toward generating the objective causes (*vibhāva*), reactions (*anubhāva*), transitory feelings (*vyabhicāribhāva*), and so on. For example,

Darkness seems to stain our bodies and the sky to rain down lampblack,
and sight is to no purpose, like service to an evil man.

The first half-verse contains two poetic fantasies, the second a simile. Insofar as they [all three] equally intensify the objective cause – the scene (*uddīpanavibhāva*), i.e., the nighttime darkness that is being described – they are [all equally] subordinate to it, and thus nothing is amiss in our definition.

[R 669.20ff., J 433.21ff. Again Bhoja examines finer points of terminology and grammar: Why are the first two figures in the above verse called “fantasy” (*utprekṣā*) rather than simile? The same particle, *iva*, should express the same meaning in both half verses, and both should therefore be similes. The conclusion, R 673.1, J 435.17, is “The verse shows a pair of poetic fantasy and a simile, and there is a “combination” of the “equilibrium” variety, insofar as both are equally directed to describing the darkness.”]

(R 673.2ff., J 435.18ff.) This “combination” was earlier defined as a mixture “of various ‘ornaments’” (*alaṅkāra*).¹⁰³ One might have defined this simply as a “mixture of ‘ornaments’”, and the fact that we use the qualification “various” is meant to indicate that qualities (*guṇa*), *rasas*, and so on are also “ornaments” insofar as these also make a poem beautiful. [Bhoja here cites KĀ 2.1, 3.] By [Daṇḍin’s] defining “*alaṅkāra*” as “[anything] that makes a poem beautiful”, he wants to include in that category language qualities (*guṇas*), *rasas*, emotions, semblances of *rasas* and emotions, and the quiescence of both as much as [figures of sense more strictly construed, such as] double-meaning (*śleṣa*) and simile. By his showing that the qualities that differentiate regional styles beautify

103 The reference must be to R 665.19, J 431.10.

(*alaṅkriyā*) [a literary work], he indicates that [the quality called] “fitness” (*śleṣa*) [between sound and sense] and so on are ornaments as much as they are qualities. When he says that there are only ten qualities, fitness and so on, that serve to differentiate regional styles, he is at the same time implying that the other qualities [naturally fall under the rubric of] ornaments, since they serve to make a poem beautiful [while having no other purpose, such as style differentiation.] [And the fact that there are other qualities is evident given] his statement, “Who could state them in full?”

Now, while it is logical [to say that qualities are “ornaments”], it may be thought illogical to say that *rasas* and the rest [emotions, semblances of emotions, etc.] are ornaments, because unlike the qualities these are never referred to as such [by Daṇḍin]. But in fact it makes perfectly good sense, since [the qualities] *ūrjasvin*, *rasavat*, and *preyas* in their intensified state (*yuktotkarṣa-*) [i.e., the state in which they become phases or stages of *rasa*],¹⁰⁴ are actually reckoned among the ornaments [by Daṇḍin, KĀ

104 RAGHAVAN found it “very difficult to understand what Bhoja is driving at here” (1978: 420). Part of the problem is that he misunderstands KĀ 2.273. *yuktotkarṣa* by no means signifies that “these three are superior”, as RAGHAVAN would have it (he calls this the “straight and plain meaning”); it signifies “when they are endowed with a particular intensity”, *saṅgataḥ utkarṣo ’dhimātratā* [read *ati-* ?] *yena*, as Ratnaśrī-jñāna notes in his first explanation ad loc. The intensifier (*utkarṣa*) morphemes – which intimate their *rasa* as opposed to *guṇa* or *alaṅkāra* character – are coded in each of the terms in Daṇḍin’s definition: *-tara* in the comparative *preyas*; *vad/-peśala* (*-vad atīśāyane*) in *rasavat*, *-svi/rūḍha* in *ūrjasvin*. Ratnaśrī-jñāna emphasizes this in his gloss: *preyas* is *atyantapriyam*, *rasavat* is *ekāntarasavat*, *ūrjasvin* is *bhr̥śa-dūrjasvin*, precisely as is done by Bhoja below (R 675.22ff. J 437.6ff.); cf. also the use of the word elsewhere in KĀ itself, 1.76: *utkarṣavān guṇaḥ*, “an intensified quality”. (An additional interesting parallel is KRM 3.199, where the definition of *ūrjita* is given: *ārūḍhanijamanōhamkārōtkarṣaprakāśam ūrjitasadaḷamkāram*, “an intensification of the sense of self”). RAGHAVAN therefore could not understand how *preyas*, for example, could be a *guṇa* (“It is not easy to understand how Bhoja included [*preyas*] among the *guṇas*” [p. 297]); it is a *guṇa* when it is not intensified, as Bhoja says very explicitly on R 675.22, J 437.6. The whole point of the passage is to show that when these three qualities are “intensified” they become *rasa* or rather three *koṭis* or degrees of *rasa*, while at the same time they are “listed as ornaments”. Thus *rasas* as well as qualities may be called “ornaments” or factors of beauty in literature (cf. Indurāja on KAS pp. 56, 58, 90), and accordingly they represent components that may be isolated out in an analysis of *samsr̥ṣṭi* (or *saṅkara*, Bhoja being apparently indifferent to the distinction between the two terms that was to be sharply drawn in later theory), this is to say, the process of “combination” of features

2.273, to quote]: “*preyas* refers to an utterance of deep desire;¹⁰⁵ *rasavat* to one beautified by *rasa*, and *ūrjasvin* to one in which the sense of self is deeply rooted. All three in their intensified states are [factors of beauty].”

(R 674.1, J 436.4) Let us examine these in order. When [Daṇḍin] defines *ūrjasvin* as [an utterance] “in which the sense of self is deeply rooted”, he is describing the first stage of *rasa* as it awakens in the form of a transformation [of primal matter] consisting of a developed sense of self in the hearts of sensitive persons. [With his definition] he captures [the following:] *Rasa*, which has the synonyms “ego”, “sense of self”, “Passion”, and the like, is that which is located in certain special individuals and is produced through an exceptional, transcendent cause (*adr̥ṣṭa*) [= *dharma*]; its “rootedness” is attained through latent memories derived from the experiences of countless past lives; it is the cause of the appearance and intensification of the entire range of qualities of the self; it is a particularly developed ego. Cf. *kārikā* 4 above. An example of *ūrjasvin*:

O joy! All homage to me! She looked at me,
that girl with eyes that flutter like a frightened doe's.

Or:

As the lovely-eyed girl stood at twilight in the courtyard, crowded as it was,
I could hardly control myself and began to swing my arms;
she sighed, her head lowered in modesty, but innocently and shyly in between
she sent looks of love toward me that shone more brilliantly than the moon.

When [Daṇḍin] defines *rasavat* as [an utterance] “beautified by *rasa*”, he is establishing the second stage of Passion, which, [in accordance with Bharata's statement that] “*Rasa* arises from the conjunction of objective causes, reactions, and transitory feelings”, comes to manifestation (*āvīrbhāvataḥ*) by means of all the different causal factors and becomes amplified so as to reach its full development. Cf. *kārikā* 9 above. An example:

At this point the lotus-eyed girl showed rare mastery of Love's lessons:
an allure beyond the power of language to describe,
every possible emotion, every physical reaction,

that constitutes *rasāviyoga* (see above, R 665.16ff., “[the non-absence of *rasa* in a passage] actually reaches full development only when these various ornaments [factors of poetic beauty] exist in combination”).

105 Or rather, love in general, since it can be used with reference to God, as Daṇḍin's two examples (KĀ 2.274, 276) indicate.

while casting her reserve to the winds. (R 675.1, J 436.20)

Or:

By chance I came upon my love like a digit of the moon
entering the maw of Rāhu and I snatched her from the arc of that bastard's sword.
I nearly lost my mind – broken from shock, melted with pity,
agitated with wonder, aflame with anger, and blossoming with joy.¹⁰⁶

When he defines *preyas* as “the utterance of deep desire”, he is indicating the highest stage of ego. For by referring [indirectly by the use of the term *preyas*] to erotic desire (*rati*), which is the paradigmatic emotion, and indicating that it transforms into love when it reaches full development and “going beyond the plane of the coming-into-being of feeling” transcends the nature of an emotion, he gives us to understand that all the other emotions as well, upon reaching full development, are transformed into *rasa*.¹⁰⁷ Cf. *kārikā* 10 above.

An example:

A man who loves a woman thinks she does everything to please him,
unaware that he finds pleasing whatever it is she does.

Or:

A unity in pleasure and pain, present in all circumstances;
a place for the heart to repose; whose *rasa* is undiminished even in old age;
which remains when time removes all coverings and the core of affection matures –
blessed the man who by some chance should acquire this one great good.

Finally, by the words “All three in their intensified states are [factors of beauty]” [Daṇḍin] gives us to understand that when they are not “intensified”, all three, *ūrjasvin*, *rasavat*, *preyas*, are qualities, not

106 In the two examples, the stable emotion, the transient feelings, and the reactions are all shown to be present.

107 The parallel passage below, R 687.5 suggests the conjecture here, “are transformed into love” (see also n. 131). Bhoja's interpretation may seem a little confusing in view of Daṇḍin's express differentiation between *preyas* as characterized by *prīti* or non-erotic affection, and *rasavat* as characterized by *rati* (etc.) (So Ratnaśrījñāna, Taruṇa-vācaspati and Hṛdayaṅgama ad KĀ 2.281 [= 2.279]). But Bhoja seems to have in mind KAS 4.2, and perhaps even Indurāja's remarks ad loc.: “*preyas*, referring as it does to the beloved (*priyatara*), who is the objective cause of the stable emotion of erotic desire, thus connotes desire; this in turn leads us to include all the other emotions by their [categorical] association with love. One can thus refer to all poetry of emotion by this metonymic use of *preyasvat*” (*bhāvakāvyaśya preyasvat iti lakṣaṇayā vyapadeśaḥ*) (KAS p. 56).

beautifying factors (*alāṅkāras*). For all three are listed among the qualities, as “*aurjitya*, *bhāvikatva*, and *preyas*”.¹⁰⁸

[After discussing the different meanings of the three terms when they are regarded as *guṇas* and as *alāṅkāras*, Bhoja returns to the question of *rasa*:]

(R 676.11ff., J 437.19ff.) Objection: Does the suffix *-vat* in the word “*rasavat*” have the sense of the possessive suffix *matup* or the comparative suffix *vati*? The former is impossible, since none of its meanings can apply. *Rasas* are states of pleasure or pain, which pertain to conscious embodied beings. Literature however consists of words and meanings, is therefore not itself conscious, and accordingly none of the meanings of the possessive *matup* (abundance, censure, etc.) are possible.¹⁰⁹ As for *vati*, it too is impossible since its meanings (as an adverb, or in reference to a possessive or locative, meaning “similar” [Pāṇ. 5.1.115-16]) are likewise inapplicable. One cannot say, for example, that [a literary work] is “*rasavat*” because it “functions like” *rasas*, nor is there anything in it or of it “similarly as in” or “similarly as of” *rasa*. Answer: It can be whichever you like. It can have the sense of *matup*, despite your objection. Someone like Rāma has *rasa*, and his speech, since its source lies in [his very] *rasa*, may itself be said to “have *rasa*” (*rasavat*); when a writer represents [such a person], by virtue of the complete identification [between the real person and the character] the representation of [his speech] may likewise be said to “have *rasa*”. Or it can have the meaning of *vati*, again despite your objection. [Another of its meanings,] “capable of that” [Pāṇ 5.1.117] is perfectly applicable: [A literary text] is *rasavat* if it is capable of expressing *rasas*. When the speech of someone like Rāma, who has *rasa*, is represented [by the poet], it is capable, given the illusion of identity [between the real and the represented speech], of expressing *rasas* and so is *rasavat*.

(R 677.1; J 438.1) Objection: All desirable elements (*upādeya*-) enhance [a poem's] beauty and could therefore be considered “ornaments”. Since there would thus be no specificity [to “ornament” as such] why not

108 See Bhoja's discussion of *guṇas* in Chapter 9 (R 528ff., J 340ff.). The three corresponding *śabdaguṇas* of these *alāṅkāras* are listed and illustrated at R 529ff. J 342ff., *aurjitya* (defined as *bandhagādhatvam*), *preyaḥ* (*vārtābhīdhānavarṇanādaḥ manahprijārthapadopākhyānam*), *bhāvikatvam* (*bhāvato vākpravr̥tīḥ*). As *artha-guṇas* they are defined at R 536-37, J 346-47: *aurjityam*: *rūḍhāhāṅkāratā*; *preyas*: *arthasyābhiṣṭatā*; *bhāvikatvam*: *sābhiprāyoktīḥ*. The dividing line between some of these and the corresponding *alāṅkāras* is admittedly rather thin.

109 Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 5.2.94, *bhūmanindā*-, etc.

just say that “‘combination’ is ‘mixture’” [i.e., rather than “combination is mixture of ornaments” let alone “mixture of various ornaments”, cf. R 673.2, pp. 161-2]? Answer: That would not be possible, for if we did not specify “ornaments” then, since [the *rasasūtra* of Bharata] speaks of a “conjunction of factors” (*samyoga*), that mixture might mistakenly be taken as the “combination” (*samsrṣṭi*) [we have in mind].¹¹⁰ This misinterpretation is forestalled by the use of the word “ornament”. Objective causes (*vibhāva*) etc. are not ornaments, but rather specific meanings (*artha*) [or: signifieds] that engender “ornaments”, which here mean the emotions (*bhāvas*), *rasas*, and the semblances of emotions and *rasas*.

Objection: Granted, but if “objective causes” and so on are qualities of meaning (*arthaguṇa-*) [or: signifieds], they would still turn out to be “ornaments”.¹¹¹ Answer: True, but given the fact that they are appropriated with something else in mind [i.e., *rasa*], they are subsumed under that something else. [In the same way,] the constitutive words of a sentence do not individually manifest themselves when we are grasping the meaning of the sentence as a whole.¹¹²

[Now] with regard to this,¹¹³ emotions (*bhāva*) can mix with figures of speech, qualities, and other emotions, but not with *rasas* or the semblances of *rasas*, because emotions are subordinate to *rasas*. *Rasas* can be said to mix with figures, qualities, and other *rasas*,¹¹⁴ but not with emotions or the semblances of *rasas*, because the former are subordinate to *rasas* and the latter are contradictory to *rasa*. The semblances of emotions and *rasas* can be said to mix with figures, qualities, and other semblance

110 That is, when he spoke earlier (R 665.19) of the *rasāviyoga* in a poem at the level of a passage (in distinction to the level of the work) as coming about especially by the “combination of various ornaments”.

111 Bhoja has already shown (R 667) that qualities can also be considered as ornaments, and one category of quality is that of the meaning/the signified, *arthaguṇa*, R 533ff.

112 Bhoja is offering us here a mere analogy, I believe (although he does in fact hold to the principle he is enunciating, cf. e.g., Chapter 9 introduction, R 474). I find nothing to suggest an echo of Dhanika’s *vākyapadīya* argument about the literary text (based on Nāyaka’s *bhāvanā*, cf. n. 69). Contrast RAGHAVAN 1978: 165, 522.

113 This is, with regard to the “mixture of various ornaments”, R 673.2.

114 I see no way out but to conjecture *rasāntaraiḥ* for *rasabhāvaiḥ* (R 677.8) and *rasābhāsaiḥ* (J 438.8). The printed readings are both flatly contradicted by the sentence in which they stand.

forms, but not with *rasas* or emotions, because *rasas* stand in contradiction to them and emotions are subordinate to them.

Objection: If you cannot predicate “mixture” of things that stand in a relation of dominant and subordinate, how could the following claim be made:

We may define two procedures of “combination of ornaments”, [where] there is a relationship of dominant and subordinate, and where all elements have equal weight (*samakakṣyatā*). [KĀ 2.360]?

[The former] the author exemplifies with “The lotuses... challenge....”

The answer is as follows: “Combination” is possible where the dominant-subordinate relation is constituted of two elements that can exist separately but wherein, by force of the poet’s expression, one of them becomes primary and the other secondary (*upakāryopakāratva-*). Where, however, there is a natural intimacy (*upas̄leṣa*) – as in the case of two figures, or an emotion and a *rasa*, that are interdependent or mutually constitutive (*ap̄rthaksiddhayoh̄*), and which [in both cases] subsist as “constituter” and thing constituted¹¹⁵ – we cannot predicate “mixture” (*saṅkara*) of them. This is so, for example, in the just cited illustration: there is no “mixture” of the figures “substantiation” and “cause”, in as much as cause itself constitutes [or: paves the way for, *ārabhyate*] the substantiation. Cf. the definition:

“Substantiation” is when one sets forth some proposition and then adduces some other proposition capable of confirming it. [KĀ 2.169]

In this verse “substantiation” is what is to be defined, whereas the definition is: the adducing of some second thing capable of confirming the matter under discussion. If he had said merely “[the adducing] of a second thing while discussing something else”, it would wind up being possible to add any proposition – “this is a pot”, for example – [in order to have a substantiation]. Thus [the qualification] “capable of confirming” [the matter under discussion] has to be added.

115 For the *vāgārambhakatvena* in R we must read *vārambhakatvenārabhyatvena vā* (i.e., *vā ārambhakatvena ārabhyatvena vā*, “cause and effect”), cf. J. 438.14. I would have preferred to translate: “as in the case of two figures that cannot exist separately (*ap̄rthaksiddhayoh̄*), or in the case of an emotion and a *rasa*, which subsist as ‘constituter’ and ‘thing constituted’,” except for the fact that in the next sentence Bhoja uses *ārabhyate* in reference to a figure.

(R 678.1, J 438.18) This does not mean that one has a “substantiation” in the statement, “this is smoke [and not mist or something else] given the presence of fire.” For although fire is capable of “confirming” (*sādhana*) that what we are seeing is smoke since smoke is generated by fire, we still have to bear in mind the definition common to all figures [*alāṅkāra*], namely, that they are things that “make poetry beautiful” [something the above statement does not do]. Since this is the case, all species of figures can be expressed by the term *vakrokti*.¹¹⁶

Bhāmaha argues that the real beauty (*parā śobhā*) of poetry is nothing but *vakrokti*. [In all forms of *vakrokti* the beauty is enhanced by punning.]¹¹⁷

Objection: But if this were so, does it not follow “the arising of *rasa* from the conjunction of objective causes, reactions, and transitory feelings” cannot be an “ornament” (*alāṅkāra*) at all?¹¹⁸ Answer: No, because the class (*varga*) of “ornament” [in the wide sense] is in fact three-fold, “indirect expression” (*vakrokti*), “expression of the thing itself” (*svabhāvokti*),¹¹⁹ and “expression of *rasa*” (*rasokti*). *Vakrokti* is present when there is stress on “ornament” in the sense of similes and the like; *svabhāvokti*, when there is stress on qualities of language (*guṇas*), such as fitness (*śleṣa*) and the rest; and *rasokti* when there is the production of *rasa* by the conjunction just described.¹²⁰

116 Anything that produces poetic beauty can be called an “ornament”, and that is why non-prosaic – “indirect” – language is a covering term for ornament.

117 As R notes, the first half of the verse is Bhoja’s, the second Daṇḍin’s (KĀ 2.360). The second half is only added to show that Daṇḍin also used the word *vakrokti* of *alāṅkāras*: since that is found near the end of the *alāṅkāra* section, *vakrokti* may be taken to refer to all that precedes.

118 Because it is not simply “indirect language”. Here Bhoja is playing on the wide and narrow definition of *alāṅkāra*.

119 *Svabhāvokti*, signifies the plain unadorned description of a thing in itself. It also connotes “language-directed language” as the next sentence suggests, for it is from the sheer linguistic resources of expression (and not any particular meaning as such) that it derives its beauty.

120 RAGHAVAN remarks, “Bhoja has sought to confuse us suddenly by a flash of originality here.... The Guna-Svabhāvokti equation of Bhoja... found plainly stated in his Sr. Pra., is not easy to be understood” (1978: 134). As I see it Bhoja is articulating here (see also SKĀ 5.8) a crucial distinction widely familiar from the practices of medieval poets, which is clearly expressed in the ninth-century Kannada treatise, the *Kavirājamārgam*. Here we find the two “Ways” (*mārga*), renamed “southern” and

[In the following section Bhoja pursues his discussion of *rasokti* (*preyolaṅkāra* etc., R 676ff.), i.e., verses that consist of, not the foregrounding of language features (*guṇa/svabhāvokti*) or figures of sense (*alaṅkāra/vakrokti*), but of the utterance of emotion (*rasavad vacanam/rasokti*). We are given the entire series of *rasas* as they are produced, and the *rasavad alaṅkāras* that arise from the *rasa* and embody it. All his examples are borrowed from Daṇḍin, who adduces them in the course of his analysis of the same topic, KĀ 2. 278ff. (Note that Bhoja ends every illustration with *vacanam... rasavad ucyate*, and connects this up with *ūrjasvin, rasavat, preyas*, once again in his conclusion, R 687). But the analysis presupposes, and reproduces, Bhoja's understanding of what *rasa* is and how it works in a literary text. In each case it is the speaker of the verse who experiences the stable emotion, the conditions that enhance it, the memory-traces that underlie it, and the *rasa* that results (cf. also SKĀ p. 526 cited below, p. 189). The one exception is the example of the *rasa* terror, where Bhoja adds a clarifying note explaining that it is not the speaker of the verse who is the locus of *rasa*, but the character described who experienced the terror. The first few examples are translated fully below, and the remaining, which follow the pattern of the former, are summarized. Bhoja returns to a consideration of all eight examples in an important later passage, R 687, pp. 177-8 below.]

(R. 678.10, J 438.26) Now, with respect to the [last of these, *rasokti*]: “Objective conditions” are two-fold, “objective cause” (*ālambanavibhāva*) and “stimulant” (*uddīpanavibhāva*). The objective cause is the sight of some loved or hated person, in respect of whom pleasure or pain arises. The experience of such pleasure or pain engenders a “latent memory”

“northern”, constituted as elsewhere by the presence and absence respectively of “qualities”: “Of these two the southern Way has ten varieties, according to the [ten linguistic features of composition]” (KRM 2.54-55). At the same time the two are explicitly and differentially linked with *svabhāvokti* and *vakrokti*: “Two Ways accordingly came into prominence, and thus there arose [with them]... two [different] forms of expression, based on a definitive concomitance (*niyati*): on the one hand, indirectness (*vakra*), on the other, directness (*svabhāva*). ‘Direct expression’ (*svabhāvā-khyānam*) is an invariable feature differentiating the kind of expression found in the southern Way. The use of well-known indirectness of expression (*pratītavakrōkti*), of many varieties, is found in the celebrated northern Way” (2.52-53). That is, poetry of pure description derives its beauty from the very stuff of the language it uses, whereas poetry that uses figures of speech derives its own from the tropes themselves. The conjuncture of *guṇa, svabhāvokti* and *vaidarbhi mārga* seems already implicit in Bhāmaha (*vaidarbhi* is *avakrokti* as well as *prasanna, komala*, etc., 1.34, the latter referring to the *guṇas*), though it is true Daṇḍin seems to have modified this (KĀ 2.3-4). See further on this whole question the discussion in my essay “The Cosmopolitan Vernacular” (*Journal of Asian Studies* 57.1 [1998]). Incidentally, the *rasokti/svabhāvokti/vakrokti* taxonomy and its implications for a theory of *rasa* different from what became dominant in post-Abhinavagupta discourse, is found preserved in Kuntaka, *Vakroktijīvita* (edited by K. Krishnamoorthy [Dharwad, Karnatak U. Press, 1977]), pp. 98, 134.

(*saṃskāra*) that produces recollection, and stimulants such as garlands, creams and so on [in the case of the *rasa* of passion] stimulate that latent memory. Once a person has such a memory stimulated by the stimulants, there arise [“qualities of the soul”, i.e.] recollection, desire, aversion, volition, which activate the functions of body, mind, speech, or heart.¹²¹ These activations are called “reactions” [or: feelings] (*anubhāva*), insofar as they are actually felt. These feelings intensify a stable emotion, erotic desire and the like, which derives from nothing other than Passion. As it seeks to attain the desired object and avoid the hated object, the stable emotion is mixed with the transitory feelings – [in the case of erotic desire these include] pleasurable transitory feelings (*vyabhicāribhāva*) such as joy, firmness, recollection, reflection and the like. Ultimately this stable emotion reaches its full development¹²² and becomes *rasa* [in the normal sense], such as “passion-enjoyed” (*sambhogaśṛṅgāra*). When it fails to attain the desired object or avoid the hated object, the selfsame stable emotion of erotic desire is mixed with disagreeable transitory feelings such as worry, longing, shock, profound indifference and the like, and thereby becomes the *rasa* called passion-frustrated (*vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*), which consists of pain.

An example of the development of the *rasa* of passion from the stable emotion called erotic desire:

The woman I would have died for, were she dead,
if in dying I could be with her –
Āvantī stands here before me. How could I,
while still alive, have gotten this woman back?

(R 679.1, J 439.8) Here Āvantī, that is, Vāsavadattā, is the objective cause. The king of Vatsa feels the stable emotion of erotic desire, to which she has given rise in him. The intensifying factor is her resuscitation. When this intensifies the stable emotion, and when the pleasurable transitory feelings such as joy, firmness, recollection, speculation, etc. arise, the stable

121 *manovāgbuddhiśarīrārambha-*, as below passim; normally *manovākkāya-* in the older popular idiom, and, in the more philosophical, *vāgbuddhiśarīrārambha-*, as in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.17. On the latter Vātsyāyana remarks, “By *buddhi* is actually meant *manas*” [*mano 'tra buddhir ity abhipretam*], but this is not necessarily the case for those accepting a more Sāṅkhyan psychology (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.15 *pūrvapakṣa*), like Bhoja (cf. n. 48 and text at n. 71).

122 Reading *samāsāditottararah* for *samāsāditottarara-*.

emotion becomes passion-enjoyed. The king's words, "The woman I would have died for, were she dead", etc., which are his reaction to this, are said to "have *rasa*" (*rasavat*) insofar as they are generated by the *rasa* of passion [in him].¹²³

An example of the development of comic *rasa* from the feeling that something is funny:

My friend, you'd better move your blouse
to cover this fresh line of scratch-marks
on your breast – aren't you supposed
to be still angry with him?

Here the objective cause is a woman who is angry with her husband and yet whose breasts are marked with the scratches he has caused [during love-making with her]. The stable emotion of the comic arises in her girlfriend, who here is taunting her. The intensifying factors include the friend's reminding the woman that she is supposed to be angry, and this intensifies the stable emotion. Hereby arise transitory feelings [in the friend], which include doubt, dissimulation, merriment, stammering, and the like. The stable emotion here, the comical, thereby reaches its full development and turns into the comic *rasa*. Her words "you're supposed to be still angry" and so on are said to "have *rasa*" (*rasavat*) insofar as they arise from the comic *rasa* [in her].

An example of the development of heroic *rasa* from emotion or feeling of the energetic:

Without having conquered land and sea,
offered many sacrifices
and given wealth to suppliants,
how could I call myself a king?

Here the stable emotion, the energetic, arises from the objective cause constituted by conquest and so on. It is intensified by [the character's] brilliance, firmness, resoluteness and other intensifying factors, and when [his] transitory feelings arise – recollection, reflection, speculation and so on – the stable emotion is fully developed and turns into the heroic. The

123 So KĀ 2.278-79. When in his later discussion of the mixture of qualities and *rasa* Bhoja cites this verse as an example of *rūdhāhankāratā* (R 687) he has in mind not *ūrjasvin alāṅkāra* but *aurjityam guṇa*. For the translation "*rasa* of passion [in him]": see above at R 676, p. 165.

character is filled with heroic *rasa* (*vīrarasātmanah pumsah*) and the words that he speaks as a result of this *rasa*, “Without having conquered...” are said to “have *rasa*” insofar as they are generated by the heroic *rasa* [in him].

An example of the development of the *rasa* of wonder from the emotion of amazement:

On the trees in the garden of the gods
the sprouts are silken cloths, the flowers
are jewelry, the fruit intoxicating drink,
and the branches mansions.

The physical form of normal trees consists of sprouts, flowers, fruit, and branches, but the trees of Nandana, garden of the gods, have in place of these things silk cloths, jewelry, drinks, and palaces. What a marvel! Thus these things function as the objective cause for someone [implied in the verse] who is visiting the world of the gods. (R 680.1, J 439.25) From these arises the stable emotion of amazement, which is stimulated by his seeing the parts of the trees. When the transitory feelings arise (joy, goosebumps, sweating, stammering), the stable emotion is fully developed and turns into wonder, and the words spoken as a result, “On the trees in the garden of the gods...” are said to “have *rasa*” insofar as they are generated by the *rasa* of wonder [in him].

Summary, R 680.3ff, J 439.27ff.: The *rasa* of cruelty from the emotion of anger:

The one who grabbed Draupadī by the hair before my very eyes – behold him,
evil Duḥśāsana! And now that I have him, he won’t live a moment longer.

The *rasa* of terror from the emotion of fear:

This is the thunderbolt of Indra that bears fire in its edge,
and just to think of it causes the wives of the antigods to miscarry.

Here the stable emotion of fear arises in the wives of the antigods. The words of the verse describe the condition of these women and may be said to “have *rasa*” since it is rooted in their emotions.

The *rasa* of pity from the emotion of grief:

The queen, whose tender body was pained by a bed of flowers –
how is she to lie down upon a blazing funeral pyre?

Again, [in the above] it is the hero who possesses the *rasa* (*karuṇarasavato nāyakasya... -vacanam*).

The *rasa* of loathing from the emotion of disgust:

Drinking time and again your enemies' blood from their cupped hands
the ghouls garlanded with entrails go dancing with headless corpses.

Here it is in someone praising the military victory of a king that the emotion of disgust arises, and not, of course, in the ghouls.

[Next follows Bhoja's critique of Bharata on the relations of *rasas* and *bhāvas*, NŚ 6 prose + vss. 34ff. (pp. 286-88).¹²⁴ Three positions are under attack, namely that *rasas* arise from *bhāvas*, *bhāvas* from *rasas*, and *rasas* from *rasas* (the mutual constitution of *rasas* and *bhāvas* is ignored); all three will be rejected, cf. R 684.1-2, J 442.7, and R 686.21, J 443.23. But again, the critique is made from the perspective of Bhoja's position on the primary notion of *rasa*, not its secondary meaning. Since Bhoja never contradicts Daṇḍin's *rasavad vacanam*, whose examples he has cited at length, he clearly accepts that, in the narrower sense of the term, *rasas* arise from *bhāvas*, and indeed that *bhāvas* – i.e., the *anubhāva* or reaction that is represented by “passionate language”, *rasavad vacanam* – arise from *rasas*. This is clear from the first example: *śrīngārarasād upajāyamānam* [*anubhāvarūpaṃ vacanam*] *rasavad ucyate*. (See also below on R 728, J 471, where he accepts as least pragmatically the doctrine he disparages here.)

Bhoja's refutation is not altogether clear; I understand his argument as follows. Bharata is represented as holding that, just as *rasas* can arise from *bhāvas* (postulate 1), and *bhāvas* from *rasas* (postulate 2), so a second *rasa*, R₂, can arise from a first *rasa*, R₁ (postulate 3). For this last he gives the examples of *hāsya* from *śrīngāra*, *adbhuta* from *vīra*, *karuṇa* from *raudra*, and *bhayānaka* from *bībhatsa* (NŚ 6.39). Bhoja first refutes postulate 3 by saying that *rasa* R₁ does not in fact yet exist at the time R₂ arises, it remains a *bhāva* (though his reason is not clear to me, R 682.11-12). Next he argues (obviously thinking about Bharata's four *rasas* giving rise to four other *rasas*) that Bharata's restriction to eight *rasas* is false; some people add four more, *sānta*, *preyas*, *uddhata*, and *ūrjasvin* (wherein the same process of conjunction of factors is present), whereas others say all 49 *bhāvas* can become *rasas*. Now to postulate 1, that *rasas* arise from *bhāvas*: *rasas* do not

124 The introductory prose does not lucidly indicate Bharata's own view. Abhinava too has difficulty even in determining the *pakṣas*, let alone the *siddhānta*, and Srinivasan is correct to state that as it stands the passage is incoherent (Srinivasan 1980: 30). Bhoja makes it clear enough that Bharata supports all three views, and Bharata's own summary verses 34-38 do so as well. I suspect some corruption in the prose preceding the verses in NŚ. Perhaps we should understand it as follows: “Do *bhāvas* arise from *rasas*, or *rasas* from *bhāvas*? Some hold that they produce each other through mutual interaction. Why this (reading: *tat kasmāt* with *v.l.*) [diversity of opinion?] Because while we can observe the production of *rasas* from *bhāvas*, we cannot observe the production of *bhāvas* from *rasas* [though they are in fact so produced].”

find their origin in *bhāvas* but rather are nothing but *bhāvas* in full development. Then to postulate 2: *bhāvas* do not arise from *rasas* plural, because there in fact exists only one *rasa*. And back to postulate 3: To say that *rasa* R₂ arises from *rasa* R₁ is to say either that R₁ constitutes the objective cause for R₂ or the prior state (*prakṛti*) out of which it develops. But Bhoja argues that there is no causal or terminological regularity that shows this to be true.]

(R 681. 11, J. 440.20) Now, Bharatācārya holds that is only these eight stable emotions, erotic desire and so on, that receive [the names of *rasas*, i.e.,] the designations “passion”, “the heroic”, etc. when they reach full development (*bhūmānam āpannāḥ*);¹²⁵ further that, just as [1] these *rasas* come from (*bhavanti*) emotions (*bhāvas*), and [2] emotions come from *rasas*, in the same way [3] *rasas* come from *rasas*. As for [3], here would be an example of the comic coming from passion:

“This Śaṅkara, universally acclaimed for abstinence,
now bears his beloved with half his body, afraid to be without her.
And they say it was him who conquered us!” With this, the god of love
squeezed his wife’s hand, and laughed – and may his laugh protect you.

An example of the wonder from the heroic:

And now listen what happened at the cattle raid –
I swear upon your heart, indeed, your own son was a witness:
When armed and massed we attacked, we saw but a single Arjuna,
but then there arose as many of him as us who were waging battle.

[Bhoja next cites *Mahāvīracarita* 2.20 as an example of the *rasa* of pity coming from that of cruelty, and *Mahāvīracarita* 1.35 as an example of the *rasa* of terror coming from that of loathing.]

(R 682.11, J 441.11) This however is wrong. For [in the case where R₂ is said to arise from R₁] the emotions of erotic desire and so on, [however] fully developed, remain themselves emotions and not *rasas*, otherwise one would wind up having to assume [which Bharata does not do] that the transitory feelings such as joy and the like [which can be as fully developed as erotic desire, etc.] could also be *rasas*. Cf. *kārikā* 11 above. Nor is there any law that there can be only eight *rasas*. Some people

125 The way R has arranged the lines indicates he did not take the statement “it is only these eight stable emotions”, etc. (lines 11-12) as part of this critique (it is true that they echo the line with which Daṇḍin ends his account of *rasavad alaṅkāra*, but he is quoting Bharata, too). The ensuing discussion requires that it be included, however; Bhoja will refute the idea on R 682.17, J 441, and cf. of course *kārikā* 11.

count as *rasas* also serenity, desire, pride, and dignity (*śāntam*, *preyas*, *uddhata*, *ūrjasvin*). The designations of the [four kinds of protagonists], the serene, the romantic, the proud, and the dignified (*dhīraprasāntadhīralalitadhīroddhatadhīrodātta*), have their basis in [the existence of these additional *rasas*].¹²⁶ An example of the *rasa* of serenity founded upon a serene protagonist:

He possesses all treasures who has a contented heart.
To the man wearing soft leather shoes the whole earth is covered in suede.

(R 683.1, J 441.2) An example of the *rasa* of desire founded upon a romantic protagonist:

A man who loves a woman thinks she does everything to please him,
unaware that he finds pleasing whatever it is she does.

An example of the *rasa* of pride founded upon an proud protagonist:

So long as I am armed what need of other arms?
What other weapon could ever achieve what my weapon cannot?

An example of the *rasa* of dignity founded upon a dignified protagonist:

Do not fear that I will take vengeance for your crimes:
My sword would never want to fall upon an enemy in retreat.

The material of the *rasa* of serenity is [the stable emotion] serenity (*śama-prakṛtiḥ śāntaḥ*); that of the *rasa* of desire, affection, that of the *rasa* of pride a [positive] self-love, that of the *rasa* of dignity, egoism (*ahaṅkāra*). And the same conjunction of objective factors, reactions, and transitory feelings can apply to these [four *rasas*] no less than to passion.

Others even argue that all [49 *bhāvas*], arising from this conjunction and fully developed, turn into *rasas*. So [Rudraṭa]: “The authorities say that *rasas* are so called because they are ‘tasted’, as food flavors like sweetness are tasted. But that applies also to [the transitory feelings like] world-weariness, and so they too are *rasas*.” And if all [the *bhāvas*] are thus equally *rasas*, it makes no sense to apply the technical terms “passion”, “the heroic” and so on only to those [eight stable emotions,] erotic desire and

126 Note again the constitutive relationship between character and *rasa*: given the fact that we refer to four distinct character types in literature, there must be four different *rasas* upon which they are founded.

the rest, when fully developed. One may do it but that would then be only a terminological distinction. Cf. *kārikā* 7 above.

(R 684.1, J 442.7) Furthermore,¹²⁷ if emotions like erotic desire when fully developed are themselves *rasas*, how can [Bharata] assert that *rasas* come from emotions? [The reverse] would then also be illogical, namely that emotions come from *rasas*. There do not exist “*rasas*” plural, but only “*rasa*” singular, i.e., Passion, something we will also argue further below at length.

As for Bharata’s doctrine that *rasas* arise from *rasas*, [this can only mean one of two things: First,] that *rasas* form the objective cause (*ālambanavibhāva*) for other *rasas*. If this were so, then there could not be the hard and fast rule [Bharata] gives, that “the comic comes from passion, pity from cruelty, wonder from the heroic, and terror from loathing.” [For there is no invariable concomitance between cause and effect in these pairs of *rasas* as there would have to be for the argument to hold:] The comic can be found to arise¹²⁸ from some *rasa* other than passion [example: comic arising from the heroic], and not to arise from passion [a verse illustrating that pity instead of the comic can arise from passion is omitted here]; pity can be found to arise from some *rasa* other than cruelty [a verse illustrating pity arising from passion is omitted], and not to arise from cruelty [a verse illustrating terror instead of pity arising from cruelty is omitted. Bhoja goes on to address the remaining two cases, which I omit.]

(R 686.3 J 443.10) [Or, secondly, the doctrine that *rasas* arise from *rasas*] can mean that [one *rasa*] functions as the prior state [or: material] (*prakṛti*) [of another *rasa*, which would thus be the *vikṛti* or derivative]. Here also we have to ask whether the comic is born from passion, or passion itself becomes the comic? The first option is precisely our position, for no stable emotion, fully developed or not, is possible for a person without Passion (*aśṛṅgārin*).¹²⁹ It is the man of Passion who feels erotic desire, energy, amazement, disgust, grief, fear, peacefulness, affection,

127 Bhoja, having refuted Bharata’s view that there are only eight *rasas*, now addresses the other two components of his theory.

128 *drśyate*. But of course Bhoja is speaking hypothetically (*abhyupagamāt*), since he does not actually accept that *rasas* arise from other *rasas*.

129 R is correct to observe that Bhoja here “mixes up” Passion and passion (1978: 500 n. 2). But that is a bivalence absolutely constitutive of the ŚP (see the Introduction, p. 126).

pride, and sense of self. But the second option – that passion, whose prior state or material is erotic desire, *turns into* the comic (*hāsyarasībhavati*) – makes no sense, given that we never use the term “the comic” in reference to passion.

Now if [as Bharata] says, “The comic *rasa* is held to be an imitation (*anukṛti*) of passion” [NŚ 6.40], we can easily hold [as per the above] that an imitation of the heroic can also be comic. The same refutation holds for the argument that pity comes from cruelty. The former neither derives from the latter, nor does the latter become the former. Finally [if as Bharata holds], “The necessary result of cruelty is pity” [6.41], we would answer that pity is not the result of cruelty, though cruelty can be [one of its] cause[s]; similarly wonder is not a result of the heroic, though nothing stops the latter from functioning in the production of the former. [As for Bharata’s statement that] “terror is that which derives from the sight of the loathsome”, [the latter *rasa*] would be functioning merely as the objective causal factor [which is position (1), and that has already been refuted, R 684.4, J 442.10].

So the entire doctrine – that *rasas* come from emotions, emotions from *rasas*, and *rasas* from *rasas* – is just so much chatter (*yat kiṃcid eva*).¹³⁰ What then is the reasonable position to hold? The one we described above, cf. *kārikā* 8:

The sense of self (*abhimāna*) that produces the experience of the consciousness of pleasure and the rest [of the emotions] as [all] agreeable to the mind is what we should understand to be *rasa*, for that is what is “tasted” through the power of the self. To apply the term [as per the normal theory] to emotions such as erotic desire and so on when fully developed is erroneous.

(R 687.3, J 444.1) Therefore the following has been established: (1) The first stage of *rasa* is a deeply rooted egoism (*ahaṅkāratā*). (2) The second state of this selfsame *rasa* is when an emotion – and this applies to all forty-nine of them [eight stable emotions, eight physical responses, and thirty-three transitory feelings] – is fully developed through the conjunction of objective causes, physical responses, and transitory feelings, and comes to merit the technical name “*rasa*”. (3) The highest phase of *rasa* is [love], which is *rasa*’s ultimate resting-point [*rasaikāyanam*], for what [Daṇḍin’s]

130 For the idiom cf. *Nyāyavārttika* (edited by Taranath Nyayatarkatirtha et al. [Calcutta Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, 1936]; Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18), p. 60.

definition of *preyas*, that it is “the utterance of deep desire” (*preyaḥ priyatarākhyānam*) [KĀ 2. 273], actually indicates is that just as erotic desire (*rati*), [the paradigmatic emotion,] transforms into love (*prema*), so at their full maturation do all other emotions.¹³¹

To explain further [the first two developmental stages, starting with the first]: [1] In the case of the *rasa* of dignity (*ūrjasvin*), as in the verse in which the speaker says “You fear for your crimes, but my sword would never dare to fall upon a retreating enemy.” [R 683.8],¹³² we perceive a deeply rooted sense of self. Similarly, in all of the following poems we can perceive [the speaker’s, i.e., character’s] sense of self [that constitutes the *rasa* principle, and underlies the individual *rasas*]: “I have gotten Āvanti” [R 678.20 (the *rasa* of passion)], “Shame on you, your jealous anger is phony” [R 679.6 (comic)], “I could not be king without conquering the earth” [R 679.13 (the heroic)], “I have never seen such trees” [R 679. 19 (wonder)], “My Draupadī was dragged by the hair” [R 680.5 (cruelty)], “Blessed is Maghavan who has this weapon” [R 680.12 (terror)], “My queen mounts the funeral pyre” [R 680. 19 (pity)], “Ugh, the ghouls who drink [your enemies’ blood] adorned with bloody innards” [R 681.16 (loathing)], “My mind is at peace” [R 682.20 (serenity)], “I treat my beloved as she treats me because she is so good to me” [R 683.2 (*preyas*, the *rasa* of desire)], “When I am armed, what need for other arms” [R 683.5 (*uddhata*, the *rasa* of pride)].

[2] Now, how does a *rasa* arise from the conjunction of the stable emotions, transitory feelings, and reactions?¹³³ [a] The stable emotions come into play (*samutpadyante*) for a person endowed with this developed sense of self under a given condition, when his mind and senses have taken on the shape of the objective cause he has encountered, in the same way that moonstone oozes waters in the presence of the moon, sunstone bursts

131 See above at R 675. “transforms into love” translates *premarūpeṇa* [J falsely *pramā-ṇarūpeṇa*] *pariṇatau*, which in the parallel passage above, R 675.9, is *rasarūpeṇa pariṇatiḥ*. While it is true that for Bhoja *rasa* and *prema* ultimately signify the same thing, the logic of the argument seems to indicate that the present reading is correct.

132 Bhoja here and below paraphrases rather than quotes the earlier citations.

133 Since for Bhoja *rasa* does not “arise” (let alone “*rasas*”), his interest in provisionally accepting Bharata’s notion is to demonstrate the singular *rasa* upon which the conventionally conceived plurality of *rasas* is epiphenomenal.

into flame in the presence of the sun, or crystal dissolves in the presence of camphor.¹³⁴ An example with respect to erotic desire, etc.:

Amazing how when I drew near
the moon-faced girl with lotus-petal eyes
my mind grew numb and liquefied
like a genuine moonstone.

An example with respect to anger, etc.:

Then my lord, from the pain/sunlight (*ātapa*) of his harsh words
Sītā though gentle by nature grew hard
and blazed and spit out bright, sharp flames
of language, like a sunstone. (R 688.1, J 444.18)

An example with respect to grief, etc.:

Then the evil demons, by the ploy of the golden deer,
did such things that, even avenged, still cause pain;
my brother's actions, so palpably piteous, in deserted Janasthāna
make even stones weep and the hardest heart split open.¹³⁵

[b] In the mind [of such a person]¹³⁶ endowed with latent memories of earlier experiences, transformations arise as a result of a given stimulant that enhance the stable emotions, as the ocean is agitated when the moon rises, as disease increases as a result of unhealthy behavior, or as a good man is deeply pained in the presence of the wicked. An example of these transformations in the case of [sudden] agitation of the [stable emotion]:

His inborn composure gone, he began to grieve,
his throat choking with sobs. If even iron runs
when heated, how much more the human soul?

134 The three similes are for *śrṅgāra*, *vīra*, and *karuṇa* respectively. For this last poetic convention I am unable to find a parallel.

135 The three poems cited both illustrate and corroborate the explanation of the transformation in the presence of the objective condition. Bhoja's citation procedures through this section are carefully designed and the selections skillfully chosen, and give continual evidence of the relevance of his analysis of *rasa* to the actually existing poetries of early India. The triadic grouping of the *sthāyibhāvas* (*rati* etc., *raudra* etc., *śoka* etc.) throughout this passage perhaps means to suggest their correlation with *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* (cf. n. 48).

136 [-*yogino*] *manasaḥ*. Perhaps haplography for *abhimānimanasaḥ*, "the mind of this person with a developed sense of self" as above (R 687.16. J 444.13-14).

Or in the case of its increase:

As she looked at him she wept even more and beat her breast.
In the presence of kin the floodgates of grief are thrown open.

Or in the case of its being counteracted:

First the god of love torments my heart
with a desire I cannot resist or fulfill;
and now I have to see the mangos sprouting,
and the southern wind ruffling their leaves.¹³⁷

[c] Various reactions and transitory feelings come into being, under given conditions, in relation to one and the same emotion (erotic desire, anger, grief, etc.); both the reactions and the feelings are both internal and external, and mingle, whether so as to be indistinguishable the one from the other, or to remain distinguishable (*vyavasthāsamplavābhyām*), in the same way as one and the same tree has both components (*prakāra*), trunk, branches, twigs, etc., and derivatives (*vikāra*), fronds, leaves, flowers, fruits, etc.; or as one and the same mass of water has mutations (*vivarta*) such as swells, whirlpools, bubbles, and waves, and transformations (*pariṇāma*) such as pearls, foam, salt, and hailstones; or as one and the same sound has timbres (*bheda*) such as sharp, normal, low, and screechy, and segmentations (*avaccheda*) such as phonemes, words, sentences, [and animal sounds such as] warbling; or one and the same [element] air has courses (*skandha*), the atmosphere, stratosphere, and the like, and continua (*anubandha*) such as inhaled air, exhaled air, circulatory air in the body.¹³⁸ With respect to transitory feelings, the internal include worry, longing, consternation, doubt, etc., and the external, sweating, shivering, tears, pallor; with respect to reactions, the internal include recollection, desire, aversion, volition, and the external, the functions of body, mind, speech, or heart. Both categories, when they are imitated, receive the technical name “representation”, whether deploying genuine bodily reactions, mime, voice,

137 Three examples showing these transformations in the case of a sudden shock (Aja seeing his dead wife), in the case of increase of already existing feeling (Rati seeing Vasanta as she is mourning for Kāma), and in the case of something contrary (Purūravas feeling the south wind when he is longing for Urvaśī).

138 The former set of items in each comparison is meant, I take it, to indicate the interior and less distinct entities, the latter set the exterior and more distinct.

or costume (*sāttvikāṅgikavācīkacitrasāmānyābhinaya-*) [NŚ. 6.23]. An example of feelings and manifestations arising from erotic desire:

(R 689.7, J 445.16)

Revealing her feelings with her limbs bristling
like young plantain stalks, the daughter of the Mountain
stood there, her lovely face downturned, with eyes half-closed.¹³⁹

Or from anger:

His anger kindled by the death of Abhimanyu at the hands of his enemies,
Partha's glances, dull with shame and suffused with tears, fell on his bow,
he was nearly faint with grief that the killers were still unavenged
and the words "My child!" flashed through his mind but did not escape his
throat.¹⁴⁰

Or from grief:

Mother, mother, my heart is breaking, my body's joints are coming undone,
the world seems empty, and I burn inside with a constant fire.
My desolate soul collapses and sinks into deep darkness
and faintness envelops me all about. What am I to do in my misfortune?¹⁴¹

[d] The different *rasas*, then, arise from the stable emotions (erotic desire, anger, grief, etc.) when conjoined with their various factors, in the same way that sap arises from sugarcane and oil from mustard seeds; or gold from minerals and iron from ore; or butter from curd and fire from wood, when conjoined with [their appropriate causal factors, viz.] a press, a smelting fire, a churn.¹⁴² For example,

139 SKĀ p. 431 calls the goosebumps the physical reaction (*sāttvika*), rather than an external transitory feeling as per above, and the "dissimulation" (*avahittha*) the transitory feeling ("half-closed", *pariyasta-*, in accordance with Bhoja's interpretation). ND pp. 162-63 makes what appears to be a similar distinction between external and internal reactions and feelings: "'reactions', i.e., firmness (or satisfaction, *dhairya*), etc. and sweating, etc.; 'transitory feelings', i.e., world-weariness (*nirveda*), etc., and sickness, etc. That is, each of these [including the *vibhāvas*] can be either conscious or physical features."

140 The reactions are the glances and the words, the transitory feeling is shame (cf. SKĀ p. 440). On SKĀ p. 385 Bhoja remarks that the verse points toward the fact that mourning is inappropriate for heroes before they have wreaked vengeance.

141 The transitory feeling is faintness.

142 The three broad categories of affective states (desire, anger, grief, cf. n. 116) produce *rasa* by three different kinds of processes, which the similes effectively suggest

(R 690.1, J 446.2)

By chance I came upon my love like a digit of the moon
 entering the maw of Rāhu and I snatched her from the arc of that bastard's sword.
 I nearly lost my mind – broken from shock, melted with pity,
 agitated with wonder, aflame with anger, and blossoming with joy.

[e] The *rasas* produced from erotic desire, etc., assimilate (*ātmarūpatām nayantaḥ*) the causal factors (objective causes, etc.) [of different *rasas*] and are thereby enhanced (*upacīyante*), in the same way that physical tastes such as salty or sour are enhanced by assimilating [sweet things such as] grapes when these come in contact with them.¹⁴³ For example,

When we asked, “Who are you thinking of?” she said, distraught and weeping,
 “Who have I to think of?” and made us weep as well.

[f] From their conjunction with *rasa*,¹⁴⁴ objective factors, transitory feelings, and reactions all become *rasa*, that is, come to possess a property common to *rasa* itself, in the same way that, by their conjunction with fire, earth-derived substances such as butter, lac, wax; water-substances such as clouds, snow, hail; fire-substances such as tin, lead, silver, all become liquids – in other words, they come to possess a property common to water.

With this sorrowful composition the king
 of Kosala mourned his wife, and even the trees,
 branches shedding tears of sap, appeared to mourn.

(contrast RAGHAVAN 1978: 646, where we are told that the process of producing *rasa* “cannot be said to have been sufficiently explained by these similes”).

143 A key to this somewhat obscure passage (there is some uncertainty about the reading, R 690.6, J 446.7) may be provided by DR 4.34, *ātmabhāvaṃ nayaty anyān [bhāvān] sa sthāyī lavaṇākaraḥ*, and the discussion of Dhanika and Bhaṭṭa Narasiṃha ad loc. (a stable emotion is not interrupted by the presence of [other] emotions whether contradictory or otherwise; it assimilates them and thereby becomes a source of [even greater] beauty). I presume Bhoja is showing how *śṛṅgārarasa* can assimilate the transitory feelings and other factors associated with *karuṇa*, which enhance it as a salty mixture takes on a heightened intensity when a drop of sweetness is added (note the close parallel with his earlier example, R 684.13, J 442.16).

144 Bhoja here turns Bharata's formula upside down: *rasa* precedes the factors that are taken to produce it through their conjunction, and transforms them into itself. The example he cites – the trees of the garden where Aja had walked with his queen, which are a stimulant of *karuṇa rasa*, are themselves affected by it – seems rather too literal for the proposition he formulates.

[g] From these various general *rasas* (*rasasāmānya*) [that appear in a literary work] a specific [dominant] *rasa* (*rasaviśeṣa*) is produced, in the same way as honey is produced from the nectar of various plants, the “six-spice drink” (*ṣāḍava*) from different sweet and other substances, rum from molasses and other substances. As for example [in the *Ratnāvalī*, which ends as follows]:

(R 691, J 446.17)

King Vikramabāhu has been made my friend; this treasure of the earth –
sole source of mastery over land and sea – my beloved Sāgarikā has been obtained;
the chief queen is overjoyed to recover her cousin, and Kosala has been conquered.
With you at my side, great minister, what desire of mine remains unfulfilled?¹⁴⁵

[h] Finally, of [what is thus] one *rasa* we have various species (*jātibheda*) (the stable emotion, the specific *rasa*, the semblance forms of both of these), different functions (*arthakriyā*) (such as the feelings of missing the loved one, obsessing about her, or rejoicing in her presence) [in the case of *śrīngāra*], and different states of being (genesis, growth, or continuity), in the same way as of a single fire we have various species (earthly fire, heavenly fire, digestive fire), with different functions (burning, illuminating, digesting), and different states of being (smoke, flame, coal, etc.).

[Bhoja illustrates all of these categories. e.g., the species of stable emotion: Śiva's first passionate look at Umā (*Kumārasambhava* 3.67); the species of a specific *rasa*: Umā's realization that she and Śiva are equally in love (*Kumārasambhava* 5.85, cf. SKĀ p. 431, where the verse is cited as an example of the *niṣpatti* or *rasa*); the species of the semblance of emotion:¹⁴⁶ Rāvaṇa's semblance of desire for and semblance of anger at Sītā (*Udāttarāghava*).]

Having thus established that qualities, *rasas*, stable emotions, etc., are all “ornaments” or factors of beauty in a poem (cf. above on R 673.3ff., J 435.18ff.), Bhoja proceeds to identify six varieties of mixture of elements: mixture of qualities, of *rasas*, of figures of speech; of qualities and *rasas*, qualities and figures, *rasas* and figures. He turns first to a discussion of the mixture of qualities (R 693.17, J 448.11). The discussion is picked up here as it turns to the question of *rasa*.]

145 Bhoja appears close to Abhinava in his understanding of the higher-order unity of *rasas* (*śrīngāra* and *vīra*, or at least the concerns of *kāma* and *dharma*) in the *Ratnāvalī*. See INGALLS et al. 1990: 511, as well as Dhanika ad DR 1.33.

146 Not “the semblance of *rasa*”, as per R's note ad loc.; see below on R 697, where Bhoja repeats and comments on the verse.

(R 696.7ff., J. 449.28ff.) Objection: Let us grant, then, that one may speak of “mixture” in the case of qualities, since these have three sub-varieties – qualities of words, qualities of sense, and faults that [if intentional] can function as good qualities in a poem – and some of these will be either prominent or not (*sollekha, nirullekha*).¹⁴⁷ But since you have dismissed the idea that *rasa* is plural – the “heroic” and the rest – how can this single *rasa*, Passion, allow us to speak of “mixture” when that is something requiring plurality? Answer: Although Passion is the sole *rasa*, the stable emotions that arise from Passion acquire the designation “*rasa*”, too, when they are stimulated by the stimulants and, precisely because they are infused with [Passion], condition the transitory feelings and reactions. Just as sense of self conditions the stable emotions and becomes *rasa* when tasted by the mind (*cetas*), so the stable emotions condition the transitory feelings (joy, resolve, worry, longing, and the like), and the reactions (the functions of body, mind, speech, or heart), and by the same infusion with a developed sense of self are tasted by the mind and [so] become *rasas* [pl.]. When [different stable emotions] are articulated simultaneously (*yugapadabhidhāne*), it allows us to speak of “mixture” [of *rasas*]. But in fact [a variety of items] are mixed [in the case of mixture of *rasas*] since there are various sub-species [in *rasa*]: they are called emotions at their origin, *rasas* when fully developed, semblances of emotions or *rasas* contrarily,¹⁴⁸ and emotion-quiescence or *rasa*-quiescence at the end. So mixture [in the case of *rasa*] is six-fold: of emotions, *rasas*, semblances of emotions and of *rasas*, quiescence of emotion, quiescence of *rasa*. An example of mixture of emotions:

That insult throbs like a sharp thunderbolt in my heart,
my mind is suffused with shame and sinks as in blinding darkness,
grief at the death of my father consumes me and I can do nothing about it,
and pity for poor Sitā cuts at my very vitals.

Here indignation, shame, grief, and love, which we understand as the reactions [in the form] of a verbalization (*vāgārambhānubhāva*) on the part of the forlorn Rāma, are equal [with respect to their mutually independent

147 On the sense of *-ullekha-* see RAGHAVAN 1978: 303.

148 That is, when full development of the emotion is not possible (in the case of the erotic, when desire is felt by the anti-hero for the heroine, or by an animal for an animal).

existence] and mixed together like sesame seeds and rice kernels. Mixture of *rasas* is found in the verse “The women of the Triple City wept from lotus eyes...”¹⁴⁹ where in the description of Hara’s power, passion and pity are mixed in a relationship of dominant and subordinate, like earth and water in a lump of mud.

Mixture of semblances of emotions is found in the following:

(R 697.1, J 450.22)

Oh Sītā, this face of yours was once so bright
with pride at the destruction of [my] kinsmen
who stood lost in confusion in the presence of your arrogant husband.
But now [I] Rāvaṇa will flood it
with tears that come streaming from your eyes
wide with terror and rolling
as your high-piled hair is violently pulled.¹⁵⁰

Here we see [Rāvaṇa’s] semblance of emotion of erotic desire mixed with a similar emotion of anger, like an image and its reflection in a mirror (*chāyādarśanyāyena*).

Mixture of semblances of *rasas*:

With one red eye filled with rage she stares at the setting sun,
with the other, tearful, at her beloved.
The *cakravākī*, fearing separation from her lover as the day ends,
displays two *rasas* mixed, like an experienced actress.¹⁵¹

Here anger and grief, in their full development, [revealed as] semblances given the comparison of the *cakravākī* bird with the actress,¹⁵² are mixed

149 See INGALLS et al. 1990: 24, 238.

150 From Māyūrāja’s as yet unpublished *Udāttarāghava* (two mss. were said to have been in the possession of V. RAGHAVAN, but they seem to have disappeared). I read *-prānta-* (for *-bhrānta-*) and *-trāsa-* (for *-tryaṃśa-*) (a possible but rather bizarre image: her eyes stretched triangularly as her hair is pulled) with the SKĀ p. 522 (and in the second case, also with J). I am assuming it is Rāvaṇa who speaks the verse and refers to himself in the third person.

151 The *Sūktimuktāvalī* (edited by Embar Krishnamacharya [Baroda, Oriental Insitute, 1938], p.249) attributes this verse to the legendary dramatist of early Kashmir, Candraka (cf. the Sanskrit introduction, p. 32). (I thank Lawrence MCCREA for the reference.)

152 Though this overdetermines the inauthenticity, since for Sanskrit *alāṅkāraśāstra*, animals cannot experience true emotions anyway.

together like the man-portion and the lion-portion in the Man-Lion [incarnation of Viṣṇu].

The mixture of quiescent emotions:

When she saw her lover, her anger like her eye
began slightly to close; when he stood at her side it was lowered like her face;
like her goosebumps it rose to go when he touched her; it relaxed
like her belt when he started to speak,
and it fled like her shame when he fell at her feet.

This concerns a woman who had been specifically instructed by her girlfriend to maintain a jealous anger. When she sees her lover (the objective cause) there arises in her the stable emotion of joy (*praharṣa*)¹⁵³ that comes from a powerful erotic attachment; this is stimulated by such stimulants as his approaching her; and as it reaches its highest development through such reactions as her closing her eyes, lowering her face, slipping off of her belt, at the same time as pleasurable transitory feelings such as goosebumps arise,¹⁵⁴ the stable emotion turns into the *rasa* of bliss (*ānandarāsatām āpadyamāna-*). Because of the inception of this powerful contradictory emotion, and by the very same factors that produced it, her shame and anger diminish moment by moment, and it is the quiescences of these two feelings that are here equally mixed, like milk and water.

The mixture of quiescent *rasas*:

Hostility has been quelled, a *rasa* of pure bliss streams forth.
My loftiness (*auddhatya*) departs, and humility constrains me.
No sooner did I see him than I somehow felt subject (*paravān*) to him.
Great men, like holy places, have some rare superiority.

In this verse the *rasas* of the heroic, the prideful (*auddhatya*), and the autonomous (*svātantrya*) are made quiescent (*praśamā[ḥ]*)¹⁵⁵ when overpowered by the *rasas* of the blissful, the quiescent (*praśama*), and the heteronomous (*pāravaśya*), in the same way that white threads of a carpet are

153 This is technically and usually considered a transitory feeling but remember that (as per *kārikā* 11) Bhoja relaxes all these categories.

154 As per R 689, goosebumps are externalized transitory feelings.

155 Read thus (and *samkīryamāṇāḥ samupalabhyante*) in place of R's *praśame*; cf. SKĀ p. 523. The plural "are made quiescent" is required since there are three *rasas*, in the same way as, in the previous example, the dual is used in connection with the two emotions.

overpowered by blue [dye]. Given this, along with the reaction in the form of a verbalization, the simile, and so on that are produced by the grandeur of the sight of Rāma and arise in [his son] Lava through his quiescence and astonishment, [these quiescent *rasas*] are found to be mixed together, like the colors in a painting.

[R 698.1ff, J 451.17ff. A discussion of mixture of figures (*alaṅkārasaṃkara*) that intervenes is omitted here.]

(R 699.22, J 453.4)¹⁵⁶ Objection. We may speak of the mixture of qualities, of *rasas*, or of figures, but how can we speak of the mixture of qualities and *rasa*? The use of qualities is as obligatory as is the avoidance of faults, and the “non-absence of *rasa*” is as essential as the presence of figures. Occasionally, to be sure, figures may be omitted, but never *rasa* and qualities. Only those entities that have a contingent relationship with other entities can be conceptualized as “mixed” when they unite, such as sesame seeds and rice kernels, or milk and water, but not those entities that are noncontingently joined, such as parts and wholes, or types and tokens. Answer: We do not speak of “mixture” of qualities and *rasa* in a passage where we can think of their presence as not resulting from a separate effort (*apṛthakprayatna*),¹⁵⁷ by the logic of part-and-whole or type-and-token, as in the case of paint-colors and a painting, man and lion [in the Man-Lion avatar of Viṣṇu], earth and water [that make up “mud”]. [Bhoja here cites verses from Daṇḍin and Ānandavardhana showing that certain *rasas* and certain qualities always will be co-present if each is to exist as what it is, e.g., *raudra* and *ojas*.] There is no question of mixture in those cases where the qualities are invariably constitutive of (*ārambhaka*) certain *rasas* or *rasas* of certain qualities. [The *arthaguṇa* or sense-quality] *aurjitya* [for example] is an expression of highly developed self-consciousness, [the *śabdaguṇa* or word-quality] *bhāvikatva* is when an utterance is prompted by deep emotion; [the sense-quality] *mādhuryam* is [when a character is described as showing] gentleness even in anger, [the sense-quality] *udāttatva* is nobility of sentiment, [the sense-quality] *preyas* is [when a character expresses] deep desire for a thing, [the sense-quality] *kānti* is when the *rasa* appears with great brilliance.¹⁵⁸ On the other

156 This closely follows SKĀ, pp. 523ff.

157 That is, where qualities and *rasas* are mutually constitutive, or where the former is a natural byproduct of a poet's concentration on producing the latter (compare DhĀ 2.17).

158 While apparently just repeating the definitions of certain *śabdaguṇas* and *arthaguṇas* given previously, Bhoja has in fact selected those qualities characterized by a consti-

hand, we may indeed speak of mixture in a passage where the presence of qualities and *rasas* is intentional given their parity [in respect of their mutually independent existence], as in the case of sesame seeds and rice kernels, milk and water, image and mirror reflection. There are six varieties of such mixture: where qualities are dominant, *rasas* dominant, both equally dominant, both equally non-dominant, or where either the qualities or the *rasas* are present in superabundance.

[Examples of the mixture and relative dominance of qualities and *rasas* follow. Of these one, the illustration of superabundance of *rasas*, is pertinent (R 702.10ff., J 454.20, cf. SKĀ 525f.): Citing the well-known verse,

A lotus out of water, and on the lotus
two dark waterlilies, and all this
on a golden vine so soft and lovely –
what a series of wondrous signs!

Bhoja remarks that while we can identify some ten qualities in it, “twenty different *rasas* of the passionate man (*śṛṅgārin*) making this compliment to his beloved can be perceived in his reaction that here has the form of a verbalization.” For Bhoja all the stable emotions and transitory feelings that are expressed in these words function as *rasas*.

At R 706. 8ff., J 457.12ff. Bhoja turns to the “mixture of *rasas* and figures”, of which six types may be distinguished, depending on whether a figure of sound, a figure of sense, or both are predominant over *rasa*, or whether an emotion, a semblance of emotion or *rasa*, or a *rasa* is predominant over a figure. The second type is exemplified in the following verse, R 707.7-10:

Rāma’s arrows, shot from hands
hallowed by fondling Sītā’s breasts,
made Rāvaṇa’s body shiver with delight
even as they pierced him,¹⁵⁹

tutive relationship with the expression of affect. This is clear from the kinds of examples adduced in the discussion of qualities in Chapter 9, R 529ff., J. 341ff. (in the definition of *bhāvikatvam* read *vākpravṛttir* for *vākyavṛttir*, with J against R, as in the passage in Chapter 9, and cf. comm. and n. on SKĀ p. 49).

159 *Setubandha* 15.66, which I read in *pādas* c-d with G. Basak (Calcutta, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1959) as *janaataṇaāpaoharapphaṃsamahagghaviakarajulaṇi-vvūdhā* (i.e., *janakatanayāpayo-dharasparśamahārghitakarayugalanirvyūdhāḥ*) “hands (hallowed) by fondling Sītā’s breasts”, for R’s *janasuāphaṃsamahagdhā via karaalāaṭṭhiavimukkā* (i.e., *janakasutāsparśamahārghā iva karatalākṛṣṭavimuktāḥ*) There is no reason for Sītā to be touching the arrows.

Here it is the figure of sense known as “supplying-a-reason” (*hetu*) (he shivered because he was touched by hands that touched the object of his desire) overpowering (*abhibhūya*) the semblance of *rasa* of erotic passion (Rāvaṇa’s illicit desire for Sītā) that makes the principal impact on the reader’s understanding (*prādhānyena pratīyate*). I take up the discussion of the last three types, these having a bearing on Bhoja’s conception of *rasa*. The discussion closely follows SKĀ pp. 526ff., where the analysis is introduced with the following general remark: “The [type of mixture in which] a *rasa* is predominant [over a figure] comes about when it is the person experiencing the emotions who describes the situation [*anubhavitraiva varṇyate*], for the actual sentence containing the figure is then in fact his or her reaction in the form of a verbalization.” Contrast the example just cited (“Rāma’s arrows ...”), where the sentiment, insofar as it is not being expressed by the one who experiences it, is submerged by the figure of sense.]

(R 707.18, J 458.12) In the following verse, an emotion is predominant [over a figure]:

Even the anger in her beautiful face at a lapse in love from me
can steal my heart away, like a spot of musk in the lovely deer-marked moon.

Here the god Hari, who possesses the *rasa* (*rasavataḥ*), is speaking and his words [are a reaction] in the form of a verbalization, which overshadows the two sense-figures in the verse, a “supplying-a-reason” (*hetu*) and a simile. This being the case, the predominant meaning we understand is his state of pleasure at experiencing Satyabhāmā’s anger (*roṣabhāva-rāmaṇīyakam*) (which was provoked by her seeing the bouquet of the divine coral tree that [Hari] had given to Rukmiṇī).

In the following verse a semblance of an emotion is predominant [over a figure]:

Why wouldn’t her waist waste away
since it will never be beheld
by those dark lotus-petal eyes
that her high heavy breasts obstruct?

The predominant meaning we understand here – the figures of “supplying-a-reason”, simile, poetic fantasy, and “transference” (*samādhi*),¹⁶⁰ being for their part overshadowed – is [the reaction in the form of] the verbalization of the semblance of *rasa* on the part of some character, [not the main protagonist but rather] the antagonist for example. Day by day he is pining away, priding himself on being deserving while he experiences the pleasure

160 Bhoja earlier defines this as the transference to one thing of the features of another thing (R 645.19, J 417.13ff.). In the present case, the wasting away of the speaker through the woman’s indifference to him is transferred to the woman’s waist.

of his developed sense of self [which finds expression here by] his complaint against the woman he cannot have.¹⁶¹

In the following verse a *rasa* is predominant [over a figure]:

Don't be so proud, my friend, to be wearing on your cheek
[a flower drawn by your lover with his own hand.
Other women would have the very same thing
if a shiver of ecstasy, that powerful foe, had not intervened.]

Here again, the predominant thing we understand, over against the figures of speech “prohibition” (*ākṣepa*), “supplying as a reason what is not a reason” (*hetur ahetuḥ*), and “circumlocution” (*paryāyokti*),¹⁶² is [a reaction in the form of] a verbalization. This arises from [the speaker's] fully developed *rasa* of erotic desire (*prakṛṣṭaratirasaprabhava*), which hints at the transitory feeling of shivering and serves to reveal how deep is the love shared with her beloved, in the face of the boasts of her girlfriend who is so proud of being loved by her lover.

[Having concluded the major exposition of his ideas of *rasa*, Bhoja devotes the rest of the section, R 708.11ff., J 458.27ff., to a more general discussion of the mixture of factors of beauty. When he turns in the second half of the Chapter to deal with *rasa* “at the level of the work as a whole”, he makes only the following very brief remarks:]

(R 710.19ff., J 460.15ff.) So much for “non-absence of *rasa*” at the level of the individual passage. Now we treat it at the level of the whole composition. That too manifests itself by the elimination of faults, the acquisition of qualities, and the mixing of “ornaments”, and becomes thereby a source of intellectual delight for intelligent readers. [To give brief definitions of these terms:] The “elimination of faults” is the

161 *anavāptadayitāpratyabhiyogābhimānasukhasya*. I am not sure I fully understand this. But recall that for Bhoja, the man of Passion (*abhimāna*, *śṛṅgāra*, *rasa*) finds pleasure even in the experience of neglect and pain. See above *kārikā* 8 and n. ad loc.

162 “A reason that is counteracted and fails to produce its effect despite the presence of all the causal conditions, is a ‘non-reason’” (R 616.13, J 396.24): the ability of the lover to produce decorations is in fact evidence of insufficient love between the couple; “A circumlocution is [effected by] the use of a pretext, a turn of speech, or a special occasion” (R 655.14, J 424.19), here presumably of the second variety, where what is meant – “my lover and I actually share a deeper love than you and your lover” – is expressed in a roundabout way. (In SKĀ p. 56 where the verse is also cited, Bhoja observes that the two women are rivals for the same man, but his use of *priyavayasyā* here instead of *sapatnī* suggests he understood the verse slightly differently on this occasion.)

avoidance of impropriety. [The examples given are omitted] (R 711.13, J 461.1) The “acquisition of qualities” is the artful construction of a composition (*saṃvidhānakasusūtratā*), achieved through adherence to genre rules (*samyaglakṣaṇayoga*) pertaining to the different kinds of literary works (*prabandha*) we will discuss. The “mixing of ‘ornaments’” is the careful arrangement of [narrative components] in these works, the various descriptions of cities, oceans, and the like.

[Bhoja proceeds to define the literary work and discuss the various genres. He then considers the general and specific qualities and “ornaments”, “the conjunction with which is the cause for the non-separation of *rasa*” at the level of the work. One of the *arthaguṇas* or “qualities of meaning” of the work as a whole is the continuous presence of *rasas* and emotions (*rasabhāvanirantaratva*):]

(R 728.20, J 471.21) The word *rasa* could have been used alone since it includes emotions, which are the cause of *rasa* [and therefore invariably co-present with it]. But it is used separately in order to emphasize the mutual cause-and-effect relationship of the two. There must be a “continuous presence” or multiplicity of them to be savored – with *rasas* producing emotions, emotions *rasas*, and *rasas rasas* – so that the literary work does not become insipid, like a meal that has only a single taste.

PRINCIPAL REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

Sanskrit Texts

Daśarūpaka of Dhanamjaya, with the commentary of Dhanika. 1969. Edited by T. Venkatacharya. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre. (DR)

Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana, with the commentary of Abhinavagupta. 1940. Edited by Pattabhirama Shastri. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. (DhĀ)

Kavirājamārgam. 1968. Edited by M. V. Seetha Ramiah. Bangalore: Karnataka Sangha. Reprint 1994. (In Kannada) (KRM)

Kāvyaśāstra of Daṇḍin, with the commentaries of Vāḍijaṅghāla, Taruṇavācaspati, and Hṛdayaṅgama. 1936. Edited by D. T. Tatacharya. Tirupati: Shrinivas Press. (KĀ)

Kāvyaśāstra [= *Kāvyaśāstra*] of Daṇḍin, with the commentary of Ratnaśrījñāna. 1957. Edited by A. Thakur and Upendra Jha. Darbhanga: Mithila Institute.

Kāvyaśāstra of Bhāmaha. 1928. Edited by B. N. Sarma and Baldeva Upadhyaya. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series office.

Kāvyaśāstra of Rudraṭa, with the commentary of Namisādhu. 1928. Edited by Pt. Durgaprasad and Wasudev Laksman Shastri Panshikar. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press.

Kāvyaśāstrasaṃgraha of Udbhaṭa, with the commentary of Pratihārendurāja. 1928. Edited by M. R. Telang. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press. (KAS)

Nāṭyadarpaṇa of Guṇacandra and Rāmacandra. 1929. Edited by G. J. Shrigondekar. Baroda: Oriental Institute. (ND)

Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata, with the commentary of Abhinavagupta. 1992. Edited by K. Krishnamoorthy. Baroda: Oriental Institute. Fourth edition.

Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇālāṅkāra of Bhoja, with the commentaries of Raneśvara and Jagaddhara. 1979. Edited by Biswanath Bhattacharya. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University. (SKĀ)

Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhoja. 1955 - ca. 1969. Edited by G. R. Joyser. Mysore: Coronation Press. Four volumes. (ŚP) (J)

Śṛṅgāraprakāśa of Bhoja. 1997. Edited by V. Raghavan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Harvard Oriental Series 53. Two volumes. (R)

SECONDARY WORKS

Bhattacharyya, Sivaprasad. 1963. "Bhoja's *Rasa*-Ideology and Its Influence on Bengal *Rasa-śāstra*". *Journal of the Oriental Institute* (Baroda) 13,2: 106-19.

Delmonico, Neil. 1989. "Sacred Rapture: A Study of the Religious Aesthetic of Rūpa Gosvāmin". Unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago.

Dufrenne, Mikel. 1973. *The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience*. Translated by Edward S. Casey et al. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Original French edition, 1953.

Eagleton, Terry. 1990. *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gerow, Edwin. 1977. *Indian Poetics*. Stuttgart: Harrassowitz. A History of Indian Literature 5.3.

Gnoli, Raniero. 1968. *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta*. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office. Second edition.

Ingalls, Daniel H. H., J. M. Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, trans. 1990. *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Iser, Wolfgang. 1978. *The Act of Reading*. Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kulkarni, V. M. 1989. *Prakrit Verses in Sanskrit Works on Poetics*. Delhi: Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology.

Masson, Jeffrey M. and M. V. Patwardhan. 1970. *Aesthetic Rapture*. Poona: Deccan College. Two volumes.

Raghavan, V. 1978. *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*. Madras: Punarvasu. Third edition (second edition, 1963).

Srinivasan, Srinivasa Ayya. 1980. *On the Composition of the Nāṭyaśāstra*. Reinbek: Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen.

Wimsatt, W. K., and M. Beardsley, "The Affective Fallacy". In *The Verbal Icon*. Lexington, 1954, pp. 21-39.