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VAIŚEṢIKASŪTRA IV.1.9 AND ITS TWO TRADITIONS OF INTERPRETATION¹

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In his remarkable reconstruction of the development of Vaiseṣika in the second volume of his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie Erich Frauwallner provides us with an outline of the "earliest philosophy of nature of the Vaiseṣika." For this outline he drew on various sources, using foremost materials preserved in the philosophical portions of the Mahābhārata, in the Mokṣadharma section, but also bits and pieces of information about more archaic Vaiseṣika views, preserved in later texts of the Vaiseṣika school and of its opponents. Besides, he incorporated into this reconstruction, which actually uncovers two stages of development, what seemed to him to be older and therefore, one can assume, more original or basic notions of

This is a revised and slightly expanded version of a paper read before the panel on early Vaisesika at the 34th ICANAS, Hongkong, August 22-28, 1993. - I would like to thank Dr. Eli Franco, Melbourne, for critical comments and valuable suggestions when he read an earlier version of this paper. Among the participants in the panel, I am especially grateful to Prof. Claus Oetke, Stockholm, and Mr. Harunaga Isaacson, M.A., Groningen, for stimulating questions and important supplementary remarks. Special thanks go to Prof. Hiroshi Marui, Tokyo, who provided me with copies of and detailed information about his two Japanese papers relevant to the present issue, which were not accessible to me otherwise. In our extended discussions, just before this paper was due for publication, it became evident that our findings and interpretations agreed in general and even in some details. Among the two papers, "Nyāya-Vaiśeşika-gakuha ni okeru jittai no chikaku joken ni tsuite" is still preliminary, but presents the gist of the problem and argument. The correctness of the reading udbhūtarūpa in PDhS 443,1-2 is not yet doubted. In "Vaiśeşikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)" Marui presents the materials concerning the transmission of VS IV.1.6 in an extensive manner and discusses the various readings and versions traced by him. The PDhS itself is not taken into consideration because of the problematic occurrence of udbhūtarūpa. The textual basis of the present paper includes some additional materials. Further, "Vaisesikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)" contains a Japanese translation of Candrananda's commentary on VS IV.1.6-9 with subsequent discussion, also of the interpretation of rūpa in IV.1.6 and rūpaviśeṣa in IV.1.9. Finally, Marui refers to NS III.1.34f. and the commentators' attempts to read the notion of (an)udbhava into the sūtra-text. In this connection he concentrates on Uddyotakara's commentary on NS III.1.31-33a, which he translates into Japanese and examines as to Uddyotakara's reading of VS IV.1.6 and his knowledge of the two diverging interpretations. - I am indebted to Prof. Marui also for various other suggestions; his extraordinary effort and care when going through this paper are highly appreciated.

Vaiśeṣika philosophy of nature, as they are still found in the fully developed Vaiśeṣika system and in classical Nyāya.² At this point, however, personal views, impressions and biases about what is oldest or most original come into play; it is possible to construct diverging, equally possible lines of development relying on the same textual basis that the great scholar presumably used, augmented by further materials. In a previous paper I have tried to do this with regard to the concept of the visual ray of light³; in this paper, I would like to take up the notion of *udbhava* or *udbhūtatva*, together with its contrary *anudbhava* or *anudbhūtatva*, that is, the being pronounced or distinct,⁴ or perhaps better: having emerged,⁵ of the special elementary qualities and its contrary.

This notion is attributed by Frauwallner to the earliest Vaiśeṣika philosophy of nature⁶. His indicated source material in this case consists exclusively of passages from Vātsyāyana's NBh. Besides, he presupposes this concept for VS IV.1.6 und 9.7 Of course, nobody would deny that classical Nyāya has taken over a considerable part of the earlier Vaiśeṣika philosophy of nature and that, therefore, it is in general quite legitimate to use ideas, contained in the earliest preserved commentary on the NS, to illustrate this early phase. In the present case, however, the NBh is to my knowledge the earliest text at all in which the two terms in question are used and a brief discussion of the two concepts can be found. The terms are not used and the concepts not explicitly referred to, even with a different expression, in the VS, which according to Frauwallner himself belongs to the last period of the classical system.⁸ Neither are (an)udbhava or (an)udbhūtatva known to the authors of the NS, nor do they play any role in the works of Candramati and Praśastapāda. The term udbhūta might occur

- 2 Cf. G.i.Ph., II, p. 314; for inclusion of Nyāya texts, cf. his source materials indicated in various notes.
- 3 Cf. Preisendanz, "On ātmendriyamanorthasannikarşa and the Nyāya-Vaiśeşika Theory of Vision," pp. 131-35.
- 4 Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 54 passim: "Ausgeprägtheit."
- 5 This is only a tentative translation which aims at a similar metaphoricalness as that of the Sanskrit term and avoids the tautology involved in other translations which can commonly be found, such as e.g. "being manifest," "being sensible," and "being appreciable." "Being evolved" is unsuitable because of its strong implication of a gradual process and its common use with regard to Sānkhya ontology. "Having uprisen," on the other hand, would be etymologically closer, but misleading in its most common metaphorical usage.
- 6 Cf. op. cit., pp. 53-54, 56-57.
- 7 Cf. op. cit., pp. 174, 177.
- 8 Cf. op. cit., p. 314.

twice in the Daśapadārthī in the context of sensory cognition. Ui assumes zhì (至) to be its — quite improbable — translation equivalent. In the PDhS, on the other hand, udbhava or udbhūtatva, or its contrary, is not named, let alone explained, as a property of the special elementary qualities or even mentioned in the sections on the individual special qualities. udbhūta seems to occur once in the context of sensory cognition, in a passage which will be examined below. And as far as I can tell from a cursory survey the notion of udbhava/udbhūtatva and anudbhava/anudbhūtatva is not an issue either in the relevant chapters of Harivarman's *Tattvasiddhi¹¹, a well-known valuable source for our knowledge of Vaiśeṣika after the final redaction of the VS and probably before the final compilation of the NS.

This lack of attention in the above-mentioned texts is indeed puzzling, considering the important role of this widely used notion in the philosophy of nature of the classical school after Praśastapāda and of its sister school, the Nyāya. Furthermore, the treatment of the topic in the NBh itself makes Frauwallner's assumption problematic. This treatment creates the very strong impression that Vātsyāyana is not reporting long-established ideas, 12 but is himself developing this concept in the context of commenting upon NS III.1.34f., which deal with the non-perception of the visual ray of light. Vātsyāyana reads the concept straight into the sūtra-s which definitely do not presuppose it, on the contrary: lack it conspicuously, and uses it in an expanded manner in his commentary on NS III.1.33 and 33a. And even if the terms udbhava/udbhūtatva and anudbhava/anudbhūtatva in a related sense might have been used elsewhere before him, their development into technical terms and their systematization would still seem to have been largely due to Vātsyāyana.

The extensive passage in the *NBh*, in the commentary on III.1.33 and 33a, details the various possible combinations of *udbhūtatva* and *anudbhūtatva*, primarily in the case of the two special elementary qualities found in fire. First, the warm seasons of the year are explained on the basis of fiery

- 9 In Ui, Vaiseshika Philosophy, p. 250, 1. 5, and 237, 1. 2, respectively. According to him, it relates once to substance, once to qualities in an enumeration starting with the first four special elementary qualities. However, the syntax is not clear to me in both cases.
- 10 Cf. Ui, op. cit., pp. 97, 109; rendered as "appreciable." Although I cannot yet offer complete solutions to the two difficult passages in question, a derivation of $pra-\sqrt{\bar{a}p}$ is much more probable as the underlying original term.
- 11 Cf. chapters 49, 51, 52.
- 12 Cf. maybe also the remark in Potter, *Nyāya-Vaiseṣika*, p. 258, that "Vātsyāyana introduces here the notion of unmanifested (*anudbhūta*) qualities."

substances, with their parts scattered in a regular, continuous manner in space. Only their warm temperature has emerged and can therefore be perceived; their colour, which should be luminously white, has not emerged and is therefore imperceptible. Consequently the substance which is responsible e.g. for summer is not perceived. 13 Similarly, the water substance responsible for the cold seasons possesses only emerged temperature; its colour, which should be white, has not emerged, and therefore the colour and the substance itself are imperceptible.14 The next fiery substance treated by Vatsyayana is the fire contained in heated water which by its nature possesses cold temperature only; it is actually the hot temperature of the intruded fire substance which is perceived. As in the case of the warm seasons, the fiery colour has not emerged and the substance is therefore imperceptible. 15 The opposite is the case with the rays of a lamp; here the colour has emerged and, consequently, the substance itself is perceptible. Its temperature, on the other hand, has not emerged and is thus not perceived. 16 Both qualities have emerged in "ordinary" fire substances, such as

- 13 Cf. NBh 766, 1-2 on NS III.1.33 = ed. 37: tathāvidham (scil. viṣaktāvayavam, see 765,2, quoted in the next n.) eva ca taijasam dravyam anudbhūtarūpam saha rūpena nopalabhyate, sparśas tv asyoṣṇa upalabhyate. tasya dravyasyānubandhād grīṣmavasantau kalpyete. Cf. also Jacobi, "Über tejas, vâyu, âkâça, speciell in der Vaiçeshika Philosophie," p. 242; Ruben, Zur indischen Erkenntnistheorie, p. 31; Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 56; Junankar, Gautama, p. 75. For later references cf. NM II 371,18-20; NTD 81,27-82,2 on NS III.1.33 = ed. 39; Kir 53,18-19; VSUp 274,4 on VS(Up) IV.1.7 and 116,7-8 on II.1.3; SM 42,15-16 on BhP 54 (cf. Sinha, Indian Psychology, I, Cognition, p. 68).
- 14 Cf. NBh 765,2-766,1 on NS III.1.33 = ed. 37: ... mahad anekadravyavac ca viṣaktāva-yavam āpyam dravyam pratyakṣato nopalabhyate, sparśas tu śīto gṛhyate. tasya dravyasyānubandhād hemantaśiśirau kalpyete. On winter in later literature cf. NM II 371,13-17; ŚlVK I 227,5-7 on ŚlV pratyakṣa 51 (cf. also Bhatt, Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, p. 165); NTD 81,26-27 on NS III.1.33 = ed. 39 (l. 27 read mahattvāneka[m]dravya-).
- 15 Cf. NBh 767,2-3 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: udbhūtasparśam anudbhūtarūpam apratyakṣaṃ yathābādisaṃyuktaṃ tejaḥ. For later references cf. e.g. NM II 372,2-3; Vy 257,21-22 and 273,4-5; NKan 444,15-16; NVTŢ 832,21 on III.2.14; SVR I 56,18-19; TBhā § 85, p. 176; VSUp 116,7-8 on VS(Up) II.1.3 and 278,2-4 on IV.1.9. A different opinion seems to have been known to Dharmapāla: the colour has emerged, but is overpowered by the colour of water; cf. Ui, op. cit., p. 80, with reference to CŚ(Dh) 224a 11-12, translated in Tillemans, Materials for the Study of Aryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti, I, p. 144.
- 16 Cf. NBh 767,2 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: udbhūtarūpam anudbhūtasparśam ca pratyakṣam (scil. tejo) yathā pradīparaśmayaḥ. For later references cf. NKan 22,3-4; NVTŢ 832,20 on NS III.2.14; TBhā § 85, p. 176; NTĀ on NS III.1.33. SPṬ 63,13-14 on SP 189 mentions exterior light as an example for this combination.

the sun rays.¹⁷ Lastly, both qualities can lack *udbhūtatva*, as is the case with the imperceptible visual ray of light, the central topic of this section of the *NS*.¹⁸ Vātsyāyana's aim in his exposition is clearly a systematic explanation for this imperceptibility.

Having emerged is therefore according to him a condition for the perceptibility of colour; the possession of emerged colour, on the other hand, is one of the conditions for the perceptibility of a substance. This brings us to Vātsyāyana's interpretation of VS IV.1.6 and 9, as these two sūtra-s are understood by the majority of the tradition as naming the conditions for the perceptibility of substances and colours respectively. Both sūtra-s are transmitted with a considerable number of variants; in the case of IV.1.6 this is true especially for the wording of the beginning of the sūtra, which contains the first condition for the perceptibility of a substance. According to Candrananda's reading this sūtra runs as follows: "With regard to a large [substance], [there is] perception (1) because [it] possesses many substances [as its cause] (i.e., inheres in many substances as its parts) and (2) because of colour" (mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhih). This is the reading found also in the sūtra-text of the so-called anonymous commentator, i.e., Bhattavādīndra, and in that of Śankara Miśra. The sūtra is furthermore known in this form to Kamalaśīla, Yaśomitra, Helārāja, Abhayadeva, Vādideva and Vācaspati Miśra II.19 With the variant anekadravyatvāt it is quoted by Akalanka.20 Vatsyayana himself refers to VS IV.1.6 in three different wordings; although in all cases the sentence is concluded with iti, we might be dealing here with paraphrases only, not with genuine quotations.

¹⁷ Cf. NBh 767,1 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: udbhūtarūpasparšam pratyakṣam tejo yathādityaraśmayaḥ. For later references cf. NVTŢ 832,19 on NS III.2.14; TBhā § 85, p. 176; NTĀ on NS III.1.33; VSUp 116,5-6 on VS(Up) II.1.3.

¹⁸ Cf. NBh 767,3 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: anudbhūtarūpasparśo 'pratyakṣaś cākṣuṣo raśmiḥ. For later references cf. e.g. NM II 372,4-5; NKan 61,8; TBhā § 85, p. 176; VSUp 116,6-7 on VS(Up) II.1.3 and 275,5-6 on IV.1.8; SM 29,12 on BhP 41ab. Cf. also Sinha, op. cit., pp. 71, 73, and Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 134. — On the resulting four types of fiery substances cf. also Dasgupta, The Natural Science of the Ancient Hindus, pp. 13-14 with n. 19; Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 229; Ruben, loc. cit.; Mishra, The Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiçeṣika, p. 330; Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 54; Junankar, loc. cit.; Kumar, Sāṃkhya Thought in the Brahmanical Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 112.

¹⁹ Cf. TSP 52,20 on TS 47, 57,16-17 on 57 and 234,16 on 555; AKVy 561,14 on AK III.100; PrPr 239,22 on VP III sādhanasamuddeśa 10; TBV I 100,39 and V 658,21; SVR I 56,15-16 and IV 929,1; NTĀ on NS III.1.33. Marui ("Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," p. (28)) mentions also Śāntaraksita's VNT 37,23-25 as a testimony for this reading.

²⁰ Cf. TAV II 465,11-12.

Vātsyāyana could have modified the sūtra slightly, while incorporating it into his running commentary. The version found in his commentary on NS III.1.62 combines the first condition, which relates to the material constitution of the substance, with a further condition consisting in a physical quality of the substance: the substance has to be large (mahattvānekadravyatvād rūpāc copalabdhih).21 This is obviously a condition extracted from the restrictive qualification of the object of perception, mentioned in the locative case (mahati), in Candrananda's reading of the sūtra. A combination of these two conditions is found also in a reference by Uddyotakara to VS IV.1.6 in his commentary on NS III.1.33 (mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhih).22 Although one could argue that the two compounds in question could be interpreted differently,²³ in his commentary on NS III.1.31 Vātsyāyana formulates most unambiguously three separate conditions with reference to VS IV.1.6 (mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhih).24 To this, Arcata's reading in the Hetubinduṭīkā is closely related (mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ).25

- NBh 800,3 on NS III.1.62 = ed. 67. Thakur ("Vātsyāyana and the Vaiśeṣika System," p. 80) mentions a divergent reading for this reference which corresponds to the reading found in the HBT and the NV according to Jambuvijayaji's Jaisalmer manuscript (cf. below); however, this is probably based on an error, as it is neither found in the Calcutta edition, used by Thakur, nor in any of the NBh editions available to me at present. According to n. (1) on NBh 800,3 Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's edition reads mahattvānekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ; I could not verify this reference.
- 22 NV 765,6 on NS III.1.33 = ed. 37; in 765,9 the sentence is referred to with the words "idam sūtram" (for a full quotation cf. n. 48 below). Marui, op. cit., p. (30), points out that Jambuvijayaji's Jaisalmer manuscript of the NV reads mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhih. This corresponds to Arcața's reading, cf. below, with n. 25.
- 23 mahattvānekadravyatva could be understood as a karmadhāraya-compound, mahad-anekadravyavattva as a genitive tatpuruṣa. A genitive tatpuruṣa has to be assumed also in Dignāga's paraphrase of VS IV.1,6 as quoted by Vācaspati Miśra I (NVTṬ 165,26 on NS 1.1,5): mahadanekadravyasamavāyād rūpāc copalabdhih.
- 24 NBh 764,3 on NS III.1.31 = ed. 35; here as well Thakur's quotation (loc. cit.) is obviously incorrect: mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpavišeṣāc copalabdhiḥ.
- 25 HBŢ 168,2-3, corresponding to the reading in Jambuvijayaji's NV manuscript (cf. n. 22 above). Durveka Miśra, however, might have read the original locative when composing his commentary hereupon; cf. HBṬĀ 382,7: mahatīti and 382,9: ... mahattvayukte mahati Note that Arcaṭa's reading preserves the wording of the last condition without the added possessive and abstract suffixes. The addition of the possessive and abstract suffixes in Uddyotaraka's reading and in Vātsyāyana's reading in his commentary on NS III.1.31 could be an adaption to the preceding anekadravyavattvāt. Besides, this would make the relation of the last condition, i.e., colour, to the object of perception, the substance, more precise in terms of the Vaiśeṣika categories. The formulation rūpāt, although easily understood, is somehow elliptic, and therefore invites secondary explica-

Finally, there is Vātsyāyana's reference to VS IV.1.6 in his commentary on NS III.1.34, where we have again a combination of the original first condition with the restrictive qualification of the original object of perception turned into a further condition. Furthermore, the original second condition, "colour" (rūpa), is modified to "particularity of colour" (rūpaviśeṣā) (mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ). This modification occurs also in Vyomaśiva's reading of VS IV.1.6, which clarifies in addition that the sūtra is to be understood as indicating the conditions for perceptibility of a substance (mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravyaṃ pratyakṣam). The value of the value

Although the role of the restrictive qualification mahat, the interpretation of the original first condition $anekadravyavattva^{28}$ and its relation to the additional condition mahattva are of considerable interest in themselves, they are outside the concern and scope of this paper.²⁹ It is the interpretation of the second condition on which the present issue hinges, namely, the interpretation of "colour" $(r\bar{u}pa)$. Originally, its implication must have been that substances can only be perceived as qualified by their colour,³⁰ a condition which from early on gave rise to a heated discussion about the percep-

tions. – Dharmapāla (cf. Ui, op. cit., p. 79) refers merely to the opinion of certain Vaisesikas which is based on the sūtra. Thus, his words cannot provide clues for a specific reading. However, it is clear that these Vaisesikas name two conditions for the perception of substances, i.e., the possession of the quality 'large' (not the possession of more than one substance, as referred to by Ui, loc. cit.) and of the quality 'colour'; they too might have added therefore both suffixes to the last condition (cf. CŚ(Dh) 224a 7, translated in Tillemans, op. cit., I, p. 144, with n. 249 on 'large'; cf. also Marui, op. cit., p. (31)).

- 26 NBh 769,4-5 on NS III.1.34 = ed. 40; cf. also Thakur, loc. cit.
- 27 Vy 557,21-22, introduced with the words tathā ca sūtram and concluded with iti; cf. also 272,21-22, where the sentence is again concluded with iti and explicitly called a sūtra, and 442,6-7, to be corrected, with Vy(G) II 16,14, to ... dravya(m) pratyakṣam. Cf. also Mishra, op. cit., p. 293, n. 17; Varadachari, "Conditions for the Rise of Perceptual Cognition," n. 22, p. 250; Hattori, "Two Types of Non-Qualificative Perception," n. 6, p. 162. On more remote references to VS IV.1.6 cf. Marui, op. cit., pp. (30)-(31); the reference by Śālikanātha in PrP 131,5f. is also treated in Preisendanz, Studien zu Nyāyasūtra III.1, n. 173.
- 28 My above translation follows Hattori's interpretation in op. cit., p. 162, and Dignāga, n. 4.37, p. 141; however, there he understands dravya in the sense of 'atoms.' In Potter, op. cit., p. 215, he paraphrases with 'substances.' Frauwallner as well understands anekadravyavattva in this way (cf. op. cit., p. 177), although for the rest of the sūtra he follows Vyomaśiva's reading and interpretation.
- 29 For an extensive discussion cf. Preisendanz, *loc. cit.*; cf. also Marui, *op. cit.*, pp. (33)-(35).
- 30 On this aspect cf. Halbfass, "Zum Begriff der Substanz (*dravya*) im Vaiśeşika," pp. 154-55, with n. 43.

tibility of wind³¹ and which led to partial changes in the conditions for the perceptibility of substances.³² "Colour" ($r\bar{u}pa$) is now modified into "particularity of colour" ($r\bar{u}pavi\acute{s}es\acute{s}a$) by both Vātsyāyana and Vyomaśiva. This modification gets some legitimization from a later $s\bar{u}tra$ in the context of perception, namely, VS IV.1.9, which details the conditions for the perceptibility of colour, again following the majority of the tradition with which I have been siding so far. According to $s\bar{u}tra$ 9 there is "perception [of colour], (1) because [it] inheres in a substance whose [constituent] substances are many and (2) because of the/a particularity of colour" (anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ). This reading adopted by Jambuvijayaji is the one according to manuscript P of Candrānanda's commentary.

VS IV.1.9 in a slightly deviating version is incorporated by Vātsyāyana into his commentary on NS III.1.33, immediately after his exposition of the warm seasons, paraphrased above. The part of the sentence corresponding to VS IV.1.9 is considered as a sūtra by some, and therefore appears as III.1.33a in Ruben's edition of the NS. In it, the first condition is contracted to anekadravyasamavāya, and the object of perception is made explicit by rūpopalabdhiḥ (anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ).³³ This lectio(?) facilior, transmitted in the sūtra-text of Śaṅkara Miśra as sūtra IV.1.8, was known also to Uddyotakara, as evidenced by his commentary on NS I.2.2,³⁴ and to Helārāja³⁵. A further version, concluded with iti, is found in Vātsyāyana's commentary on NS III.1.34; it corresponds to the reading of the sūtra in the sūtrapāṭha-manuscript PS and in manuscript O of Candrānanda's commentary used by Jambuvijayaji (anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ).³⁶ An additional slightly diverging

- 31 For a discussion and references cf. Preisendanz, op. cit., n. 95.
- 32 On VS IV.1.6 under the aspect of the visual perception of substances as wholes cf. Matilal, *Perception*, pp. 281-86.
- 33 NBh 766,4 = "NS" III.1.33a; for a full quotation and translation of the sentence cf. below.
- 34 Cf. NV 358,4-5 on NS 1.2.2; this sentence, followed by iti and a version of VS IV.1.10 also concluded with iti, seems to be a genuine reading of the sūtra, not a paraphrase only. The conflicting information given in NV(M) p. 624, n. 12, is based on the reading found in NV(M) 624,19 on 1.2.2, which preserves the beginning of the sūtra according to Candrānanda's text in manuscript P: anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhih. For the reading in NV(BI) on 1.2.2 cf. below, n. 37.
- 35 Cf. PrPr 241,5 on VP III sādhanasamuddeśa 10.
- 36 NBh 769,3 on NS III.1.34 = ed. 40. In this version the wording of the first condition, similar to Vātsyāyana's version in "NS" III.1.33a, does not point as distinctly towards an understanding of anekadravya as a bahuvrīhi-compound as does the reading in manuscript P of Candrānanda's commentary. The VSVr itself seems to indicate that

version is provided by Uddyotakara in his commentary on NS III.1.33a (anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ),³⁷ a version combining the sūtra with VS IV.1.6 by Prabhācandra (mahaty anekadravyatvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ).³⁸

To return to VS IV.1.9 as incorporated by Vātsyāyana into his commentary on NS III.1.33, that is, to the so-called NS III.1.33a. Put into contrast with the preceding statement that – together with its colour – the fiery substance responsible for the warm seasons is not perceived, in as much as it possesses colour which has not emerged, the complete sentence runs as follows: "Where, however, it happens, [i.e.] perception of colour because of inherence in a substance whose [constituent] substances are many and because of a particularity of colour, there both the colour and the substance which is its support are directly perceived." Following this sentence containing the reference to VS IV.1.9 Vātsyāyana clarifies as well how he understands rūpaviśeṣa: "As regards the particularity of colour, however, it is that property of colour on account of whose presence a colour is perceived in certain cases and on account of whose absence a substance is not perceived in certain cases; it is called 'having emerged' (udbhava)."40

Candrānanda read only anekadravyeṇa, not anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa; cf. VSVṛ 33,13: mahatānekadravyasamavāyidravyeṇa ghaṭādinā..., 33,19 (on IV.1.11) according to O: ... anekadravyeṇa samavāyābhāvāt ... and 34,6 (on IV.1.14): ... anekadravyā samavāyāt ... 33,19 according to P and 33,16 (on IV.1.10), however, support anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa. – Thakur (op. cit., pp. 79-80) argues unconvincingly for the fact that because of this difference "NS" III.1.33a is quoted by Vātsyāyana "from elsewhere."

- 37 NV 766,13-14 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38; to this corresponds the version in the commentary on NS 1.2.2 according to NV(BI) 163,4. NV(BI) 381,4 on 33a = ed. 36, however, reads: anekadravyadravyeṇa NV 766,13-14 seems to be merely a gloss of NS III.1.33a.
- 38 NKC I 30,20-21. According to Ui, op. cit., p. 61, Harivarman knew a further version, in which rūpaviśeṣa is lacking: "Colour residing in substances which are large and more than one is visible." He is probably referring to *Tattvasiddhi 329c 26-27, which however does not seem to be a quotation. To the sentence translated by Ui it is furthermore added that colour is grasped because of colour. In Sastri's "retranslation" (cf. Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman, I, p. 365,3-4) this results in a version of VS IV1.9, which combines IV.1.6 and 9 into one, similar to Prabhācandra's combined version.
- 39 NBh 766,3-6 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: yatra tv eṣā bhavaty "anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhis" (= NS III.1.33a) tatra rūpaṃ ca dravyaṃ ca tadāśrayaḥ pratyakṣata upalabhyate.
- 40 NBh 766,6-8 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: rūpavišeṣas tu yadbhāvāt kvacid rūpopalabdhir yadabhāvāc ca dravyasya kvacid anupalabdhiḥ sa rūpadharmo 'yam udbhavasamākhyāta iti. Cf. also Varadachari, op. cit., p. 249, who assumes, however, that the particularity of colour is called udbhavasama by Vātsyāyana(!), and Junankar, loc. cit.

Thus, Vātsyāyana interprets the particularity of colour (rūpaviśesa) in VS IV.1.9 as referring to the fact that a colour has emerged in the technical sense that he had given to the terms udbhava and udbhūtatva.41 The same holds good for the original second condition for perceptibility of a substance in VS IV.1.6, for which condition Vatsyayana has rūpaviśeṣa instead of the original rūpa in one of his references to the sūtra (NBh 769,4-5). Vyomaśiva adopts this interpretation; it was already pointed out above that he reads the modified second condition rūpaviśeṣa in VS IV.1.6. As regards sūtra 9, he incorporates it or a paraphrase thereof into his commentary on Praśastapāda's section on rūpa. And just as in the case of sūtra 6, his version amplifies that the sūtra should name the conditions for perceptibility, here of colour (anekadravyena \danavena \danavena \samavayat svagatavi\(\frac{se}{ac}\) ca rūpam pratyakṣam).42 The "particularity belonging to it" (svagataviśeṣa) in his quotation or paraphrase of sūtra 9 is explained by him in the same way as the "particularity of colour" (rūpaviśeṣa) in his version of sūtra 6: the "particularity" is a special factor which supports perception, a property of colour, and called "having emerged" (udbhava). On account of its presence there is perception of a colour and of a substance possessing colour; on account of its absence neither is perceived.⁴³ The same explanation is given

- This is also the interpretation of rūpaviśeṣa in VS IV.1.9 e.g., by Faddegon (The Vaiçeṣika-System, pp. 284, 289), Dasgupta (History of Indian Philosophy, I, p. 290, with n. 3), Ruben (loc. cit., where the sentence is still considered as part of the Nyāyasūtra and not recognized as a reference to VS IV.1.9 by Vātsyāyana) and Frauwallner (op. cit., p. 174); Matilal (op. cit., p. 283) remains vague with "specific nature." On Uddyotakara's comments, which follow Vātsyāyana's interpretation, cf. Marui, op. cit., pp. (40)-(42), and "A Study on the Textual Problems of the Padārthadharmasaṃgraha," pp. 117-119. I am grateful to Mr. Isaacson for making me aware of the latter paper and providing a copy of it.
- 42 Vy 441,20-21; (dravyena) according to Vy(Ms) 108b 7.
- Cf. Vy 257,16-21, relating obviously to his reading of VS IV.1.6; the context is the non-perception of the sense of vision (cf. the context of Vātsyāyana's exposition of udbhava and anudbhava): atha mahattvād anekadravya(vat?)tvāc cakṣuṣaḥ kasmād indriyeṇo-palambho na bhavati pradīpasyeva? viśiṣṭarūpābhāvāt. yatra hi ⟨rūpaviśeṣo⟩ (scil. tatra) rūpavaddravyasya cakṣuḥṣparśanābhyām upalambha iti. rūpaviśeṣas tu yatkṛtā[rthe] ⟨kva⟩cid (cf. also Vy(G) I 86,1-2) viṣaye rūpopalabdhir yadabhāvāc ca mahadanekadravyāśrayasyāpy anupalabdhiḥ sa udbhavasamākhyāto rūpadharma⟨ḥ⟩ sahakāriviśeṣa iti. For Vyomaśiva's explanation of his quotation or paraphrase of VS IV.1.9 cf. Vy 441,24-27: sūtrārthas tv anekaṃ dravyaṃ janakam asy[e]⟨ās⟩tīty (or: asye[tī]ty; VY(Ms): asyetity) anekadravyaṃ ⟨dravyaṃ, acc. to Vy(Ms) 108b 9⟩, tena saha samavāyāt, svagataviśeṣ[aniyata]⟨āc ceti yat⟩sadbhāve (Vy(Ms) 108b 9: viśeṣeti yatsadbhāve, ti might be marked to be deleted) kvacid rūpopalabdhir yadabhāvāc cānupalabdhiḥ sa eva sahakāriviśeṣo 'padiśyate, tasmāc ca rūpaṃ pratyakṣam.

on a third occasion, when Vyomasiva comments upon svagatavisesa in Prasastapāda's remarks concerning the conditions for the arising of perception of colour, taste, smell and temperature.⁴⁴ The extreme closeness in wording, which cannot be a coincidence, makes it even clearer that Vyomasiva has taken over this interpretation of the second condition in VS IV.1.6 and 9 from Vātsyāyana. There is even some probability that Vyomasiva read the relevant passage in the NBh according to a variant recorded by the editors of the Calcutta edition.⁴⁵

Further testimony to this interpretation of the original second condition in VS IV.1.6, even in its original reading $r\bar{u}p\bar{a}t$, is provided by Vācaspati Miśra I, Durveka Miśra and Bhaṭṭavādīndra.⁴⁶ Vyomaśiva's interpretation of svagataviśeṣa in the PDhS as udbhava, on the other hand, is adopted also by Udayana.⁴⁷

This brings us to the *PDhS* and possible clues as to Praśastapāda's understanding of the two sūtra-s. First of all, both of them, together with the following sūtra 10, which applies the statement of sūtra 9 to taste, smell and temperature (etena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānam vyākhyātam), are not understood as relating to the conditions for perceptibility of substances and special elementary qualities. Instead, Praśastapāda takes them as relating to the conditions for the arising of their perception. Such an alternative interpretation of VS IV.1.6 by "others" is mentioned by Uddyotakara and criticised, as the three (so according to him) conditions named are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the arising of perception.⁴⁸ It cannot, however, be Praśastapāda himself to whom he refers, because the former adds further causes to the two already contained in both the sūtra-s. For the first

- 44 Cf. Vy 558,14-16 on PDhS 459,2f., to be discussed below: ... svagataviśeṣāc ca yatkṛtā kvacid viṣaye teṣām upalabdhir yadabhāvāc cānupalabdhiḥ sa udbhavasamākhyāto rūpādidharmaḥ sahakāriviśeṣas, tasmāt
- 45 Compare the beginning of Vy 257,19-21 and 558,14-16 with the variant recorded in n. (4) on NBh 766,3-8 (yatkrtā kvacit instead of yadbhāvāt kvacit).
- 46 Cf. NVTŢ 765,10-11 on NS III.1.32 = ed. 36, on rūpaviśeṣāt in VS IV.1.6(?): ... asau viśeṣa udbhavasamākhyātaḥ; HBṬĀ 383,2 on rūpāt in VS IV.1.6: te hi rūpād ity udbhūtasamākhyātād iti viśeṣya nāyanaraśmyavayaviny upalabdhiṃ nivartayanti; VSVy 44,10 on rūpāt in VS IV.1.6 = ed. 5: rūpād ity atrodbh[a]⟨ū⟩tād iti śeṣaḥ.
- 47 Cf. Kir 186,20 on PDhS 459,2f.: svagataviśesād udbhūta(tva?)samākhyātāt.
- 48 Cf. NV 765,6-9 on NS III.1.33 = ed. 37: apare tu mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhir ity upalabdhau niyamam varņayanti, nopalabhyamāna iti. kim uktam bhavati? na yukto yatra yatra mahadanekadravyavattvarūpāṇi santi tat tad upalabhyata ity, api tu yad yad upalabhyate tatra tatra mahadanekadravyavattvarūpāṇi santīti. evam tarhīdam sūtram nopalabdheḥ kāraṇapratipādakam satsv abhāvād iti satsu mahadanekadravya(vattva?)rūpeṣūpalabdhir na bhavatīti naitāny upalabdhikāraṇam iti.

stage of perception of a large substance,⁴⁹ called "intuition of the own nature [of the substance]" (svarūpālocanamātra), these are light, the contact of the group of four and the presence of the causal complex consisting of dharma etc. "Colour" (rūpa) in VS IV.1.6 is seemingly taken up with "emerged colour" (udbhūtarupa).⁵⁰ This would be the single explicit reference to this concept in Praśastapāda's preserved work. However, Vyomaśiva obviously did not read it here.⁵¹ Śrīdhara, on the other hand, tries to find a place here for the concept of udbhava in a very forced way; he interprets rūpaprakāśa as referring to this very property of colour. There would have been no need for him to resort to this, if he had read udbhūta in the compound.⁵² These observations which cast doubt on the reading in the PDhS are corroborated by the testimony of all but one of the manuscripts of this text which have so far been examined by Isaacson; they do not contain

- 49 Praśastapāda obviously read VS IV.1.6 with the restrictive qualification of the object in the locative case (mahati).
- 50 Cf. PDhS 443,1-2: dravye tāvad [dvi]\tri\vidhe mahaty anekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpa-prakāśacatuṣṭayasannikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpālocanamātram. Cf. also Mishra, op. cit., p. 362, under the influence of Vyomaśiva; Shastri, The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, p. 435; Hattori, "Two Types...," pp. 161-62. On the emendation of dvividhe to trividhe, the reading attested in the edition with the Vy and by Vyomaśiva's commentary and the one preferred also by Shastri, cf. Hattori, op. cit., n. 2, p. 161; cf. also Marui, op. cit., p. 115, who includes the testimony of the Kir. One might add that although Śrīdhara does not quote the word, his commentary shows that he must have read trividhe as well; cf. NKan 444,13: mahati dravye pṛthivyaptejolakṣaṇe
- Cf. Vy 557,18-19: anekadravya(vat)tvam ca rūpa[tva]m ca prakāśaś ca catuṣṭayasan-nikarṣaś ceti tathoktas, tasmāt... Vy(Ms) 178a 3 does not read rūpatvam, but rūpavattvam, which makes good sense, but probably rūpam is to be preferred (cf. also Marui's suggestion, op. cit., p. 113) as Vyomaśiva merely dissolves the dvandva-compound at this point. In Vy(G) II 141,11 the reading is rūpam, without any indication as to this being an emendation. The expected and missing qualification of rūpa, udbhūta-, is added in brackets. The emendation of anekadravya(vat)tvam is also suggested by Gaurinath Sastri and Marui (loc. cit., with n. 36), who equally concludes that Vyomaśiva did not read udbhūta (cf. op. cit., pp. 116 and 118).
- 52 Cf. NKan 444,15: rūpasya prakāśa udbhavasamākhyāto rūpasya dharmaḥ... ("the shining forth of colour, [i.e.] the property of colour called 'having emerged'"). Hattori, op. cit., p. 161, follows Śrīdhara's interpretation in his understanding of the expanded expression udbhūtarūpaprakāśa ("manifestation of distinct color"); cf. also Jha's translation in Padārthadharmasangraha of Praśastapāda, p. 391 ("appearance of manifested colour"). Randle seems to be unclear about the compound, but he might refer to udbhūtarūpaprakāśa with "show manifest colour"; cf. Indian Logic in the Early Schools, p. 107. Shastri (loc. cit.), however, separates udbhūtarūpa and prakāśa. For Marui's identical conclusion as to Śrīdhara's text cf. Marui, op. cit., pp. 116 and 119.

this qualification of $r\bar{u}pa$.⁵³ Udayana's commentary poses problems as to its own correct text, but there are several points which indicate strongly that Udayana too did not read $udbh\bar{u}ta$ in the copy of Praśastapāda's text at his disposal.⁵⁴

If Praśastapāda did not mention emerged colour in his reference to VS IV.1.6, one should examine next his reference to VS IV.1.9. As regards the arising of perception of the special elementary qualities, he relates to VS IV.1.9 and 10 summarily. The only additional condition named there, probably for brevity's sake, is the crucial contact of the respective sense with the support of the respective quality, i.e., the substance in which the latter inheres. 55 rūpaviśeṣa, and by extension through sūtra 10, rasaviśeṣa etc., are

- Prof. Marui communicated to me in addition that one of the manuscripts preserved at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute has obviously *udbhūta* added by a second hand. As Mr. Isaacson has pointed out to me *udbhūta* is actually missing in the Lahore edition of 1888, which has not been available to me; cf. also Marui, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, with n. 29, and 116.
- 54 Kir 184,18 is obviously corrupt; one should probably read ... udbhūtarūpam ca prakāśa[sy]\(\(\frac{s}{c}\)\alphalokas, taih sahitā[\(\hat{h}\)]\(\cappa\)\cappa catustayasannikarṣāt... udbhūtarūpam as such does not prove conclusively that Udayana had udbhūta before him. He could have simply augmented rūpa in the text of the Padārthadharmasangraha available to him with udbhūta as a brief explanation, instead of saying e.g., rūpam codbhūtarūpam or rūpam codbhūtam rūpam. However, there are clues to the fact that he did indeed explain mere rupa in the text before him in a similar more elaborate way and that the beginning of the above quoted sentence with udbhūtarūpam ca, as presented by Jetly, is corrupt as well. Vedantatirtha's edition of this section of the Kiranāvalī in Kir(V), which is based on two manuscripts and the text as printed in Vindhyeśvarī Prasād Dvivedī's edition of the Kiraṇāvalī of 1897 (Benares Sanskrit Series 9, not available to me), shows that his materials too posed problems at this point. Kir(V) 532,1 omits udbhūtarūpam ca altogether! On the other hand, the immediately preceding word, svabhāvah, which Jetly draws with his punctuation to the end of the preceding explanation of Praśastapāda's anekadravyavattva and which does not make much sense to me, appears as svabhāvam in Kir(V) 532,1. If that would not be enough to make one doubt the correctness of the text as printed in both editions at this point (and presumably in Dvivedi's edition as well), Vardhamāna's commentary shows clearly that svabhāvam is correct and belongs to the explanation of rūpa, and only rūpa, which is, however, incomplete in both the editions used here; cf. KirPr 532,11-12: ... vişayastham ca rūpam udbhūtam sahakārīty āha - rūpam codbhūtasvabhāvam iti (cf. also the emendation in Marui, op. cit., p. 114, with n. 37). It seems therefore that all the manuscripts used by the editors so far are defective at this point as well. One could even speculate that Jetly's two manuscripts reflect an attempt to make sense of the manuscript reading as presented in Kir(V).
- 55 The addition of this condition is necessitated by the introduction of the classical doctrine of categories; on this aspect cf. Halbfass, op. cit., p. 157.

paraphrased with svagataviśeṣa. 56 This expression has already been encountered above in the context of Vyomaśiva's version of VS IV.1.9; there and in the PDhS he had explained it as referring to the property udbhava. However, a completely different interpretation of Praśastapāda's svagataviśeṣa and therefore indirectly of rūpaviśeṣa in VS IV.1.9 is found in the NKan.

According to Śrīdhara, who had tried - unconvincingly - to accommodate the concept of udbhava elsewhere, the "particularity of colour" etc. is the fact of being colour etc., i.e., the differentiating or specific universal (sāmānyaviśeṣa) inhering in colour etc.⁵⁷ Because these specific universals too are causes for the perception of the special elementary qualities, the senses are allotted to their respective objects in a restrictive way. Otherwise there would be confusion.⁵⁸ By Śrīdhara's times this means that among the senses e.g. only the sense of vision possesses colour as its prominent special quality and is therefore receptive only to colour as its object; in this sense the colour's "being colour" is a cause for the arising of its perception by a specific determined sense. Even if there is no evidence that Praśastapāda used the concept of prominence of special elementary qualities,59 this interpretation of svagataviśesa as relating to specific universals is more plausible than that by Vyomaśiva. If Praśastapāda indeed understood rūpaviśesa in VS IV.1.9 as the specific particularity of colour consisting in its having emerged, and by extension through IV.1.10 viśesa as such a particularity of taste etc., as well, why did he not say so here with a single clarifying expression such as udbhūtatva? Had he understood viśesa actually as a specialty or particular excellence, why did he not specify it? Instead he generalizes further with the expression svagataviśesa. Besides, he stresses that the perception of colour etc., is caused by respectively determined senses. 60 For these reasons, and because of Prasastapada's otherwise strictly terminological use of viśesa, Śrīdhara's interpretation in general is to be preferred over Vyomaśiva's.

⁵⁶ Cf. PDhS 459,2f.: rūparasagandhasparśeṣv anekadravyasamavāyāt svagataviśeṣāt svāśrayasannikarṣān niyatendriyanimittam (scil. pratyakṣam) utpadyate.

⁵⁷ Cf. also Ui, op. cit., p. 196, on VS(Up) IV.1.6-10; Randle, op. cit., p. 110, with n. 3; Mishra, op. cit., p. 363; Hattori in Potter, op. cit., pp. 215-16.

⁵⁸ Cf. NKan 459,9-10: svagato viśeso rūpe rūpatvam, rase rasatvam, gandhe gandhatvam, sparśe sparśatvam, tasmāt...; 460,9-10: svagataviśesāṇām hetutvād rūpādiṣv indriyavyavasthā. anyathā pariplavaḥ syād viśesābhāvāt.

⁵⁹ Cf. the discussion below.

⁶⁰ niyatendriyanimitta, cf. the full quotation in n. 56 above.

Support for such a preference comes as well from Candrānanda, who takes rūpaviśeṣa in VS IV.1.9 in this very sense.⁶¹ He might have been influenced in this by his understanding of svagataviśeṣa in the PDhS in turn.⁶² Earlier testimony is provided by Praśastapāda's older contemporary Dignāga.⁶³ In the Vaiśeṣika section of the pratyakṣa-chapter of his PS he refers in his autocommentary to an interpretation of VS IV.1.11 by a certain Vaiśeṣika, or a group of Vaiśeṣikas, which again implies an interpretation of rūpaviśeṣa as rūpatva in VS IV.1.9. The context, which cannot be fully paraphrased here,⁶⁴ is the sensory cognition of the substance by both vision and touch, claimed by the Vaiśeṣika. Dignāga points out in verse 2c that colour etc., too should be perceived by all senses, if the substance, although

- 61 Cf. VSVṛ 33,13-14: ... rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpatvākhyāt sāmānyaviśeṣād upalabdhiḥ (cf. also Hattori, Dignāga, n. 4.38, p. 142; Marui, "Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," p. (37), and "A Study ...," p. 117). He applies this understanding of viśeṣa also to the other three special elementary qualities and their perception, referred to in IV.1.10 (cf. also Marui, "Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," p. (38)).
- 62 As Praśastapāda's reference to VS IV.1.9 and 10 in PDhS 459,2f. is quite obvious, it is also conceivable that Candrananda adopted Śridhara's interpretation thereof and applied it to his interpretation of the sūtra; Candrānanda's reliance on the PDhS in his VScommentary is well-known. This assumes that he knew the NKan as a contemporary text, for he could not have lived after Śrīdhara, as Aklujkar ("Candrānanda's Date") could establish the 10th c. as the upper limit for Candrananda's life. This is based on reference to Candrānanda by Helārāja; it can be added that Helārāja knew as well Candrānanda's explanation of rūpaviśeṣa (cf. below) and his interpretation of VS IV.1.11. Vice versa it is equally possible that Candrananda lived before Śrīdhara; the lower limit of Candrananda's life is established by his well-known quotation from the NV (VSVr 29,2-4 on VS III.2.4; Matilal, without reasons though, gives the 8th or 9th c. as Candrānanda's date, cf. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, p. 74). In this case, Śrīdhara might have interpreted svagataviśesa in the PDhS under the influence of Candrananda's explanation of rūpavišesa in VS IV.1.9, to which Prašastapāda's svagatavišesa eventually goes back. Candrananda, on the other hand, could have been guided in his interpretation of the sūtra by his understanding of the relevant passage in the PDhS. - Of course, both Candrananda and Śrīdhara could also independently of each other have been aware of the older interpretation of the sūtra and been guided by this awareness in their understanding of Praśastapāda's intention in PDhS 459,2f.
- 63 Cf. also Marui, "Vaiśeşikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," pp. (37)-(38), and "A Study ...," p. 118. Prof. Hattori, in his contribution to this volume, has shown that Praśastapāda was known to the author of the *Tarkajvālā*. If indeed this commentator is identical with Bhāviveka, the author of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, this would make Praśastapāda only very slightly junior to Dignāga.
- 64 For an explanatory paraphrase of *PSVr* 203,14-28 on *PS* I 4 (Vaiśeşika) 2b according to Kanakavarman, in some aspects deviating considerably from Hattori's interpretation in *Dignāga*, cf. again Preisendanz, *op. cit.*, n. 173.

one and not manifold, could be perceived by more than one sense.⁶⁵ One sense could perceive the object of another sense; they would not be allotted to their specific objects anymore. The Vaiśeṣika's reply incorporates the crucial interpretation of VS IV.1.11 (tadabhāvād avyabhicāraḥ): the said faults do not obtain, because the specific particularities (*viśeṣa) of colour etc., determine in a restrictive way by which sense colour etc., are perceived. Because these particularities, i.e., being taste etc., do not exist e.g. in a blue object (tadabhāvāt), a cognition by a sense, e.g. taste, does not deviate towards this blue object (avyabhicāraḥ). Something in which the fact of being colour (*rūpatva) does not exist, cannot be perceived by the sense of vision. In the same way touch etc., are restricted to their specific objects by these particularities, i.e., the specific universals, of temperature etc.⁶⁶

The following re-interpretation of VS IV.1.11 by the Vaiśeṣika, reported by Dignāga, is not of immediate concern for the present issue. What is important is the fact that at least one pre-Praśastapāda commentator⁶⁷ understood tat- in VS IV.1.11 as referring to the specific universals rūpatva etc. From this one can infer that he interpreted rūpaviśeṣa in sūtra 9 as rūpatva, to which the demonstrative pronoun in sūtra 11 can relate back. Similarly, by extension through sūtra 10, he would have assumed rasatva etc., as conditions for perceptibility in the case of taste etc.;⁶⁸ although only implied through sūtra 10, they can also be related to by tat- in sūtra 11.

- 65 Cf. PSVr 203,29-33 according to Kanakavarman: gal te yan don tha mi dad pa yan dban po du mas 'dzin pa yin na gzugs la sogs pa so so la yan "dban po kun gyi(s) 'dzin par 'gyur" (= 2c) te rdzas la sogs pa bźin no. de ltar na yan gzugs la sogs pa [la] yan dban po du mas gzun bar bya bar 'gyur ro.
- 66 Cf. PSVṛ 205,1-6 according to Kanakavarman: ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te. gzugs la sogs pa de dag la raṅ raṅ gi bye brag nes pa yod pa yin la, de med pa'i phyir dban po'i blo snon po la mi 'khrul to że na ci ltar na de dag nes pa byed pa ñid yin? gan la gzugs ñid med pa de mig gi gzun bar bya ba ma yin la, de bźin du reg par bya ba la sogs pa rnams kyi yaṅ raṅ raṅ gi yul nes pa ñid yin pa ... Jinendrabuddhi's reading of the second sentence suggests that the objects(?) are determining in a restrictive way the sensory cognitions with regard to their own specific particularities; cf. PSŢ 65b 4: raṅ gi bye brag la nes par byed pa rnams so, with 5: dban po'i blo rnams kyi żes sbral bar bya'o. Instead of *svasvaviṣaya he must have read *svaviśeṣa, which I find difficult to understand. Cf. also PSVṛ 205,11-13 according to Kanakavarman: ... de lta na gan la gzugs ñid yod pa de mig gi gzun bya yin te. de lta bas na reg bya la sogs pa la yan de bźin du nes pa ñid kyis khyad par yod pa yin no.
- 67 In the light of Prof. Hattori's results mentioned in n. 63 above this would not be so certain any longer; he could be a contemporary of Praśastapāda as well.
- 68 This is indicated in the sentence preceding the paraphrase of VS IV.1.11 with *rūpādişu. Cf. also the quotation of PSVr 205,11-13 in n. 66 above.

This interpretation of VS IV.1.11 is clearly to be preferred over others which cannot be discussed here.⁶⁹ The sūtra would thus account in general for the assignment of the senses to their respective special objects. The crucial factor in this determination, appearing only in the form of tat-, would actually have been mentioned before explicitly in sūtra 9 with rūpaviśeṣa, by extension through sūtra 10 implicitly with rasaviśeṣa, i.e., rasatva, etc. Interesting in other aspects as well,⁷⁰ Vyomaśiva's interpretation of sūtra 11 is close to that by Dignāga's opponent, although he did take rūpaviśeṣa in sūtra 9 as referring to the colour's having emerged.

Lastly, Bhartrhari already seems to relate to VS IV.1.9 and 10, next to IV.1.6. He takes the sūtra-s to refer to the causes or means (sādhana) for being object of perception (dṛṣṭikarman), i.e., for perceptibility. In verse 10d of VP III, sādhanasamuddeśa, the cause rūpatva could refer to rūpaviśeṣa in VS IV.1.9, whereas the specific universals (sāmānyaviśeṣa) of taste etc., adduced in verse 11a, could go back to the generalizing VS IV.1.10.71 Helārāja, who knows both interpretations of rūpaviśeṣa in VS IV.1.9, identifies the interpretation in the sense of rūpatva as the one intended here by Bhartrhari.72

In the face of the evidence accumulated above we should therefore accept the interpretation of $r\bar{u}pavi\acute{s}e_{\dot{s}a}$ etc., in the sense of the specific universals of colour etc., as the most probable original intention of the $s\bar{u}trak\bar{a}ra$. However, at the time of the VS itself, the explanation given above – within the context of the passage PDhS 459,2f. and Śrīdhara's commentary on it – of the precise way in which these universals are causes for the arising of perception by specific senses, an explanation which can be modified to relate to the conditions for perceptibility probably meant in VS IV.1.6f., does not yet seem possible to me; elsewhere I have tried to show that the important concept of the prominence of one of the special elementary qualities in the elements and therefore in the senses made of them has been developed in the NS only, on the basis of VS VIII.16-17.73

- 69 Cf. also Hattori's judgment in op. cit., n. 4.37, p. 142. For a discussion of Candrānanda's interpretation cf. Preisendanz, loc. cit.
- 70 Cf. again Preisendanz, loc. cit.
- 71 Cf. VP III sādhanasamuddeśa 10: ghaṭasya dṛṣṭikarmatve mahattvādīni sādhanam/ rūpasya dṛṣṭikarmatve rūpatvādīni sādhanam|| 11: svaiḥ sāmānyaviśeṣaiś ca śaktimanto rasādayaḥ| niyatagrahaṇā loke, śaktayas tās tathāśrayaiḥ||
- 72 Cf. PrPr 241,3 and 7-9 on VP III sādhanasamuddeśa 10.
- 73 For an extensive discussion of this cf. Preisendanz, op. cit., n. 263. VS VIII.16 according to Candrānanda and VSVy reads: bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne, VS VIII.17 according to manuscript P of Candrānanda's commentary: tathāpas tejo vāyuś ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu rasarūpasparśaviśeṣād iti. On further readings and their discussion cf. Preisendanz, loc. cit.

But even without this improvement the specific universals of the special elementary qualities can be understood to serve the above purpose up to a certain point within the context of the VS. For example, colour has "being colour" and is therefore perceptible by the sense of vision which possesses colour (which again has "being colour") itself; it cannot be apprehended by touch, as this sense does not possess colour. Taste on the other hand, which lacks "being colour," but has "being taste," is not perceptible by the sense of vision which for its part lacks taste, the substratum of "being taste": taste is perceived by the sense of taste which possesses taste itself. In this light, the difficult rasarūpasparśaviśesa in VS VIII.17, which was obviously read by Candrananda, although he does not repeat the word in his commentary, could be understood as well as referring to the specific universals inhering in taste, colour and temperature.⁷⁴ Admittedly, the topic is a different one in VS VIII.16-17; these sūtra-s deal with the question which elements are the material causes with regard to the perceptions of the various special elementary qualities, i.e., the material causes in the senses. But this question is closely related to the present context, and the interpretation of -viśesa in both contexts as referring to the specific universals as just explained would even link the two in a meaningful way. Special elementary qualities are perceptible by specific senses in as much as these qualities have their respective specific universals such as being colour etc., which are present in the specific senses by virtue of their possessing the corresponding quality themselves (VS IV.1.9-10). On the other hand, one of the two reasons why specific elements are the material causes with regard to the perceptions of specific special qualities is that they themselves possess the respective quality which again has the respective specific universal such as being colour etc. (VS VIII.16-17). These specific universals present in the special qualities and - indirectly by way of their qualities - in the senses link them as what can be perceived and what is the material cause in perception.

The question why e.g. the fiery sense of vision does not function in the perception of temperature also, as it equally has – indirectly – the specific universal of being temperature, or why the earthy sense of smell does not function in the perception of all four qualities to which it possesses counterparts which again have the respective specific universals, has obviously not been asked explicitly in this context; there is even evidence for early criticism of this oversight.⁷⁵ One could also ask why a special elementary

⁷⁴ Candrānanda interprets rasarūpasparśaviśeṣa as relating to the specific special qualities of the elements in question, i.e., to sweet taste, which has not arisen through a thermic process, to white and luminous colour, etc.; cf. VSVr 65,6-7 on VS VIII.17.

⁷⁵ Cf. Preisendanz, loc. cit.

quality such as colour should not be perceptible by e.g. the sense of taste, if being colour is a condition for its perceptibility in as much as that by which it is perceived should be linked to the same specific universal. The notion of prominence (utkarṣa) of one of the special qualities in an element and therefore also in a sense made of it is urgently needed and provided by NS III.1.63 only. It should be noted that Praśastapāda does not yet use it in his preserved work, and that it does not come up in Dignāga's discussion with his Vaiśeṣika opponent. Maybe they saw e.g. colour as the essential special quality of the sense of vision simply because it is the one that it has in addition to the qualities owned by the sense of touch.

Even if one agrees with the above argumentation so far one could still ask why the wording in VS IV.1.9 is rūpavišesa, and not simply rūpatva, which one would expect if the specific universal was intended here. One reason for this I infer from the presence of the following sūtra 10 which extends the statement of sūtra 9 to taste etc.: with the wording rūpaviśesa in sūtra 9 the author can imply some kind of anuvrtti in sūtra 10 not only of the first condition of sūtra 9, which would not have to be changed at all, but also of the second condition in the form of x-viśesa, where x would have to be supplied by common sense out of the enumerative locative compound in sūtra 10. That is, if one were to formulate explicitly what is intended in the summarizing extension of the statement in sūtra 9 to taste etc., by sūtra 10, one could keep the wording of sūtra 9 and would have to replace just the element rūpa-, which is specific for sūtra 9, before the condition expressed generally by -viśesa. Of course, any intelligent person would also replace rūpatva with rasatva etc., after a moment's reflection, but -tva clearly does not have continuing force as easily and smoothly as -viśesa and as a suffix would not make explicit the nature of the second condition with the same clarity as the more descriptive noun -viśesa. Moreover, the use of the more unusual and maybe awkward compound instead of the usual, more concise formation with the abstract suffix -tva emphasizes already by itself that in the case of the perceptibility of special elementary qualities, different from the case of the perceptibility of a substance treated before, the second condition contains a variable.

To conclude, we have to ask ourselves why the more original interpretation of *rūpaviśeṣa* was replaced by Vātsyāyana, with Vyomaśiva and Bhaṭṭa-vādīndra in his wake. 76 Part of the answer could be that Vātsyāyana found a

⁷⁶ Although VS IV.1.9 has obviously been dropped in VSVy, Bhattavādīndra's commentary on IV.1.11 (= ed. 9) shows that he was aware of rūpaviśeṣa as a condition for visual perception. As he further supplements rūpa in VS III.1.6 with udbhūta (cf. n. 46

convenient expression in rūpaviśesa to accomodate his newly worked out concept of udbhava into the sūtra-text of the sister school as well. Another and complementary reason could be the (correct) interpretation of VS IV.1.9 as referring to the conditions for perceptibility of colour in the light of this new concept which introduces a new subdivision for the special elementary qualities, not as referring to some of the causes for the arising of its perception, as in the PDhS. In this matter, I would like to let Uddyotakara speak for me: "Being colour does not distinguish one colour from another; it is rather the fact of having emerged (udbhava) which is called 'particularity' 'specialty' (viśeṣa), because it is a factor distinguishing [among colours]. Just as [in the expression] 'specialty of a brahman' (brāhmanaviśeşa) (i.e., a special brahman) the specialty of the brahman vis à vis other brahmans is not [his] being a brahman (brāhmanatva), in the same way that which distinguishes [one thing] from something [else], which belongs to the same universal, is called 'specialty' (viśeṣa)."77 Lastly, given the above-mentioned problem involved with the specific universals rūpatva etc., as conditions for perceptibility and the change in the situation by the introduction of the notion of utkarşa, it was probably easier for Vyomaśiva to follow Vatsyayana's smooth interpretation than to struggle with rūpaviśesa etc., in the sense of specific universals in VS IV.1.9-10. The new situation had required already considerable acrobatics from him in his interpretation of VS VIII.16-17.78

Appendix:

Readings and versions of VS IV.1.6 and 9 referred to in the present paper

VS IV.1.6

mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (VSVṛ, VNṬ, TSP, AKVy, PrPr, TBV, SVR, VSVy, NTĀ, VSVp)

mahaty anekadravyatvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (TAV) mahattvānekadravyatvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.62)

above), it is highly probable that he understood *rūpaviśeṣa* in IV.1.9 as *rūpodbhava* or *rūpodbhūtatva*. — On Śaṅkara Miśra's accumulative interpretation cf. Preisendanz, *op. cit.*, n. 173.

- 77 Cf. NV 766,14-16 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: na rūpatvam rūpāntarād rūpam viśinasty, api tūdbhavo viśeṣakatvād viśeṣa ity ucyate. yathā brāhmaṇaviśeṣa iti na brāhmaṇatvam brāhmaṇaviśeṣa evam samānajātīyaviśeṣaka[tva]m yat tad viśeṣa ity ucyate.
- 78 Cf. Preisendanz, op. cit., nn. 263 and 266.

mahattvānekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.62 acc. to Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's ed.)

mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ (NV on III.1.33) mahadanekadravyasamavāyād rūpāc copalabdhih (Dignaga acc. to NVTṬ) mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.31) mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhih (HBT, NV acc. to

mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (HBṬ, NV acc. to Jaisalmer ms)

mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.34) mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśesāc ca dravyam pratyaksam (Vy)

VS IV.1.9

anekadravyeņa dravyeņa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ (NV(M) on I.2.2, VSVṛ acc. to ms P)

anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.34 = "NS" III.1.33a, NV on 1.2.2, PrPr, VSUp)

anekadravyena samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.34, sūtrapāṭha acc. to ms PS, VSVṛ acc. to ms O)

anekadravyeņa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NV on III.1.33a, NV(BI) on I.2.2)

anekadravyadravyeņa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NV(BI) on III.1.33a)

mahaty anekadravyatvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NKC) anekadravyeṇa ⟨dravyeṇa⟩ samavāyāt svagataviśeṣāc ca rūpaṃ pratyakṣam (Vy)

Abbreviations and Bibliography

I. Original Sources

AK	Abhidharmakośa, cf. AKVy
	riomenarmakosa, or. riik v j

AKVy Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, in Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasu-

bandhu with Sphuţārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra. Ed. Dwārikādās

Sāstri. Bauddha Bharati Series 5-6. 2nd ed., Varanasi 1981

Kir Kiraṇāvalī, in Praśastapādabhāsyam with the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī of

Udayanācārya. Ed. Jitendra S. Jetly. GOS 154. Baroda 1971

Kir(V) Kiranāvalī, in Kiranāvalī by Udayanācaryya with the Commentary of

Vardhamānopādhyāya. BI 200. Fasc. 4. Ed. Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha.

Calcutta 1956

KirPr Kiraņāvalīprakāśa, in Kir(V)

CŚ(Dh) Guang Bai Lun Shi Lun of Dharmapāla on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka. T. No.

1571 (Vol. 30)

*Tattvasiddhi of Harivarman. T. No. 1646 (Vol. 32)

TAV Tattvārtha-Vārttika of Śrī Akalankadeva. Ed. Mahendrakumar Jain. 2 Vols. Jñānapītha Mūrtidevī Jainagranthamālā Samskrta Grantha 10, 20. Benares 1953, 1957 **TBV** Tattvabodhavidhāyinī, in Sammatitarkaprakaranam By Siddhasena Divākara With Abhayadevasūri's Commentary, Tattvabodhavidhāyinī. 5 Vols. Ed. Sukhlāl Sanghavi und Becardās Dośi. Gujarāta Purātattvamandira Granthāvalī 10, 16, 18, 19, 21. Ahmedabad 1924-1931 (repr. Kyoto 1984) Tarkabhāṣā of Keśava Miśra. Ed. with transl. by S.R. Iyer. Gokuldas San-**TBhā** skrit Series 36. Varanasi 1979 TS Tattvasangraha of Ācārya Shāntaraksita with the Commentary 'Panjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla. 2 Vols. Ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi 1968 **TSP** Tattvasangrahapanjika, in TS **NKan** Nyāyakandalī, in PDhS Nyāya Kumud Chandra of Śrīmat Prabhāchandrāchārya. A Commentary on **NKC** Bhattākalankadeva's Laghīyastraya. Ed. Mahendra Kumar. Mānik Chandra Digambara Jain Granthamālā 38-39. Bombay 1938, 1941 NTĀ Nyāyatattvāloka, in Preisendanz (1994) Nyāyatātparyadīpikā of Bhattavāgīśvara. Ed. Kiśornāth Jhā. Allahabad 1979 NTD **NBh** Nyāyabhāsya, in Nyāyadarśanam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāsya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyatīkā & Viśvanātha's Vrtti. 2 Vols. Ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 29. Calcutta 1936, 1944 NM Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhatta. 2 Vols. Ed. K.S. Varadacharya. Oriental Research Institute Series 116, 139. Mysore 1969, 1983 NV Nyāyavārttika, see NBh Nyāya-Vārttikam, a Gloss on Vātsyāyana's Commentary of the Nyāya-Apho-NV(BI) risms. Ed. Vindhyeśvarī Prasād Dvivedin. BI 133. Calcutta 1887-1914 (repr. Delhi 1986) NV(M) Nyāyavārttika, in Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, with the Bhāsya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyatīkā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana. Vol. 1, Chapter 1. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text 20. Darbhanga 1967 Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā, see NBh **NVTT** NS Nyāyasūtra, in Ruben (1928) Praśastapādabhāsya (Padārthadharmasangraha) with commentary Nyāya-**PDhS** kandalī of Śrīdharabhatta. Ed. Durgādhar Jhā Śarma. Gangānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā 1. Varanasi 1963 PrP Prakarana Pañcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra with the Nyāya-Siddhi of Jaipuri

Nārāyaṇa Bhatta. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Banaras Hindu University Darsana Series 4. Benares 1961

PrPr Prakīrņakaprakāśa, in Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari with the Prakīrņakaprakāśa of Helārāja. 2 Vols. Ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Deccan College Monograph Series 21. Poona 1963, 1973

PS(Vr) Pramāṇasamuccaya(vrtti) I, in Hattori (1968)

PSŢ Pramāṇasamuccayaṭtkā (Viśālāmalavatī) (Yans ba dan dri ma med pa dan ldan pa) of Jinendrabuddhi. TTP No. 5766 (Vol. 139)

BhP Bhāsāpariccheda (Kārikāvalī) of Viśvanātha Pañcānana with autocommentary

VNŢ	Siddhāntamuktāvalī. Ed. Kṣemarāj Śrīkṛṣṇadās Śreṣṭhi. Mumbay 1907 Vādanyāyaṭīkā, in Vadanyayaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary Vipanchitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the Commentary of Acharya Prabhachandra. Ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 8. Varanasi 1972
VP	Vākyapadīya, in PrPr
Vy	Vyomavatī, in The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśasta Devāchārya with Commentaries (up to Dravya) Sūktī by Jagadīśa Tarkālankāra, Setu by Padmanābha Miśra and Vyomavatī by Vyomaśivāchārya (to the end). Ed. Gopinath Kavirāj.
100 Jan	CSS 61. Benares 1924-1931
Vy(G)	Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri. M.M. Śivakumāraśāstri-Granthamālā 6. 2 Vols. Varanasi 1983, 1984
Vy(Ms)	Manuscript of Vyomavatt belonging to the University of Mysore Oriental Research Institute, MsNo. C - 1575
VS	Vaiśeşikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda. Ed. Jambuvijayaji. GOS 136. Baroda 1961
VS(Up)	Vaiseşikasūtrapātha in VSUp
VS(Op)	Vaiseşikasūtropaskāra of Śrīśankaramiśra. Ed. Nārāyaṇa Miśra. KSS 195.
үзор	2nd ed., Varanasi 1969
VSVŗ	Vaiseşikasütravrtti of Candrānanda, in VS
VSVy	Vaisesikasūtravyākhyā of Bhaṭṭavādīndra, in Vaisesikadarsana of Kaṇāda with an anonymous Commentary. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series Modern Text 5. Darbhanga 1957
ŚIV	Ślokavārttika, in ŚlVK
ŚIVK	Kāśikā, in The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra. Part 1 and 2: ed. Sambasiva Sastri. Part 3: ed. Ramasvami Sastri. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 90, 99, 150. Trivandrum 1926, 1929, 1943
SP	Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī with a Commentary by Jinavardhana Sūri. Ed. J.S. Jetly. L.D. Series 1. Ahmedabad 1963.
SPT	Saptapadārthīţīkā, in SP
SM	Siddhāntamuktāvalī, in BhP
SVR	Syādvādaratnākara of Vādidevasūri, autocommentary on Pramāṇanayatattvālokālaṅkāra. 5 Vols. Ed. M. Osval. Ārhatamataprabhākara 4. Poona 1926-1930 (repr. Delhi 1988)
НВŢ	Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra. Ed. S. Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji. GOS 93. Baroda 1949
HBŢĀ	Hetubinduṭtkāloka, in HBŢ

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