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VAIŚEŚIKASŪTRA IV.1.9
AND ITS TWO TRADITIONS OF INTERPRETATION¹

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In his remarkable reconstruction of the development of Vaiśeṣika in the second volume of his *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* Erich Frauwallner provides us with an outline of the “earliest philosophy of nature of the Vaiśeṣika.” For this outline he drew on various sources, using foremost materials preserved in the philosophical portions of the *Mahābhārata*, in the Mokṣadharma section, but also bits and pieces of information about more archaic Vaiśeṣika views, preserved in later texts of the Vaiśeṣika school and of its opponents. Besides, he incorporated into this reconstruction, which actually uncovers two stages of development, what seemed to him to be older and therefore, one can assume, more original or basic notions of

- 1 This is a revised and slightly expanded version of a paper read before the panel on early Vaiśeṣika at the 34th ICANAS, Hongkong, August 22-28, 1993. – I would like to thank Dr. Eli Franco, Melbourne, for critical comments and valuable suggestions when he read an earlier version of this paper. Among the participants in the panel, I am especially grateful to Prof. Claus Oetke, Stockholm, and Mr. Harunaga Isaacson, M.A., Groningen, for stimulating questions and important supplementary remarks. Special thanks go to Prof. Hiroshi Marui, Tokyo, who provided me with copies of and detailed information about his two Japanese papers relevant to the present issue, which were not accessible to me otherwise. In our extended discussions, just before this paper was due for publication, it became evident that our findings and interpretations agreed in general and even in some details. Among the two papers, “Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-gakuha ni okeru jittai no chikaku jōken ni tsuite” is still preliminary, but presents the gist of the problem and argument. The correctness of the reading *udbhūtarūpa* in *PDhS* 443,1-2 is not yet doubted. In “Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)” Marui presents the materials concerning the transmission of *VS* IV.1.6 in an extensive manner and discusses the various readings and versions traced by him. The *PDhS* itself is not taken into consideration because of the problematic occurrence of *udbhūtarūpa*. The textual basis of the present paper includes some additional materials. Further, “Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)” contains a Japanese translation of Candrānanda’s commentary on *VS* IV.1.6-9 with subsequent discussion, also of the interpretation of *rūpa* in IV.1.6 and *rūpaviśeṣa* in IV.1.9. Finally, Marui refers to *NS* III.1.34f. and the commentators’ attempts to read the notion of (*an*)*udbhava* into the *sūtra*-text. In this connection he concentrates on Uddyotakara’s commentary on *NS* III.1.31-33a, which he translates into Japanese and examines as to Uddyotakara’s reading of *VS* IV.1.6 and his knowledge of the two diverging interpretations. – I am indebted to Prof. Marui also for various other suggestions; his extraordinary effort and care when going through this paper are highly appreciated.

Vaiśeṣika philosophy of nature, as they are still found in the fully developed Vaiśeṣika system and in classical Nyāya.² At this point, however, personal views, impressions and biases about what is oldest or most original come into play; it is possible to construct diverging, equally possible lines of development relying on the same textual basis that the great scholar presumably used, augmented by further materials. In a previous paper I have tried to do this with regard to the concept of the visual ray of light³; in this paper, I would like to take up the notion of *udbhava* or *udbhūtatva*, together with its contrary *anudbhava* or *anudbhūtatva*, that is, the being pronounced or distinct,⁴ or perhaps better: having emerged,⁵ of the special elementary qualities and its contrary.

This notion is attributed by Frauwallner to the earliest Vaiśeṣika philosophy of nature⁶. His indicated source material in this case consists exclusively of passages from Vātsyāyana's *NBh*. Besides, he presupposes this concept for *VS* IV.1.6 und 9.⁷ Of course, nobody would deny that classical Nyāya has taken over a considerable part of the earlier Vaiśeṣika philosophy of nature and that, therefore, it is in general quite legitimate to use ideas, contained in the earliest preserved commentary on the *NS*, to illustrate this early phase. In the present case, however, the *NBh* is to my knowledge the earliest text at all in which the two terms in question are used and a brief discussion of the two concepts can be found. The terms are not used and the concepts not explicitly referred to, even with a different expression, in the *VS*, which according to Frauwallner himself belongs to the last period of the classical system.⁸ Neither are *(an)udbhava* or *(an)udbhūtatva* known to the authors of the *NS*, nor do they play any role in the works of Candramati and Praśastapāda. The term *udbhūta* might occur

2 Cf. *G.i.Ph.*, II, p. 314; for inclusion of Nyāya texts, cf. his source materials indicated in various notes.

3 Cf. Preisendanz, "On *ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣa* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Vision," pp. 131-35.

4 Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 54 *passim*: "Ausgeprägtheit."

5 This is only a tentative translation which aims at a similar metaphoricalness as that of the Sanskrit term and avoids the tautology involved in other translations which can commonly be found, such as e.g. "being manifest," "being sensible," and "being appreciable." "Being evolved" is unsuitable because of its strong implication of a gradual process and its common use with regard to Sāṅkhya ontology. "Having arisen," on the other hand, would be etymologically closer, but misleading in its most common metaphorical usage.

6 Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54, 56-57.

7 Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 174, 177.

8 Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 314.

twice in the *Daśapadārthī* in the context of sensory cognition.⁹ Ui assumes *zhì* (至) to be its – quite improbable – translation equivalent.¹⁰ In the *PDhS*, on the other hand, *udbhava* or *udbhūtatva*, or its contrary, is not named, let alone explained, as a property of the special elementary qualities or even mentioned in the sections on the individual special qualities. *udbhūta* seems to occur once in the context of sensory cognition, in a passage which will be examined below. And as far as I can tell from a cursory survey the notion of *udbhava/udbhūtatva* and *anudbhava/anudbhūtatva* is not an issue either in the relevant chapters of Harivarman's **Tattvasiddhi*¹¹, a well-known valuable source for our knowledge of Vaiśeṣika after the final redaction of the *VS* and probably before the final compilation of the *NS*.

This lack of attention in the above-mentioned texts is indeed puzzling, considering the important role of this widely used notion in the philosophy of nature of the classical school after Praśastapāda and of its sister school, the Nyāya. Furthermore, the treatment of the topic in the *NBh* itself makes Frauwallner's assumption problematic. This treatment creates the very strong impression that Vātsyāyana is not reporting long-established ideas,¹² but is himself developing this concept in the context of commenting upon *NS* III.1.34f., which deal with the non-perception of the visual ray of light. Vātsyāyana reads the concept straight into the *sūtra*-s which definitely do not presuppose it, on the contrary: lack it conspicuously, and uses it in an expanded manner in his commentary on *NS* III.1.33 and 33a. And even if the terms *udbhava/udbhūtatva* and *anudbhava/anudbhūtatva* in a related sense might have been used elsewhere before him, their development into technical terms and their systematization would still seem to have been largely due to Vātsyāyana.

The extensive passage in the *NBh*, in the commentary on III.1.33 and 33a, details the various possible combinations of *udbhūtatva* and *anudbhūtatva*, primarily in the case of the two special elementary qualities found in fire. First, the warm seasons of the year are explained on the basis of fiery

9 In Ui, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 250, 1. 5, and 237, 1. 2, respectively. According to him, it relates once to substance, once to qualities in an enumeration starting with the first four special elementary qualities. However, the syntax is not clear to me in both cases.

10 Cf. Ui, *op. cit.*, pp. 97, 109; rendered as “appreciable.” Although I cannot yet offer complete solutions to the two difficult passages in question, a derivation of *pra-√āp* is much more probable as the underlying original term.

11 Cf. chapters 49, 51, 52.

12 Cf. maybe also the remark in Potter, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 258, that “Vātsyāyana introduces here the notion of unmanifested (*anudbhūta*) qualities.”

substances, with their parts scattered in a regular, continuous manner in space. Only their warm temperature has emerged and can therefore be perceived; their colour, which should be luminously white, has not emerged and is therefore imperceptible. Consequently the substance which is responsible e.g. for summer is not perceived.¹³ Similarly, the water substance responsible for the cold seasons possesses only emerged temperature; its colour, which should be white, has not emerged, and therefore the colour and the substance itself are imperceptible.¹⁴ The next fiery substance treated by Vātsyāyana is the fire contained in heated water which by its nature possesses cold temperature only; it is actually the hot temperature of the intruded fire substance which is perceived. As in the case of the warm seasons, the fiery colour has not emerged and the substance is therefore imperceptible.¹⁵ The opposite is the case with the rays of a lamp; here the colour has emerged and, consequently, the substance itself is perceptible. Its temperature, on the other hand, has not emerged and is thus not perceived.¹⁶ Both qualities have emerged in “ordinary” fire substances, such as

- 13 Cf. *NBh* 766, 1-2 on *NS* III.1.33 = ed. 37: *tathāvidham* (scil. *viṣaktāvayavam*, see 765,2, quoted in the next n.) *eva ca taijasam dravyam anudbhūtarūpam saha rūpeṇa nopalabhyate, sparśas tv asyoṣṇa upalabhyate. tasya dravyasyānubandhād grīṣmavasantau kalpyete*. Cf. also Jacobi, “Über tejas, vāyu, ākāṣa, speciell in der Vaiṣeṣhika Philosophie,” p. 242; Ruben, *Zur indischen Erkenntnistheorie*, p. 31; Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Junankar, *Gautama*, p. 75. For later references cf. *NM* II 371,18-20; *NTD* 81,27-82,2 on *NS* III.1.33 = ed. 39; *Kir* 53,18-19; *VSUp* 274,4 on *VS(Up)* IV.1.7 and 116,7-8 on II.1.3; *SM* 42,15-16 on *BhP* 54 (cf. Sinha, *Indian Psychology*, I, *Cognition*, p. 68).
- 14 Cf. *NBh* 765,2-766,1 on *NS* III.1.33 = ed. 37: ... *mahad anekadravyavac ca viṣaktāvayavam āpyam dravyam pratyakṣato nopalabhyate, sparśas tu śīto grhyate. tasya dravyasyānubandhād hemantaśīṣrau kalpyete*. On winter in later literature cf. *NM* II 371,13-17; *ŚIVK* I 227,5-7 on *ŚIV* *pratyakṣa* 51 (cf. also Bhatt, *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, p. 165); *NTD* 81,26-27 on *NS* III.1.33 = ed. 39 (l. 27 read *mahattvāneka[m]dravya-*).
- 15 Cf. *NBh* 767,2-3 on *NS* III.1.33a = ed. 38: *udbhūtasparśam anudbhūtarūpam apratyakṣam yathābādisamyuktaṁ tejaḥ*. For later references cf. e.g. *NM* II 372,2-3; *Vy* 257,21-22 and 273,4-5; *NKan* 444,15-16; *NVTṬ* 832,21 on III.2.14; *SVR* I 56,18-19; *TBhā* § 85, p. 176; *VSUp* 116,7-8 on *VS(Up)* II.1.3 and 278,2-4 on IV.1.9. A different opinion seems to have been known to Dharmapāla: the colour has emerged, but is overpowered by the colour of water; cf. Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 80, with reference to *CŚ(Dh)* 224a 11-12, translated in Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, I, p. 144.
- 16 Cf. *NBh* 767,2 on *NS* III.1.33a = ed. 38: *udbhūtarūpam anudbhūtasparśam ca pratyakṣam* (scil. *tejo*) *yathā pradīparaśmayah*. For later references cf. *NKan* 22,3-4; *NVTṬ* 832,20 on *NS* III.2.14; *TBhā* § 85, p. 176; *NTĀ* on *NS* III.1.33. *SPT* 63,13-14 on *SP* 189 mentions exterior light as an example for this combination.

the sun rays.¹⁷ Lastly, both qualities can lack *udbhūtatva*, as is the case with the imperceptible visual ray of light, the central topic of this section of the NS.¹⁸ Vātsyāyana's aim in his exposition is clearly a systematic explanation for this imperceptibility.

Having emerged is therefore according to him a condition for the perceptibility of colour; the possession of emerged colour, on the other hand, is one of the conditions for the perceptibility of a substance. This brings us to Vātsyāyana's interpretation of VS IV.1.6 and 9, as these two *sūtra*-s are understood by the majority of the tradition as naming the conditions for the perceptibility of substances and colours respectively. Both *sūtra*-s are transmitted with a considerable number of variants; in the case of IV.1.6 this is true especially for the wording of the beginning of the *sūtra*, which contains the first condition for the perceptibility of a substance. According to Candrānanda's reading this *sūtra* runs as follows: "With regard to a large [substance], [there is] perception (1) because [it] possesses many substances [as its cause] (i.e., inheres in many substances as its parts) and (2) because of colour" (*mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*). This is the reading found also in the *sūtra*-text of the so-called anonymous commentator, i.e., Bhaṭṭavādīndra, and in that of Śaṅkara Miśra. The *sūtra* is furthermore known in this form to Kamalaśīla, Yaśomitra, Helārāja, Abhayadeva, Vālideva and Vācaspati Miśra II.¹⁹ With the variant *anekadravyatvāt* it is quoted by Akalaṅka.²⁰ Vātsyāyana himself refers to VS IV.1.6 in three different wordings; although in all cases the sentence is concluded with *iti*, we might be dealing here with paraphrases only, not with genuine quotations.

17 Cf. NBh 767,1 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: *udbhūtarūpasparśam pratyakṣam tejo yathādityaraśmayah*. For later references cf. NVT 832,19 on NS III.2.14; TBhā § 85, p. 176; NTĀ on NS III.1.33; VSUp 116,5-6 on VS(Up) II.1.3.

18 Cf. NBh 767,3 on NS III.1.33a = ed. 38: *anudbhūtarūpasparśo 'pratyakṣas cākṣuṣo raśmiḥ*. For later references cf. e.g. NM II 372,4-5; NKan 61,8; TBhā § 85, p. 176; VSUp 116,6-7 on VS(Up) II.1.3 and 275,5-6 on IV.1.8; SM 29,12 on BhP 41ab. Cf. also Sinha, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 73, and Chatterjee, *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, p. 134. – On the resulting four types of fiery substances cf. also Dasgupta, *The Natural Science of the Ancient Hindus*, pp. 13-14 with n. 19; Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 229; Ruben, *loc. cit.*; Mishra, *The Conception of Matter according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 330; Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 54; Junankar, *loc. cit.*; Kumar, *Sāṃkhya Thought in the Brahmanical Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 112.

19 Cf. TSP 52,20 on TS 47, 57,16-17 on 57 and 234,16 on 555; AKVy 561,14 on AK III.100; PrPr 239,22 on VP III *sādhanaśamuddeśa* 10; TBV I 100,39 and V 658,21; SVR I 56,15-16 and IV 929,1; NTĀ on NS III.1.33. Marui ("Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," p. (28)) mentions also Śāntarakṣita's VNT 37,23-25 as a testimony for this reading.

20 Cf. TAV II 465,11-12.

Vātsyāyana could have modified the *sūtra* slightly, while incorporating it into his running commentary. The version found in his commentary on *NS* III.1.62 combines the first condition, which relates to the material constitution of the substance, with a further condition consisting in a physical quality of the substance: the substance has to be large (*mahattvāneka-dravyatvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*).²¹ This is obviously a condition extracted from the restrictive qualification of the object of perception, mentioned in the locative case (*mahati*), in Candrānanda's reading of the *sūtra*. A combination of these two conditions is found also in a reference by Uddyotakara to *VS* IV.1.6 in his commentary on *NS* III.1.33 (*mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ*).²² Although one could argue that the two compounds in question could be interpreted differently,²³ in his commentary on *NS* III.1.31 Vātsyāyana formulates most unambiguously three separate conditions with reference to *VS* IV.1.6 (*mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ*).²⁴ To this, Arcaṭa's reading in the *Hetubinduṭīkā* is closely related (*mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*).²⁵

- 21 *NBh* 800,3 on *NS* III.1.62 = ed. 67. Thakur ("Vātsyāyana and the Vaiśeṣika System," p. 80) mentions a divergent reading for this reference which corresponds to the reading found in the *HBṬ* and the *NV* according to Jambuvijayaji's Jaisalmer manuscript (cf. below); however, this is probably based on an error, as it is neither found in the Calcutta edition, used by Thakur, nor in any of the *NBh* editions available to me at present. According to n. (1) on *NBh* 800,3 Phanibhūṣaṇa's edition reads *mahattvāneka-dravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*; I could not verify this reference.
- 22 *NV* 765,6 on *NS* III.1.33 = ed. 37; in 765,9 the sentence is referred to with the words "idam sūtram" (for a full quotation cf. n. 48 below). Marui, *op. cit.*, p. (30), points out that Jambuvijayaji's Jaisalmer manuscript of the *NV* reads *mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*. This corresponds to Arcaṭa's reading, cf. below, with n. 25.
- 23 *mahattvāneka-dravyatva* could be understood as a *karmadhāraya*-compound, *mahadanekadravyavattva* as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*. – A genitive *tatpuruṣa* has to be assumed also in Dignāga's paraphrase of *VS* IV.1,6 as quoted by Vācaspati Miśra I (*NVTṬ* 165,26 on *NS* 1.1,5): *mahadanekadravyasamavāyād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ*.
- 24 *NBh* 764,3 on *NS* III.1.31 = ed. 35; here as well Thakur's quotation (*loc. cit.*) is obviously incorrect: *mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ*.
- 25 *HBṬ* 168,2-3, corresponding to the reading in Jambuvijayaji's *NV* manuscript (cf. n. 22 above). Durveka Miśra, however, might have read the original locative when composing his commentary hereupon; cf. *HBṬĀ* 382,7: *mahatīti* and 382,9: ... *mahattvayukte mahati* ... Note that Arcaṭa's reading preserves the wording of the last condition without the added possessive and abstract suffixes. The addition of the possessive and abstract suffixes in Uddyotaraka's reading and in Vātsyāyana's reading in his commentary on *NS* III.1.31 could be an adaption to the preceding *anekadravyavattvāt*. Besides, this would make the relation of the last condition, i.e., colour, to the object of perception, the substance, more precise in terms of the Vaiśeṣika categories. The formulation *rūpāt*, although easily understood, is somehow elliptic, and therefore invites secondary explica-

Finally, there is Vātsyāyana's reference to *VS* IV.1.6 in his commentary on *NS* III.1.34, where we have again a combination of the original first condition with the restrictive qualification of the original object of perception turned into a further condition. Furthermore, the original second condition, "colour" (*rūpa*), is modified to "particularity of colour" (*rūpaviśeṣa*) (*mahad-anekadravvyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ*).²⁶ This modification occurs also in Vyomaśiva's reading of *VS* IV.1.6, which clarifies in addition that the *sūtra* is to be understood as indicating the conditions for perceptibility of a substance (*mahattvād anekadravvyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravyam pratyakṣam*).²⁷

Although the role of the restrictive qualification *mahat*, the interpretation of the original first condition *anekadravvyavattva*²⁸ and its relation to the additional condition *mahattva* are of considerable interest in themselves, they are outside the concern and scope of this paper.²⁹ It is the interpretation of the second condition on which the present issue hinges, namely, the interpretation of "colour" (*rūpa*). Originally, its implication must have been that substances can only be perceived as qualified by their colour,³⁰ a condition which from early on gave rise to a heated discussion about the percep-

tions. – Dharmapāla (cf. Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 79) refers merely to the opinion of certain Vaiśeṣikas which is based on the *sūtra*. Thus, his words cannot provide clues for a specific reading. However, it is clear that these Vaiśeṣikas name two conditions for the perception of substances, i.e., the possession of the quality 'large' (not the possession of more than one substance, as referred to by Ui, *loc. cit.*) and of the quality 'colour'; they too might have added therefore both suffixes to the last condition (cf. *CS*(Dh) 224a 7, translated in Tillemans, *op. cit.*, I, p. 144, with n. 249 on 'large'; cf. also Marui, *op. cit.*, p. (31)).

26 *NBh* 769,4-5 on *NS* III.1.34 = ed. 40; cf. also Thakur, *loc. cit.*

27 *Vy* 557,21-22, introduced with the words *tathā ca sūtram* and concluded with *iti*; cf. also 272,21-22, where the sentence is again concluded with *iti* and explicitly called a *sūtra*, and 442,6-7, to be corrected, with *Vy*(G) II 16,14, to ... *dravya(m) pratyakṣam*. Cf. also Mishra, *op. cit.*, p. 293, n. 17; Varadachari, "Conditions for the Rise of Perceptual Cognition," n. 22, p. 250; Hattori, "Two Types of Non-Qualificative Perception," n. 6, p. 162. – On more remote references to *VS* IV.1.6 cf. Marui, *op. cit.*, pp. (30)-(31); the reference by Śālikanātha in *PrP* 131,5f. is also treated in Preisendanz, *Studien zu Nyāyasūtra* III.1, n. 173.

28 My above translation follows Hattori's interpretation in *op. cit.*, p. 162, and *Dignāga*, n. 4.37, p. 141; however, there he understands *dravya* in the sense of 'atoms.' In Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 215, he paraphrases with 'substances.' Frauwallner as well understands *anekadravvyavattva* in this way (cf. *op. cit.*, p. 177), although for the rest of the *sūtra* he follows Vyomaśiva's reading and interpretation.

29 For an extensive discussion cf. Preisendanz, *loc. cit.*; cf. also Marui, *op. cit.*, pp. (33)-(35).

30 On this aspect cf. Halbfass, "Zum Begriff der Substanz (*dravya*) im Vaiśeṣika," pp. 154-55, with n. 43.

tibility of wind³¹ and which led to partial changes in the conditions for the perceptibility of substances.³² “Colour” (*rūpa*) is now modified into “particularity of colour” (*rūpaviśeṣa*) by both Vātsyāyana and Vyomaśiva. This modification gets some legitimization from a later *sūtra* in the context of perception, namely, *VS* IV.1.9, which details the conditions for the perceptibility of colour, again following the majority of the tradition with which I have been siding so far. According to *sūtra* 9 there is “perception [of colour], (1) because [it] inheres in a substance whose [constituent] substances are many and (2) because of the/a particularity of colour” (*anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ*). This reading adopted by Jambuvijayaji is the one according to manuscript P of Candrānanda’s commentary.

VS IV.1.9 in a slightly deviating version is incorporated by Vātsyāyana into his commentary on *NS* III.1.33, immediately after his exposition of the warm seasons, paraphrased above. The part of the sentence corresponding to *VS* IV.1.9 is considered as a *sūtra* by some, and therefore appears as III.1.33a in Ruben’s edition of the *NS*. In it, the first condition is contracted to *anekadravyasamavāya*, and the object of perception is made explicit by *rūpopalabdhiḥ* (*anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*).³³ This lectio(?) facilior, transmitted in the *sūtra*-text of Śāṅkara Mīśra as *sūtra* IV.1.8, was known also to Uddyotakara, as evidenced by his commentary on *NS* I.2.2,³⁴ and to Helārāja³⁵. A further version, concluded with *iti*, is found in Vātsyāyana’s commentary on *NS* III.1.34; it corresponds to the reading of the *sūtra* in the *sūtrapāṭha*-manuscript PS and in manuscript O of Candrānanda’s commentary used by Jambuvijayaji (*anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ*).³⁶ An additional slightly diverging

31 For a discussion and references cf. Preisendanz, *op. cit.*, n. 95.

32 On *VS* IV.1.6 under the aspect of the visual perception of substances as wholes cf. Matilal, *Perception*, pp. 281-86.

33 *NBh* 766,4 = “*NS*” III.1.33a; for a full quotation and translation of the sentence cf. below.

34 Cf. *NV* 358,4-5 on *NS* I.2.2; this sentence, followed by *iti* and a version of *VS* IV.1.10 also concluded with *iti*, seems to be a genuine reading of the *sūtra*, not a paraphrase only. – The conflicting information given in *NV*(M) p. 624, n. 12, is based on the reading found in *NV*(M) 624,19 on I.2.2, which preserves the beginning of the *sūtra* according to Candrānanda’s text in manuscript P: *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*. For the reading in *NV*(BI) on I.2.2 cf. below, n. 37.

35 Cf. *PrPr* 241,5 on *VP* III *sādhanasamuddeśa* 10.

36 *NBh* 769,3 on *NS* III.1.34 = ed. 40. In this version the wording of the first condition, similar to Vātsyāyana’s version in “*NS*” III.1.33a, does not point as distinctly towards an understanding of *anekadravya* as a *bahuvrīhi*-compound as does the reading in manuscript P of Candrānanda’s commentary. The *VS**Vr* itself seems to indicate that

version is provided by Uddyotakara in his commentary on *NS* III.1.33a (*anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*),³⁷ a version combining the *sūtra* with *VS* IV.1.6 by Prabhācandra (*mahaty anekadravyatvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ*).³⁸

To return to *VS* IV.1.9 as incorporated by Vātsyāyana into his commentary on *NS* III.1.33, that is, to the so-called *NS* III.1.33a. Put into contrast with the preceding statement that – together with its colour – the fiery substance responsible for the warm seasons is not perceived, in as much as it possesses colour which has not emerged, the complete sentence runs as follows: “Where, however, it happens, [i.e.] perception of colour because of inherence in a substance whose [constituent] substances are many and because of a particularity of colour, there both the colour and the substance which is its support are directly perceived.”³⁹ Following this sentence containing the reference to *VS* IV.1.9 Vātsyāyana clarifies as well how he understands *rūpaviśeṣa*: “As regards the particularity of colour, however, it is that property of colour on account of whose presence a colour is perceived in certain cases and on account of whose absence a substance is not perceived in certain cases; it is called ‘having emerged’ (*udbhava*).”⁴⁰

Candrānanda read only *anekadravyeṇa*, not *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa*; cf. *VSVr* 33,13: *mahatānekadravyasamavāyidravyeṇa ghaṭādīnā* ... , 33,19 (on IV.1.11) according to O: ... *anekadravyeṇa samavāyābhāvāt* ... and 34,6 (on IV.1.14): ... *anekadravyā samavāyāt* 33,19 according to P and 33,16 (on IV.1.10), however, support *anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa*. – Thakur (*op. cit.*, pp. 79-80) argues unconvincingly for the fact that because of this difference “*NS*” III.1.33a is quoted by Vātsyāyana “from elsewhere.”

37 *NV* 766,13-14 on *NS* III.1.33a = ed. 38; to this corresponds the version in the commentary on *NS* 1.2.2 according to *NV*(BI) 163,4. *NV*(BI) 381,4 on 33a = ed. 36, however, reads: *anekadravyadravyeṇa* – *NV* 766,13-14 seems to be merely a gloss of *NS* III.1.33a.

38 *NKC* I 30,20-21. – According to Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 61, Harivarman knew a further version, in which *rūpaviśeṣa* is lacking: “Colour residing in substances which are large and more than one is visible.” He is probably referring to **Tattvasiddhi* 329c 26-27, which however does not seem to be a quotation. To the sentence translated by Ui it is furthermore added that colour is grasped because of colour. In Sastri’s “retranslation” (cf. *Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman*, I, p. 365,3-4) this results in a version of *VS* IV.1.9, which combines IV.1.6 and 9 into one, similar to Prabhācandra’s combined version.

39 *NBh* 766,3-6 on *NS* III.1.33a = ed. 38: *yatra tv eṣā bhavaty “anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhis” (= NS III.1.33a) tatra rūpaṃ ca dravyaṃ ca tadāśrayaḥ pratyakṣata upalabhyate.*

40 *NBh* 766,6-8 on *NS* III.1.33a = ed. 38: *rūpaviśeṣas tu yadbhāvāt kvacid rūpopalabdhir yadabhāvāc ca dravyasya kvacid anupalabdhiḥ sa rūpadharmo ’yam udbhavasamākhyāta iti.* Cf. also Varadachari, *op. cit.*, p. 249, who assumes, however, that the particularity of colour is called *udbhavasama* by Vātsyāyana(!), and Junankar, *loc. cit.*

Thus, Vātsyāyana interprets the particularity of colour (*rūpaviśeṣa*) in *VS* IV.1.9 as referring to the fact that a colour has emerged in the technical sense that he had given to the terms *udbhava* and *udbhūtatva*.⁴¹ The same holds good for the original second condition for perceptibility of a substance in *VS* IV.1.6, for which condition Vātsyāyana has *rūpaviśeṣa* instead of the original *rūpa* in one of his references to the *sūtra* (*NBh* 769,4-5). Vyomaśiva adopts this interpretation; it was already pointed out above that he reads the modified second condition *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.6. As regards *sūtra* 9, he incorporates it or a paraphrase thereof into his commentary on Praśastapāda's section on *rūpa*. And just as in the case of *sūtra* 6, his version amplifies that the *sūtra* should name the conditions for perceptibility, here of colour (*anekadravyeṇa* ⟨*dravyeṇa*⟩ *samavāyāt svagataviśeṣāc ca rūpaṃ pratyakṣam*).⁴² The "particularity belonging to it" (*svagataviśeṣa*) in his quotation or paraphrase of *sūtra* 9 is explained by him in the same way as the "particularity of colour" (*rūpaviśeṣa*) in his version of *sūtra* 6: the "particularity" is a special factor which supports perception, a property of colour, and called "having emerged" (*udbhava*). On account of its presence there is perception of a colour and of a substance possessing colour; on account of its absence neither is perceived.⁴³ The same explanation is given

41 This is also the interpretation of *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.9 e.g., by Faddegon (*The Vaiśeṣika-System*, pp. 284, 289), Dasgupta (*History of Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 290, with n. 3), Ruben (*loc. cit.*, where the sentence is still considered as part of the *Nyāyasūtra* and not recognized as a reference to *VS* IV.1.9 by Vātsyāyana) and Frauwallner (*op. cit.*, p. 174); Matilal (*op. cit.*, p. 283) remains vague with "specific nature." – On Uddyotakara's comments, which follow Vātsyāyana's interpretation, cf. Marui, *op. cit.*, pp. (40)-(42), and "A Study on the Textual Problems of the Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha," pp. 117-119. I am grateful to Mr. Isaacson for making me aware of the latter paper and providing a copy of it.

42 *Vy* 441,20-21; ⟨*dravyeṇa*⟩ according to *Vy*(Ms) 108b 7.

43 Cf. *Vy* 257,16-21, relating obviously to his reading of *VS* IV.1.6; the context is the non-perception of the sense of vision (cf. the context of Vātsyāyana's exposition of *udbhava* and *anudbhava*): *atha mahattvād anekadravya(vat?)tvāc cakṣuṣaḥ kasmād indriyeṇopalambho na bhavati pradīpasyeva? viśiṣṭarūpābhāvāt. yatra hi (rūpaviśeṣo) (scil. tatra) rūpavaddravyasya cakṣuḥsparsānābhīyām upalambha iti. rūpaviśeṣas tu yatkr̥tā[rthe] (kva)cid* (cf. also *Vy*(G) I 86,1-2) *viśaye rūpopalabdhir yadabhāvāc ca mahadanekadravyāśrayasyāpy anupalabdhīḥ sa udbhavasamākhyāto rūpadharma(h) sahakāriśeṣa iti*. For Vyomaśiva's explanation of his quotation or paraphrase of *VS* IV.1.9 cf. *Vy* 441,24-27: *sūtrārthas tv – anekam dravyam janakam asy[e](ās)itīty* (or: *asye[tī]ty*; *VY*(Ms): *asyetity*) *anekadravyam (dravyam, acc. to Vy*(Ms) 108b 9), *tena saha samavāyāt, svagataviśeṣ[anīyata](āc ceti yat)sadbhāve* (*Vy*(Ms) 108b 9: – *viśeṣeti yatsadbhāve, ti* might be marked to be deleted) *kvacid rūpopalabdhir yadabhāvāc cānupalabdhīḥ sa eva sahakāriśeṣo 'padīśyate, tasmāc ca rūpaṃ pratyakṣam*.

on a third occasion, when Vyomaśiva comments upon *svagataviśeṣa* in Praśastapāda's remarks concerning the conditions for the arising of perception of colour, taste, smell and temperature.⁴⁴ The extreme closeness in wording, which cannot be a coincidence, makes it even clearer that Vyomaśiva has taken over this interpretation of the second condition in *VS* IV.1.6 and 9 from Vātsyāyana. There is even some probability that Vyomaśiva read the relevant passage in the *NBh* according to a variant recorded by the editors of the Calcutta edition.⁴⁵

Further testimony to this interpretation of the original second condition in *VS* IV.1.6, even in its original reading *rūpāt*, is provided by Vācaspati Miśra I, Durveka Miśra and Bhaṭṭavādīndra.⁴⁶ Vyomaśiva's interpretation of *svagataviśeṣa* in the *PDhS* as *udbhava*, on the other hand, is adopted also by Udayana.⁴⁷

This brings us to the *PDhS* and possible clues as to Praśastapāda's understanding of the two *sūtra*-s. First of all, both of them, together with the following *sūtra* 10, which applies the statement of *sūtra* 9 to taste, smell and temperature (*etena rasagandhasparśeṣu jñānaṃ vyākhyātam*), are not understood as relating to the conditions for perceptibility of substances and special elementary qualities. Instead, Praśastapāda takes them as relating to the conditions for the arising of their perception. Such an alternative interpretation of *VS* IV.1.6 by "others" is mentioned by Uddyotakara and criticised, as the three (so according to him) conditions named are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for the arising of perception.⁴⁸ It cannot, however, be Praśastapāda himself to whom he refers, because the former adds further causes to the two already contained in both the *sūtra*-s. For the first

44 Cf. *Vy* 558,14-16 on *PDhS* 459,2f., to be discussed below: ... *svagataviśeṣāc ca – yatkr̥tā kvacid viṣaye teṣāṃ upalabdhir yadbhāvāc cānupalabdhīḥ sa udbhavasamākhyāto rūpādidharmaḥ sahakāriśeṣas, tasmāt ...*

45 Compare the beginning of *Vy* 257,19-21 and 558,14-16 with the variant recorded in n. (4) on *NBh* 766,3-8 (*yatkr̥tā kvacit* instead of *yadbhāvāt kvacit*).

46 Cf. *NVT* 765,10-11 on *NS* III.1.32 = ed. 36, on *rūpaviśeṣāt* in *VS* IV.1.6(?): ... *asau viśeṣa udbhavasamākhyātaḥ; HB* 383,2 on *rūpāt* in *VS* IV.1.6: *te hi rūpād ity udbhūtasamākhyātād iti viśeṣya nāyanaraśmyavavyaviny upalabdhim nivartayanti; VSVy* 44,10 on *rūpāt* in *VS* IV.1.6 = ed. 5: *rūpād ity atrodh[a]{ū}tād iti śeṣaḥ*.

47 Cf. *Kir* 186,20 on *PDhS* 459,2f.: *svagataviśeṣād udbhūta{tva?}samākhyātāt*.

48 Cf. *NV* 765,6-9 on *NS* III.1.33 = ed. 37: *apare tu mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhir ity upalabdhou niyamam varṇayanti, nopalabhyamāna iti. kim uktaṃ bhavati? na yukto yatra yatra mahadanekadravyavattvarūpāni santi tat tad upalabhyata ity, api tu yad yad upalabhyate tatra tatra mahadanekadravyavattvarūpāni santīti. evaṃ tarhīdam sūtram nopalabdheḥ kāraṇapratipādakam satsv abhāvād iti – satsu mahadanekadravya{vattva?}rūpeṣūpalabdhir na bhavatīti naitāny upalabdhikāraṇam iti.*

stage of perception of a large substance,⁴⁹ called “intuition of the own nature [of the substance]” (*svarūpālocanamātra*), these are light, the contact of the group of four and the presence of the causal complex consisting of *dharmā* etc. “Colour” (*rūpa*) in *VS* IV.1.6 is seemingly taken up with “emerged colour” (*udbhūtarūpa*).⁵⁰ This would be the single explicit reference to this concept in Praśastapāda’s preserved work. However, Vyomaśiva obviously did not read it here.⁵¹ Śrīdhara, on the other hand, tries to find a place here for the concept of *udbhava* in a very forced way; he interprets *rūpaprakāśa* as referring to this very property of colour. There would have been no need for him to resort to this, if he had read *udbhūta* in the compound.⁵² These observations which cast doubt on the reading in the *PDhS* are corroborated by the testimony of all but one of the manuscripts of this text which have so far been examined by Isaacson; they do not contain

- 49 Praśastapāda obviously read *VS* IV.1.6 with the restrictive qualification of the object in the locative case (*mahati*).
- 50 Cf. *PDhS* 443,1-2: *dravye tāvad [dvī]{tri}vidhe mahaty anekadravyavattvodbhūtarūpaprakāśacatuṣṭayasannikarṣād dharmādisāmagrye ca svarūpālocanamātram*. Cf. also Mishra, *op. cit.*, p. 362, under the influence of Vyomaśiva; Shastri, *The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 435; Hattori, “Two Types . . .,” pp. 161-62. On the emendation of *dvividhe* to *trividhe*, the reading attested in the edition with the *Vy* and by Vyomaśiva’s commentary and the one preferred also by Shastri, cf. Hattori, *op. cit.*, n. 2, p. 161; cf. also Marui, *op. cit.*, p. 115, who includes the testimony of the *Kir*. One might add that although Śrīdhara does not quote the word, his commentary shows that he must have read *trividhe* as well; cf. *NKan* 444,13: *mahati dravye pṛthivyaptejolakṣaṇe . . .*
- 51 Cf. *Vy* 557,18-19: *anekadravya(vat)tvam ca rūpa[tva]ṃ ca prakāśaś ca catuṣṭayasannikarṣaś ceti tathoktas, tasmāt. . . Vy(Ms) 178a 3* does not read *rūpatvam*, but *rūpavattvam*, which makes good sense, but probably *rūpam* is to be preferred (cf. also Marui’s suggestion, *op. cit.*, p. 113) as Vyomaśiva merely dissolves the *dvandva*-compound at this point. In *Vy(G)* II 141,11 the reading is *rūpam*, without any indication as to this being an emendation. The expected and missing qualification of *rūpa*, *udbhūta-*, is added in brackets. The emendation of *anekadravya(vat)tvam* is also suggested by Gaurinath Sastri and Marui (*loc. cit.*, with n. 36), who equally concludes that Vyomaśiva did not read *udbhūta* (cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 116 and 118).
- 52 Cf. *NKan* 444,15: *rūpasya prakāśa udbhavasamākhyaṭo rūpasya dharmah. . .* (“the shining forth of colour, [i.e.] the property of colour called ‘having emerged’”). Hattori, *op. cit.*, p. 161, follows Śrīdhara’s interpretation in his understanding of the expanded expression *udbhūtarūpaprakāśa* (“manifestation of distinct color”); cf. also Jha’s translation in *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha of Praśastapāda*, p. 391 (“appearance of manifested colour”). Randle seems to be unclear about the compound, but he might refer to *udbhūtarūpaprakāśa* with “show manifest colour”; cf. *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, p. 107. Shastri (*loc. cit.*), however, separates *udbhūtarūpa* and *prakāśa*. – For Marui’s identical conclusion as to Śrīdhara’s text cf. Marui, *op. cit.*, pp. 116 and 119.

this qualification of *rūpa*.⁵³ Udayana's commentary poses problems as to its own correct text, but there are several points which indicate strongly that Udayana too did not read *udbhūta* in the copy of Praśastapāda's text at his disposal.⁵⁴

If Praśastapāda did not mention emerged colour in his reference to *VS* IV.1.6, one should examine next his reference to *VS* IV.1.9. As regards the arising of perception of the special elementary qualities, he relates to *VS* IV.1.9 and 10 summarily. The only additional condition named there, probably for brevity's sake, is the crucial contact of the respective sense with the support of the respective quality, i.e., the substance in which the latter inheres.⁵⁵ *rūpaviśeṣa*, and by extension through *sūtra* 10, *rasaviśeṣa* etc., are

53 Prof. Marui communicated to me in addition that one of the manuscripts preserved at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute has obviously *udbhūta* added by a second hand. – As Mr. Isaacson has pointed out to me *udbhūta* is actually missing in the Lahore edition of 1888, which has not been available to me; cf. also Marui, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, with n. 29, and 116.

54 *Kir* 184,18 is obviously corrupt; one should probably read ... *udbhūtarūpaṃ ca prakāśa[sy]⟨ś c⟩ālokaḥ, taiḥ sahitā[h]⟨c⟩ catuṣṭayasannikarṣāt. . . . udbhūtarūpaṃ aś* such does not prove conclusively that Udayana had *udbhūta* before him. He could have simply augmented *rūpa* in the text of the *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* available to him with *udbhūta* as a brief explanation, instead of saying e.g., *rūpaṃ codbhūtarūpaṃ* or *rūpaṃ codbhūtaṃ rūpaṃ*. However, there are clues to the fact that he did indeed explain mere *rūpa* in the text before him in a similar more elaborate way and that the beginning of the above quoted sentence with *udbhūtarūpaṃ ca*, as presented by Jetly, is corrupt as well. Vedantatirtha's edition of this section of the *Kiraṇāvalī* in *Kir(V)*, which is based on two manuscripts and the text as printed in Vindhyaśvartī Prasād Dvivedī's edition of the *Kiraṇāvalī* of 1897 (Benares Sanskrit Series 9, not available to me), shows that his materials too posed problems at this point. *Kir(V)* 532,1 omits *udbhūtarūpaṃ ca* altogether! On the other hand, the immediately preceding word, *svabhāvaḥ*, which Jetly draws with his punctuation to the end of the preceding explanation of Praśastapāda's *anekadravyavattva* and which does not make much sense to me, appears as *svabhāvaṃ* in *Kir(V)* 532,1. If that would not be enough to make one doubt the correctness of the text as printed in both editions at this point (and presumably in Dvivedī's edition as well), Vardhamāna's commentary shows clearly that *svabhāvaṃ* is correct and belongs to the explanation of *rūpa*, and only *rūpa*, which is, however, incomplete in both the editions used here; cf. *KirPr* 532,11-12: ... *viśayasthaṃ ca rūpaṃ udbhūtaṃ sahakārīty āha – rūpaṃ codbhūtasvabhāvaṃ iti* (cf. also the emendation in Marui, *op. cit.*, p. 114, with n. 37). It seems therefore that all the manuscripts used by the editors so far are defective at this point as well. One could even speculate that Jetly's two manuscripts reflect an attempt to make sense of the manuscript reading as presented in *Kir(V)*.

55 The addition of this condition is necessitated by the introduction of the classical doctrine of categories; on this aspect cf. Halbfass, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

paraphrased with *svagataviśeṣa*.⁵⁶ This expression has already been encountered above in the context of Vyomaśiva's version of *VS* IV.1.9; there and in the *PDhS* he had explained it as referring to the property *udbhava*. However, a completely different interpretation of Praśastapāda's *svagataviśeṣa* and therefore indirectly of *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.9 is found in the *NKan*.

According to Śrīdhara, who had tried – unconvincingly – to accommodate the concept of *udbhava* elsewhere, the “particularity of colour” etc. is the fact of being colour etc., i.e., the differentiating or specific universal (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) inhering in colour etc.⁵⁷ Because these specific universals too are causes for the perception of the special elementary qualities, the senses are allotted to their respective objects in a restrictive way. Otherwise there would be confusion.⁵⁸ By Śrīdhara's times this means that among the senses e.g. only the sense of vision possesses colour as its prominent special quality and is therefore receptive only to colour as its object; in this sense the colour's “being colour” is a cause for the arising of its perception by a specific determined sense. Even if there is no evidence that Praśastapāda used the concept of prominence of special elementary qualities,⁵⁹ this interpretation of *svagataviśeṣa* as relating to specific universals is more plausible than that by Vyomaśiva. If Praśastapāda indeed understood *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.9 as the specific particularity of colour consisting in its having emerged, and by extension through IV.1.10 *viśeṣa* as such a particularity of taste etc., as well, why did he not say so here with a single clarifying expression such as *udbhūtatva*? Had he understood *viśeṣa* actually as a specialty or particular excellence, why did he not specify it? Instead he generalizes further with the expression *svagataviśeṣa*. Besides, he stresses that the perception of colour etc., is caused by respectively determined senses.⁶⁰ For these reasons, and because of Praśastapāda's otherwise strictly terminological use of *viśeṣa*, Śrīdhara's interpretation in general is to be preferred over Vyomaśiva's.

56 Cf. *PDhS* 459,2f.: *rūparasagandhasparśeṣv anekadravyasamavāyāt svagataviśeṣāt svāśrayasannikarṣān niyatendriyanimittam* (scil. *pratyakṣam*) *utpadyate*.

57 Cf. also Ui, *op. cit.*, p. 196, on *VS(Up)* IV.1.6-10; Randle, *op. cit.*, p. 110, with n. 3; Mishra, *op. cit.*, p. 363; Hattori in Potter, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-16.

58 Cf. *NKan* 459,9-10: *svagato viśeṣo rūpe rūpatvaṃ, rase rasatvaṃ, gandhe gandhatvaṃ, sparsē sparsātvaṃ, tasmāt . . .*; 460,9-10: *svagataviśeṣānām hetutvād rūpādiṣv indriyavyavasthā. anyathā pariplavaḥ syād viśeṣābhāvāt*.

59 Cf. the discussion below.

60 *niyatendriyanimitta*, cf. the full quotation in n. 56 above.

Support for such a preference comes as well from Candrānanda, who takes *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.9 in this very sense.⁶¹ He might have been influenced in this by his understanding of *svagataviśeṣa* in the *PDhS* in turn.⁶² Earlier testimony is provided by Praśastapāda's older contemporary Dignāga.⁶³ In the Vaiśeṣika section of the *pratyakṣa*-chapter of his *PS* he refers in his autocommentary to an interpretation of *VS* IV.1.11 by a certain Vaiśeṣika, or a group of Vaiśeṣikas, which again implies an interpretation of *rūpaviśeṣa* as *rūpatva* in *VS* IV.1.9. The context, which cannot be fully paraphrased here,⁶⁴ is the sensory cognition of the substance by both vision and touch, claimed by the Vaiśeṣika. Dignāga points out in verse 2c that colour etc., too should be perceived by all senses, if the substance, although

61 Cf. *VSṼr* 33,13-14: ... *rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpatvākhyāt sāmānyaviśeṣād upalabdhiḥ* (cf. also Hattori, *Dignāga*, n. 4.38, p. 142; Marui, "Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," p. (37), and "A Study ...," p. 117). He applies this understanding of *viśeṣa* also to the other three special elementary qualities and their perception, referred to in IV.1.10 (cf. also Marui, "Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," p. (38)).

62 As Praśastapāda's reference to *VS* IV.1.9 and 10 in *PDhS* 459,2f. is quite obvious, it is also conceivable that Candrānanda adopted Śrīdhara's interpretation thereof and applied it to his interpretation of the *sūtra*; Candrānanda's reliance on the *PDhS* in his *VS*-commentary is well-known. This assumes that he knew the *NKan* as a contemporary text, for he could not have lived after Śrīdhara, as Aklujkar ("Candrānanda's Date") could establish the 10th c. as the upper limit for Candrānanda's life. This is based on reference to Candrānanda by Helārāja; it can be added that Helārāja knew as well Candrānanda's explanation of *rūpaviśeṣa* (cf. below) and his interpretation of *VS* IV.1.11. Vice versa it is equally possible that Candrānanda lived before Śrīdhara; the lower limit of Candrānanda's life is established by his well-known quotation from the *NV* (*VSṼr* 29,2-4 on *VS* III.2.4; Matilal, without reasons though, gives the 8th or 9th c. as Candrānanda's date, cf. *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, p. 74). In this case, Śrīdhara might have interpreted *svagataviśeṣa* in the *PDhS* under the influence of Candrānanda's explanation of *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.9, to which Praśastapāda's *svagataviśeṣa* eventually goes back. Candrānanda, on the other hand, could have been guided in his interpretation of the *sūtra* by his understanding of the relevant passage in the *PDhS*. – Of course, both Candrānanda and Śrīdhara could also independently of each other have been aware of the older interpretation of the *sūtra* and been guided by this awareness in their understanding of Praśastapāda's intention in *PDhS* 459,2f.

63 Cf. also Marui, "Vaiśeṣikasūtra 4.1.6 no kenkyū (I)," pp. (37)-(38), and "A Study ...," p. 118. – Prof. Hattori, in his contribution to this volume, has shown that Praśastapāda was known to the author of the *Tarkajvālā*. If indeed this commentator is identical with Bhāviveka, the author of the *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā*, this would make Praśastapāda only very slightly junior to Dignāga.

64 For an explanatory paraphrase of *PSṼr* 203,14-28 on *PS* I 4 (Vaiśeṣika) 2b according to Kanakavarman, in some aspects deviating considerably from Hattori's interpretation in *Dignāga*, cf. again Preisendanz, *op. cit.*, n. 173.

one and not manifold, could be perceived by more than one sense.⁶⁵ One sense could perceive the object of another sense; they would not be allotted to their specific objects anymore. The Vaiśeṣika's reply incorporates the crucial interpretation of *VS* IV.1.11 (*tadabhāvād avyabhicārah*): the said faults do not obtain, because the specific particularities (**viśeṣa*) of colour etc., determine in a restrictive way by which sense colour etc., are perceived. Because these particularities, i.e., being taste etc., do not exist e.g. in a blue object (*tadabhāvāt*), a cognition by a sense, e.g. taste, does not deviate towards this blue object (*avyabhicārah*). Something in which the fact of being colour (**rūpatva*) does not exist, cannot be perceived by the sense of vision. In the same way touch etc., are restricted to their specific objects by these particularities, i.e., the specific universals, of temperature etc.⁶⁶

The following re-interpretation of *VS* IV.1.11 by the Vaiśeṣika, reported by Dignāga, is not of immediate concern for the present issue. What is important is the fact that at least one pre-Praśastapāda commentator⁶⁷ understood *tat-* in *VS* IV.1.11 as referring to the specific universals *rūpatva* etc. From this one can infer that he interpreted *rūpaviśeṣa* in *sūtra* 9 as *rūpatva*, to which the demonstrative pronoun in *sūtra* 11 can relate back. Similarly, by extension through *sūtra* 10, he would have assumed *rasatva* etc., as conditions for perceptibility in the case of taste etc.;⁶⁸ although only implied through *sūtra* 10, they can also be related to by *tat-* in *sūtra* 11.

65 Cf. *PSVṛ* 203,29-33 according to Kanakavarman: *gal te yañ don tha mi dad pa yañ dbaṅ po du mas 'dzin pa yin na gzugs la sogs pa so so la yañ "dbaṅ po kun gyi(s) 'dzin par 'gyur"* (= 2c) *te rdzas la sogs pa bzin no. de ltar na yañ gzugs la sogs pa [la] yañ dbaṅ po du mas gzuñ bar bya bar 'gyur ro.*

66 Cf. *PSVṛ* 205,1-6 according to Kanakavarman: *ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te. gzugs la sogs pa de dag la rañ rañ gi bye brag ñes pa yod pa yin la, de med pa 'i phyir dbaṅ po 'i blo sñon po la mi 'khrul to že na – ci ltar na de dag ñes pa byed pa ñid yin? gañ la gzugs ñid med pa de mig gi gzuñ bar bya ba ma yin la, de bzin du reg par bya ba la sogs pa rñams kyi yañ rañ rañ gi yul ñes pa ñid yin pa* Jinendrabuddhi's reading of the second sentence suggests that the objects(?) are determining in a restrictive way the sensory cognitions with regard to their own specific particularities; cf. *PST* 65b 4: *rañ gi bye brag la ñes par byed pa rñams so*, with 5: *dbaṅ po 'i blo rñams kyi zes sbral bar bya 'o.* Instead of **svasvaviṣaya* he must have read **svaviśeṣa*, which I find difficult to understand. – Cf. also *PSVṛ* 205,11-13 according to Kanakavarman: *. . . de lta na gañ la gzugs ñid yod pa de mig gi gzuñ bya yin te. de lta bas na reg bya la sogs pa la yañ de bzin du ñes pa ñid kyi s khyad par yod pa yin no.*

67 In the light of Prof. Hattori's results mentioned in n. 63 above this would not be so certain any longer; he could be a contemporary of Praśastapāda as well.

68 This is indicated in the sentence preceding the paraphrase of *VS* IV.1.11 with **rūpādiṣu*. Cf. also the quotation of *PSVṛ* 205,11-13 in n. 66 above.

This interpretation of *VS* IV.1.11 is clearly to be preferred over others which cannot be discussed here.⁶⁹ The *sūtra* would thus account in general for the assignment of the senses to their respective special objects. The crucial factor in this determination, appearing only in the form of *tat-*, would actually have been mentioned before explicitly in *sūtra* 9 with *rūpaviśeṣa*, by extension through *sūtra* 10 implicitly with *rasaviśeṣa*, i.e., *rasatva*, etc. Interesting in other aspects as well,⁷⁰ Vyomaśiva's interpretation of *sūtra* 11 is close to that by Dignāga's opponent, although he did take *rūpaviśeṣa* in *sūtra* 9 as referring to the colour's having emerged.

Lastly, Bhartṛhari already seems to relate to *VS* IV.1.9 and 10, next to IV.1.6. He takes the *sūtra*-s to refer to the causes or means (*sādhana*) for being object of perception (*dr̥ṣṭikarman*), i.e., for perceptibility. In verse 10d of *VP* III, *sādhanasamuddeśa*, the cause *rūpatva* could refer to *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.9, whereas the specific universals (*sāmānyaviśeṣa*) of taste etc., adduced in verse 11a, could go back to the generalizing *VS* IV.1.10.⁷¹ Helārāja, who knows both interpretations of *rūpaviśeṣa* in *VS* IV.1.9, identifies the interpretation in the sense of *rūpatva* as the one intended here by Bhartṛhari.⁷²

In the face of the evidence accumulated above we should therefore accept the interpretation of *rūpaviśeṣa* etc., in the sense of the specific universals of colour etc., as the most probable original intention of the *sūtrakāra*. However, at the time of the *VS* itself, the explanation given above – within the context of the passage *PDhS* 459,2f. and Śrīdhara's commentary on it – of the precise way in which these universals are causes for the arising of perception by specific senses, an explanation which can be modified to relate to the conditions for perceptibility probably meant in *VS* IV.1.6f., does not yet seem possible to me; elsewhere I have tried to show that the important concept of the prominence of one of the special elementary qualities in the elements and therefore in the senses made of them has been developed in the *NS* only, on the basis of *VS* VIII.16-17.⁷³

69 Cf. also Hattori's judgment in *op. cit.*, n. 4.37, p. 142. For a discussion of Candrānanda's interpretation cf. Preisendanz, *loc. cit.*

70 Cf. again Preisendanz, *loc. cit.*

71 Cf. *VP* III *sādhanasamuddeśa* 10: *ghaṭasya dr̥ṣṭikarmatve mahattvādñi sādhanam/ rūpasya dr̥ṣṭikarmatve rūpatvādñi sādhanam*|| 11: *svaiḥ sāmānyaviśeṣaiś ca śaktimanto rasādayaḥ| niyatagrahaṇā loke, śaktayas tās tathāśrayaiḥ*||

72 Cf. *PrPr* 241,3 and 7-9 on *VP* III *sādhanasamuddeśa* 10.

73 For an extensive discussion of this cf. Preisendanz, *op. cit.*, n. 263. *VS* VIII.16 according to Candrānanda and *VSVy* reads: *bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne, VS* VIII.17 according to manuscript P of Candrānanda's commentary: *tathāpas tejo vāyus ca rasarūpasparśajñāneṣu rasarūpasparśaviśeṣād iti*. On further readings and their discussion cf. Preisendanz, *loc. cit.*

But even without this improvement the specific universals of the special elementary qualities can be understood to serve the above purpose up to a certain point within the context of the *VS*. For example, colour has “being colour” and is therefore perceptible by the sense of vision which possesses colour (which again has “being colour”) itself; it cannot be apprehended by touch, as this sense does not possess colour. Taste on the other hand, which lacks “being colour,” but has “being taste,” is not perceptible by the sense of vision which for its part lacks taste, the substratum of “being taste”: taste is perceived by the sense of taste which possesses taste itself. In this light, the difficult *rasarūpasparśaviśeṣa* in *VS* VIII.17, which was obviously read by Candrānanda, although he does not repeat the word in his commentary, could be understood as well as referring to the specific universals inhering in taste, colour and temperature.⁷⁴ Admittedly, the topic is a different one in *VS* VIII.16-17; these *sūtra*-s deal with the question which elements are the material causes with regard to the perceptions of the various special elementary qualities, i.e., the material causes in the senses. But this question is closely related to the present context, and the interpretation of *-viśeṣa* in both contexts as referring to the specific universals as just explained would even link the two in a meaningful way. Special elementary qualities are perceptible by specific senses in as much as these qualities have their respective specific universals such as being colour etc., which are present in the specific senses by virtue of their possessing the corresponding quality themselves (*VS* IV.1.9-10). On the other hand, one of the two reasons why specific elements are the material causes with regard to the perceptions of specific special qualities is that they themselves possess the respective quality which again has the respective specific universal such as being colour etc. (*VS* VIII.16-17). These specific universals present in the special qualities and – indirectly by way of their qualities – in the senses link them as what can be perceived and what is the material cause in perception.

The question why e.g. the fiery sense of vision does not function in the perception of temperature also, as it equally has – indirectly – the specific universal of being temperature, or why the earthy sense of smell does not function in the perception of all four qualities to which it possesses counterparts which again have the respective specific universals, has obviously not been asked explicitly in this context; there is even evidence for early criticism of this oversight.⁷⁵ One could also ask why a special elementary

74 Candrānanda interprets *rasarūpasparśaviśeṣa* as relating to the specific special qualities of the elements in question, i.e., to sweet taste, which has not arisen through a thermic process, to white and luminous colour, etc.; cf. *VSVr* 65,6-7 on *VS* VIII.17.

75 Cf. Preisendanz, *loc. cit.*

quality such as colour should not be perceptible by e.g. the sense of taste, if being colour is a condition for its perceptibility in as much as that by which it is perceived should be linked to the same specific universal. The notion of prominence (*utkarṣa*) of one of the special qualities in an element and therefore also in a sense made of it is urgently needed and provided by *NS* III.1.63 only. It should be noted that Praśastapāda does not yet use it in his preserved work, and that it does not come up in Dignāga's discussion with his Vaiśeṣika opponent. Maybe they saw e.g. colour as the essential special quality of the sense of vision simply because it is the one that it has in addition to the qualities owned by the sense of touch.

Even if one agrees with the above argumentation so far one could still ask why the wording in *VS* IV.1.9 is *rūpaviśeṣa*, and not simply *rūpatva*, which one would expect if the specific universal was intended here. One reason for this I infer from the presence of the following *sūtra* 10 which extends the statement of *sūtra* 9 to taste etc.: with the wording *rūpaviśeṣa* in *sūtra* 9 the author can imply some kind of *anuvṛtti* in *sūtra* 10 not only of the first condition of *sūtra* 9, which would not have to be changed at all, but also of the second condition in the form of *x-viśeṣa*, where *x* would have to be supplied by common sense out of the enumerative locative compound in *sūtra* 10. That is, if one were to formulate explicitly what is intended in the summarizing extension of the statement in *sūtra* 9 to taste etc., by *sūtra* 10, one could keep the wording of *sūtra* 9 and would have to replace just the element *rūpa-*, which is specific for *sūtra* 9, before the condition expressed generally by *-viśeṣa*. Of course, any intelligent person would also replace *rūpatva* with *rasatva* etc., after a moment's reflection, but *-tva* clearly does not have continuing force as easily and smoothly as *-viśeṣa* and as a suffix would not make explicit the nature of the second condition with the same clarity as the more descriptive noun *-viśeṣa*. Moreover, the use of the more unusual and maybe awkward compound instead of the usual, more concise formation with the abstract suffix *-tva* emphasizes already by itself that in the case of the perceptibility of special elementary qualities, different from the case of the perceptibility of a substance treated before, the second condition contains a variable.

To conclude, we have to ask ourselves why the more original interpretation of *rūpaviśeṣa* was replaced by Vātsyāyana, with Vyomaśiva and Bhaṭṭavādīndra in his wake.⁷⁶ Part of the answer could be that Vātsyāyana found a

76 Although *VS* IV.1.9 has obviously been dropped in *VS*Y, Bhaṭṭavādīndra's commentary on IV.1.11 (= ed. 9) shows that he was aware of *rūpaviśeṣa* as a condition for visual perception. As he further supplements *rūpa* in *VS* III.1.6 with *udbhūta* (cf. n. 46

convenient expression in *rūpaviśeṣa* to accomodate his newly worked out concept of *udbhava* into the *sūtra*-text of the sister school as well. Another and complementary reason could be the (correct) interpretation of *VS* IV.1.9 as referring to the conditions for perceptibility of colour in the light of this new concept which introduces a new subdivision for the special elementary qualities, not as referring to some of the causes for the arising of its perception, as in the *PDhS*. In this matter, I would like to let Uddyotakara speak for me: “Being colour does not distinguish one colour from another; it is rather the fact of having emerged (*udbhava*) which is called ‘particularity’/‘specialty’ (*viśeṣa*), because it is a factor distinguishing [among colours]. Just as [in the expression] ‘specialty of a brahman’ (*brāhmaṇaviśeṣa*) (i.e., a special brahman) the specialty of the brahman vis à vis other brahmans is not [his] being a brahman (*brāhmaṇatva*), in the same way that which distinguishes [one thing] from something [else], which belongs to the same universal, is called ‘specialty’ (*viśeṣa*).”⁷⁷ Lastly, given the above-mentioned problem involved with the specific universals *rūpatva* etc., as conditions for perceptibility and the change in the situation by the introduction of the notion of *utkarṣa*, it was probably easier for Vyomaśiva to follow Vātsyāyana’s smooth interpretation than to struggle with *rūpaviśeṣa* etc., in the sense of specific universals in *VS* IV.1.9-10. The new situation had required already considerable acrobatics from him in his interpretation of *VS* VIII.16-17.⁷⁸

Appendix:

Readings and versions of VS IV.1.6 and 9 referred to in the present paper

VS IV.1.6

mahaty anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (VSVṛ, VNTṛ, TSP, AKVy, PrPr, TBV, SVR, VSVy, NTĀ, VSVp)

mahaty anekadravyatvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (TAV)

mahattvānekadravyatvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.62)

above), it is highly probable that he understood *rūpaviśeṣa* in IV.1.9 as *rūpodbhava* or *rūpodbhūtatva*. – On Śāṅkara Miśra’s accumulative interpretation cf. Preisendanz, *op. cit.*, n. 173.

77 Cf. *NV* 766,14-16 on *NS* III.1.33a = ed. 38: *na rūpatvaṃ rūpāntarād rūpaṃ viśiṅaṣṭy, api tūdbhavo viśeṣakatvād viśeṣa ity ucyate. yathā brāhmaṇaviśeṣa iti na brāhmaṇatvaṃ brāhmaṇaviśeṣa evaṃ samānajātīyaviśeṣaka[tva]ṃ yat tad viśeṣa ity ucyate.*

78 Cf. Preisendanz, *op. cit.*, nn. 263 and 266.

mahattvānekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.62 acc. to Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's ed.)

mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ (NV on III.1.33)

mahadanekadravyasamavāyād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (Dignaga acc. to NVTT)

mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpavattvāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.31)

mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpāc copalabdhiḥ (HBT, NV acc. to Jaisalmer ms)

mahadanekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.34)

mahattvād anekadravyavattvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca dravyaṃ pratyakṣam (Vy)

VS IV.1.9

anekadravyeṇa dravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ (NV(M) on I.2.2, VSVṛ acc. to ms P)

anekadravyasamavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.34 = "NS" III.1.33a, NV on I.2.2, PrPr, VSUp)

anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc copalabdhiḥ (NBh on III.1.34, *sūtra-pāṭha* acc. to ms PS, VSVṛ acc. to ms O)

anekadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NV on III.1.33a, NV(BI) on I.2.2)

anekadravyadravyeṇa samavāyād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NV(BI) on III.1.33a)

mahaty anekadravyatvād rūpaviśeṣāc ca rūpopalabdhiḥ (NKC)

anekadravyeṇa (dravyeṇa) samavāyāt svagataviśeṣāc ca rūpaṃ pratyakṣam (Vy)

Abbreviations and Bibliography

I. Original Sources

- AK Abhidharmakośa, cf. AKVy
 AKVy Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, in *Abhidharmakośa & Bhāṣya of Ācārya Vasubandhu with Sphuṭārthā Commentary of Ācārya Yaśomitra*. Ed. Dwārikādās Śāstri. Bauddha Bharati Series 5-6. 2nd ed., Varanasi 1981
 Kir Kiraṇāvalī, in *Prasastapādabhāṣyam with the Commentary Kiraṇāvalī of Udayanācārya*. Ed. Jitendra S. Jetly. GOS 154. Baroda 1971
 Kir(V) Kiraṇāvalī, in *Kiraṇāvalī by Udayanācārya with the Commentary of Vardhamānopādhyāya*. BI 200. Fasc. 4. Ed. Narendra Chandra Vedantatirtha. Calcutta 1956
 KirPr Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa, in Kir(V)
 CŚ(Dh) Guang Bai Lun Shi Lun of Dharmapāla on Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka. T. No. 1571 (Vol. 30)
 *Tattvasiddhi of Harivarman. T. No. 1646 (Vol. 32)

- TAV *Tattvārtha-Vārttika of Śrī Akalaṅkadeva*. Ed. Mahendrakumar Jain. 2 Vols. Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jainagranthamālā Saṃskṛta Grantha 10, 20. Benares 1953, 1957
- TBV *Tattvabodhavidhāyini*, in *Sammatitarkaprakaraṇam By Siddhasena Divākara With Abhayadevasūri's Commentary, Tattvabodhavidhāyini*. 5 Vols. Ed. Sukhlāl Saṅghavi und Becardās Doṣi. Gujarāta Purātattvamandira Granthāvalī 10, 16, 18, 19, 21. Ahmedabad 1924-1931 (repr. Kyoto 1984)
- TBhā *Tarkabhāṣā of Keśava Miśra*. Ed. with transl. by S.R. Iyer. Gokuldas Sanskrit Series 36. Varanasi 1979
- TS *Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla*. 2 Vols. Ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 1. Varanasi 1968
- TSP *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, in TS
- NKan *Nyāyakandalī*, in PDhS
- NKC *Nyāya Kumud Chandra of Śrīmat Prabhāchandrāchārya. A Commentary on Bhaṭṭākalāṅkadeva's Laghīyāstraya*. Ed. Mahendra Kumar. Māṅik Chandra Digambara Jain Granthamālā 38-39. Bombay 1938, 1941
- NTĀ *Nyāyatattvāloka*, in Preisendanz (1994)
- NTD *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā of Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara*. Ed. Kiśornāth Jhā. Allahabad 1979
- NBh *Nyāyabhāṣya*, in *Nyāyadarśanam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyāṭikā & Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*. 2 Vols. Ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 29. Calcutta 1936, 1944
- NM *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa*. 2 Vols. Ed. K.S. Varadacharya. Oriental Research Institute Series 116, 139. Mysore 1969, 1983
- NV *Nyāyavārttika*, see NBh
- NV(BI) *Nyāya-Vārttikam, a Gloss on Vātsyāyana's Commentary of the Nyāya-Aphorisms*. Ed. Vindhyaśvarī Prasād Dvivedin. BI 133. Calcutta 1887-1914 (repr. Delhi 1986)
- NV(M) *Nyāyavārttika*, in *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparyāṭikā of Vācaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana*. Vol. 1, Chapter 1. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text 20. Darbhanga 1967
- NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, see NBh
- NS *Nyāyasūtra*, in Ruben (1928)
- PDhS *Prāśastapādabhāṣya (Padārthadharmasaṅgraha) with commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdharabhaṭṭa*. Ed. Durgādhar Jhā Śarma. Gaṅgānātha-Jhā-Granthamālā 1. Varanasi 1963
- PrP *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śālikanātha Miśra with the Nyāya-Siddhi of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Banaras Hindu University Darśana Series 4. Benares 1961
- PrPr *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa*, in *Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari with the Prakīrṇakaprakāśa of Helārāja*. 2 Vols. Ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer. Deccan College Monograph Series 21. Poona 1963, 1973
- PS(Vṛ) *Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) I*, in Hattori (1968)
- PST *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā (Viśālāmalavati) (Yaṅs ba daṅ dri ma med pa daṅ ldan pa) of Jinendrabuddhi*. TTP No. 5766 (Vol. 139)
- BhP *Bhāṣāpariccheda (Kārikāvalī) of Viśvanātha Pañcānana with autocommentary*

- VNT Siddhāntamuktāvalī. Ed. Kṣemarāj Śrīkṛṣṇadās Śreṣṭhi. Mumbai 1907
Vādanyāyatīkā, in *Vadanyayaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary Vipancitārthā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita and Sambandhaparīkṣā with the Commentary of Acharya Prabhachandra*. Ed. Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati Series 8. Varanasi 1972
- VP Vākyapadīya, in PrPr
- Vy Vyomavati, in *The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśasta Devāchārya with Commentaries (up to Dravya) Sūkti by Jagadīśa Tarkālaṅkāra, Setu by Padmanābha Miśra and Vyomavati by Vyomaśivāchārya (to the end)*. Ed. Gopinath Kavirāj. CSS 61. Benares 1924-1931
- Vy(G) *Vyomavati of Vyomaśivāchārya*. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri. M.M. Śivakumārasāstri-Granthamālā 6. 2 Vols. Varanasi 1983, 1984
- Vy(Ms) Manuscript of Vyomavati belonging to the University of Mysore Oriental Research Institute, Ms.-No. C - 1575
- VS *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Ed. Jambuvijayaji. GOS 136. Baroda 1961
- VS(Up) Vaiśeṣikasūtrapāṭha in VSUp
- VSUp *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra of Śrīśaṅkaramiśra*. Ed. Nārāyaṇa Miśra. KSS 195. 2nd ed., Varanasi 1969
- VSVṛ Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti of Candrānanda, in VS
- VSVy Vaiśeṣikasūtravyākhyā of Bhaṭṭavādīndra, in *Vaiśeṣikadarsana of Kaṇāda with an anonymous Commentary*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series Modern Text 5. Darbhanga 1957
- ŚIV Ślokaṁvārttika, in ŚIVK
- ŚIVK *Kāśikā*, in *The Mīmāṃsāślokaṁvārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamīśra*. Part 1 and 2: ed. Sambasiva Sastri. Part 3: ed. Ramasvami Sastri. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 90, 99, 150. Trivandrum 1926, 1929, 1943
- SP *Śivādīya's Saptapadārthī with a Commentary by Jinavardhana Sūri*. Ed. J.S. Jetly. L.D. Series 1. Ahmedabad 1963.
- SPT Saptapadārthīṭīkā, in SP
- SM Siddhāntamuktāvalī, in BhP
- SVR Syādvādaratnākara of Vādidēvasūri, autocommentary on Pramāṇanayatattvā-lokāṅkāra. 5 Vols. Ed. M. Ośval. Ārhatamataprabhākara 4. Poona 1926-1930 (repr. Delhi 1988)
- HBṬ *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcāṭa with the sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Ed. S. Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji. GOS 93. Baroda 1949
- HBṬĀ Hetubinduṭīkāloka, in HBṬ

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