

Zeitschrift: Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft = Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie

Herausgeber: Schweizerische Asiengesellschaft

Band: 48 (1994)

Heft: 2: Proceedings of the Panel on Early Vaiesika , Hong Kong, August 1993

Artikel: Vaiesika or Crvka? : the mysterious opponent in Pramnavrttika
2.63-72

Autor: Franco, Eli

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-147103>

Nutzungsbedingungen

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften auf E-Periodica. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen sowie auf Social Media-Kanälen oder Webseiten ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. [Mehr erfahren](#)

Conditions d'utilisation

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. La reproduction d'images dans des publications imprimées ou en ligne ainsi que sur des canaux de médias sociaux ou des sites web n'est autorisée qu'avec l'accord préalable des détenteurs des droits. [En savoir plus](#)

Terms of use

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. Publishing images in print and online publications, as well as on social media channels or websites, is only permitted with the prior consent of the rights holders. [Find out more](#)

Download PDF: 12.01.2026

ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, <https://www.e-periodica.ch>

VAIŚEŚIKA OR CĀRVĀKA?
THE MYSTERIOUS OPPONENT IN *PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA* 2.63-72¹

Eli FRANCO, Bundoora

As is well known, the *Pramānasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramānavārttika* is construed as a loose commentary on the five epithets of the Buddha in the *mangalaśloka* of the *Pramānasamuccaya*. The second of these epithets, “seeking the benefit of all living beings” (*jagaddhitaśin*), is interpreted by Dharmakīrti as being compassionate, and he dedicates almost a hundred verses (34-132ab) to this topic. Unlike what one may expect, Dharmakīrti’s purpose in these verses is not to prove that the Buddha is compassionate. This proof is accomplished by the direct and indirect relationships among the epithets themselves.² Dharmakīrti’s purpose here is of a different order. He sets out to prove the preconditions which would make the Buddha’s compassion possible. Broadly speaking, there are two such preconditions.³ The first, and to judge by the space allotted to it, the more important one, is an infinite number of previous lives. Clearly, an infinite compassion like the Buddha’s couldn’t possibly be accumulated during a single life-time. It had to be practiced repeatedly during many life-times. Thus, verses 34 onwards form a kind of *paralokasiddhi*, a proof that the so-called other world exists.⁴ So far, the few sporadic remarks by modern scholars invariably identify the target of these verses as Cārvāka or Lokāyata materialists. My

- 1 An earlier draft of this paper was read at the 34th ICANAS. I would like to thank all the participants of the special panel “Early Vaiśeśika” for their useful and friendly comments. Special thanks are due, as always, to Dr. K. Preisendanz.
- 2 Cf. my “Yet another look at the framework of the *Pramānasiddhi* chapter of the *Pramānavārttika*” forthcoming in *Indo-Iranian Journal*.
- 3 The second precondition presupposes the first and consists in the possibility of an infinite increase of compassion. For even if there is an infinite number of previous lives, this does not imply that compassion can increase indefinitely. This second precondition does not concern us here.
- 4 On *paralokasiddhi* in the Buddhist tradition cf. above all several publications by Steinkellner; to mention only two: “Anmerkungen zu einer buddhistischen Texttradition: Paralokasiddhi,” *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Kl. d. Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 121, 79-94, 1984; *Dharmottaras Paralokasiddhi*. Wien 1986. Cf. also M. Namai, “Two aspects of *paralokasādhana* in the Dharmakirtian Tradition,” in E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*. Wien 1991. Cf. also K. Preisendanz, *Studien zu Nyāyasutra* III.1, forthcoming in *Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien*, n. 104.

purpose here is not to deny that, but only to claim that when we look closely at the arguments, the picture is somewhat more complex. In other words, granted that the main opponents in this section are the Cārvākas, or more precisely Kambalāśvatara, are they the only opponents? After criticizing Kambalāśvatara,⁵ Dharmakīrti examines three further relationships between the body and cognition, in which the body is considered 1) as determined by the three humours (*doṣa*), 2) as support or locus (*āśraya*, *ādhāra*), and 3) as a whole (*avayavin*). Should we assume that we are still dealing with Cārvāka opponents? In principle there is nothing objectionable to such an assumption: the trouble is that none of the fragmentary Cārvāka materials known to us seems to support such an assumption.⁶ Should we then assume that the opponents belong to the medical school and to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, or perhaps even to the Sāṃkhya school, where the doctrines of the three humours and of the whole are well established? The trouble is that none of these schools doubts the existence of the ‘other world’, and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do not even consider the body to be the support of cognition which is a quality of the soul.

Before arguing any further, we need to take a closer look at the arguments themselves. Elsewhere, I have translated the entire section⁷; but for lack of time, I shall confine myself here only to one type of relationship, the one between support and supported.⁸

5 Kambalāśvatara is criticized in *PV* 2.34ff. I intend to argue in some detail for this identification on a different occasion. The identification of Kambalāśvatara with Ajita Keśakambalin, as suggested by Tucci and Bhattacharya, can be safely discarded. Cf. Tucci, *Linee di una Storia del Materialismo Indiano*, repr. in *Opera Minora*, Parte I, Roma 1971, pp. 49-155, at p. 140: “Il ricordo del suo nome (scil. Ajita Kesakambalin) e della sua teoria è conservato dalla tradizione buddhistica fino ai tempi relativamente recenti: ché infatti nel *Kambalāśvatara* ricordato da Śāntarakṣita, sl. 1864, è evidente che occorre vedere lo stesso Ajita Kesakambalin di cui il *Dīghanikāya* fa menzione.” Cf. also Bhattacharya’s Foreword to the first edition of *TS*, pp. XXXVIII-IX. Bhattacharya identifies Kambalāśvatara also with the music teacher mentioned in the *Saṅgītāloka*. The present author would be very grateful for any further information on Kambalāśvatara.

6 The best collection to date of Cārvāka-Lokāyata fragments can be found in M. Namai, “A Survey of Bāṛhaspatya Philosophy,” *Indological Review* 2, 1976, 29-74.

7 *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*. Forthcoming in *Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde*. Cf. also my summary of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter forthcoming in *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, ed. K. Potter.

8 Cf. *PV* 2.63-72:

anāśrayāt sadasator nāśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇam |
satas ced āśrayo, nāsyāḥ sthātūr avyatirekataḥ ||63||
vyatireke 'pi taddhetus, tena bhāvasya kiṃ kṛtam |
avināśaprasyaṅgah, sa nāśahetor mato yadi ||64||

Dharmakīrti claims that neither an existing thing nor a non-existing thing has a support, for a non-existing thing cannot have one, while an existing thing does not need one. The opponent objects that an existing thing has a support, which is the cause of its continuity (*sthitikāraṇa*). Dharmakīrti replies that the continuity is not something different from the agent of continuity (*sthāṭṛ*), i.e., the continuing thing itself; thus, the cause of continuity is nothing but the cause of the thing itself, i.e., the respective previous moments in the same series, and not its support. Even if it is admitted that a thing and its continuity are different, the cause of the thing is also the cause of its continuity. Therefore, nothing is accomplished by the assumption of a further support.

If one assumes that something continues to exist because of the cause of its continuity, then it will not be destroyed as long as that cause is present; e.g., the cognition would last as long as the body, but one observes that the cognition arises and disappears while the body continues to exist. If one assumes that the destruction is due to the cause of destruction, the same inadmissible consequence applies here too, namely, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing. If a thing is destroyed because of a cause of destruction, it would continue to exist even without the cause of continuity until the cause of destruction operates on it. In other words, until the cause of destruction arrives, the thing continues to exist by itself; thus, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing, i.e., is superfluous. And when the cause of destruction arrives on the scene, the thing is destroyed; thus, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing, i.e., is powerless.

tulyah prasāgas tatrāpi, kiṁ punah sthitihetunā |
 ā nāśakāgamāt sthānam tatas ced vastudharmatā ||65||
 nāśasya saty abādhō 'sāv iti kiṁ sthitihetunā |
 yathā jalāder ādhāra iti cet, tulyam atra ca ||66||
 pratikṣaṇavināśe hi bhāvānām bhāvasantateḥ |
 tathotpatteḥ sahetutvād āśrayo, 'yuktam anyathā ||67||
 syād ādhāro jalādinām gamanapratibandhataḥ |
 agatīnām kiṁ ādhārair gunasāmānyakarmanām ||68||
 etena samavāyaś ca samavāyi ca kāraṇam |
 vyavasthitatvam jātyāder nirastam anapāśrayat ||69||
 parato bhāvanāśaś cet, tasya kiṁ sthitihetunā |
 sa vinasyed vināpy anyair, asaktāḥ sthitihetavāḥ ||70||
 sthitimān sāśrayaḥ sarvāḥ sarvotpattau ca sāśrayaḥ |
 tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya na vināśaḥ kadācana ||71||
 svayam vinasvarātmā cet tasya kah sthāpakaḥ parah |
 svayam na naśvarātmā cet tasya kah sthāpakaḥ parah ||72||

The opponent may claim that the cause of continuity is responsible for the continuity only until the cause of destruction arrives. In this case, however, the destruction would be a property of that thing. For if a thing needs a cause for its continuity, this implies that the thing left to itself will perish by itself or spontaneously. Thus, the destruction is immanent to the own nature of the thing. Consequently, when the thing is present, the destruction cannot be obstructed. For whatever obstructs the destruction will also obstruct that very thing. Therefore, the cause of continuity accomplishes nothing. (63-66ab)

The opponent may claim that the body is the support or the locus (*ādhāra*) of cognition just as the pot is the support of water, but the same inadmissible consequence would apply here too, that is, inasmuch as the pot is taken to be the cause of continuity for water. However, there is another meaning of “support” which is acceptable for Dharmakīrti. When things perish at every moment, something is called “support” not because it causes continuity, but because it causes the series (*santati*) to be located at the same place (i.e., the place of the support).⁹ In this sense, and in no other, the term support may be applied to one of the coproducers of the series. If, on the other hand, one accepts the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that things are not momentary, and some notion of support is to be used in this context, then the support of water etc., would be something which prevents their movement. But in the case of qualities, universals and actions, things which lack movement, the assumption of support is superfluous. (66cd-68) By the same argument the relation of inherence, the notion of the inhered or containing cause, and the distribution of the universal in all the individuals containing it are refuted, because they do not need a support. (69)

Verses 70-72 conclude the discussion. If a thing has to be destroyed by something else, this implies that the thing, by its own nature, tends to continue to exist; thus, the cause of continuity is superfluous. If, on the other hand, a thing is unstable by its own nature, and tends to be destroyed even without the cause of destruction, then the cause of continuity is powerless. According to the opponent, everything which has a support lasts, and in every production the effect has a support. Therefore, nothing would ever be destroyed. The argument in this form is too elliptic. However, Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin explain that things whose support is eternal, e.g., the soul, would last as long as their support. But even things which seem not to have eternal support, such as a pot, would last forever, because the pot is

⁹ Cf. the example of the plate and the berries in *PVS* I 70.12-15 translated below.

supported by its parts (*kapāla*), which are supported by their parts, and so on up to the atoms, which are eternal. Thus, nothing will ever be destroyed. Therefore, if a thing has a perishable nature, nothing can make it continue; and if it does not have a perishable nature, nothing can make it continue.

Is there any reason why we should not assume a Cārvāka opponent for this section? Indeed the Cārvāka in general, and Kambalāśvatara in particular, considered the body as the support of cognition or consciousness. The main reason is, of course, that Dharmakīrti uses typical Nyāya-Vaiśeśika terminology, referring in 68-69 to the categories of quality (*guna*), universal (*sāmānya*), action (*karman*) and inherence (*samavāya*). Of course, this argument in itself is not conclusive. After all, what we know about the Cārvākas is at best fragmentary. Can we be sure that no Cārvāka has ever accepted the Vaiśeśika categories, at least in a modified form? The Cārvākas were not creative metaphysicians. On the contrary, they seem to have adapted previously existing philosophies of nature to their ethical needs. For instance, certain *Bṛhaspatisūtras* evoke unmistakably philosophy of nature as found in the *Mahābhārata* in a formulation which is also reflected in the *Padārtha-dharmasaṅgraha*.¹⁰ We know that certain Cārvākas were willing to accept atomism, even though atoms are not perceived by perception, the only means of knowledge traditionally accepted in the school.¹¹ Certain other Cārvākas, or perhaps the same ones, were willing to admit ether as a fifth element, next to the four accepted by Bṛhaspati.¹² And it should not surprise us that a school which was fighting above all a moral battle, was quite open on other matters, and was quite willing to up-date or modernize its philosophy of nature, as long as this did not interfere with its ethics. Indeed, one has the feeling that the entire Cārvāka metaphysics and epistemology (with the notable exception of Jayarāśi's) were subservient to their moral teachings. Furthermore, we know of at least two philosophers, Aviddhakarṇa and

10 Cf. *Bṛhaspatisūtra* A3 (Namai's enumeration): *tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviśayaśaṁjñā(h)* with *PDhS* 81.2: *trividham cāsyāḥ kāryam śarīrendriyaviśayaśaṁjñākam*. *PDhS* 94.2-3: *tāśām tu kāryam trividham śarīrendriyaviśayaśaṁjñākam*. Cf. also *MBh* 12.187.8-10ab, 12.239.9-11ab.

11 Cf. J. Sinha, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Calcutta 1956, vol. I, p. 242: "Some Cārvākas believed in the existence of atoms. The sense-organs are produced by the atomic arrangement of the elements." I could not locate the reference for this statement. A possible source could be Śilaṅka's commentary on *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* 1.1.7-8, which, however, is not available to me.

12 Cf. *TRD* 450.11-12: *caturbhūtātmakam jagad ācakṣate. kecī tu cārvākaikadeśīyā ākāśam pañcamam bhūtam abhimanyamānāḥ pañcabhūtātmakam jagad iti nigadanti.*

Bhāvivikta, who wrote both Cārvāka and Nyāya works.¹³ Whether they were Cārvākas who converted to Nyāya, or Naiyāyikas who converted to the Cārvāka philosophy, is anybody's guess. But the possibility of them introducing Vaiśeṣika categories into the Cārvāka school is certainly not unimaginable. And if this were the case, one can assume that the relationship between body and consciousness was redefined by using Vaiśeṣika concepts.

On the other hand, the alternative assumption that Dharmakīrti was criticizing a Vaiśeṣika opponent immediately raises two obvious problems. First, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas did not deny the doctrine of rebirth. They may disagree with Dharmakīrti on the question as to whether Siddhārtha Gautama had infinite compassion and deserves the title of a Buddha, but they would not disagree that he, like everybody else, had lived an infinite number of lives in the past. A *paralokasiddhi* directed against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not seem to make sense. Second, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika did not maintain that the body is the support of cognition. Thus, in this respect too, Dharmakīrti's arguments would involve the fallacy of *siddhasādhyatā*.

In spite of the above said, the assumption of a Cārvāka opponent is problematic. The reason for this is quite simple, and perhaps not entirely conclusive: If a Cārvāka were Dharmakīrti's opponent, then the commentators, or at least the two early commentators Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, should have known about it. In fact, Devendrabuddhi, while commenting on 64c, but certainly referring already to 63, identifies the opponent as Vaiśeṣika (*bye brag pa*).¹⁴ And Śākyamati thereon (*PVT* 125b2) reiterates the same identification. Significantly enough, they do not even qualify their identification by *ekadesin* or a similar expression, that is, they take the opinion criticized as orthodox or mainstream Vaiśeṣika, not as some individual deviation. Prajñākaragupta does not identify the opponent by name, but he uses typical Vaiśeṣika vocabulary in his comments.¹⁵ Manorathanandin is the only one who makes an effort to keep the Cārvāka in the discussion and to show that the arguments using Vaiśeṣika terminology are relevant to the Cārvāka as well: "Just as the pot etc., are the support of [already] existing water etc., so

13 Cf. Steinkellner, "Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya," WZKSO 5, 1961, 149-162; K. Potter, *The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, vol. II, pp. 281, 338-340. Cf. also *NMGBh* 197.4: *cirantanacārvākair hi bhāvivikta prabhṛtibhiḥ...*

14 Cf. *PVP* 36b2 (Derge 32a7): *bye brag pa'i bum pa la sog pa'i rdzas kyi yan gnas par byed pa yod pa'i phyir ro*|| "For according to the Vaiśeṣika, even a substance like a pot etc., has a cause of continuity."

15 Cf. *PVA* 80.10f. Some of the terms used are: *samavāya*, *saṃyoga*, *yutāyutasiddhi*, *avayavasamavetatva*, etc.

is the body [the support] of cognition.”¹⁶ “The universal ‘cow’ resides only in certain individuals (i.e., cows), and consciousness [resides] only in certain [material elements] which undergo a transformation into the form of a body.”¹⁷ This is a commendable, but somewhat awkward attempt to make the discussion coherent. Manorathanandin probably faced the same problem as we do. And his solution was to construe analogies between certain relations in Vaiśeśika and the mind-body relationship in Cārvāka thought. Significantly, the relations used for the analogies do not hold for the mind-body relationship in the Vaiśeśika itself.

To conclude, under the assumption of a Vaiśeśika opponent, there are serious doctrinal incompatibilities with the position criticized, namely, the doctrine of rebirth and the relationship between the body and cognition. Under the assumption of a Cārvāka opponent, though there are no serious doctrinal problems, the position is not known to us from any other source, and what is more important, it does not seem to have been known to Dharmakīrti’s commentators. This assumption is corroborated by the parallel passages in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita. Unlike most of the arguments against the Cārvākas, the arguments presented here appear not in the *Lokāyataparīkṣā*, but in the *Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā* and in the *Sāmānyaparīkṣā*, and in both cases in contexts which have nothing to do with Cārvāka ideas, nor with the doctrine of rebirth, nor with the relationship between body and cognition, nor even with the relationship between soul and cognition.¹⁸

The parallel passage in the *Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā* is a bit intriguing, because Śāntarakṣita’s opponent, or one of his main opponents, is no other than Aviddhakarṇa.¹⁹ However, a closer examination leaves no doubt that we are dealing here with Aviddhakarṇa the Naiyāyika. The whole context of the discussion points at the Nyāya school, and Aviddhakarṇa seems closely

16 *PVV* 31.15: *yathā jalādeḥ sata evādhāro ghaṭādis, tathā cittasya deha iti cet.*

17 *PVV* 32.8-9: *vyavasthitavām jātyādeh kāsucid eva vyaktiṣu gotvām vartate keṣucid eva ca dehākārapariṇāteṣu caitanyam ityādi nirastam.*

18 Cf. *TS* 350-384. One verse is repeated almost verbatim in the *Sāmānyaparīkṣā*; cp. v. 68 quoted above in n. 8 with *TS* 801:

syād ādhāro jalādinām gamanapratibandhakah |
agatīnām kim ādhāraiḥ sāmānyānām parikalpitaiḥ ||

Cf. also *HBTĀ* 386.15-16.

19 Cf. *TSP* 172.12f. on *TS* 367: *atrāviddhakarṇoktāni vināśasya hetumattvasādhane pramāṇāni...* Although the general doctrine of the cause of destruction was undoubtedly endorsed by Aviddhakarṇa, it is not clear whether his particular arguments, as reported in 367-369, are addressed by Dharmakīrti.

related to Uddyotakara, for their positions are presented next to each other, and both are refuted together.²⁰

Nor can we infer from the fact that Aviddhakarna wrote both Nyāya and Cārvāka works that he “converted” from one school to another or that he attempted a synthesis of the two schools. There are some well known cases where an author of one school writes a treatise on a rival school without engaging in criticism or involving his own positions and presuppositions. The most famous example is, of course, Vācaspati Miśra, but he is by no means unique in this respect. The practice seems to have been common especially among the Jainas, e.g., Śivāditya’s *Saptapadārthī*, Mallavādin’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippanī*, etc.

Furthermore, we may gain some insight by examining parallel passages in Dharmakīrti’s writings where the topic of support/locus (*āśraya*, *ādhāra*) is discussed. While reducing various relationships to *kāryahetu* in *PVin* III,²¹ Dharmakīrti interprets the relation of locus and located (*ādhāra*, *ādheya*) in terms of accessory cause and its effect (*upakāraka*, *upakārya*). The example used to illustrate this relationship is that of water and ground. Without the ground, the special state of the water, e.g., being still, is impossible. The opponent objects that the water is calm, not because the ground participates in its production, but because of a contact with the ground. Cf. *PVin* III 312a2: *gal te de las bdag ñid kyi khyad par skyes pa'i phyir chu de ltar gnas pa ni ma yin no|| 'o na ci že na| ldan pa las yin no že na*. “[Objection:] The water does not remain so because a specific character has arisen [for it] from that [locus/support], but because of conjunction.” Here too the opponent is not named, but the doctrine of support in terms of conjunction, which is itself connected to the supporting and supported entities by inherence,²² is specific to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Cf. for instance, *VS* 5.1.7: *saṃyogābhāve gurutvāt patanam*. And even the example of water seems to be taken directly from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika sources, e.g., *NBh* 574.4-5: *vidhārake hi vāyvabhrasamyoge gurutvād apām patanakarma na bhavati*. “For when there is a supporting conjunction between wind and cloud, the action of falling of water because of heaviness does not arise.” The probability that this doctrine of support was borrowed by a Cārvāka is, I think, rather low. It would imply that some Cārvākas claim that the body is the support of consciousness, because it has a

20 Cf. *TSP* on 370. Both are refuted together in 373ff.

21 Cf. *PVin* III 312a1f., translated by T. Iwata, “Pramāṇaviniścaya III 64-67,” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* XXXVII, 1993, 165-200, at p. 178f.

22 Cf. *PVin* III 312a2-7 and Iwata, *ibid.*, p. 189.

contact with consciousness. The assumption of a Nyāya-Vaiśeśika opponent, on the other hand, is further strengthened by taking into consideration another parallel passage where the relationship of support and supported is illustrated by the example of berries on a plate. Dharmakīrti is again reducing various Vaiśeśika relationships to causal ones, and the opponent asks how the plate could be the locus of the berries, given that it does not produce the berries. Cf. *PVS* 70.16-20: *prakṛtyaiva guruno dravyasyāsamānadeśakāryotpādanadharmaṇah samānadeśakāryotpādanabhāva ādhārakṛtaḥ. tasmāt tatpūrvakṣaṇasahakāri kuṇḍam tatraiva badarakāryam janayad ādhāra ity ucyate. anyatheha kunde badarāṇīti na syāt. na vai tadupakārakto 'yam vyapadeśah, kiṁ tarhi, saṃyogakṛtaḥ.* “The fact that a heavy substance, which by its own nature alone is destined to produce its effect in a dissimilar place, produces its effect in the same place, is due to/produced by a locus/support. Therefore, inasmuch as a plate, which is a coproducer in the previous moment of these [berries], produces its effect, [namely,] the berries, precisely there (i.e., precisely on the plate of the next moment), it is called a locus. Otherwise, one would also not [have the cognition] ‘There are berries here on the plate.’ [Objection:] The designation is not due to the [plate being] an accessory cause, but to a conjunction.”

Dharmakīrti replies to the objection by arguing that all connections between things are based on causal relationships. The opponent claims that such reduction of the relationship between locus and located could not account for the relation between a universal and its support, since the universal is eternal. Cf. *PVS* 71.11-14: *athāpi syāt sthāpaka āśrayaḥ sāmānyasya tataḥ sthitihetutvād ādhāro na jananād iti. tad ayuktam. tasya tadabhāve 'pi sthānāt. patanadharmaṇām hi bhāvānām pātāpratibandhād ajanako 'pi sthāpako bhavet.*

“[Objection:] The support of a universal is the cause of continuity [of the universal in a certain place]. Therefore, [something is] a locus, because it is a cause of continuity, not – because it produces [the universal].

[Reply:] This is not correct, because [the universal] continues [to exist] even when that [cause of continuity] is absent. Even though [something is] not a producer, it may be a cause of continuity, because it prevents things which are destined to fall from falling.”

The close parallel between this passage and ours is, I think, undeniable. And here too, everything points at a Nyāya-Vaiśeśika opponent. Furthermore, unlike the commentaries on *PV* II, Karṇakagomin identifies the opponent of this section twice as Uddyotakara (cf. *PVS* 277.6, 281.15: *yad āhod<2>yotakaraḥ...*); he quotes in the first instance from *NV* 669.7-8 on 2.2.64, and closely paraphrases in the second instance *NV* 481.9f., on 2.1.33.

Assuming that *PVS*V and *PV* II refer to the same opponent, Karṇakagomin's identification is corroborated by the few references I was able to trace to the latter in post-Dharmakīrti Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. *PV* II 68 is quoted in *NBhū* 125.1-2, and there is no doubt that Bhāsarvajña takes Dharmakīrti's verse as aiming at the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of whole (*avayavī*) and residence (*vṛtti*). His reply is that Dharmakīrti's notion of locus is too narrow. Cf. *NBhū* 125.3-5: *na hi gurutvapratibandhaka evādhāro loke prasiddhah kimtv anyathāpi. yathā darpane mukham, śarīre duhkha-dayah, khadge dīptir iti.* "For a locus is not well known among people only as something which obstructs [the effect of] heaviness, but otherwise too. For instance, a face in the mirror, pleasure and pain in the body, brightness on a sword."

NM II 306.6-7 is not a direct quotation of *PV* II 72, and as such could refer to other passages in Dharmakīrti's writings where the doctrine of momentariness is expounded, notably *PV* I 195, but the formulation has a striking similarity to *PV* II 72 and most probably alludes to it:

*vinaśvarasvabhāve 'smiṇ kṛtam pralayahetubhiḥ |
anaśvarasvabhāve hi kṛtam pralayahetubhiḥ ||*

Just like Bhāsarvajña, Jayanta takes this argument as criticizing the Nyāya. And no reference or connection to a Cārvāka could be traced in this context.

Similarly, from the Vaiśeṣika side, *PV* II 72 seems to be referred to in *NKan* 189.7f.: *api ca bhāvasyāvinaśvarasvabhāvate vināśo 'śakyakarano vahner iva śītimā, vinaśvarasvabhāvate vā nārtho hetubhiḥ.* "Moreover, if a thing has an imperishable nature, [its] destruction cannot be effected, like the coldness of fire. Or if it has a perishable nature, the causes [of destruction] are superfluous." Since this rendering is not a quotation, we cannot be sure whether Śrīdhara does not refer to some other passage where the same argument appears. The context in the *NKan* would fit better to a passage where the doctrine of momentariness, rather than that of support/locus, is discussed in detail, and earlier in the discussion Dharmottara's name is mentioned (*NKan* 184.10). In any case, here too there is nothing in the discussion to indicate that a Cārvāka is somehow connected to the topic.

To sum up, we have several layers of evidence which point at a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent for the verses under discussion. First, parallel passages from Dharmakīrti's own writings (*PVS*V and *PVin* III). Second, identification of the opponents by Dharmakīrti's commentators – as a Vaiśeṣika by Devendrabuddhi (and Śākyabuddhi), as Uddyotakara by Karṇakagomin. Third, the context of the same arguments in the *TS(P)*. Fourth, the reaction to

Dharmakīrti's verses by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika authors like Jayanta, Bhāsarvajña and Śrīdhara.

Unfortunately, however, all this is not enough to entirely exclude the possibility of a Cārvāka opponent, if we assume that certain Cārvākas accepted some revised version of the Vaiśeṣika ontology. In this case, the Cārvāka position would be similar to that of the Mīmāṃsā. For inasmuch as the Mīmāṃsakas accepted large portions of the Vaiśeṣika ontology, and rejected momentariness, they could be equally targeted by Dharmakīrti's arguments. And indeed Śālikanātha had every reason to feel that Prabhākara was also targeted by Dharmakīrti. *PrP* 369.23f.: *kim kṛtakā bhāvāḥ svahetubhyah samupajāyamānā vinaśvarasvabhāvā eva jāyante, avinaśvarasvabhāvā vā? vinaśvarasvabhāvā udāyānantaram eva līyanta iti kṣaṇabhaṅgināḥ. avinaśvarasvabhāvās tu na kadācid vinaśyeyuh.* “Do the caused things arise from their own causes as having a perishable nature or an imperishable nature? Having a perishable nature, they pass away immediately after they arise; thus, they are momentary. On the other hand, having an imperishable nature, they would never be destroyed.”

Therefore, what can be concluded from the above is that Dharmakīrti criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and by the same token the Mīmāṃsā. As for the question whether the Cārvākas are *also* criticized, it must, for the time being, remain open, inasmuch as we cannot exclude the possibility that certain Cārvākas accepted the Vaiśeṣika ontology in some form. If this were to be the case, it would not mean that entities like an eternal soul could have been equally accepted, just as the Prabhākara-Mīmāṃsakas accepted inheritance, but denied that it is one or eternal. This inevitably leads us to the following question: What is, in the final analysis, the subject matter of these verses? For the Cārvāka, the support of cognition is the body; for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṃsā, it is the *ātman*. Unfortunately, vv. 63-72 mention neither the body nor the *ātman*. It should be noted, however, that immediately before (v. 62) and immediately after (v. 73) the body is explicitly mentioned, and, therefore, the more natural reading would be to take the body as the main subject of these verses, allowing for the *ātman* to be the subject of the argument by implication in v. 69, that is, to be intended as the *samavāyikāraṇa* of cognition.

Consulting the commentaries on this question does not lead to a clear-cut answer. Devendrabuddhi introduces v. 63 as a general rejection of the notion of support when assumed to be ontologically different from the supported. The rejection applies to the cognition too, but in fact to any quality (**guṇa*), universal etc. (*PVP* 31b4): *'dis kyaṇ sems ñid daṇ yon tan daṇ spyi la sog pa gžan gyi rten ñid yod pa ma yin te.* This is also consistent with

Devendrabuddhi's identification of the opponent as Vaiśeṣika. On the whole, Devendrabuddhi must have considered vv. 63-72 as a digression on the topic of support in view of the Vaiśeṣika categories, which has no particular relevance to the topic of rebirth. Significantly, neither a word for body, nor a word for *paraloka* appear in Devendrabuddhi's comments on these verses. On the other hand, the word **ātman* appears twice, once in the commentary on v. 69, and more significantly on v. 71, where pleasure etc., are said to be supported by the *ātman* (*bdag la brten pa'i bde la sogs pa*). When we add to that the typical Vaiśeṣika vocabulary, we get quite a consistent presentation of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent. Yet the connection to the Cārvāka is not entirely severed, and it appears where one would expect it least, in the commentary to 69c, where it is suggested as one out of three alternatives to interpret *ādi* in the verse. Cf. *PVP* 37b5-6: *'byun ba rnam la brten nas sems ñid gnas pa'am* | "Or consciousness continues [to exist] inasmuch as it is supported by the elements."

Reading through Prajñākaragupta's commentary, however, a somewhat different picture emerges. First, there is no mention of an opponent by name. Second, Prajñākaragupta introduces v. 63 as referring to the body and cognition (*PVA* 79.24: *kāyacetasoḥ*). Third, the word *ātman* is never used. Fourth, *paraloka* and equivalent expressions occur. For instance, *PVA* 82.2: *paralokasya pratiṣṭhitir itīṣṭam āpatitam*; *PVA* 82.10: *anādyanantah samsārah*. Yet throughout the discussion, typical Vaiśeṣika terminology is used. The general impression one gets from Prajñākaragupta's comments is that of a Cārvāka opponent who has incorporated the Vaiśeṣika ontology into a materialistic world view.

Ravigupta (*PVV(R)* 329a4ff.) follows on the whole Prajñākaragupta, and perhaps should not even count as an additional opinion. If there is a nuance of difference between the two commentaries, it would be a strengthening in the Cārvāka direction. The body is introduced as a subject for practically every verse, and the Vaiśeṣika terminology, although present, is less prominent. *paraloka* is maintained as the general purport of the discussion.

Finally, we reach Manorathanandin, our last commentator, who knew the conflicting interpretations of Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta and had to decide between them or find some compromise. He introduces v. 63 (= 65 in M's enumeration) as referring to the body (*PVV* 30.10: *nanu dehas cittasyāśrayaḥ*, cf. also *PVV* 31.15 on 66cd (= 68cd): *tathā cittasya dehaḥ*). He seems to take vv. 63-67 (= 65-69) as a general critique of the notion of support and supported, and v. 68 (= 70) as a specific critique of the substance etc., perhaps no longer referring to a Cārvāka. Cf. *PVV* 31.21 introducing v. 68 (= 70): *evam sāmānyenāśrayāśrayibhāvadūṣanam abhidhāya dravya-*

dūṣaṇādau viśeṣe dūṣaṇam āha – syād ādhāro jalādīnām... In this analysis Manorathanandin differs from Prajñākaragupta who presents vv. 66cd-68 as a reply to the objection that vv. 63f. are useless, because the support of water is seen, and no reasoning can sublate that perception. Verse 69ab (= 71ab) according to Manorathanandin is definitely not referring to a Cārvāka, but to a Naiyāyika etc.; cf. *PVV* 31.26f.: *samavāyikāraṇam ca samavetakārya-janakam, yathā – ātmādi buddhyādīnām.* But the second half of the same verse (69cd = 71cd) brings the Cārvāka back to the discussion; *PVV* 32.9: *keśucid eva ca dehākāraparinatesu caitanyam.* The same shift can be seen about the summarizing verses 70-72 (=72-74) where Manorathanandin reverts yet again to a Nyāya-Vaiśeśika opponent, and mentions the *ātman* as support of pleasure etc. (*PVV* 32.16: *sukhādir ātmāśritah*). On the whole, Manorathanandin's solution was to read certain verses as referring to Nyāya-Vaiśeśika, others as referring to Cārvāka. Thus, this section of the *PVV* can be read as a general critique of "support," which can sometimes be used against the Cārvāka, sometimes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika.

In view of the above, it may be advisable to suggest yet another reading of "support," which has certain advantages in explanatory power, even though it has a disadvantage inasmuch as it is not endorsed by any of the commentaries, at least not explicitly. One of the problems in reading vv. 63-72 as referring to the Nyāya was that we assumed that in that case the arguments should refer to the *ātman*, which is never mentioned in these verses, and furthermore, immediately before and after this section (vv. 62 and 73) the body is mentioned. Yet we could maintain the assumption of a Nyāya-Vaiśeśika opponent and the body as subject of discussion, since the body in Nyāya is considered support (*āśraya*) for the experience of pleasure and pain (*sukhaduḥkhasaṃvedana*).²³ Assuming that kind of support would bring our verses somewhat closer to the examples of the berries on the plate, or the water on the ground. For the berries and the water do not rest on the plate or the ground in the manner in which a cognition is supported by the soul or a quality by its substance. Further, this reading of "support" will also provide a smoother reading of v. 69 as referring to something new (in the reading of "support" as *ātman*, *samavāyikāraṇa* was eo ipso refuted). However, there is still the problem of the relevance to the topic of rebirth. My answer is that it is relevant, because, just like the Cārvāka, the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika and the

23 Cf. *NS* 3.1.6 and *NBh* 724.5f.: *kāryam tu sukhaduḥkhasaṃvedanam tasyāyatanaṃ adhiṣṭhānam āśrayah śārīram*, cf. also *NBhū* 125.4 quoted above.

Mīmāṃsā²⁴ denied that the series of cognition can shift from one body to another, that is, as long as one does not assume the *ātman*. Therefore, unlike the assumption of the omnipresent soul as the support in which the cognition inheres, the assumption of the body as support of cognition (technically: as delimiting the possibility of the experience by the omnipresent soul to a certain place) makes the discussion relevant to the doctrine of rebirth, even if we assume a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent.

Thus, is there any reason to assume a Cārvāka opponent at all for the verses under discussion? As we have seen, the assumption of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can account for all three points which are needed to make the discussion meaningful in its context. It accounts for the terminology and the specific doctrine of support as cause of continuity (not of a single cognition, of course, but of the series) and locus, it can take the body as the intended support, and it is relevant to the topic of rebirth. As pointed out above, this cannot absolutely exclude the possibility of a Cārvāka opponent as well, but in fact the only evidence for such an opponent is based on Prajñākaragupta's commentary. (Ravigupta and Manorathanandin probably rely in this point on Prajñākaragupta and cannot count as independent evidence.) Moreover, it should be noted that there is no absolute necessity to read the *PVA* as referring to a Cārvāka, since the statements concerning the body and the "other world" can be read against a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-Mīmāṃsā background. Admittedly, however, such a reading is less natural, and statements such as

24 Cf. *ŚV*, *ātmavāda* 59-62 (partly repeated and closely paraphrased in *NM* II 345.4f.):

dehāntare ca buddhīnām sañcāro nōpapadyate |
 pūrvadehād bahirbhāvo na ca tāsām pratīyate ||59||
 vāyunā preryamāṇam hi jvālādy anyatra sañcāret |
 buddheḥ kāraṇadeśāt tu preraṇam nāsti kenacit ||60||
 amūrtatvāt svayam nāsāv utplutyānyatra gacchati |
 jīvadadehe 'pi tenāsyā gamanaṇam nōpapadyate ||61||
 antarābhavadehas tu niṣiddho vindhyavāsinā |
 tadasitve pramāṇam hi na kiñcid avagamyate ||62||

"59. Moreover, the shift of cognitions [from one body] to another body is not possible. Nor is it apprehended that [cognitions] come out from the previous body.

60. For a flame etc., may shift to another [place] when driven forth by wind. But nothing prompts the cognition to move from the place of its cause.

61. Because it is not corporeal, the [cognition can] not leap up and go elsewhere by itself. For this [reason], the movement [of cognition] is not possible even in a living body.

62. As for the body of the intermediary state, it was refuted by Vindhavāsin. For no proof whatsoever is apprehended for its existence." (According to Vindhavāsin the senses are omnipresent (*vibhu*) and therefore the assumption of the subtle body (*sūkṣma-sarīra*) is superfluous; cf. *YD* 121.13-14.)

PVA 82.13: *caitanyam ca sāmānyam gunah karma vānyathā*, seem to evoke a Cārvāka rather than a Naiyāyika. But does this mean that Prajñākaragupta actually knew a Cārvāka text where such opinions were advocated? Couldn't he just assume that Dharmakīrti was criticizing a Cārvāka (an understandable assumption in this context) and construe his commentary accordingly? What was his source material for the presumed Cārvāka doctrine?

In the previous section (*PV* II 54-62), Dharmakīrti argues against the dependence of the cognition on the body characterized by the three humours. And basically the same dilemma arises, for none of the Cārvāka materials known to us adopts such a position, which is well known from medical texts, where, however, the doctrine of rebirth is not denied. Prajñākaragupta explicitly identifies the opponent as Cārvāka (cf. *PVA* 74.4: *cārvākasyāpi tarhi pariḥāro 'sty eva*), but in this case we can be quite certain that no such Cārvāka was known to him. For in order to illustrate the opponent's position, Prajñākaragupta quotes from the *Siddhasāra* of Ravigupta.²⁵ Had he known a Cārvāka source, why would he quote from a Buddhist text?

Similarly, the presentation of the opponent in v. 69 seems to refer to a Cārvāka, yet the source material seems to come from the Vaiśeṣika. Cf. for instance, *PVA* 82.29-30: *evam āśritatve 'pi caitanyam śarīrābhāve 'pi śarīrāntarānugatam bhavīyatīti na paralokāsiddhīḥ*. "Even if [the cognition] is supported [by the body] in this manner (i.e., in the manner in which a universal is supported by an individual), even when one body is absent, consciousness will enter into another body. Thus, the other world is well established." Yet *PVA* 82.18-19 is almost a quotation of Praśastapāda: ... *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām ihabuddhinibandhanaḥ samavāya iti vacanāt*. Cp. *PDhS* 773.3-4: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*.

Therefore, I would like to conclude that the opponent in vv. 63-72 was a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and/or a Mīmāṃsaka. This conclusion is of relevance to other sections in Dharmakīrti's proof of rebirth, which, however, cannot be discussed here. In any case, it demonstrates that in trying to establish the autonomy of the mind, Dharmakīrti was not concerned solely with the Cārvāka, but was fighting on several fronts at the same time.

25 Cf. *PVA* 74.10 = *SSāra* 1.10cd: *teṣām* (scil. *doṣānām*) *samatvam ārogyam kṣayavṛddhi viparyayah*. I would like to thank Professor Emmerick for identifying the quotation.

Abbreviations

TRD: *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* of Guṇaratna. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. *Jñānapīṭha Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā: Saṃskṛta Granthāṇḍika* 36. Delhi 1981²

TS(P): *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with the commentary *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. Ed. D. Shastri. Bauddha Bhāratī Series 2. Vārāṇasī 1968

NKan: *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara. Cf. *PDhS*

NBh: *Nyāyabhaṣya*, cf. *NS*

NBhū: *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña. Ed. Yogindrānanda. Varanasi 1968

NM: *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta. Ed. V.K.S. Varadacharya. University of Mysore, Oriental Research Institute Series Nos. 110, 139. Mysore 1969, 1983

NMGBh: *Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara. Ed. N. Shah. L.D. Series 35. Ahmedabad 1972

NV: *Nyāyavārttika*, cf. *NS*

NS: *Nyāyasūtra* in *Nyāyadarśanam* with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyāṭikā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*. Ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 29. Calcutta 1936, 1944

PDhS: *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* of Praśastapāda. Ed. D.J. Sharma. Gaṅganātha Jhā Granthamālā 1. Vārāṇasī 1977²

PrP: *Prakaraṇapañcikā* of Śālikanātha. Ed. A. Subrahmanyā Shastri. Benares 1961

PV: *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti. Ed. Y. Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2. Naritasan Shinshoji 1971/72. Cf. also *PVA* and *PVV*.

PVSV: *The Pramāṇavārttikam* of Dharmakīrti. Ed. R. Gnoli. Serie Orientale Roma XXIII. Roma 1960

PVSVT: *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiśikā* of Karṇakagomin. Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Allahabad 1943

PVA: *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* of Prajñākaragupta. Ed. R. Sankrityayana. Patna 1953

PVin: *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti. TTP 5710

PVT: *Pramāṇavārttikāṭikā* of Śākyabuddhi. TTP 5718

PVP: *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā* of Devendrabuddhi. TTP No. 5717

PVV: *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin. Ed. D. Shastri. Bauddha Bhāratī Series 3. Vārāṇasī 1968

PVV(R): *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Ravigupta. Derge 4224

MBh: *Mahābhārata*. Critical edition, BORI, Poona

VS: *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda. Ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji. Baroda 1961

ŚV: *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila. Ed. D. Shastri. Varanasi 1978

SSāra: *The Siddhasāra* of Ravigupta. Vol. 1: The Sanskrit text. Ed. R.E. Emmerick. Wiesbaden 1980

HBTĀ: *Hetubinduṭīkāloka* of Durveka Miśra. Ed. S. Sanghavi and Muni Jinavijayaji. GOS CXIII. Baroda 1949