VIVAKSĀ IN THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

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Vivaksā's terminology occurs frequently in the *kārikās* of Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya[1]; *vivaksā* changes meaning and implications according to context.

The first context in which the term *vivaksā* appears, in the I Kānda, is clearly a phonetic one.

It is found in a *kārikā* quoted from the Pāninīya Śiksā,[2] the last in a series following VP.I.110 (the series, numbered I.111-119 in W. Rau's edition, is missing in the southern branch of the *kārikās'* manuscript tradition), which reviews opinions of the *śiksākāras* regarding the production of articulated sound, the *śabda*. This review is certainly not complete but is important nevertheless.

Whether the basic element of the *śabda* lies in the air, *vāyu*, the atom, *anu*, or knowledge, *jñāna*, the setting in motion of the prime matter, *prāna vāyu anu*, and then the arrival of the flow at the points of articulation, *sthāna*, remains a constant in the various representations. The mind, *manas*, takes on the impulse and guides the movement. Above and beyond the *manas*, the *buddhi* or a *jñātṛ*, an internal knower, is mentioned. There are also terms indicating heat: these are less technically associated with sound production than is *prayatna*, which basically means the articulatory effort or the predisposition of the organs, *karana*, to the articulatory effort.

It is in this context that the term *vivaksā* appears in the Pāninīya Śiksā's *kārikā* (I,6), included in the review. It is said that after the *buddhi* has formed its vision of things, the desire of the individual to express

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1   All occurrences of *vivaksā* terminology in the *kārikās* of the Vākyapadīya have been considered, verifying them in W. Rau's edition, "Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya. Die *mūlakārikās* nach den Handschriften hrsg. und mit einem *pāda*-Index versehen", Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XLII 4, Wiesbaden 1977 & "Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya. Vollständiger Wortindex zu den *mūlakārikās*", Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur, Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse Jg. 1988, Nr. 11. In Rau's Index the occurrences are listed under *vivaksā, °vivaksā* (also separately under *anyaśabdavivaksā, samkhyāvivaksā*, etc.), *vivaksāniyamāśraya, vivaksita, vivaksitanibandhana, vac* (for *vivaksyate* and *vivaksyante*), *avivaksā, °avivaksā* (also separately under *upamānāvivaksā*), *avivaksātas, avivaksita, prativivaksita*.

2   VP.I.119 in the numbering of the above-cited edition by W. Rau. This numbering is followed unless otherwise specified.

himself resorts to the *manas*, which stimulates the energy needed for articulation; thus *marut* is produced.

The *vivaksā* in this *kārikā* seems to be the equivalent of the *vaktur icchā*, the 'desire to speak', the expression used in another *kārikā*, VP.I.111, of the same series, which simply explains that, moved by the effort resulting from the desire to speak, air, *vāyu*, beats against the points of articulation, producing articulated sound.

The specificity of the opinions reviewed in this series of *kārikās* is clarified by the *vṛtti*, which repeats that they are viewpoints of the *śikṣākāras*, the phoneticians. On the other hand, the *vṛtti* itself extends the investigation beyond the immediate, contingent speech organs; following a course opposite to that of exhaled air, it attempts to reach what appears to be the beginning of the motion of the air itself. Important stages which were part of traditional physiology are mentioned: first *nābhi*, the navel, and also *koṣṭha*, the abdomen, then *kaṇṭha*, the throat.

Under VP.I.121 the *vṛtti* speaks of the *prāṇa* which, penetrated by the *buddhi*, rises like a flame in the direction of the organs of articulation.

This motion of the *prāṇa* does not seem to be distinguishable from what the first tāntric texts call the motion of the *kuṇḍalinī*. The *kuṇḍalīśakti* according to Ahirbudhnya-Saṃhitā (XVI,55 foll.)[3] moves up from the *mūlādhāra*, first reaches the navel, then proceeds to the heart; from there, 'desiring to express the *vācya*', *vācyavivakṣayā* (XVI,63), turns towards the throat where phonemes are produced.

The motion of the *prāṇa-kuṇḍalinī* is spontaneous, just as man's speech is a spontaneous phenomenon coming before its acoustic, grammatical or philosophical interpretation.

In the phonetic context, the *vivakṣā* is simply a datum of experience. Without the natural function of speech, which man naturally wants to exercise, there would be no production of articulated sound.

However, correct speech is the subject-matter of grammar.

Proceeding with the *kārikās* of the I Kāṇḍa, in I.152 we encounter that *sato'vivakṣā* – if that is the correct reading – which immediately refers to the Mahābhāṣya.

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3   Ed. M.D. Ramanujacharya, under the supervision of F.O. Shrader, rev. V. Krishna-macharya, Vol. I, second ed., first rep., Adyar, Madras 1986, pp. 147-149.

The Mahābhāsya is the first of the two known fundamental stages through which grammatical tradition reached Bhartṛhari; the other is the Cāndravyākaraṇa.[4]

It is with the Mahābhāsya that the *vivakṣā* appears in the history of grammar; it certainly existed before Patañjali because it occurs in the formulation of *vārttikas* he commented on.

B.A. Van Nooten presented a paper on *vivakṣā* especially in the Mahābhāsya some time ago.[5] The investigation, on Pathak and Chitrao's Index, is far from definitive; on the contrary, it does not hit the mark in important points.

It is first necessary to distinguish *vivakṣā* in Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* from *vivakṣā* in Patañjali's dialectics.

For the few occurrences in the *vārttikas*, one could simplistically say that *vivakṣā*, or rather *(a)vivakṣitatva*, is resorted to only in the attempt to resolve difficulties in the interpretation and application of Pāṇini's *sūtras*. For example, *sūtra* 1.4.24 which gives the *samjñā* of *apādāna*, contemplating a fixed point, *dhruvam*, from which the movement of departure begins, would seem to have no validity for moving objects, in which there is no fixed point. *Vārtt.* 3 under the *sūtra* eliminates the difficulty: the speaker may not wish to present the object in motion but only the separation from that object. Pā. 1.4.24 remains valid also in these cases.

On the other hand, in Patañjali's dialectic *vivakṣā* enters at times with a vitality demanding revision of F. Kielhorn's old opinion,[6] never denied, i.e., *vivakṣā*, like *anabhidhāna*, is an artifice "of no value whatever".

Patañjali is still far from the medieval scholasticism of the Bhāṣāvṛtti and the Durghaṭavṛtti, which will reduce *vivakṣā* to a pure expedient, even if often ingenious, used to justify difficult forms which would otherwise be aberrant with respect to the rules.

From Patañjali comes the formula, quasi *paribhāsā: itikaraṇah kriyate tataśced vivakṣā*, "*iti* is there, from it *vivakṣā* is deduced". That is, only in Pāṇini's *sūtras*, in whose formulation *iti* appears, the *vivakṣā* can

4   See also the recent Th. Oberlies, "Studie zum Cāndravyākaraṇa. Eine kritische Bearbeitung von Candra IV.4.52-148 und V.2", Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien hrsg. Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets an der Universität Hamburg, Stuttgart 1989, pp. 11-14, "Die Datierung Candragomins und Dharmadāsas".

5   "*Vivakṣā-*, or intention to speak, as a linguistic principle", Proceedings of the International Seminar on Studies in the *Astādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class E 9, University of Poona, 1983, pp. 43-52.

6   F. Kielhorn, "Notes on the Mahabhashya, 7. Some devices of Indian grammarians", Ind. Ant. 16 (1887), pp. 244-252.

legitimately be invoked; there the *vivakṣā* dispenses with additions or modifications.

Omitting arguments regarding rules and grammatical technique, two points about *vivakṣā* seem particularly interesting in Patañjali's remarks.

The first has been misunderstood in Van Nooten's paper. It is what Patañjali explains under 5.1.16 (Vol. II, pp. 342-43); he says there are two types of *vivakṣā: prāyoktrī* and *laukikī*.

The *prāyoktrī* is present when one uses 'tender, affected, slippery' words, yielding to an individual taste for speech. The series of adjectives Patañjali uses, *mrdūn snigdhān ślakṣṇān*, seems to reach with a crescendo that 'corrupt', *apabhraṃśān*, with which Kaiyaṭa's comment below the passage[7] frankly annotates the series. They are clearly individual affectations which others must not and cannot imitate; there is no limit, Kaiyaṭa says, to personal freedom.

The *laukikī vivakṣā* is of a different type: there we have majority consent, *prāyasya sampratyayah*; that is, it expresses a generally perceived tendency and so its established use regards the general run of language users. Grammatical tradition, Kaiyaṭa further states, has its roots in usage: *prayogamūlatvād vyākaraṇasmrteh*. Here the *vivakṣā* goes well beyond that spontaneity accorded it by phoneticians. A strictly linguistic factor has been added: the recognition of tendencies that assert themselves in language.

The other interesting point about *vivakṣā* in Patañjali's discourse is found under 1.4.24, after the above-cited *vārtt.* 3 and then passim, under 2.3.50, etc. Patañjali says that one may not wish to communicate things that objectively exist, just as one may wish to express things that do not exist: *sato'py avivakṣā bhavati.....asataś ca vivakṣā.*

Bhartrhari's *kārikā* I.152 follows Patañjali's wording.

The ocean may seem a basin and the Vindhya a large pile of rice: that is to say that fantasy is free and the language following it must not be questioned. The stylistic and rhetorical implications deriving from this are remarkable.

There have been contrasts and errors in evaluation on the part of scholars concerning the use the Cāndravyākaraṇa makes of *vivakṣā*.[8]

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7   Ed. Vedavrata, Haryāṇā Sāhitya Saṃsthāna, Gurukula Jhajjar (Rohatak), Vol. IV, 1963, p. 21.

8   See M. Deshpande, "Candragomin's syntactic rules, some misconceptions", Indian Linguistics, Vol. 40 (1979), pp. 133-145, which criticizes S.D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen,

An index of all occurrences of the term and connected terminology in the *sutras* and the *vrtti* must still be compiled.[9]

The theory of the *karakas* in the Cāndravyākarana is interesting. Candra reunified in Ca. 2.1.43-98 Pānini's two sections 1.4.23-55 and 2.3.1-70, in addition to including the treatment of the *upapada*.

Pā. 1.4.23-55 had roughly sketched out sectors of activity, which make themselves known in language through verbs and syntactic operators, *karakas*, while Pā. 2.3.1-70 had given the related detailed use of case endings, *vibhaktis*. Reunifying Pānini's two sections, Candra directly connected cases of the declension with actions that are carried out and require an accusative in language to indicate the object, an instrumental to indicate the agent or the instrument, and so on.

The speaker may wish to express the object – this is the *vyāpyavivaksā* – or an instrument – this is the *karanavivaksā* – and thus uses a particular ending. The *vivaksā* does not violate the rules. These are useful for learning the correct usage, only by using the correct cases can we express what we mean. But the use of cases serves the speaker, who wants to express events in his own way. This is the meaning of the well-known *paribhāsā*, in the form presented under Ca. 2.1.49: *vivaksāto hi kārakāni bhavanti.*[10]

We would rather emphasize the freedom the *vivaksā* allowed, according to Cāndravyākarana, freedom in using the rules, and stylistic freedom.

That dichotomy between reality, *karakas*, and language, *vibhaktis*, not resolved in Pānini's two sections and overcome in Candra by simple superimposition, is philosophically systematized in Bhartrhari.

In the Sādhanasamuddeśa in the III Kānda of the Vākyapadīya, as well as elsewhere in this great work, the *sādhana-kārakas* are clearly seen to

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"Patañjali's Vyākarana-Mahābhāsya: Kārakāhnika (P.1.4.23-1.4.55)", Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class C 10, University of Poona 1975, "Introduction".

9   I plan to read a paper on this subject at the 9th World Sanskrit Conference in Melbourne.

10 "*Vivaksātah kārakāni bhavanti*" is the title of a chapter Cārudevaśāstrī dedicated to *vivaksā* in "Prastāvataranginī", Haridāsa-Samskrta-Granthamālā 201, Benares 1950, pp. 188-196. There a valid philological discussion on *vivaksā* had already been set out, meant to constitute orthodox teaching rather than supply elements of historical criticism on the evolution of the concept among grammarians. As far as I know, there are no other later monographic studies on *vivaksā* untill the above-cited article by Van Nooten. The scholar who seems to have shed more light on the subject is L. Renou, with his edition of "La Durghatavrtti de Saranadeva. Traité grammatical en sanskrit du XIIe siècle", Collection Émile Senart, I 1-3, II 1-3, Paris 1940-1956.

act on the level of mental activity. There is an interior vision of things which is individualistic and free; in it action is represented in various ways and the elements of reality assume the roles of the various *kārakas*.

When the desire to translate the interior vision into words comes with the *vivakṣā*, at that point grammar acts as a guide and the *vibhaktis* are used. The *vibhaktis* are on the level of the *śabda*, the translation of mental representation into words.

Thus the *vivakṣā* acts as a link between the mental plane of the *kalpanā*, *buddhikalpanā*, where the *kārakas* operate and the plane of expressed words, which use the *vibhaktis*.

There is another *paribhāṣā* in the Cāndravyākaraṇa which we briefly wish to call attention to: *vivakṣāvyāpter iṣṭavasāyaḥ*. It is what one wants to express that commands the desiderata of grammar, that indicates what forms we want to see regularized by grammar.

Here the field is that of word formations, *śabdasaṃskāra*, in which the *vivakṣā* will have a long way to go before arriving at medieval scholasticism and beyond.

The way the Cāndravyākaraṇa presents the process is clearly seen from the *vṛtti* under 5.2.44; see also the Kāśikā under 6.3.45. How can we justify the form *śreyastarā* which the rule accepting *śreyasitarā* and *śreya-sītarā* does not sanction? It is justified because one does not want to express the feminine form with it, and this choice occurs before the suffix denoting the degree of comparison is added. In terms of the *vṛtti*: *prakarṣayogāt prāk strītvasyāvivakṣitatvāt siddham*.

In Bhartṛhari as well, in the Vṛttisamuddeśa in the III Kāṇḍa, the *kāri-kās* repeatedly point out that forms – see the use of the suffix *vat*, compounds, the expression of *upamāna*, etc. – are explained as grammatically correct only by considering the *vivakṣā*. Why *mṛgadugdhā*, for example?: because the first member does not mean to express the feminine form (419). Surely here *vivakṣā* appears channeled into normative grammar to correctly and efficiently unfold itself according to rules valid for everyone.

It is also conditioned by the cultural milieu. Children inherit a linguistic patrimony at birth (VP.I. 129, foll.). Their organs are already predisposed for articulating words.

It is Bhartṛhari the philosopher, not a linguist, who is speaking. From time to time his discourse is tinged with psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics and linguistic speculation; it is never purely linguistic.

The idea emerging in Patañjali's dialectics on the *laukikī vivakṣā*, of the language as an autonomous organism in which tendencies develop, disappears in the philosopher Bhartṛhari.

In the II Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya, which presents and debates the two fundamental themes of grammar, *vākya* and *pada*, we find sections containing interesting cues regarding textual and stylistic analysis.

Verses 64-87 contain a sequence of objections that *padavādins* raised against the *akhaṇḍavādins*, based on specific observations: a word, for example *vrīhi*, which must be substituted in the prescription of a rite, when that material is not available; an unfamiliar word like *pika*, which is taken out of context for explanation; the difference between direct statement and syntactical connection; attention paid to secondary clauses; finally, a number of elements in a clause from which are understood the sequence, the primary action, etc., elements depending on the reading of the text, important because their correct interpretation involves the fruit, *phala* (named in 83), of the sacrificial act itself. The *padavādins* argued that it was impossible to deny the *pada* a meaning independent of that of the *vākya*.

In these twenty-four verses the terminology of *vivakṣā*, or here rather of non-*vivakṣā* (69: *avivakṣitāḥ*, *avivakṣā*; 80: *na vivakṣitaḥ*; 83: *avivakṣitaḥ*), appears quite conspicuously, considering the total number of appearences in the II Kāṇḍa. Other terminology used is also interesting. An important part is played by the *śruti*, direct statement; in contrast there is *sāmarthyam*, what is gathered from context, which is indicated, *lakṣita*, or contained in an indication, *lakṣaṇā*, derived from context, *sāmarthya-lakṣaṇa*. The *abhidhā*, or more precisely the *śabdo'bhidhāyakaḥ*, the *śabda* having denotative power, also appears.

Understanding the *vivakṣā*, which is what the text wants to convey, means interpreting it correctly and acting accordingly.

Other instances of *vivakṣā* terminology in the II Kāṇḍa (301: *vivakṣite*, *avivakṣitam*; 304: *avivakṣitam*) are found in the final part of a long section, II.250-324, presenting theories and opinions on the meaning of the word and above all on the difference between the primary meaning, *mukhya*, and secondary meaning, *gauṇa*.[11]

It is stated (298) that, just as a lamp reveals not only the objects it is meant to illuminate but also others nearby, in the same way a word used in one meaning involves others along with the desired one. *Vivakṣita* is the desired meaning; other meanings automatically involved are *avivakṣita* (301).

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11   There is an article by K.A. Subramania Iyer, dealing in detail with passages contained in this section of the II Kāṇḍa, which never mentions *vivakṣā* at all: "Bhartrhari on the primary & secondary meanings of words", Indian Linguistics, Vol. 29 (1968), S.M. Katre Felicitation Volume Part I, pp. 97-112.

Further on (314 and 315) are two lists of determining elements for assigning meaning to a word: the clause in which it is found, *vākya*, the context, *prakaraṇa*, the meaning of the other words, *artha*, the propriety, *aucitya*, place, *deśa*, and time, *kāla*. The second list which follows is broader, repeating two elements, *artha* and *prakaraṇa*, already considered in the first one. The subject had evidently been debated.

The accepted conclusion, in simple terms, is that the word has many meanings which are used according to context. Here *vivakṣā* is the intention of conveying one meaning rather than another.

There is also an indirect way of making oneself understood, and this seems the most interesting stylistic suggestion. This occurs when one does not simply wish to use the primary or one of the secondary meanings. For instance, the "crows" from which the boy is asked to protect the *sarpis* also means "dogs" or similar animals (312). The *dhātu bhuj*, used in the sense of "to feed", also implies washing the dishes in which the food was eaten and the pots in which the food was cooked (313). It is said that the sacred texts expressing praise or blame, this being the only way to incite or dissuade from action, should not be taken literally, *ayathārtham* (319).

The discourse presented in these passages of the II Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya is one of textual criticism, using specific terminology and examining Vedic texts.

Before Bhartṛhari, the meaning of the *mantra* had long been an object of criticism, at times hostile. Kautsa's judgement stated in Nirukta I.15 was categorical: *anarthakā hi mantrāḥ*, "*mantras* have no meaning at all". Kautsa's objections and their refutations will have broad repercussions long after Bhartṛhari.

The meaning Kautsa could not find in the *mantras* was in effect the common meaning, difficult to extract from an archaic, at times obscure language which often expressed itself in contradictory terms.

The meaning of the *mantras*, or more precisely the *mantravākyārtha* (Nirukta VII.3), was considered in another context: that of hymns of praise to the divinity. These varying visions of the *mantras*, *ṛṣīṇām mantradṛṣṭayaḥ*, were broadened and consolidated in a list of thirty-six different *vākya*, *vividhāni vākyāni*, that the Bṛhaddevatā exemplifies in I.46-60. They are modes of expression, whose purpose is to praise the divinity but which sometimes directly express *nindā*, blame, or *saṃśaya*, doubt, praise to the divinity remaining a matter of inference.

Here the analysis of the meaning of the *vākya* had already become a stylistic-rhetorical investigation linked, in the type of texts under examination, to the expression of praise to the divinity.

Nirukta and Bṛhaddevatā are far from Bhartṛhari, but they are the first well-known texts in which the meaning of the *mantra* undergoes an investigation oriented toward the textual and stylistic criticism we will later on find in Bhartṛhari. Moreover, the texts investigated are at least in part the ones Bhartṛhari himself will consider.

The *vivakṣā* which is read in the Vākyapadīya in these contexts of the II Kāṇḍa returns in what are properly regarded the first texts on rhetoric.

The *vivakṣita artha*, "the understood meaning", already appears in the analysis of the *doṣa bhinnārtha* in that schematic compendium of the essentials of poetic art given by the Nātyaśāstra and concluding with their use in the presentation of the *rasas*.[12] It is the first sign of that familiarity with the *vivakṣā* constantly found in the first *alaṃkārikas*, in Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhata, where the *vivakṣā* is resorted to in order to enter into the intricacies of the figures. In Vāmana as well (4.3.27), the *vivakṣā* is used to define an *alaṃkāra*, the *alaṃkāra ākṣepa*; then in the last adhyāya of the Kāvyālaṃkārasūtrāni, in a strictly grammatical context, that of *śabdaśuddhi*.

Ānandavardhana emphasized the presence of the *vivakṣā* as a stylistic and poetic element. The two broad categories of true poetry, *dhvani kāvya*, already contain *vivakṣā* in their own definitions of *avivakṣita-vācya* and *vivakṣitānyapara-vācya*. Ānandavardhana is certainly a long way from Bhartṛhari; he reconciled the contrasts of the various schools: of the systems of the *rasa, alaṃkāra, rīti*. In any case the indebtedness of Ānandavardhana to Bhartṛhari has been pointed out several times.

Even without definitively ascertaining Bhartṛhari's date, we can say that Bhartṛhari lived more or less between Bharata and Bhāmaha, in a period relatively lacking in documentation on rhetorical studies. His historical position is extremely interesting as his field is still the Vedic. From this point of view, the dramatic texts Bharata deals with and above all the *kāvya* texts from which Bhāmaha and the other rhetoricians take their examples are traditionally considered more modern. But Bhartṛhari is certainly near to them, in the use he makes of the term *vivakṣā*.

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12 Adhyāya 16, v. 91 in "Nātyaśāstra with the commentary of Abhinavagupta", ed. M. Ramakrishna Kavi, Vol. II, Gaekwad's Oriental Series LXIII, Baroda 1934, p. 332. The line was overcorrected by V. Raghavan, "Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa", p. 222 in the first edition, Madras 1963. However *vivakṣita-* can be read unequivocally.

Two conclusions can clearly be drawn from the observations on the above-examined occurrences of *vivakṣā* terminology in the II Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya.

The first is that the sections considered should by right be included among Indian works on rhetoric. Seeing the scarcity of such documents for the period preceding Bhāmaha, it would be reasonable to treasure them.

The second conclusion regards the term *vivakṣā* and is a corollary of the first. The occurrences of *vivakṣā* terminology in these sections assume their full meaning only in light of the Indian rhetorical theories of the period.

Phonetics, grammar, stylistics: they represent three different currents which carry the idea of *vivakṣā* and a terminology for *vivakṣā*.

However, Bhartṛhari's discourse is principally philosophical; phonetics, stylistics and normative grammar are only secondarily involved. The grand design running from the first to the third Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya moves from the *Śabdabrahman* of the first Kāṇḍa, through the two great themes, *vākya* and *pada*, in the second Kāṇḍa, to the detailed review of linguistic aspects and principles to which the third Kāṇḍa is dedicated. It almost follows the *Vāc* – the observation has been made several times – which descends from the level of *paśyantī*, through the *madhyamā*, to the world level with the *vaikharī*.

The *vivakṣā* enters into this grand design even if it is not the object of particular attention. There is a turning point in the *madhyamā vāc*, this *Vāc* being of an ambivalent nature precisely because it is intermediate. It is the moment when the *vāc madhyamā*, even with the sequence suppressed or contracted, according to how one interprets "*saṃhāra*" in the expression *kramasaṃhārabhāve* in the *vṛtti* under I.159, despite resorting to a motion of subtle *prāṇa, sūkṣmaprāṇavṛttyanugatā*, is yet according to some *vyaktaprāṇaparigrahā*, that is, as Iyer nicely translates, "it has distinct functioning of breath in it". Vṛṣabha explains that this is made clear when one recites something silenty to oneself: *svayam apy asyopāṃśutaram paṭhataḥ tat spaṣṭam*. This *vāc madhyamā* is interior and in a certain sense contains sequence, and the *buddhi* is its sole foundation: *madhyamā tv antaḥsamniveśinī parigṛhītakrameva buddhimātropādānā* (*vṛtti*). Vṛṣabha says that the *madhyamā* is interior because it is the form of the word in the *buddhi* before it is pronounced: *na karaṇasthā kim tv enam śabdam samuccārayāmīti buddhau yaḥ śabdākāraḥ*, "it is not in the articulatory

organs, but it is the form of the *śabda* which is in the *buddhi*, when the intention is to pronounce those particular words".[13]

This is the turning point: the moment in which the *madhyamā vāc* prepares itself to be translated into the *vāc vaikharī* which will be articulated by the speech organs. This translation, substantially unbiased in literary production, is also the common source of action. Because one desires to intervene or decides to intervene depending on "how he views reality", *samdarśana* (VP.III.7.16). Then one action develops from another and determines activity. Regardless of whether the articulated word is accompanied by an action or whether there is only the word, it is this desire to express oneself that constitutes the *vivakṣā*. It is due to this desire that the constructions of the *buddhi* are translated one after another into language.

VP.III.7.17 states that it is *caitanya*, "sentience", that is the means to the "vision" of things and as such comes before all activity and "vision" itself. With the *caitanya* one finally arrives at that life principle of which is to be recognized "the ultimate identity with *brahman*, the postulated starting point of the world of our experience".[14]

It is true that Bhartṛhari has not reserved particular treatment for that epistemology whose elements he accepts and uses in his discourse. However, it seems certain that for him it is the *buddhi* that constructs images of the reality; these images the listener comprehends. This clearly means, in another context, VP.III.3.32: "the word is understood (by the listener) with the meaning present in the *buddhi* (of the speaker)".

Somānanda was not mistaken, proposing his precious testimony at the beginning of the II āhnika of the Śivadṛṣṭi. Summing up before proceeding to the confutation, the position of the *vaiyākaraṇas*, i.e., substantially that of Bhartṛhari, regarding levels of reality, gives *paśyantī*, which is for them the *parā sthitiḥ*, corresponding to the level of *Sadāśiva*, then *madhyamā* which is *śabda* on the mental plane of *vijñāna*, ready to express things, finally *vaikharī*. Somānanda uses the term *vivakṣā* in this context: *āste vijñānarūpatve sa śabdo'rthavivakṣayā / madhyamā kathyate saiva*. And

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13 See "Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti and the Paddhati of Vṛsabhadeva. Kāṇḍa I", ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer, Deccan College Monograph Series 32, Poona 1966, p. 214 & K.A. Subramania Iyer, "The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti. Chapter I. English translation", Deccan College Building Centenary & Silver Jubilee Series 26, Poona 1965, p. 125.

14 Quoted from A. Aklujkar: "Bhartr-hari's concept of the Veda", p. 7, Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Vol. V, *Pāṇini and the Veda*, Leiden 1991, pp. 1-18.

again, about the grammarians' *madhyamā*: "It is the *madhyamā* that is united with the *buddhi*, whose nature is that of constructing images".[15]

Bhartṛhari will have great influence on Indian thought in the following centuries.

The paragraph in the *vṛtti* under VP.I.159 relative to *paśyantī* will be entirely quoted by Abhinavagupta in the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛttivimarśinī and attributed to Bhartṛhari himself.[16]

Of all Abhinavagupta's speculations regarding *Vāc*, here it is interesting to recall and compare what is contained in ten verses at the end of the III āhnika of the Tantrāloka.[17]

After having developed the theme of the emanation of phonemes, which is also the unfolding of creation, Abhinavagupta presents multiplicity as a triple body, *vapus*, named *paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. Each of these three *Vāc* has a triple nature: *sthūla, sūksma* and *para*.

Sthūlā paśyantī is the *nādarūpiṇī* of music consisting only of notes, without the harshness of distinct phonemes. *Sthūlā madhyamā* is *dhvani* in the music made, for example, by drums, which also knows how to be sweet when imitating singing. *Sthūlā vaikharī* is that of spoken language, with its phonemes and clauses.

The stage preceding the *sthūla* for each, *paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, is the *sūksma*. This consists of an *anusandhāna*, planning, let us say an intention. It can be formulated with the words of common experience: now I am going to make music, now I am going to play an instrument, now I am going to talk.

Beyond this level, for the three *Vāc*, is the supreme, *para*, which reaches Śiva.

It is the *sūksma* stage that interests us here.

Jayaratha's comment on the meaning of *anusandhāna* expresses no doubts. It has the nature of desire; in its three varieties, corresponding to *paśyantī, madhyamā* and *vaikharī*, it is respectively the desire to sing, *jigāsā*, to play an instrument, *vivādayisā*, and finally to speak: *vivaksā*.

In Abhinavagupta's conception, the three stages, *sthūla, sūksma* and *para*, constitute a stairway within each of the three *Vāc*, which descends

15   Cf. ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Shāstrī, KSTS LIV, Srinagar 1934, pp. 36-42 and p. 59.
16   Cf. ed. Madhusūdan Kaul Shāstrī, KSTS LXII, Bombay 1941, Vol. II, p. 226.
17   See "The Tantrāloka of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Jayaratha", ed. R.C. Dwivedi and Navajivan Rastogi, enlarged edition, Delhi 1987, Vol. II Chapters 1-3, pp. 577-584.

from heaven to earth and then reascends. The *paśyantī* does not remain outside the world but descends there and is incorporated into sublime music, and the *vaikharī* is not only in the world but goes beyond it, as far as Śiva.

If we look for the *vivakṣā* in this grandiose conception, in which all conflicts and polemics about *Vāc* levels are overcome, we find it at the point in which the *Vāc* is about to present itself in the world, just before the *sthūla* stage of the *vaikharī*.