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LINKING UP BHARTRHARI AND THE BAUDDHAS

Chr. Lindtner, Copenhagen

1. There is, as will be recalled, a good tradition (Punyarāja and Simhasūri) to the effect that Vasurāta was at one time the *guru* of Bhartrhari. According to another source (Paramārtha), the Bauddha teacher Vasubandhu was attacked by Vasurāta, the grammarian, i.e. Bhartrhari's teacher.¹

On the basis of these pieces of independent external evidence only, it would be natural to conclude that Bhartrhari cannot have been absolutely ignorant about at least some of the writings of "the master of 1000 śāstra-s", as the Chinese sources occasionally speak of Vasubandhu (thus, probably, not implying more than that Vasubandhu was an extremely prolific author). When I here speak of Vasubandhu, I am, to be sure, speaking of the author of Abhidharmakośa, Karmasiddhi, Pañcaskandhaka, Vimśatikā, Trimśikā, Vyākhyāyukti, etc. - to mention only the most important of his authentic works.

Naturally, the question then arises, whether we can detect any palpable pieces of influence from Vasubandhu in Bhartrhari's magnum opus, the Vākyapadīya (VP).² We might then find ourselves in a position to understand what I-ching had in mind when he reported that Bhartrhari was "intimately acquainted with the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā (Chinese: weishih)".³

- For the references, see E. Frauwallner, *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 857 (= "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", in *WZKSO* 5 (1961), pp. 125-148).
- I am here mostly using Rau's critical edition, Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya, Wiesbaden 1977, and his most useful Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya. Vollständiger Wortindex zu den mūlakārikās, Wiesbaden/Stuttgart 1988. In addition to these, K.A. Subramania Iyer's standard edition with the extant commentaries: VP I, Poona 1966; VP II, Delhi 1983; VP III, Poona 1963 (i) and 1973 (ii). For Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, see also (somewhat outdated) D. Seyfort Ruegg, Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne, Paris 1959, pp. 57-93.
- This is the translation of John Brough in "I-ching on the Sanskrit grammarians" in BSOAS 36 (1973), pp. 248-260. The old translation of Takakusu was "sole knowledge (Vidyāmātra)", which is impossible. But wei-shih could also, and more likely, be rendered vijñānamātra, or even cittamātra, any of which is preferable to Brough's vijñaptimātratā (ibid., p. 260). Brough (ibid., p. 259) gives further ref. to the question of Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, which he, absurdly, regards as a "dead issue". See also H. Nakamura's "Buddhist influence upon the Vākyapadīya", in Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute 29 (1973), pp. 367-388.

I think there is sufficient evidence to show that I-ching was right. Perhaps it is superfluous of me to quote the first verse of Vasubandhu's *Trimśikā* (T).⁴ Anyhow, here it is:

```
ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yah pravartate / vijnānaparināme 'sau parināmah sa ca tridhā //
```

Also, T 17 and 18ab should be kept in mind:

```
vijnānaparināmo 'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate /
tena tan nāsti tenedam sarvam vijnāptimātrakam //
sarvabījam hi vijnānam (parināmas tathā tathā /)
```

Of these verses I cannot help hearing an echo in VP I.124:

```
śabdasya parināmo 'yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ / chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvam pravartate //<sup>5</sup>
```

If required to describe the philosophy of Vasubandhu and Bhartrhari in a single word, it could well be *vijnānaparināma*- and śabdaparināmavāda, respectively. No doubt Bhartrhari deliberately alludes to Vasubandhu. This would have been recognized immediately by the contemporary learned reader.

For Bhartrhari the absolute, Brahman, is eka (I.29), but as a result of various powers (śakti, I.2c) and forces (kratu, I.52b, a Vedic term never used by the Bauddhas) it develops (vivartate, I.1c = vartate, I.2d = pravartate, I.124b) so as to appear manifold. The ultimate reason for this, as in Buddhism, is avidyā. As a grammarian Bhartrhari likes to call the absolute śabdatattva, and he speaks of its manifestation, also in grammatical terminology, as prakriyā, formation. When VP I.4 furthermore says of Brahman that it is sarvabīja, and that it appears as bhoktr, bhoktavya and bhoga, we again hear Buddhist echoes. Vasubandhu makes a distinction between grāhya and grāhaka. So does Bhartrhari. Bhartrhari speaks of the three (or four?) forms of vāk, viz. vaikharī, madhyamā and paśyantī (VP I. 159-

havisām parināmo 'yam yad etad akhilam jagat /

There are, as known, many editions and translations of Vasubandhu's *Trimśikā*. See, most recently, S. Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi 1984. Here the Sanskrit text is given on pp. 422-423. See also the facsimile edition given in K. Mimaki et al. (eds.), *Three Works of Vasubandhu in Sanskrit Manuscript*, Tokyo 1989. (There are no significant variants.)

In the *Visnupurāna* (as quoted in PW, s.v. parināma) there is an interesting variant, probably of VP:

170). Likewise Vasubandhu speaks of three kinds of parināma (vipāka, mananā and visayavijñapti), and of three characters (parikalpita-, paratantra- and parinispannasvabhāva). Both are concerned about three forms of the absolute. The terminology and the details certainly differ, but the structural similarity is too striking to be purely coincidental. Moreover, technical terms such as samghāta and upalabdhi, so common in Vasubandhu, may also have been borrowed by Bhartrhari in whose VP they are quite common, too.⁷

It is true that Bhartrhari never uses the term vijñapti(-mātratā). Even vijñāna rarely occurs. One could perhaps go as far as to say that he carefully avoids it! In any case, internal evidence certainly supports I-ching's remark about Bhartrhari being intimately acquainted with the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā (or vijñāna-mātra), i.e. with the philosophical works of Vasubandhu.

2. Paul Hacker, in particular, has stressed that there is an important distinction to be drawn between vivarta- and parināmavāda in Indian philosophy. In case of parināmavāda, the material cause and its product is held to be essentially the same. In case of vivartavāda (...ist vom monistisch-illusionistischen Vedānta ausgebildet worden), we are here dealing with the concept of "Scheinentfaltung". As Hacker points out, Bhartrhari uses the term vivarta in the sense of "Scheinentwicklung", and one can characterize his point of view "als illusionistischen Bhedābhedavāda". To Bhartrhari vivarta (also vikāra) and parināma are more or less synonyms. Finally, Hacker suggests that Bhartrhari's usage of vivarta has a Buddhist background.

Unfortunately, Hacker only gives a few vague references to the use of vivartate/vivarta in Buddhist sources. Hacker is quite right, though, that vivartate (Pāli: vivatṭati) belongs to a cosmological context. Though it cannot be said to be very common in the Buddhist sūtra-s the idea is known from several early sūtra-s of Mahāyāna. We have a nice example

On all this, see K.A. Subramania Iyer's classical work, Bhartrhan. A study of the Vākya-padīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries, Poona 1969. - For a discussion of śabdādvaita, etc., see also the same author's The Vākyapadīya - Some Problems, Poona 1982

⁷ For the references, see Rau's Wortindex, s.s.v.

⁸ See his Vivarta. Studien zur Geschichte der illusionistischen Kosmologie und Erkenntnistheorie der Inder, Wiesbaden 1953.

⁹ Op. cit., p. 16.

from a most important chapter of the Samādhirājasūtra, recently edited by C. Cüppers (IX.1-2):

```
yada lokadhātūna vivartu bhotī
ākāśu bhotī ayu sarvaloke /
yathaiva tam pūrvi tathaiva paścāt
tathopamām jānatha sarvadharmān // (IX.1)
idam jagad yāvata kiñci vartate (v.l.: kim vivartate!)
adhastam etī ayam āpaskandhah /
yathaiva tam hesti tathaiva ūrd(h)vam
tathopamām jānatha sarvadharmān // (IX.2)<sup>10</sup>
```

Here then, in an early and influential Mahāyāna text, we are clearly confronted with a vivartavāda according to which the entire world (lokadhātu, idam jagat) evolves from one single principle, ākāśa, into which it also, in the course of time, reverts again. This sort of "monistic illusionism" is most characteristic of Mahāyāna. In Vasubandhu, however, ākāśa is replaced by vijñāna, in Bhartrhari by śabda(-tattva). The concepts of vivarta and parināma were certainly not invented by Bhartrhari.

Since we are here dealing with the Buddhist sources that may have influenced Bhartrhari, it is reasonable to ask whether there is any evidence that would allow us to say anything about his knowledge of Buddhist sūtra-s. There is no definite answer to this question, at least on the basis of the VP. There is a nice case, though, which shows Bhartrhari using specific Buddhist terminology. This is, in Rau's critical edition, VP II.238ab:

```
upāyāh śiksamānānām bālānām upalāpanāh /
```

The reading *upalāpanāh* is significant. It is given in the *Mūlakārikā*-s and in the Commentary of Punyarāja (ed. K.A.S. Iyer, Delhi 1983, p. 98). In the *Vrtti*, however the reading has been changed to *apalāpanāh*. This is definitely a wrong reading. If the author of the *Vrtti* actually did write (or read) *apalāpanāh* (which is not certain, for it could be a scribal error), we can be quite sure that its author was *not* Bhartrhari. How so?

First of all, it may be noted that Iyer has misunderstood the meaning of the verse in his translation: "These śāstras which are a means (of attaining knowledge) are really misleading to ignorant people." The version

¹⁰ C. Cüppers, The IXth Chapter of the Samādhirājasūtra, Stuttgart 1990, p. 17.

¹¹ Thus also, e.g. K. Raghavan Pillai, The Vākyapadīya, Delhi 1971, p. 91.

¹² K.A. Subramania Iyer, The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Chapter II, Delhi 1977, p. 103.

of K. Raghavan Pillai is also on the wrong track: "Means are intended as a concealment of the truth for the sake of the unwise who are learning".¹³

In Buddhist texts we occasionally find expressions such as bālalāpana, bālollāpana, bālopalāpana and bālālāpana.¹⁴ The expression is used about a teaching which is not really true, but nevertheless useful and good for beginners. In other words something that is true vyavahāratah, but not paramārthatah.¹⁵ In Mahāyāna texts it belongs to the context of satyadvaya, as indeed it also does in the VP. Hence upāyāh ...upalāpanāh, in VP, should be translated with a positive connotation, e.g.: "When dealing with young students still learning ("freshmen") (their teacher may use) pedagogical means".

There can hardly be any doubt that Bhartrhari derived the expression bālānām upalāpanāh from some Buddhist text, and therefore, of course, the reading apalāpanāh must be erroneous.

We cannot be sure precisely from which Bauddha text Bhartrhari borrowed this expression, but it may be worthy of note that bālalāpana occurs in Nāgārjuna's Acintyastava 7, especially so since it is not impossible that VP III. 2.1.:

```
ātmā vastu svabhāvas ca sarīram tattvam ity api /
dravyam ity asya paryāyās tac ca nityam iti smrtam //
```

is moulded upon Acintyastava 45ab:

```
svabhāvah prakṛtis tattvam dravyam vastu sad ity api /16
```

Whether this be so or not, the fact remains that there are numerous echoes of typical Madhyamaka arguments and doctrines to be found scattered around in Bhartrhari's VP.

It may, incidentally, be pointed out that Nāgārjuna's Acintyastava shows a considerable influence from Samādhirajasūtra IX, not just with regard to vivartavāda (see above), but also, among other things, with

¹³ See n. 11.

See my Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Copenhagen 1982, p. 143, n. 7. For the idea cf. also Yuktisastikā 30, ibid., p. 110.

¹⁵ This satyadvayavibhāga is about as common in the VP as in Mahāyāna texts in general – not to speak of other Vedānta texts.

¹⁶ This seems first to have been pointed out by O. Qvarnström, Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective, Lund 1989, p. 130.

regard to the question of *pramāna*-s, a topic to which we shall revert soon. For now I shall just point out that *Acintyastava* 20:

```
jadatvam apramānatvam athāvyākrtatām api /
viparītaparijñānam indriyānām tvam ūcivān //<sup>17</sup>
```

without any doubt is based on Samādhirājasūtra IX.24:

```
yasmād ime indriya apramānā
jadāh svabhāvena avyākrtāś ca /
tasmād ya nirvānapathena arthikah
sa āryamārgena karotu kāryam //18
```

We here have an early canonical source to the effect that *indriya-pratyakṣa* cannot be considered a *pramāna*. 19

3. We are on safer ground when we turn to Buddhist authors after Bhartrhari. The first to come into consideration would be Dignāga.

As already pointed out long ago, Dignāga, towards the end of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) V, quotes at least two verses from VP, viz. II. 158 and 155.²⁰ There are numerous other references to VP in the PS, and there can, therefore, be no doubt that Dignāga knew Bhartrhari, and that he should also be placed *after* that author in time.²¹

- 17 Quoted from my Nagarjuniana, p. 146, where I failed to identify the original source.
- 18 Cüppers, op. cit., p. 39.
- Nāgārjuna accepts four pramāna-s (as does e.g. Candrakīrti, his celebrated commentator), but, naturally, only vyavahāratah. This is clear from his Vigrahavyāvartanī and Vaidalyaprakarana. Probably also from his *Upāyahrdaya (?), provided Y. Kajiyama is justified in accepting its authenticity, see his recent paper "On the Authorship of the Upāyahrdaya" in E. Steinkellner (ed.), Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Wien 1991, pp. 107-117. I still regard my hesitations as valid, see Nagarjuniana, p. 17, n. 44.
- Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 856, with ref. See also M. Hattori (ed.), The Pramānasamuccayavrtti of Dignāga. Chapter Five, Kyoto 1982, pp. 147 & 149, for the Sanskrit and Tibetan.
- Many examples in R. Herzberger, Bhartrhari and the Buddhists An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought, Dordrecht 1986, passim. Apart from this very problematic book, one may refer to M. Hattori's "Apoha and Pratibhā", in M. Nagatomi et al. (eds.), Sanskrit and Indian Studies. Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Dordrecht 1980, pp. 61-73. In the opinion of Hattori, Dignāga "adopted" his concept of pratibhā from VP. See also, F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, "Some Remarks on Bhartrhari's Concept of Pratibhā", in JIP 18 (1990), pp. 95-112. There is no single word to cover all the meanings of this important term in VP. It covers notions such as:

Quite interesting in this connection is Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā*, a text in 33 verses available in an old Tibetan translation. Or rather, since (apart from its initial and final verses) it is but an extract from the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (VP III.3.53-85, with some omissions), it is also still available as such in Sanskrit.²²

The final verses occur in the *Vrtti* to VP I.1. They are often quoted, and Frauwallner may be right in suggesting that their original source was Bhartrhari's now lost Śabdadhātusamīksā:

```
yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto janah /
samkīrnam iva mātrābhis citrābhir abhimanyate //
tathedam amrtam brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /
kalusatvam ivāpannam bhedarūpam vivartate //
```

There is, as already pointed out by Frauwallner, a small and significant change introduced here by Dignāga, who replaces Bhartrhari's subject (amrtam) brahma with mam śes, i.e. vijnānam (and hi?). It is hard to say exactly what Dignāga wished to achieve by adapting Bhartrhari's verses, but by replacing brahma with vijnāna he at least affirms that Bhartrhari's monism is acceptable to the Bauddhas, i.e. to Yogācāra, provided vijnāna, not brahma, is read. By making this replacement Dignāga brings the verses closer to the idea expressed e.g. in Madhyāntavibhāga (I. 16, 21-22, especially), which may indeed have been one of Bhartrhari's original sources for the distinction between brahma/vijnāna/citta as originally pure, but under normal circumstances rendered impure by kleśa-s, above all avidyā. In a word, Dignāga brings the verses back into their original Buddhist form. Dignāga was, like I-ching, very much aware of Bhartrhari's Buddhist leanings.

Later on we find Bauddhas such as Bhavya and Śāntaraksita accusing Gaudapāda and others of having "stolen" their ideas from the Buddhist texts.²³ Dignāga is saying the same thing in a more diplomatic language.

The fact that Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīksā* is thus based on Bhartrhari's *Prakīrna(ka)* (VP III), tallies very nicely with the tradition that the celebrated Dharmapāla wrote a commentary (vrtti) on that very chapter

intelligence, instinct, intuition, bright idea, and the like. Thanks to experience and intelligence, some people are more "bright" than others. Even animals and children possess pratibhā telling them what to do in a given situation.

²² Sanskrit and Tibetan texts in Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 821-828.

²³ The charge of having stolen from the Buddhists is almost a locus communis, cf. Qvarn-ström, op. cit., pp. 101-104.

of the VP. Its title was, according to Durvekamiśra, *Prakūrnavrtti*. ²⁴ Apart from fragments, and as opposed to Dharmapāla's incomplete commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, it now, as known, seems to have been irreparably lost. But all this is nevertheless sufficient to show that by the time of Dignāga the works of Bhartrhari were carefully studied by the Bauddhas, especially by those belonging to Yogācāra.

4. Kambala and Dharmakīrti are among those Bauddhas in whose extant works we can detect traces of their having read Bhartrhari. A few obvious instances must be sufficient to establish this point.

First Kambala (ca. 450-525 A.D.). În his Navaśloka 9ab:

```
yoginām api yaj jñānam tad apy ākāśalaksanam /
```

has a nice parallel in his Alokamālā 110ab:

```
yoginām api yaj jñānam tad apy ajñānam eva hi /
```

This is based on VP I.30cd:

```
rsīnām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam /
```

Likewise, there can hardly be any doubt that *Ālokamālā* 111:

```
sarvam samvrtimaj jñānam panditasyetarasya ca / grahane vyapadeśe ca samam eva pravartate //<sup>25</sup>
```

is based on VP III.3.55:

```
rūpanavyapadeśābhyām laukike vartmani sthitau /
jñānam praty abhilāpam ca sadršau bālapanditau //
```

Whether Kambala got it directly from VP, or from Dignāga's *Traikālya-parīkṣā* (where it comes as verse 4) is difficult to decide. *Ālokamālā* 19 and 20 run:

```
abhinnam api bhedena bahiś cāpy abahirgatam / visayākārakalusam khyāti cittam anekadhā //
```

²⁴ Frauwallner, op. cit., p. 857, n. 27.

²⁵ Kambala's *Ālokamālā* was edited by me in *Miscellanea Buddhica*, Copenhagen 1985, pp. 109-221.

```
sūryacandramasau vyoma tārācakram vasumdharā / saritsāgaradikśailāś cittasyaitā vibhūtayah //
```

We are here, when it comes to kālusya, kalusatva, not just reminded of VP III.3.57 (= Traikālyaparīksā 6, cf. 4), but especially VP III.7.41:

```
dyauh kṣamā vāyur ādityah sāgarāh sarito diśah / antahkaranatattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāh //
```

See also Ālokamālā 85, 146, 157, 162, 177 and 193 for further references etc. to Bhartrhari by Kambala.

Dharmakīrti, too, knew his Bhartrhari. Not only does the style and the very title of his Sambandhaparīksā²⁶ recall Bhartrhari's Sambandhasamuddeśa, but especially in Dharmakīrti's own commentary to the first chapter of the Pramānavārttika there are numerous places reminiscent of VP.²⁷ The learned readers in those days would, of course, immediately recognize such allusions and they would appreciate them, just as one cannot fail to appreciate what in poetics is called dhvani. Indeed, as I have now tried to point out, such sat sapienti allusions must have been a characteristic and much cherished feature of sophisticated Sanskrit literature in the period we are here dealing with. A failure to recognize this device can easily lead to wrong judgements about the proper historical context.

I would not here want to go into the problem of the authenticity of the collection of poems ascribed to Bhartrhari, i.e. the Śatakatraya (or Subhā-sitatriśatī, etc.).²⁸ Personally, I have no hesitation at all in accepting its authenticity whatever its original form may have been. Dharmakīrti, too, composed poems, including some very nice ones in the śrngāra style.²⁹ He may, indeed, have been inspired by the example of Bhartrhari to do so. In any case, by the time of Dharmakīrti, Bhartrhari was almost a part of the Buddhist heritage.

When Dharmakīrti in the *Pramānasiddhi* chapter of his PV discusses *pramāna*, reliable knowledge, he also deals with language, which, for him,

²⁶ Edited and translated by Frauwallner, op. cit., pp. 490-529. The original Sanskrit text (including the Tīkā of Vinītadeva) was recently discovered in Tibet, but still awaits publication

²⁷ R. Gnoli (ed.), The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Auto-commentary, Roma 1960, passim.

²⁸ For a discussion (with further ref.) see e.g. Harold G. Coward, *Bhartrhari*, Boston 1976, pp. 95-104.

²⁹ The references are listed in L. Sternbach, Poésie sanskrite conservée dans les anthologies et les inscriptions, Tome II, Paris 1982, pp. 130-132.

can be reduced to anumāna. (Or rather: which for him must be reduced to anumāna, since his system does not, for various reasons, permit more than two pramāna-s.) Language, speech and communication can be reliable for practical purposes to the extent that it tells us what other people have in mind. But how things actually are is not something we can be sure of merely on the basis of what other people tell us. Reliable knowledge is knowledge we can actually use for some meaningful practical purpose. We always have to try out whether it works. Dharmakīrti defines reliability, avisamvādana, as arthakriyāsthiti, the ability of being of any practical use. When he says, PV II.2cd:

(prāmānyam tatra śabdasya) nārthatattvanibandhanam /

we are not wrong in taking this as an allusion to VP I.13ab:

arthapravrttitattvānām śabdā eva nibandhanam /.

Of course, it is not quite fair of Dharmakīrti to refute Bhartrhari in this way, because śabda means much more than just words and language in the VP. So Dharmakīrti's criticism is here a bit onesided.³⁰

When Dharmakīrti defines reliable knowledge in terms of *arthakriyā* he certainly has Bhartrhari in mind, even though the term can be traced back as far as Nāgārjuna.³¹ The idea that real things are *arthakriyā-samartha*, or *kāryakriyāsamartha*, is an old one in Indian thought.

In his PVin II.5-6, Dharmakīrti quite clearly has VP I. 33-35 in mind. The "hints" are given by the example of the *mani-*, and by VP 33b: *tām tām arthakriyām prati*, which in PVin II.5d becomes: *viśeso 'rthakriyām prati*.

Bhartrhari's argument is that real things (dravya) may have the ability to do this or that (arthakriyā), but under various circumstances other things may prevent them from doing so. This, however, is not something we can be sure of by means of anumāna. It requires a sort of expertise,

- 30 Cf. my paper "The Initial Verses of the Pramānasiddhi Chapter of the Pramānavārttika", in the volume of proceedings edited by E. Steinkellner (see n. 19), pp. 155-159. Dharma-kīrti, to be sure, was not the first to employ avisamvādana as a criterion of valid knowledge. The term avisamvāda is found in Pramānasamuccaya II. 5ab, Ślokavārttika, Śūnyavāda, Codanā 80, Tarkajvālā ad MHK IV.38 (...bslu ba med pa ni bden pa yin par rigs kyi...), and even as early as Ratnāvalī II.35 (ed. M. Hahn, Bonn 1982, p. 52).
- 31 In the author's own commentary to VV 2 we thus read: atha śūnyāh sarvabhāvā na ca kāryakriyāsamarthā bhavanti mā bhūd... This implies that something real must be kāryakriyāsamartha, which is much the same as arthakriyāsamartha.

such as the one that a jeweller has based on long experience (abhyāsa). Such an expertise is inherited from a long cultural tradition, it depends on āgama. For Bhartrhari āgama has things in common with perception, but is clearly a third pramāna in its own right apart from pratyaksa and anumāna.³² For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, the validity of cognition is not a question of abhyāsa (at least in this context!) but rather one of seeing whether our ideas actually work:

arthakriyānurodhena pramānatvam vyavasthitam /83

In Dharmakīrti there is no room for āgama as a third sort of pramāna. He therefore has to adapt, or interpret, this passage in the VP (with which, as we shall see, Buddhist philosophers were very much concerned) so as to suit the demands of his own system of two pramāna-s.

I have no doubt that future research will show that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are heavily indebted to Bhartrhari for much of their technical terminology. Here I just want to point out one such case. Speaking of an ignoramus with a "limited horizon", Dharmakīrti at least twice uses the expression tshu rol mthon ba. This corresponds in Sanskrit to arvāgdarśana, a term which can be traced back to the Vrtti to VP I.134, which may well, directly or indirectly, be Dharmakīrti's source.³⁴

5. The term *arvāgdarśana* also occurs in another Buddhist author before Dharmakīrti, namely Bhavya, to whom I shall now turn my attention.

That Bhavya knew Bhartrhari has already been established long ago. Let us briefly review some of the evidence before we try to determine the

- 32 Cf. A. Aklujkar "The Number of Pramānas according to Bhartrhari" in WZKS 33 (1989), pp. 151-159. See also Aklujkar and Potter's summary of the VP in H.G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (eds.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume V: The Philosophy of the Grammarians, Delhi 1990, pp. 121-172.
- 33 PVin II.6cd, quoted from E. Steinkellner (ed.), Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviniścayah. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I, Wien 1973, p. 27.
- Ibid., p. 66: de la tshu rol mthon ba bdag ñid kyi mnon sum log pa tshad mar byed pa ni des gzun bar 'os pa ñid dgag pa pa nigs kyi thams cad ni de lta ma yin pa'i phyir thams cad 'gog pa ni ma yin no. In PVin III (Peking ed., Ce 319b6) we read: tshu rol mthon ba 'dis... In the Vrtti to VP I. 134. (ed. Iyer, p. 221) we have what is probably the source of Dharmakīrti (and, as we shall see, Bhavya): arvāgdarśanānām tu purusānām prāyena sāti-śayāh pratighātinyah sāparādhāh śaktayah. The term also occurs in the Vrtti to VP I. 151 (ed. Rau), see Iyer, op. cit., p. 205 (ad VP I. 127). Cf. also E. Steinkellner (trans.), Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviniścayah. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II, Wien 1979, p. 79, n. 258 for some later references. No source earlier than VP seems to be known.

extent to which Bhartrhari exerted a positive influence upon Bhavya's way of thinking. As we shall see, it was very considerable.

In his *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK) IX.13-14 Bhavya has these two verses presenting the view of Mīmāmsā:

```
dūsayitvā trayīmārgam hetubhir hetuvādinah / anumānapradhānatvāt svanayam dyotayanti ye // pādasparsād ivāndhānām visame pathi dhāvatām / anumānapradhānānām pātah tesām na durlabhah //85
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This includes an almost literal quotation from VP I.42:

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hastasparśād ivāndhena visame pathi dhāvatā / anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhah //
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The same verse, to be sure, is also cited by Bhavya in his *Prajñāpradīpa* IX, which, incidentally, confirms the variant readings:

```
/lon ba rkan pa'i tshod dpag kyi(s)//nam na'i lam du rgyug pa ltar//rjes su dpag pa gtsor 'dzin pa//mam par lhun ba mi dka' 'o/36
```

On the basis of this there can be no doubt that Bhavya knew the VP. Before proceeding further it may be useful briefly to recall the ideas expressed in VP I.30-42. Bhartrhari's fundamental position is that *dharma* can only be stablished by means of *āgama*. Even the cognition of saints is based on *āgama*. It is impossible to figure out what *dharma* is merely by tarka or anumāna (VP I.30):

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na cāgamād rie dharmas tarkeņa vyavatisthate / rsīnām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam //<sup>37</sup>
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What Bhartrhari disavows is not tarka or anumāna as such, but merely its limitations, and therefore also those philosophers who put too much emphasis on "reason", those who are anumānapradhāna. As long as tarka is ancillary to āgama it is fully acceptable to Bhartrhari (VP I. 151ab):

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vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś caksur apaśyatām /
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³⁵ Quoted from S. Kawasaki (ed.), The Mīmāmsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hrdaya-kārikā: Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts, Tsukuba 1976, 1987, 1988, p. 12 (with a few changes).

³⁶ Cf. Kawasaki, op. cit., p. 13, n. 7, for the source of the Tibetan.

³⁷ As will be recalled, Kambala also referred to this verse, in *Navaśloka* 9ab and *Ālokamālā* 110ab, both quoted above (p. 202).

Bhartrhari's view can certainly be considered "orthodox". In the verse just quoted he seems to have had in mind Manu XII.106 (or some such passage):

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ārṣam dharmopadeśam ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā / yas tarkenānusamdhatte sa dharmam veda netarah //
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He has nothing against tarka or anumāna as such, but only against those who are śuskatarkānusārin (VP II. 484b, cf. Mahābhārata III. 13463, quoted in PW, s.v.),³⁸ or anumānapradhāna. Logic and reason are all right as long as they are not in conflict with the holy tradition.

The hostile attitude towards "dry logicians" (tārkika) is by no means specific to Manu and the VP. According to Nāgārjuna, for instance, even the Buddha took exception to tārkika-s.³⁹ And let us not forget that in early Buddhist texts nirvāna is said to be inaccessible to reason (atarkāvacara).⁴⁰

To sum up Bhartrhari's position: He accepts three pramāṇa-s, true, but they are by no means on a par. When one has to make the right decision (dharma, itikartavyatā) in matters of religion, ethics and grammar (!) one must resort to āgama. As we would say, āgama has to do with values, with good and bad, rather than with "facts". Āgama can be supported by anumāna and tarka, but never challenged or questioned by reason and logic. Āgama works as a sort of perception, but it covers much more than normal perception. This sort of āgama is the most fundamental of the three pramāna-s accepted by Bhartrhari.

When it comes to Bhavya the situation is much the same, at least in principle. His attitude towards $\bar{a}gama$ is partly inherited from Bhartrhari though it certainly also has a Buddhist background, and, of course, his conception of what *dharma* is has nothing in common with Bhartrhari. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the antithesis $\bar{a}gama$ -tarka expressed by Manu and VP has an old parallel in the Buddhist distinction between $\bar{a}gama$ and yukti. 41

³⁸ The expression is also known to Śamkara, see Adyar Library Bulletin 54 (1990), p. 147. See also Manu II. 12.

³⁹ See Lokātītastava 21, in my Nagarjuniana, p. 134.

⁴⁰ Cf. A Critical Pāli Dictionary for ref.

⁴¹ This distinction is already known to Nāgārjuna, cf. his Ratnāvalī III.14a: nigs pa dan ni lun bstan pa...yukti and āgama...

Let us now look at some of the most significant passages in question. To Bhartrhari, $\bar{a}gama$ is, roughly speaking, the Veda with all its $up\bar{a}niga$ -s, etc., and those civilized people (sista) who follow it. With Bhavya it is otherwise. The correct teaching is to be found in the Buddhist scriptures, the Buddha being the most competent authority. How can we be sure? Because it is the least unreasonable of all teachings, according to Bhavya. (This again implies that one has to check all other teachings, to see that they are unreasonable. This again explains the doxographical nature of Bhavya's main works.) See MHK V.8-9:

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(atrocyate) pramānam nah sarvam tāthāgatam vacah / āptopadeśaprāmānyād bhadro hi pratipadyate // nāgamāntarasamdigdhaviparyastamatih parah / tasmāt tatpratipattyartham tanmrgyo yuktimannayah // **
```

The Buddhist scriptures tell us what *tattva* is, and what *dharma* is. "Reason", on the other hand, shows us that all other opinions entertained by our opponents, are, in the final analysis, wrong. Still, the ultimate *tattva* of the Bauddhas (*śūnyatā*, *anutpāda*, *dharmakāya*, etc.) is beyond the range of reason (but not, as we shall see, beyond the range of "personal experience"). This is clear from MHK V. 104-105:

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tattvasyātarkagocarāt tadbodho nānumānatah / nātas tarkena dharmānām grhyeta dharmateti cet // ihānumānān nirdosād āgamānuvidhāyinah / kalpitāśesavividhavikalpāpām nirākrteh //
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When Bhavya here speaks of anumāna as having to be nirdoṣa and āgamānuvidhāyin, it is in principle similar to Manu's tarka which must be vedaśāstrāvirodhi(n), a term taken over, as we have seen, by VP I.151. Bhavya can therefore say, MHK V.107:

```
ato 'numānavisayam na tattvam pratipadyate / tattvajñānavipakso yah tasya tena nirāknyā //
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One can, on this basis, speak of Bhavya's "negative dialectics", and in this sense Bhavya's *tattva* is, as he says in MHK V. 113, *yuktāgamopeta*, i.e. based on *āgama*, supported by logic.

42 Quoted from the critical edition of the text (in prep. by myself and M.D. Eckel). It is based on the only available Sanskrit Ms., for which see Qvarnström, op. cit., p. 23. (The following verses come from the same source.)

In the commentary to MHK IX.7 the Bauddhas are accused of reducing āgama to anumāna.⁴³ This would, at least in a sense, apply to Dignāga and, later on, Dharmakīrti, but not to Bhavya. The issue is taken up by Bhavya later on in his *Prajñāpradīpa*. Here, he agrees that āgama and anumāna have the same visaya. They deal with the same thing. There is nothing wrong with anumāna as such, but one must not place too much emphasis on anumāna. This is exactly the position of Bhartrhari, as we have already seen.⁴⁴

What, then, is the relationship between $\bar{a}gama$ and tattva, for, surely, $\bar{a}gama$ is not identical with tattva? Bhavya attempts to solve this problem by saying that the words of the Buddha are ji lta ba bzin, or $yath\bar{a}vat$, they are adequate in the sense that they "correspond" to reality. This idea comes very close to VP I.5 which describes the Veda (i.e. $\bar{a}gama$) as a $pr\bar{a}ptyup\bar{a}ya$ and an $anuk\bar{a}ra$ ("image, imitation") of (sabda-)tattva. The scriptures are valid because they somehow reflect true reality. The rest is logic, and it is yoga, in Bhartrhari as well as in Bhavya.

We would have liked to know what exactly Bhartrhari has in mind when he refers to śabdapūrvayoga (VP I.20c) and to adhyātmaśāstra (VP I.174c). Is it the sort of "OM-mysticism" mentioned e.g. in Patañjali's YS I. 25-27, or in the first chapter of the āgamaśāstra of Gaudapāda?

- 43 TJ IX ad MHK IX.7 (Peking ed. Dsa 311b5): gan yan sans rgyas pas lun gis rjes su dpag pa'i khons su gtogs so źes btags pa de ni bden pa ma yin te/gan gi phyir/pratyaksam anumānam ca śābdam copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavah sādhyasādhakāh //
 - Cf. Kawasaki, op. cit., p. 9, n.5. See also TJ ad IX.18 for agama.
- 44 Prajñāpradīpa IX (Peking ed. Tsha 154a 4), just after the citation of VP I. 42...lun ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa ma yin par gzun bar bya ste/mnon sum ma yin pa'i don ntogs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir/dper na/rjes su dpag pa'i ran gi bdag ñid bźin no//kha cig na re/lun ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa kho na yin te/de las yul tha dad pa'i phyir dper na mnon sum bźin no//de ltar yan rjes su dpag pa ni dban pos gzun ba'i don gyi yul can yin la/sgra'i mtshan ñid kyi tshad ma ni dban po las 'das pa mtho ris dan byan grol gyi yul can yin pas/de'i phyir lun ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa kho na yin no/źe na/lun ni rjes su dpag pa las yul tha dad pa ñid ma yin te/...yan na mtho ris dan thar pa yod do//źes bya ba/de bźin gśegs pa'i lun gan yin pa de ni ji lta ba bźin te... Bhavya, in MHK IX. 19-20, goes as far as to say that everything that is handed down and makes sense, is āgama:

yat parīksāksamam yuktyā vacanam cet tad āgamah / With this in mind, it is understandable why Candrakīrti would accuse Bhavya of priyānumānatā (Prasannapadā, p. 16), a predilection for logic. Cf. also the very title Bhavya chose for his work: Tarkajvālā. Still, the accusation is not quite fair, as we see once we also keep MHK V. 104-107 in mind (quoted above). Bhavya is also very much aware of the limitations of logic.

We cannot be sure. In any case, Bhavya's position is clear enough. The ideal is to obtain vajropamasamādhi, or tattvajñāna, i.e. to experience śūnyatā and anutpāda personally. First one learns the doctrine of anutpāda etc. from Buddhist āgama (esp. Prajñāpāramitā). Then one refutes all other āgama-s with the help of yukti, tarka and anumāna. This brings one to the truth. Finally one realizes the reality behind truth through "auto-suggestion", or bhāvanā. This reflects the old Buddhist distinction between three degrees of prajñā, partly modified by Bhavya himself.

Of course Bhavya accepts a tattvajñāna, as all Mādhyamikas always do. This jñāna, however, is neither savikalpa nor avikalpa, see e.g. MHK III. 285cd (speaking of the dharmakāya):

savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy esa durdrśah //46

or MHK III.265:

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nirvikalpārthaviṣayā nirvikalpāpi dhīr mṛṣā /
anātmādisvabhāvatvāt tadyathā savikalpadhīh //<sup>A7</sup>
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or MHK VIII.104:

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savikalpāvikalpā ca yadā buddhir nivartate / dhiyām avisaye tasmin prapañcopaśamah śivah //<sup>48</sup>
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This is a bit surprising, and this terminology - neither savikalpa nor nirvikalpa (avikalpa) - ought to strike us as odd. One would have expected Bhavya to say that tattva was the object of some sort of nirvikalpajñāna, as Mahāyāna texts otherwise invariably do. Bhavya seems to be the only Bauddha to express himself in this curious way, if I am not mistaken.

There is a very specific historical background for this oddity. The clue is to be found in the commentary to MHK III.285. Here we are told that anumāna is savikalpa and determined by vikalpa and anusmrti, whereas pratyaksa is nirvikalpa and grasps vastumātra as its object.⁴⁹ The dharma-

- 45 See e.g. MHK IX. 18 with TS.
- 46 Quoted from the edition of Y. Ejima, Chūgan-Shisō no Tenkai-Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū, Tokyo 1980, p. 340.
- 47 *Ibid.*, p. 334.
- 48 Quoted from Qvarnström, op. cit., p. 48 (cf. p. 153 for Tib.). Cf. ibid., p. 95, n. 118 for further references.
- 49 TJ ad MHK III.285: nog pa dan bcas pa ni rjes su dpag pa ste/ rtog pa dan rjes su dran pa'i mam par rtog pa yod pa'i phyir ro// mam par rtog pa med pa ni mnon sum gyi ses

kāya, according to MHK III.286, is tārkikānām agocarah. Bhavya obviously has certain tārkika-s in mind when he says that tattva cannot be known by anumāna or pratyakṣa. Logicians who accept only two pramāna-s. That Bhavya here has Dignāga (to whom he explicitly refers in MHK V) in mind is quite clear. His terminology is a reaction against the epistemology of Yogācāra sākāravāda. In other words, Bhavya does not accept merely two pramāna-s, as does Dignāga etc. To him, as to Bhartrhari, āgama is the most fundamental pramāna, provided, naturally, that one does not forget to practise yoga.

When Dignāga speaks of a yogipratyaksa(-jñāna), Bhavya speaks of jñānakṣaṇa (MHK III.291), ekakṣaṇajñāna (ad MHK I.6, and MHK 268), svayaṃbhūjñāna, or the like. The difference, of course, is hardly more than one of terminology in the final analysis.

Finally, in the first chapter of the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, there are some unmistakable echoes of VP when Bhavya opines that tārkika-s who are anumānapramānapradhāna are unable to understand tattva, etc., because their cognition is too limited, being that of arvāgdarśana.⁵¹

6. Also in later Buddhist literature we find references to Bhartrhari's opinion about the limitations of anumāna. In his Tattvasamgraha (TS) 1460-1462, for instance, Śāntaraksita quotes VP I.32-34. But a little later (TS 1476-1477) Śāntaraksita, by adding na, indicates that he does not agree:

pa ste/drios po tsam la dmigs pa'i phyir ro//. This is based on Dignāga. The idea that pratyaksa has vastumātra as its "object" comes up again in Dharmakīrti. The scriptural origin of the term vastumātra (or paratantrasvabhāva, as the "object" of pratyaksa) seems to be the Tattvārthapatala of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. The terms svalaksana and vastumātra thus become almost interchangeable, depending on the context. – See also TJ ad MHK IV.67.

- See my "Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, Chapter IV", in B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 239-263.
- MRP I: 'di ltar rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma gtso bor byed pa'i rtog ge pas ni de kho na ñid dan/ sans rgyas kyi sku dan ye ses sin tu lkog tu gyur pa dag brtags sin dpyad pas ses par mi 'gyur te/ tshu rol mthon ba'i ses par yin pa'i phyir ro//

ñi ma dmus lon yul min bźin//mtho ris sdig can yul ma yin/ /de ñid dan ni bsgrub bya de//rtog ge pa yi yul ma yin/ /nor bu rin chen brtag pa la//lon ba tshad ma yin nam ci/

These verses contain echoes of MHK III. 286 (Ejima, op. cit., p. 340) and (as later on also *Pramānaviniscaya*, as we have seen, II.5-6) VP I.35cd: manirūpyādivijnānam tadvidām nānumānikam. Cf. also the *Vnti* to VP I.127 (ed. Iyer, p. 205).

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avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktisu / bhāvānām anumānena nātah siddhih sudurlabhā // yatnenānumito 'py arthah kuśalair anumātrbhih / nānyathā sādhyate so 'nyair abhiyuktatarair api //52
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Another late Buddhist author who often quotes the VP, is Jñānaśrībhadra, who composed a *Vrtti* to the *Lankāvatārasūtra*. He was active in the 11th century A.D., and is quoted by Jñānavajra, the author of the only other Indian commentary on the *Lankāvatārasūtra* that has come down to us. Both seem now to have been lost in the original Sanskrit. All in all Jñānaśrībhadra quotes about fourty verses from Bhartrhari ("Bha ta hari") and other grammarians. Among these it will here be sufficient to cite a sample which, when compared with the corresponding Sanskrit original, shows a few interesting variants, but otherwise serves to corroborate the *textus receptus*.⁵³

This list of extracts can be seen as a supplement to the useful preliminary set of testimonia in K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye's edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, Poona 1965.

```
    anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad aksaram / vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yatah //
    thog ma med pa'i tshans pa rtag//yan dag sgra ni yig 'bru gan/ / gan las don dnos 'byun ba dan//'gro ba'i rab tu byed pa yan /
    yah sarvaparikalpānām ābhāse 'py anavasthitah / tarkāgamānumānena bahudhā parikalpitah //
    gan yons rtogs pa thams cad la//snan bar yan ni mi gnas te/
    rtog pa lun dan rjes dpag pas//rnam pa du mar kun brtags pa'o/
    vyatīto bhedasamsargau bhāvābhāvau kramākramau / satyānrte ca viśvātmā pravivekāt prakāśate //
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- 52 Quoted from A. Kunst, Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasangraha, Kraków 1939, p. 100. (To Śāntaraksita tattva is also beyond anumāna, as in case of Bhavya. But vyavahāratah both accept an anumāna that is nirdosa, which, in case of Śāntaraksita, means that it follows the rules of Dharmakīrti.)
- For Jñānaśrībhadra, who also wrote a commentary on Pramānaviniścaya, see E. Steinkellner, op. cit., 1973, p. 15. His commentary on the Lankāvatāra is also mentioned in the splendid (but often rather uncritical) work of H. Nakamura, A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy, Delhi 1983, pp. 257-258. In the verses here quoted from VP (Vnti or Śabdadhātusamīksā?) I & III, there seem to be some variant readings, e.g., in 1, anādi hi nityam ... 'rhabhāvaś ca, etc. In the Tibetan I have corrected in 4b 'gram dan nin (for 'gran dan nin) and 8a nig (for nigs). Read, perhaps, also nam yan for mam dag in 8d. Other quotations from various grammarians are found 74a2 (2 v. from VP), 74a4 (11 v. from VP), 74b1 (1 v. from gźon nu can gyi mur byed pa), 133a (2 v. from VP), 140a2 (3 v. from VP), 140a8 (1 v. from VP), 242b5 (2 v. from VP), and 276a6 (6 v. from VP).

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/ 'das kyan 'du 'dzi byed pa dan//dnos dan dnos med rim mi rim/
/ bden dan brdzun par sna tshogs bdag//dben pa las ni rab tu snan/
    antaryāmī sa bhūtānām ārād dūre ca drśyate /
    so 'tyantamukto moksāya mumuksubhir upāsyate //
/ 'byun po rnams kyi nan rgyu ba// 'gram dan rin du'an snan ba ste/
/ thar pa rab tu grol ba de//grol 'dod rnams kyis bstan par byed/
5. prakrtitvam api prāptān vikārān ākaroti sah /
    rtudhām eva grīsmānte mahato meghasamplavān //
/ de yi tshor ba gcig po yan//rnam pa man por rab tu 'byed/
/ 'jig pa 'byun ba'i me mdag dan//chu yi phun por chu bźin du/
    tasmād ākrtigotrasthād vyaktigrāmā vikārinah /
    mārutād iva jāyante vrstimanto balāhakāh //
/ de phyir da rod rigs gnas pa// gsal ba'i gron rnams 'gyur ba ni/
/ sprin rnams char dan ldan pa rnams//rlun las 'byun ba bźin du 'o/
   trayīrūpena tajjyotih paramam parivartate /
    prthaktīrthapravādesu drstibhedanibandhanam //
/ gsum gyi gzugs su de snan ba//mur smra tha dad rnams la ni/
/ mchog gi yons su 'gyur ba ste// lta ba tha dad kyis ni bcins/
   śāntavidyātmako yo 'mśah tad uhaitad avidyayā /
    tayā grastam ivājasram yā nirvaktum na śakyate //
/ źi źiń rig bdag tshańs pa ste// de las byuń ba'i ma rig pa/
/ des ni srin po bźin du med//gań smra mi nus rnam dag go/
   yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto janah /
    samkīrnam iva mātrābhiś citrābhir abhimanyate //
/ ji ltar nam mkha' rnam dag par//rab rib 'khrul pa'i skyes bu yis/
/ ri mo rnam pa sna tshogs kyis//kun tu gan bar sems pa pa/
10. tathedam amrtam brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /
    kalusatvam ivāpannam bhedarūpam vivartate //
/ de ltar tshans pa bdud rtsi 'di//'gyur ba med pa ma rig pas/
/ rñog pa lta bur byas pas na//tha dad gzugs su snan ba ste/
11. dyauh ksamā vāyur ādityah sāgarāh sarito diśah /
    antahkaranatattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāh //
/ lha sa rlun dan nam mkha' dan//ri dan chu dan phyogs rnams kyan/
/ nan du byed pa'i yan dag gi// cha rnams phyi rol bźin du gnas/
12. ekam eva yad āmnātam bhinnaśaktivyapāśrayāt /
    aprthaktve 'pi śaktibhyah prthaktveneva vartate //
/ tshul ni gcig ñid gan yin las// tha dad mthu ni rnam gnas pas/
/ mthu las tha dad ma yin yan// tha dad bźin du 'byun ba'o/
13. brahmedam śabdanirmānam śabdaśaktinibandhanam /
    vivrttam śabdamātrābhyas tāsv eva pravilīyate //
/ tshans sgra'i 'di ni sprul pa ste//sgra yi mthu las gnas pas ni/
/ sgra tsam las ni byun ba yan//de dag ñid du źa bar 'gyur/
14. yad ekam prakriyābhedair bahudhā pravibhajyate /
    tad vyākaranam āgamya param brahmādhigamyate //
/ rab tu byed pa gcig 'byed la//man por rab tu phye ba pa/
/ de ni lun ston rtogs pa las//tshans pa mchog ni chud par 'gyur/
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