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LINKING UP BHARTRHARI AND THE BAUDDHAS

Chr. Lindtner, Copenhagen

1. There is, as will be recalled, a good tradition (Punyarāja and Simhasūri) to the effect that Vasurāta was at one time the *guru* of Bhartrhari. According to another source (Paramārtha), the Bauddha teacher Vasubandhu was attacked by Vasurāta, the grammarian, i.e. Bhartrhari's teacher.¹

On the basis of these pieces of independent external evidence only, it would be natural to conclude that Bhartrhari cannot have been absolutely ignorant about at least some of the writings of "the master of 1000 *sāstra*-s", as the Chinese sources occasionally speak of Vasubandhu (thus, probably, not implying more than that Vasubandhu was an extremely prolific author). When I here speak of Vasubandhu, I am, to be sure, speaking of the author of *Abhidharmakośa*, *Karmasiddhi*, *Pañcaskandhaka*, *Vimśatikā*, *Trimśikā*, *Vyākhyāyukti*, etc. – to mention only the most important of his authentic works.

Naturally, the question then arises, whether we can detect any palpable pieces of influence from Vasubandhu in Bhartrhari's *magnum opus*, the *Vākyapadīya* (VP).² We might then find ourselves in a position to understand what I-ching had in mind when he reported that Bhartrhari was "intimately acquainted with the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* (Chinese: *wei-shih*)".³

- 1 For the references, see E. Frauwallner, *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 857 (= "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic", in *WZKSO* 5 (1961), pp. 125-148).
- 2 I am here mostly using Rau's critical edition, *Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya*, Wiesbaden 1977, and his most useful *Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya. Vollständiger Wortindex zu den mūlakārikās*, Wiesbaden/Stuttgart 1988. In addition to these, K.A. Subramania Iyer's standard edition with the extant commentaries: VP I, Poona 1966; VP II, Delhi 1983; VP III, Poona 1963 (i) and 1973 (ii). – For Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, see also (somewhat outdated) D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique indienne*, Paris 1959, pp. 57-93.
- 3 This is the translation of John Brough in "I-ching on the Sanskrit grammarians" in *BSOAS* 36 (1973), pp. 248-260. The old translation of Takakusu was "sole knowledge (Vidyāmātra)", which is impossible. But *wei-shih* could also, and more likely, be rendered *vijñānamātra*, or even *cittamātra*, any of which is preferable to Brough's *vijñaptimātratā* (*ibid.*, p. 260). Brough (*ibid.*, p. 259) gives further ref. to the question of Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, which he, absurdly, regards as a "dead issue". – See also H. Nakamura's "Buddhist influence upon the *Vākyapadīya*", in *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute* 29 (1973), pp. 367-388.

I think there is sufficient evidence to show that I-ching was right. Perhaps it is superfluous of me to quote the first verse of Vasubandhu's *Trimśikā* (T).⁴ Anyhow, here it is:

ātmadharmpacāro hi vividho yah pravartate /
vijñānaparināme 'sau parināmah sa ca tridhā //

Also, T 17 and 18ab should be kept in mind:

vijñānaparināmo 'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate /
tena tan nāsti tenedam sarvam vijñaptimātrakam //
sarvabījam hi vijñānam (parināmas tathā tathā /)

Of these verses I cannot help hearing an echo in VP I.124:

śabdasya parināmo 'yam ity āmnāyavido viduh /
chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvam pravartate //⁵

If required to describe the philosophy of Vasubandhu and Bhartrhari in a single word, it could well be *vijñānaparināma*- and *śabdaparināmavāda*, respectively. No doubt Bhartrhari deliberately alludes to Vasubandhu. This would have been recognized immediately by the contemporary learned reader.

For Bhartrhari the absolute, Brahman, is *eka* (I.29), but as a result of various powers (*śakti*, I.2c) and forces (*kratu*, I.52b, a Vedic term never used by the Buddhas) it develops (*vivartate*, I.1c = *vartate*, I.2d = *pravartate*, I.124b) so as to *appear* manifold. The ultimate reason for this, as in Buddhism, is *avidyā*. As a grammarian Bhartrhari likes to call the absolute *śabdatattva*, and he speaks of its manifestation, also in grammatical terminology, as *prakriyā*, formation. When VP I.4 furthermore says of Brahman that it is *sarvabīja*, and that it appears as *bhoktr*, *bhoktavya* and *bhoga*, we again hear Buddhist echoes. Vasubandhu makes a distinction between *grāhya* and *grāhaka*. So does Bhartrhari. Bhartrhari speaks of the three (or four?) forms of *vāk*, viz. *vaikhari*, *madhyamā* and *paśyantī* (VP I. 159-.

4 There are, as known, many editions and translations of Vasubandhu's *Trimśikā*. See, most recently, S. Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, Delhi 1984. Here the Sanskrit text is given on pp. 422-423. See also the facsimile edition given in K. Mimaki *et al.* (eds.), *Three Works of Vasubandhu in Sanskrit Manuscript*, Tokyo 1989. (There are no significant variants.)

5 In the *Visnupurāṇa* (as quoted in PW, s.v. *parināma*) there is an interesting variant, probably of VP:

havisām parināmo 'yam yad etad akhilam jagat /

170).⁶ Likewise Vasubandhu speaks of three kinds of *parināma* (*vipāka*, *mananā* and *visayavijñapti*), and of three characters (*parikalpita*-, *para-tantra*- and *parinisp洋洋svabhāva*). Both are concerned about three forms of the absolute. The terminology and the details certainly differ, but the structural similarity is too striking to be purely coincidental. Moreover, technical terms such as *samghāta* and *upalabdhi*, so common in Vasubandhu, may also have been borrowed by Bhartrhari in whose VP they are quite common, too.⁷

It is true that Bhartrhari never uses the term *vijñapti*(-*mātratā*). Even *vijñāna* rarely occurs. One could perhaps go as far as to say that he carefully avoids it! In any case, internal evidence certainly supports I-ching's remark about Bhartrhari being intimately acquainted with the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* (or *vijñāna-mātra*), i.e. with the philosophical works of Vasubandhu.

2. Paul Hacker, in particular, has stressed that there is an important distinction to be drawn between *vivarta*- and *parināmavāda* in Indian philosophy.⁸ In case of *parināmavāda*, the material cause and its product is held to be essentially the same. In case of *vivartavāda* (...ist vom monistisch-illusionistischen Vedānta ausgebildet worden), we are here dealing with the concept of "Scheinentfaltung". As Hacker points out, Bhartrhari uses the term *vivarta* in the sense of "Scheinentwicklung", and one can characterize his point of view "als illusionistischen *Bhedābheda-vāda*". To Bhartrhari *vivarta* (also *vikāra*) and *parināma* are more or less synonyms. Finally, Hacker suggests that Bhartrhari's usage of *vivarta* has a Buddhist background.⁹

Unfortunately, Hacker only gives a few vague references to the use of *vivartate*/*vivarta* in Buddhist sources. Hacker is quite right, though, that *vivartate* (Pāli: *vivattati*) belongs to a cosmological context. Though it cannot be said to be very common in the Buddhist *sūtra*-s the idea is known from several early *sūtra*-s of Mahāyāna. We have a nice example

6 On all this, see K.A. Subramania Iyer's classical work, *Bhartrhari. A study of the Vākyapādiya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries*, Poona 1969. – For a discussion of *śabdādvaita*, etc., see also the same author's *The Vākyapādiya – Some Problems*, Poona 1982.

7 For the references, see Rau's *Wortindex*, s.s.v.

8 See his *Vivarta. Studien zur Geschichte der illusionistischen Kosmologie und Erkenntnistheorie der Inder*, Wiesbaden 1953.

9 *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

from a most important chapter of the *Samādhirājasūtra*, recently edited by C. Cüppers (IX.1-2):

*yada lokadhātūna vivartu bhoī
 ākāśu bhoī ayu sarvaloke /
 yathaiva tam pūrvi tathaiva paścāt
 tathopamām jānatha sarvadharmaṇ // (IX.1)
 idam jagad yāvata kiñci vartate (v.l.: kim vivartate!)
 adhastam eū ayam āpaskandhah /
 yathaiva tam hesi tathaiva ūrd(h)vam
 tathopamām jānatha sarvadharmaṇ // (IX.2)¹⁰*

Here then, in an early and influential Mahāyāna text, we are clearly confronted with a *vivartavāda* according to which the entire world (*lokadhātu*, *idam jagat*) evolves from one single principle, *ākāśa*, into which it also, in the course of time, reverts again. This sort of “monistic illusionism” is most characteristic of Mahāyāna. In Vasubandhu, however, *ākāśa* is replaced by *vijñāna*, in Bhartrhari by *śabda*(-*tattva*). The concepts of *vivarta* and *parināma* were certainly not invented by Bhartrhari.

Since we are here dealing with the Buddhist sources that may have influenced Bhartrhari, it is reasonable to ask whether there is any evidence that would allow us to say anything about his knowledge of Buddhist *sūtra*-s. There is no definite answer to this question, at least on the basis of the VP. There is a nice case, though, which shows Bhartrhari using specific Buddhist terminology. This is, in Rau’s critical edition, VP II.238ab:

upāyāḥ śiksānānām bālānām upalāpanāḥ /

The reading *upalāpanāḥ* is significant. It is given in the *Mūlakārikā*-s and in the Commentary of Punyarāja (ed. K.A.S. Iyer, Delhi 1983, p. 98). In the *Vṛtti*, however the reading has been changed to *apalāpanāḥ*.¹¹ This is definitely a wrong reading. If the author of the *Vṛtti* actually did write (or read) *apalāpanāḥ* (which is not certain, for it could be a scribal error), we can be quite sure that its author was *not* Bhartrhari. How so?

First of all, it may be noted that Iyer has misunderstood the meaning of the verse in his translation: “These śāstras which are a means (of attaining knowledge) are really misleading to ignorant people.”¹² The version

10 C. Cüppers, *The IXth Chapter of the Samādhirājasūtra*, Stuttgart 1990, p. 17.

11 Thus also, e.g. K. Raghavan Pillai, *The Vākyapadīya*, Delhi 1971, p. 91.

12 K.A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Chapter II*, Delhi 1977, p. 103.

of K. Raghavan Pillai is also on the wrong track: "Means are intended as a concealment of the truth for the sake of the unwise who are learning".¹³

In Buddhist texts we occasionally find expressions such as *bālalāpana*, *bālollāpana*, *bālapralāpa*, *bālopalāpana* and *bālālāpana*.¹⁴ The expression is used about a teaching which is not really true, but nevertheless useful and good for beginners. In other words something that is true *vyavahāratah*, but not *paramārthatah*.¹⁵ In Mahāyāna texts it belongs to the context of *satyadvaya*, as indeed it also does in the VP. Hence *upāyāḥ* ...*upalāpanāḥ*, in VP, should be translated with a positive connotation, e.g.: "When dealing with young students still learning ("freshmen") (their teacher may use) pedagogical means".

There can hardly be any doubt that Bhartrhari derived the expression *bālānām upalāpanāḥ* from some Buddhist text, and therefore, of course, the reading *apalāpanāḥ* must be erroneous.

We cannot be sure precisely from which Buddha text Bhartrhari borrowed this expression, but it may be worthy of note that *bālalāpana* occurs in Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava* 7, especially so since it is not impossible that VP III. 2.1.:

*ātmā vastu svabhāvaś ca śarīram tattvam ity api /
dravyam ity asya paryāyāś tac ca nityam iti smṛtam //*

is moulded upon *Acintyastava* 45ab:

svabhāvah prakrtis tattvam dravyam vastu sad ity api /¹⁶

Whether this be so or not, the fact remains that there are numerous echoes of typical Madhyamaka arguments and doctrines to be found scattered around in Bhartrhari's VP.

It may, incidentally, be pointed out that Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava* shows a considerable influence from *Samādhirajasūtra* IX, not just with regard to *vivartavāda* (see above), but also, among other things, with

13 See n. 11.

14 See my *Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna*, Copenhagen 1982, p. 143, n. 7. For the idea cf. also *Yuktisastikā* 30, *ibid.*, p. 110.

15 This *satyadvayavibhāga* is about as common in the VP as in Mahāyāna texts in general – not to speak of other Vedānta texts.

16 This seems first to have been pointed out by O. Qvarnström, *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective*, Lund 1989, p. 130.

regard to the question of *pramāna*-s, a topic to which we shall revert soon. For now I shall just point out that *Acintyastava* 20:

*jadatvam apramānatvam athāvyākrtatām api /
vīparītāparijñānam indriyānām tvam īcivān //¹⁷*

without any doubt is based on *Samādhirājasūtra* IX.24:

*yasmād ime indriya apramānā
jadāḥ svabhāvena avyākrtāś ca /
tasmād ya nirvānapathena arthikāḥ
sa āryamārgena karotu kāryam //¹⁸*

We here have an early canonical source to the effect that *indriya-pratyakṣa* cannot be considered a *pramāna*.¹⁹

3. We are on safer ground when we turn to Buddhist authors *after* Bhartrhari. The first to come into consideration would be Dignāga.

As already pointed out long ago, Dignāga, towards the end of his *Pramānasamuccaya* (PS) V, quotes at least two verses from VP, viz. II. 158 and 155.²⁰ There are numerous other references to VP in the PS, and there can, therefore, be no doubt that Dignāga knew Bhartrhari, and that he should also be placed *after* that author in time.²¹

17 Quoted from my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 146, where I failed to identify the original source.

18 Cüppers, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

19 Nāgārjuna accepts four *pramāna*-s (as does e.g. Candrakīrti, his celebrated commentator), but, naturally, only *vyavahāratātā*. This is clear from his *Vīrahavyāvartanī* and *Vaidalyaprakarana*. Probably also from his **Upāyahṛdaya* (?), provided Y. Kajiyama is justified in accepting its authenticity, see his recent paper “On the Authorship of the *Upāyahṛdaya*” in E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, Wien 1991, pp. 107-117. I still regard my hesitations as valid, see *Nagarjuniana*, p. 17, n. 44.

20 Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 856, with ref. – See also M. Hattori (ed.), *The Pramānasamuccayavitti of Dignāga. Chapter Five*, Kyoto 1982, pp. 147 & 149, for the Sanskrit and Tibetan.

21 Many examples in R. Herzberger, *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists – An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*, Dordrecht 1986, *passim*. Apart from this very problematic book, one may refer to M. Hattori’s “*Apoha* and *Pratibhā*”, in M. Nagatomi *et al.* (eds.), *Sanskrit and Indian Studies. Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls*, Dordrecht 1980, pp. 61-73. In the opinion of Hattori, Dignāga “adopted” his concept of *pratibhā* from VP. – See also, F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, “Some Remarks on Bhartrhari’s Concept of *Pratibhā*”, in *JIP* 18 (1990), pp. 95-112. – There is no single word to cover all the meanings of this important term in VP. It covers notions such as:

Quite interesting in this connection is Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīksā*, a text in 33 verses available in an old Tibetan translation. Or rather, since (apart from its initial and final verses) it is but an extract from the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* (VP III.3.53-85, with some omissions), it is also still available as such in Sanskrit.²²

The final verses occur in the *Vṛtti* to VP I.1. They are often quoted, and Frauwallner may be right in suggesting that their original source was Bhartrhari's now lost *Śabdadhātusamīksā*:

yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto janah /
samkīrṇam iva mātrābhīs citrābhīr abhimanyate //
tathedam amṛtam brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /
kalusatvam ivāpannam bhedanūpam vivartate //

There is, as already pointed out by Frauwallner, a small and significant change introduced here by Dignāga, who replaces Bhartrhari's subject (*amṛtam*) *brahma* with *mam* 's, i.e. *vijñānam* (and *hi?*). It is hard to say exactly what Dignāga wished to achieve by adapting Bhartrhari's verses, but by replacing *brahma* with *vijñāna* he at least affirms that Bhartrhari's monism is acceptable to the Bauddhas, i.e. to Yogācāra, provided *vijñāna*, not *brahma*, is read. By making this replacement Dignāga brings the verses closer to the idea expressed e.g. in *Madhyāntavibhāga* (I. 16, 21-22, especially), which may indeed have been one of Bhartrhari's original sources for the distinction between *brahma/vijñāna/citta* as originally pure, but under normal circumstances rendered impure by *kleśa*-s, above all *avidyā*. In a word, Dignāga brings the verses back into their original Buddhist form. Dignāga was, like I-ching, very much aware of Bhartrhari's Buddhist leanings.

Later on we find Bauddhas such as Bhavya and Śāntarakṣita accusing Gaudapāda and others of having "stolen" their ideas from the Buddhist texts.²³ Dignāga is saying the same thing in a more diplomatic language.

The fact that Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīksā* is thus based on Bhartrhari's *Prakīrṇa(ka)* (VP III), tallies very nicely with the tradition that the celebrated Dharmapāla wrote a commentary (*vṛtti*) on that very chapter

intelligence, instinct, intuition, bright idea, and the like. Thanks to experience and intelligence, some people are more "bright" than others. Even animals and children possess *pratibhā* telling them what to do in a given situation.

22 Sanskrit and Tibetan texts in Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, pp. 821-828.

23 The charge of having stolen from the Buddhists is almost a *locus communis*, cf. Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-104.

of the VP. Its title was, according to Durvekamīśra, *Prakīrnavrtti*.²⁴ Apart from fragments, and as opposed to Dharmapāla's incomplete commentary on Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīksā*, it now, as known, seems to have been irreparably lost. But all this is nevertheless sufficient to show that by the time of Dignāga the works of Bhartrhari were carefully studied by the Bauddhas, especially by those belonging to Yogācāra.

4. Kambala and Dharmakīrti are among those Bauddhas in whose extant works we can detect traces of their having read Bhartrhari. A few obvious instances must be sufficient to establish this point.

First Kambala (ca. 450-525 A.D.). In his *Navaśloka* 9ab:

yoginām api yaj jñānam tad apy ākāśalakṣaṇam /

has a nice parallel in his *Ālokamālā* 110ab:

yoginām api yaj jñānam tad apy ajñānam eva hi /

This is based on VP I.30cd:

r̥ṣinām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgama-pūrvakam /

Likewise, there can hardly be any doubt that *Ālokamālā* 111:

*sarvam samvrtimaj jñānam panditasyetarasya ca /
grahane vyapadeśe ca samam eva pravartate //²⁵*

is based on VP III.3.55:

*rūpanavyapadeśābhyaṁ laukike vartmani sthitau /
jñānam praty abhilāpam ca sadṛśau bālapanditau //*

Whether Kambala got it directly from VP, or from Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīksā* (where it comes as verse 4) is difficult to decide.

Ālokamālā 19 and 20 run:

*abhinnam api bhedena bahiś cāpy abahirgatam /
viśayākārakaluśam khyāti cittam anekadhā //*

24 Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, p. 857, n. 27.

25 Kambala's *Ālokamālā* was edited by me in *Miscellanea Buddhica*, Copenhagen 1985, pp. 109-221.

*sūryacandramasau vyoma tārācakram vasumdhara /
saritsāgaradikśailāś cittasyaitā vibhūtayah //*

We are here, when it comes to *kālusya*, *kalusatva*, not just reminded of VP III.3.57 (= *Traikālyaparīksā* 6, cf. 4), but especially VP III.7.41:

*dyauḥ ksamā vāyur ādityah sāgarāḥ sarito diśah /
antahkarana-tattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāḥ //*

See also *Ālokamālā* 85, 146, 157, 162, 177 and 193 for further references etc. to Bhartrhari by Kambala.

Dharmakīrti, too, knew his Bhartrhari. Not only does the style and the very title of his *Sambandhaparīksā*²⁶ recall Bhartrhari's *Sambandha-samuddeśa*, but especially in Dharmakīrti's own commentary to the first chapter of the *Pramānavārttika* there are numerous places reminiscent of VP.²⁷ The learned readers in those days would, of course, immediately recognize such allusions and they would appreciate them, just as one cannot fail to appreciate what in poetics is called *dhvani*. Indeed, as I have now tried to point out, such *sat sapienti* allusions must have been a characteristic and much cherished feature of sophisticated Sanskrit literature in the period we are here dealing with. A failure to recognize this device can easily lead to wrong judgements about the proper historical context.

I would not here want to go into the problem of the authenticity of the collection of poems ascribed to Bhartrhari, i.e. the *Śatakatraya* (or *Subhā-sitatriśatī*, etc.).²⁸ Personally, I have no hesitation at all in accepting its authenticity whatever its *original* form may have been. Dharmakīrti, too, composed poems, including some very nice ones in the *śrigāra* style.²⁹ He may, indeed, have been inspired by the example of Bhartrhari to do so. In any case, by the time of Dharmakīrti, Bhartrhari was almost a part of the Buddhist heritage.

When Dharmakīrti in the *Pramānasiddhi* chapter of his PV discusses *pramāṇa*, reliable knowledge, he also deals with language, which, for him,

- 26 Edited and translated by Frauwallner, *op. cit.*, pp. 490-529. The original Sanskrit text (including the *Tikā* of Vinitadeva) was recently discovered in Tibet, but still awaits publication.
- 27 R. Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Auto-commentary*, Roma 1960, *passim*.
- 28 For a discussion (with further ref.) see e.g. Harold G. Coward, *Bhartrhari*, Boston 1976, pp. 95-104.
- 29 The references are listed in L. Sternbach, *Poésie sanskrite conservée dans les anthologies et les inscriptions, Tome II*, Paris 1982, pp. 130-132.

can be reduced to *anumāna*. (Or rather: which for him *must* be reduced to *anumāna*, since his system does not, for various reasons, permit more than two *pramāna*-s.) Language, speech and communication can be reliable for practical purposes to the extent that it tells us what other people have in mind. But how things actually are is not something we can be sure of merely on the basis of what other people tell us. Reliable knowledge is knowledge we can actually use for some meaningful practical purpose. We always have to try out whether it works. Dharmakīrti defines reliability, *avisaṃvādana*, as *arthakriyāsthiti*, the ability of being of any practical use. When he says, PV II.2cd:

(prāmānyam tatra śabdasya) nārthatattvanibandhanam /

we are not wrong in taking this as an allusion to VP I.13ab:

arthapratittitattvānām śabdā eva nibandhanam /

Of course, it is not quite fair of Dharmakīrti to refute Bhartrhari in this way, because *śabda* means much more than just words and language in the VP. So Dharmakīrti's criticism is here a bit onesided.³⁰

When Dharmakīrti defines reliable knowledge in terms of *arthakriyā* he certainly has Bhartrhari in mind, even though the term can be traced back as far as Nāgārjuna.³¹ The idea that real things are *arthakriyā-samartha*, or *kāryakriyā-samartha*, is an old one in Indian thought.

In his PVin II.5-6, Dharmakīrti quite clearly has VP I. 33-35 in mind. The "hints" are given by the example of the *mani*-, and by VP 33b: *tām tām arthakriyām prati*, which in PVin II.5d becomes: *viśeso 'rthakriyām prati*.

Bhartrhari's argument is that real things (*dravya*) may have the ability to do this or that (*arthakriyā*), but under various circumstances other things may prevent them from doing so. This, however, is *not* something we can be sure of by means of *anumāna*. It requires a sort of expertise,

30 Cf. my paper "The Initial Verses of the *Pramānasiddhi* Chapter of the *Pramānavārttika*", in the volume of proceedings edited by E. Steinkellner (see n. 19), pp. 155-159. Dharmakīrti, to be sure, was not the first to employ *avisaṃvādana* as a criterion of valid knowledge. The term *avisaṃvāda* is found in *Pramānasamuccaya* II. 5ab, *Ślokavārttika*, *Śūnya-vāda*, *Codanā* 80, *Tarkajvālā* ad MHK IV.38 (...*bslu ba med pa ni bden pa yin par rigs kyi...*), and even as early as *Ratnāvalī* II.35 (ed. M. Hahn, Bonn 1982, p. 52).

31 In the author's own commentary to VV 2 we thus read: *atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā na ca kāryakriyā-samarthā bhavanti mā bhūd...* This implies that something real must be *kāryakriyā-samartha*, which is much the same as *arthakriyā-samartha*.

such as the one that a jeweller has based on long experience (*abhyāsa*). Such an expertise is inherited from a long cultural tradition, it depends on *āgama*. For Bhartrhari *āgama* has things in common with perception, but is clearly a third *pramāṇa* in its own right apart from *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.³² For Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, the validity of cognition is not a question of *abhyāsa* (at least in this context!) but rather one of seeing whether our ideas actually work:

arthakriyānurodhena pramāṇatvam vyavasthitam ³³

In Dharmakīrti there is no room for *āgama* as a third sort of *pramāṇa*. He therefore has to adapt, or interpret, this passage in the VP (with which, as we shall see, Buddhist philosophers were very much concerned) so as to suit the demands of his own system of two *pramāṇa*-s.

I have no doubt that future research will show that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are heavily indebted to Bhartrhari for much of their technical terminology. Here I just want to point out one such case. Speaking of an ignoramus with a “limited horizon”, Dharmakīrti at least twice uses the expression *tshu rol mthon ba*. This corresponds in Sanskrit to *arvāgdarśana*, a term which can be traced back to the *Vṛtti* to VP I.134, which may well, directly or indirectly, be Dharmakīrti’s source.³⁴

5. The term *arvāgdarśana* also occurs in another Buddhist author before Dharmakīrti, namely Bhavya, to whom I shall now turn my attention.

That Bhavya knew Bhartrhari has already been established long ago. Let us briefly review some of the evidence before we try to determine the

32 Cf. A. Aklujkar “The Number of Pramāṇas according to Bhartrhari” in WZKS 33 (1989), pp. 151-159. – See also Aklujkar and Potter’s summary of the VP in H.G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume V: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, Delhi 1990, pp. 121-172.

33 PVin II.6cd, quoted from E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayah. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I*, Wien 1973, p. 27.

34 *Ibid.*, p. 66: *de la tshu rol mthon ba bdag ŋid kyi mrión sum log pa tshad mar byed pa ni des gzur bar 'os pa ŋid dgag pa pa rigs kyi thams cad ni de lta ma yin pa'i phyir thams cad 'gog pa ni ma yin no.* – In PVin III (Peking ed., Ce 319b6) we read: *tshu rol mthon ba 'dis...* In the *Vṛtti* to VP I. 134. (ed. Iyer, p. 221) we have what is probably the source of Dharmakīrti (and, as we shall see, Bhavya): *arvāgdarśanānām tu purusānām prāyena sātiśayāḥ pratīghātīnyah sāparādhāḥ śaktayah*. The term also occurs in the *Vṛtti* to VP I. 151 (ed. Rau), see Iyer, *op. cit.*, p. 205 (ad VP I. 127). Cf. also E. Steinkellner (trans.), *Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayah. Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II*, Wien 1979, p. 79, n. 258 for some later references. No source earlier than VP seems to be known.

extent to which Bhartrhari exerted a positive influence upon Bhavya's way of thinking. As we shall see, it was very considerable.

In his *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (MHK) IX.13-14 Bhavya has these two verses presenting the view of Mīmāṃsā:

*dūsayitvā trayīmārgam hetubhir hetuvādinah /
anumānapradhānatvāt svanayam dyotayanti ye //
pādasparśād ivāndhānām visame pathi dhāvatām /
anumānapradhānānām pātah tesām na durlabhaḥ //³⁵*

This includes an almost literal quotation from VP I.42:

*hastasparśād ivāndhena visame pathi dhāvatā /
anumānapradhānena vinipāto na durlabhaḥ //*

The same verse, to be sure, is also cited by Bhavya in his *Prajñāpradīpa* IX, which, incidentally, confirms the variant readings:

*/loñ ba rkari pa'i tshod dpag kyi(s)//nam ŋa'i lam du rgyug pa ltar/
/rjes su dpag pa gtsor 'dzin pa//mam par lhun ba mi dka' 'o/*³⁶

On the basis of this there can be no doubt that Bhavya knew the VP. Before proceeding further it may be useful briefly to recall the ideas expressed in VP I.30-42. Bhartrhari's fundamental position is that *dharma* can only be established by means of *āgama*. Even the cognition of saints is based on *āgama*. It is impossible to figure out what *dharma* is merely by *tarka* or *anumāna* (VP I.30):

*na cāgamād rte dharmas tarkena vyavatisthate /
ṛśinām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam //*³⁷

What Bhartrhari disavows is not *tarka* or *anumāna* as such, but merely its limitations, and therefore also those philosophers who put too much emphasis on "reason", those who are *anumānapradhāna*. As long as *tarka* is ancillary to *āgama* it is fully acceptable to Bhartrhari (VP I. 151ab):

vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś caksur apaśyatām /

35 Quoted from S. Kawasaki (ed.), *The Mīmāṃsā Chapter of Bhavya's Madhyamaka-hṛdayakārikā: Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts*, Tsukuba 1976, 1987, 1988, p. 12 (with a few changes).

36 Cf. Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 13, n. 7, for the source of the Tibetan.

37 As will be recalled, Kambala also referred to this verse, in *Navāśloka* 9ab and *Ālokamālā* 110ab, both quoted above (p. 202).

Bhartrhari's view can certainly be considered "orthodox". In the verse just quoted he seems to have had in mind *Manu* XII.106 (or some such passage):

ārsam dharmopadeśam ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā /
yas tarkenānusamdhatte sa dharmam veda netarah //

He has nothing against *tarka* or *anumāna* as such, but only against those who are *śuskatarkānusārin* (VP II. 484b, cf. *Mahābhārata* III. 13463, quoted in PW, s.v.),³⁸ or *anumānapradhāna*. Logic and reason are all right as long as they are not in conflict with the holy tradition.

The hostile attitude towards "dry logicians" (*tārkika*) is by no means specific to Manu and the VP. According to Nāgārjuna, for instance, even the Buddha took exception to *tārkika*-s.³⁹ And let us not forget that in early Buddhist texts *nirvāna* is said to be inaccessible to reason (*atarkāvacara*).⁴⁰

To sum up Bhartrhari's position: He accepts three *pramāna*-s, true, but they are by no means on a par. When one has to make the right decision (*dharma*, *itikartavyatā*) in matters of religion, ethics and grammar (!) one must resort to *āgama*. As we would say, *āgama* has to do with *values*, with good and bad, rather than with "facts". *Āgama* can be supported by *anumāna* and *tarka*, but never challenged or questioned by reason and logic. *Āgama* works as a sort of perception, but it covers much more than normal perception. This sort of *āgama* is the most fundamental of the three *pramāna*-s accepted by Bhartrhari.

When it comes to Bhavya the situation is much the same, at least in principle. His attitude towards *āgama* is partly inherited from Bhartrhari though it certainly also has a Buddhist background, and, of course, his conception of what *dharma* is has nothing in common with Bhartrhari. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the antithesis *āgama-tarka* expressed by Manu and VP has an old parallel in the Buddhist distinction between *āgama* and *yukti*.⁴¹

38 The expression is also known to Śaṅkara, see *Adyar Library Bulletin* 54 (1990), p. 147. See also *Manu* II. 12.

39 See *Lokāñītastava* 21, in my *Nagarjuniana*, p. 134.

40 Cf. *A Critical Pāli Dictionary* for ref.

41 This distinction is already known to Nāgārjuna, cf. his *Ratnāvalī* III.14a: *rīgs pa dañ ni luri bstān pa...yukti* and *āgama...*

Let us now look at some of the most significant passages in question. To Bhartrhari, *āgama* is, roughly speaking, the Veda with all its *upāṅga*-s, etc., and those civilized people (*sīṣṭa*) who follow it. With Bhavya it is otherwise. The correct teaching is to be found in the Buddhist scriptures, the Buddha being the most competent authority. How can we be sure? Because it is the least unreasonable of all teachings, according to Bhavya. (This again implies that one has to check all other teachings, to see that they are unreasonable. This again explains the doxographical nature of Bhavya's main works.) See MHK V.8-9:

(atrocitate) *pramāṇam nah sarvam tāthāgatam vacah /*
āptopadeśaprāmānyād bhadro hi pratipadyate //
nāgamāntarasamdigdhaviparyastamatiḥ parah /
*tasmāt tatpratipattyartham tanmrgyo yuktimannayah //*⁴²

The Buddhist scriptures tell us what *tattva* is, and what *dharma* is. “Reason”, on the other hand, shows us that all other opinions entertained by our opponents, are, in the final analysis, wrong. Still, the ultimate *tattva* of the Buddhas (*śūnyatā*, *anutpāda*, *dharmaṅkāya*, etc.) is beyond the range of reason (but not, as we shall see, beyond the range of “personal experience”). This is clear from MHK V. 104-105:

tattvasyātarkagocarāt tadbodho nānumānataḥ /
nātās tarkena dharmānām gṛhyeta dharmateti cet //
ihānumānān nirdosād āgamānuvidhāyinah /
kalpitāśesavividhavikalpāpām nirākṛteḥ //

When Bhavya here speaks of *anumāna* as having to be *nirdosa* and *āgamānuvidhāyin*, it is in principle similar to Manu's *tarka* which must be *vedāśastrāvirodhī(n)*, a term taken over, as we have seen, by VP I.151. Bhavya can therefore say, MHK V.107:

ato 'numānaviśayam na tattvam pratipadyate /
tattvajñānavipakṣo yah tasya tena nirākriyā //

One can, on this basis, speak of Bhavya's “negative dialectics”, and in this sense Bhavya's *tattva* is, as he says in MHK V. 113, *yuktāgamopeta*, i.e. based on *āgama*, supported by logic.

42 Quoted from the critical edition of the text (in prep. by myself and M.D. Eckel). It is based on the only available Sanskrit Ms., for which see Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, p. 23. (The following verses come from the same source.)

In the commentary to MHK IX.7 the Bauddhas are accused of reducing *āgama* to *anumāna*.⁴³ This would, at least in a sense, apply to Dignāga and, later on, Dharmakīrti, but not to Bhavya. The issue is taken up by Bhavya later on in his *Prajñāpradīpa*. Here, he agrees that *āgama* and *anumāna* have the same *visaya*. They deal with the same thing. There is nothing wrong with *anumāna* as such, but one must not place too much emphasis on *anumāna*. This is exactly the position of Bhartrhari, as we have already seen.⁴⁴

What, then, is the relationship between *āgama* and *tattva*, for, surely, *āgama* is not identical with *tattva*? Bhavya attempts to solve this problem by saying that the words of the Buddha are *ji lta ba bzin*, or *yathāvat*, they are adequate in the sense that they “correspond” to reality. This idea comes very close to VP I.5 which describes the Veda (i.e. *āgama*) as a *prāptyupāya* and an *anukāra* (“image, imitation”) of (*śabda*-)*tattva*. The scriptures are valid because they somehow reflect true reality. The rest is logic, and it is *yoga*, in Bhartrhari as well as in Bhavya.

We would have liked to know what exactly Bhartrhari has in mind when he refers to *śabdapūrvayoga* (VP I.20c) and to *adhyātmaśāstra* (VP I.174c). Is it the sort of “OM-mysticism” mentioned e.g. in Patañjali’s *YS* I. 25-27, or in the first chapter of the *āgamaśāstra* of Gaudapāda?

43 TJ IX ad MHK IX.7 (Peking ed. Dsa 311b5): *gari yari saris rgyas pas luri gis rjes su dpag pa'i khoris su gtogs so zes btags pa de ni bden pa ma yin te/ gari gi phyir/ pratyaksam anumānam ca śābdam copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca hetavah sādhyasādhakāḥ //*

Cf. Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 9, n.5. See also TJ ad IX.18 for *āgama*.

44 *Prajñāpradīpa* IX (Peking ed. Tsha 154a 4), just after the citation of VP I. 42...*luri ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa ma yin par gzuri bar bya ste/ mriion sum ma yin pa'i don rtogs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir/ dper na/ rjes su dpag pa'i rai gi bdag riid bzin no// kha cig na re/ luri ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa kho na yin te/ de las yul tha dad pa'i phyir dper na mriion sum bzin no// de ltar yari rjes su dpag pa ni dbari pos gzuri ba'i don gyi yul can yin la/ sgra'i mtshan riid kyi tshad ma ni dbari po las 'das pa mtho ris dan byari grol gyi yul can yin pas/ de'i phyir luri ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa kho na yin no/ ze na/ luri ni rjes su dpag pa las yul tha dad pa riid ma yin te/...yari na mtho ris dari thar pa yod do// zes bya ba/ de bzin g'segs pa'i luri gari yin pa de ni ji lta ba bzin te... Bhavya, in MHK IX. 19-20, goes as far as to say that everything that is handed down and makes sense, is *āgama*:*

yat parīksāksamam yuktyā vacanam cet tad āgamah /

With this in mind, it is understandable why Candrakīrti would accuse Bhavya of *priyānumānatā* (*Prasannapadā*, p. 16), a predilection for logic. Cf. also the very title Bhavya chose for his work: *Tarkajvālā*. Still, the accusation is not quite fair, as we see once we also keep MHK V. 104-107 in mind (quoted above). Bhavya is also very much aware of the limitations of logic.

We cannot be sure. In any case, Bhavya's position is clear enough. The ideal is to obtain *vajropamasamādhi*, or *tattvajñāna*, i.e. to experience *śūnyatā* and *anutpāda* personally. First one learns the doctrine of *anutpāda* etc. from Buddhist *āgama* (esp. *Prajñāpāramitā*). Then one refutes all other *āgama*-s with the help of *yukti*, *tarka* and *anumāna*.⁴⁵ This brings one to the truth. Finally one realizes the reality behind truth through "auto-suggestion", or *bhāvanā*. This reflects the old Buddhist distinction between three degrees of *prajñā*, partly modified by Bhavya himself.

Of course Bhavya accepts a *tattvajñāna*, as all Mādhyamikas always do. This *jñāna*, however, is neither *savikalpa* nor *avikalpa*, see e.g. MHK III. 285cd (speaking of the *dharmaśāh*):

savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy esa durdrśah //⁴⁶

or MHK III.265:

*nirvikalpārthavisayā nirvikalpāpi dhīr mrṣā /
anātmādisvabhāvatvāt tadyathā savikalpadhīḥ //⁴⁷*

or MHK VIII.104:

*savikalpāvikalpā ca yadā buddhir nivartate /
dhiyām avisaye tasmin prapañcopaśamah śivah //⁴⁸*

This is a bit surprising, and this terminology - neither *savikalpa* nor *nirvikalpa* (*avikalpa*) - ought to strike us as odd. One would have expected Bhavya to say that *tattva* was the object of some sort of *nirvikalpajñāna*, as Mahāyāna texts otherwise invariably do. Bhavya seems to be the only Buddha to express himself in this curious way, if I am not mistaken.

There is a very specific historical background for this oddity. The clue is to be found in the commentary to MHK III.285. Here we are told that *anumāna* is *savikalpa* and determined by *vikalpa* and *anusmṛti*, whereas *pratyakṣa* is *nirvikalpa* and grasps *vastumātra* as its object.⁴⁹ The *dharma-*

45 See e.g. MHK IX. 18 with TS.

46 Quoted from the edition of Y. Ejima, *Chūgan-Shisō no Tenkai-Bhāvaviveka Kenkyū*, Tokyo 1980, p. 340.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 334.

48 Quoted from Qvarnström, *op. cit.*, p. 48 (cf. p. 153 for Tib.). Cf. *ibid.*, p. 95, n. 118 for further references.

49 TJ ad MHK III.285: *rtog pa dañ bcas pa ni rjes su dpag pa ste/ rtog pa dañ rjes su dran pa'i mam par rtog pa yod pa'i phyir ro// mam par rtog pa med pa ni mñon sum gyi šes*

kāya, according to MHK III.286, is *tārkikānām agocarah*. Bhavya obviously has certain *tārkika*-s in mind when he says that *tattva* cannot be known by *anumāna* or *pratyakṣa*. Logicians who accept only two *pramāṇa*-s. That Bhavya here has Dignāga (to whom he explicitly refers in MHK V) in mind is quite clear. His terminology is a reaction against the epistemology of Yogācāra *sākāravāda*.⁵⁰ In other words, Bhavya does not accept merely two *pramāṇa*-s, as does Dignāga etc. To him, as to Bhartrhari, *āgama* is the most fundamental *pramāṇa*, provided, naturally, that one does not forget to practise yoga.

When Dignāga speaks of a *yogipratyakṣa*(-*jñāna*), Bhavya speaks of *jñānakṣana* (MHK III.291), *ekaksanajñāna* (ad MHK I.6, and MHK 268), *svayambhūjñāna*, or the like. The difference, of course, is hardly more than one of terminology in the final analysis.

Finally, in the first chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, there are some unmistakable echoes of VP when Bhavya opines that *tārkika*-s who are *anumānapramāṇapradhāna* are unable to understand *tattva*, etc., because their cognition is too limited, being that of *arvāgdarśana*.⁵¹

6. Also in later Buddhist literature we find references to Bhartrhari's opinion about the limitations of *anumāna*. In his *Tattvasamgraha* (TS) 1460-1462, for instance, Śāntarakṣita quotes VP I.32-34. But a little later (TS 1476-1477) Śāntarakṣita, by adding *na*, indicates that he does not agree:

pa ste/ drios po tsam la dmigs pa'i phyir ro//. This is based on Dignāga. The idea that *pratyakṣa* has *vastumātra* as its "object" comes up again in Dharmakīrti. The scriptural origin of the term *vastumātra* (or *paratantrasvabhāva*, as the "object" of *pratyakṣa*) seems to be the *Tattvārthapatala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The terms *svalaksana* and *vastumātra* thus become almost interchangeable, depending on the context. – See also TJ ad MHK IV.67.

50 See my "Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, Chapter IV", in B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans (eds.), *Buddhist Logic and Epistemology*, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 239-263.

51 MRP I: *'di ltar rjes su dpag pa'i tshad ma gtso bor byed pa'i rtog ge pas ni de kho na nīd dan/ saris rgyas kyi sku dan ye šes šin tu lkog tu gyur pa dag brtags šin dpyad pas šes par mi 'gyur te/ tshu rol mthor'i ba'i šes par yin pa'i phyir ro/*

ni ma dmus lon yul min bzin//mtho ris sdig can yul ma yin/
/de nīd dari ni bsgrub bya de//rtog ge pa yi yul ma yin/
/nor bu rin chen brtag pa la//lon ba tshad ma yin nam ci/

These verses contain echoes of MHK III. 286 (Ejima, *op. cit.*, p. 340) and (as later on also *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, as we have seen, II.5-6) VP I.35cd: *manirūpyādivijñānam tadvidām nānumānikam*. Cf. also the *Vṛtti* to VP I.127 (ed. Iyer, p. 205).

avasthādeśakālānām bhedād bhinnāsu śaktisu /
 bhāvānām anumānena nātah siddhih sudurlabha //
 yatnenānumito 'py arthah kuśalair anumātrbhih /
 nānyathā sādhyate so 'nyair abhiyuktatarair api //⁵²

Another late Buddhist author who often quotes the VP, is Jñānaśrībhadra, who composed a *Vṛtti* to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. He was active in the 11th century A.D., and is quoted by Jñānavajra, the author of the only other Indian commentary on the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* that has come down to us. Both seem now to have been lost in the original Sanskrit. All in all Jñānaśrībhadra quotes about fourty verses from Bhartrhari ("Bha ta hari") and other grammarians. Among these it will here be sufficient to cite a sample which, when compared with the corresponding Sanskrit original, shows a few interesting variants, but otherwise serves to corroborate the *textus receptus*.⁵³

This list of extracts can be seen as a supplement to the useful preliminary set of testimonia in K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye's edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, Poona 1965.

1. *anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvam yad aksaram / vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yatah //*
/ thog ma med pa'i tshañ pa rtag//yañ dag sgra ni yig 'bru gañ//
/ gañ las don dños 'byuñ ba dañ//'gro ba'i rab tu byed pa yañ /
2. *yah sarvaparikalpānām ābhāse 'py anavasthitah / tarkāgamānumānena bahudhā parikalpitah //*
/ gañ yoñs rtogs pa thams cad la//snañ bar yañ ni mi gnas te//
/ rtog pa luñ dañ rjes dpag pas//rnam pa du mar kun brtags pa'o/
3. *vyatito bhedasamsargau bhāvābhāvau kramākramau / satyānrte ca viśvātmā pravivekāt prakāśate //*

52 Quoted from A. Kunst, *Probleme der buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṅgraha*, Kraków 1939, p. 100. (To Śāntarakṣita *tattva* is also beyond *anumāna*, as in case of Bhavya. But *vyavahāratah* both accept an *anumāna* that is *nirdoṣa*, which, in case of Śāntarakṣita, means that it follows the rules of Dharmakīrti.)

53 For Jñānaśrībhadra, who also wrote a commentary on *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, see E. Steinkellner, *op. cit.*, 1973, p. 15. His commentary on the *Laṅkāvatāra* is also mentioned in the splendid (but often rather uncritical) work of H. Nakamura, *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, Delhi 1983, pp. 257-258. – In the verses here quoted from VP (*Vṛtti* – or *Śabdadhātusamīksā*?) I & III, there seem to be some variant readings, e.g., in 1, *anādi hi nityam ... 'rthabhāvaś ca*, etc. – In the Tibetan I have corrected in 4b 'gram dañ riñ (for 'gran dañ rim) and 8a rig (for rigs). Read, perhaps, also *nam yañ* for *mam dag* in 8d. – Other quotations from various grammarians are found 74a2 (2 v. from VP), 74a4 (11 v. from VP), 74b1 (1 v. from gzon nu can gyi mur byed pa), 133a (2 v. from VP), 140a2 (3 v. from VP), 140a8 (1 v. from VP), 242b5 (2 v. from VP), and 276a6 (6 v. from VP).

/ 'das kyañ 'du 'dzi byed pa dañ//dños dañ dños med rim mi rim/
 / bden dañ brdzun par sna tshogs bdag//dben pa las ni rab tu snañ//

4. *antaryāmī sa bhūtānām ārād dūre ca drṣyate /*
so 'tyantamukto moksāya mumukṣubhir upāsyate //
 / 'byuñ po rnams kyi nañ rgyu ba// 'gram dañ riñ du'añ snañ ba ste/
 / thar pa rab tu grol ba de//grol 'dod rnams kyis bstan par byed//

5. *prakṛitiṁ api prāptiān vikārān ākaroti sah /*
rtudhām eva grīsmānte mahato meghasamplavān //
 / de yi tshor ba gcig po yañ//rnam pa mañ por rab tu 'byed/
 / 'jig pa 'byuñ ba'i me mdag dañ//chu yi phuñ por chu bžin du/
 6. *tasmād ākṛtigotrasthād vyaktigrāmā vikārināh /*
mārutād iva jāyante vr̄stimanto balāhakāh //
 / de phyir da rod rigs gnas pa// gsal ba'i groñ rnams 'gyur ba ni/
 / sprin rnams char dañ ldan pa rnams//rluñ las 'byuñ ba bžin du 'o/
 7. *trayīrūpena tajjyotih paramam parivartate /*
prthakfirtha pravādesu drstibhedanibandhanam //
 / gsum gyi gzugs su de snañ ba//mur smra tha dad rnams la ni/
 / mchog gi yoñs su 'gyur ba ste// lta ba tha dad kyis ni bciñs/
 8. *śāntavidyātmako yo 'mśah tad uha itad avidyayā /*
tayā grastam ivājasram yā nirvaktum na śakyate //
 / ži žiñ rig bdag tshañs pa ste// de las byuñ ba'i ma rig pa/
 / des ni sruñ po bžin du med//gañ smra mi nus rnam dag go/
 9. *yathā viśuddham ākāśam timiropapluto janah /*
samkīrṇam iva mātrābhiś citrābhir abhimanyate //
 / ji ltar nam mkha' rnam dag par//rab rib 'khrul pa'i skyes bu yis/
 / ri mo rnam pa sna tshogs kyis//kun tu gañ bar sems pa pa/
 10. *tathedam amṛtam brahma nirvikāram avidyayā /*
kaluṣatvam ivāpannam bhedārūpam vivartate //
 / de ltar tshañs pa bdud rtsi 'di// 'gyur ba med pa ma rig pas/
 / rñog pa lta bur byas pas na//tha dad gzugs su snañ ba ste/
 11. *dyauḥ kṣamā vāyur ādityah sāgarāḥ sarito diśah /*
antahkarana tattvasya bhāgā bahir avasthitāḥ //
 / lha sa rluñ dañ nam mkha' dañ//ri dañ chu dañ phyogs rnams kyañ/
 / nañ du byed pa'i yañ dag gi// cha rnams phyi rol bžin du gnas/
 12. *ekam eva yad āmnātām bhinnaśaktiyapāśrayāt /*
aprthaktve 'pi śaktibhyah prthaktvena vartate //
 / tshul ni gcig ūñid gañ yin las// tha dad mthu ni rnam gnas pas/
 / mthu las tha dad ma yin yañ// tha dad bžin du 'byuñ ba'o/
 13. *brahmedam śabdānīmānam śabdaśaktinibandhanam /*
vivṛttam śabdamātrābhyas tāsv eva pravīlīyate //
 / tshans sgra'i 'di ni sprul pa ste//sgra yi mthu las gnas pas ni/
 / sgra tsam las ni byuñ ba yañ//de dag ūñid du ža bar 'gyur/
 14. *yad ekam prakriyābhedair bahudhā pravibhajyate /*
tad vyākaranam āgamyā param brahmādhigamyate //
 / rab tu byed pa gcig 'byed la//mañ por rab tu phye ba pa/
 / de ni luñ ston rtogs pa las//tshañs pa mchog ni chud par 'gyur/

