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BHARTRHARI'S DEFINITION OF *KRIYĀ*

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0. General Introduction

In this paper I will treat Bhartrhari's and Patañjali's definition of *kriyā* as interpreted by Helārāja in the *Kriyāsamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadiya*.

In his *Kriyāsamuddeśa*, Bhartrhari deals with *kriyā* from two different points of view, from that of those who hold that a word denotes the particular (*vyaktivādin*) and that of those who hold that the word denotes the universal (*jātivādin*).¹ It seems that *kriyā* as understood by the *jātivādin* is more interesting than that of the *vyaktivādin*, but here I will limit the discussion to the *vyaktivādin*'s understanding of *kriyā*.

1. Bhartrhari's Definition of *kriyā*.

1.0. Introduction

It is from the author of the *Nirukta* that Bhartrhari inherits the idea that an act, which Yāska calls *bhāva*, is continuous (*pūrvāparībhūta*)². And he introduces that idea into the field of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*). And, keeping it in his mind, he gives his definition of *kriyā* 'act' as denoted by *śabda* 'a word' in his *Kriyāsamuddeśa*'s first kārikā. It reads

*yāvat siddham asiddham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate /
āśritakramarūpatvāt tat kriyety abhidhīyate // (VP.3.8.k.1)*³

According to Helārāja, this kārikā gives a scientific definition (*śāstriyam laksanam*) of *kriyā* 'act'.⁴ We may exemplify the definition briefly as fol-

- 1 Helārāja on KS.20 (VPI, page 18, lines 14-15): *evam tāvat padārthānām apoddhāre jātir vā vyaktir eva vā/ iti vyaktivādimatena kriyālaksano 'poddhārapadārtho nirmūtah/ idānīm jātivādimatenāha/*
- 2 Nirukta 1.1.: *pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaste vrajati pacatūti upakramaprabhrtyapavargaparyantam/* See Helārāja on KS.k.11 (VPI., page 12, line 14).
- 3 VPR reads *pratīyate* for *abhidhīyate*.
- 4 Helārāja on KS.1 (VPI, page 1, lines 2-3): *idānīm sādhyāpeksatvāt sādhanasya sādhanānantaram uddiṣṭāyāḥ kriyāyāḥ śāstriyam laksanam āha/*

lows.⁵ In the case of *{apāksīt}* ‘[he] cooked’}, something is *siddha*. On the other hand, in the case of *{pacati}* ‘[he] is cooking’} and *{paksyati}* ‘[he] will cook’}, something is *asiddha*. In both cases, in so far as something is denoted by a word as *sādhya*, that something is called *kriyā*.

1.1 General conception of the act as *sādhya*.

A general account of *kriyā* as *sādhya* can be found in Helārāja’s commentary on this kārikā.⁶

Let us observe the process of making a pot of clay, on the level of the actual world. First, there is a lump of clay. Then out of this, a potter makes several parts which will become a body or an ear and so on. Then the parts are united and baked by the potter. After that a pot appears in the actual world.

Now let us leave the actual world and turn to the level of the word. We will examine the expression *{ghatah kriyate}* ‘the pot is being made’}. From this expression we understand the process of a pot being made just in the same way as it happened in the actual world.

Then, what kind of notion does the expression *{ghatah}* alone bring about in our mind? The notion which is brought about by *{ghatah}* in our mind is not the process of a pot being made, but it is only ‘pot’.

Therefore, the process of a pot being made is to be understood from the verb *{kriyate}*. And such a process in temporal sequence is what the word *sādhya* means. In this way, a *kriyā* has many component acts, which have a temporal order and constitute a series.

1.2 The mentally unified whole is the act.

Then, how can a *kriyā* be regarded as a whole such as “the act of cooking”? Bhartrhari gives an answer to this question in the fourth kārikā of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*. It reads

5 VSM, page 45, lines 23-24: ‘pacati’ ‘paksyati’ ityādāv *asiddham*, ‘apāksīt’ ityādāu *siddham* vā *sādhya* *venābhidhīyamānam* *kriyā*/

6 Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 5, lines 11-15): *tathā hi - dravyaśabdāḥ pravartamānāḥ ghataḥ kriyate, pataḥ kriyate ityādisādhyamānāvasthesv api sanmātrākārāvalambanām pratyayam janayanti/ ghatasya hi bhāvyamānāvasthā śivakastūpākādīnām avasthānām kramena prādurbhāvah/ na cāsau ghatāśabdāt praśyate, kriyata iti kriyāśabdāprayogād eva tadavagateh/*

*gunabhūtair avayavaiḥ samūhah kramajanmanām /
buddhyā prakalpitābhedah kriyeti vyapadiṣyate // (VP 3.8.k.4)*

According to Helārāja, this kārikā can be interpreted as follows. As mentioned above, *kriyā* is a mere continuous series of its component acts. But they aim at a single result (*ekaphaloddeśa*).⁷ And on the basis of this singleness of result the component parts can be regarded as a collection (*samudāya*) whose nature is single and total, thanks to the intellectual function of joining.

Therefore, when we pay attention to a collection, we can say that a *kriyā* is single; and on the other hand, when we fix our eyes upon its component parts, we can speak of it as having an order (*krama*) or sequence (*paurvāparya*).

However, this singleness with regard to a collection is nothing but a mental construction (*adhyāropita*), because each component part disappears immediately after it originates and all the parts cannot exist simultaneously to constitute a real collection.

To Bhartrhari, *kriyā* is a collection conceived as a whole. And it is such a collection that brings about a result.

1.3 Any component part of a composite action is also an act (*kriyā*).

Here there arises a problem. If a process as a whole is *kriyā*, a part of it, for instance, *adhiśrayana* ‘putting [a pot] on a fire’, could not be called *kriyā*. If so, we could not apply the expression {*pacati*} to a part such as *adhiśrayana*.

Bhartrhari gives an answer to this question in the fifth kārikā of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*:

*samūhah sa tathābhūtaḥ pratibhedam samūhīsu/
samāpyate tato bhede kālabhedasya sambhavah // (VP 3.8.k.5.)*

According to Helārāja, a man who is beginning to cook aims at eating as the result of cooking from the very beginning. Therefore the whole process

7 Bhartrhari and Helārāja mention another reason for regarding a *kriyā* as a whole. See Helārāja on *Kālasamuddeśa* k. 90 (VPI, page 78, lines 17-18): *pūrvam kṣanasa-mūhasyaikatvam ekaphaloddeśena samarhitam/ idānīm saṅkalanābuddhyupārūḍhasya buddhyākāraṇātvena bhāvikam ekatvam ucyate/*. Here the reason why a *kriyā* is regarded as a whole is singleness of intellect.

is conceptually fixed on each part of cooking such as *adhiśrayana*. In other words, a part (*samūhin*) is regarded as the whole or collection (*samūha*). In this case, we can apply the expression *{pacati}* to a component part, such as *adhiśrayana*, on which the whole process of cooking is superimposed. And when *adhiśrayana*, is finished, we can apply the expression *{apāksūt}* to it. And with reference to a component part which will happen in the future, we can say *{paksyati}*. Helārāja says that this mental construction (*adhyāsa*) occurs, because the notion of cooking continues (*anuvartate*) in each component part.⁸

Then, another problem arises. From the discussion above, it will follow that a component part, such as *adhiśrayana*, is not *sādhya*, though the expression *{pacati}* can be applied to it, because a component part has the concept of the whole fixed on it and therefore it does not have its own parts.

Helārāja gives an answer to this problem in his commentary.⁹ He says that a part is constructed conceptually as having the same nature as the whole. In other words, a part is exactly the same as the whole. Accordingly, any component part, having its own component parts in temporal sequence, is *sādhya*.

1.4 The act is not perceptible.

Incidentally it may be remarked that, according to Patañjali, a *kriyā* cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred.¹⁰ However, if the whole is conceived in each part, as I mentioned above, a *kriyā* would be perceptible, because its very last atomic moment is perceptible.¹¹

8 Helārāja on KSk.5 (VPI, page 9, lines 22-23): *adhyāsaś ca sarvatra pacatīti pratyaya-syānuvrter eva jñāyate/*

9 Helārāja on KSk.5 (VPI, page 9, line 25-page 10, line 2): *atrocate/ na samudāya-buddhyaikatvena, nāpy avayavabuddhyā ayam cāyam ceti samuccayena pratyekam samudā-yasyāvayavesv āropo 'tra/ kim tarhi? pūrvāparībhūtāvayavatvenaiva/*

10 MBh on P. 1.3.1 (MBh I vol. 1, page 254, lines 15-17): *kriyā nāmeyam atyantāparidrstā 'śakyā pindībhūtā nidarśayitum/ yathā garbho nirluṭhitah/ sāsāv anumānagamyā/*. See Cardona 1991, page 453-454 (Sec. 5.1.5.).

11 Helārāja holds that the very last atomic moment, which is no longer called *kriyā*, is perceptible. See Helārāja on KSk. 11 (VPI, page 12, lines 18-19): *bhāgaśāḥ pratyakṣatvāc ca na śakyā pindībhūtā pāmsurāśivat kriyā nidarśayitum ity uktam/*. Cf. Cardona 1991, footnote 54.

Bhartrhari discusses this problem in the sixth kārikā of the *Kriyāsāmuddeśa*.

*kramāt sadasatām tesām ātmāno na samūhinām /
sadvastuvisayair yānti sambandham caksurādibhīḥ // (VP 3.8.k.6).*

The first part of a composite act, for instance, *adhiśrayana* ‘putting [a pot] on a fire’, has already finished when the second part, namely, *udakāsecana* ‘pouring the water [into the pot]’, begins. In other words, the first part is non-existent (*asat*) and the second part is existent (*sat*). That is to say, the composite act is both existent and non-existent. And the objects of sense-organs such as the eye are existent things. Accordingly, the composite act, which is both existent and non-existent, cannot be the object of sense-organs. In other words, the composite act is not perceptible. Nor can the component parts of the composite act be perceived. As I mentioned above, the component parts are perfectly equivalent to the composite act and each component part is both existent and non-existent. Therefore they are in the same situation as the composite act, and cannot be perceived either.

Next, *adhiśrayana*, which is a component part of the composite act of cooking, has its own component parts such as *istakāviniyojana* ‘laying out of bricks’, *hastaprasārana* ‘stretching out the hands’, *sthālīvinyāsa* ‘putting down the pot’ and so on. In this case, the whole is denoted by the verb “*adhiśrayati*”.

Now, let us move to the next problem. Each component act is further divided into subdivisions. For example, *hastaprasārana* is further divided. Bhartrhari speaks of this division in the ninth kārikā of the *Kriyāsāmuddeśa*.

*yathā ca bhāgāḥ pacater udakāsecanādayah /
udakāsecanādīnām jñeyā bhāgāḥ tathāpare // (VP 3.8.k.9)*

The question which we must consider next concerns further subdivisions of the component act. For example, *hastaprasārana* has further subdivisions. And these further subdivisions have their component parts. Finally, the composite act will be divided into atomic moments. Can such minute moments have their own component parts in a temporal sequence? And can the minute moment, too, be *sādhya*? And would it be perceptible?

Bhartrhari gives the following answer to this question:

*yaś cāpakarsaparyantam anuprāptah pratīyate /
tatraikasmin kriyāśabdah kevale na prayujyate // (VP 3.8. k.10)*

That is, a minute moment which has no parts is not called *kriyā*. This means that what is denoted by a word, namely, a verbal act, involves a process.

Here it is important to say that Bhartrhari approaches the problem of *kriyā* from the viewpoint of a grammarian. He is concerned with what is denoted by the word, not with the actual world, because he is a *śabdaprāmāṇaka*.¹²

2. *Patañjali's definition of kriyā as interpreted by Helārāja*

2.0 Introduction

Let us now turn to Patañjali's definition of *kriyā*. Patañjali, too, gives a definition of *kriyā* in his *Mahābhāṣya*. It reads “*kārakāñām pravṛttiśesah kriyā*”.¹³

Since it is difficult to give a definitive interpretation of the definition, Helārāja presents six interpretations.

When interpreting this definition, we are confronted with two difficulties.

The first difficulty is how to understand the meaning of the word ‘*kārakāñām*’. As is well known, Panini introduces in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* six *kārakas* ‘act-participants’: namely, *apādāna* ‘starting point’, *sampradāna* ‘beneficiary’, *karaṇa* ‘instrument’, *adhikarana* ‘locus’, *karman* ‘object’ and *kartr* ‘agent’.¹⁴ The point here is to know what Patañjali means by this plural *kārakāñām*.

12 Helārāja remarks frequently that *iha vyākarane na vastvartho 'rthah, api tu śabdārtho 'rthah*. For instance, VPI, page 5, lines 6-7.

13 This definition appears twice in MBh. on P.1.3.1. (MBh I., vol. 1, page 258, line 11) and on P.5.3.42. (MBh I., vol. 2, page 410, lines 13-14). This definition is argued originally in a context with reference to *as*, *bhū* and *vid*, which express mere existence in the *Mahābhāṣya* and Helārāja's commentary on KS. See Helārāja on KS. 1 (VPI, page 1, lines 7-14): “*astibhavatividyatīnām dhātutvam vaktavyam*” (MBh I., vol. 1, page 255, line 2) *iti coditam/ tathā hi yathā kim karoti? pacati, iti pacādīnām karotinā sāmānādhi-karanyāt kriyāviśesavācakatvādhyavasāyah, na tathā bhavatyādīnām/ na hi bhavati kim karoti? bhavati, ityādītī na te kriyāvacanāḥ syuh/ kim ca parispanasvabhāvā loke kriyā prasiddhā/ astibhavatividyatīnām ca na parispanasvabhāvō 'rtha iti sakaladhātuvyāpakaṁ kriyālakṣaṇam bhāṣye pranītam “kārakāñām pravṛttiśesah kriyā” iti/*. See 6th view below.

14 The general rules for these act-participants are P.1.4.24. *dhruvam apāye 'pādānam/*, P.1.4.32. *karmanā yam abhiprāti sa sampradānam/*, P.1.4.42. *sādhakatamam karanam/*, P.1.4.54. *ādhāro 'dhikaranam/*, P.1.4.49. *kartur īpsitatamam karma/* and P.1.4.54. *svatantrah kartā/*.

The second difficulty is how to understand the compound *pravṛttiviśesa*. In this respect, Helārāja presents two alternatives, as follows:¹⁵

- 1) *sarvesām kārakānām ekah pravṛttiviśesah*
- 2) *pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛttih*

In the case of the former alternative, the point is how to interpret the compound *pravṛttiviśesa*. In the case of the latter, the word *viśesa* is explained as *bhinnā* ‘split or different’. The question here is what the word *pratikārakam* means.¹⁶ Helārāja presents six kinds of interpretation based on these two alternatives. Let us examine them one by one.

2.1 The First View.¹⁷

The first view is based on the second alternative. In this view, the word “*kārakānām*” points to all the act-participants (*kāraka*).

Helārāja quotes Patañjali who says “A root is what denotes an act (*kriyāvacano dhātuh*)”.¹⁸ If so, a root should denote the different activities (*pravṛtti*) of all the act-participants, because an act is {*pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛttih*} in this view.¹⁹

Next, the question arises: If *Lakāra*, which is introduced after a root (*dhātu*), denotes a *sādhana* ‘means of accomplishing’ the act, which is denoted by the root, *Lakāra* will also denote all the act-participants. But Pāṇini limits the function of *Lakāra* to *kartr*, *karman* or *bhāva*.²⁰ Thus, it seems that Helārāja’s first interpretation contradicts Pāṇini’s prescription.

And this contradiction is due to a difference of approach. I take the word “*svikāra*” in Helārāja’s commentary as a synonym of “*abhyupagama*” “hypothesis”, according to the *Nyāyasūtra*.²¹ Now, in a sentence such as

15 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 1, lines 14-16): *tatra vicāryate sarvesām vā kārakānām ekah pravṛttiviśesah, pratikārakam bhinnā vā pravṛttir iti/*

16 For a discussion of the compound *pratikārakam*, see Joshi, S.D. & Roodbergen, J.A.F. [1975], page 27, footnote 93.

17 VPI, page 1, line 16-page 2, line 4.

18 MBh on P.1.3.1. (MBh I., vol. 1, page 254, line 13).

19 Because we can put {*pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛttih*} in the place of the “*kriyā*” in Patañjali’s expression {*kriyāvacano dhātuh*}. Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 1, lines 18-19): *ittham ca kriyāvācī dhātūr iti sakalakārakavyāpārābhidhāyī dhātuh prāptah/*

20 P.3.4.69. *lah karmani ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ* / [P.3.4.68. *kartari*]

21 a) VPŚ. page 402, lines 3-5: .../ *satyam etat/ kin tu 'devadattah kāsthaiḥ sthālyām odanam pacati' ityādau viśesena* pacater dhātōh sarvakārakavyāpārasvīkāropalabdher akhilakārakavyāpārābhidhāyī dhātūr ity upagamāī/ *VPI: ityādāv aviśesena.*

{*devadattah kāsthaih sthālyām odanam pacati*}, we observe that many act-participants are involved in different activities. Therefore, we can hypothesize that different activities are denoted by a verb. However, the activities of an agent (*kartr*) and an object (*karman*) gain predominance (*prādhānya*) over those of other act-participants. Therefore, the function of *Lakāra* is to point to an agent and an object, as we can deduce by means of the logical method based on positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), and as Pānini teaches in the rule P.3.4.69.

2.2 The Second View.²²

The second view is also based on the second alternative {*pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛttih*}. This view says that the definition “*kārakānām pravṛttivīśesah kriyā*” is concerned with the nature of the act (*kriyā*) and not with the meaning of the root (*dhātu*).²³ Here the activities of the *apādāna* and the *sampradāna* are also *kriyā*. But the root does not denote them.²⁴ This view differs from the first view in that it limits the number of act-participants whose activities are denoted by the root to four, namely, *kartr*, *karman*, *adhikarana*, and *karana*, all of which may be considered to have *svātantrya*. But, in that case, in order to express their independence, *karana* and *adhikarana* have to be transformed into a *kartr*.²⁵

2.3 The Third View.²⁶

Unlike the previous two, the third view is based on the first alternative {*sarvesām kārakānām ekaḥ pravṛttivīśesah*}. The compound *pravṛttivīśesa* is

- b) NS 1.1.31. (page 266): *aparīksitābhupagamāt tadvīśesaparīksanam abhyupagamasiddhāntah*. See NKs.v. “*abhyupagama*”, 2. *svīkārah/ astu dravyam śabda iti/*
- 22 VPI, page 2, lines 4-13: *anye manyante.../.../...dhātunābhidhānāt/*
- 23 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 8-10): *ataś ca kārakānām pravṛttivīśesah kriyeta kriyāsvarūpamātram kathitam, na tu dhātuvācyatvam/*
- 24 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 4-5): *...sampradānādivyāpāre dhātor na vṛttih/ karānādivyāpāra eva tu vṛttih/*
- 25 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 11-13): *kācid eva tu dhātunābhidhīyate karmagatā kartrgatā vā pacyate pacatīti/ ata eva kartrkarmanor evotpadyate lakārah tadvyāpārasyaiva dhātunābhidhānāt/*
- 26 VPI, page 2, lines 13-15: *anye tu viśesapade.../.../...kriyeta vyācaksate/*

taken as a genitive *tatpurusa*, that is *{pravṛttinām viśesah}*,²⁷ and “*viśesa*” means ‘distinguishing feature’.

In this view, *kriyā* is regarded as a result (*phala*) brought about by the activities of all the act-participants. For example, the activities of all the act-participants in the act of ‘cooking’ bring about a single specific result, namely, ‘softening of rice (*viklitti*)’.

2.4 The Fourth View.²⁸

The fourth view is based on the second alternative, *{pratikārakam bhinnā pravṛtih}*. In this view, the predominant act-participant in the form of *kartr* is intended by the word ‘*kāraka*’. And the plural ending in ‘*kārakānām*’ does not point to the plurality of the act-participants, but only to that of the *kartr*.²⁹ However, we observe that *Lakāra* can also denote a *karman*. In such cases, the activity of the *karman* is also *kriyā*.

Here an objection is raised. The plural number of *kārakānām* could be explained with reference to *karman* only. Because activity is that of which the *karman* constitutes a purpose (*artha*) and the *karman* could also be the predominant *kāraka*. Why should the *kartr* be the only predominant *kāraka*?³⁰

To this objection, the fourth view answers as follows. The *kriyā* of all roots has a *kartr*, but it does not always have a *karman*. In other words, the *kartr* pervades all roots. That is the reason why this view considers that the *kartr* is the predominant *kāraka*.³¹ Here this view quotes a *Mahābhāṣya* passage as a means of proof which says “*anyathā śuskaudane kārakāni pravartante/anyathā māmsaudane*”³² This view interprets this passage as follows. Many act-participants act impetuously towards rice with meat, and slowly towards dried rice. And acting impetuously or slowly is possible only

27 The *sasthī vibhakti* in *pravṛttinām* denotes *janyajanakabhāva*.

28 VPI, page 2, line 15-page 3, line 18: *apare punah kārakam atra pradhānam.../.../...iīdam darśanam/*

29 Kārakas other than the main agent (*pradhānakartr*) also function as agents (*gunakartr*) of their own minor acts (*gunakriyā*).

30 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 18-19).

31 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 19-20): *naitad asti, karmano 'sarvavisayatvāt/ kartā punah sarvatra sthita iti vyāpakatvāt sa evātra pradhānam kārakam vivaksitam/*

32 VPI, page 2, line 21. But the original text reads *anyathā ca kārakāni śuskaudane pravartante, anyathā ca māmsaudane* (MBh I, vol. 1, page 258, lines 11-12). This passage is also quoted by the fifth view below.

for a *kartr* that is animate (*cetana*). Therefore *kāraka* in the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* stands only for *kartr*.

Now, two questions arise. First, if *kāraka* in this definition stands only for an animate *kartr*, then an inanimate *kartr* will not be included and the activities of an inanimate *kartr* will not be called *kriyā*. But in the sentence {*khatvā kampate* ‘a bed is shaking’}, the activity of the bed, which is an inanimate *kartr*, should also be called *kriyā*.³³ Second, in the sentence {*pāninā māmsaudanam bhunkte* ‘he is eating rice mixed with meat with his hand’}, a hand, which is *karana* and not *kartr*, can act impetuously or slowly towards rice with meat.³⁴ How can you say that the *Bhāsyakāra* intends only *kartr*?

It is somewhat difficult to understand the answer to this question. This view says that *pravṛttiviṣesa* is accidentally distinguished (*upalaksita*) by *samrambha* and *mandatā* in the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya*, and general activities other than those distinguished by *samrambha* and *mandatā* of *kartr* are not excluded by *samrambha* and *mandatā*. And we have to probably interpret the word *kartr* in the answer as that which is in the form of *kartr* in actual expression without reference to whether it is animate or not and whether it is the agent of the main act (*pradhānakartr*) or that of a subordinate act (*gunakartr*). This fourth view analyses the compound *pravṛtti-viṣesa* as *pravṛttir eva viṣesah* ‘speciality in the form of activity’.³⁵ In this view, the argument concerning *karman* is rather obscure. This view says that the fact that Patañjali states *kārakānām* and not *kartrnām*, shows that the word *kāraka* in this definition intimates (*sūcita*) *karman* also.³⁶ The most likely explanation is that the activities of *kartr* are predominant over those of *karman*.

Now the following question arises. The *Mahābhāṣya* says “*atha kah paceh pradhāno ’rthah/ yā ’sau tandulānām viklittih*”.³⁷ In short, this statement means that the main meaning of the root *pac* is softening (*viklitti*)

33 Ambākartrī (VPŚ, page 404, lines 18-19): *atra kecid vadanti - cetanasyaiva sasamrambhā mandā vā pravṛtih sambhavati ity acetanah kartā na grhītah syāt iti tatpravṛtih kriyeti noktam syād khatvā kampate ityādau/*

34 Ambākartrī (VPŚ, page 405, lines 1-2): *kiñ ca pāninā māmsaudanam bhunkte ityādisthale māmsaudanau pānyādirūpānām karanādīnām api samrambhavattvāt tat katham kartavātra nirdista iti /*

35 VPŚ (page 405, line 8) reads *pravṛtter eva viṣesah* for *pravṛttir eva viṣesah* in VPI. This reading intends to exclude activities of *kārakas* other than *kartr*.

36 VPI, page 3, line 10.

37 VPI, page 3, line 12. But original text reads “*iha paceh kah pradhānārthah*”/ See MBh on P.3.1.26. (MBh I., vol. 2, page 32, lines 24-25).

of rice grains. And this softening of rice grains is an activity of *karman* and not that of *kartr*. And the activity of *kartr* is *vikledana* ‘making [rice grain] soft’. Does this *Bhāṣya* passage conflict with the fourth view?

This view answers as follows. In this passage Patañjali investigates the problem from an objective (*vastvartha*) point of view and not from a *śabda* point of view. From an objective point of view, the main meaning of the root *pac* is *viklitti*. But from the *śabda* point of view, *vikledana* is the main meaning of the root *pac*.

As regards the case that *Lakāra* is introduced in the sense of *karman* after the root, some think that only *viklitti*, which is the activity of *karman*, is the meaning of the root *pac*, and others think *viklitti* to which *vikledana* is subordinated is the meaning of *pac*.

2.5 The Fifth View³⁸

The fifth view is based on the first alternative {*sarvesāṁ kārakānām ekaḥ pravṛttiviśesah*}, and rests on the authority of the *Mahābhāṣya*.³⁹ There are some variant readings, and I adopt the reading “*pravṛttimātram agrhītaviśesam sakalakārakānuyāyi*”.⁴⁰

This view establishes a single *pravṛttiviśesa* as a characteristic common to all the *kārakas*. They all produce a single result. It is true that all the *kārakas* have their own activities.⁴¹ But these activities produce one result. Therefore, so far as the result is concerned, there is no difference between them.

In this view, the compound “*pravṛttiviśesa*” is a *karmadhāraya*, as is shown by the paraphrase {*pravṛttiś cāyam viśesāś ca*}.⁴² And the meaning of the whole expression is “[*kriyā* is] a special function [which is called *jananā* ‘producing’,] common to all the *kārakas*”.

38 I may divide this view and the next view at VPI, page 4, line 4, *pravṛtir ity.../ for convenience' sake*. See the next view.

39 MBh on P.1.4.23. (MBh I, vol. 1, page 326, line 15): ...*sāmānyabhūtā kriyā vartate.../*. For a discussion of this passage, see Joshi, S.D. & Roodbergen, J.A.F. 1975, page 44.

40 VPŚ, page 403, lines 5-6: *pravṛttimātram agrhītaviśesam** *sakalakārakānuyāyi** kriyeti manyante/* *VPŚ reads *pravṛttimātragrītaviśesam* for VPI *pravṛttimātram agrhītaviśesam*. **VPI reads *sakalakārakānuyāyīnī* for VPŚ *sakalakārakānuyāyi*.

41 Namely, *avāntaravyāpāra* of each *kāraka*.

42 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 3, line 2).

2.6 The Sixth View

There is a difference of viewpoint between the preceding five views and this sixth view. The former five are concerned with the relation between *kāraka* and *kriyā* with respect to one *kriyā*. On the other hand, the sixth view is concerned with the difference between two *kriyās*.

This sixth view, which seems to be adopted by Kaiyāta and Nāgeśa,⁴³ is also based on the first alternative, that is {*sarvesām kārakānām ekah pravṛttiviśesah*}. In this view, the compound *pravṛttiviśesa* means 'difference from another activity'. And this difference is of two kinds. The one is *sajātīya* 'of same kind' and the other is *vijātīya* 'of a different kind'. In order to illustrate the former (*sajātīya*), this view quotes the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* which is also quoted by the fourth view above, namely, "anyathā kārakāni śuskaudane pravartante anyathā māmsaudane."⁴⁴ This quotation means that act-participants act impetuously towards rice with meat, and do so indifferently towards dried rice. The purpose of this is to show that, for example, the act of eating (*bhujikriyā*) rice with meat is different from the act of eating dried rice.⁴⁵ This is the difference from an activity 'of the same kind'.

Next, we will take up the difference from a different kind of activity. It is clear that the act of cooking is different from the act of reciting (*pathikriyā*). There is no need for further explanation.

Here, it may be worth pointing out that Helārāja does not draw a sharp line between the fifth view and the sixth view, although he does so elsewhere. And this sixth view is not contradictory to the fifth view above. In this connection, we may say that this view provides additional information to or constitutes a more elaborate interpretation of, the fifth view.⁴⁶

43 Pradīpa on P.1.3.1. (MBh II., vol. 2, page 123, col. 2, lines 10-11, 25-26): *pravṛttiviśesa iti/ sarvā pravṛttili pravṛtyantarād bhidyate ity asty eva sarvasyāḥ kriyātvam/.../ yady evam iti/ atrāpi pravṛtyantarāpeksayāsty eva pravṛttiviśesarūpatvam ity arthah/*
Uddyota on P.1.3.1. (MBh II., vol. 2, page 123, col. 2, lines 17-19): *nanu pravṛttiviśesasya kriyātve pravartata ity atra kriyātvānāpattir ata āha - sarveti/ pacyādyapeksayā sāpi viśesa eveti bhāvah/*

44 VPI, page 4, line 8.

45 *bhujikriyā* means *kriyā* which is expressed by the verbal root *bhuj* 'to eat'.

46 It seems that the meaning of *as*, *bhū* or *vid* is called *kriyā* on the basis of this sixth view. See Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 6, line 1-page 7, line 10). But these arguments are not clear for me at present.

3. Conclusion

It is not easy to decide which view is adopted by Helārāja himself. And from Bhartrhari's and Helārāja's standpoint of *sarvapārsada* we need not decide which one is their own. But when we remember Bhartrhari's definition which we referred to in the first half of this paper, it seems that the fifth view that '*kriyā*' is defined as a special function (*pravrttivisesa*) found in all the act-participants, is adoptable. The sixth view, in which '*kriyā*' is defined as that which is differentiated from other activities, and which is not clearly separated from the fifth view by Helārāja, cannot be excluded.

It is to be regretted that Helārāja's work *Kriyāviveka*, in which he dealt with *kriyā* in detail, is not available.⁴⁷

Bibliography

A. Primary Sources and Abbreviations.

Ambākartrī: Raghunātha Śarma's commentary. See VP.

KS: Bhartrhari's *Kriyāsamuddeśa*. See VP.

VSM: *Vaiyākarana-siddhānta-maṇjūṣā* by Nāgeśa Bhatta. Edited by K.P. Sukla, Varanasi, 1977: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya.

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II.: *Vyākaranāmahābhāṣya*. Edited with Kaiyata's *Pradīpa* and Nāgeśa's *Uddyota* by Bhargavasastri Joshi, Sivadatta D. Kudala, and Raghunathasastri. 6 parts, Nirnaya Sagar Press. Reprinted, 1982-91, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan.

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NK: *Nyāyakośa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy* by Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar, Poona, 1978: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

NS: *Nyāyadarśana*. Edited by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta, 1936-44. Reprinted, 1985, New Delhi: Munshiram.

Pradīpa: Kaiyata's *Pradīpa*. See MBh II.

Uddyota: Nāgeśa's *Uddyota*. See MBh II.

47 See Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 7, line 20).

VP: Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*.

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