Zeitschrift: Asiatische Studien : Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft =

Études asiatiques : revue de la Société Suisse-Asie

Herausgeber: Schweizerische Asiengesellschaft

Band: 47 (1993)

Heft: 1: Proceedings of the first international conference on Bhartrhari:

University of Poona, January 6 - 8, 1992

Artikel: Bhartrhari's definition of kriy

Autor: Honda, Yoshichika

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5169/seals-147007

Nutzungsbedingungen

Die ETH-Bibliothek ist die Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften auf E-Periodica. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Zeitschriften und ist nicht verantwortlich für deren Inhalte. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern beziehungsweise den externen Rechteinhabern. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Print- und Online-Publikationen sowie auf Social Media-Kanälen oder Webseiten ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. Mehr erfahren

Conditions d'utilisation

L'ETH Library est le fournisseur des revues numérisées. Elle ne détient aucun droit d'auteur sur les revues et n'est pas responsable de leur contenu. En règle générale, les droits sont détenus par les éditeurs ou les détenteurs de droits externes. La reproduction d'images dans des publications imprimées ou en ligne ainsi que sur des canaux de médias sociaux ou des sites web n'est autorisée qu'avec l'accord préalable des détenteurs des droits. En savoir plus

Terms of use

The ETH Library is the provider of the digitised journals. It does not own any copyrights to the journals and is not responsible for their content. The rights usually lie with the publishers or the external rights holders. Publishing images in print and online publications, as well as on social media channels or websites, is only permitted with the prior consent of the rights holders. Find out more

Download PDF: 27.11.2025

ETH-Bibliothek Zürich, E-Periodica, https://www.e-periodica.ch

BHARTRHARI'S DEFINITION OF KRIYĀ

Yoshichika Honda, Kyoto

0. General Introduction

In this paper I will treat Bhartrhari's and Patañjali's definition of kriyā as interpreted by Helārāja in the Kriyāsamuddeśa of the Vākyapadīya.

In his Kriyāsamuddeśa, Bhartrhari deals with kriyā from two different points of view, from that of those who hold that a word denotes the particular (vyaktivādin) and that of those who hold that the word denotes the universal (jātivādin). It seems that kriyā as understood by the jātivādin is more interesting than that of the vyaktivādin, but here I will limit the discussion to the vyaktivādin's understanding of kriyā.

1. Bhartrhari's Definition of kriyā.

1.0. Introduction

It is from the author of the *Nirukta* that Bhartrhari inherits the idea that an act, which Yāska calls *bhāva*, is continuous (*pūrvāparībhūta*)². And he introduces that idea into the field of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*). And, keeping it in his mind, he gives his definition of *kriyā* 'act' as denoted by *śabda* 'a word' in his *Kriyāsamuddeśa*'s first kārikā. It reads

yāvat siddham asiddham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate / āśritakramarūpatvāt tat kriyety abhidhīyate // (VP.3.8.k.1)³

According to Helārāja, this kārikā gives a scientific definition (śāstrīyam lakṣaṇam) of kriyā 'act'. We may exemplify the definition briefly as fol-

- 1 Helārāja on KSk.20 (VPI, page 18, lines 14-15): evam tāvat padārthānām apoddhāre jātir vā vyaktir eva vā/ iti vyaktivādimatena kriyālaksano 'poddhārapadārtho nirnītah/ idānīm jātivādimatenāha/
- 2 Nirukta 1.1.: pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaste vrajati pacatīti upakramaprabhrtyapavargaparyantam/ See Helārāja on KS.k.11 (VPI., page 12, line 14).
- 3 VPR reads pratiyate for abhidhiyate.
- 4 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 1, lines 2-3): idānīm sādhyāpeksatvāt sādhanasya sādhanānantaram uddistāyāh kriyāyāh śāstrīyam laksanam āha/

lows.⁵ In the case of {apāksīt '[he] cooked'}, something is siddha. On the other hand, in the case of {pacati '[he] is cooking'} and {paksyati '[he] will cook'}, something is asiddha. In both cases, in so far as something is denoted by a word as sādhya, that something is called kriyā.

1.1 General conception of the act as sādhya.

A general account of kriyā as sādhya can be found in Helārāja's commentary on this kārikā.6

Let us observe the process of making a pot of clay, on the level of the actual world. First, there is a lump of clay. Then out of this, a potter makes several parts which will become a body or an ear and so on. Then the parts are united and baked by the potter. After that a pot appears in the actual world.

Now let us leave the actual world and turn to the level of the word. We will examine the expression {ghatah kriyate 'the pot is being made'}. From this expression we understand the process of a pot being made just in the same way as it happened in the actual world.

Then, what kind of notion does the expression {ghatah} alone bring about in our mind? The notion which is brought about by {ghatah} in our mind is not the process of a pot being made, but it is only 'pot'.

Therefore, the process of a pot being made is to be understood from the verb $\{kriyate\}$. And such a process in temporal sequence is what the word $s\bar{a}dhya$ means. In this way, a $kriy\bar{a}$ has many component acts, which have a temporal order and constitute a series.

1.2 The mentally unified whole is the act.

Then, how can a *kriyā* be regarded as a whole such as "the act of cooking"? Bhartṛhari gives an answer to this question in the fourth kārikā of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*. It reads

- 5 VSM, page 45, lines 23-24: 'pacati' 'paksyati' ityādāv asiddham, 'apāksīt' ityādau siddham vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyamānam kriyā/
- Helāraja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 5, lines 11-15): tathā hi dravyaśabdāh pravartamānāh ghatah kriyate, patah kriyate ityādisādhyamānāvasthesv api sanmātrākārāvalambanam pratyayam janayanti/ ghatasya hi bhāvyamānāvasthā śivakastūpakādīnām avasthānām kramena prādurbhāvah/na cāsau ghataśabdāt pratīyate, kriyata iti kriyāśabdaprayogād eva tadavagateh/

gunabhūtair avayavaih samūhah kramajanmanām / buddhyā prakalpitābhedah kriyeti vyapadiśyate // (VP 3.8.k.4)

According to Helārāja, this kārikā can be interpreted as follows. As mentioned above, *kriyā* is a mere continuous series of its component acts. But they aim at a single result (*ekaphaloddeśa*).⁷ And on the basis of this singleness of result the component parts can be regarded as a collection (*samudāya*) whose nature is single and total, thanks to the intellectual function of joining.

Therefore, when we pay attention to a collection, we can say that a kriyā is single; and on the other hand, when we fix our eyes upon its component parts, we can speak of it as having an order (krama) or sequence (paurvāparya).

However, this singleness with regard to a collection is nothing but a mental construction (adhyāropita), because each component part disappears immediately after it originates and all the parts cannot exist simultaneously to constitute a real collection.

To Bhartrhari, $kriy\bar{a}$ is a collection conceived as a whole. And it is such a collection that brings about a result.

1.3 Any component part of a composite action is also an act $(kriy\bar{a})$.

Here there arises a problem. If a process as a whole is $kriy\bar{a}$, a part of it, for instance, $adhi\acute{s}rayana$ 'putting [a pot] on a fire', could not be called $kriy\bar{a}$. If so, we could not apply the expression $\{pacati\}$ to a part such as $adhi\acute{s}rayana$.

Bhartrhari gives an answer to this question in the fifth kārikā of the Kriyāsamuddeśa:

```
samūhah sa tathābhūtah pratibhedam samūhisu/
samāpyate tato bhede kālabhedasya sambhavah // (VP 3.8.k.5.)
```

According to Helārāja, a man who is beginning to cook aims at eating as the result of cooking from the very beginning. Therefore the whole process

Bhartrhari and Helārāja mention another reason for regarding a kriyā as a whole. See Helārāja on Kālasamuddeśa k. 90 (VPI, page 78, lines 17-18): pūrvam ksanasamūhasyaikatvam ekaphaloddeśena samarthitam/idānīm sankalanābuddhyupārūdhasya buddhyākārarūpatvena bhāvikam ekatvam ucyate/. Here the reason why a kriyā is regarded as a whole is singleness of intellect.

is conceptually fixed on each part of cooking such as adhiśrayana. In other words, a part (samūhin) is regarded as the whole or collection (samūha). In this case, we can apply the expression {pacati} to a component part, such as adhiśrayana, on which the whole process of cooking is superimposed. And when adhiśrayana, is finished, we can apply the expression {apāksūt} to it. And with reference to a component part which will happen in the future, we can say {paksyati}. Helārāja says that this mental construction (adhyāsa) occurs, because the notion of cooking continues (anuvartate) in each component part.⁸

Then, another problem arises. From the discussion above, it will follow that a component part, such as *adhiśrayaṇa*, is not *sādhya*, though the expression {pacati} can be applied to it, because a component part has the concept of the whole fixed on it and therefore it does not have its own parts.

Helārāja gives an answer to this problem in his commentary. He says that a part is constructed conceptually as having the same nature as the whole. In other words, a part is exactly the same as the whole. Accordingly, any component part, having its own component parts in temporal sequence, is sādhya.

1.4 The act is not perceptible.

Incidentally it may be remarked that, according to Patañjali, a *kriyā* cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred.¹⁰ However, if the whole is conceived in each part, as I mentioned above, a *kriyā* would be perceptible, because its very last atomic moment is perceptible.¹¹

- 8 Helārāja on KSk.5 (VPI, page 9, lines 22-23): adhyāsaś ca sarvatra pacatīti pratyayasyānuvṛtter eva jñāyate/
- 9 Helārāja on KSk.5 (VPI, page 9, line 25-page 10, line 2): atrocyate/ na samudāyabuddhyaikatvena, nāpy avayavabuddhyā ayam cāyam ceti samuccayena pratyekam samudāyasyāvayavesv āropo 'tra/ kim tarhi? pūrvāparībhūtāvayavatvenaiva/
- 10 MBh on P. 1.3.1 (MBh I vol. 1, page 254, lines 15-17): kriyā nāmeyam atyantāparidrstā 'šakyā pindībhūtā nidaršayitum/ yathā garbho nirluthitah/ sāsāv anumānagamyā/. See Cardona 1991, page 453-454 (Sec. 5.1.5.).
- 11 Helārāja holds that the very last atomic moment, which is no longer called kriyā, is perceptible. See Helārāja on KSk. 11 (VPI, page 12, lines 18-19): bhāgašah pratyaksatvāc ca na śakyā pindībhūtā pāmsurāśivat kriyā nidaršayitum ity uktam/. Cf. Cardona 1991, footnote 54.

Bhartrhari discusses this problem in the sixth kārikā of the Kriyāsa-muddeśa.

```
kramāt sadasatām tesām ātmāno na samūhinām / sadvastuvisayair yānti sambandham caksurādibhih// (VP 3.8.k.6).
```

The first part of a composite act, for instance, adhiśrayana 'putting [a pot] on a fire', has already finished when the second part, namely, udakāsecana 'pouring the water [into the pot]', begins. In other words, the first part is non-existent (asat) and the second part is existent (sat). That is to say, the composite act is both existent and non-existent. And the objects of sense-organs such as the eye are existent things. Accordingly, the composite act, which is both existent and non-existent, cannot be the object of sense-organs. In other words, the composite act is not perceptible. Nor can the component parts of the composite act be perceived. As I mentioned above, the component part is both existent and non-existent. Therefore they are in the same situation as the composite act, and cannot be perceived either.

Next, adhiśrayana, which is a component part of the composite act of cooking, has its own component parts such as istakāviniyojana 'laying out of bricks', hastaprasārana 'stretching out the hands', sthālīvinyāsa 'putting down the pot' and so on. In this case, the whole is denoted by the verb "adhiśrayati".

Now, let us move to the next problem. Each component act is further divided into subdivisions. For example, *hastaprasārana* is further divided. Bhartrhari speaks of this division in the ninth kārikā of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa*.

```
yathā ca bhāgāh pacater udakāsecanādayah / udakāsecanādīnām jñeyā bhāgās tathāpare // (VP 3.8.k.9)
```

The question which we must consider next concerns further subdivisions of the component act. For example, hastaprasāraṇa has further subdivisions. And these further subdivisions have their component parts. Finally, the composite act will be divided into atomic moments. Can such minute moments have their own component parts in a temporal sequence? And can the minute moment, too, be sādhya? And would it be perceptible?

Bhartrhari gives the following answer to this question:

```
yaś cāpakarṣaparyantam anuprāptah pratīyate / tatraikasmin kriyāśabdah kevale na prayujyate // (VP 3.8. k.10)
```

That is, a minute moment which has no parts is not called *kriyā*. This means that what is denoted by a word, namely, a verbal act, involves a process.

Here it is important to say that Bhartrhari approaches the problem of kriyā from the viewpoint of a grammarian. He is concerned with what is denoted by the word, not with the actual world, because he is a śabdapramānaka.¹²

2. Patañjali's definition of kriyā as interpreted by Helārāja

2.0 Introduction

Let us now turn to Patañjali's definition of kriyā. Patañjali, too, gives a definition of kriyā in his Mahābhāsya. It reads "kārakānām pravrttiviśeṣaḥ kriyā". 13

Since it is difficult to give a definitive interpretation of the definition, Helārāja presents six interpretations.

When interpreting this definition, we are confronted with two difficulties.

The first difficulty is how to understand the meaning of the word 'kārakānām'. As is well known, Panini introduces in his Astādhyāyī six kārakas 'act-participants': namely, apādāna 'starting point', sampradāna 'beneficiary', karana 'instrument', adhikarana 'locus', karman 'object' and kartr 'agent'. The point here is to know what Patañjali means by this plural kārakānām.

- 12 Helārāja remarks frequently that iha vyākarane na vastvartho 'rthah, api tu śabdārtho 'rthah. For instance, VPI, page 5, lines 6-7.
- 13 This definition appears twice in MBh. on P.1.3.1. (MBh I., vol. 1, page 258, line 11) and on P.5.3.42. (MBh I., vol. 2, page 410, lines 13-14). This definition is argued originally in a context with reference to as, bhū and vid, which express mere existence in the Mahābhāsya and Helārāja's commentary on KS. See Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 1, lines 7-14): "astibhavatividyatīnām dhātutvam vaktavyam" (MBh I., vol. 1, page 255, line 2) iti coditam/ tathā hi yathā kim karoti? pacati, iti pacādīnām karotinā sāmānādhikaranyāt kriyāviśesavācakatvādhyavasāyah, na tathā bhavatyādīnām/ na hi bhavati kim karoti? bhavati, ityādīti na te kriyāvacanāh syuh/ kim ca parispandasvabhāvā loke kriyā prasiddhā/astibhavatividyatīnām ca na parispandasvabhāvo 'rtha iti sakaladhātuvyāpakam kriyālaksanam bhāsye pranītam "kārakānām pravrttiviśesah kriyā" iti/. See 6th view below.
- 14 The general rules for these act-participants are P.1.4.24. dhruvam apāye 'pādānam/, P.1.4.32. karmanā yam abhipraiti sa sampradānam/, P.1.4.42. sādhakatamam karanam/, P.1.4.54. ādhāro 'dhikaranam/, P.1.4.49. kartur īpsitatamam karma/ and P.1.4.54. svatantrah kartā/.

The second difficulty is how to understand the compound *pravrttiviśeṣa*. In this respect, Helārāja presents two alternatives, as follows: 15

- 1) sarvesām kārakānām ekah pravrttiviśesah
- 2) pratikārakam bhinnā pravrttih

In the case of the former alternative, the point is how to interpret the compound *pravrttiviśesa*. In the case of the latter, the word *viśesa* is explained as *bhinna* 'split or different'. The question here is what the word *pratikārakam* means. ¹⁶ Helārāja presents six kinds of interpretation based on these two alternatives. Let us examine them one by one.

2.1 The First View.¹⁷

The first view is based on the second alternative. In this view, the word "kārakānām" points to all the act-participants (kāraka).

Helārāja quotes Patañjali who says "A root is what denotes an act (kriyāvacano dhātuh)". 18 If so, a root should denote the different activities (pravrtti) of all the act-participants, because an act is {pratikārakam bhinnā pravrttih} in this view. 19

Next, the question arises: If Lakāra, which is introduced after a root (dhātu), denotes a sādhana 'means of accomplishing' the act, which is denoted by the root, Lakāra will also denote all the act-participants. But Pāṇini limits the function of Lakāra to kartr, karman or bhāva.²⁰ Thus, it seems that Helārāja's first interpretation contradicts Pāṇini's prescription.

And this contradiction is due to a difference of approach. I take the word "svīkāra" in Helārāja's commentary as a synonym of "abhyupagama" "hypothesis", according to the Nyāyasūtra.²¹ Now, in a sentence such as

- 15 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 1, lines 14-16): tatra vicāryate sarvesām vā kārakānām ekah pravrttivišesah, pratikārakam bhinnā vā pravrttir iti/
- For a discussion of the compound *pratikārakam*, see Joshi, S.D. & Roodbergen, J.A.F. [1975], page 27, footnote 93.
- 17 VPI, page 1, line 16-page 2, line 4.
- 18 MBh on P.1.3.1. (MBh I., vol. 1, page 254, line 13).
- 19 Because we can put {pratikārakam bhinnā pravntih} in the place of the "kriyā" in Patañjali's expression {kriyāvacano dhātuh}. Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 1, lines 18-19): ittham ca kriyāvācī dhātur iti sakalakārakavyāpārābhidhāyī dhātuh prāptah/
- 20 P.3.4.69. lah karmani ca bhāve cākarmakebhyah/[P.3.4.68. kartari]
- a) VPS. page 402, lines 3-5: .../ satyam etat/kin tu 'devadattah kāsthaih sthālyām odanam pacati' ityādau višesena* pacater dhātoh sarvakārakavyāpārasvīkāropalabdher akhilakārakavyāpārābhidhāyī dhātur ity upagamāt/*VPI: ityādāv avišesena.

{devadattah kāsthaih sthālyām odanam pacati}, we observe that many actparticipants are involved in different activities. Therefore, we can hypothesize that different activities are denoted by a verb. However, the activities of an agent (kartr) and an object (karman) gain predominance (prādhānya) over those of other act-participants. Therefore, the function of
Lakāra is to point to an agent and an object, as we can deduce by means
of the logical method based on positive concomitance (anvaya) and negative concomitance (vyatireka), and as Pānini teaches in the rule P.3.4.69.

2.2 The Second View.²²

The second view is also based on the second alternative {pratikārakam bhinnā pravrttih}. This view says that the definition "kārakānām pravrttiviśesah kriyā" is concerned with the nature of the act (kriyā) and not with the meaning of the root (dhātu).²³ Here the activities of the apādāna and the sampradāna are also kriyā. But the root does not denote them.²⁴ This view differs from the first view in that it limits the number of act-participants whose activities are denoted by the root to four, namely, kartr, karman, adhikarana, and karana, all of which may be considered to have svātantrya. But, in that case, in order to express their independence, karana and adhikarana have to be transformed into a kartr.²⁵

2.3 The Third View.²⁶

Unlike the previous two, the third view is based on the first alternative {sarvesām kārakānām ekah pravrttiviśesah}. The compound pravrttiviśesa is

- b) NS 1.1.31. (page 266): aparīksitābhyupagamāt tadviśesaparīksanam abhyupagamasiddhāntah/. See NKs.v. "abhyupagama", 2. svīkārah/ astu dravyam śabda iti/
- 22 VPI, page 2, lines 4-13: anye manyante.../.../...dhātunābhidhānāt/
- 23 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 8-10): ataś ca kārakānām pravrttiviśesah kriyeti kriyāsvarūpamātram kathitam, na tu dhātuvācyatvam/
- 24 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 4-5): ...sampradānādivyāpāre dhātor na vṛttiḥ/karaṇādivyāpāra eva tu vṛttiḥ/
- 25 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 11-13): kācid eva tu dhātunābhidhīyate karmagatā kartrgatā vā pacyate pacatīti/ ata eva kartrkarmanor evotpadyate lakārah tadvyāpārasyaiva dhātunābhidhānāt/
- 26 VPI, page 2, lines 13-15: anye tu viśesapade.../.../...kriyeti vyācaksate/

taken as a genitive tatpurusa, that is {pravrttīnām viśeṣah},²⁷ and "viśeṣa" means 'distinguishing feature".

In this view, kriyā is regarded as a result (phala) brought about by the activities of all the act-participants. For example, the activities of all the act-participants in the act of 'cooking' bring about a single specific result, namely, 'softening of rice (viklitti)'.

2.4 The Fourth View.²⁸

The fourth view is based on the second alternative, {pratikārakam bhinnā pravrttih}. In this view, the predominant act-participant in the form of kartr is intended by the word 'kāraka'. And the plural ending in 'kārakānām' does not point to the plurality of the act-participants, but only to that of the kartr. However, we observe that Lakāra can also denote a karman. In such cases, the activity of the karman is also kriyā.

Here an objection is raised. The plural number of $k\bar{a}rak\bar{a}n\bar{a}m$ could be explained with reference to karman only. Because activity is that of which the karman constitutes a purpose (artha) and the karman could also be the predominant $k\bar{a}raka$. Why should the kartr be the only predominant $k\bar{a}raka$?

To this objection, the fourth view answers as follows. The kriyā of all roots has a kartr, but it does not always have a karman. In other words, the kartr pervades all roots. That is the reason why this view considers that the kartr is the predominant kāraka.³¹ Here this view quotes a Mahābhāsya passage as a means of proof which says "anyathā śuskaudane kārakāni pravartante/anyathā māmsaudane".³² This view interprets this passage as follows. Many act-participants act impetuously towards rice with meat, and slowly towards dried rice. And acting impetuously or slowly is possible only

- 27 The sasthī vibhakti in pravrttīnām denotes janyajanakabhāva.
- 28 VPI, page 2, line 15-page 3, line 18: apare punaḥ kārakam atra pradhānam.../.../...itīdam darśanam/
- 29 Kārakas other than the main agent (pradhānakartr) also function as agents (gunakartr) of their own minor acts (gunakriyā).
- 30 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 18-19).
- 31 Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 2, lines 19-20): naitad asti, karmano 'sarvavisayatvāt/ kartā punah sarvatra sthita iti vyāpakatvāt sa evātra pradhānam kārakam vivaksitam/
- 32 VPI, page 2, line 21. But the original text reads anyathā ca kārakāni śuskaudane pravartante, anyathā ca māmsaudane (MBh I, vol. 1, page 258, lines 11-12). This passage is also quoted by the fifth view below.

for a *kartr* that is animate (*cetana*). Therefore *kāraka* in the passage of the *Mahābhāsya* stands only for *kartr*.

Now, two questions arise. First, if kāraka in this definition stands only for an animate kartr, then an inanimate kartr will not be included and the activities of an inanimate kartr will not be called kriyā. But in the sentence {khatvā kampate 'a bed is shaking'}, the activity of the bed, which is an inanimate kartr, should also be called kriyā. Second, in the sentence {pāninā māmsaudanam bhunkte 'he is eating rice mixed with meat with his hand'}, a hand, which is karana and not kartr, can act impetuously or slowly towards rice with meat. How can you say that the Bhāsyakāra intends only kartr?

It is somewhat difficult to understand the answer to this question. This view says that pravrttiviśesa is accidentally distinguished (upalaksita) by samrambha and mandatā in the passage of the Mahābhāsya, and general activities other than those distinguished by samrambha and mandatā of kartr are not excluded by samrambha and mandatā. And we have to probably interpret the word kartr in the answer as that which is in the form of kartr in actual expression without reference to whether it is animate or not and whether it is the agent of the main act (pradhānakartr) or that of a subordinate act (gunakartr). This fourth view analyses the compound pravrtti-viśesa as pravrttir eva viśesah 'speciality in the form of activity'. In this view, the argument concerning karman is rather obscure. This view says that the fact that Patañjali states kārakānām and not kartrnām, shows that the word kāraka in this definition intimates (sūcita) karman also. The most likely explanation is that the activities of kartr are predominant over those of karman.

Now the following question arises. The Mahābhāsya says "atha kah paceh pradhāno 'rthah/ yā 'sau tandulānām viklittih". ³⁷ In short, this statement means that the main meaning of the root pac is softening (viklitti)

³³ Ambākartrī (VPŚ, page 404, lines 18-19): atra kecid vadanti – cetanasyaiva sasamrambhā mandā vā pravrttih sambhavati ity acetanah kartā na grhītah syāt iti tatpravrttih kriyeti noktam syād khatvā kampate ityādau/

³⁴ Ambākartrī (VPŚ, page 405, lines 1-2): kiñ ca pāninā māmsaudanam bhunkte ityādisthale māmsaudanau pānyādirūpānām karanādīnām api samrambhavattvāt tat katham kartaivātra nirdista iti /

VPS (page 405, line 8) reads pravrtter eva visesah for pravrttir eva visesah in VPI. This reading intends to exclude activities of kārakas other than kartr.

³⁶ VPI, page 3, line 10.

³⁷ VPI, page 3, line 12. But original text reads "iha paceh kah pradhānārthah" / See MBh on P.3.1.26. (MBh I., vol. 2, page 32, lines 24-25).

of rice grains. And this softening of rice grains is an activity of *karman* and not that of *kartr*. And the activity of *kartr* is *vikledana* 'making [rice grain] soft'. Does this *Bhāsya* passage conflict with the fourth view?

This view answers as follows. In this passage Patañjali investigates the problem from an objective (vastvartha) point of view and not from a śābda point of view. From an objective point of view, the main meaning of the root pac is viklitti. But from the śābda point of view, vikledana is the main meaning of the root pac.

As regards the case that *Lakāra* is introduced in the sense of *karman* after the root, some think that only *viklitti*, which is the activity of *karman*, is the meaning of the root *pac*, and others think *viklitti* to which *vikledana* is subordinated is the meaning of *pac*.

2.5 The Fifth View³⁸

The fifth view is based on the first alternative {sarveṣām kārakānām ekaḥ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ}, and rests on the authority of the Mahābhāṣya.³⁹ There are some variant readings, and I adopt the reading "pravṛttimātram agṛhīta-viśeṣam sakalakārakānuyāyi".⁴⁰

This view establishes a single *pravrttivisesa* as a characteristic common to all the $k\bar{a}rakas$. They all produce a single result. It is true that all the $k\bar{a}rakas$ have their own activities.⁴¹ But these activities produce one result. Therefore, so far as the result is concerned, there is no difference between them.

In this view, the compound "pravrttiviśesa" is a karmadhāraya, as is shown by the paraphrase {pravrttiś cāyam viśeṣaś ca}. ⁴² And the meaning of the whole expression is "[kriyā is] a special function [which is called jananā 'producing',] common to all the kārakas".

³⁸ I may divide this view and the next view at VPI, page 4, line 4, pravrttir ity.../ for convenience' sake. See the next view.

³⁹ MBh on P.1.4.23. (MBh I, vol. 1, page 326, line 15): ...sāmānyabhūtā kriyā vartate.../. For a discussion of this passage, see Joshi, S.D. & Roodbergen, J.A.F. 1975, page 44.

⁴⁰ VPŚ, page 403, lines 5-6: pravrttimātram agrhītaviśesam* sakalakārakānuyāyi** kriyeti manyante/*VPŚ reads pravrttimātragrhītaviśesam for VPI pravrttimātram agrhītaviśesam. **VPI reads sakalakārakānuyāyinī for VPŚ sakalakārakānuyāyi.

⁴¹ Namely, avāntaravyāpāra of each kāraka.

⁴² Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 3, line 2).

2.6 The Sixth View

There is a difference of viewpoint between the preceding five views and this sixth view. The former five are concerned with the relation between $k\bar{a}raka$ and $kriy\bar{a}$ with respect to one $kriy\bar{a}$. On the other hand, the sixth view is concerned with the difference between two $kriy\bar{a}s$.

This sixth view, which seems to be adopted by Kaiyata and Nāgeśa, is also based on the first alternative, that is {sarvesām kārakānām ekah pravrttiviśesah}. In this view, the compound pravrttiviśesa means 'difference from another activity'. And this difference is of two kinds. The one is sajātīya 'of same kind' and the other is vijātīya 'of a different kind'. In order to illustrate the former (sajātīya), this view quotes the passage of the Mahābhāsya which is also quoted by the fourth view above, namely, "anyathā kārakāni śuskaudane pravartante anyathā māmsaudane." This quotation means that act-participants act impetuously towards rice with meat, and do so indifferently towards dried rice. The purpose of this is to show that, for example, the act of eating (bhujikriyā) rice with meat is different from the act of eating dried rice. This is the difference from an activity 'of the same kind'.

Next, we will take up the difference from a different kind of activity. It is clear that the act of cooking is different from the act of reciting (pathikriyā). There is no need for further explanation.

Here, it may be worth pointing out that Helārāja does not draw a sharp line between the fifth view and the sixth view, although he does so elsewhere. And this sixth view is not contradictory to the fifth view above. In this connection, we may say that this view provides additional information to or constitutes a more elaborate interpretation of, the fifth view.⁴⁶

⁴³ Pradīpa on P.1.3.1. (MBh II., vol. 2, page 123, col. 2, lines 10-11, 25-26): pravrttiviśesa iti/sarvā pravrttih pravrtyantarād bhidyate ity asty eva sarvasyāh kriyātvam/.../yady evam iti/atrāpi pravrtyantarāpeksayāsty eva pravrttiviśesarūpatvam ity arthah/Uddyota on P.1.3.1. (MBh II, vol. 2, page 123, col. 2, lines 17-19): nanu pravrttiviśesasya kriyātve pravartata ity atra kriyātvānāpattir ata āha – sarveti/pacyādyapeksayā sāpi viśesa eveti bhāvah/

⁴⁴ VPI, page 4, line 8.

⁴⁵ bhujikriyā means kriyā which is expressed by the verbal root bhuj 'to eat'.

It seems that the meaning of as, bhū or vid is called kriyā on the basis of this sixth view. See Helārāja on KSk.1 (VPI, page 6, line 1-page 7, line 10). But these arguments are not clear for me at present.

3. Conclusion

It is not easy to decide which view is adopted by Helārāja himself. And from Bhartrhari's and Helārāja's standpoint of sarvapārsada we need not decide which one is their own. But when we remember Bhartrhari's definition which we referred to in the first half of this paper, it seems that the fifth view that 'kriyā' is defined as a special function (pravrttiviśesa) found in all the act-participants, is adoptable. The sixth view, in which 'kriyā' is defined as that which is differentiated from other activities, and which is not clearly separated from the fifth view by Helārāja, cannot be excluded.

It is to be regretted that Helārāja's work *Kriyāviveka*, in which he dealt with *kriyā* in detail, is not available.⁴⁷

Bibliography

A. Primary Sources and Abbreviations.

Ambākartrī: Raghunātha Śarma's commentary. See VP.

KS: Bhartrhari's Kriyāsamuddeśa. See VP.

VSM: Vaiyākarana-siddhānta-mañjūsā by Nāgeśa Bhatta. Edited by K.P. Sukla,

Varanasi, 1977: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya.

MBh I.: The Vyākarana = Mahābhāsya. Edited by F. Kielhorn, Third edition revised and

furnished with additional readings, references, and select critical notes by K.V. Abhyankar. 3 volumes, Poona, 1962-1972: Bhandarkar Oriental Research

Institute.

II.: Vyākaranamahābhāsya. Edited with Kaiyata's Pradīpa and Nāgeśa's Uddyota by Bhargavasastri Joshi, Sivadatta D. Kudala, and Raghunathasastri. 6 parts, Nirnaya Sagar Press. Reprinted, 1982-91, Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit

Pratishthan.

Nirukta: The Nirukta of Yāska. Edited with Durga's commentary by H.M. Bhadkamkar,

vol. 1, 1918. Reprinted, 1985, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

NK: Nyāyakośa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy by

Mahāmahopādhyāya Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar, Poona, 1978: Bhandarkar Oriental

Research Institute.

NS: Nyāyadarśana. Edited by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan

Tarkatirtha. Calcutta, 1936-44. Reprinted, 1985, New Delhi: Munshiram.

Pradīpa: Kaiyata's Pradīpa. See MBh II.

Uddyota: Nāgeśa's Uddyota. See MBh II.

47 See Helārāja on KSk. 1 (VPI, page 7, line 20).

VP: Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya.

VPI: Edited with Helārāja's commentary by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Kānda III, part ii. Poona, 1973: Deccan College.

VPŚ: Edited with Helārāja's commentary and Raghunātha Śarma's Ambākartrī by Raghunātha Śarma. Part III, vol. II (Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamalā 91) Varanasi, 1979: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya.

VPR: Edited by Wilhelm Rau. Bhanrhans Vākyapadīya: Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben and mit einem Pāda-Index versehen. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes XLII. 4.) Wiesbaden, 1977: Steiner.

B. Others

- Bandini, Giovanni.: 1980, Die Erörterung der Wirksamkeit. Bhartrharis Kriyāsamuddeša und Helārājas Prakāša zum ersten Male aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt, mit einer Einführung und einem Glossar, Wiesbaden (Beiträge zur Südasienforschung. Südasien-Institut Universität Heidelberg, Band 61).
- Cardona, George.: 1974, 'Pāṇini's kārakas: Agency, Animation and Identity', *JIP* 2:231-306. -do-: 1991, 'A Path Still Taken: Some Early Indian Arguments Concerning Time', *JAOS* 111.3: 445-464.
- Joshi, S.D. & Roodbergen, J.A.F.: 1975, Patañjali's Vyākarana-Mahābhāsya Kārakāhnika (P.1.4.23.-1.4.55), Introduction, Translation and Notes, Poona. (Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, Class, C No. 10).
- Rocher, Rosane.: 1969, 'The Concept of Verbal Root in Indian Grammar (A Propos of Pānini 1.3.1.)', FL 5.1: 73-82.
- -do-: 1983, 'Review of Bandini 1980', JAOS 103.4.: 778-9.
- Subrahmania Iyer, K.A.: 1951, 'The Conception of Action Among the Vaiyākaranas', *JGJRI* 8.2.: 165-188.
- -do-: 1969, Bhartrhari. A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries, Poona. (Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 71).
- -do-: 1974, The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Chapter III, pt. II. English Translation with Exegetical Notes, Delhi (Motilal Banarsidass).