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KAMALAŚĪLA'S INTERPRETATION OF SOME VERSES IN THE VĀKYAKĀNDA OF BHARTRHARI'S VĀKYAPADĪYA

Masaaki Hattori, Kyoto

In the *Tattvasamgraha* (abbrev.: *TS*) of Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788 A.D.), various views maintained by scholars of different schools are critically examined and repudiated. For the purpose of examination the author Śāntarakṣita often introduces the view of others by the citation from their works.

The 16th chapter of TS, viz., Śabdārthaparīksā, is devoted to the problem of meaning. As a follower of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, Śāntaraksita maintains the apoha-theory, i.e., the theory that the function of a word consists not in the direct reference to a real object but in the differentiation (apoha) of an object from other things. He begins this chapter with the discussions that a word does not directly denote a specific feature (svalaksana), nor an individual (vyakti), nor a universal (jāti), nor the relation (sambandha) between an individual and a universal, and firmly establishes his theory through severe criticism on the views put forward by Bhāmaha, Kumārila and Uddyotakara against the apohatheory. Before introducing their arguments, the author makes reference to some views which recognize something other than svalaksana, etc. as the meaning of a word, and criticizes these views. In that portion he quotes the following six verses (TS, 886-891) from the Vākyakānda of Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya (abbrev.: VP).

asty arthah sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣanam / apūrvadevatāsvargaih samam āhur gavādisu // (VP, II.119)

- 1 The editions used are as below.
 - TS: Bauddha Bharati Ser., 1, vol. 1. Varanasi 1968. (GOS edition gives exactly the same reading. The verse-numbers in it are 887-892.)
 - VP: (1) R = Rau, W. (ed.), Bhartrharis Vākyapadīya. Wiesbaden 1977 (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XLII, 4).
 - (2) I = Iyer, K.A. Subramania (ed.), The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Kānda II, with the Commentary of Punyarāja and the Ancient Vrtti. Delhi, etc.: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.

The quotations of VP, II.119, 126-128, 132 in TS are pointed out in K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye (ed.), Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Poona 1965 (Univ. of Poona Skt. and Pkt. Ser., 2), Appendix III, pp. 220-223.

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887
        samudāyo 'bhidheyo vāpy avikalpasamuccayah /
        asatyo vāpi samsargah śabdārthah kaiś cid isyate // (126)
888
        asatyopādhi yat satyam tad vā śabdanibandhanam /
        śabdo vāpy abhijalpatvam āgato vāti vācyatām // (127)
            b: nibandhanām R d: vācyatam R
889
        so 'yam ity abhisambandhād rūpam ekīkrtam yadā /
        śabdasyārthena tam śabdam abhijalpam pracaksate // (128)
        yo vārtho buddhivisayo bāhyavastunibandhanah /
890
        sa bāhyam vastv iti jñātah śabdārthah kaiś cid isyate // (132)
            d: śabdartha iti gamyate R
891
        abhyāsāt pratibhāhetuh sarvah śabdah samāsatah /
        bālānām ca tiraścām ca yathārthapratipādane // (117)
            b: sarvah śabdo (śabdah sarvo) 'paraih smrtah R (I)
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Seven views are referred to in these six verses. (1) 886: All words simply mean that 'something exists'. Such words as apūrva, devatā and svarga do not produce a form of any particular object in the mind of a hearer. They simply make him understand that there exists something which is called 'apūrva', etc. It is known by extension that the word 'go' (cow) and the like also mean only that 'something exists'. (2) 887ab: An aggregate free from option (vikalpa) and accumulation (samuccya) is the denotation of a word. (3) 887cd: The unreal relation of a thing with its universal is the meaning of a word. (4) 888ab: The real with unreal adjuncts is the cause of the application of a word. (5) 888cd, 889: When the form of a word becomes identified with the object, this word is called abhijalpa. The meaning of a word is nothing other than the word in the state of abhijalpa. (6) 890: When the image of a thing, which is caused by an external object, is externalized, it is recognized as the meaning of a word. (7) 891: All words are the cause of pratibhā (intuition) through repeated practice, as in the case of making things understood to infants and animals. This pratibhā is the meaning of a word.

These seven views are among those which are enumerated by Bhartrhari in VP, Vākyakānda, 116ff. It is not known by whom these views were advocated. The seventh view seems to represent Bhartrhari's own idea, since the concept of $pratibh\bar{a}$ is peculiar to his theory of meaning. However, while Bhartrhari considers $pratibh\bar{a}$ as the meaning of a sentence

In VP, II.116, Bhartrhari states: avikalpe 'pi vākyārthe vikalpā bhāvanāśrayāh / atrādhi-karane vādāh pūrvesām bahudhā matāh (gatāh I) (Although the meaning of a sentence is not diversified, there arises diversification [into the meanings of component words] on the basis of bhāvanā [of different persons]. Concerning this subject, the discussions of ancient scholars took place variously.) Then he introduces thirteen views concerning the meaning of a word.

 $(v\bar{a}kya)$, the idea expressed in TS, 891 (VP, II.117) is that $pratibh\bar{a}$ is caused by any word, whether it is a single word or a sentence. It may be either that Bhartrhari admitted that $pratibh\bar{a}$ is caused even by a single word or that TS, 891 represents a view maintained by some unknown predecessor of Bhartrhari.³

An elaborate commentary on TS, viz., the TS-Pañjikā (abbrev.: TSP), was written by Kamalašīla (ca. 740-745 A.D.), a direct disciple of Śāntaraksita. In this commentary we find a clear and intelligible explanation of each verse quoted above. There is a $t\bar{t}k\bar{a}$ on the Vākyakānda of VP (abbrev.: VPT), which is usually ascribed to Punyarāja⁴, who is supposed to have lived in the first half of the 10th century⁵, that is, much later than Kamalašīla. The explanation of the above-cited verses in VPT is not always clear enough to make the meaning of the verse understandable. This deficiency is covered by the appropriate interpretation of the verses presented in TSP. I shall cite two examples.

Introducing the verse 127ab which states that satya possessing asatya as an adjunct (upādhi) is the cause of śabda, VPT states: "atha satyam evāsatyopādhivicitritam śabdavācyam iti sastham pakṣam āha," and gives no further explanation. This tīkā does not help us understand what is meant by 'satya' and 'asatya'. A clear explanation on this verse is furnished in TSP: "When the adjuncts, i.e., the particulars such as bracelet, ring, and so on, which are unreal (asatya) as the denotation of a word, belong to the real (satya), i.e., gold (suvarna) which is of generic character and permeates all the particulars, then it is called 'real with unreal adjuncts' (satyam asatyopādhi)."

Kamalasıla's interpretation of this verse is based on VP, III.2 (Dravyasamuddesa), kk. 2-4:6

- 3 Dr. J. Houben suggested me in personal communication that Bhartrhari might have admitted that $pratibh\bar{a}$ is produced even by a single word. He may discuss this point in one of his future articles.
- At the end of *VPT* there are sixty verses, in which the author mentions his name as Punyarāja. However, A. Aklujkar expresses some doubt upon Punyarāja's authorship of *VPT*, mentioning that the two older manuscripts ascribe *VPT* to Helārāja, and some other reasons, cf. A. Aklujkar, "The Authorship of the Vākya-kānda-tīkā," *Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume*, vol. I, Delhi 1974, pp. 165-188. His view is criticized in Peri Sarveswara Sharma, "Punyarāja's Tīkā on the Vākya-kānda of the Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari," *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, 42 (1983), pp. 1-21. I should like to express my thanks to Dr. J. Houben for his kindness to make this latter article accessible to me.
- 5 Cf. P.S. Sharma, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
- This has been suggested to me by Professor A. Aklujkar on the occasion of the Bhartrhari Conference in 1992. The idea presented in these verses is close to that refer-

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satyam vastu tadākārair asatyair avadhāryate / asatyopādhibhih śabdaih satyam evābhidhīyate // 2 adhruvena nimittena devadattagrham yathā / grhītam grhaśabdena śuddham evābhidhīyate // 3 suvarnādi yathā bhinnam svair ākārair apāyibhih / rucakādyabhidhānānām śuddham evaiti vācyatām // 4
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"A real substance is ascertained through its unreal forms. It is in fact what is real that is expressed by the words with unreal adjuncts. Just as Devadatta's house, which is cognized through an impermanent mark, is expressed in its pure form by the word 'house', [or,] just as gold, for instance, which is differentiated by its own impermanent forms, becomes in its pure form the object of such words as 'rucaka' (golden necklace) and the like." From afar Devadatta's house may be indicated by a crow resting on the roof with the words: "His house is that one with a crow on the roof." However, what is really expressed by the word 'house' is not the house with a crow on the roof, but it is only the house which remains unchanged even after the crow flies away. Similar is the case with such words as 'rucaka' etc., which are used to indicate gold in the form of necklace, etc. What is expressed by these words is in fact gold as the real substance, which subsists under the change of impermanent, unreal forms.

On the verse 126ab which states that an aggregate (samudāya) free from option (vikalpa) and accumulation (samuccaya) is the denotation of a word, VPT states: "nanu yady ākārasamudāyam samuccitam eva pratyāyayati tarhi bahuvacanam eva tatra syāt. atha vikalpitam pratyāyayati tadā vacanavikalpam syād ity āśańkyāha - 'avikalpasamuccayah' iti. (If [a word] causes to apprehend the aggregate of forms simply as accumulated, then only plural may be used for it. If it causes to apprehend the same as optional, then there may be alternation of number. - Anticipating this [question, the author] says: "free from option and accumulation".) This explanation is not unintelligible, but a far clearer understanding is obtained from the example given in TSP: "When the word 'forest' (vana) is uttered, the notion arises not through option as: 'dhava tree or khadira tree or palāśa tree', nor through accumulation as: 'dhava tree and khadira tree and palāśa tree', but dhava tree, etc. are apprehended generally. In the same way, when the word 'brāhmana' is uttered, the apprehension is not in the form: 'austerity (tapas) or birth (jāti) or learning (śruta)', nor is

red to by Patañjali in *Mahābhāsya* (ed. Kielhorn), Vol. I, p. 7.11-18. Cf. also J. Bronkhorst, *Mahābhāsyadīpikā of Bhartrhari*, Fasc. IV: Āhnika I. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Inst., 1987, pp. 22 (text), 78-79 (translation).

it in the form: 'austerity and birth and learning'; but austerity, etc. distinguished from other correlatives are apprehended in entirety as an assembled whole."⁷

All these seven views are repudiated by Śāntaraksita. Neither TSP nor VPT inform us to whom or to which school these views are to be attributed. It draws our attention that the concept of pratibha presented in the verse 891 (VP, II.117) is also criticized in TS. I have shown elsewhere that Dignāga, who advocated the apoha-theory, adopted the concept of pratibhā from Bhartrhari in his discussion on the meaning of a sentence.8 Śāntaraksita also accepts the view that pratibhā is the meaning of a sentence. He is known to have modified Dignaga's apoha-theory by laying emphasis on the fact that a word produces a positive mental image (pratibimba) in the mind of the hearer. In the process of his counter-attack against Kumārila who criticized Dignāga for the inconsistency of admitting apoha as the meaning of a word and pratibhā as the meaning of a sentence, Śāntaraksita considers the term pratibhā as synonymous with apoha which, according to him, is of the nature of pratibimba.9 When he criticizes the doctrine of pratibhā in VP, II.117, his discussion is focussed on the problem concerning the relation between pratibhā and external object: "Pratibhā has also been regarded as the meaning of a word. If it takes an external thing for its object, then, inasmuch as the external thing has only one particular character, how could there be various pratibhā-s for different persons who take one and the same thing for their object? If pratibhā be held to be objectless, being produced only by dint of the impression of previous experiences (vāsanā), then how could there be either apprehension or activity pertaining to external things? It is not appropriate to say that pratibh \bar{a} is baseless, since in that case there would follow an absurd conclusion that it is produced anywhere. If its basis consists in the mutual difference [among things], then that is exactly our view."10 Thus it is understood that Śāntaraksita does not totally reject the

⁷ TSP, p. 350.9-13.

⁸ M. Hattori, "Apoha and Pratibhā," Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H.H. Ingalls, ed. by M. Nagatomi, et al. Dordrecht, etc.: D. Reidel Publ. Co., 1979, pp. 61-73.

⁹ Cf. TS, 1027: pratibimbātmako 'pohaḥ padād apy upajāyate / pratibhākhyo jhat ity eva padārtho 'py ayam eva naḥ //

¹⁰ TS, 901-904: pratibhāpi ca śabdārtho bahyārthavisayā yadi / ekātmaniyate bāhye vicitrāh pratibhāh katham // atha nirvisayā etā vāsanāmātrabhāvatah / pratipattih pravrttir vā bahyārthesu katham bhavet // ... nirbījā na ca sā yuktā sarvatraiva prasangatah / itaretarabhedo 'syā bījam cet paksa esa nah //

doctrine of $pratibh\bar{a}$. To be criticized is the view that $pratibh\bar{a}$ pertains to some real thing in the external world. It is his thought that $pratibh\bar{a}$ does not go beyond the mental realm and has nothing to do with external objects. On this point he is close to Bhartrhari who maintains that words pertain only to mentally constructed secondary being $(aupac\bar{a}rik\bar{a}satt\bar{a})$ and not to the real entity in the external world.¹¹