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PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA IV (3)*

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The present article is the third in a series aiming at a translation of the chapter on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) in the *Pramānavārttika*, the major work of the Buddhist philosopher, Dharmakīrti (6th-7th century A.D.). For the two previous articles, see Tillemans (1986) and (1987).

(PVV's introduction to k. 28 and 29:) "[Objection:] But if the thesis-statement is not a means of proof (*sādhana*) and has as content something which is to be understood by implication, then what was the point when the Master [Dignāga] formulated the [defining] characteristic of the thesis (*pakṣalakṣaṇa*)? [Dharmakīrti] replies:"¹

(28) *gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asammoḥāya lakṣaṇam /*

tac caturlakṣaṇam rūpanipāteṣṭasvayampadaih² //

(29) *asiddhāsādhānārthoktavādyabhyupagatagrahah³ /*

anukto 'picchayā vyāptah sādhyā ātmārthavan matah //

"Although the statement of what is to be proven (*sādhyā* = *pakṣa*) is something which can be understood [by implication], the [defining] characteristic [of the thesis] was [stated] to dispel confusion. This [*sādhyā*] has four characteristics: By means of the words 'essence' (*rūpa*), 'alone' (*nipāta* 'particle' = *eva*), 'intended' (*īṣṭa*) and 'himself', one understands that [the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a *sādhana*, is stated according to the [real] sense and is what is accepted by the proponent (*vādin*). Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is

* Financial support for the continuation of this project has been provided by the *Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique*. Although the fourth chapter of *Pramānavārttika* might well seem to be about as far removed from the *Mādhyamika* as one could possibly imagine, Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's discussions on precisely what a thesis is do perhaps also have some relevance when we attempt to understand the *Mādhyamika*'s recurring principle that he has *no* philosophical theses whatsoever. The latter theme particularly interested and influenced Jacques May in his approach to Buddhist thought. This article, then, is offered as a gesture of gratitude to Prof. May. My thanks to E. Steinkellner for some helpful remarks.

1 PVV 424, 13-14: *nanu yadi pakṣavacanam asādhanam sāmāthyagamyābhidheyam ca tadācāryeṇa pakṣalakṣaṇam kṛtam kim artham ity āha.*

2 Ego *rūpanipāteṣṭasvayampadaih*: PV-k(I) *rūpaṃ nipātesu svayam padaih*; PV-k(II),(III), Miy. *rūpanipātesu svayam padaih*. See Frauwallner (1957a) p. 59. Clearly, what is at stake is not a locative plural °*esu*, but the word *īṣṭa* in Dignāga's definition. Also, °*padaih* must be one long compound.

3 PV-k(I) °*oktam vādyabhyupagatagrahah*; PV-k(III), Miy. °*abhyupagatagrahah*. PV Tib. has *khas blaṅs pa*, which is in keeping with PV-k(II)'s reading *abhyupagata*; *abhyupagama* would most likely have been translated by *khas len pa*.

pervaded by the [proponent's] intention is held to be the *sādhya*, as in [the Sāṃkhya's argument that the eyes, etc. are] for the use of the Self (*ātman*)."

(Our explanatory notes:) PV IV, k. 29ab = PVin III, k. 6cd. Cf. PVin P. 288a 8-b 2.⁴ From PV IV, k. 28 until k. 163, Dharmakīrti will discuss the second verse in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) III, Dignāga's chapter on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*). The Sanskrit of the latter verse can be restored on the basis of the *Nyāyabindu*, the Tibetan of PS and Dharmakīrti's word by word commentary in PV IV: *svarūpenaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam isto 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmīni //*⁵ "[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*ista*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) according to its essence alone (*svarūpenaiva*) [i.e. as a *sādhya*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharmin*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*)."

According to Dharmakīrti, the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*) was given in PS III to dispel confusion about what theses are, and not because the thesis is itself a *sādhana* and hence indispensable member of a *parārthānumāna*. Dharmakīrti harkens back to k. 22, where it had been argued that the thesis is, in any case, implied by the two members of a *parārthānumāna* and need not be explicitly stated.⁶ The four character-

4 'o na sgrub par byed pa de bstan pa med na med pa ma yin pa'i phyir[1] phyogs kyi mtshan ñid brjod par mi bya'o ze na / brjod par bya ba yin[2] te / bsgrub par bya ba dan bsgrub par bya ba ma yin pa la phyin ci log tu log par rtogs pa mthoñ ba'i phyir / de bzlog pa'i don du yin no // rjes su dpag par bya ba de yan / ño bo kho nar bstan par bya / ran ñid 'dod dan ma bsal ba'o // 'dir ran gi ño bo dan / tshig phrad dan / 'dod pa dan / ran ñid kyi tshig bzis / ma grub sgrub byed min don brjod // rgol bas khas blañs pa bzun[3] ño // zes rig[4] par bya'o // ([1] P. bstan pa med pa ma yin pa'i phyir. [2] P. ma yin [3] P. gzuñ [4] P. rigs [D. 190a 7-b 2]).

5 PS Tib.: ran gi ño bo kho nar bstan // bdag 'dod ran gi chos can la // mñon sum don dan rjes dpag dan // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o //. Skt. of *svarūpenaiva* ... 'nirākṛtaḥ is to be found in NB III, 38. The restoration of PS III, k. 2 follows Frauwallner (1957a), p. 60; see also Van Bijlert (1989) p. 72.

6 The history of the gradual disappearance of the thesis-statement from *parārthānumāna* is a complex one and has been discussed in M. Inami, "On *pakṣābhāsa*" (*Proceedings of the Second Dharmakīrti Conference*, Vienna 1991, 69-83) as well as in my article "More on *parārthānumāna*, Theses and Syllogisms" (*Études Asiatiques*, 45, 1991, 133-148). Suffice it to say here that in PS Dignāga recognized that the *pakṣavacana* was not a *sādhana*, but that it could be stated to show the goal of the reason (*hetvartha*); in PV and the *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti seems to have held essentially the same position, but stressed that *pakṣa* was implied by the two members of a *parārthānumāna*; subsequently,

istics spoken about in k. 28-29 are conveyed by Dignāga's words *svarūpenaiva ... svayam iṣṭo*: (1) The word *svarūpa* ensures that the thesis is indeed something which needs to be proven, i.e. a *sādhya*, and is not already established for the opponent, as for example the obviously true proposition that sound is audible.⁷ (2) The particle *eva* ("only"/"alone") eliminates the possibility that any *sādhana* in an inference-for-others, such as unestablished reasons and examples, would also be counted as the thesis, for the thesis is *only a sādhya*. The point (which turns on Dignāga's refutation of the *Nyāyasūtra*'s definition of the thesis) was discussed earlier on in Dharmakīrti's k. 24-26. (3) The word *iṣṭa* was destined to guarantee *arthokta*, that the thesis is indeed the intended proposition, stated as the proponent meant it, and not some potentially seductive proposition which might seem to fit the words, but is not what the proponent actually meant. (4) *svayam* shows that the thesis is *vādyabhyupagata*, what the proponent himself accepts and wishes to prove, rather than the various related or unrelated statements which might be found in the treatises of the proponent's school.⁸ (The specification *anirākṛta* and the four types of refutation – viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āpta* and *prasiddha* – will be treated later in k. 91-135; *svadharmin* is discussed in k. 136-148.)

Dharmakīrti seems to have innovated somewhat upon Dignāga's own explanation in PS by introducing four different functions for *svarūpena*, *eva*, *svayam* and *iṣṭa*, Dignāga himself, in his *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV) on k. 2, having only spoken of two. In PSV *svarūpenaiva* served to eliminate unestablished reasons and examples from being theses, and *svayam iṣṭa* eliminated theses which were just positions of a treatise, but not those of the proponent.⁹ While PSV took *svayam iṣṭa* together¹⁰, Dharmakīrti made a split between *svayam* and *iṣṭa*, and assigned *vādyā-*

in the *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, the fact that the thesis is implied and that it is not a *sādhana* led him to view the *paksavacana* as completely redundant and hence as having no place whatsoever in a *parārthānumāna*.

7 PVin P. 288b 2: *des na grub pa dper na sgra ni mñan par bya'o zes bya ba lta bu dan /* (D. 190b 2-3).

8 Cf. NB III, 39-43.

9 See the article by M. Ono (1986), which discusses Dharmakīrti's development of Dignāga's definition of the thesis.

10 PSV(b) 125a 1, Kitagawa 471: *bdag ñid 'dod pa zes bya ba ni 'dis ni bstan bcos la mi bltos pa'i khas blañs pa bstan pa yin no /* "This [phrase], *svayam iṣṭa*, shows a position (*abhyupagama*) which does not rely upon treatises (*śāstrānapekṣa*)." Cf. the fragment in PVBh 495.2, Kitagawa (1973) p. 129, n. 166: *svayam iti śāstrānapekṣam abhyupagamam darśayati*.

bhyupagata as the point of the former and *arthokta* as that of the latter. As we shall see, such a separate treatment of the two provisoes enabled Dharmakīrti to use *īsta* to refute the sophistical arguments given by the Sāṃkhyas and Cārvākas (see k. 34 *et seq.* below), while using *svayam* to expand upon Dignāga's idea that logical theses are independent of what is stated in treatises.

Finally, the words *ātmārthavat* allude to the Sāṃkhya's equivocal proof for the existence of the *ātman*. The latter philosopher argues that the eyes and other sense organs are for the "benefit of another" (*parārtha*): "The eyes and other [faculties] are for the benefit of another, because they are composite, like accessories such as a bed or seat, etc. (*parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ samghātatvāc chayanāsanādyāṅgavad*)¹¹". However, what the Sāṃkhya actually intends by *parārtha* in this case, but does not say, is that derivatives of primordial matter (*prakṛti*) are for the use of the *ātman*, i.e. the Spirit (*puruṣa*),¹² and it is this intended proposition which is the actual thesis. The argument will be taken up again in k. 31-33.

(PVV's introduction to k. 30:) "[Objection:] But since all [propositions] which are unintended (*anīsta*) are eliminated by the word *īsta*, then it is established that [propositions] accepted in treatises, but unintended by the proponent, are not the *sādhyā* either. Thus the word *svayam* is ineffectual. [Dharmakīrti] replies: Words have the effect of excluding [their contraries], and therefore, on account of the word *īsta*,"¹³

(30) *sarvānyeṣṭanivṛttāv apy āsamkāsthānavāraṇam /*
vṛttau svayamśruteḥ¹⁴ prāha kṛtā caisā tadarthikā //

11 Skt. in NB III, 87 and PVV *ad* k. 29. For *aṅga* in this context, see NBT *ad* 87: *tad evāṅgam puruṣopabhogāṅgatvāt* "The [bed, etc.] are *aṅga* in that they are factors for the man's enjoyment."

12 See PVV 425, 6-8: *yathātmāsti na veti vivāde tatsādhanārtham sāmkyena parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ samghātatvāc chayanāsanādyāṅgavat / ity uktasya sādhanasyātmārthatvam anuktam apī sādhyam icchāvisayatvāt //*. Note that *samghātaparārthatva* is one of the five reasons used by the Sāṃkhyas to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. See *Sāmkyakārikās* k. 17.

13 PVV 425, 9-11: *nanv īstaśabdenānistasya sarvasya nirāsāt / śāstropagatasyāpi vādyanistasyāsādhyatvam siddham / tan niṣphalam svayampadam ity āha / vyavaccheda-phalatvāc chabdānām īstaśabdāt...*

14 PV-k(II) *svayamśrutenāha*; PV-k(III), Miy. *svayam śruteḥ*.

“All which is intended by anyone other [than the proponent] is excluded, but nonetheless, in the [*Pramānasamuccaya*]vṛtti, [Dignāga] explained eliminating the persistence of doubt [as the need] for the word *svayam*.¹⁵ And this [word *svayam*] was composed [by him] for that purpose [i.e. refuting wrong conceptions].”¹⁶

Dharmakīrti’s k. 30 is a reply to an objection broadly similar to Uddyotakara’s attack on the explanation of *svayam* in Dignāga’s *Vādaividhānaṭīkā*: it is absurd to say “himself” when the rest of the sentence makes this redundant.¹⁷ Dharmakīrti replies that strictly speaking *īṣṭa* does also ensure that it is the proponent himself; *svayam* is thus not needed for the logical equivalence between the definiens and definiendum, but rather serves to eliminate a seductive misunderstanding, namely, that the school’s tenets as found in treatises are also being proven. This understanding of *svayam* will be taken up again in k. 42 *et seq.*, and will form a key element in Dharmakīrti’s views on inference being independent of scripture.

(31) *viśeṣas tad vyapekṣātaḥ*¹⁸ *kathito dharmadharminoh /
anuktāv api vāñchāyā bhavet prakaraṇād gatiḥ //*

“That [which is intended] is said to be a quality (*viśeṣa*) of the property [to be proved] (*dharmā*) or of the subject (*dharmīn*) according to how one regards [it]. Although the intention might not be [explicitly] stated, it would be understood from the context of the discussion (*prakaraṇa*).”

15 Cf. PVBh 495, 8-9: *ata eva svayamgrahaṇasya śāstranivṛttir eva prajoyanam uktam /.*

16 PVV 425, 16-17: *eṣā svayamśrutiḥ tadarthikā vipratipattinirākaraṇārthā kṛtā.*

17 Note that Dignāga gave two explanations for the term *svayam* in his definitions of the thesis: In the *Nyāyamukha* (*ad k. 1*) and the *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* versions (both of which Dharmakīrti comments upon in PV IV), Dignāga took *svayam* as qualifying *īṣṭa* / *īṣṭita* and thus maintained that *svayam* guaranteed that the thesis was *intended* by the proponent himself, independent of treatises (*śāstrānapekṣa*); in the *Vādaividhānaṭīkā*, however, *svayam* was joined to *sādhayitum īṣṭaḥ* to ensure that it is indeed the proponent, and not someone else, who will *establish* the thesis. For the *Vādaividhānaṭīkā*’s position see NV 281, 16-17; Frauwallner (1933) p. 302: *yad api vādaividhānaṭīkāyām sādhayitūḥ śabdasya svayam pareṇa ca tulyatvāt svayam iti viśeṣanam /* “In the *Vādaividhānaṭīkā* there is also the following: “The word *sādhayati* is indifferent with regard to oneself and another, and hence the qualifier, *svayam*.”” Uddyotakara, in NV *ad* 1.1.33 (281, 12 *et seq.*) criticized both Dignāga’s versions of *svayam* separately, and in particular argued that the *Vādaividhānaṭīkā*’s use was redundant, as absurd as saying “I am myself going to bathe”, when “I am going to bathe” would suffice. On Dignāga’s authorship of the *Vādaividhānaṭīkā* see Hattori (1968) pp. 9-10.

18 PV-k(II) *tad vyapekṣatvāt.*

Cf. PVin P. 288b 3-6.¹⁹ We have not followed Miyasaka in taking *tadvya-peksātaḥ* as a compound. We also differ from Watanabe (1977) on this point and in *not* taking *viśeṣaḥ*, but rather *tad*, as the subject of *kathitaḥ* (*kathito*). In spite of the *prima facie* normalcy of reading *tadvyapekṣātaḥ*, this and Watanabe's Japanese translation cannot be adopted: (1) They do not concord with the Tibetan of PV, *de ni ltos nas chos dag dan // chos can khyad par yin par brjod*, which clearly takes *de = tad* as the subject of *brjod = kathitaḥ*; PVin is analogous to PV Tib. in this respect. (2) The commentators on both PV and PVin do not explain the compound *tadvyapekṣātaḥ*, but rather simply *vyapekṣātaḥ*; indeed, Manorathanandin's commentary to k. 31 shows that he read *sa* instead of *tad*, making *sa* the correlative of *ya evecchayā viśayīkrtaḥ*. (3) In fact, it is syntactically quite possible that *tad* is the subject, but that *kathitaḥ* becomes masculine due to *attraction de genre*, i.e. its gender was influenced by the masculine noun, *viśeṣaḥ*, figuring in the predicate. For examples of this phenomenon, see §369 paragraph *a*) in L. Renou (1975).²⁰

The general philosophical background for k. 31ab is as follows: Dignāga, in PS III and the *Nyāyamukha*, had spoken of four sorts of contradictory reasons (*viruddhahetu*), viz. (1) those which prove the opposite of the *dharma* itself (*dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana*), (2) those proving the opposite of a quality of the *dharma* (*dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*), (3) those proving the opposite of the *dharmin* itself (*dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*) and (4) those proving the opposite of a quality of the *dharmin* (*dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana*).²¹ Recall that in the Sāṃkhya argument under discussion, the proponent speaks of the eyes being for the benefit of another (*parārtha*). However, for him “another” has the

19 *da ni ji ltar ma thos na bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'dod pa yin no zés rtogs sé na / skabs kyi so // dper na 'dus pa mams gzan gyi don yin par grub pa ni bdag gi don ñid bzin no // de ni ma smras su zin kyan 'dod pas khyab pa'i bsgrub par bya ba yin no zés bstan pa'i phyir 'dod pa smos so // de[1] ñid ltos pa las chos dan chos can gyi khyad par du bsad pa yin te / 'di dag ni 'dus pa ma[2] yin pa'i yul can gzan gyi don yin no zés brjod pas na chos kyi khyad par du ñe bar gzuñ ba'i phyir[3] de[4] de'i khyad par yin la[5] / mig la sogs pa 'dus pa ma yin pa'i don dag ni / gzan gyi don du 'gyur ba yin no zés bya ba ni chos can gyi khyad par yin no // ([1]P. 'di [2] P. omits ma [3] P. omits phyir [4] P. omits de [5] D. no [D. 190b 4-6]).*

20 Renou (1975), p. 500: “L'accord grammatical attendu est souvent rompu par attraction de forme, de contiguïté, ou par quelque influence de sens ... a) Accord contigu du verbal avec le prédicat, *tvam me mitram jātam* Pañc[atantra] IV 7 14.”

21 See PS III, k. 27: *chos dan chos can ran ño bo // yan na de yi khyad par mams // phyin ci log tu sgrub pa'i phyir // gnod pa med la 'gal ba yin // (= NM k. 9). See also NP §3.2.3; Katsura (1979) p. 78ff. as well as Kitagawa (1973) pp. 205-217.*

quality (*viśeṣa*) that it is one “who is not composed (*asamhata*)”, namely, the *ātman*. The reason, “being a composite” (*samghāatva*) then becomes contradictory in that it will not prove *parārthatva* qualified in this way: instead, it will prove the opposite, viz. that they are for the benefit of another who is composed – consciousness is composed in that it is made up of temporal parts.

Now, there are various ways of formulating the Sāṃkhya’s argument depending upon whether we take the quality (*viśeṣa*), *asamhatatva*, as being of the *dharma* or of the *dharmin*: nonetheless the Sāṃkhya’s intended proposition remains the same. According to Devendrabuddhi, the fact that the intention is the *sādhya*, and that this intention does not vary, leads to the following objection, which k. 31 will seek to answer: “If the *sādhya* is just what the proponent intends, then there would no longer be [different sorts of] contradictory [reasons] such as *dharmaviśeṣaviparīta-sādhana*, etc. If one and the same combination [of *dharmin* and *dharma*] were the *sādhya*, then the *sādhana* which prove the opposite of those [*sādhya*] would, therefore, also be the same.”²² Faced with this objection, Dharmakīrti seems to nuance the principle that the intention is the *sādhya*: it is in reality the *sādhya* and remains the same, but admits of differences in verbal expression; the distinction between *dharmaviśeṣa* and *dharmiviśeṣa* here stems from our verbal formulation.²³ The quality

- 22 PVP P. 328a 7-8: *gal te rgol bas 'dod pa ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin pa de'i tshe / chos kyi khyad par phyin ci log tu sgrub par byed pa la sogs pa 'gal ba mams yod pa ñid ma yin no // gal te tshogs pa gcig bsgrub par bya ba yin pa[1] de bas na de las bzlog pa'i sgrub[2] par byed pa yañ gcig ñid yin no ze na // ([1] P. yin [2] P. bsgrub [D. 275b 6-7]).* The Skt. of *gal te rgol bas ... yod pa ñid ma yin no* is found in PVV-n ad k. 31, n. 1: *yadi vādinesta eva sādhyas tadā dharmaviśeṣaviparītasāadhanādinām viruddhānām asambhava evety āha*. Cf. the explanations in PVBh 495, 13-14: *nanu sa viśeso dharmadharminor na sādhyo sādhyarve viśeṣatā katham / na sādhyaviśeṣayor ekatā / uktam cācāryena "dharmaviśeṣaviparyayasāadhanād dhi viruddha" ityādi /*. Note that Prajñākaragupta cites part of PS III, k. 27 = NM k. 9. “[Objection:] But surely this is a quality of the *dharmin* or *dharma*, but is not the *sādhya*. If it were the *sādhya* how could it be a quality? The *sādhya* and the quality are not the same. Now, the Master [Dignāga] did say, ‘it is contradictory because it establishes the opposite of the quality of the *dharma*, etc.’”
- 23 PVin P. 288b 6-7: *de ltar mam par bzag pa tsam zig tha dad par zad kyi don ni ma yin no //* “In this way there is nothing but the mere presentation which differs, but not the proposition (*don* = *artha*).” If we follow Dharmottara, what seems to be invoked here is the general Dharmakīrtian principle that making connections between qualities and quality-possessors is never based on anything other than words. The *artha* itself is indivisible and admits of no such distinctions. Cf. PVinT 18b 5-8: *skabs kyi rten du gyur pa'i bsgrub par bya'i chos 'di ñid ni btos pa las chos dañ chos can gyi khyad par yin no // dños po las khyad par dañ khyad par can gyi 'brel ba yod pa ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyañ sgra'i yul ñid do // des na ma zin pa'i don ñid ni 'ga' yañ khyad par ma yin no // gañ gi*

asamhatatva can be regarded as of the *dharma* or of the *dharmin*: if one construes the argument as “the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of ‘another’ which refers to something uncomposed (*cakṣurādīnām asamhataviṣayam pārārthyam*)”, this will be a case of *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhana*, and *asamhataviṣaya* will be a quality of the *dharma*, *pārārthya*. However, if one interprets the argument as “the eyes, etc., which are for the benefit of another, are for the benefit of something uncomposed (*parārthāḥ santaś cakṣurādayo ’samhatārthāḥ*), this would be *dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana* in that *asamhatārthāḥ* would be a quality of the *dharmin*, *parārthās santaś cakṣurādayah*.²⁴

(PVV’s introduction to k. 32): “What fault is there in the debate about [the eyes, etc.] being for the benefit of the *ātman* (*ātmārthatva*)? [Reply:]”²⁵

(32) *ananvayo ’pi dr̥ṣṭānte doṣas tasya yathoditam*²⁶ /
ātmā paraś cet so^{26a} *’siddha iti tatrestaghatakṛt*²⁷ //

“This [viz. being for the benefit of the *ātman*] also has the fault that there is no positive concomitance (*anvaya*) [of the *sādhyadharmā* and the reason] in the example. As [Vasubandhu] had explained: ‘If the *ātman* is [what is meant by] “another” (*para*), then this [*ātman*] is not established [in the example].’ In that case [the reason] would refute what is intended (*īṣṭaghatakṛt*).”

tshe sgras chos kyi yul du ñe bar ’god pa de’i tshe ni chos kyi khyad par yin la / gan gi tshe chos can gyi yul du ’god pa de’i tshe chos can gyi khyad par yin pa’i phyir sgras ñe bar bkod pa la bltos te gñi ga’i khyad par du ’gyur ba yin no // “This very *sādhyadharmā* which is the basis of the discussion [i.e. *asamhatatva*] is a quality of the *dharma* or of the *dharmin* according to how one regards [it]. There are no connections between qualities and quality-possessors which are due to [real] entities, but rather they only concern words. Consequently, the same unexpressed meaning [i.e. *asamhatatva*] admits of no differences whatsoever. When one verbally presents it as concerning the *dharma* it is then a quality of the *dharma*; when one presents it as a quality of the *dharmin* it is then a quality of the *dharmin*. Thus, it becomes a quality of either in regard to (*bltos*) its verbal presentation.”

24 See PVV 425, 23-25. Cf. PVT 315a 2-3, which gives a similar explanation of the two *vyapeksā* (*bltos pa*): *bltos pas zes bya ba ni de ltar gzan gyi don ñid yin na / de dag ni gzan gyi don byed pa ñid ’dus pa’i yul can ma yin no zes bya ba’i bltos pa ’di la chos kyi bye brag ste / mig la sogs pa gzan gyi don du gyur pa ’dus pa’i don can ma yin no / chos can gyi tshig gi sgras don bstan pa la bltos pa la chos can gyi bye brag yin no //*

25 PVV 426,6: *ātmārthatvasya vivāde ko doṣa ity āha /*

26 PV-k(III), Miy. *yathoditah*.

26^a Miy. *cetso*.

27 PV-k(II) *īṣṭaghatavat*.

Cf. PVin P. 289a 2-3.²⁸ Dharmakīrti now takes up the critique of the argument as it was actually intended by the Sāṃkhya, i.e. with *ātmārthatva* as the real meaning of *pārārthya*. There are two faults. (1) No *anvaya*. This critique had been put forward earlier by Vasubandhu, and indeed Dharmakīrti actually cites a passage from what is presumably Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstrī* or, less probably, his *Vādaśāstrī*: *ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhah*.²⁹ The problem turns on the two sorts of concomitance, positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*)³⁰, figuring in the Buddhist account of valid logical reasons – *anvaya* between the reason and *sādhyadharmā* (“property to be proved”) means that wherever the former occurs so does the latter. Now, while such a principle is to be established on the basis of particular examples, in the Sāṃkhya's argument there will not in fact be any *anvaya* in the example, because the *sādhyadharmā* will not occur in, or qualify, the example: seats, etc. are not established as being for the benefit of “another”, if this means the *ātman*. (2) The reason, “because they are composite” would be a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*) in that it would prove the opposite of the intended *sādhyā*. In other words, “being composite” would prove that the eyes, etc. are *not* for the benefit of another – the so-called “other” (*para*) of the *sādhyā* simply does not exist if it is taken as being the *ātman*.

The latter refutation had already been developed in Dignāga's PSV *ad* PS III, and Dharmakīrti, in what seems to have been a deliberate echo of Dignāga, used the Dignāgean terminology *istavighātakṛt* (“[reason] which refutes what is intended”). Dignāga had mentioned *istavighātakṛt* as a

28 *ji skad bśad pa'i chos dan chos can gyi khyad par la ni rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i skyon 'dod pa ñid de / ji skad du bdag gzan yin no ze na ni de ma grub pa'o zes bśad pa yin no // 'gal ba'i chos kyan 'dod pa de ñid la gnod par byas pa yin no //* (D. 191a 2-3).

29 See PVBh 494, 23 and 496, 6. Cf. PVin n. 28. This is not to be found in the fragments given in Frauwallner (1933) and (1957b). Note that Manorathanandin mixes his own commentary with the actual quotation; Dharmottara does likewise, as is apparent by the fact that their commentarial additions differ. PVV 426, 11-12: *yathoditam ācāryavasubandhunā / parārthāś caksurādaya ity atra paraś ced ātmā vivakṣitah so 'siddho drstānta iti*. “As Ācārya Vasubandhu had explained: When it is said that the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of another, then if the *ātman* is what is meant by ‘another’, this [*ātman*] is not established in the example [i.e. seats, beds, etc.]” Dharmottara's comment makes it clear that *so 'siddhah* is to be taken as meaning *ātmā 'siddho drstānte*. PVinT 20a 2-3: *slob dpon dbyig gr̄ien gyis ci skad du gzan gyi don ces bya ba 'dir gal te pha rol po bdag gzan gyi sgras brjod par 'dod na bdag de ni ma grub pa'o zes bśad pa yin no /*

30 Cf. Katsura (1983) p. 541: “In Indian philosophy *anvaya* and *vyatireka* jointly make up a sort of method of induction. They may be formulated as follows: ‘When *x* occurs, *y* occurs (*anvaya*), and when *x* is absent, *y* is absent (*vyatireka*).’”

separate category of *viruddhahetu*, and in PSV *ad* PS III k. 22 and 26 gave the Sāṃkhya argument as an example: subsequently, in *Nyāyabindu* III, however, Dharmakīrti explicitly took the position that there was no point in taking *istavighātakṛt* as a separate sort of *viruddhahetu* as it was the same as the other two sorts in proving the opposite of the *sādhya*.³¹

(PVV's introduction to k. 33:) [Objection:] "Being for the benefit of the *ātman* (*ātmārthatva*) is not the *sādhya*. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"³²

(33) *sādhanaṃ yadvivādena*³³ *nyastam tac cen na sādhyate /*
kim sādhyam anyathānistam bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā //

"Suppose that when a *sādhana* is presented because of a dispute about a certain [proposition³⁴], that [proposition] is [nonetheless] not being proven. Then what is being proven (*sādhya*)? Otherwise [if the proposition in dispute were not the *sādhya*], then either [the *sādhya*] would be something unintended, or [the *sādhana*] would be completely superfluous."³⁵

Cf. PVin P. 289a 2-3.³⁶ The opponent now argues that *ātmārthatva* is not the *sādhya* because it is not stated. Dharmakīrti replies that in that case there is the following dilemma: (1) The Sāṃkhya's argument is proving something which he does not intend, viz. the contrary of *ātmārthatva* / *asamhatapārārthya*. (2) If the *sādhana*, "being composite", really did prove *pārārthya* as it is literally stated, i.e. without any qualifications, there would ensue the fault of redundancy, or *siddhasādhana*, "proving what is already established": the Buddhist himself would accept that version of *pārārthya* – one which is not taken as meaning *ātmārthatva* / *asamhatapārārthya*. As Dharmakīrti himself put it in the *Pramāna-*

31 See PSV(b) P. 131b 7-132a 1, 133a 8-133b 8, Kitagawa 494, 499-500; NB III, 89-91.

32 PVV 426, 13: *ātmārthatvam na sādhyam ity āha*.

33 Ego *yadvivādena*: Miy. *yadvivāde na*. Both readings find some commentarial support. Manorathanandin's PVV clearly commented upon *yadvivāde na nyastam*, but Devendrabuddhi suggests the instrumental *yadvivādena*. See PVP P. 328b 6: *gṛān yañ / gal te gañ la rtsod[1] pa yis / don gañ la rtsod pas te /...* ([1] P. *bitsad* [D. 276a 3]). See n. 36 for PVin. As for PV Tib., note that Miyasaka opted for D. *rtsod pa yin*, but P.N. do read the instrumental *yis*; moreover, P.D.N. do not support *na nyastam*. Watanabe also seems to have read *yadvivādena*, which makes better philosophical sense than Manorathanandin's interpretation.

34 PVP *don gañ la*. See n. 33.

35 PVV 426, 17-18: *anyathā vivādavisayo yadi na sādhyam tadānistam viparyayasiddhiḥ syāt /*. PVV 427, 2-3: *sādhanaivaiphalyam eva vā syāt /*.

36 *ma brjod pa'i phyir de yañ bsgrub par bya ba ma yin no ze na / gal te gañ la rtsod pas[1] sgrub par byed pa bkod pa de bsgrub par bya ba ma yin na bsgrub par bya ba ci yin / de ltar yin na phyin ci log tu grub pa'am don med par 'gyur te /* ([1]P. *rtsod pa* [D. 191a 3-4]).

vinīścaya, “They [i.e. the Buddhists] accept that composites accomplish the benefit of another, and thus the *sādhana* is superfluous.”³⁷

- (34) *sadvitīyaprayogeṣu niranvayaviruddhate*³⁸ /
etena kathite sādhyam sāmānyenātha sammatam //
 “In the case of the reasonings concerning ‘having a companion’ (*sadvitīyaprayoga*), [the faults of] no *anvaya* and contradictoriness have been pointed out by means of the above [remarks]. But suppose that the *sādhyā* [*sadvitīyatva*] is held generally (*sāmānyena*).”

Cf. PVin P. 289a 8-b 3.³⁹

- (35) *tad evārthāntarābhāvād dehānāptau na sidhyati*⁴⁰ /
*vācyam sūnyam*⁴¹ *pralapatām tad etaj jādyacintitam*⁴² //
 “This very [*sadvitīyatva*] is not established, for when the body does not obtain there is not another object (*arthāntara*). This [*sadvitīyatva*] of those who prattle vacuities was invented because of stupidity.”

Cf. PVin P. 289b 5-6 and 290b 1.⁴³ This section of PV IV (k. 34-41), still centered on the word *īṣṭa* in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis, is specifically directed against the Cārvāka’s use of a sophisticated type of argumentation known as the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, “a reasoning concerning ‘having a companion’”.⁴⁴ Relying on the presentation of the argument in

37 Cf. PVin P. 289a 7: *de dag ’dus pa gzan gyi don byed par ni khas blaṅs pa’i phyir / sgrub par byed pa ’bras bu med pa yin no* // (D. 191a 6-7).

38 PV-k(I) *niranvayo virudhyate*.

39 *’dis ni gñis pa dañ bcas pa’i sbyor ba mams la yañ rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i ñes pa bśad pa yin te / dper na bum pa ni mñon par gsal[1] ba’i sems pa can[2] lus kyi mtshan ñid kyi skyes bu dañ bum pa gañ yañ ruñ bas gñis pa dañ bcas pa[3] yin te / ut pa la ma yin pa’i phyir rtsig pa bžin no žes bya ba la / rtsig pa ni de lta bur gyur pa’i skyes bus gñis pa dañ bcas par[4] ma grub pa bžin no // ’on te spyi bsgrub par bya bar[5] ’dod pa’i phyir khyad par ’phen pa ma yin no že na / ’di la ni de mi ’phen na sgrub par byed pa’i ’bras bu ci yin / yañ na ni mi ’dod par ’gyur ro žes bśad zin to // ([1]P. bsal [2]P. sems can [3]D. pas [4]D. pa [5]D. ba [D. 191a 7-b 3]).*

40 Miy. *sidhyate*.

41 PV-k(II) *vācyasūnyam*.

42 PV-k(I),(II) *varmitam*.

43 P. 289b 5-6: *mam pa de lta bu’i lus bum pa las don gzan gyi no bor khas mi len na spyi sgrub pa yañ mi srid de / gañ yañ ruñ ba’i don gzan gyi no bo med pa’i phyir ro /* (D. 191b 5). P. 290 b1: *de’i phyir tshig gi tshul ni gsog yin no* // (D. 192b 1).

44 Literally, *sadvitīya* = “having a second”. Commentators gloss *dvitīya*, however, as meaning “a companion”. Cf. PVinT 21a 4: *gñis pa dañ bcas pa ste zla bo dañ bcas pa’o* //. Watanabe (1977) is a study on this argument in Dharmakīrti and elsewhere; we have also discussed it in some detail in an article entitled “Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms”, *Proceedings of the Second Dharmakīrti Conference*, Vienna 1991, 403-413. Steinkellner (1980) pp. 292-294 gives two Sanskrit fragments from Śākyaṃati’s PVT

the *Pramānaviniścaya* (see n. 39) and the commentaries to PV, we can ascertain that the Cārvāka's reasoning was as follows: *abhivyaktacaitanya-śārīralaksanapurūṣaghatayor anyatareṇa sadvīṭyo ghataḥ / anutpalatvāt / kudyavat /* "A vase has a companion in the form of (a) either a vase or (b) a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements], because it [i.e. the vase] is not an *utpala* [flower], like a wall."⁴⁵

Before proceeding further with the Cārvāka version, however, it is worthwhile to make it clear that *sadvīṭya*-style reasonings were by no means restricted to that Materialist school. We see that Dharmakīrti, in the *Vādanyāya*, also argued against a Mīmāṃsaka who tried to prove that sound is permanent by using a *sadvīṭya*-style reasoning: *jaiminipratijñātattvanityatādhikaranaśabdaghatānyatarasadvīṭyo ghataḥ* "The vase has a companion in the form of either (a) a vase or (b) a sound which is accepted by Jaimini as being a locus for [its] true nature, permanence."⁴⁶ Indeed, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, and especially Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga*, also show the *sadvīṭyaprayoga* being used by an adversary who sought to argue against sound's impermanence, and in Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasamgrahapañjikā*, we find it being used (in a slightly different manner) by the Naiyāyika, Aviddhakarṇa, to argue against Dignāga's twofold division of *pramānas* and *prameyas*.⁴⁷ In PV, VN and Cakradhara the argued for conclusions differ, but the logical strategy is essentially the same: a kind of bogus dilemma – expressed by *anyatarasadvīṭyatva* – where the alternative that the *dharmin*, the vase, has itself as its own companion is quickly ruled out in favour of the other alternative, which contains the proposition which the proponent actually wants us to believe.

explaining the *sadvīṭyaprayoga*, one of which has been translated in our article.

45 Sanskrit given in Steinkellner (1980) pp. 292-293. PVV's and PVBh's versions contain a number of obvious errors. For the details, see Appendix II in our article "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms".

46 VN 66, 15-17: *nityaḥ śabdo 'nityo veti vāde dvādaśalaksanaprapaṅca-prakāśanaśāstrapranetuh jaiminipratijñātātattva-nityatādhikaranaśabdaghatānyatarasadvīṭyo ghata iti pratijñām uparacayya dvādaśalaksanārthavyākhyānam* * / *Shāstrī: *laksanādivyākhyānam*.

47 See *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* (Ed. N.J. Shah) p. 64, 12-14; *Tattvasamgrahapañjikā ad k. 1583-1585*, pp. 556-557 (ed. D. Shāstrī). For the details see our "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms".

Let us now try to summarize how the Cārvāka uses this (pseudo-) dilemma to arrive at his desired conclusion. (For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of “being accompanied by ...” instead of the more literal “having a companion in the form of ...”.)

(a) Obviously, a vase is not an *utpala* flower. Hence the *pakṣadharmatva* holds: the reason, *anutpalatva*, qualifies the *dharmin*, the vase.

(b) The Cārvāka then uses various tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic, first to establish the general principle (*vyāpti* “pervasion”), and later to show that for Cārvāka and Buddhist alike the demand for *vyāpti* in inferences can never in fact be satisfied.

(c) A vase cannot be accompanied by itself – *sadvitīyatva* necessitates difference – and therefore it must be accompanied by the person.

(d) If the vase is accompanied by a person whose mind is just a manifestation of the elements, then the Materialist view on what people are is correct, with the result that all rebirth is impossible, for such a person (who is not different from his body) would be destroyed at the time of death.

Dharmakīrti’s first line of attack (i.e. in k. 34bc) is to invoke the same twofold critique which he had just applied to the Sāṃkhya’s argument.

(1) No *anvaya* in the example. The actual *sādhya* which the Cārvāka intends is “having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements]”. However, just as in the Sāṃkhya reasoning, the really intended *sādhya* has no *anvaya* in the example: the wall is not accompanied by the Cārvāka’s version of the “person”: for a Buddhist, this Materialist version of the person simply does not exist. (2) *viruddhahetu*. The Buddhist will admit that a wall can be accompanied by a vase. But if *ghatena sadvitīyatva* had *anvaya* in the example, the reason would prove the contrary of what the Cārvāka actually intended. In effect, if it were established that the vase was accompanied by itself, the Cārvāka could not exploit the disjunction conveyed by *anyatara* to prove the Materialist version of the person, i.e. his actual *sādhya*. The logic can be presented as follows: *anyatara* means one – but not both – of *A* or *B*. Hence, in the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, if we established that the vase was the “companion”, *ipso facto* it would be proven that the person is not. As in the Sāṃkhya’s argument, which was criticized in k. 32 as leading to *īṣṭavighātakṛt*, here too the reason would be a *viruddhahetu*.⁴⁸

48 See PVV 427, 9-12: *tatra ca niranvayaviruddhate kathite / tathā hy abhivyaktacaitanya-dehalakṣanapuruseṇa sadvitīyatvam sādhyam / tena ca kudye 'nvayo na drṣṭa iti niranvayaiā / ghātasya tu kudye 'nvayo drṣṭa iti tena sadvitīyatvasādhanāt viruddhatā*

We now come to k. 34d: “But suppose that the *sādhya* [*sadvitīyatva*] is held generally”. This begins what we, in point (b) of our summary above, have termed the use of “tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic” to establish pervasion (*vyāpti*). The Cārvāka argues that the *sādhyadharmā*, or “property to be proved”, is simply *sadvitīyatva*, “having a companion”, rather than “having a companion in the form of either a vase or a person, etc. etc.”⁴⁹ Even so, how would pervasion hold between the reason, *anutpalatva*, and the *dharma*, *sadvitīyatva*? Probably the Cārvāka’s initial strategy, in k. 34, is to argue that there is such a pervasion because all things, such as walls and vases, etc., which are not *utpala* flowers, do “have a companion” in the sense that they are generally accompanied by something; they are not absolutely alone.⁵⁰ Subsequently, in k. 37cd-40, however, he will give a variety of arguments

syāt / “Now, here no *anvaya* and contradictoriness have been pointed out. As follows: ‘having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body with a manifested consciousness’ is the *sādhya*. And thus positive concomitance [of the reason and this *sādhya*] in [the example,] the wall, is not observed: hence there is no *anvaya*. For the vase, however, the *anvaya* in [the example,] the wall, is observed: thus, because [the reason] would prove ‘having a companion in the form of the latter [i.e. the vase]’ it would be contradictory.”

49 There are some differences amongst the commentators in their phrasing of this *sādhya*. Cf. PVV 427, 17-18: *atha sāmānyena viśeṣam anulikhya sadvitīyatvam sādhyam kudye sadvitīyatvamātrenānvayāt* / “But suppose that *sadvitīyatva*, taken generally, without specifying any particular cases, is the *sādhya*, because there is *anvaya* [of the reason] with mere *sadvitīyatva* in [the example], the wall.” PVinT 21b 1: *’on te spyir spyi dari ldan pa’i gñis pa ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi / skyes bur gyur pa’i gñis pa dañ bcas pa zes khyad par ’phen pa min[1] no ze na / ([1]P. yin)* “[Objection:] ‘Being a companion’ (*dvitīyatva*), taken generally (*spyir = spyi dari ldan pa’i*), is the *sādhya*, but one does not specify the particular case, ‘companion (*dvitīya*) in the form of a person’”. While Maṅorathanandin and Dharmottara speak of *sadvitīyatva/dvitīyatva*, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati speak of *anyatarāthāntaratva* (“being another object which is either”). PVP P. 329a 5-6: *don gžan gañ yañ ruñ ba spyir bsgrub par bya bar ’dod pa des khyad par can ’phen[1] par byed pa ma yin phyir skyon yod pa ma yin no ze na / ([1]D. ’phel [D. 276b 1])*. Cf. PVT fragment 2 in Steinkellner (1980) p. 293: *anyatarāthāntaratvam sāmānyam ghate sādhyadharmīni kudye ca drstāntadharmīny upanītam iti*. This *arthāntaratva* is simply another way of saying *dvitīyatva*.

50 Cf. PVinT 21a6-8: *rtsig pa la ni gñis ka yañ yod pa’i phyir rjes su ’gro ba dañ ldog pa dag grub pa yin la / ut pa la ma yin pa ñid ni phyogs kyi chos yin no // spyir gñis pa dañ bcas pas ni khyab pa yin te / des na rjes su ’gro ba med pa’i ñes pa med ciñ bum pa ñid ni bum pa gñis pa dañ bcas pa ma[1] yin pa’i phyir śugs kyis de lta bur gyur pa’i skyes bur ’gyur ba yin no zes bya ba de la /... ([1]P. omits ma)*. “Because the wall also has a companion, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are established. Not being an *utpala* is the *paksadharmā*. It [i.e. not being an *utpala*] is pervaded by having a companion, taken generally. So therefore, the fault of no *anvaya* does not occur, and since the vase itself does not have a second vase [i.e. a companion-vase], then indirectly there would be a person of the sort [which the Materialist describes].” For PVV see n. 49.

to show that the Buddhist logician is equally vulnerable to charges of no *anvaya* and *viruddhahetu*, and that *vyāpti* is never really established in any inference; no doubt, *en filigrane* in this discussion is the Cārvāka's well-known tenet that inference is not a *pramāṇa*.

The Cārvāka justifies taking the *sādhya* as simply *sadvitīyatva* (or *anyatarasadvitīyatva*) by saying that for him, just as for a Buddhist logician, the *sādhya* must be taken generally (*sāmānyena*), free from all qualifications concerning particular cases: the universal (*sāmānya*) at stake here is best understood as *dvitīyatva* ("being a companion"), or equivalently, *arthāntaratva* ("being another object"; see n. 49). Dharmakīrti, in k. 35ab, then replies that the body, as understood by the Cārvākas, is inexistent, and thus, there is no other object (*arthāntara*) separate from a vase which could serve as the companion so that we could then speak of "having a companion" (*sadvitīyatva*). PVin and PVBh explain that the point turns on the Buddhist logicians' repudiation of real, independently existing universals: universals can never exist anywhere apart from their instantiations (*vyakti*), and thus the universal, "being a companion" (*dvitīyatva*), cannot exist here if neither the vase nor the person are instantiations of it.⁵¹ The conclusion is that *sadvitīyatva*, as it presupposes the universal *dvitīyatva*, would be nonsensical.

(36) *tulyam nāśe*⁵² 'pi cec chabdaghatābhedenā kalpane /
na siddhena vināśena tadvatāḥ sādhanād dhvaneḥ //

51 PVin P. 290a2-3: 'di'i phyir spyi la bten pa ma yin te / gsal ba thams cad yod par mi srid na de'i spyi mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // dper na bram ze la sogs pa ma yin pa ñid la rigs[1] ñid dam / rtog pa'i śes pa la dbaṅ po la bten pa ñid bzin no // ([1] D. rig [D. 192a 2-3]) "So too, [the *sādhya*] does not partake of (*bten pa* = 'bhāḥ?) the universal [*dvitīyatva*], for when none of the instantiations can exist, their universal is absurd, as for example caste with regard to those who are not Brahmins, etc., or 'partaking of the sense organs' with regard to conceptual cognition. Cf. Dharmottara's gloss on this passage showing that *spyi* (*sāmānya*)⁵² here means *gñis pa ñid* (*dvitīyatva*). PVinT 23b1: 'di la bum par gyur pa dañ skyes bur gyur pa gñis (pa) ñid kyi khyad par med pa'i phyir gñis pa ñid kyi spyi mi 'thad pa yin no / "Because the particular cases of *dvitīyatva*, viz. the vase and the person, do not exist here, the universal, *dvitīyatva*, is absurd." Finally, see PVBh 497, 9-10: *nanu nātra viśeṣāksepah / tad asat / yato dehasyāsiddhau vyaktyabhāvāt kutah sāmānyam / na hi govaktyabhāve sāmānyam* / "[Objection:] But surely particular cases are not mentioned here. [Reply:] This is not correct. Since the instantiations do not exist when the body is not established, how could the universal be? Indeed there is no [cow-]universal in the absence of cow-instantiations."

52 PV-k(III) *nāśo*.

“[Objection:] But it is analogous for the [*sādhyā*] ‘perishability’ too, if one conceives of it in terms of the particular cases, sound and vase. [Reply:] No, it is not [analogous], for through an established perishability there is a proof that sound has this [property, perishability].”

Cf. PVin P. 290b 6.⁵³ The Cārvāka now invokes another pseudo-parallel with Buddhist logic in order to justify taking *sadvitīyatva* without the particularities, *ghaṭa* and *puruṣa*. When a Buddhist proves that sound is perishable because it is produced, like a vase, it is a cardinal principle of his logic that perishability must be taken *simpliciter* as the *sādhya*dharma, and that one should not speak of particular cases. Otherwise, so the Buddhist maintains, if it were sound’s perishability which was being proven, there would be the problem of no *anvaya* in the example: the example, the vase, has perishability taken generally, but not sound’s perishability.⁵⁴ Dharmakīrti replies that the analogy does not hold: the universal, perishability, is established in sound, but *dvitīyatva* / *arthāntaratva* is in neither *ghaṭa* nor *puruṣa*.

(37) *tathārthāntarabhāve syāt tadvān kumbho 'py anityatā /*
*viśistā*⁵⁵ *dhvaninānveti no cen nāyogavāranāt //*

“Similarly, if another object existed [i.e. if one from among the body and the vase were accepted as being the other object⁵⁶], then the vase would also have this [property, *sadvitīyatva*]. [Objection:] Impermanence qualified by sound has no *anvaya* [in the example]. [Reply:] No, [there is no such fault of no *anvaya*,] since we are [just] excluding [sound’s] non-connection (*ayogavāraṇa*) [with the qualifier, impermanence].”⁵⁷

53 *sgra dan bum pa'i khyad par gyis rtogs na ni mi rtag pa la yan mtshuñs so ze na / ma yin te / mi rtag pa ñid grub pas na sgra de dan ldan par sgrub pa'i phyir ro //* (D. 192b 5-6).

54 PVV 428, 3-5: *nāṣe 'pi sādhye śabdaghāṭayoh sādhyadr̥ṣṭāntadharminoh sambandhitayā bhedenā kalpane śabdasambandhino nāśasya ghāṭe 'nvayābhāvād asādhyatvam / ghasambandhinaś ca śabde 'sambhavād asādhyateti tulyam idam iti cet /* “[Objection:] In the case of *sādhyā* ‘perishability’ too, if one conceives of it in terms of particular cases, i.e. as connected with the subjects of the *sādhyā* and of the example, sound and vase [respectively], then perishability connected with sound would not be the *sādhyā*, as there is no *anvaya* [of the reason and sound’s perishability] in the vase. And nor would [perishability] connected with a vase be the *sādhyā*, for it could not occur in sound. Thus this is analogous.”

55 PV-k(I) *viśisto*.

56 Cf. PVin n. 58 and PVinT 28a 3: *gal te lus dan bum pa dag las 'ga' žig don gžan du 'gyur bar khas len yin na ni /*

57 Cf. PVV 428, 17-18: *atha dhvaninā svasambandhitayā viśistānityatā dr̥ṣṭāntam nānvetīti cet / nānanvayadošo viśeṣenāyogasyāsambandhasya vāranāt //*

Cf. PVin P. 290b 6-7.⁵⁸

(38) *dvividho hi vyavacchedo viyogāparayogayoh /
vyavacchedād ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamah*⁵⁹ //

“Indeed, there are two kinds of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*), as there is exclusion of non-connection and exclusion of connections with anything other. But when non-connection is to be excluded, [the fault of] no *anvaya* [of impermanence in the example] will not ensue.”

K. 37ab. If either the vase or the person (taken materialistically) existed as another object, i.e. as a companion to the vase, then *sadvitīyatva* would be established, and the vase would possess this property, just as it possesses perishability. But the vase is not other than itself, and a “body with a consciousness consisting in a manifestation of the elements” is inexistent from the point of view of the Cārvāka’s (non-Materialist) adversary, who holds that consciousness exists as a mental entity distinct from the physical elements making up the body. Manorathanandin points out⁶⁰ that if the body were simply without consciousness, then *sadvitīyatva* could be established: but then, the Cārvāka would, of course, fail to prove his thesis of Materialism.

K. 37cd-38. Next, we have an objection involving the Buddhist theory of the three types of exclusion (*vārana* = *vyavaccheda*), one of which must figure explicitly (via the word *eva*) or implicitly (without *eva*) in any relationship between a qualifier (*viśeṣana*) and qualificand (*viśeṣya*).⁶¹

58 *de bzin du 'ga' zig don gzan du gyur par[1] khas len na gan yan run ba don gzan gyi no bor 'gyur ba yin no* // ([1]D. pas [D.192b 6]). Watanabe (1977) n. 17 cites P. 290a 1-2 in connection with k. 37, which seems wrong.

59 PV-k(II), (III) *ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamah*: PV-k(I), Miy. *ayoge tu nānyenānanvayāgamah*. Although PV-k(I) is supported by PV Tib. (*gzan dan ni rjes 'gro med par 'gyur ma yin*), Devendrabuddhi supports our reading. PVP P. 330a 6-7: *de la mi ldan pa / bzlog la ... rjes 'gro med pa min[1] / bsgrub par bya bas ston pa ma yin no zes bya ba'i tha tshig go* // ([1] Ego min: P.D. yin [D. 277a 5]).

60 PVV 428, 12-14: *yadi punar acetanasvabhāvatayā ghaṭajāṭīyenaiva dehena sadvitīyatvam ghatasya sādhyate tadā sidhyaty eva / tathāvidhasya sadvitīyatvasya siddhatvād vināśavat / kim tu vādino nestasiddhiḥ / dehasya cetanasvabhāvatayā 'siddheḥ* / “Suppose, however, that it were established that the vase had a companion in the form of a body of the very same natural kind as the vase, that is, naturally unconscious. Then [*sadvitīyatva*] would indeed be established, for such a type of *sadvitīyatva* is established just like perishability. But then the proponent’s intended [proposition] would not be proven, since the body would not be established as being naturally conscious.”

61 On the theory of *vyavaccheda*, see Kajiyama (1973), as well as Gillon and Hayes (1982). To take the classic examples of *ayogavyavaccheda* and *anyayogavyavaccheda* mentioned in PVV ad k. 38, the usual intention in uttering the sentence *caitro dhanurdharah* is simply to assert that Caitra is not a non-archer: there can be other archers too. Thus:

The opponent in k. 37cd argues as follows: The Buddhist also incurs the fault of no *anvaya* of the *sādhyadharmā* in the example when he proves that sound is impermanent. He establishes the property impermanence as qualified by sound; but then impermanence, which belongs to sound, cannot also be a property of the example, the vase. Dharmakīrti replies that opponent has misconstrued the type of exclusion in the *sādhyā*: If the proposition “sound is impermanent” implicitly involved *anyayogavyavaccheda* (“exclusion of connections with anything other”), it would exclude connections between impermanence and anything other than sound. In that case, impermanence could not also be a property of the example. However, it is not *anyayogavyavaccheda* which is implicit in this *sādhyā*, but rather *ayogavyavaccheda*: the proposition is merely excluding the non-connection of impermanence with sound, but does not in any way prevent impermanence from being connected with other entities.⁶²

(39) *sāmānyam eva tat sādhyam na ca siddhaprasādhanam /
viśiṣṭam dharminā tac ca na niranvayadoṣavat*⁶³ //

“This universal [i.e. impermanence, etc.] alone is the *sādhyā*. Neither is one proving something [already] established, nor does this [impermanence, etc.], which is qualified by the *dharmin* [through *ayogavyavaccheda*], have the fault of lacking *anvaya* [in the example].”

It is true that particular cases (like sound’s impermanence) would not be properties of the example, and that there would be the fault of no *anvaya*. However, this problem will be avoided by the Buddhist in that only universals, and not particular cases, are being proved. But then it could be argued that this restriction to universals would make inference redundant – we would be proving something which has already been proven to exist. PVV: “[Objection:] Surely the universal, i.e. impermanence, etc., is actually established somewhere; a proof [of it] would be pointless. [Reply:]

“Caitra is an archer”. On the other hand, a speaker will utter *pārtho dhanurdharah* in order to convey that Pārtha is the only excellent archer among the brothers of the Pāṇḍava. Then we would have to translate: “It is Pārtha [alone] who is the archer”. See PV IV, 190-192 translated and discussed in Kajiyama *op. cit.*

62 Cf. Devendrabuddhi *ad* k. 39 (P. 330a 5): ... *zes sñiar bśad zin to* “[this] was already explained earlier.” Indeed, the same objection and reply figures frequently in Dharmakīrti’s works. E.g. PVSV 2, 7-10: *paksasya dharmatve tadviśesanāpeksasyānyatrānanuvrtter asādhāranateti cet / na / ayogavyavacchedena viśesanāt / yathā caitro dhanurdharah / nānyayogavyavacchedena / yathā pārtho dhanurdhara ity ākṣepsyāmah /*. See also PV in Chapter II p. 30, 6 *et seq.*; transl. Steinkellner p. 32.

63 PV-k(III) *niranvayadoṣavat*.

Now, one is not proving something, i.e. impermanence, which is established by merely existing somewhere, for one is proving something unestablished, namely, an exclusion of non-connection with regard to the *dharmin*.⁶⁴

Dharmakīrti, as we saw earlier in the *sadvitīyaprayoga* discussion, does seem to recognize that universals, such as impermanence, are established, or exist, insofar as they exist in some or another *dharmin*. However, from this it does not follow that proving that *sound* is impermanent is pointless, for one is proving something which may as yet be unestablished, viz. that impermanence is present in the *dharmin*, sound. Moreover, because one is establishing the mere exclusion of non-connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*) between sound and impermanence, other entities, like the vase, can also be impermanent: the fault of no *anvaya* in the example does not occur.

(40) *etena dharmidharmābhyām viśiṣṭau dharmadharminau /
pratyākhyāto⁶⁵ nirākurvan dharminy evam asāadhanāt //*

“The [Cārvāka] who refutes [that sound has] the *dharma* [impermanence] qualified by the *dharmin* [sound] or the *dharmin* [sound] qualified by the *dharma* [impermanence] is [himself] rebuffed by this [assertion of Dignāga that what is intended is the *sādhyā*], because one is not proving anything like that of the *dharmin* [sound].”

Cf. PVin P. 290b 7-8.⁶⁶ The opponent (whom Manorathanandin specifies as still being the Cārvāka) continues his attempt to show that the Buddhist also incurs the faults of no *anvaya* and *viruddhahetu*. We now find an obfuscating argument against the Buddhist’s idea of the *sādhyā*, viz. the *dharma* qualified by the *dharmin* (see k. 39). The Buddhist maintains that one intends to prove the simple universal, impermanence

64 PVV 429, 3-6: *nanv anityatādi sāmānyam siddham eva kvacit* sādhanē vaiyarthyaṃ ity āha / na ca siddhasya kvacit sattāmātreṇānityasya prasāadhanam / dharminy ayogavyavacchedasyāsiddhasya prasāadhanāt /* *Cf. PVV-n’s gloss on *kvacit*: *vidyudādau*.

65 Ego *pratyākhyāto*: PV-k(I),(II),(III), Miy. *pratyākhyātau*. Manorathanandin, in PVV 429, 14-15, comments on *pratyākhyāto*: ... *sa evam vadan pratyākhyātaḥ*. See n. 67. The idea, as Manorathanandin shows, is that when the Cārvāka argues that there is no *anvaya* when the *dharma* is construed as qualified by the *dharmin*, etc., he is himself rebuffed by Dignāga’s specification *ista*. Note that while PV Tib. may support the dual, *pratyākhyātau*, the Tibetan in PVP (330b 4-5) is in keeping with PVV: *chos can chos dag gis / chos dañ chos can khyad par can / ’gog par byed pa’i rgol ba bsal ba yin te /*

66 *’dod pa bsgrub byar brjod pa ’dis ni chos dañ chos can dag gis khyad par du byas pa’i chos dañ chos can dag ’gog pa yañ bsal ba yin te / dper na sgra ni mi rtag pa’i sgra dañ ldan pa ma yin pa’am sgra’i mi rtag pa dañ ldan pa ma yin no / ’zes bya ba lta bu ste / chos can la spyi bkag pa ni ’gal ba med pa’i phyir ro //* (D. 192b 6-193a 1).

(*anityatvamātra*), as being present in the *dharmin*, sound. The Cārvāka, however, misrepresents the Buddhist position as being that a *dharma* qualified by a *dharmin* (*dharmiviśiṣṭadharmā*), or vice versa (i.e. *dharmaviśiṣṭadharmin*), is asserted to be present in the *dharmin*. Thus, the *sādhyā* would be either “sound has the impermanence belonging to sound” (*śabdānityatvavān śabdah*), or “sound has sound which is impermanent” (*anityaśabdavān śabdah*). In both cases there would be no positive concomitance (*anvaya*) of the reason with the *dharma* in an example, and thus the reason would prove the contrary of this *sādhyā* and be a *viruddhahetu*. Dharmakīrti, in effect, replies that the problem of no *anvaya* or *viruddha* does not arise: the Buddhist never intends to prove that sound has impermanence belonging to sound or that it has sound which is impermanent: Dignāga’s *īṣṭa* eliminates such unintended properties.⁶⁷

- (41) *samudāyāpavādo hi na dharmīni virudhyate /*
*sādhyam*⁶⁸ *yatas tathā nestam sādhyo dharmo 'tra kevalah //*
 “Indeed, the denial of the combination [of *dharma* and *dharmin*] in the *dharmin* is not contradiction, since the *sādhyā* was not intended in this manner. The *dharma* alone is what is to be proved in this [*dharmin*].”

The Buddhist certainly *does* hold that the combination (*samudāya*) of *dharmin* and *dharma* is the *sādhyā*.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, this combination is not, as the Cārvāka maintained, that of the *dharmin* plus a *dharmiviśiṣṭadharmā* or a *dharmaviśiṣṭadharmin*: it is only of the *dharmin* plus the simple *dharma*, the universal: the Cārvāka’s version was never intended at all. As a result, the fact that the reason would prove the opposite of the type of combination which the Cārvāka advances does not make it a *viruddhahetu*.⁷⁰

67 See PVV 429, 11-15: *etenestasya sādhyatvavacanena dharmidharmābhyām viśiṣṭau dharmadharmīnāv ananvayān nirākurvan cārvāko yathā na śabdānityatvavān śabdo nānityaśabdavān vā śabda iti / na hi śabdānityatvenānityaśabdena vā kvacid ghatādau dr̥ṣṭānte kṛtakatvayānvayo 'sti tata istaviparyāsanād viruddham kṛtakatvam iti sa evam vādan pratyākhyātaḥ katham ity āha / dharmīni śabde evam dharmiviśiṣṭasya dharmasya dharmaviśiṣṭasya vā dharmīno 'sādhanād anityatvamātrasya śabde sādhyatvenestatvāt /* Cf. PVin, n. 66.

68 PV-k(III) *sādhanam*.

69 Cf. PVV 429, 18-19: *dharmamātrasya dharmisādhyatvāt samudāya eva sādhyah /* “Because the mere *dharma* is to be proved of the *dharmin*, the combination alone is the *sādhyā*.”

70 Cf. PVBh 501, 2-3: *na hi dharmīny aparah śabdānityatvasamudāyah śabde sādhyah / tatas tasya nirākarane 'pi na dosah / anityatāmātranirākarane hi dosah /* “Indeed, another combination of sound and impermanence is not being proved of the *dharmin*,

This concludes the discussion of *īṣṭa* in *Pramānasamuccaya*'s definition of the thesis. Dharmakīrti will now comment upon *svayam* – Dignāga's condition that the proponent himself must intend to prove the thesis in question and that it is not merely a proposition to be found in a treatise of his school.

(42) *ekasya dharminaḥ śāstre nānādharmasthitāḥ api / sādhyah syād ātmanaiveṣṭa ity upāttā svayamśrutih*⁷¹ //

"The word 'himself' (*svayamśruti*) was employed with the following in mind: Even though in a treatise (*śāstra*) various *dharmas* might be posited of one [and the same] *dharmin*, what is to be proved (*sādhyā*) would be what is intended by [the proponent] himself alone."

Cf. PVin P. 291a 3-4.⁷² NB III, 42-44: "'*svayam*' means by the proponent who states the *sādhana* at that time. Consequently, the following was meant: although he might state a *sādhana* basing [himself] on some treatise, [and] even though the author of that treatise might have accepted many *dharmas* [as belonging] to that *dharmin*, the *sādhyā* is only that *dharma* which this proponent himself intends to prove at this time, and nothing else."⁷³

Here begins a long argument, very possibly in part directed against Uddyotakara, who argued in the *Nyāyavārttika* against the word *svayam* (see n. 17); the argumentation is generally directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that "because [the proponent] accepts a treatise, everything found there will be the *sādhyā*".⁷⁴ Dharmakīrti will use the

sound. So, even if it is refuted, there is no fault. For, it is when simple impermanence is refuted that there is a fault."

71 PV-k(I),(II),(III), Miy. *svayam śrutih*. The word is a compound.

72 *rañ ñid kyī sgra ni chos can gcig la bstan bcos las chos du ma mam par gźag[1] kyañ rañ ñid bdag ñid 'dod pa de[2] kho na bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi / bstan bcos khas blañs su zin kyañ gźan ni ma yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir /...* ([1] P. bźag [2] D. omits *de* [D. 193a 2-3]).

73 *svayam iti vādinā //42// yas tadā sādhanam āha //43// etena yady api kvacic chāstre sthitah sādhanam āha tacchāstrakāreṇa tasmin dharmīny anekadharmābhyupagame 'pi yas tadā tena vādinā dharmah svayam sādhyatum istah sa eva sādhyo netara ity uktam bhavati //44//*. On the recurrent theme that one *dharmin* has many *dharmas*, cf. e.g. PS I, k. 5 and NM 17-18.

74 PVin P. 291a 5-6: *bstan bcos khas blañs pa'i phyir de la mthoñ ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin no źes dogs pa srid par 'gyur ro /* (D. 193a 5). Although neither Dharmakīrti nor his commentators explicitly identify which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika(s) held this, it seems reasonably clear that Uddyotakara did. He argued, against Dignāga (see n. 10), that if *svayam* showed that the position which the proponent sought to prove was independent of *śāstra* (*śāstrānapekṣa*), then we should ask what is meant by *śāstra*. If the latter meant

term *svayam* to stress the proponent's independence from any doctrinal and dogmatic affiliations whatsoever: the proponent is only responsible for what he intends to prove at the moment of the argument. The implicit anti-dogmatism⁷⁵ here is radical indeed: subsequently, in the discussion of *āpta* (k. 93-108), we find the case of an apostate Mīmāṃsaka who, contrary to his school's tenets, decides to prove that words are impermanent. His "heresy" in denying a cardinal tenet of his school does not constitute a refutation of his thesis.

- (43) *śāstrābhyupagamād eva sarvādānāt*⁷⁶ *prabādhane / tatraikasyāpi doṣaḥ syād yadi hetupratijñāyoh //*
 "Suppose the following is argued⁷⁷: [The proponent] holds all [the *dharmas*] because he does accept the treatise. Consequently, if [a reason] invalidated even one [*dharma*] amongst those [mentioned in the treatise], there would be the fault of the reason and the thesis [each being contradictory]."⁷⁸

what is not contradicted by perception or scripture, then *not* relying on *śāstra* would be tantamount to holding and proving a false view. NV ad 1.1.33, p. 282, 4-8: *yad api svayamśabdena śāstrānapekṣam abhyupagamam darśayati atroktam / kim uktam / parāvajānasyāyuktatvād ity evamādi / kim punaḥ śāstram yadanapekṣam abhyupagamam darśayati / nanu śāstram pratyakṣāgamābhyām aviruddham / āgamas tadanapekṣam abhyupagamam darśayati bruvatā 'pramānakam artham abhyupaiṭity uktam / yaś cāpramānako 'bhyupagamo nāsāv abhyupagantum svasthātmanā yuktah / nāpi pratipādāyitum yukta iti /*

- 75 Stcherbatsky (1958) p. 156, n. 2, explaining Vācaspatimiśra's comments on NV, conveys what dogmatism would be in this Indian context: "If, says Vācaspatimiśra, someone known to be an adherent of the Vaiśeṣika system would appear in a learned society (*pariṣad*) and advance the tenet that the sounds of speech are eternal entities, which is a tenet of the Mīmāṃsaka school against which the Vaiśeṣikas always protested, neither the society nor the official opponent would care to listen. He would not even be allowed to state his argument, he would be declared beaten as soon as he had pronounced the thesis." See *Nyāyavārttikatātparyafikā* p. 282, 24-26.
- 76 PV-k(I) *samādānāt*. Cf. Tib. *thams cad = sarva*.
- 77 I translate the *yadi* non-literally here by "Suppose ... argued". See PVV-n ad k. 43: *yadi tadāparaḥ ślokaḥ*. Cf. PVin, n. 79: *kha cig na re*. Following Bu ston this opponent is a Mīmāṃsaka.
- 78 See PVV 430, 12-13: *śāstrenābhyupagamād eva sarveṣām dharmānām ādānāt parigrahāt vādinā tatra tesu madhye ekasyāpi dharmasyopanyastahetunā bādhane hetupratijñāyor viruddhatā doṣa ucyate //*. Note, however, that PVV's *śāstrenābhyupagamād eva* ("just because there is acceptance by the treatise") is an odd understanding. The Tibetan versions of the other PV and PVin commentaries do not have this instrumental *śāstrena*; cf. PVinT 30a 7 *bstan bcos khas blaṅs pa'i phyir ro*. We have followed PVBh ad k. 43: *yadi śāstram abhyupagatam ity eva śāstrabādhane doṣaḥ pratijñāhetvos tadā...* "Suppose that the treatise is indeed accepted, and that consequently if there is an invalidation of the treatise there will be a fault of the thesis and reason. Then ..."

Cf. PVin P. 291a 6-7.⁷⁹ An opponent might argue against a Vaiśeṣika that the reason, “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*) is contradictory (*viruddha*) when the latter philosopher seeks to prove that *śabda* (“sound”; “words”) is impermanent. In the classic argument *anityah śabdah kṛtakatvāt, kṛtakatva* would also establish that *śabda* is *not* a quality of space (*ākāśagunatva*), because space (*ākāśa*) is permanent and what depends upon it must be permanent too.⁸⁰ However, the Vaiśeṣika’s own treatise says that *śabda* is a quality of space (see VS 2.1.24-26), and hence this proposition must also be the *sādhya*. In that case, because the reason *kṛtakatva* would refute the Vaiśeṣika’s *sādhya*, the reason would be a *viruddhahetu*. Although it is clear that the philosopher being attacked is a Vaiśeṣika here, the Indian commentators do not explicitly identify his attacker. Nonetheless, Bu ston’s commentary to the *Pramānaviniścaya* and Vibhūticandra’s notes to PVV maintain that he is a Mīmāṃsaka⁸¹. The attribution is plausible, given the Mīmāṃsaka’s views that *śabda* is permanent, but in fact this line of attack on the proof of sound’s impermanence is not exclusive to the Mīmāṃsaka. The very same argument is even on occasion used to attack the possibility of inference in general: such is the Cārvāka’s strategy as depicted in Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasamgrahapañjikā ad TS 1456-7*.

We can summarize the logic as follows:

- (1) All which is mentioned in treatises which *A* accepts is *A*’s *sādhya*.
- (2) *śabdākāśagunatva* is mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika’s treatises and hence is also his *sādhya* in the proof of sound’s impermanence by the reason, *kṛtakatva*.
- (3) If sound is *ākāśaguna* then sound is permanent.
- (4) *kṛtakatva* establishes that sound is impermanent and hence that sound is not *ākāśaguna*.
- (5) Therefore, *kṛtakatva* establishes the opposite of the Vaiśeṣika’s *sādhya* and is thus a *viruddhahetu*.

79 *log par rtogs pa yañ mthoñ ba ñid de / kha cig na re bstan bcos las mthoñ ba ni bsgrub par bya ba kho na yin la / de gnod na yañ gtan tshigs dañ dam bca’ ba dag gi skyon yin no zes zer ro / (D. 193a 6).*

80 See PVV-n *ad k. 44, n. 3: ākāśasya nityatvāt tadāśritam ca nityam syāt / tad anityatvena bādhyate / Cf. VS 2.1.27: dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte.*

81 Śākyamati, e.g. speaks of the “author of the Vaiśeṣikaśāstra” (*bye brag pa’i bstan bcos byed pa*) in PVT 318b 3. For the reference to the Mīmāṃsaka, see Bu ston p. 373 which glosses PVin’s *kha cig na re* (see n. 77) as *dpyod pa ba* [= Mīmāṃsaka] *na re*. See also Vibhūticandra, PVV-n *ad k. 44, n. 3*, which speaks of the *vedāpauruṣeyavādin*.

- (44) *śabdanāṣe prasādhye syād gandhabhūḡunatāksateh*⁸² /
hetur viruddho 'prakṛter no ced anyatra sā samā //
 “[Dharmakīrti deduces the following absurdity:] Then, when the perishability of sound is being proven, the reason [‘being a product’ (*kṛtakatva*)] would be contradictory (*viruddha*), because it refutes that smell is a quality of the earth [element] (*gandhabhūḡunatā*). [Objection:] But as [smell’s being a quality of the earth] is not being discussed (*aprakṛti*), [*kṛtakatva*] would not be [contradictory]. [Dharmakīrti replies:] This [fact of not being discussed (*aprakṛti*)] is the same in the other case [viz. sound’s being a quality of space (*ākāśaḡunatva*).]”

Cf. PVin P. 291a 7-8.⁸³ Dharmakīrti accepts that k. 43’s refutation of the Vaiśeṣika is inevitable, *providing* the *sādhyā* is thought to include all properties which the school’s treatises attribute to the *dharmin*. (See Dharmottara’s gloss on PVin given in n. 83.) He then takes the absurd consequences coming from this view of the *sādhyā* one step further: just as⁸⁴ *kṛtakatva* refutes the tenet that *śabda* is *ākāśaḡuṇa*, so *kṛtakatva* would also refute the Vaiśeṣika tenet (cf. VS 2.1.1; 2.2.3) that smell (*gandha*) is a quality of the earth element (*bhūḡunatva*); hence, when proving *anityaḡ śabdāḡ kṛtakatvāt*, *kṛtakatva* would also be contradictory in that it would, in addition, refute the *sādhyā*, *gandhabhūḡunatva*. To this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika exponent of the *sādhyā* being everything found in treatises might retort by saying that *bhūḡunatva* is irrelevant in this context, as it is not being discussed. Dharmakīrti replies that there is no difference between *bhūḡunatva* and *ākāśaḡunatva* on this score: the proponent did not discuss or intend to prove *ākāśaḡunatva* either, but since his *sādhyā* is all which is to be found in his treatises, *śabdākāśaḡunatva* and *gandhabhūḡunatva* are equally his *sādhyā*.

- (45) *athātra dharmī prakṛtas tatra śāstrārthabādhanam /*
atha vādīṣṭatām brūyād dharmidharmādisādhanaiḡ //

- 82 PV-k(I),(III) *gandhe bhūḡunatāksateh*. For PV Tib. we read *dri sa'i yon tan*: P.D.N. Miy. erroneously read *dri za'i yon tan*. *dri za* = *gandharva*.
- 83 *de dag gi ltar na byas nīd ni[1] / sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na[2] dri la sogs pa'i yon tan bzlog pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal bar 'gyur ro //* *skabs ma yin pa'i phyir ma yin no ze na de ni gzan la yan mtshuṅs so //* ([1]D. *kyi* [2]D. omits *na* [D.193a 6-7]). PVinT 30b 4 has an important gloss on PVin’s *de dag* (“they”): *bstan bcos las mthorṅ ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin par smra ba de dag* ... “those who say that everything found in the treatise is the *sādhyā*”.
- 84 Cf. the *yathā* ... *tathā* construction in PVV 430, 14-20.

“[Opponent:] But here [i.e. in the case of *ākāśagunatva*] the *dharmin* [*śabda*] was discussed: in that case there [could] be invalidation of the property found in the treatise. Next, [in answer to Dharmakīrti’s reply that neither *śabdākāśagunatva* nor *gandhabhūgunatva* were intended by the proponent and hence neither were discussed, the adversary] might assert by means of *sādhana*s [i.e. reasons] such as [its] being a *dharma* of the *dharmin* that [*ākāśagunatva*] was [indeed] intended by the proponent.”

Cf. PVin P. 291a 8-291b 2.⁸⁵

(PVV *ad* k. 45:) “[Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika:] But here, i.e. in the case of *ākāśagunatva*, etc., the *dharmin* sound was discussed. In that case, there is invalidation of a property found in the treatise, viz. *ākāśagunatva*, etc. And when this [property] is invalidated the reason will be contradictory (*viruddha*). However, in the case of *bhūgunatva*, the *dharmin* smell was not discussed. Therefore, even if this [*bhūgunatva*] is invalidated, there will be no contradiction. [Dharmakīrti’s reply:] This is no answer. For indeed, the fault is not said to be because the opposite of what the proponent intended [is the case], but rather because of the contradiction with properties [found] in his treatises. And so being discussed [or not] is inapplicable. Rather, because they are not intended by the proponent, this [*bhūgunatva*] and *ākāśagunatva* are the same in not being discussed. Next, by means of *sādhana* [i.e. logical reasons] such as [its] being a *dharma* of the *dharmin*, the adversary might assert that *ākāśagunatva* was [indeed] intended by the proponent. [The *prayoga* is as follows:] since it is a *dharma* of the *dharmin*, or since it is a part of that [*sādhya*samudāya], *ākāśagunatva* was intended by the proponent, just like impermanence.”⁸⁶

Dharmakīrti’s adversary tries to show a dissimilarity between *ākāśagunatva* and *bhūgunatva*, saying that the *sādhya* is not just every property found in the treatise, but rather all properties mentioned in the treatise as pertaining to the particular *dharmin* under discussion.

85 *mi mtshuis te 'dir chos can gyi skabs[1] yin pa'i phyir ro ze na / ... 'on te rgol bas kyañ 'dod pas sgrub par byed do[2] // bsgrub par bya ba spyi'i phyogs gcig tu gyur ba'i khyad par yin pa'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos bzin no ze na / ([1]P. skabs su. PVinT reads skabs. [2]P. sgrub byed PVinT sgrub par byed pa de'i tshe. [D.193a 7-193b 2]).*

86 PVV 431, 9-15: *athātrākāśagunatvātau dharmī śabdah prakṛtah / tatra śāstrārthasyākāśagunatvādeh bādhanam[1] tadbādhanē ca viruddhatā hetoh / bhūgunatve tu gandho dharmy aprakṛta iti tadbādhanē 'pi na virodhah / naiṣa parihārah / tathā hi na vādīstāvipyāsanena doṣa uktah / kim tu śāstrārthavirodhena tathā ca prakṛtatvam anupayuktam / atha vādyanīstatayā 'prakṛtatvam taccākāśagunatvayoh samānam / athākāśagunatvasya vādīstatām paro brūyāt dharmidharmādisāadhanaih / sādhyadharmidharmatvāt tadekadeśatvād vākāśagunatvam iṣtam vādinā[2] 'nityatvavad iti / ([1] PVV sādhanam [2] PVV vādino).*

Therefore, *ākāśagunatva* will be the *sādhya* when the *dharmin* is sound, but *bhūgunatva* will not – it would have necessitated a different *dharmin*, viz. smell. Thus *ākāśagunatva* could be refuted by the reason, *kṛtakatva*, when one is proving that sound is impermanent, but *bhūgunatva* could not be refuted in such a discussion. The *kārikā* does not give Dharmakīrti's own refutation of this argument, but some idea of it can be gleaned from Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's commentaries: (1) The adversary makes the mistake of simply speaking of properties mentioned in treatises as being *sādhya* and does not take the proponent's intentions into account at all. (2) Nonetheless, something's being discussed is a function of what the proponent's intentions are. (3) *śabdākāśagunatva* and *gandhabhūgunatva* are then the same in both being unintended, and hence in not being discussed. Note, however, that the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* has a somewhat different refutation, one which appeals to the fact that neither *ākāśagunatva* nor *bhūgunatva* are connected in reality with the *sādhyadharma*, impermanence.⁸⁷

87 See PVinT 31a 7-31b 2: *ma yin te zes bya ba ni mtshuñs pa ñid do // chos can skabs su bab pa dañ ma bab pa dag gis ni khyad par du gyur pa ma yin no // ci'i phyir ze na / gañ gi phyir chos can skabs su bab pa yin yañ mi rtag pa ñid sgrub pa na / gañ la dños po la 'brel ba yod pa de ni ma smos kyañ bsgrub bya ñid du 'gyur ba yin te / dper na bdag med pa la sogs pa lta bu'o // nam mkha'i yon tan ñid la ni de ltar dños la 'brel ba yod pa ma yin te / de med pa'i rgyu'i phyir ro // 'on kyañ 'di dag ni bstan bcos khas blañs pa'i rgyu kho nas bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'brel ba na bstan bcos khas blañs pa de ni sa'i yon tan la sogs pa thams cad la yañ mtshuñs pa yin te / de'i phyir nam mkha'i yon tan ñid dañ / sa'i yon tan 'di ñid la luñ gi sgo nas 'oñs pa'i bsgrub par bya ba ñid du bye brag med do // "No, i.e. they are in fact similar. There is no difference whether the *dharmin* is under discussion or not. Why? For the following reasons: Even when the *dharmin* is under discussion, then if one proves impermanence, whatever is necessarily connected in reality would be the *sādhya*, albeit not stated, as for example [properties] like selflessness (*nairātmya*). But *ākāśagunatva* will have no such necessary connection ('brel ba = *sambandha*) in reality, for the reason that it does not exist. However, if these [i.e. *ākāśagunatva*, etc.] are connected as *sādhya* merely because of acceptance in treatises, then this acceptance in treatises is completely the same in the case of *bhūgunatva* and the like, and therefore, *ākāśagunatva* and *bhūgunatva* have no difference in being *sādhya* which stem from scriptures."*

K. 45cd. Finally, the adversary seeks to argue that *ākāśagunatva* is in fact intended by the proponent, while *bhūgunatva* is not.⁸⁸ Devendrabuddhi's PVP and Vibhūticandra's notes to PVV give the details of the two formal logical reasonings used by Dharmakīrti's adversary to prove his point: "Whatever is a quality of the *dharmin* is the *sādhya*, because it is a *dharma* of the *dharmin* (*dharmidharma*), just like the *sādhya**dharmā*." Or: "Whatever is a quality of one part of the combination [of *dharmin* and *dharma*] which is the *sādhya* (*sādhya**samudāyaikadeśa**viśeṣa*), that is intended as the *sādhya* by the proponent, just like, for instance, the *sādhya**dharmā*. Similarly, [*ākāśagunatva*] is also a quality of the *dharmin*."⁸⁹

(46) *kaiścit prakaraṇair icchā bhavet sā gamyate ca taih /
balāt taveccheyam*⁹⁰ *iti vyaktam īśvaraceṣṭitam //*

"[Reply to k. 45cd:] It is because of some contexts of discussion (*prakaraṇa*) that there would be an intention. And this [intention] is understood by means of those [contexts]. If one says [of a proponent who does not himself intend to prove a particular property], 'You have this intention because of the force [of the *sādhana*],' then it is obviously the work of God!"

- 88 If we follow Dharmottara's interpretation, the adversary actually abandons his definition of the *sādhya* as being "what is accepted in treatises" in favour of "what is intended by the proponent". PVinT 31b 3-5: 'di sñyam du bstan bcos khas blañs pa'i phyir bsgrub byar 'gyur ba ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyañ rgoł ba 'dod pa yin pa'i phyir ro // rgoł ba la skabs su bab pa'i chos can la ji sñed yod pa'i chos de thams cad bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'dod pa yod pa yin te // des na de[1] kho na la bsgrub par bya ba ñid yod pa yin no // chos can gzan la bsten pa bsgrub par bya ba ñid du mi 'dod pa'i phyir 'di la yañ bsgrub par 'dod pa ma grub par 'gyur ba ni ma yin no ze na / ([1] P. omits de) "The following might be thought: something does not become the *sādhya* because it is accepted in treatises, but rather because of the proponent's intention. For the proponent the *dharmas* which pertain to the *dharmin* under discussion are all intended as the *sādhya*, and thus this alone is the *sādhya*. What relies on another *dharmin* is not intended to be the *sādhya*. Consequently, it is not so that this [*ākāśagunatva*] is also not established as intended to be proven."
- 89 PVP P. 332a 1-3: *chos can gyi bye brag[1] gañ yin pa de ni bsgrub[2] par bya ba yin te / chos can gyi[3] chos ñid yin pa'i phyir bsgrub[4] par bya ba'i chos bzin no // sogs pa smos pa[5] ni / gañ dañ gañ bsgrub par bya ba'i spyi'i phyogs gcig gi bye brag gis gañ yin pa de ni bsgrub par bya ba ñid du rgoł bas 'dod pa yin te / dper na bsgrub par bya ba'i chos lta bu'o // de bzin du chos can[6] gyi khyad par yañ yin no ze na / ([1] P. cha bye brag [2]P. sgrub [3]D. omits gyi [4]P. sgrub [5]P. pas [6]D. omits can [D. 278b 1-2]). PVV-n ad k. 45, n.2: yo dharmino viśeṣaḥ sādhya**samudāyaikadeśa**viśeṣo vā sa sādhyaḥ* "Whatever is a quality of the *dharmin* or is a quality of one part of the combination [of *dharmin* and *dharma*] which is being proven, that is the *sādhya*."
- 90 Miy. *taveccheyam*.

PV IV, k. 46 = PVin III, k. 7; P. 291b 4-5. Dharmakīrti refers back to his previously stated view (see k. 31) that the proponent's intentions are conditioned by the contexts of the discussions – what the debate is about –, and he ridicules the adversary's attempt to use the above-described inconclusive arguments to say that someone *must* have certain intentions. Here in PV IV Dharmakīrti does not seem to criticize explicitly the *sādhana* alluded to in k. 45cd, contenting himself with some caustic sarcasm. In the *Pramānaviniścaya* (P. 291b 2-4), however, he attacks the reasons as leading to the absurdity (*atiprasaṅga*) that one would have a constant, never ceasing intention to prove *ākāśagunatva*, etc. Moreover, to say that the proponent *must* have these intentions is simply contradicted by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). Devendrabuddhi, in the same vein, criticizes the reasons, *dharmidharmatva* and *sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśeṣatva*, by arguing that because there is no *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāna* (“*pramāna* which invalidates the presence of the reason in the contrary of the *sādhyadharmatva*”), the *vyāpti* (“pervasion”) is not established, and the reasons are hence *śeṣavat* (“with remainder”).⁹¹

(47) *vadann akāryalingām*⁹² *tām vyabhicāreṇa bādhyate / anāntarīyake cārthe bādHITE 'nyasya kā kṣatih //*

“One who says that this [intention] has something other than an effect as the reason [proving its existence] is invalidated on account of [such a reason's] being deviant (*vyabhicāra*). And [furthermore], although an entity [i.e. *ākāśagunatva*] which is not invariably related [with the *sādhyā*, impermanence,] might be invalidated, what refutation is there of the other [term, i.e. the *sādhyā*]?”

PV IV, k. 47 = PVin III, k. 8; P. 291b 5. One can infer the presence of a speaker's intention from its effects (*kārya*), viz. his words – the theme recurs constantly in PV.⁹³ The adversary, however, sees that this *kāryalinga* will not prove that when the proponent is speaking about sound's impermanence he also intends to prove *ākāśagunatva*. He thus

91 PVP P. 332a 3-4: 'di ltar chos can chos sogs sgrub byed kyis rgol ba'i 'dod pa 'grub par mi 'gyur te / bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad ma med pas[1] khyab pa med pa'i phyir / rjes su dpag pa lhag ma dan ldan pa nīd du 'gyur ro // ([1]D. ma yin pas [D. 278b 2-3]) “Thus *sādhana* [i.e. logical reasons] such as *dharmidharma*, etc. will not establish the intention of the proponent, for since there is no [*sādhyā*]*viparyaye bādhakapramāna*, there is no *vyāpti*. The inference becomes *śeṣavat*.”

92 Miy. *vadan na kāryalingām*. Cf. PVV *tām icchām akāryalingām* * *kāryetaralingām*. *Text reads *akāryalingajām*.

93 Cf. PV I k. 213 and PV II k. 1-2; Tillemans (1987) pp. 143-144.

proposes another type of reason, one which is not a *kāryaliṅga*. This is predictably discounted by Dharmakīrti as leading to deviance, i.e. the *vyāpti* will not hold.

According to Dharmottara, the adversary might then argue: “Even though *ākāśagunatva* is not under discussion, still if it were invalidated, the *sādhya* would be invalidated. Hence, the establishment of the *sādhya* is simultaneous with the establishment of this [*ākāśagunatva*], and consequently the latter is also the *sādhya*.”⁹⁴ Dharmakīrti certainly does acknowledge that what is necessarily connected with a valid *sādhya* should not be refuted – this is only reasonable, as a negation of what the *sādhya* entails would lead to the negation of the *sādhya* by contraposition. It is, however, quite another matter to say that what is entailed is also the *sādhya*, or, what is even stronger, that it was intended to be proved.⁹⁵ In PV IV, k. 47, however, the issue is left undecided: Dharmakīrti simply argues that there is in fact no necessary connection (*sambandha*), or in other terms, no invariable relation (*nāntarīyakatā*) between *ākāśagunatva* and the actual *sādhya*, *anityatva*. Proving *anityatva* by means of *kṛtakatva* does not also entail proving *ākāśagunatva*; nor does denying *ākāśagunatva* imply denying *anityatva*.

(To be continued)

94 PVinT 33a 4-5: 'di sñam du gal te nam mkha'i yon tan ñid skabs su bab pa ma yin pa de ltar na yañ de la gnod na bsgrub bya la gnod par 'gyur bas bsgrub par bya ba grub pa ni de grub pa dañ lhan gcig pa yin te / des na bsgrub bya yin no sñam na /.

95 Curiously enough, however, Dharmottara at least did seem to tend to this latter position and argued that all which is necessarily connected is the *sādhya*, albeit unstated. Cf. n. 87.

Bibliography and Abbreviations

- Bu ston = Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364). *Tshad ma mam par nes pa'i fīkā tshig don rab gsal*. Included in *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, New Delhi 1971.
- D. = sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon. *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka*, bsTan 'gyur *Tshad ma*. Tokyo 1981ff.
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- PSV = *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* of Dignāga. (a) transl. Vasudhararakṣita and Señ rgyal, P. 5701. (b) transl. Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab, P. 5702.

- PV = *Pramānavārttika* of Dharmakīrti (PV I = *Svārthānumāna*; PV II = *Pramānasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).
- PV-k(I) = *Kārikās* of PV, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana in appendices to JBORS 24 (1938), Parts I-II.
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- PV-k(III) = *Kārikās* of PV included in Prajñākaragupta's PVBh.
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