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PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA IV (3)*

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The present article is the third in a series aiming at a translation of the chapter on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*) in the *Pramānavārttika*, the major work of the Buddhist philosopher, Dharmakīrti (6th-7th century A.D.). For the two previous articles, see Tillemans (1986) and (1987).

(PVV's introduction to k. 28 and 29:) "[Objection:] But if the thesis-statement is not a means of proof (*sādhana*) and has as content something which is to be understood by implication, then what was the point when the Master [Dignāga] formulated the [defining] characteristic of the thesis (*paksalaksana*)? [Dharmakīrti] replies:"¹

(28) *gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asammohāya laksanam / tac caturlaksanam rūpanipātestasvayampadaih² //*
(29) *asiddhāsādhanārthoktavādyabhyupagatagrahah³ / anukto 'picchayā vyāptah sādhya ātmārthavan matah //*

"Although the statement of what is to be proven (*sādhya* = *pakṣa*) is something which can be understood [by implication], the [defining] characteristic [of the thesis] was [stated] to dispel confusion. This [*sādhya*] has four characteristics: By means of the words 'essence' (*rūpa*), 'alone' (*nipāta* 'particle' = *eva*), 'intended' (*ista*) and 'himself', one understands that [the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a *sādhana*, is stated according to the [real] sense and is what is accepted by the proponent (*vādin*). Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is

* Financial support for the continuation of this project has been provided by the *Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique*. Although the fourth chapter of *Pramānavārttika* might well seem to be about as far removed from the Mādhyamika as one could possibly imagine, Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's discussions on precisely what a thesis is do perhaps also have some relevance when we attempt to understand the Mādhyamika's recurring principle that he has *no* philosophical theses whatsoever. The latter theme particularly interested and influenced Jacques May in his approach to Buddhist thought. This article, then, is offered as a gesture of gratitude to Prof. May. My thanks to E. Steinkellner for some helpful remarks.

1 PVV 424, 13-14: *nanu yadi paksavacanam asādhanam sāmarthyagamyābhidheyam catadācāryena paksalaksanam krtam kim artham ity āha.*
2 Ego *rūpanipātestasvayampadaih*: PV-k(I) *rūpam nipātesu svayam padaih*; PV-k(II),(III), Miy. *rūpanipātesu svayam padaih*. See Frauwallner (1957a) p. 59. Clearly, what is at stake is not a locative plural **esu*, but the word *ista* in Dignāga's definition. Also, **padaih* must be one long compound.
3 PV-k(I) **oktam vādyabhyupagamagrahah*; PV-k(III), Miy. **abhyupagamagrahah*. PV Tib. has *khas blaris pa*, which is in keeping with PV-k(II)'s reading *abhyupagata*; *abhyupagama* would most likely have been translated by *khas len pa*.

pervaded by the [proponent's] intention is held to be the *sādhya*, as in [the Sāṃkhya's argument that the eyes, etc. are] for the use of the Self (*ātman*)."

(Our explanatory notes:) PV IV, k. 29ab = PVin III, k. 6cd. Cf. PVin P. 288a 8-b 2.⁴ From PV IV, k. 28 until k. 163, Dharmakīrti will discuss the second verse in *Pramānasamuccaya* (PS) III, Dignāga's chapter on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*). The Sanskrit of the latter verse can be restored on the basis of the *Nyāyabindu*, the Tibetan of PS and Dharmakīrti's word by word commentary in PV IV: *svarūpenaiva nirdeśyah svayam isto 'nirākṛtaḥ / pratyaksārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmini //*⁵ "[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (*ista*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) according to its essence alone (*svarūpenaiva*) [i.e. as a *sādhya*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharmin*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyaksārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*)."

According to Dharmakīrti, the definition of the thesis (*pakṣa*) was given in PS III to dispel confusion about what theses are, and not because the thesis is itself a *sādhana* and hence indispensable member of a *parārthānumāna*. Dharmakīrti harkens back to k. 22, where it had been argued that the thesis is, in any case, implied by the two members of a *parārthānumāna* and need not be explicitly stated.⁶ The four character-

4 'o na sgrub par byed pa de bstan pa med na med pa ma yin pa'i phyir[1] phyogs kyi mtshan ūid brjod par mi bya'o ūe na / brjod par bya ba yin[2] te / bsgrub par bya ba dan bsgrub par bya ba ma yin pa la phyin ci log tu log par rtogs pa mthon ba'i phyir / de bzlog pa'i don du yin no // rjes su dpag par bya ba de yari / no bo kho nar bstan par bya / rai ūid 'dod dan ma bsal ba'o // 'dir rai gi no bo dan / tshig phrad dan / 'dod pa dan / rai ūid kyi tshig bžis /
ma grub sgrub byed min don brjod // rgol bas khas blañs pa bzun[3] no //
žes rig[4] par bya'o // ([1] P. bstan pa med pa ma yin pa'i phyir. [2] P. ma yin [3] P. gzun [4] P. rigs [D. 190a 7-b 2]).

5 PS Tib.: rai gi no bo kho nar bstan // bdag 'dod rai gi chos can la // miñon sum don dan rjes dpag dan // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o //. Skt. of *svarūpenaiva ... 'nirākṛtaḥ* is to be found in NB III, 38. The restoration of PS III, k. 2 follows Frauwallner (1957a), p. 60; see also Van Blijert (1989) p. 72.

6 The history of the gradual disappearance of the thesis-statement from *parārthānumāna* is a complex one and has been discussed in M. Inami, "On *paksābhāṣa*" (*Proceedings of the Second Dharmakīrti Conference*, Vienna 1991, 69-83) as well as in my article "More on *parārthānumāna*, Theses and Syllogisms" (*Études Asiatiques*, 45, 1991, 133-148). Suffice it to say here that in PS Dignāga recognized that the *paksavacana* was not a *sādhana*, but that it could be stated to show the goal of the reason (*hetvartha*); in PV and the *Nyāyabindu* Dharmakīrti seems to have held essentially the same position, but stressed that *pakṣa* was implied by the two members of a *parārthānumāna*; subsequently,

istics spoken about in k. 28-29 are conveyed by Dignāga's words *svarūpenaiva ... svayam isto*: (1) The word *svarūpa* ensures that the thesis is indeed something which needs to be proven, i.e. a *sādhya*, and is not already established for the opponent, as for example the obviously true proposition that sound is audible.⁷ (2) The particle *eva* ("only"/"alone") eliminates the possibility that any *sādhana* in an inference-for-others, such as unestablished reasons and examples, would also be counted as the thesis, for the thesis is *only a sādhya*. The point (which turns on Dignāga's refutation of the *Nyāyasūtra*'s definition of the thesis) was discussed earlier on in Dharmakīrti's k. 24-26. (3) The word *ista* was destined to guarantee *arthokta*, that the thesis is indeed the intended proposition, stated as the proponent meant it, and not some potentially seductive proposition which might seem to fit the words, but is not what the proponent actually meant. (4) *svayam* shows that the thesis is *vādyabhyupagata*, what the proponent himself accepts and wishes to prove, rather than the various related or unrelated statements which might be found in the treatises of the proponent's school.⁸ (The specification *anirākṛta* and the four types of refutation – viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āptā* and *prasiddha* – will be treated later in k. 91-135; *svadharmin* is discussed in k. 136-148.)

Dharmakīrti seems to have innovated somewhat upon Dignāga's own explanation in PS by introducing four different functions for *svarūpena*, *eva*, *svayam* and *ista*, Dignāga himself, in his *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV) on k. 2, having only spoken of two. In PSV *svarūpenaiva* served to eliminate unestablished reasons and examples from being theses, and *svayam ista* eliminated theses which were just positions of a treatise, but not those of the proponent.⁹ While PSV took *svayam ista* together¹⁰, Dharmakīrti made a split between *svayam* and *ista*, and assigned *vādyā-*

in the *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, the fact that the thesis is implied and that it is not a *sādhana* led him to view the *paksavacana* as completely redundant and hence as having no place whatsoever in a *parārthānumāna*.

- 7 PVin P. 288b 2: *des na grub pa dper na sgra ni mñan par bya'o žes bya ba lta bu dai* / (D. 190b 2-3).
- 8 Cf. NB III, 39-43.
- 9 See the article by M. Ono (1986), which discusses Dharmakīrti's development of Dignāga's definition of the thesis.
- 10 PSV(b) 125a 1, Kitagawa 471: *bdag ŋid 'dod pa žes bya ba ni 'dis ni bstan bcos la mi blos pa'i khas bla is pa bstan pa yin no* / "This [phrase], *svayam ista*, shows a position (*abhyupagama*) which does not rely upon treatises (*śāstrānapeksa*)."
Cf. the fragment in PVBh 495.2, Kitagawa (1973) p. 129, n. 166: *svayam iti śāstrānapeksam abhyupagamam darśayati*.

bhyupagata as the point of the former and *arthokta* as that of the latter. As we shall see, such a separate treatment of the two provisos enabled Dharmakīrti to use *ista* to refute the sophistical arguments given by the Sāṃkhyas and Cārvākas (see k. 34 *et seq.* below), while using *svayam* to expand upon Dignāga's idea that logical theses are independent of what is stated in treatises.

Finally, the words *ātmārthavat* allude to the Sāṃkhya's equivocal proof for the existence of the *ātman*. The latter philosopher argues that the eyes and other sense organs are for the "benefit of another" (*parārtha*): "The eyes and other [faculties] are for the benefit of another, because they are composite, like accessories such as a bed or seat, etc. (*parārthāś caksurādayah samghātavāc chayanāsanādyangavaad*)¹¹". However, what the Sāṃkhya actually intends by *parārtha* in this case, but does not say, is that derivatives of primordial matter (*prakṛti*) are for the use of the *ātman*, i.e. the Spirit (*puruṣa*),¹² and it is this intended proposition which is the actual thesis. The argument will be taken up again in k. 31-33.

(PVV's introduction to k. 30:) "[Objection:] But since all [propositions] which are unintended (*anista*) are eliminated by the word *ista*, then it is established that [propositions] accepted in treatises, but unintended by the proponent, are not the *sādhyā* either. Thus the word *svayam* is ineffectual. [Dharmakīrti] replies: Words have the effect of excluding [their contraries], and therefore, on account of the word *ista*,"¹³

(30) *sarvānyestanivrttāv apy āśamkāsthānavāraṇam /*
vr̥tau svayamśruteh¹⁴ prāha krtā caisā tadarthikā //

11 Skt. in NB III, 87 and PVV *ad* k. 29. For *arīga* in this context, see NBT *ad* 87: *tad evārīgam purusopabhogaṇigatvāt* "The [bed, etc.] are *arīga* in that they are factors for the man's enjoyment."

12 See PVV 425, 6-8: *yathātmāsti na veti vivāde tatsādhanārtham sāṃkhyena parārthāś caksurādayah samghātavāc chayanāsanādyarīgavat / ity uktasya sādhanasyātmārthavam anuktam api sādhyam icchāvisayatvāt //*. Note that *samghātāparārthavat* is one of the five reasons used by the Sāṃkhyas to establish the existence of *puruṣa*. See *Sāṃkhyakārikās* k. 17.

13 PVV 425, 9-11: *nanv istaśabdenānistasya sarvasya nirāśāt / śāstropagatasyāpi vādyanistasyāsādhyatvam siddham / tan nispahalam svayampadam ity āha / vyavacchedaphalatvāc chabdānām istaśabdāt...*

14 PV-k(II) *svayamśrutenāha*; PV-k(III), Miy. *svayam śruteh*.

"All which is intended by anyone other [than the proponent] is excluded, but nonetheless, in the [Pramānasamuccaya]vr̥tti, [Dignāga] explained eliminating the persistence of doubt [as the need] for the word *svayam*.¹⁵ And this [word *svayam*] was composed [by him] for that purpose [i.e. refuting wrong conceptions]."¹⁶

Dharmakīrti's k. 30 is a reply to an objection broadly similar to Uddyotakara's attack on the explanation of *svayam* in Dignāga's *Vādavidhānatīkā*: it is absurd to say "himself" when the rest of the sentence makes this redundant.¹⁷ Dharmakīrti replies that strictly speaking *ista* does also ensure that it is the proponent himself; *svayam* is thus not needed for the logical equivalence between the definiens and definiendum, but rather serves to eliminate a seductive misunderstanding, namely, that the school's tenets as found in treatises are also being proven. This understanding of *svayam* will be taken up again in k. 42 *et seq.*, and will form a key element in Dharmakīrti's views on inference being independent of scripture.

(31) *viśesas tad vyapeksātah*¹⁸ *kathito dharmadharminoh / anuktāv api vāñchāyā bhavet prakaranād gatih //*

"That [which is intended] is said to be a quality (*viśesa*) of the property [to be proved] (*dharma*) or of the subject (*dharmin*) according to how one regards [it]. Although the intention might not be [explicitly] stated, it would be understood from the context of the discussion (*prakarana*)."

15 Cf. PV Bh 495, 8-9: *ata eva svayamgrahanasya śāstranivrttir eva prajoyanam uktam /.*

16 PVV 425, 16-17: *esā svayamśrūtis tadarthikā vīpratipattinirākaranārthā kṛtā.*

17 Note that Dignāga gave two explanations for the term *svayam* in his definitions of the thesis: In the *Nyāyamukha* (ad k. 1) and the *Pramānasamuccayavṛtti* versions (both of which Dharmakīrti comments upon in PV IV), Dignāga took *svayam* as qualifying *ista* / *ipsita* and thus maintained that *svayam* guaranteed that the thesis was *intended* by the proponent himself, independent of treatises (*śāstrānapekṣa*); in the *Vādavidhānatīkā*, however, *svayam* was joined to *sādhyatum istah* to ensure that it is indeed the proponent, and not someone else, who will *establish* the thesis. For the *Vādavidhānatīkā*'s position see NV 281, 16-17; Frauwallner (1933) p. 302: *yad api vādavidhānatīkāyām sādhyatūti śabdasya svayam parena ca tulyatvāt svayam iti viśesānam /* "In the *Vādavidhānatīkā* there is also the following: The word *sādhyati* is indifferent with regard to oneself and another, and hence the qualifier, *svayam*." Uddyotakara, in NV ad 1.1.33 (281, 12 *et seq.*) criticized both Dignāga's versions of *svayam* separately, and in particular argued that the *Vādavidhānatīkā*'s use was redundant, as absurd as saying "I am myself going to bathe", when "I am going to bathe" would suffice. On Dignāga's authorship of the *Vādavidhānatīkā* see Hattori (1968) pp. 9-10.

18 PV-k(II) *tad vyapeksatvāt.*

Cf. PVin P. 288b 3-6.¹⁹ We have not followed Miyasaka in taking *tadvyapeksātah* as a compound. We also differ from Watanabe (1977) on this point and in not taking *viśesāh*, but rather *tad*, as the subject of *kathitah* (*kathito*). In spite of the *prima facie* normalcy of reading *tadvyapeksātah*, this and Watanabe's Japanese translation cannot be adopted: (1) They do not concord with the Tibetan of PV, *de ni ltos nas chos dag dan // chos can khyad par yin par brjod*, which clearly takes *de* = *tad* as the subject of *brjod* = *kathitah*; PVin is analogous to PV Tib. in this respect. (2) The commentators on both PV and PVin do not explain the compound *tadvyapeksātah*, but rather simply *vyapeksātah*; indeed, Manorathanandin's commentary to k. 31 shows that he read *sa* instead of *tad*, making *sa* the correlative of *ya evecchayā visayikrtah*. (3) In fact, it is syntactically quite possible that *tad* is the subject, but that *kathitah* becomes masculine due to *attraction de genre*, i.e. its gender was influenced by the masculine noun, *viśesāh*, figuring in the predicate. For examples of this phenomenon, see §369 paragraph a) in L. Renou (1975).²⁰

The general philosophical background for k. 31ab is as follows: Dignāga, in PS III and the *Nyāyamukha*, had spoken of four sorts of contradictory reasons (*viruddhahetu*), viz. (1) those which prove the opposite of the *dharma* itself (*dharmaśvarūpaviparītasādhana*), (2) those proving the opposite of a quality of the *dharma* (*dharmaviśesaviparītasādhana*), (3) those proving the opposite of the *dharmin* itself (*dharmaśvarūpaviparītasādhana*) and (4) those proving the opposite of a quality of the *dharmin* (*dharmaviśesaviparītasādhana*).²¹ Recall that in the Sāṃkhya argument under discussion, the proponent speaks of the eyes being for the benefit of another (*parārtha*). However, for him "another" has the

19 *da ni ji ltar ma thos na bsgrub par bya ba ūid du 'dod pa yin no ūes rtogs ūe na / skabs kyis so // dper na 'dus pa mams gān gyi don yin par grub pa ni bdag gi don ūid bzin no // de ni ma smras su zin kyari 'dod pas khyab pa'i bsgrub par bya ba yin no ūes bstan pa'i phyir 'dod pa smos so // de[1] ūid ltos pa las chos dan chos can gyi khyad par du bśad pa yin te / 'di dag ni 'dus pa ma[2] yin pa'i yul can gān gyi don yin no ūes brjod pas na chos kyi khyad par du ūe bar gzuñ ba'i phyir[3] de[4] de'i khyad par yin la[5] / mig la sogs pa 'dus pa ma yin pa'i don dag ni / gān gyi don du 'gyur ba yin no ūes bya ba ni chos can gyi khyad par yin no // ([1]P. 'di [2] P. omits *ma* [3] P. omits *phyir* [4] P. omits *de* [5] D. *no* [D. 190b 4-6]).*

20 Renou (1975), p. 500: "L'accord grammatical attendu est souvent rompu par attraction de forme, de contiguïté, ou par quelque influence de sens ... a) Accord contigu du verbal avec le prédicat, *tvam me mitram jātam Pañc[atantra] IV 7 14.*"

21 See PS III, k. 27: *chos dari chos can rai ūo bo // yai na de yi khyad par mams // phyin ci log tu sgrub pa'i phyir // gnod pa med la 'gal ba yin //* (= NM k. 9). See also NP §3.2.3; Katsura (1979) p. 78ff. as well as Kitagawa (1973) pp. 205-217.

quality (*viśesa*) that it is one “who is not composed (*asamhata*)”, namely, the *ātman*. The reason, “being a composite” (*samghātata*) then becomes contradictory in that it will not prove *parārthatva* qualified in this way: instead, it will prove the opposite, viz. that they are for the benefit of another who *is* composed – consciousness is composed in that it is made up of temporal parts.

Now, there are various ways of formulating the Sāṃkhya’s argument depending upon whether we take the quality (*viśesa*), *asamhatatva*, as being of the *dharma* or of the *dharmin*: nonetheless the Sāṃkhya’s intended proposition remains the same. According to Devendrabuddhi, the fact that the intention is the *sādhya*, and that this intention does not vary, leads to the following objection, which k. 31 will seek to answer: “If the *sādhya* is just what the proponent intends, then there would no longer be [different sorts of] contradictory [reasons] such as *dharmaviśesaviparītasādhana*, etc. If one and the same combination [of *dharmin* and *dharma*] were the *sādhya*, then the *sādhana* which prove the opposite of those [*sādhya*] would, therefore, also be the same.”²² Faced with this objection, Dharmakīrti seems to nuance the principle that the intention is the *sādhya*: it is in reality the *sādhya* and remains the same, but admits of differences in verbal expression; the distinction between *dharmaviśesa* and *darmiviśesa* here stems from our verbal formulation.²³ The quality

22 PVP P. 328a 7-8: *gal te rgol bas 'dod pa ŋid bsgrub par bya ba yin pa de'i tshe / chos kyi khyad par phyin ci log tu sgrub par byed pa la sogs pa 'gal ba mams yod pa ŋid ma yin no // gal te tshogs pa gcig bsgrub par bya ba yin pa[1] de bas na de las bzlog pa'i sgrub[2] par byed pa yari gcig ŋid yin no źe na // ([1] P. yin [2] P. bsgrub [D. 275b 6-7]).* The Skt. of *gal te rgol bas ... yod pa ŋid ma yin no* is found in PVV-n ad k. 31, n. 1: *yadi vādinesta eva sādhyas tadā dharmaviśesaviparītasādhanādīnām viruddhānām asambhava evety āha.* Cf. the explanations in PVBh 495, 13-14: *nanu sa viśeso dharmadharminor na sādhyo sādhyatve viśesatā katham / na sādhyaviśesayor ekatā / uktam cācāryena "dharmaviśesaviparyayaśādhanād dhi viruddha" ityādi /.* Note that Prajñākara Gupta cites part of PS III, k. 27 = NM k. 9. “[Objection:] But surely this is a quality of the *dharmin* or *dharma*, but is not the *sādhya*. If it were the *sādhya* how could it be a quality? The *sādhya* and the quality are not the same. Now, the Master [Dignāga] did say, ‘it is contradictory because it establishes the opposite of the quality of the *dharma*, etc.’”

23 PVin P. 288b 6-7: *de ltar mam par bzag pa tsam źig tha dad par zad kyi don ni ma yin no //* “In this way there is nothing but the mere presentation which differs, but not the proposition (*don* = *artha*).” If we follow Dharmottara, what seems to be invoked here is the general Dharmakīrtian principle that making connections between qualities and quality-possessors is never based on anything other than words. The *artha* itself is indivisible and admits of no such distinctions. Cf. PVinT 18b 5-8: *skabs kyi rten du gyur pa'i bsgrub par bya'i chos 'di ŋid ni bltos pa las chos dari chos can gyi khyad par yin no // dños po las khyad par dari khyad par can gyi 'brel ba yod pa ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyan sgra'i yul ŋid do // des na ma zin pa'i don ŋid ni 'ga' yari khyad par ma yin no // gan gi*

asamhatatva can be regarded as of the *dharma* or of the *dharmin*: if one construes the argument as “the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of ‘another’ which refers to something uncomposed (*caksurādīnām asamhatavisayam pārārthyam*)”, this will be a case of *dharmaviśesaviparītasādhana*, and *asamhatavisaya* will be a quality of the *dharma*, *pārārthya*. However, if one interprets the argument as “the eyes, etc., which are for the benefit of another, are for the benefit of something uncomposed (*parārthāḥ santāḥ caksurādayo 'samhatārthāḥ*)”, this would be *dharmaviśesaviparītasādhana* in that *asamhatārthāḥ* would be a quality of the *dharmin*, *parārthāḥ santāḥ caksurādayaḥ*.²⁴

(PVV’s introduction to k. 32): “What fault is there in the debate about [the eyes, etc.] being for the benefit of the *ātman* (*ātmārthatva*)? [Reply:]”²⁵

(32) *ananvayo 'pi drstānte dosas tasya yathoditam*²⁶ /
ātmā paraś cet so^{26a} *'siddha iti tatreṣṭaghātakṛt*²⁷ //

“This [viz. being for the benefit of the *ātman*] also has the fault that there is no positive concomitance (*anvaya*) [of the *sādhyadharma* and the reason] in the example. As [Vasubandhu] had explained: ‘If the *ātman* is [what is meant by] ‘another’ (*para*), then this [*ātman*] is not established [in the example].’ In that case [the reason] would refute what is intended (*istaghātakṛt*).”

tshe sgras chos kyi yul du ū bar 'god pa de'i tshe ni chos kyi khyad par yin la / gari gi tshe chos can gyi yul du 'god pa de'i tshe chos can gyi khyad par yin pa'i phyir sgras ū bar bkod pa la bltos te gñi ga'i khyad par du 'gyur ba yin no // “This very *sādhyadharma* which is the basis of the discussion [i.e. *asamhatatva*] is a quality of the *dharma* or of the *dharmin* according to how one regards [it]. There are no connections between qualities and quality-possessors which are due to [real] entities, but rather they only concern words. Consequently, the same unexpressed meaning [i.e. *asamhatatva*] admits of no differences whatsoever. When one verbally presents it as concerning the *dharma* it is then a quality of the *dharma*; when one presents it as a quality of the *dharmin* it is then a quality of the *dharmin*. Thus, it becomes a quality of either in regard to (bltos) its verbal presentation.”

24 See PVV 425, 23-25. Cf. PVT 315a 2-3, which gives a similar explanation of the two *vyapeksā* (bltos pa): *bltos pas žes bya ba ni de ltar gžan gyi don ūid yin na / de dag ni gžan gyi don byed pa ūid 'dus pa'i yul can ma yin no žes bya ba'i bltos pa 'di la chos kyi bye brag ste / mig la sogs pa gžan gyi don du gyur pa 'dus pa'i don can ma yin no / chos can gyi tshig gi sgras don bstan pa la bltos pa la chos can gyi bye brag yin no //*.

25 PVV 426,6: *ātmārthatvasya vivāde ko dosa ity āha /*

26 PV-k(III), Miy. *yathoditah*.

26^a Miy. *cetso*.

27 PV-k(II) *istaghātavat*.

Cf. PVin P. 289a 2-3.²⁸ Dharmakīrti now takes up the critique of the argument as it was actually intended by the Sāṃkhya, i.e. with *ātmārthatva* as the real meaning of *pārārthya*. There are two faults. (1) No *anvaya*. This critique had been put forward earlier by Vasubandhu, and indeed Dharmakīrti actually cites a passage from what is presumably Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi* or, less probably, his *Vādavidhāna*: *ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhah*.²⁹ The problem turns on the two sorts of concomitance, positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*)³⁰, figuring in the Buddhist account of valid logical reasons – *anvaya* between the reason and *sādhyadharma* (“property to be proved”) means that wherever the former occurs so does the latter. Now, while such a principle is to be established on the basis of particular examples, in the Sāṃkhya's argument there will not in fact be any *anvaya* in the example, because the *sādhyadharma* will not occur in, or qualify, the example: seats, etc. are not established as being for the benefit of “another”, if this means the *ātman*. (2) The reason, “because they are composite” would be a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*) in that it would prove the opposite of the intended *sādhyā*. In other words, “being composite” would prove that the eyes, etc. are *not* for the benefit of another – the so-called “other” (*para*) of the *sādhyā* simply does not exist if it is taken as being the *ātman*.

The latter refutation had already been developed in Dignāga's PSV *ad* PS III, and Dharmakīrti, in what seems to have been a deliberate echo of Dignāga, used the Dignāgean terminology *istavighātakrt* (“[reason] which refutes what is intended”). Dignāga had mentioned *istavighātakrt* as a

28 *ji skad bśad pa'i chos dan chos can gyi khyad par la ni rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i skyon 'dod pa ŋid de / ji skad du bdag gźan yin no źe na ni de ma grub pa'o źes bśad pa yin no // 'gal ba'i chos kyari 'dod pa de ŋid la gnod par byas pa yin no //* (D. 191a 2-3).

29 See PVBh 494, 23 and 496, 6. Cf. PVin n. 28. This is not to be found in the fragments given in Frauwallner (1933) and (1957b). Note that Manorathanandin mixes his own commentary with the actual quotation; Dharmottara does likewise, as is apparent by the fact that their commentarial additions differ. PVV 426, 11-12: *yathoditam ācāryavasubandhunā / parārthāś caksurādaya ity atra paraś ced ātmā vivaksitah so 'siddho drstānta iti*. “As Ācārya Vasubandhu had explained: When it is said that the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of another, then if the *ātman* is what is meant by ‘another’, this [*ātman*] is not established in the example [i.e. seats, beds, etc.].” Dharmottara's comment makes it clear that *so 'siddhah* is to be taken as meaning *ātmā 'siddho drstānte*. PVinT 20a 2-3: *slob dpon dbyig gñen gyis ci skad du gźan gyi don ces bya ba 'dir gal te pha rol po bdag gźan gyi sgras brjod par 'dod na bdag de ni ma grub pa'o źes bśad pa yin no /*.

30 Cf. Katsura (1983) p. 541: “In Indian philosophy *anvaya* and *vyatireka* jointly make up a sort of method of induction. They may be formulated as follows: ‘When *x* occurs, *y* occurs (*anvaya*), and when *x* is absent, *y* is absent (*vyatireka*).’”

separate category of *viruddhahetu*, and in PSV ad PS III k. 22 and 26 gave the Sāṃkhya argument as an example: subsequently, in *Nyāyabindu* III, however, Dharmakīrti explicitly took the position that there was no point in taking *istavighātakṛt* as a separate sort of *viruddhahetu* as it was the same as the other two sorts in proving the opposite of the *sādhya*.³¹

(PVV's introduction to k. 33:) [Objection:] “Being for the benefit of the *ātman* (*ātmārthatva*) is not the *sādhya*. [Dharmakīrti] replies:”³²

(33) *sādhanam yadvivādena*³³ *nyastam tac cen na sādhya /*
kim sādhyam anyathāniṣṭam bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā //

“Suppose that when a *sādhana* is presented because of a dispute about a certain [proposition]³⁴, that [proposition] is [nonetheless] not being proven. Then what is being proven (*sādhya*)? Otherwise [if the proposition in dispute were not the *sādhya*], then either [the *sādhya*] would be something unintended, or [the *sādhanā*] would be completely superfluous.”³⁵

Cf. PVin P. 289a 2-3.³⁶ The opponent now argues that *ātmārthatva* is not the *sādhya* because it is not stated. Dharmakīrti replies that in that case there is the following dilemma: (1) The Sāṃkhya's argument is proving something which he does not intend, viz. the contrary of *ātmārthatva* / *asamhatapārārthya*. (2) If the *sādhanā*, “being composite”, really did prove *pārārthya* as it is literally stated, i.e. without any qualifications, there would ensue the fault of redundancy, or *siddhasādhanā*, “proving what is already established”: the Buddhist himself would accept that version of *pārārthya* — one which is not taken as meaning *ātmārthatva* / *asamhatapārārthya*. As Dharmakīrti himself put it in the *Pramāna*-

31 See PSV(b) P. 131b 7-132a 1, 133a 8-133b 8, Kitagawa 494, 499-500; NB III, 89-91.

32 PVV 426, 13: *ātmārthatvam na sādhyam ity āha*.

33 Ego *yadvivādena*: Miy. *yadvivāde na*. Both readings find some commentarial support. Manorathanandin's PVV clearly commented upon *yadvivāde na nyastam*, but Devendrabuddhi suggests the instrumental *yadvivādena*. See PVP P. 328b 6: *gžan yan / gal te gari la rtsod[1] pa yis / don gari la rtsod pas te /...* ([1] P. *btsad* [D. 276a 3]). See n. 36 for PVin. As for PV Tib., note that Miyasaka opted for D. *rtsod pa yin*, but P.N. do read the instrumental *yis*; moreover, P.D.N. do not support *na nyastam*. Watanabe also seems to have read *yadvivādena*, which makes better philosophical sense than Manorathanandin's interpretation.

34 PVP *don gari la*. See n. 33.

35 PVV 426, 17-18: *anyathā vivādavisayo yadi na sādhyam tadāniṣṭam viparyayasiddhīḥ syāt /*. PVV 427, 2-3: *sādhanavaiphalyam eva vā syāt /*.

36 *ma brjod pa'i phyir de yan bsgrub par bya ba ma yin no že na / gal te gari la rtsod pas[1] sgrub par byed pa bkod pa de bsgrub par bya ba ma yin na bsgrub par bya ba ci yin / de ltar yin na phyin ci log tu grub pa'am don med par 'gyur te /* ([1]P. *rtsod pa* [D. 191a 3-4]).

viniścaya, “They [i.e. the Buddhists] accept that composites accomplish the benefit of another, and thus the *sādhana* is superfluous.”³⁷

(34) *sadvitīyaprayogesu niranyaviruddhate*³⁸ /
etenā kathite sādhyam sāmānyenātha sammatam //

“In the case of the reasonings concerning ‘having a companion’ (*sadvitīyaprayoga*), [the faults of] no *anvaya* and contradictoriness have been pointed out by means of the above [remarks]. But suppose that the *sādhyā* [*sadvitīyatva*] is held generally (*sāmānyena*).”

Cf. PVin P. 289a 8-b 3.³⁹

(35) *tad evārthāntarābhāvād dehānāptau na sidhyati*⁴⁰ /
*vācyam śūnyam*⁴¹ *pralapatām tad etaj jādyacintitam*⁴² //

“This very [*sadvitīyatva*] is not established, for when the body does not obtain there is not another object (*arthāntara*). This [*sadvitīyatva*] of those who prattle vacuities was invented because of stupidity.”

Cf. PVin P. 289b 5-6 and 290b 1.⁴³ This section of PV IV (k. 34-41), still centered on the word *ista* in Dignāga’s definition of the thesis, is specifically directed against the Cārvāka’s use of a sophistical type of argumentation known as the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, “a reasoning concerning ‘having a companion’”.⁴⁴ Relying on the presentation of the argument in

37 Cf. PVin P. 289a 7: *de dag 'dus pa gān gyi don byed par ni khas blañs pa'i phyir / sgrub par byed pa 'bras bu med pa yin no* // (D. 191a 6-7).

38 PV-k(I) *niranvayo virudhyate*.

39 ‘*dis ni gñis pa dari bcas pa'i sbyor ba mams la yari rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa bśad pa yin te / dper na bum pa ni mñion par gsal[1] ba'i sems pa can[2] lus kyi mtshan ñid kyi skyes bu dari bum pa gān yari rui bas gñis pa dari bcas pa[3] yin te / ut pa la ma yin pa'i phyir rtsig pa bñin no ñes bya ba la / rtsig pa ni de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bus gñis pa dari bcas par[4] ma grub pa bñin no* // ‘*on te spyi bsgrub par bya bar[5] 'dod pa'i phyir khyad par 'phen pa ma yin no ñe na / 'di la ni de mi 'phen na sgrub par byed pa'i 'bras bu ci yin / yari na ni mi 'dod par 'gyur ro ñes bśad zin to* // ([1]P. bsal [2]P. sems can [3]D. pas [4]D. pa [5]D. ba [D. 191a 7-b 3]).

40 Miy. *sidhyate*.

41 PV-k(II) *vācyasūnyam*.

42 PV-k(I),(II) *varnitam*.

43 P. 289b 5-6: *mam pa de lta bu'i lus bum pa las don gān gyi ño bor khas mi len na spyi sgrub pa yari mi srid de / gān yari rui ba'i don gān gyi ño bo med pa'i phyir ro* / (D. 191b 5). P. 290 b1: *de'i phyir tshig gi tshul ni gsog yin no* // (D. 192b 1).

44 Literally, *sadvitīya* = “having a second”. Commentators gloss *dvitīya*, however, as meaning “a companion”. Cf. PVinT 21a 4: *gñis pa dari bcas pa ste zla bo dari bcas pa'o* //. Watanabe (1977) is a study on this argument in Dharmakīrti and elsewhere; we have also discussed it in some detail in an article entitled “Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms”, *Proceedings of the Second Dharmakīrti Conference*, Vienna 1991, 403-413. Steinkellner (1980) pp. 292-294 gives two Sanskrit fragments from Śākyamati’s PVT

the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (see n. 39) and the commentaries to PV, we can ascertain that the Cārvāka's reasoning was as follows: *abhivyaktacaitanyaśārīralaksanapurusaghatayor anyatarena sadvityo ghataḥ / anutpalatvāt / kudyavat* / “A vase has a companion in the form of (a) either a vase or (b) a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements], because it [i.e. the vase] is not an *utpala* [flower], like a wall.”⁴⁵

Before proceeding further with the Cārvāka version, however, it is worthwhile to make it clear that *sadvītya*-style reasonings were by no means restricted to that Materialist school. We see that Dharmakīrti, in the *Vādanyāya*, also argued against a Mīmāṃsaka who tried to prove that sound is permanent by using a *sadvītya*-style reasoning: *jaiminipratijñātataitvanityatādhikaranaśabdaghatañyatarasadvītyo ghataḥ* “The vase has a companion in the form of either (a) a vase or (b) a sound which is accepted by Jaimini as being a locus for [its] true nature, permanence.”⁴⁶ Indeed, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s *Nyāyamañjarī*, and especially Cakradhara’s *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhāṅga*, also show the *sadvītyaprayoga* being used by an adversary who sought to argue against sound’s impermanence, and in Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, we find it being used (in a slightly different manner) by the Naiyāyika, Aviddhakarṇa, to argue against Dignāga’s twofold division of *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*.⁴⁷ In PV, VN and Cakradhara the argued for conclusions differ, but the logical strategy is essentially the same: a kind of bogus dilemma – expressed by *anyatarasadvītyatva* – where the alternative that the *dharmin*, the vase, has itself as its own companion is quickly ruled out in favour of the other alternative, which contains the proposition which the proponent actually wants us to believe.

explaining the *sadvitīyapravayoga*, one of which has been translated in our article.

45 Sanskrit given in Steinkellner (1980) pp. 292-293. PVV's and PVBh's versions contain a number of obvious errors. For the details, see Appendix II in our article "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms".

46 VN 66, 15-17: *nityah śabdo 'nityo veti vāde dvādaśalakṣaṇaprapāñcapra kāśa nāśāstra p r a n e t u h j a i m i n i p r a t i j nāt a t a t t v a - nityatādhikaranaśabdaghaṭānyatarasadvītiyo ghata iti pratijñām uparacayya dvādaśalakṣaṇārthavyākhyānam* / *Shāstri: "laksanādivyākhyānam.*

47 See *Nyāyamārjanigranthibhāṅga* (Ed. N.J. Shah) p. 64, 12-14; *Tattvasaṁgraha pāṇijīkā* ad k. 1583-1585, pp. 556-557 (ed. D. Śāstri). For the details see our “Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms”.

Let us now try to summarize how the Cārvāka uses this (pseudo-) dilemma to arrive at his desired conclusion. (For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of “being accompanied by ...” instead of the more literal “having a companion in the form of ...”.)

- (a) Obviously, a vase is not an *utpala* flower. Hence the *paksadharmatva* holds: the reason, *anutpalatva*, qualifies the *dharmin*, the vase.
- (b) The Cārvāka then uses various tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic, first to establish the general principle (*vyāpti* “pervasion”), and later to show that for Cārvāka and Buddhist alike the demand for *vyāpti* in inferences can never in fact be satisfied.
- (c) A vase cannot be accompanied by itself — *sadvityyatva* necessitates difference — and therefore it must be accompanied by the person.
- (d) If the vase is accompanied by a person whose mind is just a manifestation of the elements, then the Materialist view on what people are is correct, with the result that all rebirth is impossible, for such a person (who is not different from his body) would be destroyed at the time of death.

Dharmakīrti’s first line of attack (i.e. in k. 34bc) is to invoke the same twofold critique which he had just applied to the Sāṃkhya’s argument.

(1) No *anvaya* in the example. The actual *sādhya* which the Cārvāka intends is “having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements]”. However, just as in the Sāṃkhya reasoning, the really intended *sādhya* has no *anvaya* in the example: the wall is not accompanied by the Cārvāka’s version of the “person”: for a Buddhist, this Materialist version of the person simply does not exist. (2) *viruddhahetu*. The Buddhist will admit that a wall can be accompanied by a vase. But if *ghatena sadvityyatva* had *anvaya* in the example, the reason would prove the contrary of what the Cārvāka actually intended. In effect, if it were established that the vase was accompanied by itself, the Cārvāka could not exploit the disjunction conveyed by *anyatara* to prove the Materialist version of the person, i.e. his actual *sādhya*. The logic can be presented as follows: *anyatara* means one — but not both — of *A* or *B*. Hence, in the *sadvityaprayoga*, if we established that the vase was the “companion”, *ipso facto* it would be proven that the person is not. As in the Sāṃkhya’s argument, which was criticized in k. 32 as leading to *istavighātakrt*, here too the reason would be a *viruddhahetu*.⁴⁸

48 See PVV 427, 9-12: *tatra ca niranvayaviruddhate kathite / tathā hy abhivyaktacaitanya-dehalaksanapurusena sadvityatvam sādhyam / tena ca kudye 'nvayo na drsta iti niranvayatā / ghatasya tu kudye 'nvayo drsta iti tena sadvityatvasādhanat viruddhatā*

We now come to k. 34d: “But suppose that the *sādhya* [*sadvitīyatva*] is held generally”. This begins what we, in point (b) of our summary above, have termed the use of “tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic” to establish pervasion (*vyāpti*). The Cārvāka argues that the *sādhya**dharm*a, or “property to be proved”, is simply *sadvitīyatva*, “having a companion”, rather than “having a companion in the form of either a vase or a person, etc. etc.”⁴⁹ Even so, how would pervasion hold between the reason, *anutpalatva*, and the *dharma*, *sadvitīyatva*? Probably the Cārvāka’s initial strategy, in k. 34, is to argue that there is such a pervasion because all things, such as walls and vases, etc., which are not *utpala* flowers, do “have a companion” in the sense that they are generally accompanied by something; they are not absolutely alone.⁵⁰ Subsequently, in k. 37cd-40, however, he will give a variety of arguments

syāt / “Now, here no *anvaya* and contradictoriness have been pointed out. As follows: ‘having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body with a manifested consciousness’ is the *sādhya*. And thus positive concomitance [of the reason and this *sādhya*] in [the example,] the wall, is not observed: hence there is no *anvaya*. For the vase, however, the *anvaya* in [the example,] the wall, is observed: thus, because [the reason] would prove ‘having a companion in the form of the latter [i.e. the vase]’ it would be contradictory.”

49 There are some differences amongst the commentators in their phrasing of this *sādhya*. Cf. PVV 427, 17-18: *atha sāmānyena viśesam anulikhyā sadvitiyatvam sādhyaṁ kudye sadvitiyatvamātrenānvayāt* / “But suppose that *sadvitīyatva*, taken generally, without specifying any particular cases, is the *sādhya*, because there is *anvaya* [of the reason] with mere *sadvitīyatva* in [the example], the wall.” PVinT 21b 1: ‘*on te spyir spyi dari ldan pa'i gnis pa ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi / skyes bur gyur pa'i gnis pa dari bcas pa ñes khyad par 'phen pa min[1] no ñe na /* ([1]P. *yin*) “[Objection:] ‘Being a companion’ (*dvitīyatva*), taken generally (*spyir = spyi dari ldn pa'i*), is the *sādhya*, but one does not specify the particular case, ‘companion (*dvitīya*) in the form of a person’”. While Manorathanandin and Dharmottara speak of *sadvitīyatva/dvitīyatva*, Devendrabuddhi and Śākyamati speak of *anyatarārthāntaratva* (“being another object which is either”). PVP P. 329a 5-6: *don gžan gan yari rui ba spyir bsgrub par bya bar 'dod pa des khyad par can 'phen[1] par byed pa ma yin phyir skyon yod pa ma yin no ñe na /* ([1]D. *'phel* [D. 276b 1]). Cf. PVT fragment 2 in Steinkellner (1980) p. 293: *anyatarārthāntaratvam sāmānyam ghate sādhya**dharm*ini *kudye ca drstāntadharminy upanītam iti*. This *arthāntaratva* is simply another way of saying *dvitīyatva*.

50 Cf. PVinT 21a6-8: *rtsig pa la ni gnis ka yari yod pa'i phyir rjes su 'gro ba dari ldog pa dag grub pa yin la / ut pa la ma yin pa ñid ni phyogs kyi chos yin no // spyir gnis pa dari bcas pas ni khyab pa yin te / des na rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa med ciñ bum pa ñid ni bum pa gnis pa dari bcas pa ma[1] yin pa'i phyir śugs kyis de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bur 'gyur ba yin no ñes bya ba de la / ...* ([1]P. omits *ma*). “Because the wall also has a companion, the *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are established. Not being an *utpala* is the *paksadharma*. It [i.e. not being an *utpala*] is pervaded by having a companion, taken generally. So therefore, the fault of no *anvaya* does not occur, and since the vase itself does not have a second vase [i.e. a companion-vase], then indirectly there would be a person of the sort [which the Materialist describes].” For PVV see n. 49.

to show that the Buddhist logician is equally vulnerable to charges of no *anvaya* and *viruddhahetu*, and that *vyāpti* is never really established in any inference; no doubt, *en filigrane* in this discussion is the Cārvāka's well-known tenet that inference is not a *pramāna*.

The Cārvāka justifies taking the *sādhyā* as simply *sadvityatva* (or *anyatarasadvityatva*) by saying that for him, just as for a Buddhist logician, the *sādhyadharma* must be taken generally (*sāmānyena*), free from all qualifications concerning particular cases: the universal (*sāmānya*) at stake here is best understood as *dvitīyatva* ("being a companion"), or equivalently, *arthāntaratva* ("being another object"; see n. 49). Dharmakīrti, in k. 35ab, then replies that the body, as understood by the Cārvākas, is nonexistent, and thus, there is no other object (*arthāntara*) separate from a vase which could serve as the companion so that we could then speak of "having a companion" (*sadvityatva*). PVin and PVBh explain that the point turns on the Buddhist logicians' repudiation of real, independently existing universals: universals can never exist anywhere apart from their instantiations (*vyakti*), and thus the universal, "being a companion" (*dvitīyatva*), cannot exist here if neither the vase nor the person are instantiations of it.⁵¹ The conclusion is that *sadvityatva*, as it presupposes the universal *dvitīyatva*, would be nonsensical.

(36) *tulyam nāśe⁵² 'pi cec chabdaghatabhedenā kalpane /*
na siddhena vināśena tadvataḥ sādhanād dhvaneh //

51 PVin P. 290a2-3: 'di'i phyir spyi la brten pa ma yin te / gsal ba thams cad yod par mi srid na de'i spyi mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // dper na bram ze la sogs pa ma yin pa ūid la rigs[1] ūid dam / rtog pa'i šes pa la dbar po la brten pa ūid bzin no // ([1] D. rig [D. 192a 2-3]) "So too, [the *sādhyā*] does not partake of (*brten pa* = 'bhāj?) the universal [*dvitīyatva*], for when none of the instantiations can exist, their universal is absurd, as for example caste with regard to those who are not Brahmins, etc., or 'partaking of the sense organs' with regard to conceptual cognition. Cf. Dharmottara's gloss on this passage showing that *spyi* (*sāmānya*) here means *gñis pa ūid* (*dvitīyatva*). PVinT 23b1: 'di la bum par gyur pa dari skyes bur gyur pa gñis (pa) ūid kyi khyad par med pa'i phyir gñis pa ūid kyi spyi mi 'thad pa yin no / "Because the particular cases of *dvitīyatva*, viz. the vase and the person, do not exist here, the universal, *dvitīyatva*, is absurd." Finally, see PVBh 497, 9-10: *nanu nātra viśesāksepaḥ / tad asat / yato dehasyāsiddhau vyaktyabhāvāt kutah sāmānyam / na hi govyaktyabhāve sāmānyam /* "[Objection:] But surely particular cases are not mentioned here. [Reply:] This is not correct. Since the instantiations do not exist when the body is not established, how could the universal be? Indeed there is no [cow]-universal in the absence of cow-instantiations."

52 PV-k(III) *nāśo*.

“[Objection:] But it is analogous for the [sādhya] ‘perishability’ too, if one conceives of it in terms of the particular cases, sound and vase. [Reply:] No, it is not [analogous], for through an established perishability there is a proof that sound has this [property, perishability].”

Cf. PVin P. 290b 6.⁵³ The Cārvāka now invokes another pseudo-parallel with Buddhist logic in order to justify taking *sadvītyatva* without the particularities, *ghata* and *puruṣa*. When a Buddhist proves that sound is perishable because it is produced, like a vase, it is a cardinal principle of his logic that perishability must be taken *simpliciter* as the *sādhyadharma*, and that one should not speak of particular cases. Otherwise, so the Buddhist maintains, if it were sound’s perishability which was being proven, there would be the problem of no *anvaya* in the example: the example, the vase, has perishability taken generally, but not sound’s perishability.⁵⁴ Dharmakīrti replies that the analogy does not hold: the universal, perishability, is established in sound, but *dvītyatva* / *arthāntararatva* is in neither *ghata* nor *puruṣa*.

(37) *tathārthāntarabhāve syāt tadvān kumbho 'py anityatā / viśīṣṭā⁵⁵ dhvaninānveti no cen nāyogavāraṇāt //*

“Similarly, if another object existed [i.e. if one from among the body and the vase were accepted as being the other object⁵⁶], then the vase would also have this [property, *sadvītyatva*]. [Objection:] Impermanence qualified by sound has no *anvaya* [in the example]. [Reply:] No, [there is no such fault of no *anvaya*,] since we are [just] excluding [sound’s] non-connection (*ayogavāraṇa*) [with the qualifier, impermanence].”⁵⁷

53 *sgra dari bum pa'i khyad par gyis rtogs na ni mi rtag pa la yañ mtshuriñ so žé na / ma yin te / mi rtag pa riid grub pas na sgra de dari ldan par sgrub pa'i phyir ro //* (D. 192b 5-6).

54 PVV 428, 3-5: *nāše 'pi sādhye śabdaghata�oh sādhyadrśtāntadharminoh sambandhitayā bhedena kalpane śabdasaṃbandhino nāśasya ghate 'nvayābhāvād asādhyatvam / ghataśaṃbandhinaś ca śabde 'sambhavād asādhyateti tulyam idam iti cet /* “[Objection:] In the case of *sādhya* ‘perishability’ too, if one conceives of it in terms of particular cases, i.e. as connected with the subjects of the *sādhya* and of the example, sound and vase [respectively], then perishability connected with sound would not be the *sādhya*, as there is no *anvaya* [of the reason and sound’s perishability] in the vase. And nor would [perishability] connected with a vase be the *sādhya*, for it could not occur in sound. Thus this is analogous.”

55 PV-k(I) *viśīṣṭo*.

56 Cf. PVin n. 58 and PVinT 28a 3: *gal te lus dari bum pa dag las 'ga' žig don gčān du 'gyur bar khas len yin na ni /*.

57 Cf. PVV 428, 17-18: *atha dhvaninā svasaṃbandhitayā viśīṣṭānityatā drśtāntam nānvetīti cet / nānanvayadośo viśeṣenāyogaśaṃbandhasya vāraṇāt //*

Cf. PVin P. 290b 6-7.⁵⁸

(38) *dvividho hi vyavacchedo viyogāparayogayoh /
vyavacchedād ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamah⁵⁹ //*

“Indeed, there are two kinds of exclusion (*vyavaccheda*), as there is exclusion of non-connection and exclusion of connections with anything other. But when non-connection is to be excluded, [the fault of] no *anvaya* [of impermanence in the example] will not ensue.”

K. 37ab. If either the vase or the person (taken materialistically) existed as another object, i.e. as a companion to the vase, then *sadvitīyatva* would be established, and the vase would possess this property, just as it possesses perishability. But the vase is not other than itself, and a “body with a consciousness consisting in a manifestation of the elements” is nonexistent from the point of view of the Cārvāka’s (non-Materialist) adversary, who holds that consciousness exists as a mental entity distinct from the physical elements making up the body. Manorathanandīn points out⁶⁰ that if the body were simply without consciousness, then *sadvitīyatva* could be established: but then, the Cārvāka would, of course, fail to prove his thesis of Materialism.

K. 37cd-38. Next, we have an objection involving the Buddhist theory of the three types of exclusion (*vārana* = *vyavaccheda*), one of which must figure explicitly (via the word *eva*) or implicitly (without *eva*) in any relationship between a qualifier (*viśesāṇa*) and qualificand (*viśesya*).⁶¹

58 *de bzin du 'ga' žig don gžan du gyur par[1] khas len na gari yari runi ba don gžan gyi no bor 'gyur ba yin no //* ([1]D. pas [D.192b 6]). Watanabe (1977) n. 17 cites P. 290a 1-2 in connection with k. 37, which seems wrong.

59 PV-k(II), (III) *ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamah*: PV-k(I), Miy. *ayoge tu nānyenānanvayāgamah*. Although PV-k(I) is supported by PV Tib. (*gžan dari ni rjes 'gro med par 'gyur ma yin*), Devendrabuddhi supports our reading. PVP P. 330a 6-7: *de la mi ldan pa / bzlog la ... rjes 'gro med pa min[1] / bsgrub par bya bas ston pa ma yin no žes bya ba'i tha tshig go //* ([1] Ego min: P.D. yin [D. 277a 5]).

60 PVV 428, 12-14: *yadi punar acetanasvabhāvatayā ghatajātiyenaiva dehena sadvitīyatvam ghatasya sādhyate taddā sidhyaty eva / tathāvidhasya sadvitīyatvasya siddhatvād vināśavat / kim tu vādino nestasiddhīh / dehasya cetanasvabhāvatayā 'siddheh /* “Suppose, however, that it were established that the vase had a companion in the form of a body of the very same natural kind as the vase, that is, naturally unconscious. Then [*sadvitīyatva*] would indeed be established, for such a type of *sadvitīyatva* is established just like perishability. But then the proponent’s intended [proposition] would not be proven, since the body would not be established as being naturally conscious.”

61 On the theory of *vyavaccheda*, see Kajiyama (1973), as well as Gillon and Hayes (1982). To take the classic examples of *ayogavyavaccheda* and *anyayogavyavaccheda* mentioned in PVV ad k. 38, the usual intention in uttering the sentence *caitro dhanurdharah* is simply to assert that Caitra is not a non-archer: there can be other archers too. Thus:

The opponent in k. 37cd argues as follows: The Buddhist also incurs the fault of no *anvaya* of the *sādhyadharma* in the example when he proves that sound is impermanent. He establishes the property impermanence as qualified by sound; but then impermanence, which belongs to sound, cannot also be a property of the example, the vase. Dharmakīrti replies that opponent has misconstrued the type of exclusion in the *sādhyā*: If the proposition “sound is impermanent” implicitly involved *anyayogavyavaccheda* (“exclusion of connections with anything other”), it would exclude connections between impermanence and anything other than sound. In that case, impermanence could not also be a property of the example. However, it is not *anyayogavyavaccheda* which is implicit in this *sādhyā*, but rather *ayogavyavaccheda*: the proposition is merely excluding the non-connection of impermanence with sound, but does not in any way prevent impermanence from being connected with other entities.⁶²

(39) *sāmānyam eva tat sādhyam na ca siddhaprasādhanam /*
*viśistam dharminā tac ca na niravayadosavat*⁶³ //

“This universal [i.e. impermanence, etc.] alone is the *sādhyā*. Neither is one proving something [already] established, nor does this [impermanence, etc.], which is qualified by the *dharmin* [through *ayogavyavaccheda*], have the fault of lacking *anvaya* [in the example].”

It is true that particular cases (like sound’s impermanence) would not be properties of the example, and that there would be the fault of no *anvaya*. However, this problem will be avoided by the Buddhist in that only universals, and not particular cases, are being proved. But then it could be argued that this restriction to universals would make inference redundant – we would be proving something which has already been proven to exist. PVV: “[Objection:] Surely the universal, i.e. impermanence, etc., is actually established somewhere; a proof [of it] would be pointless. [Reply:]

“Caitra is an archer”. On the other hand, a speaker will utter *pārtho dhanurdharah* in order to convey that Pārtha is the only excellent archer among the brothers of the Pāndava. Then we would have to translate: “It is Pārtha [alone] who is the archer”. See PV IV, 190-192 translated and discussed in Kajiyama *op. cit.*

62 Cf. Devendrabuddhi *ad* k. 39 (P. 330a 5): ... *žes snar bśad zin to* “[this] was already explained earlier.” Indeed, the same objection and reply figures frequently in Dharmakīrti’s works. E.g. PVSV 2, 7-10: *paksasya dharmatve tadvišesanāpeksasyānyatrānanuvritter asādhāranateti cet / na / ayogavyavacchedena višesanāt / yathā caitro dhanurdharah / nānyayogavyavacchedena / yathā pārtho dhanurdhara ity āksepsyāmah /*. See also PVin Chapter II p. 30, 6 *et seq.*; transl. Steinkellner p. 32.

63 PV-k(III) *niranvapadosavat*.

Now, one is not proving something, i.e. impermanence, which is established by merely existing somewhere, for one is proving something unestablished, namely, an exclusion of non-connection with regard to the *dharmin*.⁶⁴

Dharmakīrti, as we saw earlier in the *sadvitīyaprayoga* discussion, does seem to recognize that universals, such as impermanence, are established, or exist, insofar as they exist in some or another *dharmin*. However, from this it does not follow that proving that *sound* is impermanent is pointless, for one is proving something which may as yet be unestablished, viz. that impermanence is present in the *dharmin*, sound. Moreover, because one is establishing the mere exclusion of non-connection (*ayogavyavaccheda*) between sound and impermanence, other entities, like the vase, can also be impermanent: the fault of no *anvaya* in the example does not occur.

(40) *etenā dharmidharmābhyaṁ viśistau dharmadharminau / pratyākhyāto⁶⁵ nirākurvan dharmīny evam asādhanāt //*

"The [Cārvāka] who refutes [that sound has] the *dharma* [impermanence] qualified by the *dharmin* [sound] or the *dharmin* [sound] qualified by the *dharma* [impermanence] is [himself] rebuffed by this [assertion of Dignāga that what is intended is the *sādhyā*], because one is not proving anything like that of the *dharmin* [sound]."

Cf. PVin P. 290b 7-8.⁶⁶ The opponent (whom Manorathanandin specifies as still being the Cārvāka) continues his attempt to show that the Buddhist also incurs the faults of no *anvaya* and *viruddhahetu*. We now find an obfuscating argument against the Buddhist's idea of the *sādhyā*, viz. the *dharma* qualified by the *dharmin* (see k. 39). The Buddhist maintains that one intends to prove the simple universal, impermanence

64 PVV 429, 3-6: *nanv anityatādi sāmānyam siddham eva kvacit* sādhane vaiyarthyam ity āha / na ca siddhasya kvacit satiāmātrenānityasya prasādhanam / dharmīny ayogavyavacchedasyāsiddhasya prasādhanāt /* *Cf. PVV-n's gloss on *kvacit*: *vidyudādau*.

65 Ego *pratyākhyāto*: PV-k(I),(II),(III), Miy. *pratyākhyātāu*. Manorathanandin, in PVV 429, 14-15, comments on *pratyākhyāto*: ... *sa evam vadān pratyākhyātāh*. See n. 67. The idea, as Manorathanandin shows, is that when the Cārvāka argues that there is no *anvaya* when the *dharma* is construed as qualified by the *dharmin*, etc., he is himself rebuffed by Dignāga's specification *ista*. Note that while PV Tib. may support the dual, *pratyākhyātāu*, the Tibetan in PVP (330b 4-5) is in keeping with PVV: *chos can chos dag gis / chos dari chos can khyad par can / 'gog par byed pa'i rgol ba bsal ba yin te /*.

66 'dod pa bsgrub byar brjod pa 'dis ni chos dari chos can dag gis khyad par du byas pa'i chos dari chos can dag 'gog pa yai bsal ba yin te / dper na sgra ni mi rtag pa'i sgra dari ldan pa ma yin pa'am sgra'i mi rtag pa dari ldan pa ma yin no / žes bya ba lta bu ste / chos can la spyi bkag pa ni 'gal ba med pa'i phyir ro // (D. 192b 6-193a 1).

(anityatvamātra), as being present in the *dharmin*, sound. The Cārvāka, however, misrepresents the Buddhist position as being that a *dharma* qualified by a *dharmin* (*darmivisistadharma*), or vice versa (i.e. *dharma-visistadharmin*), is asserted to be present in the *dharmin*. Thus, the *sādhyā* would be either “sound has the impermanence belonging to sound” (*śabdānityatvavān śabdah*), or “sound has sound which is impermanent” (*anityaśabdavān śabdah*). In both cases there would be no positive concomitance (*anvaya*) of the reason with the *dharma* in an example, and thus the reason would prove the contrary of this *sādhyā* and be a *viruddhahetu*. Dharmakīrti, in effect, replies that the problem of no *anvaya* or *viruddha* does not arise: the Buddhist never intends to prove that sound has impermanence belonging to sound or that it has sound which is impermanent: Dignāga’s *ista* eliminates such unintended properties.⁶⁷

(41) *samudāyāpavādo hi na dharmini virudhyate /*
sādhyam⁶⁸ yatas tathā nestam sādhyo dharmo 'tra kevalah //
 “Indeed, the denial of the combination [of *dharma* and *dharmin*] in the *dharmin* is not contradiction, since the *sādhyā* was not intended in this manner. The *dharma* alone is what is to be proved in this [*dharmin*].”

The Buddhist certainly *does* hold that the combination (*samudāya*) of *dharmin* and *dharma* is the *sādhyā*.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, this combination is not, as the Cārvāka maintained, that of the *dharmin* plus a *darmivisistadharma* or a *dharmavisistadharmin*: it is only of the *dharmin* plus the simple *dharma*, the universal: the Cārvāka’s version was never intended at all. As a result, the fact that the reason would prove the opposite of the type of combination which the Cārvāka advances does not make it a *viruddhahetu*.⁷⁰

67 See PVV 429, 11-15: *etenesiṣya sādhyatvavacanena dharmidharmābhyaṁ viśistau dharmadharmināv ananvayān nirākurvan cārvāko yathā na śabdānityatvavān śabdo nānityaśabdavān vā śabda iti / na hi śabdānityatvenānityaśabdena vā kvacid ghaṭādau drstānte krtakatvayānvayo 'sti tata istaviparyāsanād viruddham krtakatvam iti sa evam vadān pratyākhyātah katham ity āha / dharmini śabde evam dharmivisistasya dharmasya dharmavisistasya vā dharmino 'sādhanād anityatvamātrasya śabde sādhyatvenestatvāt /*. Cf. PVin, n. 66.

68 PV-k(III) *sādhanam*.

69 Cf. PVV 429, 18-19: *dharmaṁātrasya dharmisādhyatvāt samudāya eva sādhyah /* “Because the mere *dharma* is to be proved of the *dharmin*, the combination alone is the *sādhyā*.”

70 Cf. PVBh 501, 2-3: *na hi dharminy aparah śabdānityatvasamudāyah śabde sādhyah / tatas tasya nirākarane 'pi na dosah / anityatāmātranirākarane hi dosah /* “Indeed, another combination of sound and impermanence is not being proved of the *dharmin*,

This concludes the discussion of *ista* in *Pramānasamuccaya*'s definition of the thesis. Dharmakīrti will now comment upon *svayam* – Dignāga's condition that the proponent himself must intend to prove the thesis in question and that it is not merely a proposition to be found in a treatise of his school.

(42) *ekasya dharminah sāstre nānādharmasthitāv api /*
*sādhyah syād ātmanaivesta ity upāttā svayamśrutih*⁷¹ //

"The word 'himself' (*svayamśruti*) was employed with the following in mind: Even though in a treatise (*sāstra*) various *dharmas* might be posited of one [and the same] *dharmin*, what is to be proved (*sādhyā*) would be what is intended by [the proponent] himself alone."

Cf. PVin P. 291a 3-4.⁷² NB III, 42-44: "‘*svayam*’ means by the proponent who states the *sādhana* at that time. Consequently, the following was meant: although he might state a *sādhana* basing [himself] on some treatise, [and] even though the author of that treatise might have accepted many *dharmas* [as belonging] to that *dharmin*, the *sādhyā* is only that *dharma* which this proponent himself intends to prove at this time, and nothing else."⁷³

Here begins a long argument, very possibly in part directed against Uddyotakara, who argued in the *Nyāyavārttika* against the word *svayam* (see n. 17); the argumentation is generally directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that "because [the proponent] accepts a treatise, everything found there will be the *sādhyā*".⁷⁴ Dharmakīrti will use the

sound. So, even if it is refuted, there is no fault. For, it is when simple impermanence is refuted that there is a fault."

71 PV-k(I),(II),(III), Miy. *svayam śrutih*. The word is a compound.

72 *raññid kyi sgra ni chos can gcig la bstan bcos las chos du ma mam par gžag[1] kyan raiññid bdag ñid 'dod pa de[2] kho na bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi / bstan bcos khas blaris suzin kyan gžan ni ma yin no žes bstan pa'i phyir /... ([1] P. bžag [2] D. omits de [D. 193a 2-3]).*

73 *svayam iti vādinā //42// yas tadā sādhanam āha //43// etena yady api kvacic chāstre sthitah sādhanam āha tacchāstrakārena tasmin dharminy anekadharmābhupagame 'pi yas tadā tena vādinā dharmah svayam sādhayitum istah sa eva sādhyo netara ity uktam bhavati //44//.* On the recurrent theme that one *dharmin* has many *dharmas*, cf. e.g. PS I, k. 5 and NM 17-18.

74 PVin P. 291a 5-6: *bstan bcos khas blaris pa'i phyir de la mthoñ ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin no žes dogs pa srid par 'gyur ro /* (D. 193a 5). Although neither Dharmakīrti nor his commentators explicitly identify which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika(s) held this, it seems reasonably clear that Uddyotakara did. He argued, against Dignāga (see n. 10), that if *svayam* showed that the position which the proponent sought to prove was independent of *śāstra* (*śāstrānapeksa*), then we should ask what is meant by *śāstra*. If the latter meant

term *svayam* to stress the proponent's independence from any doctrinal and dogmatic affiliations whatsoever: the proponent is only responsible for what he intends to prove at the moment of the argument. The implicit anti-dogmatism⁷⁵ here is radical indeed: subsequently, in the discussion of *āpta* (k. 93-108), we find the case of an apostate Mīmāṃsaka who, contrary to his school's tenets, decides to prove that words are impermanent. His "heresy" in denying a cardinal tenet of his school does not constitute a refutation of his thesis.

(43) *śāstrābhypagamād eva sarvādānāt⁷⁶ prabādhane /*
tatraikasyāpi dosah syād yadi hetupratijñayoh //

"Suppose the following is argued⁷⁷: [The proponent] holds all [the *dharmas*] because he does accept the treatise. Consequently, if [a reason] invalidated even one [dharma] amongst those [mentioned in the treatise], there would be the fault of the reason and the thesis [each being contradictory]."⁷⁸

what is not contradicted by perception or scripture, then *not* relying on *śāstra* would be tantamount to holding and proving a false view. NV *ad* 1.1.33, p. 282, 4-8: *yad api svayamśabdena śāstrānapeksam abhyupagamam darśayatīti atroktam / kim uktam / parāvajānasyāyuktatvād ity evamādi / kim punah śāstram yadanapeksam abhyupagamam darśayati / nanu śāstram pratyaksāgamābhyaṁ aviruddham / āgamas tadanapeksam abhyupagamam darśayatīti bruvatā 'pramānakam artham abhyupaitīty uktam / yaś cāpramānako 'bhyupagamo nāsāv abhyupagantum svasthātmanā yuktaḥ / nāpi pratipādayitum yukta iti /*

75 Stcherbatsky (1958) p. 156, n. 2, explaining Vācaspatimiśra's comments on NV, conveys what dogmatism would be in this Indian context: "If, says Vācaspatimiśra, someone known to be an adherent of the Vaiśeṣika system would appear in a learned society (*pariṣad*) and advance the tenet that the sounds of speech are eternal entities, which is a tenet of the Mīmāṃsaka school against which the Vaiśekas always protested, neither the society nor the official opponent would care to listen. He would not even be allowed to state his argument, he would be declared beaten as soon as he had pronounced the thesis." See *Nyāyavārttikatātparyātikā* p. 282, 24-26.

76 PV-k(I) *samādānāt*. Cf. Tib. *thams cad* = *sva*.

77 I translate the *yadi* non-literally here by "Suppose ... argued". See PVV-n *ad* k. 43: *yadi tadāparah ślokah*. Cf. PVin, n. 79: *kha cig na re*. Following Bu ston this opponent is a Mīmāṃsaka.

78 See PVV 430, 12-13: *śāstrenābhypagamād eva sarvesām dharmānām ādānāt parigrahāt vādinā tatra tesu madhye ekasyāpi dharmasyopanyastahetunā bādhane hetupratijñayor viruddhatā dosa ucyate //*. Note, however, that PVV's *śāstrenābhypagamād eva* ("just because there is acceptance by the treatise") is an odd understanding. The Tibetan versions of the other PV and PVin commentaries do not have this instrumental *śāstrena*; cf. PVinT 30a 7 *bstan bcos khas blaris pa'i phyir ro*. We have followed PVBh *ad* k. 43: *yadi śāstram abhyupagatam ity eva śāstrabādhane dosah pratijñāhetvos tadā...* "Suppose that the treatise is indeed accepted, and that consequently if there is an invalidation of the treatise there will be a fault of the thesis and reason. Then ..."

Cf. PVin P. 291a 6-7.⁷⁹ An opponent might argue against a Vaiśeṣika that the reason, “being produced” (*kṛtakatva*) is contradictory (*viruddha*) when the latter philosopher seeks to prove that *śabda* (“sound”; “words”) is impermanent. In the classic argument *anityah śabdah kṛtakatvāt*, *kṛtakatva* would also establish that *śabda* is *not* a quality of space (*ākāśagunatva*), because space (*ākāśa*) is permanent and what depends upon it must be permanent too.⁸⁰ However, the Vaiśeṣika’s own treatise says that *śabda* *is* a quality of space (see VS 2.1.24-26), and hence this proposition must also be the *sādhya*. In that case, because the reason *kṛtakatva* would refute the Vaiśeṣika’s *sādhya*, the reason would be a *viruddhahetu*. Although it is clear that the philosopher being attacked is a Vaiśeṣika here, the Indian commentators do not explicitly identify his attacker. Nonetheless, Bu ston’s commentary to the *Pramānavinīścaya* and Vibhūticandra’s notes to PVV maintain that he is a Mīmāṃsaka⁸¹. The attribution is plausible, given the Mīmāṃsaka’s views that *śabda* is permanent, but in fact this line of attack on the proof of sound’s impermanence is not exclusive to the Mīmāṃsaka. The very same argument is even on occasion used to attack the possibility of inference in general: such is the Cārvāka’s strategy as depicted in Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasamgrahapañjikā ad TS 1456-7*.

We can summarize the logic as follows:

- (1) All which is mentioned in treatises which *A* accepts is *A*’s *sādhya*.
- (2) *śabdākāśagunatva* is mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika’s treatises and hence is also his *sādhya* in the proof of sound’s impermanence by the reason, *kṛtakatva*.
- (3) If sound is *ākāśaguna* then sound is permanent.
- (4) *kṛtakatva* establishes that sound is impermanent and hence that sound is not *ākāśaguna*.
- (5) Therefore, *kṛtakatva* establishes the opposite of the Vaiśeṣika’s *sādhya* and is thus a *viruddhahetu*.

79 *log par rtogs pa yari mthon ba ñid de / kha cig na re bstan bcos las mthon ba ni bsgrub par bya ba kho na yin la / de gnod na yari gtan tshigs dañ dam bca’ ba dag gi skyon yin no žes zer ro /* (D. 193a 6).

80 See PVV-n ad k. 44, n. 3: *ākāśasya nityatvāt taddāśritam ca nityam syāt / tad anityatvena bādhya /*. Cf. VS 2.1.27: *dravyatvānityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte*.

81 Śākyamati, e.g. speaks of the “author of the Vaiśeṣikaśāstra” (*bye brag pa’i bstan bcos byed pa*) in PVT 318b 3. For the reference to the Mīmāṃsaka, see Bu ston p. 373 which glosses PVin’s *kha cig na re* (see n. 77) as *dpyod pa ba* [= Mīmāṃsaka] *na re*. See also Vibhūticandra, PVV-n ad k. 44, n. 3, which speaks of the *vedāpauruseyavādin*.

(44) *śabdanāśe prasādhye syād gandhabhūgunatāksateh*⁸² /
hetur viruddho 'prakṛter no ced anyatra sā samā //

“[Dharmakīrti deduces the following absurdity:] Then, when the perishability of sound is being proven, the reason ['being a product' (*kṛtakatva*)] would be contradictory (*viruddha*), because it refutes that smell is a quality of the earth [element] (*gandhabhūgunatā*). [Objection:] But as [smell's being a quality of the earth] is not being discussed (*aprakṛti*), [*kṛtakatva*] would not be [contradictory]. [Dharmakīrti replies:] This [fact of not being discussed (*aprakṛti*)] is the same in the other case [viz. sound's being a quality of space (*ākāśagunatva*)].”

Cf. PVin P. 291a 7-8.⁸³ Dharmakīrti accepts that k. 43's refutation of the Vaiśeṣika is inevitable, *providing* the *sādhyā* is thought to include all properties which the school's treatises attribute to the *dharmin*. (See Dharmottara's gloss on PVin given in n. 83.) He then takes the absurd consequences coming from this view of the *sādhyā* one step further: just as⁸⁴ *kṛtakatva* refutes the tenet that *śabda* is *ākāśaguna*, so *kṛtakatva* would also refute the Vaiśeṣika tenet (cf. VS 2.1.1; 2.2.3) that smell (*gandha*) is a quality of the earth element (*bhūgunatva*); hence, when proving *anityah śabdah kṛtakatvāt*, *kṛtakatva* would also be contradictory in that it would, in addition, refute the *sādhyā*, *gandhabhūgunatva*. To this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika exponent of the *sādhyā* being everything found in treatises might retort by saying that *bhūgunatva* is irrelevant in this context, as it is not being discussed. Dharmakīrti replies that there is no difference between *bhūgunatva* and *ākāśagunatva* on this score: the proponent did not discuss or intend to prove *ākāśagunatva* either, but since his *sādhyā* is all which is to be found in his treatises, *śabdākāśagunatva* and *gandhabhūgunatva* are equally his *sādhyā*.

(45) *athātra dharmī prakṛtas tatra śāstrārthabādhanam* /
atha vādīstatām brūyād dharmidharmādisādhanaih //

82 PV-k(I),(III) *gandhe bhūgunatāksateh*. For PV Tib. we read *dri sa'i yon tan*: P.D.N. Miy. erroneously read *dri za'i yon tan*. *dri za* = *gandharva*.

83 *de dag gi ltar na byas ūid ni*[1] / *sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na*[2] *dri la sog pa'i yon tan bzlog pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal bar 'gyur ro* // *skabs ma yin pa'i phyir ma yin no ūe na de ni gžan la yan mtshuris so* // ([1]D. *kyi* [2]D. omits *na* [D.193a 6-7]). PVinT 30b 4 has an important gloss on PVin's *de dag* ("they"): *bstan bcos las mthoni ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin par smra ba de dag* ... "those who say that everything found in the treatise is the *sādhyā*".

84 Cf. the *yathā ... tathā* construction in PVV 430, 14-20.

“[Opponent:] But here [i.e. in the case of *ākāśagunatva*] the *dharmin* [*śabda*] was discussed: in that case there [could] be invalidation of the property found in the treatise. Next, [in answer to Dharmakīrti’s reply that neither *śabdākāśagunatva* nor *gandhabhūgunatva* were intended by the proponent and hence neither were discussed, the adversary] might assert by means of *sādhanas* [i.e. reasons] such as [its] being a *dharma* of the *dharmin* that [*ākāśagunatva*] was [indeed] intended by the proponent.”

Cf. PVin P. 291a 8-291b 2.⁸⁵

(PVV *ad* k. 45:) “[Nyāya-Vaiśesika:] But here, i.e. in the case of *ākāśagunatva*, etc., the *dharmin* sound was discussed. In that case, there is invalidation of a property found in the treatise, viz. *ākāśagunatva*, etc. And when this [property] is invalidated the reason will be contradictory (*viruddha*). However, in the case of *bhūgunatva*, the *dharmin* smell was not discussed. Therefore, even if this [*bhūgunatva*] is invalidated, there will be no contradiction. [Dharmakīrti’s reply:] This is no answer. For indeed, the fault is not said to be because the opposite of what the proponent intended [is the case], but rather because of the contradiction with properties [found] in his treatises. And so being discussed [or not] is inapplicable. Rather, because they are not intended by the proponent, this [*bhūgunatva*] and *ākāśagunatva* are the same in not being discussed. Next, by means of *sādhanas* [i.e. logical reasons] such as [its] being a *dharma* of the *dharmin*, the adversary might assert that *ākāśagunatva* was [indeed] intended by the proponent. [The *prayoga* is as follows:] since it is a *dharma* of the *dharmin*, or since it is a part of that [*sādhyasamudāya*], *ākāśagunatva* was intended by the proponent, just like impermanence.”⁸⁶

Dharmakīrti’s adversary tries to show a dissimilarity between *ākāśagunatva* and *bhūgunatva*, saying that the *sādhyas* is not just *every* property found in the treatise, but rather all properties mentioned in the treatise as pertaining to the particular *dharmin* under discussion.

85 *mi mtshuris te 'dir chos can gyi skabs[1] yin pa'i phyir ro že na / ... 'on te rgol bas kyan 'dod pas sgrub par byed do[2] // bsgrub par bya ba spyi'i phyogs gcig tu gyur ba'i khyad par yin pa'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos bzin no že na / ([1]P. skabs su. PVinT reads skabs. [2]P. sgrub byed PVinT sgrub par byed pa de'i tshe. [D.193a 7-193b 2]).*

86 PVV 431, 9-15: *athātrākāśagunatvādau dharmī śabdah prakrtah / tatra śāstrārthasyākāśagunatvādēh bādhanam[1] tadbādhane ca viruddhātā hetoh / bhūgunatve tu gandho dharmy aprakrtā iti tadbādhane 'pi na virodhah / naisa parihārah / tathā hi na vādīstaviparyāsanena dosa uktah / kim tu śāstrārthavirodhena tathā ca prakrtatvam anupayuktam / atha vādyanisitatayā 'prakrtatvam taccākāśagunatvayoh samānam / athākāśagunatvasya vādīstatām paro brūyāt dharmidharmādisādhanaih / sādhyadharmidharmatvāt tadekadeśatvād vākāśagunatvam iṣṭam vādinā[2] 'nityatvavād iti / ([1] PVV sādhanam [2] PVV vādino).*

Therefore, *ākāśagunatva* will be the *sādhya* when the *dharmin* is sound, but *bhūgunatva* will not – it would have necessitated a different *dharmin*, viz. smell. Thus *ākāśagunatva* could be refuted by the reason, *kṛtakatva*, when one is proving that sound is impermanent, but *bhūgunatva* could not be refuted in such a discussion. The *kārikā* does not give Dharmakīrti's own refutation of this argument, but some idea of it can be gleaned from Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's commentaries: (1) The adversary makes the mistake of simply speaking of properties mentioned in treatises as being *sādhya* and does not take the proponent's intentions into account at all. (2) Nonetheless, something's being discussed is a function of what the proponent's intentions are. (3) *śabdākāśagunatva* and *gandhabhūgunatva* are then the same in both being unintended, and hence in not being discussed. Note, however, that the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* has a somewhat different refutation, one which appeals to the fact that neither *ākāśagunatva* nor *bhūgunatva* are connected in reality with the *sādhya-dharma*, impermanence.⁸⁷

87 See PVinT 31a 7-31b 2: *ma yin te ūes bya ba ni mtshuris pa ūid do // chos can skabs su bab pa dari ma bab pa dag gis ni khyad par du gyur pa ma yin no // ci'i phyir ūe na / gan gi phyir chos can skabs su bab pa yin yani mi rtag pa ūid sgrub pa na / gan la dños po la 'brel ba yod pa de ni ma smos kyan bsgrub bya ūid du 'gyur ba yin te / dper na bdag med pa la sogs pa lta bu'o // nam mkha'i yon tan ūid la ni de ltar dños la 'brel ba yod pa ma yin te / de med pa'i rgyu'i phyir ro // 'on kyan 'di dag ni bstan bcos khas blans pa'i rgyu kho nas bsgrub par bya ba ūid du 'brel ba na bstan bcos khas blans pa de ni sa'i yon tan la sogs pa thams cad la yani mtshuris pa yin te / de'i phyir nam mkha'i yon tan ūid dari / sa'i yon tan 'di ūid la lun gi sgo nas 'oris pa'i bsgrub par bya ba ūid du bye brag med do //* “No, i.e. they are in fact similar. There is no difference whether the *dharmin* is under discussion or not. Why? For the following reasons: Even when the *dharmin* is under discussion, then if one proves impermanence, whatever is necessarily connected in reality would be the *sādhya*, albeit not stated, as for example [properties] like selflessness (*nairātmya*). But *ākāśagunatva* will have no such necessary connection (*'brel ba* = *sambandha*) in reality, for the reason that it does not exist. However, if these [i.e. *ākāśagunatva*, etc.] are connected as *sādhya* merely because of acceptance in treatises, then this acceptance in treatises is completely the same in the case of *bhūgunatva* and the like, and therefore, *ākāśagunatva* and *bhūgunatva* have no difference in being *sādhya* which stem from scriptures.”

K. 45cd. Finally, the adversary seeks to argue that *ākāśagunatva* is in fact intended by the proponent, while *bhūgunatva* is not.⁸⁸ Devendrabuddhi's PVP and Vibhūticandra's notes to PVV give the details of the two formal logical reasonings used by Dharmakīrti's adversary to prove his point: "Whatever is a quality of the *dharmin* is the *sādhya*, because it is a *dharma* of the *dharmin* (*darmidharma*), just like the *sādhyadharma*." Or: "Whatever is a quality of one part of the combination [of *dharmin* and *dharma*] which is the *sādhya* (*sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśesa*), that is intended as the *sādhya* by the proponent, just like, for instance, the *sādhyadharma*. Similarly, [*ākāśagunatva*] is also a quality of the *dharmin*."⁸⁹

(46) *kaiścit prakaranair icchā bhavet sā gamyate ca taih /*
balāt taveccheyam⁹⁰ iti vyaktam iśvaracestitam //

"[Reply to k. 45cd:] It is because of some contexts of discussion (*prakarana*) that there would be an intention. And this [intention] is understood by means of those [contexts]. If one says [of a proponent who does not himself intend to prove a particular property], 'You have this intention because of the force [of the *sādhana*],' then it is obviously the work of God!"

88 If we follow Dharmottara's interpretation, the adversary actually abandons his definition of the *sādhya* as being "what is accepted in treatises" in favour of "what is intended by the proponent". PVinT 31b 3-5: 'di sñiyam du bstan bcos khas blāñs pa'i phyir bsgrub byar 'gyur ba ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyari rgol ba 'dod pa yin pa'i phyir ro // rgol ba la skabs su bab pa'i chos can la ji sñed yod pa'i chos de thams cad bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'dod pa yod pa yin te // des na de[1] kho na la bsgrub par bya ba ñid yod pa yin no // chos can gñāñ la brten pa bsgrub par bya ba ñid du mi 'dod pa'i phyir 'di la yari bsgrub par 'dod pa ma grub par 'gyur ba ni ma yin no ze na / ([1] P. omits *de*) "The following might be thought: something does not become the *sādhya* because it is accepted in treatises, but rather because of the proponent's intention. For the proponent the *dharmas* which pertain to the *dharmin* under discussion are all intended as the *sādhya*, and thus this alone is the *sādhya*. What relies on another *dharmin* is not intended to be the *sādhya*. Consequently, it is not so that this [*ākāśagunatva*] is also not established as intended to be proven."

89 PVP P. 332a 1-3: *chos can gyi bye brag[1] gai yin pa de ni bsgrub[2] par bya ba yin te / chos can gyi[3] chos ñid yin pa'i phyir bsgrub[4] par bya ba'i chos bñin no // sogs pa smos pa[5] ni / gai dan gai bsgrub par bya ba'i spyi'i phyogs gcig gi bye brag gis gai yin pa de ni bsgrub par bya ba ñid du rgol bas 'dod pa yin te / dper na bsgrub par bya ba'i chos lta bu'o // de bñin du chos can[6] gyi khyad par yari yin no ze na / ([1] P. cha bye brag [2]P. sgrub [3]D. omits gyi [4]P. sgrub [5]P. pas [6]D. omits can [D. 278b 1-2]). PVV-n ad k. 45, n.2: *yo dharmino viśesah sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśeso vā sa sādhyah* "Whatever is a quality of the *dharmin* or is a quality of one part of the combination [of *dharmin* and *dharma*] which is being proven, that is the *sādhya*."*

90 Miy. *taveccheyam*.

PV IV, k. 46 = PVin III, k. 7; P. 291b 4-5. Dharmakīrti refers back to his previously stated view (see k. 31) that the proponent's intentions are conditioned by the contexts of the discussions — what the debate is about —, and he ridicules the adversary's attempt to use the above-described inconclusive arguments to say that someone *must* have certain intentions. Here in PV IV Dharmakīrti does not seem to criticize explicitly the *sādhana* alluded to in k. 45cd, contenting himself with some caustic sarcasm. In the *Pramānaviniścaya* (P. 291b 2-4), however, he attacks the reasons as leading to the absurdity (*atiprasaṅga*) that one would have a constant, never ceasing intention to prove *ākāśagunatva*, etc. Moreover, to say that the proponent *must* have these intentions is simply contradicted by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). Devendrabuddhi, in the same vein, criticizes the reasons, *dharmaidharmatva* and *sādhyasamudāyaikadeśavīśesatva*, by arguing that because there is no *sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* ("*pramāṇa* which invalidates the presence of the reason in the contrary of the *sādhyadharma*"), the *vyāpti* ("pervasion") is not established, and the reasons are hence *śesavat* ("with remainder").⁹¹

(47) *vadann akāryalingām⁹² tām vyabhicārena bādhyate / anāntarīyake cārthe bādhite 'nyasya kā ksatih //*

"One who says that this [intention] has something other than an effect as the reason [proving its existence] is invalidated on account of [such a reason's] being deviant (*vyabhicāra*). And [furthermore], although an entity [i.e. *ākāśagunatva*] which is not invariably related [with the *sādhyā*, impermanence,] might be invalidated, what refutation is there of the other [term, i.e. the *sādhyā*]?"

PV IV, k. 47 = PVin III, k. 8; P. 291b 5. One can infer the presence of a speaker's intention from its effects (*kārya*), viz. his words — the theme recurs constantly in PV.⁹³ The adversary, however, sees that this *kāryalinga* will not prove that when the proponent is speaking about sound's impermanence he also intends to prove *ākāśagunatva*. He thus

91 PVP P. 332a 3-4: *'di ltar chos can chos sogs sgrub byed kyis rgol ba'i 'dod pa 'grub par mi 'gyur te / bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad ma med pas[1] khyab pa med pa'i phyir / rjes su dpag pa lhag ma dañ ldan pa riid du 'gyur ro //* ([1]D. ma yin pas [D. 278b 2-3]) "Thus *sādhana* [i.e. logical reasons] such as *dharmaidharmatva*, etc. will not establish the intention of the proponent, for since there is no [*sādhyā*]viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, there is no *vyāpti*. The inference becomes *śesavat*."

92 Miy. *vadan na kāryalingām*. Cf. PVV *tām icchām akāryalingām** *kāryetaralingām*. *Text reads *akāryalingām*.

93 Cf. PV I k. 213 and PV II k. 1-2; Tillemans (1987) pp. 143-144.

proposes another type of reason, one which is not a *kāryalinga*. This is predictably discounted by Dharmakīrti as leading to deviance, i.e. the *vyāpti* will not hold.

According to Dharmottara, the adversary might then argue: “Even though *ākāśagunatva* is not under discussion, still if it were invalidated, the *sādhya* would be invalidated. Hence, the establishment of the *sādhya* is simultaneous with the establishment of this [*ākāśagunatva*], and consequently the latter is also the *sādhya*.⁹⁴ Dharmakīrti certainly does acknowledge that what is necessarily connected with a valid *sādhya* should not be refuted – this is only reasonable, as a negation of what the *sādhya* entails would lead to the negation of the *sādhya* by contraposition. It is, however, quite another matter to say that what is entailed is also the *sādhya*, or, what is even stronger, that it was intended to be proved.⁹⁵ In PV IV, k. 47, however, the issue is left undecided: Dharmakīrti simply argues that there is in fact no necessary connection (*sambandha*), or in other terms, no invariable relation (*nāntarīyakatā*) between *ākāśagunatva* and the actual *sādhya*, *anityatva*. Proving *anityatva* by means of *krtakatva* does not also entail proving *ākāśagunatva*; nor does denying *ākāśagunatva* imply denying *anityatva*.

(To be continued)

94 PVinT 33a 4-5: 'di sñam du gal te nam mkha'i yon tan ñid skabs su bab pa ma yin pa de ltar na yan de la gnod na bsgrub bya la gnod par 'gyur bas bsgrub par bya ba grub pa ni de grub pa dari lhan gcig pa yin te / des na bsgrub bya yin no sñam na /.

95 Curiously enough, however, Dharmottara at least did seem to tend to this latter position and argued that all which is necessarily connected is the *sādhya*, albeit unstated. Cf. n. 87.

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Bu ston = Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364). *Tshad ma mam par nies pa'i tīkā tshig don rab gsal*. Included in *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, New Delhi 1971.

D. = sDe dge edition of Tibetan canon. *sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka*, *bsTan 'gyur Tshad ma*. Tokyo 1981ff.

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JBORS = *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*.

k. = *kārikā(s)*.

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Miy. = Miyasaka, Y. (1971/72). *Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan), edited by Y. Miyasaka. *Acta Indologica* 2: 1-206.

N. = sNar thaṇ edition of Tibetan canon.

NB = *Nyāyabindu* of Dharmakīrti, with *Nyāyabindutīkā* of Dharmottara and Pandita Durvekamīśra's *Dharmottarapradīpa*. Ed. D. Malvania. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 2. Patna 1955.

NBT = *Nyāyabindutīkā* of Dharmottara. See NB.

NM = *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga, *Taishō* XXXII, 1628. Ed. and Japanese translation in S. Katsura, *Inmyō shōrimonron kenkyū*.

NP = *Nyāyapraveśa* of Śāṅkarasvāmin. Ed. and translated in M. Tachikawa (1971). "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1: 111-129.

NV = *Nyāyavārttika* of Uddyotakara. In *Nyāyadarśanam* with Vātsyāyaṇa's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyatīkā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*. Rinsen Sanskrit Text Series I-1 and I-2. Kyoto 1982.

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P. = Peking edition of Tibetan canon.

PS = *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga, P. 5700.

PSV = *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* of Dignāga. (a) transl. Vasudhararakṣita and Seṇ ḥrgyal, P. 5701. (b) transl. Kanakavarman and Dad pa śes rab, P. 5702.

PV = *Pramānavārttika* of Dharmakīrti (PV I = *Svārthānumāna*; PV II = *Pramānasiddhi*; PV III = *Pratyakṣa*; PV IV = *Parārthānumāna*).

PV-k(I) = *Kārikās* of PV, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyaṇa in appendices to JBORS 24 (1938), Parts I-II.

PV-k(II) = *Kārikās* of PV included in Manorathanandin's PVV, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyaṇa in appendices to JBORS 24 (1938), Part III.

PV-k(III) = *Kārikās* of PV included in Prajñākaragupta's PVbh.

PVbh = *Pramānavārttikabhāṣya* or *Vārttikālamkāra* of Prajñākaragupta, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyaṇa. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. 1. Patna 1953. Tib. P. 5719.

PVin = *Pramānavinīścaya* of Dharmakīrti, P. 5710. Chapter II ed. and transl. by E. Steinkellner. *Dharmakīrti's Pramānavinīścayah Zweites Kapitel*. Two volumes. Vienna 1973, 1979.

PVinT = *Pramānavinīścayatīkā* of Dharmottara, P. 5727.

PVP = *Pramānavārttikapāñjikā* of Devendrabuddhi, P. 5717.

PVSV = *Pramānavārttikasavavṛtti* of Dharmakīrti. In *The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes*. Ed. R. Gnoli. Serie Orientale Roma XXIII. Rome 1960.

PVT = *Pramānavārttikatīkā* of Śākyamati, P. 5718.

PVV = *Pramānavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin. In *Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin*. Ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyaṇa in the appendices to JBORS 24 (1938) Part III.

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TS = *Tattvasamgraha* of Śāntarakṣita. In *Tattvasamgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā'* of Śrī Kamalaśīla. Ed. D. Shāstrī. Baudha Bhāratī 1. Varanasi 1981.

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