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Autor: Tillemans, Tom J.F.

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# PRAMĀŅAVĀRTTIKA IV (3)\*

## Tom J.F. Tillemans, Lausanne

The present article is the third in a series aiming at a translation of the chapter on inference-for-others (parārthānumāna) in the Pramānavārttika, the major work of the Buddhist philosopher, Dharmakīrti (6th-7th century A.D.). For the two previous articles, see Tillemans (1986) and (1987).

(PVV's introduction to k. 28 and 29:) "[Objection:] But if the thesis-statement is not a means of proof (sādhana) and has as content something which is to be understood by implication, then what was the point when the Master [Dignāga] formulated the [defining] characteristic of the thesis (paksalaksana)? [Dharmakīrti] replies:"

- (28) gamyārthatve 'pi sādhyokter asammohāya laksanam / tac caturlaksanam rūpanipātestasvayampadaih² //
- anukto 'pīcchayā vyāptah sādhya ātmārthavan matah //

  "Although the statement of what is to be proven (sādhya = paksa) is something which can be understood [by implication], the [defining] characteristic [of the thesis] was [stated] to dispel confusion. This [sādhya] has four characteristics: By means of the words 'essence' (rūpa), 'alone' (nipāta 'particle' = eva), 'intended' (ista) and 'himself', one understands that [the thesis] is unestablished [for the opponent], is not a sādhana, is stated according to the [real] sense and is what is accepted by the proponent (vādin). Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is
- \* Financial support for the continuation of this project has been provided by the Fonds national suisse de la recherche scientifique. Although the fourth chapter of Pramānavārttika might well seem to be about as far removed from the Mādhyamika as one could possibly imagine, Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's discussions on precisely what a thesis is do perhaps also have some relevance when we attempt to understand the Mādhyamika's recurring principle that he has no philosophical theses whatsoever. The latter theme particularly interested and influenced Jacques May in his approach to Buddhist thought. This article, then, is offered as a gesture of gratitude to Prof. May. My thanks to E. Steinkellner for some helpful remarks.
- 1 PVV 424, 13-14: nanu yadi paksavacanam asādhanam sāmarthyagamyābhidheyam ca tadācāryena paksalaksanam krtam kim artham ity āha.
- 2 Ego rūpanipātestasvayampadaih: PV-k(I) rūpam nipātesu svayam padaih; PV-k(II),(III), Miy. rūpanipātesu svayam padaih. See Frauwallner (1957a) p. 59. Clearly, what is at stake is not a locative plural \*esu, but the word ista in Dignāga's definition. Also, \*padaih must be one long compound.
- 3 PV-k(I) oktam vādyabhyupagamagrahah; PV-k(III), Miy. abhyupagamagrahah. PV Tib. has khas blans pa, which is in keeping with PV-k(II)'s reading abhyupagata; abhyupagama would most likely have been translated by khas len pa.

pervaded by the [proponent's] intention is held to be the sādhya, as in [the Sāmkhya's argument that the eyes, etc. are] for the use of the Self (ātman)."

(Our explanatory notes:) PV IV, k. 29ab = PVin III, k. 6cd. Cf. PVin P. 288a 8-b 2.<sup>4</sup> From PV IV, k. 28 until k. 163, Dharmakīrti will discuss the second verse in *Pramānasamuccaya* (PS) III, Dignāga's chapter on inference-for-others (*parārthānumāna*). The Sanskrit of the latter verse can be restored on the basis of the *Nyāyabindu*, the Tibetan of PS and Dharmakīrti's word by word commentary in PV IV: svarūpenaiva nirdeśyah svayam isto 'nirākrtah / pratyaksārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmini // <sup>5</sup> "[A valid thesis] is one which is intended (ista) by [the proponent] himself (svayam) as something to be stated (nirdeśya) according to its essence alone (svarūpenaiva) [i.e. as a sādhya]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (svadharmin), it is not opposed (anirākrta) by perceptible objects (pratyaksārtha), by inference (anumāna), by authories (āpta) or by what is commonly recognized (prasiddha)."

According to Dharmakīrti, the definition of the thesis (paksa) was given in PS III to dispel confusion about what theses are, and not because the thesis is itself a sādhana and hence indispensable member of a parārthānumāna. Dharmakīrti harkens back to k. 22, where it had been argued that the thesis is, in any case, implied by the two members of a parārthānumāna and need not be explicitly stated. The four character-

- 4 'o na sgrub par byed pa de bstan pa med na med pa ma yin pa'i phyir[1] phyogs kyi mtshan ñid brjod par mi bya'o źe na / brjod par bya ba yin[2] te / bsgrub par bya ba dan bsgrub par bya ba ma yin pa la phyin ci log tu log par rtogs pa mthon ba'i phyir / de bzlog pa'i don du yin no // rjes su dpag par bya ba de yan / no bo kho nar bstan par bya / ran nid 'dod dan ma bsal ba'o // 'dir ran gi no bo dan / tshig phrad dan / 'dod pa dan / ran nid kyi tshig bźis /
  ma grub sgrub byed min don brjod // rgol bas khas blans pa bzun[3] no //
  źes rig[4] par bya'o // ([1] P. bstan pa med pa ma yin pa'i phyir. [2] P. ma yin [3] P. gzun [4] P. rigs [D. 190a 7-b 2]).
- 5 PS Tib.: ran gi no bo kho nar bstan // bdag 'dod ran gi chos can la // mnon sum don dan rjes dpag dan // yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o //. Skt. of svarūpenaiva ... 'nirāknah is to be found in NB III, 38. The restoration of PS III, k. 2 follows Frauwaliner (1957a), p. 60; see also Van Bijlert (1989) p. 72.
- 6 The history of the gradual disappearance of the thesis-statement from parārthānumāna is a complex one and has been discussed in M. Inami, "On paksābhāsa" (Proceedings of the Second Dharmakīri Conference, Vienna 1991, 69-83) as well as in my article "More on parārthānumāna, Theses and Syllogisms" (Études Asiatiques, 45, 1991, 133-148). Suffice it to say here that in PS Dignāga recognized that the paksavacana was not a sādhana, but that it could be stated to show the goal of the reason (hetvartha); in PV and the Nyāyabindu Dharmakīrti seems to have held essentially the same position, but stressed that paksa was implied by the two members of a parārthānumāna; subsequently,

istics spoken about in k. 28-29 are conveyed by Dignaga's words svarūpenaiva ... svavam isto: (1) The word svarūpa ensures that the thesis is indeed something which needs to be proven, i.e. a sādhya, and is not already established for the opponent, as for example the obviously true proposition that sound is audible. (2) The particle eva ("only"/"alone") eliminates the possibility that any sādhana in an inference-for-others, such as unestablished reasons and examples, would also be counted as the thesis, for the thesis is only a sādhya. The point (which turns on Dignāga's refutation of the Nyāyasūtra's definition of the thesis) was discussed earlier on in Dharmakīrti's k. 24-26. (3) The word ista was destined to guarantee arthokta, that the thesis is indeed the intended proposition, stated as the proponent meant it, and not some potentially seductive proposition which might seem to fit the words, but is not what the proponent actually meant. (4) svayam shows that the thesis is vādyabhyupagata, what the proponent himself accepts and wishes to prove, rather than the various related or unrelated statements which might be found in the treatises of the proponent's school.8 (The specification anirākrta and the four types of refutation — viz. pratyaksa, anumāna, āpta and prasiddha – will be treated later in k. 91-135; svadharmin is discussed in k. 136-148.)

Dharmakīrti seems to have innovated somewhat upon Dignāga's own explanation in PS by introducing four different functions for svarūpena, eva, svayam and ista, Dignāga himself, in his Pramānasamuccayavrtti (PSV) on k. 2, having only spoken of two. In PSV svarūpenaiva served to eliminate unestablished reasons and examples from being theses, and svayam ista eliminated theses which were just positions of a treatise, but not those of the proponent. While PSV took svayam ista together toget

in the *Hetubindu* and *Vādanyāya*, the fact that the thesis is implied and that it is not a sādhana led him to view the paksavacana as completely redundant and hence as having no place whatsoever in a parārthānumāna.

- 7 PVin P. 288b 2: des na grub pa dper na sgra ni mñan par bya'o źes bya ba lta bu dań / (D. 190b 2-3).
- 8 Cf. NB III, 39-43.
- 9 See the article by M. Ono (1986), which discusses Dharmakīrti's development of Dignāga's definition of the thesis.
- 10 PSV(b) 125a 1, Kitagawa 471: bdag ñid 'dod pa źes bya ba ni 'dis ni bstan bcos la mi bltos pa'i khas blans pa bstan pa yin no / "This [phrase], svayam ista, shows a position (abhyupagama) which does not rely upon treatises (śāstrānapeksa)." Cf. the fragment in PVBh 495.2, Kitagawa (1973) p. 129, n. 166: svayam iti śāstrānapeksam abhyupagamam darśayati.

bhyupagata as the point of the former and arthokta as that of the latter. As we shall see, such a separate treatment of the two provisoes enabled Dharmakīrti to use ista to refute the sophistical arguments given by the Sāṃkhyas and Cārvākas (see k. 34 et seq. below), while using svayam to expand upon Dignāga's idea that logical theses are independent of what is stated in treatises.

Finally, the words ātmārthavat allude to the Sāmkhya's equivocal proof for the existence of the ātman. The latter philosopher argues that the eyes and other sense organs are for the "benefit of another" (parārtha): "The eyes and other [faculties] are for the benefit of another, because they are composite, like accessories such as a bed or seat, etc. (parārthāś caksurādayah samghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad)<sup>11</sup>". However, what the Sāmkhya actually intends by parārtha in this case, but does not say, is that derivatives of primordial matter (prakrti) are for the use of the ātman, i.e. the Spirit (purusa),<sup>12</sup> and it is this intended proposition which is the actual thesis. The argument will be taken up again in k. 31-33.

(PVV's introduction to k. 30:) "[Objection:] But since all [propositions] which are unintended (anista) are eliminated by the word ista, then it is established that [propositions] accepted in treatises, but unintended by the proponent, are not the sādhya either. Thus the word svayam is ineffectual. [Dharmakīrti] replies: Words have the effect of excluding [their contraries], and therefore, on account of the word ista," 13

(30) sarvānyestanivrttāv apy āśamkāsthānavāranam / vrttau svayamśruteh 14 prāha krtā caisā tadarthikā //

- 11 Skt. in NB III, 87 and PVV ad k. 29. For anga in this context, see NBT ad 87: tad evāngam purusopabhogāngatvāt "The [bed, etc.] are anga in that they are factors for the man's enjoyment."
- 12 See PVV 425, 6-8: yathātmāsti na veti vivāde tatsādhanārtham sāmkhyena parārthāś caksurādayah samghātatvāc chayanāsanādyangavat / ity uktasya sādhanasyātmārthatvam anuktam api sādhyam icchāvisayatvāt //. Note that samghātaparārthatva is one of the five reasons used by the Sāmkhyas to establish the existence of purusa. See Sāmkhyakārikās k. 17.
- 13 PVV 425, 9-11: nanv istašabdenānistasya sarvasya nirāsāt / śāstropagatasyāpi vādyanistasyāsādhyatvam siddham / tan nisphalam svayampadam ity āha / vyavaccheda-phalatvāc chabdānām istašabdāt...
- 14 PV-k(II) svayamśrutenāha; PV-k(III), Miy. svayam śruteh.

"All which is intended by anyone other [than the proponent] is excluded, but nonetheless, in the [Pramānasamuccaya]vrtti, [Dignāga] explained eliminating the persistence of doubt [as the need] for the word svayam. And this [word svayam] was composed [by him] for that purpose [i.e. refuting wrong conceptions]."

Dharmakīrti's k. 30 is a reply to an objection broadly similar to Uddyotakara's attack on the explanation of svayam in Dignāga's Vādavidhānatīkā: it is absurd to say "himself" when the rest of the sentence makes this redundant. Tharmakīrti replies that strictly speaking ista does also ensure that it is the proponent himself; svayam is thus not needed for the logical equivalence between the definiens and definiendum, but rather serves to eliminate a seductive misunderstanding, namely, that the school's tenets as found in treatises are also being proven. This understanding of svayam will be taken up again in k. 42 et seq., and will form a key element in Dharmakīrti's views on inference being independent of scripture.

(31) viśesas tad vyapeksātah<sup>18</sup> kathito dharmadharminoh / anuktāv api vāñchāyā bhavet prakaranād gatih // "That [which is intended] is said to be a quality (viśesa) of the property [to be proved] (dharma) or of the subject (dharmin) according to how one regards [it]. Although the intention might not be [explicitly] stated, it would be understood from the context of the discussion (prakarana)."

- 15 Cf. PVBh 495, 8-9: ata eva svayamgrahanasya śāstranivrttir eva prajoyanam uktam /.
- 16 PVV 425, 16-17: esā svayamśrutis tadarthikā vipratipattinirākaranārthā krtā.
- Note that Dignāga gave two explanations for the term svayam in his definitions of the thesis: In the Nyāyamukha (ad k. 1) and the Pramānasamuccayavrīti versions (both of which Dharmakīrti comments upon in PV IV), Dignāga took svayam as qualifying ista / īpsita and thus maintained that svayam guaranteed that the thesis was intended by the proponent himself, independent of treatises (śāstrānapeksa); in the Vādavidhānatīkā, however, svayam was joined to sādhayitum istah to ensure that it is indeed the proponent, and not someone else, who will establish the thesis. For the Vādavidhānatīkā's position see NV 281, 16-17; Frauwallner (1933) p. 302: yad api vādavidhānatīkāyām sādhayatīti śabdasya svayam parena ca tulyatvāt svayam iti višesanam / "In the Vādavidhānatīkā there is also the following: "The word sādhayati is indifferent with regard to oneself and another, and hence the qualifier, svayam." Uddyotakara, in NV ad 1.1.33 (281, 12 et seq.) criticized both Dignāga's versions of svayam separately, and in particular argued that the Vādavidhānatīkā's use was redundant, as absurd as saying "I am myself going to bathe", when "I am going to bathe" would suffice. On Dignāga's authorship of the Vādavidhānatīkā see Hattori (1968) pp. 9-10.
- 18 PV-k(II) tad vyapeksatvāt.

Cf. PVin P. 288b 3-6. 19 We have not followed Miyasaka in taking tadvyapeksātah as a compound. We also differ from Watanabe (1977) on this point and in not taking visesah, but rather tad, as the subject of kathitah (kathito). In spite of the prima facie normalcy of reading tadvyapeksātah, this and Watanabe's Japanese translation cannot be adopted: (1) They do not concord with the Tibetan of PV, de ni ltos nas chos dag dan // chos can khyad par yin par brjod, which clearly takes de = tad as the subject of briod = kathitah; PVin is analogous to PV Tib. in this respect. (2) The commentators on both PV and PVin do not explain the compound tadvyapeksātah, but rather simply vyapeksātah; indeed, Manorathanandin's commentary to k. 31 shows that he read sa instead of tad, making sa the correlative of ya evecchayā visayīkrtah. (3) In fact, it is syntactically quite possible that tad is the subject, but that kathitah becomes masculine due to attraction de genre, i.e. its gender was influenced by the masculine noun, viśesah, figuring in the predicate. For examples of this phenomenon, see §369 paragraph a) in L. Renou (1975).<sup>20</sup>

The general philosophical background for k. 31ab is as follows: Dignāga, in PS III and the Nyāyamukha, had spoken of four sorts of contradictory reasons (viruddhahetu), viz. (1) those which prove the opposite of the dharma itself (dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhana), (2) those proving the opposite of a quality of the dharma (dharmavišesaviparītasādhana), (3) those proving the opposite of the dharmin itself (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana) and (4) those proving the opposite of a quality of the dharmin (dharmivišesaviparītasādhana). Recall that in the Sāṃkhya argument under discussion, the proponent speaks of the eyes being for the benefit of another (parārtha). However, for him "another" has the

da ni ji ltar ma thos na bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'dod pa yin no źes rtogs śe na / skabs kyis so // dper na 'dus pa mams gźan gyi don yin par grub pa ni bdag gi don ñid bźin no // de ni ma smras su zin kyań 'dod pas khyab pa'i bsgrub par bya ba yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir 'dod pa smos so // de[1] ñid ltos pa las chos dań chos can gyi khyad par du bśad pa yin te / 'di dag ni 'dus pa ma[2] yin pa'i yul can gźan gyi don yin no źes brjod pas na chos kyi khyad par du ñe bar gzuń ba'i phyir[3] de[4] de'i khyad par yin la[5] / mig la sogs pa 'dus pa ma yin pa'i don dag ni / gźan gyi don du 'gyur ba yin no źes bya ba ni chos can gyi khyad par yin no // ([1]P. 'di [2] P. omits ma [3] P. omits phyir [4] P. omits de [5] D. no [D. 190b 4-6]).

Renou (1975), p. 500: "L'accord grammatical attendu est souvent rompu par attraction de forme, de contiguïté, ou par quelque influence de sens ... a) Accord contigu du verbal avec le prédicat, tvam me mitram jātam Pañc[atantra] IV 7 14."

<sup>21</sup> See PS III, k. 27: chos dan chos can ran no bo // yan na de yi khyad par mams // phyin ci log tu sgrub pa'i phyir // gnod pa med la 'gal ba yin // (= NM k. 9). See also NP §3.2.3; Katsura (1979) p. 78ff. as well as Kitagawa (1973) pp. 205-217.

quality (viśesa) that it is one "who is not composed (asamhata)", namely, the ātman. The reason, "being a composite" (samghātatva) then becomes contradictory in that it will not prove parārthatva qualified in this way: instead, it will prove the opposite, viz. that they are for the benefit of another who is composed — consciousness is composed in that it is made up of temporal parts.

Now, there are various ways of formulating the Sāmkhya's argument depending upon whether we take the quality (viśesa), asamhatatva, as being of the dharma or of the dharmin: nonetheless the Sāmkhya's intended proposition remains the same. According to Devendrabuddhi, the fact that the intention is the sādhya, and that this intention does not vary, leads to the following objection, which k. 31 will seek to answer: "If the sādhya is just what the proponent intends, then there would no longer be [different sorts of] contradictory [reasons] such as dharmaviśesaviparīta-sādhana, etc. If one and the same combination [of dharmin and dharma] were the sādhya, then the sādhana which prove the opposite of those [sādhya] would, therefore, also be the same." Faced with this objection, Dharmakīrti seems to nuance the principle that the intention is the sādhya: it is in reality the sādhya and remains the same, but admits of differences in verbal expression; the distinction between dharmaviśesa and dharmiviśesa here stems from our verbal formulation. The quality

- PVP P. 328a 7-8: gal te rgol bas 'dod pa ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin pa de'i tshe / chos kyi khyad par phyin ci log tu sgrub par byed pa la sogs pa 'gal ba mams yod pa ñid ma yin no // gal te tshogs pa gcig bsgrub par bya ba yin pa[1] de bas na de las bzlog pa'i sgrub[2] par byed pa yan gcig ñid yin no źe na // ([1] P. yin [2] P. bsgrub [D. 275b 6-7]). The Skt. of gal te rgol bas ... yod pa ñid ma yin no is found in PVV-n ad k. 31, n. 1: yadi vādinesta eva sādhyas tadā dharmavišesaviparītasādhanādīnām viruddhānām asambhava evety āha. Cf. the explanations in PVBh 495, 13-14: nanu sa višeso dharmadharminor na sādhyo sādhyatve višesatā katham / na sādhyavišesayor ekatā / uktam cācāryena "dharmavišesaviparyayasādhanād dhi viruddha" ityādi /. Note that Prajñākaragupta cites part of PS III, k. 27 = NM k. 9. "[Objection:] But surely this is a quality of the dharmin or dharma, but is not the sādhya. If it were the sādhya how could it be a quality? The sādhya and the quality are not the same. Now, the Master [Dignāga] did say, 'it is contradictory because it establishes the opposite of the quality of the dharma, etc."
- PVin P. 288b 6-7: de ltar mam par bźag pa tsam źig tha dad par zad kyi don ni ma yin no // "In this way there is nothing but the mere presentation which differs, but not the proposition (don = artha)." If we follow Dharmottara, what seems to be invoked here is the general Dharmakīrtian principle that making connections between qualities and quality-possessors is never based on anything other than words. The artha itself is indivisible and admits of no such distinctions. Cf. PVinT 18b 5-8: skabs kyi rten du gyur pa'i bsgrub par bya'i chos 'di ñid ni bltos pa las chos dań chos can gyi khyad par yin no // dnos po las khyad par dań khyad par can gyi 'brel ba yod pa ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyań sgra'i yul ñid do // des na ma zin pa'i don ñid ni 'ga' yań khyad par ma yin no // gań gi

asamhatatva can be regarded as of the dharma or of the dharmin: if one construes the argument as "the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of 'another' which refers to something uncomposed (caksurādīnām asamhatavisayam pārārthyam)", this will be a case of dharmavisesaviparītasādhana, and asamhatavisaya will be a quality of the dharma, pārārthya. However, if one interprets the argument as "the eyes, etc., which are for the benefit of another, are for the benefit of something uncomposed (parārthāh santaś caksurādayo 'samhatārthāh), this would be dharmivisesaviparītasādhana in that asamhatārthāh would be a quality of the dharmin, parārthās santaś caksurādayah.<sup>24</sup>

(PVV's introduction to k. 32): "What fault is there in the debate about [the eyes, etc.] being for the benefit of the ātman (ātmārthatva)? [Reply:]"25

(32) ananvayo 'pi dṛṣṭānte doṣas tasya yathoditam<sup>26</sup> / ātmā paraś cet so<sup>26a</sup> 'siddha iti tatreṣṭaghātakṛt<sup>27</sup> //

"This [viz. being for the benefit of the ātman] also has the fault that there is no positive concomitance (anvaya) [of the sādhyadharma and the reason] in the example. As [Vasubandhu] had explained: 'If the ātman is [what is meant by] "another" (para), then this [ātman] is not established [in the example].' In that case [the reason] would refute what is intended (istaghātakn)."

tshe sgras chos kyi yul du ñe bar 'god pa de'i tshe ni chos kyi khyad par yin la / gañ gi tshe chos can gyi yul du 'god pa de'i tshe chos can gyi khyad par yin pa'i phyir sgras ñe bar bkod pa la bltos te gñi ga'i khyad par du 'gyur ba yin no // "This very sādhyadharma which is the basis of the discussion [i.e. asamhatatva] is a quality of the dharma or of the dharmin according to how one regards [it]. There are no connections between qualities and quality-possessors which are due to [real] entities, but rather they only concern words. Consequently, the same unexpressed meaning [i.e. asamhatatva] admits of no differences whatsoever. When one verbally presents it as concerning the dharma it is then a quality of the dharma; when one presents it as a quality of the dharmin it is then a quality of the dharmin. Thus, it becomes a quality of either in regard to (bltos) its verbal presentation."

- 24 See PVV 425, 23-25. Cf. PVT 315a 2-3, which gives a similar explanation of the two vyapeksā (bltos pa): bltos pas žes bya ba ni de ltar gźan gyi don nīd yin na / de dag ni gźan gyi don byed pa nīd 'dus pa'i yul can ma yin no žes bya ba'i bltos pa 'di la chos kyi bye brag ste / mig la sogs pa gźan gyi don du gyur pa 'dus pa'i don can ma yin no / chos can gyi tshig gi sgras don bstan pa la bltos pa la chos can gyi bye brag yin no //.
- 25 PVV 426,6: ātmārthatvasya vivāde ko dosa ity āha /.
- 26 PV-k(III), Miy. yathoditah.
- 26ª Miy. cetso.
- 27 PV-k(II) istaghātavat.

Cf. PVin P. 289a 2-3.<sup>28</sup> Dharmakīrti now takes up the critique of the argument as it was actually intended by the Sāmkhya, i.e. with ātmārthatva as the real meaning of pārārthya. There are two faults. (1) No anvaya. This critique had been put forward earlier by Vasubandhu, and indeed Dharmakīrti actually cites a passage from what is presumably Vasubandhu's Vādavidhi or, less probably, his Vādavidhāna: ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhah.29 The problem turns on the two sorts of concomitance, positive (anvaya) and negative (vyatireka)30, figuring in the Buddhist account of valid logical reasons - anvaya between the reason and sādhyadharma ("property to be proved") means that wherever the former occurs so does the latter. Now, while such a principle is to be established on the basis of particular examples, in the Samkhya's argument there will not in fact be any anvaya in the example, because the sādhyadharma will not occur in, or qualify, the example: seats, etc. are not established as being for the benefit of "another", if this means the atman. (2) The reason, "because they are composite" would be a contradictory reason (viruddhahetu) in that it would prove the opposite of the intended sādhya. In other words, "being composite" would prove that the eyes, etc. are not for the benefit of another – the so-called "other" (para) of the sādhya simply does not exist if it is taken as being the atman.

The latter refutation had already been developed in Dignāga's PSV ad PS III, and Dharmakīrti, in what seems to have been a deliberate echo of Dignāga, used the Dignāgean terminology istavighātakrt ("[reason] which refutes what is intended"). Dignāga had mentioned istavighātakrt as a

ji skad bśad pa'i chos dań chos can gyi khyad par la ni rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i skyon 'dod pa ñid de / ji skad du bdag gźan yin no źe na ni de ma grub pa'o źes bśad pa yin no // 'gal ba'i chos kyań 'dod pa de ñid la gnod par byas pa yin no // (D. 191a 2-3).

See PVBh 494, 23 and 496, 6. Cf. PVin n. 28. This is not to be found in the fragments given in Frauwallner (1933) and (1957b). Note that Manorathanandin mixes his own commentary with the actual quotation; Dharmottara does likewise, as is apparent by the fact that their commentarial additions differ. PVV 426, 11-12: yathoditam ācāryavasubandhunā / parārthāś caksurādaya ity atra paraś ced ātmā vivaksitah so 'siddho drstānta iti. "As Ācārya Vasubandhu had explained: When it is said that the eyes, etc. are for the benefit of another, then if the ātman is what is meant by 'another', this [ātman] is not established in the example [i.e. seats, beds, etc.]." Dharmottara's comment makes it clear that so 'siddhah is to be taken as meaning ātmā 'siddho drstānte. PVinT 20a 2-3: slob dpon dbyig gren gyis ci skad du gźan gyi don ces bya ba 'dir gal te pha rol po bdag gźan gyi sgras brjod par 'dod na bdag de ni ma grub pa'o źes bśad pa yin no /.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Katsura (1983) p. 541: "In Indian philosophy anvaya and vyatireka jointly make up a sort of method of induction. They may be formulated as follows: "When x occurs, y occurs (anvaya), and when x is absent, y is absent (vyatireka)."

separate category of viruddhahetu, and in PSV ad PS III k. 22 and 26 gave the Sāṃkhya argument as an example: subsequently, in Nyāyabindu III, however, Dharmakīrti explicitly took the position that there was no point in taking istavighātakrt as a separate sort of viruddhahetu as it was the same as the other two sorts in proving the opposite of the sādhya.<sup>31</sup>

(PVV's introduction to k. 33:) [Objection:] "Being for the benefit of the ātman (ātmārthatva) is not the sādhya. [Dharmakīrti] replies:"<sup>32</sup>

(33) sādhanam yadvivādena<sup>33</sup> nyastam tac cen na sādhyate / kim sādhyam anyathānistam bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā //
"Suppose that when a sādhana is presented because of a dispute about a certain [proposition<sup>34</sup>], that [proposition] is [nonetheless] not being proven. Then what is being proven (sādhya)? Otherwise [if the proposition in dispute were not the sādhya], then either [the sādhya] would be something unintended, or [the sādhana] would be completely superfluous."<sup>35</sup>

Cf. PVin P. 289a 2-3.36 The opponent now argues that ātmārthatva is not the sādhya because it is not stated. Dharmakīrti replies that in that case there is the following dilemma: (1) The Sāmkhya's argument is proving something which he does not intend, viz. the contrary of ātmārthatva / asamhatapārārthya. (2) If the sādhana, "being composite", really did prove pārārthya as it is literally stated, i.e. without any qualifications, there would ensue the fault of redundancy, or siddhasādhana, "proving what is already established": the Buddhist himself would accept that version of pārārthya — one which is not taken as meaning ātmārthatva / asamhatapārārthya. As Dharmakīrti himself put it in the Pramāna-

- 31 See PSV(b) P. 131b 7-132a 1, 133a 8-133b 8, Kitagawa 494, 499-500; NB III, 89-91.
- 32 PVV 426, 13: ātmārthatvam na sādhyam ity āha.
- Ego yadvivādena: Miy. yadvivāde na. Both readings find some commentarial support. Manorathanandin's PVV clearly commented upon yadvivāde na nyastam, but Devendrabuddhi suggests the instrumental yadvivādena. See PVP P. 328b 6: gźan yań / gal te gan la rtsod[1] pa yis / don gan la rtsod pas te /... ([1] P. btsad [D. 276a 3]). See n. 36 for PVin. As for PV Tib., note that Miyasaka opted for D. rtsod pa yin, but P.N. do read the instrumental yis; moreover, P.D.N. do not support na nyastam. Watanabe also seems to have read yadvivādena, which makes better philosophical sense than Manorathanandin's interpretation.
- 34 PVP don gan la. See n. 33.
- 35 PVV 426, 17-18: anyathā vivādavisayo yadi na sādhyam tadānistam viparyayasiddhih syāt /. PVV 427, 2-3: sādhanavaiphalyam eva vā syāt /.
- 36 ma brjod pa'i phyir de yan bsgrub par bya ba ma yin no źe na / gal te gan la rtsod pas[1] sgrub par byed pa bkod pa de bsgrub par bya ba ma yin na bsgrub par bya ba ci yin / de ltar yin na phyin ci log tu grub pa'am don med par 'gyur te / ([1]P. rtsod pa [D. 191a 3-4]).

viniścaya, "They [i.e. the Buddhists] accept that composites accomplish the benefit of another, and thus the sādhana is superfluous." 37

(34) sadvitīyaprayogesu niranvayaviruddhate<sup>38</sup> / etena kathite sādhyam sāmānyenātha sammatam //
"In the case of the reasonings concerning 'having a companion' (sadvitīyaprayoga), [the faults of] no anvaya and contradictoriness have been pointed out by means of the above [remarks]. But suppose that the sādhya [sadvitīyatva] is held generally (sāmānyena)."

### Cf. PVin P. 289a 8-b 3.39

(35) tad evārthāntarābhāvād dehānāptau na sidhyati<sup>40</sup> / vācyam šūnyam<sup>41</sup> pralapatām tad etaj jādyacintitam<sup>42</sup> // "This very [sadvitīyatva] is not established, for when the body does not obtain there is not another object (arthāntara). This [sadvitīyatva] of those who prattle vacuities was invented because of stupidity."

Cf. PVin P. 289b 5-6 and 290b 1.<sup>43</sup> This section of PV IV (k. 34-41), still centered on the word *ista* in Dignāga's definition of the thesis, is specifically directed against the Cārvāka's use of a sophistical type of argumentation known as the *sadvitīyaprayoga*, "a reasoning concerning 'having a companion".<sup>44</sup> Relying on the presentation of the argument in

- 37 Cf. PVin P. 289a 7: de dag 'dus pa gźan gyi don byed par ni khas blans pa'i phyir / sgrub par byed pa 'bras bu med pa yin no // (D. 191a 6-7).
- 38 PV-k(I) niranvayo virudhyate.
- 'dis ni gñis pa dan bcas pa'i sbyor ba mams la yan rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa bsad pa yin te / dper na bum pa ni mnon par gsal[1] ba'i sems pa can[2] lus kyi mtshan nid kyi skyes bu dan bum pa gan yan run bas gñis pa dan bcas pa[3] yin te / ut pa la ma yin pa'i phyir nsig pa bzin no zes bya ba la / nsig pa ni de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bus gñis pa dan bcas par[4] ma grub pa bzin no // on te spyi bsgrub par bya bar[5] 'dod pa'i phyir khyad par 'phen pa ma yin no ze na / 'di la ni de mi 'phen na sgrub par byed pa'i 'bras bu ci yin / yan na ni mi 'dod par 'gyur ro zes bsad zin to // ([1]P. bsal [2]P. sems can [3]D. pas [4]D. pa [5]D. ba [D. 191a 7-b 3]).
- 40 Miy. sidhyate.
- 41 PV-k(II) vācyaśūnyam.
- 42 PV-k(I),(II) varnitam.
- 43 P. 289b 5-6: rnam pa de lta bu'i lus bum pa las don géan gyi no bor khas mi len na spyi sgrub pa yan mi srid de / gan yan run ba'i don géan gyi no bo med pa'i phyir ro / (D. 191b 5). P. 290 b1: de'i phyir tshig gi tshul ni gsog yin no // (D. 192b 1).
- 44 Literally, sadvifiya = "having a second". Commentators gloss dvifiya, however, as meaning "a companion". Cf. PVinT 21a 4: gñis pa dan bcas pa ste zla bo dan bcas pa'o //. Watanabe (1977) is a study on this argument in Dharmakīrti and elsewhere; we have also discussed it in some detail in an article entitled "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms", Proceedings of the Second Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna 1991, 403-413. Steinkellner (1980) pp. 292-294 gives two Sanskrit fragments from Śākyamati's PVT

the *Pramānaviniścaya* (see n. 39) and the commentaries to PV, we can ascertain that the Cārvāka's reasoning was as follows: abhivyaktacaitanya-śarīralakṣanapuruṣaghatayor anyatarena sadvitīyo ghatah / anutpalatvāt / kudyavat / "A vase has a companion in the form of (a) either a vase or (b) a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements], because it [i.e. the vase] is not an utpala [flower], like a wall."

Before proceeding further with the Carvaka version, however, it is worthwhile to make it clear that sadvifiya-style reasonings were by no means restricted to that Materialist school. We see that Dharmakīrti, in the Vādanyāya, also argued against a Mīmāmsaka who tried to prove that sound is permanent by using a sadvitīya-style reasoning: jaiminipratijñātatattvanityatādhikaranaśabdaghatānyatarasadvifīyo ghatah "The vase has a companion in the form of either (a) a vase or (b) a sound which is accepted by Jaimini as being a locus for [its] true nature, permanence."46 Indeed, Jayanta Bhatta's Nyāyamañjarī, and especially Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhanga, also show the sadvitīyaprayoga being used by an adversary who sought to argue against sound's impermanence, and in Kamalasīla's Tattvasamgrahapanjikā, we find it being used (in a slightly different manner) by the Naiyayika, Aviddhakarna, to argue against Dignāga's twofold division of pramānas and prameyas.<sup>47</sup> In PV, VN and Cakradhara the argued for conclusions differ, but the logical strategy is essentially the same: a kind of bogus dilemma - expressed by anyatarasadvifiyatva - where the alternative that the dharmin, the vase, has itself as its own companion is quickly ruled out in favour of the other alternative, which contains the proposition which the proponent actually wants us to believe.

explaining the sadvitīyaprayoga, one of which has been translated in our article.

Sanskrit given in Steinkellner (1980) pp. 292-293. PVV's and PVBh's versions contain a number of obvious errors. For the details, see Appendix II in our article "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms".

<sup>46</sup> VN 66, 15-17: nityah śabdo 'nityo veti vāde dvādasalaksanaprapañcaprakāśanaśās trapranetuh jaiminipratijñātatattvanityatādhikaranasabdaghatānyatarasadvitīyo ghata iti pratijñām uparacayya dvādasalaksanārhavyākhyānam\*/\*Shāstrī: °laksanādivyākhyānam.

<sup>47</sup> See Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhanga (Ed. N.J. Shah) p. 64, 12-14; Tattvasamgrahapañjikā ad k. 1583-1585, pp. 556-557 (ed. D. Shāstrī). For the details see our "Dharmakīrti on Some Sophisms".

Let us now try to summarize how the Cārvāka uses this (pseudo-) dilemma to arrive at his desired conclusion. (For the sake of simplicity we shall speak of "being accompanied by ..." instead of the more literal "having a companion in the form of ...".)

- (a) Obviously, a vase is not an *utpala* flower. Hence the *pakṣadharmatva* holds: the reason, *anutpalatva*, qualifies the *dharmin*, the vase.
- (b) The Cārvāka then uses various tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic, first to establish the general principle (vyāpti "pervasion"), and later to show that for Cārvāka and Buddhist alike the demand for vyāpti in inferences can never in fact be satisfied.
- (c) A vase cannot be accompanied by itself sadvitiyatva necessitates difference and therefore it must be accompanied by the person.
- (d) If the vase is accompanied by a person whose mind is just a manifestation of the elements, then the Materialist view on what people are is correct, with the result that all rebirth is impossible, for such a person (who is not different from his body) would be destroyed at the time of death.

Dharmakīrti's first line of attack (i.e. in k. 34bc) is to invoke the same twofold critique which he had just applied to the Sāmkhya's argument.

(1) No anvaya in the example. The actual sādhya which the Cārvāka intends is "having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body having a consciousness which is manifested [by the elements]". However, just as in the Sāmkhya reasoning, the really intended sādhya has no anvaya in the example: the wall is not accompanied by the Carvaka's version of the "person": for a Buddhist, this Materialist version of the person simply does not exist. (2) viruddhahetu. The Buddhist will admit that a wall can be accompanied by a vase. But if ghatena sadvitīyatva had anvaya in the example, the reason would prove the contrary of what the Cārvāka actually intended. In effect, if it were established that the vase was accompanied by itself, the Carvaka could not exploit the disjunction conveyed by anyatara to prove the Materialist version of the person, i.e. his actual sādhya. The logic can be presented as follows: anyatara means one — but not both — of A or B. Hence, in the sadvitiya prayoga, if we established that the vase was the "companion", ipso facto it would be proven that the person is not. As in the Samkhya's argument, which was criticized in k. 32 as leading to istavighātakrt, here too the reason would be a viruddhahetu.48

<sup>48</sup> See PVV 427, 9-12: tatra ca niranvayaviruddhate kathite / tathā hy abhivyaktacaitanyadehalaksanapurusena sadvitīyatvam sādhyam / tena ca kudye 'nvayo na drsta iti niranvayatā / ghatasya tu kudye 'nvayo drsta iti tena sadvitīyatvasādhanāt viruddhatā

We now come to k. 34d: "But suppose that the sādhya [sadvifīyatva] is held generally". This begins what we, in point (b) of our summary above, have termed the use of "tricks and pseudo-parallels with Buddhist logic" to establish pervasion (vyāpti). The Cārvāka argues that the sādhyadharma, or "property to be proved", is simply sadvifīyatva, "having a companion", rather than "having a companion in the form of either a vase or a person, etc. etc." Even so, how would pervasion hold between the reason, anutpalatva, and the dharma, sadvitīyatva? Probably the Cārvāka's initial strategy, in k. 34, is to argue that there is such a pervasion because all things, such as walls and vases, etc., which are not utpala flowers, do "have a companion" in the sense that they are generally accompanied by something; they are not absolutely alone. Subsequently, in k. 37cd-40, however, he will give a variety of arguments

 $sy\bar{a}t$  / "Now, here no anvaya and contradictoriness have been pointed out. As follows: 'having a companion in the form of a person characterized as a body with a manifested consciousness' is the  $s\bar{a}dhya$ . And thus positive concomitance [of the reason and this  $s\bar{a}dhya$ ] in [the example,] the wall, is not observed: hence there is no anvaya. For the vase, however, the anvaya in [the example,] the wall, is observed: thus, because [the reason] would prove 'having a companion in the form of the latter [i.e. the vase]' it would be contradictory."

- 49 There are some differences amongst the commentators in their phrasing of this sādhya. Cf. PVV 427, 17-18: atha sāmānyena višesam anulikhya sadvitīyatvam sādhyam kudye sadvifiyatvamātrenānvayāt / "But suppose that sadvitīyatva, taken generally, without specifying any particular cases, is the sādhya, because there is anvaya [of the reason] with mere sadvitiyatva in [the example], the wall." PVinT 21b 1: 'on te spyir spyi dan ldan pa'i gñis pa ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi / skyes bur gyur pa'i gñis pa dan bcas pa žes khyad par 'phen pa min[1] no že na / ([1]P. yin) "[Objection:] 'Being a companion' (dvifiyatva), taken generally (spyir = spyi dari ldan pa'i), is the sādhya, but one does not specify the particular case, 'companion (dvifiya) in the form of a person". While Manorathanandin and Dharmottara speak of sadvitīyatva/dvitīyatva, Devendrabuddhi and Sākyamati speak of anyatarārthāntaratva ("being another object which is either"). PVP P. 329a 5-6: don gźan gan yan run ba spyir bsgrub par bya bar 'dod pa des khyad par can 'phen[1] par byed pa ma yin phyir skyon yod pa ma yin no źe na / ([1]D. 'phel [D. 276b 1]). Cf. PVT fragment 2 in Steinkellner (1980) p. 293: anyatarārthāntaratvam sāmānyam ghate sādhyadharmini kudye ca drstāntadharminy upanītam iti. This arthantaratva is simply another way of saying dviftyatva.
- Cf. PVinT 21a6-8: nsig pa la ni gñis ka yan yod pa'i phyir rjes su 'gro ba dan ldog pa dag grub pa yin la / ut pa la ma yin pa ñid ni phyogs kyi chos yin no // spyir gñis pa dan bcas pas ni khyab pa yin te / des na rjes su 'gro ba med pa'i ñes pa med cin bum pa ñid ni bum pa gñis pa dan bcas pa ma[1] yin pa'i phyir sugs kyis de lta bur gyur pa'i skyes bur 'gyur ba yin no zes bya ba de la /... ([1]P. omits ma). "Because the wall also has a companion, the anvaya and vyatireka are established. Not being an utpala is the paksadharma. It [i.e. not being an utpala] is pervaded by having a companion, taken generally. So therefore, the fault of no anvaya does not occur, and since the vase itself does not have a second vase [i.e. a companion-vase], then indirectly there would be a person of the sort [which the Materialist describes]." For PVV see n. 49.

to show that the Buddhist logician is equally vulnerable to charges of no anvaya and viruddhahetu, and that vyāpti is never really established in any inference; no doubt, en filigrane in this discussion is the Cārvāka's well-known tenet that inference is not a pramāna.

The Carvaka justifies taking the sadhya as simply sadvitiyatva (or anyatarasadvifiyatva) by saying that for him, just as for a Buddhist logician, the sādhyadharma must be taken generally (sāmānyena), free from all qualifications concerning particular cases: the universal (sāmānya) at stake here is best understood as dviftyatva ("being a companion"), or equivalently, arthantaratva ("being another object"; see n. 49). Dharmakīrti, in k. 35ab, then replies that the body, as understood by the Cārvākas, is inexistent, and thus, there is no other object (arthāntara) separate from a vase which could serve as the companion so that we could then speak of "having a companion" (sadvitīyatva). PVin and PVBh explain that the point turns on the Buddhist logicians' repudiation of real, independently existing universals: universals can never exist anywhere apart from their instantiations (vyakti), and thus the universal, "being a companion" (dvitīyatva), cannot exist here if neither the vase nor the person are instantiations of it.<sup>51</sup> The conclusion is that sadvitīyatva, as it presupposes the universal dvifiyatva, would be nonsensical.

(36) tulyam nāśe<sup>52</sup> 'pi cec chabdaghatabhedena kalpane / na siddhena vināśena tadvatah sādhanād dhvaneh //

<sup>51</sup> PVin P. 290a2-3: 'di'i phyir spyi la brten pa ma yin te / gsal ba thams cad yod par mi srid na de'i spyi mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // dper na bram ze la sogs pa ma yin pa ñid la rigs[1] ñid dam / rtog pa'i ses pa la dban po la brien pa ñid bzin no // ([1] D. rig [D. 192a 2-3]) "So too, [the sādhya] does not partake of (brien pa = bhāj?) the universal [dvitīyatva], for when none of the instantiations can exist, their universal is absurd, as for example caste with regard to those who are not Brahmins, etc., or 'partaking of the sense organs' with regard to conceptual cognition. Cf. Dharmottara's gloss on this passage showing that spyi (sāmānya) here means gnis pa nid (dvifiyatva). PVinT 23b1: 'di la bum par gyur pa dan skyes bur gyur pa gñis (pa) ñid kyi khyad par med pa'i phyir gñis pa ñid kyi spyi mi 'thad pa yin no / "Because the particular cases of dvifiyatva, viz. the vase and the person, do not exist here, the universal, dvifiyatva, is absurd." Finally, see PVBh 497, 9-10: nanu nātra višesāksepah / tad asat / yato dehasyāsiddhau vyaktyabhāvāt kutah sāmānyam / na hi govyaktyabhāve sāmānyam / "[Objection:] But surely particular cases are not mentioned here. [Reply:] This is not correct. Since the instantiations do not exist when the body is not established, how could the universal be? Indeed there is no [cow-]universal in the absence of cow-instantiations." 52 PV-k(III) nāśo.

"[Objection:] But it is analogous for the [sādhya] 'perishability' too, if one conceives of it in terms of the particular cases, sound and vase. [Reply:] No, it is not [analogous], for through an established perishability there is a proof that sound has this [property, perishability]."

Cf. PVin P. 290b 6.<sup>53</sup> The Cārvāka now invokes another pseudo-parallel with Buddhist logic in order to justify taking sadvifīyatva without the particularities, ghaṭa and puruṣa. When a Buddhist proves that sound is perishable because it is produced, like a vase, it is a cardinal principle of his logic that perishability must be taken simpliciter as the sādhyadharma, and that one should not speak of particular cases. Otherwise, so the Buddhist maintains, if it were sound's perishability which was being proven, there would be the problem of no anvaya in the example: the example, the vase, has perishability taken generally, but not sound's perishability.<sup>54</sup> Dharmakīrti replies that the analogy does not hold: the universal, perishability, is established in sound, but dvitīyatva / arthāntaratva is in neither ghata nor purusa.

(37) tathārthāntarabhāve syāt tadvān kumbho 'py anityatā / viśistā<sup>55</sup> dhvaninānveti no cen nāyogavāranāt //
"Similarly, if another object existed [i.e. if one from among the body and the vase were accepted as being the other object<sup>56</sup>], then the vase would also have this [property, sadvitīyatva]. [Objection:] Impermanence qualified by sound has no anvaya [in the example]. [Reply:] No, [there is no such fault of no anvaya,] since we are [just] excluding [sound's] non-connection (ayogavārana) [with the qualifier, impermanence]."<sup>57</sup>

- 53 sgra dan bum pa'i khyad par gyis rtogs na ni mi rtag pa la yan mtshuns so źe na / ma yin te / mi rtag pa ñid grub pas na sgra de dan ldan par sgrub pa'i phyir ro // (D. 192b 5-6).
- PVV 428, 3-5: nāśe 'pi sādhye śabdaghatayoh sādhyadrstāntadharminoh sambandhitayā bhedena kalpane śabdasambandhino nāśasya ghate 'nvayābhāvād asādhyatvam / ghatasambandhinaś ca śabde 'sambhavād asādhyateti tulyam idam iti cet / "[Objection:] In the case of sādhya 'perishability' too, if one conceives of it in terms of particular cases, i.e. as connected with the subjects of the sādhya and of the example, sound and vase [respectively], then perishability connected with sound would not be the sādhya, as there is no anvaya [of the reason and sound's perishability] in the vase. And nor would [perishability] connected with a vase be the sādhya, for it could not occur in sound. Thus this is analogous."
- 55 PV-k(I) viśisto.
- 56 Cf. PVin n. 58 and PVinT 28a 3: gal te lus dan bum pa dag las 'ga' zig don gzan du 'gyur bar khas len yin na ni /.
- 57 Cf. PVV 428, 17-18: atha dhvaninā svasambandhitayā viśistānityatā dṛṣṭāntam nānvetīti cet / nānanvayadoso viśesenāyogasyāsambandhasya vāranāt //.

### Cf. PVin P. 290b 6-7.58

(38) dvividho hi vyavacchedo viyogāparayogayoh / vyavacchedād ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamah<sup>59</sup> //
"Indeed, there are two kinds of exclusion (vyavaccheda), as there is exclusion of non-connection and exclusion of connections with anything other. But when non-connection is to be excluded, [the fault of] no anvaya [of impermanence in the example] will not ensue."

K. 37ab. If either the vase or the person (taken materialistically) existed as another object, i.e. as a companion to the vase, then sadvitīyatva would be established, and the vase would possess this property, just as it possesses perishability. But the vase is not other than itself, and a "body with a consciousness consisting in a manifestation of the elements" is inexistent from the point of view of the Cārvāka's (non-Materialist) adversary, who holds that consciousness exists as a mental entity distinct from the physical elements making up the body. Manorathanandin points out<sup>60</sup> that if the body were simply without consciousness, then sadvitīyatva could be established: but then, the Cārvāka would, of course, fail to prove his thesis of Materialism.

K. 37cd-38. Next, we have an objection involving the Buddhist theory of the three types of exclusion ( $v\bar{a}rana = vyavaccheda$ ), one of which must figure explicitly (via the word eva) or implicitly (without eva) in any relationship between a qualifier ( $vi\acute{s}esana$ ) and qualificand ( $vi\acute{s}esya$ ).

- de bźin du 'ga' źig don gźan du gyur par[1] khas len na gan yan nun ba don gźan gyi no bor 'gyur ba yin no // ([1]D. pas [D.192b 6]). Watanabe (1977) n. 17 cites P. 290a 1-2 in connection with k. 37, which seems wrong.
- 59 PV-k(II), (III) ayoge tu vārye nānanvayāgamah: PV-k(I), Miy. ayoge tu nānyenānanvayāgamah. Although PV-k(I) is supported by PV Tib. (gźan dan ni rjes 'gro med par 'gyur ma yin), Devendrabuddhi supports our reading. PVP P. 330a 6-7: de la mi ldan pa / bzlog la ... rjes 'gro med pa min[1] / bsgrub par bya bas ston pa ma yin no źes bya ba'i tha tshig go // ([1] Ego min: P.D. yin [D. 277a 5]).
- 60 PVV 428, 12-14: yadi punar acetanasvabhāvatayā ghatajātīyenaiva dehena sadvitīyatvam ghatasya sādhyate tadā sidhyaty eva / tathāvidhasya sadvitīyatvasya siddhatvād vināśavat / kim tu vādino nestasiddhih / dehasya cetanasvabhāvatayā 'siddheh / "Suppose, however, that it were established that the vase had a companion in the form of a body of the very same natural kind as the vase, that is, naturally unconscious. Then [sadvitīyatva] would indeed be established, for such a type of sadvitīyatva is established just like perishability. But then the proponent's intended [proposition] would not be proven, since the body would not be established as being naturally conscious."
- On the theory of vyavaccheda, see Kajiyama (1973), as well as Gillon and Hayes (1982). To take the classic examples of ayogavyavaccheda and anyayogavyavaccheda mentioned in PVV ad k. 38, the usual intention in uttering the sentence caitro dhanurdharah is simply to assert that Caitra is not a non-archer: there can be other archers too. Thus:

The opponent in k. 37cd argues as follows: The Buddhist also incurs the fault of no anvaya of the sādhyadharma in the example when he proves that sound is impermanent. He establishes the property impermanence as qualified by sound; but then impermanence, which belongs to sound, cannot also be a property of the example, the vase. Dharmakīrti replies that opponent has misconstrued the type of exclusion in the sādhya: If the proposition "sound is impermanent" implicitly involved anyayogavyavaccheda ("exclusion of connections with anything other"), it would exclude connections between impermanence and anything other than sound. In that case, impermanence could not also be a property of the example. However, it is not anyayogavyavaccheda which is implicit in this sādhya, but rather ayogavyavaccheda: the proposition is merely excluding the non-connection of impermanence with sound, but does not in any way prevent impermanence from being connected with other entities.<sup>62</sup>

(39) sāmānyam eva tat sādhyam na ca siddhaprasādhanam / visistam dharminā tac ca na niranvayadosavat<sup>63</sup> //
"This universal [i.e. impermanence, etc.] alone is the sādhya. Neither is one proving something [already] established, nor does this [impermanence, etc.], which is qualified by the dharmin [through ayogavyavaccheda], have the fault of lacking anvaya [in the example]."

It is true that particular cases (like sound's impermanence) would not be properties of the example, and that there would be the fault of no anvaya. However, this problem will be avoided by the Buddhist in that only universals, and not particular cases, are being proved. But then it could be argued that this restriction to universals would make inference redundant — we would be proving something which has already been proven to exist. PVV: "[Objection:] Surely the universal, i.e. impermanence, etc., is actually established somewhere; a proof [of it] would be pointless. [Reply:]

<sup>&</sup>quot;Caitra is an archer". On the other hand, a speaker will utter pārtho dhanurdharah in order to convey that Pārtha is the only excellent archer among the brothers of the Pāndava. Then we would have to translate: "It is Pārtha [alone] who is the archer". See PV IV, 190-192 translated and discussed in Kajiyama op. cit.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. Devendrabuddhi ad k. 39 (P. 330a 5): ... žes snar bšad zin to "[this] was already explained earlier." Indeed, the same objection and reply figures frequently in Dharmakīrti's works. E.g. PVSV 2, 7-10: paksasya dharmatve tadvišesanāpeksasyānyatrānanuvrter asādhāranateti cet / na / ayogavyavacchedena višesanāt / yathā caitro dhanurdharah / nānyayogavyavacchedena / yathā pārtho dhanurdhara ity āksepsyāmah /. See also PVin Chapter II p. 30, 6 et seq.; transl. Steinkellner p. 32.

<sup>63</sup> PV-k(III) niranvapadosavat.

Now, one is not proving something, i.e. impermanence, which is established by merely existing somewhere, for one is proving something unestablished, namely, an exclusion of non-connection with regard to the dharmin."<sup>64</sup>

Dharmakīrti, as we saw earlier in the sadvitīyaprayoga discussion, does seem to recognize that universals, such as impermanence, are established, or exist, insofar as they exist in some or another dharmin. However, from this it does not follow that proving that sound is impermanent is pointless, for one is proving something which may as yet be unestablished, viz. that impermanence is present in the dharmin, sound. Moreover, because one is establishing the mere exclusion of non-connection (ayogavyavaccheda) between sound and impermanence, other entities, like the vase, can also be impermanent: the fault of no anvaya in the example does not occur.

etena dharmidharmābhyām visistau dharmadharminau / pratyākhyāto<sup>65</sup> nirākurvan dharminy evam asādhanāt //
"The [Cārvāka] who refutes [that sound has] the dharma [impermanence] qualified by the dharmin [sound] or the dharmin [sound] qualified by the dharma [impermanence] is [himself] rebuffed by this [assertion of Dignāga that what is intended is the sādhya], because one is not proving anything like that of the dharmin [sound]."

Cf. PVin P. 290b 7-8.66 The opponent (whom Manorathanandin specifies as still being the Cārvāka) continues his attempt to show that the Buddhist also incurs the faults of no anvaya and viruddhahetu. We now find an obfuscating argument against the Buddhist's idea of the sādhya, viz. the dharma qualified by the dharmin (see k. 39). The Buddhist maintains that one intends to prove the simple universal, impermanence

- 64 PVV 429, 3-6: nanv anityatādi sāmānyam siddham eva kvacit\* sādhane vaiyarthyam ity āha / na ca siddhasya kvacit sattāmātrenānityasya prasādhanam / dharminy ayogavyavacchedasyāsiddhasya prasādhanāt / \*Cf. PVV-n's gloss on kvacit: vidyudādau.
- Ego pratyākhyāto: PV-k(I),(II),(III), Miy. pratyākhyātau. Manorathanandin, in PVV 429, 14-15, comments on pratyākhyāto: ... sa evam vadan pratyākhyātah. See n. 67. The idea, as Manorathanandin shows, is that when the Cārvāka argues that there is no anvaya when the dharma is construed as qualified by the dharmin, etc., he is himself rebuffed by Dignāga's specification ista. Note that while PV Tib. may support the dual, pratyākhyātau, the Tibetan in PVP (330b 4-5) is in keeping with PVV: chos can chos dag gis / chos dan chos can khyad par can / 'gog par byed pa'i rgol ba bsal ba yin te /.
- 'dod pa bsgrub byar brjod pa 'dis ni chos dan chos can dag gis khyad par du byas pa'i chos dan chos can dag 'gog pa yan bsal ba yin te / dper na sgra ni mi rtag pa'i sgra dan ldan pa ma yin pa'am sgra'i mi rtag pa dan ldan pa ma yin no / źes bya ba lta bu ste / chos can la spyi bkag pa ni 'gal ba med pa'i phyir ro // (D. 192b 6-193a 1).

(anityatvamātra), as being present in the dharmin, sound. The Cārvāka, however, misrepresents the Buddhist position as being that a dharma qualified by a dharmin (dharmiviśistadharma), or vice versa (i.e. dharma-viśistadharmin), is asserted to be present in the dharmin. Thus, the sādhya would be either "sound has the impermanence belonging to sound" (śabdānityatvavān śabdah), or "sound has sound which is impermanent" (anityaśabdavān śabdah). In both cases there would be no positive concomitance (anvaya) of the reason with the dharma in an example, and thus the reason would prove the contrary of this sādhya and be a viruddhahetu. Dharmakīrti, in effect, replies that the problem of no anvaya or viruddha does not arise: the Buddhist never intends to prove that sound has impermanence belonging to sound or that it has sound which is impermanent: Dignāga's ista eliminates such unintended properties.<sup>67</sup>

(41) samudāyāpavādo hi na dharmini virudhyate / sādhyam<sup>68</sup> yatas tathā nestam sādhyo dharmo 'tra kevalah // "Indeed, the denial of the combination [of dharma and dharmin] in the dharmin is not contradiction, since the sādhya was not intended in this manner. The dharma alone is what is to be proved in this [dharmin]."

The Buddhist certainly does hold that the combination (samudāya) of dharmin and dharma is the sādhya.<sup>69</sup> Nonetheless, this combination is not, as the Cārvāka maintained, that of the dharmin plus a dharmiviśistadharma or a dharmaviśistadharmin: it is only of the dharmin plus the simple dharma, the universal: the Cārvāka's version was never intended at all. As a result, the fact that the reason would prove the opposite of the type of combination which the Cārvāka advances does not make it a viruddhahetu.<sup>70</sup>

- 67 See PVV 429, 11-15: etenestasya sādhyatvavacanena dharmidharmābhyām viśistau dharmadharmināv ananvayān nirākurvan cārvāko yathā na śabdānityatvavān śabdo nānityaśabdavān vā śabda iti / na hi śabdānityatvenānityaśabdena vā kvacid ghatādau drstānte krtakatvasyānvayo 'sti tata istaviparyāsanād viruddham krtakatvam iti sa evam vadan pratyākhyātah katham ity āha / dharmini śabde evam dharmiviśistasya dharmasya dharmaviśistasya vā dharmino 'sādhanād anityatvamātrasya śabde sādhyatvenestatvāt /. Cf. PVin, n. 66.
- 68 PV-k(III) sādhanam.
- 69 Cf. PVV 429, 18-19: dharmamātrasya dharmisādhyatvāt samudāya eva sādhyah / "Because the mere dharma is to be proved of the dharmin, the combination alone is the sādhya."
- 70 Cf. PVBh 501, 2-3: na hi dharminy aparah śabdānityatvasamudāyah śabde sādhyah / tatas tasya nirākarane 'pi na dosah / anityatāmātranirākarane hi dosah / "Indeed, another combination of sound and impermanence is not being proved of the dharmin,

This concludes the discussion of *ista* in *Pramānasamuccaya*'s definition of the thesis. Dharmakīrti will now comment upon *svayam* — Dignāga's condition that the proponent himself must intend to prove the thesis in question and that it is not merely a proposition to be found in a treatise of his school.

ekasya dharminah śāstre nānādharmasthitāv api / sādhyah syād ātmanaivesta ity upāttā svayamśrutih<sup>71</sup> // "The word 'himself' (svayamśruti) was employed with the following in mind: Even though in a treatise (śāstra) various dharmas might be posited of one [and the same] dharmin, what is to be proved (sādhya) would be what is intended by [the proponent] himself alone."

Cf. PVin P. 291a 3-4.<sup>72</sup> NB III, 42-44: "svayam' means by the proponent who states the sādhana at that time. Consequently, the following was meant: although he might state a sādhana basing [himself] on some treatise, [and] even though the author of that treatise might have accepted many dharmas [as belonging] to that dharmin, the sādhya is only that dharma which this proponent himself intends to prove at this time, and nothing else."

Here begins a long argument, very possibly in part directed against Uddyotakara, who argued in the *Nyāyavārttika* against the word *svayam* (see n. 17); the argumentation is generally directed against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that "because [the proponent] accepts a treatise, everything found there will be the *sādhya*". The Dharmakīrti will use the

- sound. So, even if it is refuted, there is no fault. For, it is when simple impermanence is refuted that there is a fault."
- 71 PV-k(I),(II),(III), Miy. svayam śrutih. The word is a compound.
- 72 ran ñid kyi sgra ni chos can gcig la bstan bcos las chos du ma mam par gźag[1] kyan ran ñid bdag ñid 'dod pa de[2] kho na bsgrub par bya ba yin gyi / bstan bcos khas blans su zin kyan gźan ni ma yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir /... ([1] P. bźag [2] D. omits de [D. 193a 2-3]).
- 73 svayam iti vādinā //42// yas tadā sādhanam āha //43// etena yady api kvacic chāstre sthitah sādhanam āha tacchāstrakārena tasmin dharminy anekadharmābhyupagame 'pi yas tadā tena vādinā dharmah svayam sādhayitum istah sa eva sādhyo netara ity uktam bhavati //44//. On the recurrent theme that one dharmin has many dharmas, cf. e.g. PS I, k. 5 and NM 17-18.
- PVin P. 291a 5-6: bstan bcos khas blans pa'i phyir de la mthon ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin no zes dogs pa srid par 'gyur ro / (D. 193a 5). Although neither Dharmakīrti nor his commentators explicitly identify which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika(s) held this, it seems reasonably clear that Uddyotakara did. He argued, against Dignāga (see n. 10), that if svayam showed that the position which the proponent sought to prove was independent of śāstra (śāstrānapeksa), then we should ask what is meant by śāstra. If the latter meant

term svayam to stress the proponent's independence from any doctrinal and dogmatic affiliations whatsoever: the proponent is only responsible for what he intends to prove at the moment of the argument. The implicit anti-dogmatism<sup>75</sup> here is radical indeed: subsequently, in the discussion of āpta (k. 93-108), we find the case of an apostate Mīmāṃsaka who, contrary to his school's tenets, decides to prove that words are impermanent. His "heresy" in denying a cardinal tenet of his school does not constitute a refutation of his thesis.

(43) śāstrābhyupagamād eva sarvādānāt<sup>76</sup> prabādhane / tatraikasyāpi dosah syād yadi hetupratijñayoh //
"Suppose the following is argued<sup>77</sup>: [The proponent] holds all [the dharmas] because he does accept the treatise. Consequently, if [a reason] invalidated even one [dharma] amongst those [mentioned in the treatise], there would be the fault of the reason and the thesis [each being contradictory]."<sup>78</sup>

what is not contradicted by perception or scripture, then not relying on śāstra would be tantamount to holding and proving a false view. NV ad 1.1.33, p. 282, 4-8: yad api svayamśabdena śāstrānapeksam abhyupagamam darśayasīti atroktam / kim uktam / parāvajānasyāyuktatvād ity evamādi / kim punah śāstram yadanapeksam abhyupagamam darśayati / nanu śāstram pratyaksāgamābhyām avinuddham / āgamas tadanapeksam abhyupagamam darśayasīti bruvatā 'pramānakam artham abhyupaisīty uktam / yaś cāpramānako 'bhyupagamo nāsāv abhyupagantum svasthātmanā yuktah / nāpi pratipādayitum yukta iti /.

- 75 Stcherbatsky (1958) p. 156, n. 2, explaining Vācaspatimiśra's comments on NV, conveys what dogmatism would be in this Indian context: "If, says Vācaspatimiśra, someone known to be an adherent of the Vaiśesika system would appear in a learned society (parisad) and advance the tenet that the sounds of speech are eternal entities, which is a tenet of the Mīmāmsaka school against which the Vaiśesikas always protested, neither the society nor the official opponent would care to listen. He would not even be allowed to state his argument, he would be declared beaten as soon as he had pronounced the thesis." See Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā p. 282, 24-26.
- 76 PV-k(I)  $sam\bar{a}d\bar{a}n\bar{a}t$ . Cf. Tib. thams cad = sarva.
- I translate the yadi non-literally here by "Suppose ... argued". See PVV-n ad k. 43: yadi tadāparah ślokah. Cf. PVin, n. 79: kha cig na re. Following Bu ston this opponent is a Mīmāmsaka.
- See PVV 430, 12-13: śāstrenābhyupagamād eva sarvesām dharmānām ādānāt parigrahāt vādinā tatra tesu madhye ekasyāpi dharmasyopanyastahetunā bādhane hetupratijāayor viruddhatā dosa ucyate //. Note, however, that PVV's śāstrenābhyupagamād eva ("just because there is acceptance by the treatise") is an odd understanding. The Tibetan versions of the other PV and PVin commentaries do not have this instrumental sāstrena; cf. PVinT 30a 7 bstan bcos khas blans pa'i phyir ro. We have followed PVBh ad k. 43: yadi śāstram abhyupagatam ity eva śāstrabādhane dosah pratijāahetvos tadā... "Suppose that the treatise is indeed accepted, and that consequently if there is an invalidation of the treatise there will be a fault of the thesis and reason. Then ..."

Cf. PVin P. 291a 6-7.79 An opponent might argue against a Vaisesika that the reason, "being produced" (krtakatva) is contradictory (viruddha) when the latter philosopher seeks to prove that śabda ("sound"; "words") is impermanent. In the classic argument anityah śabdah krtakatvāt, krtakatva would also establish that śabda is not a quality of space (ākāśagunatva), because space (ākāśa) is permanent and what depends upon it must be permanent too.80 However, the Vaisesika's own treatise says that śabda is a quality of space (see VS 2.1.24-26), and hence this proposition must also be the sādhya. In that case, because the reason krtakatva would refute the Vaisesika's sādhya, the reason would be a viruddhahetu. Although it is clear that the philosopher being attacked is a Vaisesika here, the Indian commentators do not explicitly identify his attacker. Nonetheless, Bu ston's commentary to the Pramānaviniścaya and Vibhūticandra's notes to PVV maintain that he is a Mīmāmsaka<sup>81</sup>. The attribution is plausible, given the Mīmāmsaka's views that śabda is permanent, but in fact this line of attack on the proof of sound's impermanence is not exclusive to the Mīmāmsaka. The very same argument is even on occasion used to attack the possiblity of inference in general: such is the Carvaka's strategy as depicted in Kamalasıla's Tattvasamgrahapañjikā ad TS 1456-7.

We can summarize the logic as follows:

- (1) All which is mentioned in treatises which A accepts is A's sādhya.
- (2) śabdākāśagunatva is mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika's treatises and hence is also his sādhya in the proof of sound's impermanence by the reason, krtakatva.
- (3) If sound is ākāśaguna then sound is permanent.
- (4) krtakatva establishes that sound is impermanent and hence that sound is not ākāśaguna.
- (5) Therefore, krtakatva establishes the opposite of the Vaisesika's sādhya and is thus a viruddhahetu.

<sup>79</sup> log par rtogs pa yan mthon ba ñid de / kha cig na re bstan bcos las mthon ba ni bsgrub par bya ba kho na yin la / de gnod na yan gtan tshigs dan dam bca' ba dag gi skyon yin no zes zer ro / (D. 193a 6).

<sup>80</sup> See PVV-n ad k. 44, n. 3: ākāśasya nityatvāt tadāśritam ca nityam syāt / tad anityatvena bādhyate /. Cf. VS 2.1.27: dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte.

<sup>81</sup> Śākyamati, e.g. speaks of the "author of the Vaiśeṣikaśāstra" (bye brag pa'i bstan bcos byed pa) in PVT 318b 3. For the reference to the Mīmāmsaka, see Bu ston p. 373 which glosses PVin's kha cig na re (see n. 77) as dpyod pa ba [= Mīmāmsaka] na re. See also Vibhūticandra, PVV-n ad k. 44, n. 3, which speaks of the vedāpauruseyavādin.

(44) śabdanāśe prasādhye syād gandhabhūgunatāksateh<sup>82</sup> / hetur viruddho 'prakrter no ced anyatra sā samā //
"[Dharmakīrti deduces the following absurdity:] Then, when the perishability of sound is being proven, the reason ['being a product' (krtakatva)] would be contradictory (viruddha), because it refutes that smell is a quality of the earth [element] (gandhabhūgunatā). [Objection:] But as [smell's being a quality of the earth] is not being discussed (aprakrti), [krtakatva] would not be [contradictory]. [Dharmakīrti replies:] This [fact of not being discussed (aprakrti)] is the same in the other case [viz. sound's being a quality of space (ākāśagunatva]."

Cf. PVin P. 291a 7-8.83 Dharmakīrti accepts that k. 43's refutation of the Vaisesika is inevitable, providing the sādhya is thought to include all properties which the school's treatises attribute to the dharmin. (See Dharmottara's gloss on PVin given in n. 83.) He then takes the absurd consequences coming from this view of the sādhya one step further: just as<sup>84</sup> krtakatva refutes the tenet that śabda is ākāśaguna, so krtakatva would also refute the Vaisesika tenet (cf. VS 2.1.1; 2.2.3) that smell (gandha) is a quality of the earth element (bhūgunatva); hence, when proving anityah śabdah krtakatvāt, krtakatva would also be contradictory in that it would, in addition, refute the sādhya, gandhabhūgunatva. To this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika exponent of the sādhya being everything found in treatises might retort by saying that bhūgunatva is irrelevant in this context, as it is not being discussed. Dharmakīrti replies that there is no difference between bhūgunatva and ākāśagunatva on this score: the proponent did not discuss or intend to prove ākāśagunatva either, but since his sādhya is all which is to be found in his treatises, śabdākāśagunatva and gandhabhūgunatva are equally his sādhya.

(45) athātra dharmī prakrtas tatra śāstrārthabādhanam / atha vādīstatām brūyād dharmidharmādisādhanaih //

<sup>82</sup> PV-k(I),(III) gandhe bhūgunatāksateh. For PV Tib. we read dri sa'i yon tan: P.D.N. Miy. erroneously read dri za'i yon tan. dri za = gandharva.

de dag gi ltar na byas ñid ni[1] / sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na[2] dri la sogs pa'i yon tan bzlog pa'i phyir gtan tshigs 'gal bar 'gyur ro // skabs ma yin pa'i phyir ma yin no źe na de ni gźan la yań mtshuńs so // ([1]D. kyi [2]D. omits na [D.193a 6-7]). PVinT 30b 4 has an important gloss on PVin's de dag ("they"): bstan bcos las mthoń ba thams cad bsgrub par bya ba yin par smra ba de dag ... "those who say that everything found in the treatise is the sādhya".

<sup>84</sup> Cf. the yathā ... tathā construction in PVV 430, 14-20.

"[Opponent:] But here [i.e. in the case of ākāśagunatva] the dharmin [śabda] was discussed: in that case there [could] be invalidation of the property found in the treatise. Next, [in answer to Dharmakīrti's reply that neither śabdākāśagunatva nor gandhabhūgunatva were intended by the proponent and hence neither were discussed, the adversary] might assert by means of sādhanas [i.e. reasons] such as [its] being a dharma of the dharmin that [ākāśagunatva] was [indeed] intended by the proponent."

# Cf. PVin P. 291a 8-291b 2.85

(PVV ad k. 45:) "[Nyāya-Vaiśesika:] But here, i.e. in the case of ākāśagunatva, etc., the dharmin sound was discussed. In that case, there is invalidation of a property found in the treatise, viz. ākāśagunatva, etc. And when this [property] is invalidated the reason will be contradictory (viruddha). However, in the case of bhūgunatva, the dharmin smell was not discussed. Therefore, even if this [bhūgunatva] is invalidated, there will be no contradiction. [Dharmakīrti's reply:] This is no answer. For indeed, the fault is not said to be because the opposite of what the proponent intended [is the case], but rather because of the contradiction with properties [found] in his treatises. And so being discussed [or not] is inapplicable. Rather, because they are not intended by the proponent, this [bhūgunatva] and ākāśagunatva are the same in not being discussed. Next, by means of sādhana [i.e. logical reasons] such as [its] being a dharma of the dharmin, the adversary might assert that ākāśagunatva was [indeed] intended by the proponent. [The prayoga is as follows:] since it is a dharma of the dharmin, or since it is a part of that [sādhyasamudāya], ākāśagunatva was intended by the proponent, just like impermanence."86

Dharmakīrti's adversary tries to show a dissimilarity between  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\dot{s}agunatva$  and  $bh\bar{u}gunatva$ , saying that the  $s\bar{a}dhya$  is not just every property found in the treatise, but rather all properties mentioned in the treatise as pertaining to the particular *dharmin* under discussion.

<sup>85</sup> mi mtshuńs te 'dir chos can gyi skabs[1] yin pa'i phyir ro źe na / ... 'on te rgol bas kyań 'dod pas sgrub par byed do[2] // bsgrub par bya ba spyi'i phyogs gcig tu gyur ba'i khyad par yin pa'i phyir bsgrub par bya ba'i chos bźin no źe na / ([1]P. skabs su. PVinT reads skabs. [2]P. sgrub byed PVinT sgrub par byed pa de'i tshe. [D.193a 7-193b 2]).

<sup>86</sup> PVV 431, 9-15: athātrākāśagunatvādau dharmī śabdah prakrtah / tatra śāstrārthasyākāśagunatvādeh bādhanam[1] tadbādhane ca viruddhatā hetoh / bhūgunatve tu gandho dharmy aprakrta iti tadbādhane 'pi na virodhah / naisa parihārah / tathā hi na vādīstaviparyāsanena dosa uktah / kim tu śāstrārthavirodhena tathā ca prakrtatvam anupayuktam / atha vādyanistatayā 'prakrtatvam taccākāśagunatvayoh samānam / athākāśagunatvasya vādīstatām paro brūyāt dharmidharmādisādhanaih / sādhyadharmidharmatvāt tadekadeśatvād vākāśagunatvam istam vādinā[2] 'nityatvavad iti / ([1] PVV sādhanam [2] PVV vādino).

Therefore, ākāśagunatva will be the sādhya when the dharmin is sound, but bhūgunatva will not – it would have necessitated a different dharmin, viz. smell. Thus ākāśagunatva could be refuted by the reason, krtakatva, when one is proving that sound is impermanent, but bhūgunatva could not be refuted in such a discussion. The kārikā does not give Dharmakīrti's own refutation of this argument, but some idea of it can be gleaned from Devendrabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's commentaries: (1) The adversary makes the mistake of simply speaking of properties mentioned in treatises as being sādhya and does not take the proponent's intentions into account at all. (2) Nonetheless, something's being discussed is a function of what the proponent's intentions are. (3) śabdākāśagunatva and gandhabhūgunatva are then the same in both being unintended, and hence in not being discussed. Note, however, that the Pramānaviniścaya has a somewhat different refutation, one which appeals to the fact that neither ākāśagunatva nor bhūgunatva are connected in reality with the sādhyadharma, impermanence.87

87 See PVinT 31a 7-31b 2: ma yin te źes bya ba ni mtshuńs pa ñid do // chos can skabs su bab pa dan ma bab pa dag gis ni khyad par du gyur pa ma yin no // ci'i phyir źe na / gan gi phyir chos can skabs su bab pa yin yan mi nag pa nid sgrub pa na / gan la dnos po la 'brel ba yod pa de ni ma smos kyan bsgrub bya nid du 'gyur ba yin te / dper na bdag med pa la sogs pa lta bu'o // nam mkha'i yon tan ñid la ni de ltar dños la 'brel ba yod pa ma yin te / de med pa'i rgyu'i phyir ro // 'on kyan 'di dag ni bstan bcos khas blans pa'i rgyu kho nas bsgrub par bya ba nid du 'brel ba na bstan bcos khas blans pa de ni sa'i yon tan la sogs pa thams cad la yan mtshuns pa yin te / de'i phyir nam mkha'i yon tan ñid dan / sa'i yon tan 'di ñid la lun gi sgo nas 'ons pa'i bsgrub par bya ba ñid du bye brag med do // "No, i.e. they are in fact similar. There is no difference whether the dharmin is under discussion or not. Why? For the following reasons: Even when the dharmin is under discussion, then if one proves impermanence, whatever is necessarily connected in reality would be the sādhya, albeit not stated, as for example [properties] like selflessness (nairātmya). But ākāśagunatva will have no such necessary connection ('brel ba = sambandha) in reality, for the reason that it does not exist. However, if these [i.e. ākāśagunatva, etc.] are connected as sādhya merely because of acceptance in treatises, then this acceptance in treatises is completely the same in the case of bhūgunatva and the like, and therefore, ākāśagunatva and bhūgunatva have no difference in being sadhya which stem from scriptures."

K. 45cd. Finally, the adversary seeks to argue that  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}sagunatva$  is in fact intended by the proponent, while  $bh\bar{u}gunatva$  is not. Bevendrabuddhi's PVP and Vibhūticandra's notes to PVV give the details of the two formal logical reasonings used by Dharmakīrti's adversary to prove his point: "Whatever is a quality of the dharmin is the sādhya, because it is a dharma of the dharmin (dharmidharma), just like the sādhyadharma." Or: "Whatever is a quality of one part of the combination [of dharmin and dharma] which is the sādhya (sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśesa), that is intended as the sādhya by the proponent, just like, for instance, the sādhyadharma. Similarly, [ākāśagunatva] is also a quality of the dharmin."

(46) kaiścit prakaranair icchā bhavet sā gamyate ca taih / balāt taveccheyam<sup>90</sup> iti vyaktam īśvaracestitam // "[Reply to k. 45cd:] It is because of some contexts of discussion (prakarana) that there would be an intention. And this [intention] is understood by means of those [contexts]. If one says [of a proponent who does not himself intend to prove a particular property], 'You have this intention because of the force [of the sādhana],' then it is obviously the work of God!"

- If we follow Dharmottara's interpretation, the adversary actually abandons his definition of the sādhya as being "what is accepted in treatises" in favour of "what is intended by the proponent". PVinT 31b 3-5: 'di sñyam du bstan bcos khas blans pa'i phyir bsgrub byar 'gyur ba ni ma yin gyi / 'on kyan rgol ba 'dod pa yin pa'i phyir ro // rgol ba la skabs su bab pa'i chos can la ji sñed yod pa'i chos de thams cad bsgrub par bya ba ñid du 'dod pa yod pa yin te // des na de[1] kho na la bsgrub par bya ba ñid yod pa yin no // chos can gźan la brten pa bsgrub par bya ba ñid du mi 'dod pa'i phyir 'di la yan bsgrub par 'dod pa ma grub par 'gyur ba ni ma yin no źe na / ([1] P. omits de) "The following might be thought: something does not become the sādhya because it is accepted in treatises, but rather because of the proponent's intention. For the proponent the dharmas which pertain to the dharmin under discussion are all intended as the sādhya, and thus this alone is the sādhya. What relies on another dharmin is not intended to be the sādhya. Consequently, it is not so that this [ākāśagunatva] is also not established as intended to be proven."
- PVP P. 332a 1-3: chos can gyi bye brag[1] gan yin pa de ni bsgrub[2] par bya ba yin te / chos can gyi[3] chos nid yin pa'i phyir bsgrub[4] par bya ba'i chos bzin no // sogs pa smos pa[5] ni / gan dan gan bsgrub par bya ba'i spyi'i phyogs gcig gi bye brag gis gan yin pa de ni bsgrub par bya ba nid du rgol bas 'dod pa yin te / dper na bsgrub par bya ba'i chos lta bu'o // de bzin du chos can[6] gyi khyad par yan yin no ze na / ([1] P. cha bye brag [2]P. sgrub [3]D. omits gyi [4]P. sgrub [5]P. pas [6]D. omits can [D. 278b 1-2]). PVV-n ad k. 45, n.2: yo dharmino visesah sādhyasamudāyaikadesaviseso vā sa sādhyah "Whatever is a quality of the dharmin or is a quality of one part of the combination [of dharmin and dharma] which is being proven, that is the sādhya."

90 Miy. taveccheyam.

PV IV, k. 46 = PVin III, k. 7; P. 291b 4-5. Dharmakīrti refers back to his previously stated view (see k. 31) that the proponent's intentions are conditioned by the contexts of the discussions - what the debate is about -, and he ridicules the adversary's attempt to use the abovedescribed inconclusive arguments to say that someone must have certain intentions. Here in PV IV Dharmakīrti does not seem to criticize explicitly the sādhana alluded to in k. 45cd, contenting himself with some caustic sarcasm. In the *Pramānaviniścaya* (P. 291b 2-4), however, he attacks the reasons as leading to the absurdity (atiprasanga) that one would have a constant, never ceasing intention to prove ākāśagunatva, etc. Moreover, to say that the proponent must have these intentions is simply contradicted by direct perception (pratyaksa). Devendrabuddhi, in the same vein, criticizes the reasons, dharmidharmatva and sādhyasamudāyaikadeśaviśesatva, by arguing that because there is sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāna ("pramāna which invalidates the presence of the reason in the contrary of the sādhyadharma"), the vyāpti ("pervasion") is not established, and the reasons are hence *sesavat* ("with remainder").91

vadann akāryalingām<sup>92</sup> tām vyabhicārena bādhyate / anāntarīyake cārthe bādhite 'nyasya kā ksatih //
"One who says that this [intention] has something other than an effect as the reason [proving its existence] is invalidated on account of [such a reason's] being deviant (vyabhicāra). And [furthermore], although an entity [i.e. ākāśagunatva] which is not invariably related [with the sādhya, impermanence,] might be invalidated, what refutation is there of the other [term, i.e. the sādhya]?"

PV IV, k. 47 = PVin III, k. 8; P. 291b 5. One can infer the presence of a speaker's intention from its effects ( $k\bar{a}rya$ ), viz. his words — the theme recurs constantly in PV.<sup>93</sup> The adversary, however, sees that this  $k\bar{a}ryalinga$  will not prove that when the proponent is speaking about sound's impermanence he also intends to prove  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}\acute{s}agunatva$ . He thus

PVP P. 332a 3-4: 'di ltar chos can chos sogs sgrub byed kyis rgol ba'i 'dod pa 'grub par mi 'gyur te / bzlog na gnod pa can gyi tshad ma med pas[1] khyab pa med pa'i phyir / rjes su dpag pa lhag ma dan ldan pa nid du 'gyur ro // ([1]D. ma yin pas [D. 278b 2-3]) "Thus sādhana [i.e. logical reasons] such as dharmidharma, etc. will not establish the intention of the proponent, for since there is no [sādhya]viparyaye bādhakapramāna, there is no vyāpti. The inference becomes śesavat."

<sup>92</sup> Miy. vadan na kāryalingām. Cf. PVV tām icchām akāryalingām\* kāryetaralingām. \*Text reads akāryalingajām.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. PV I k. 213 and PV II k. 1-2; Tillemans (1987) pp. 143-144.

proposes another type of reason, one which is not a *kāryalinga*. This is predictably discounted by Dharmakīrti as leading to deviance, i.e. the *vyāpti* will not hold.

According to Dharmottara, the adversary might then argue: "Even though ākāśagunatva is not under discussion, still if it were invalidated, the sādhya would be invalidated. Hence, the establishment of the sādhya is simultaneous with the establishment of this [ākāśagunatva], and consequently the latter is also the sādhya."94 Dharmakīrti certainly does acknowledge that what is necessarily connected with a valid sādhva should not be refuted – this is only reasonable, as a negation of what the sādhya entails would lead to the negation of the sādhya by contraposition. It is, however, quite another matter to say that what is entailed is also the sādhya, or, what is even stronger, that it was intended to be proved. 95 In PV IV, k. 47, however, the issue is left undecided: Dharmakīrti simply argues that there is in fact no necessary connection (sambandha), or in other terms, no invariable relation (nāntarīyakatā) between ākāśagunatva and the actual sādhya, anityatva. Proving anityatva by means of krtakatva does not also entail proving ākāśagunatva; nor does denying ākāśagunatva imply denying anityatva.

(To be continued)

Curiously enough, however, Dharmottara at least did seem to tend to this latter position and argued that all which is necessarily connected is the sādhya, albeit unstated. Cf. n. 87.

<sup>94</sup> PVinT 33a 4-5: 'di sñam du gal te nam mkha'i yon tan ñid skabs su bab pa ma yin pa de ltar na yan de la gnod na bsgrub bya la gnod par 'gyur bas bsgrub par bya ba grub pa ni de grub pa dan lhan gcig pa yin te / des na bsgrub bya yin no sñam na /.

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- PS = Pramānasamuccaya of Dignāga, P. 5700.
- PSV = Pramānasamuccayavrtti of Dignāga. (a) transl. Vasudhararakṣita and Sen rgyal, P. 5701. (b) transl. Kanakavarman and Dad pa ses rab, P. 5702.

PV = Pramānavārttika of Dharmakīrti (PV I = Svārthānumāna; PV II = Pramānasiddhi; PV III = Pratyaksa; PV IV = Parārthānumāna).

PV-k(I) = Kārikās of PV, ed. R. Sānkrtyāyana in appendices to JBORS 24 (1938), Parts I-II.

PV-k(II) = Kārikās of PV included in Manorathanandin's PVV, ed. R. Sānkrtyāyana in appendices to JBORS 24 (1938), Part III.

PV-k(III) = Kārikās of PV included in Prajñākaragupta's PVBh.

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VN = Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti. In Vādanyāyaprakarana of Ācārya Dharmakīrti with the Vipañcitārthā of Ācārya Śāntaraksita and Sambandhaparīksā with the Commentary of Ācārya Prabhācandra. Ed. D. Shāstrī. Bauddha Bhāratī 8. Varanasi 1972.

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