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# THE YOGĀCĀRA COGNITION THEORY AND DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

### Gadjin M. Nagao, Kyoto

Since the earliest times, Buddhist teachers seem to have emphasized experiential knowledge rather than dogmas as the starting point for their spiritual searches. The knowledges obtained in and through their practices of meditation were finally constituted into systematic philosophies. An example of this kind is the philosophy of Abhidharma, in which mind (citta) and its mental factors (caitta, cetasikā) were analyzed, investigated, and systematized. In a similar way, the Yogācāra teachers of Indian Mahāyāna also investigated "mind" in terms of "cognition" (vijñāna) and, after several decades or even several centuries, established firmly the "cognition theory" (vijñānavāda).

This Yogācāra cognition theory reveals unique features at various points, including the innovation of ālaya-vijnāna, "ālaya-cognition" or "store-cognition." This theory was introduced to Japan during the Nara period, the eighth century, and thereafter it has been vigorously studied under the name of Hossō-shū (a continuation of the Chinese Fa-hsiangtsung) to this day; still now its study is flourishing in Japan. I would like in this paper, however, to call for a re-consideration of the theory of ālaya-vijnāna, with the suggestion that it constitutes a psychology, specifically a depth psychology, systematized in Buddhism as early as the fourth or fifth century. The principal propounders of this theory were Asanga and his younger brother Vasubandhu.

Mrs. Rhys Davids was perhaps the first scholar to use the term "Buddhist psychology." She seems to have thought of Buddhist ethics as a whole as an advanced psychological analysis of the human mind. In the Introductory Essay of her first book, A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, published in 1900, comparing Buddhism with Berkeley's philosophy, she states:

<sup>\*</sup> I would like to express my hearty thanks to Mr. Jonathan Silk for his advice and correction of the English text.

<sup>1</sup> Caroline A.F. Rhys Davids wrote several papers and books concerning the idea of Buddhist psychology. Among them, the following two may be most important: A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1900 (rep. 1923); Buddhist Psychology. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914 (rep. 1924).

And just as Berkeley, approaching philosophical questions through psychology, 'was the first man to begin a perfectly scientific doctrine of sense-perception as a psychologist,' so Buddhism, from a quite early stage of its development, set itself to analyze and classify mental processes with remarkable insight and sagacity.

In her 1900 book, Rhys Davids studied and translated a Pāli text, the *Dhamma-sanganī* (Collection of Dhamma), which is one of the philosophical treatises contained in the Pāli Tipiṭaka of the Theravāda School. A number of technical terms in use in Buddhist scriptures are collected, explained, and systematized in this book; in these terms are included the above-mentioned mental factors or mental states, abundant in number; and the analysis of these mental factors seems to have fascinated Mrs. Rhys Davids deeply. Her second book, *Buddhist Psychology*, contains her own psychological exposition based upon her first book. However, as these are studies of Pāli Buddhism, the term *ālaya-vijñāna* does not appear.

H.V. Guenther also published a book on the topic of Buddhist psychology.<sup>2</sup> In this book, he studied and compared three texts: Atthasālinī (a commentary on the Dhammasanganī, the text translated by Rhys Davids), Abhidharma-kośa of Vasubandhu, and Abhidharma-samuccaya of Asanga. These are treatises belonging to the Theravāda, the Sarvāstivāda, and the Yogācāra-vijñānavāda, respectively. Centering around mental factors explicated in these texts, the author explained various Buddhist topics: meditation, the material world, and the path toward liberation. The last text, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, belongs to the Yogācāra school and, therefore, the ālaya-vijñāna is mentioned therein. But Guenther alludes to this name only in passing.

In Japan a study of Buddhist psychology was worked out by Sasaki Genjun.<sup>3</sup> He studied and translated into Japanese the *Attha-sālinī* mentioned above; consequently his study has the same characteristics as that of Rhys Davids insofar as the psychological aspect is concerned. However, as the author is conversant with Mahāyāna Buddhism, he alludes to the ālaya-cognition in relation to the notion of the "subliminal cognition of 'bhavānga' (lit. limb of existence)," which appears in this text and which is considered as a forerunner of the ālaya-cognition by both ancient and modern scholars.

<sup>2</sup> Herbert V. Guenther, *Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidhamma*. Lucknow: Buddha Vihara, 1957.

<sup>3</sup> Sasaki Genjun, *Bukkyō-shinrigaku no Kenkyū* (A Study of Buddhist Psychology). Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1960.

In short, these studies emphasize the mental factors (caitta). These mental factors are organized into various systems, in which the number of them is counted differently as 46, 51, or more. However, almost all of these mental factors belong to the level of consciousness, not to that of the unconscious. And it is natural that, as the pre-Mahāyāna systems are the object of these studies, the ālaya-cognition does not appear therein.

Depth psychology and psycho-analysis, developed for the first time in the present century by S. Freud, C.G. Jung, and others, seem to occupy a very important position in the study of psychology in general. The relationship between Buddhism and this new psychology shows features different from those investigated by Rhys Davids and others. A workshop on Zen thought and psychoanalysis was held for one week in 1957 in Mexico, and about 50 psychologists and psychiatrists participated. The central figures of this meeting were D.T. Suzuki, E. Fromm, and R. De Martino, whose papers read at that occasion were published in book form.<sup>4</sup>

In the resulting book, Fromm commented that most of the people present at the workshop were not just interested but deeply concerned, and the week spent with Dr. Suzuki had a most stimulating and refreshing influence on them; as for Fromm himself, he had to completely revise his paper for printing, due to the interaction that took place at the conference itself. However, it seems to me that D.T. Suzuki simply talked about Zen, although psychological topics were specifically dealt with, and the psychologists in attendance simply tried to grasp this Zen Buddhism presented by Suzuki objectively from a psychological viewpoint. Psychological research into Zen, including experimental observations such as the measurement of the brain waves of a person in zazen, is not infrequent in modern Japan. There are also many examples of other types of research into the psychological aspects of religious ideas being carried out these days in Japan. These researches, however, seem to observe the practice of Buddhism from without as a kind of material data for psychological research. As such, this attitude is entirely different from that of Rhys Davids which regards Buddhist doctrine as a psychological system. In a sense this points to the distinction between theoretical and experimental psychology.

A recent contribution to the subject is a book entitled *Buddhist and Western Psychology*.<sup>5</sup> It is a collection of papers authored by 14 scholars who, almost all, are specialists in both Buddhist studies and psychology,

<sup>4</sup> D.T. Suzuki, Erich Fromm, and Richard De Martino, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis. New York: Grove Press, 1960.

<sup>5</sup> Nathan Katz, ed., Buddhist and Western Psychology. Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1983.

including some psychiatrists. Not only Pāli Buddhism, but also various types of Mahāyāna Buddhism found in India, Japan, and Tibet, are discussed in this book. According to Nathan Katz, the editor, the aim of these studies is to consider issues from alternative perspectives of Buddhist and Western systems, without reducing one system to the other. The book seems to emphasize the comparative study of the two systems, and their mutual understanding through their theory and practice.

Here again the ālaya-cognition is not much dealt with. However, Dr. Akihisa Kondo, a psychiatrist from Tokyo, introduced the theory of the ālaya-cognition and compared it with the psychological theory of Karen Horney, his teacher. The author's concern is mainly focussed on the phenomena of "illusion" (and its disillusioning) described in these two systems. As a psychiatrist, it is natural for him to take up this topic. But the ālaya-cognition, the basis for such suffering as illusion, is not explained extensively.

Another recent book, Buddhism and Jungian Psychology,<sup>6</sup> is coauthored by two Jungian psychologists, one from the West and the other from Japan. Dr. Mokusen Miyuki, the Japanese author, is not only a Jungian but also a Buddhist scholar and a Buddhist priest. The two authors, often sharing the same topic, collaborated with each other in clarifying various themes in Zen, Pure Land, and other types of Buddhism, but without trying to ignore the differences in their respective backgrounds or ways of thinking, which are as different as East and West. However, in this book too, the ālaya-cognition is never discussed.

The books mentioned above represent a sample of some of the work conducted in relation to Buddhist psychology; I seldom found in them reference to the ālaya-cognition. There are many other important works that are more or less concerned with Buddhist psychology, such as those written by Padma Siri de Silva, Ninian Smart, et al, to which I could not refer in this paper. Quite recently, however, W. Waldron, an American scholar, has published a paper, in which he has extensively compared the idea of the ālaya-cognition with the theories of Freud, Jung, and others, clarifying similarities and dissimilarities found between them.<sup>7</sup> The author's efforts deserve our sincere and respectful appreciation, as a rare case, I think, among Buddhist scholars.

<sup>6</sup> J. M. Spiegelman and Mokusen Miyuki, *Buddhism and Jungian Psychology*. Phoenix: Falcon Press, 1985.

<sup>7</sup> William Waldron, "On the Relationship between the Alaya-vijñāna and Theories of the Unconscious in Depth Psychology," Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute, Vol. 6, 1988, pp. 109-50.

As for Japanese scholars, however, I see several authors who have discussed the *ālaya*-cognition with a view to regarding it as an analysis from the view-point of depth psychology. I would like to agree with and follow them. The *ālaya*-cognition, I believe, is the subconscious cognition, and the Yogācāra cognition theory in which the *ālaya*-cognition is central is comparable to modern depth psychology, and is the most advanced psychology in Buddhism. Just as Mrs. Rhys Davids took Buddhism as a whole as a psychology, I would like to think of the *ālaya*-cognition theory not only as a psychology but as a sort of depth psychology.

Then, how and in what sense can we consider the *ālaya*-cognition to be a subconscious? For this purpose I would like to explain briefly in the following the scheme of the Yogācāra cognition theory.

\* \* \*

In the Yogācāra school, all phenomena, external things as well as internal actions, are believed to be represented by "mind" (citta) or "cognition" (vijāāna). This belief makes up a background (not an ultimate rationale) for the saying of the school: "The whole world is mind-only," or "cognition-only." "Cognition" here refers to bare "knowing" or mental events which are experienced by everyone in daily life. Cognition is analyzed as follows.

First, there are six cognitions, 1. eye-cognition through 6. thought-cognition as are shown in the chart below, together with their objects, color/form and so on. Of these, the first five cognitions provide our contact with the external world; they are "senses" in the usual meaning. Thought-cognition, the sixth, covers the whole range of mental activities, including recognition of and reflection on what the first five cognitions cognize. This six-cognition system is largely adopted by all Buddhist schools excepting the Yogācāras.

The Yogācāras established an eight-cognition system by adding two cognitions to the standard six: 7. defiled manas or defiled thinking (klistam manas) and 8. ālaya-cognition (ālaya-vijñāna). Both of these additional cognitions are subliminal and unconscious, and refer to the state of

<sup>8</sup> In his book, Yuishiki no Tetsugaku (Philosophy of Mind-only) (Kyoto: Heirakuji-shoten, 1979), pp. 114, 174, Yokoyama Kōichi expressly equates the ālaya-cognition with depth psychology and explains briefly the reason it is so considered. Ota Kyūki wrote a book which, though not intended to be an academic study, is entitled: Bukkyō no Shinsō Shinri (Buddhist Depth Psychology) (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1983). At a time preceding these books, Tamaki Kōshirō made a comparative study of Sāmkhya, Vijñānavāda and Freud in his "Comparative Research into Human Consciousness," Tōyō University Asian Studies, No. II, 1964.

potentiality. In contrast to this, the first six are called "functioning cognitions" (pravrtti-vijnāna), which means actuality or actualized cognitions functioning in the phenomenal sphere. To distinguish the two additional cognitions from the six functioning cognitions, a broken line is placed in the chart below between the two groups.

Not a few schools of Buddhist philosophy opposed this idea of an eightfold cognition, maintaining that cognition can be sufficient with six cognitions; they thus deny the additional two cognitions. It is true that our intentional acts in daily life are performed with these six cognitions. It is also through these six cognitions that the means of correct knowledge in logic (pramāna) — which are considered in this school to be of two kinds: direct sensory perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumāna) — are made available to us.


However, while these six cognitions are generally conscious, the ālaya-cognition is unconscious. Or, I would like to call the ālaya-cognition rather "sub-conscious," in the sense that it always lies beneath the functioning cognitions as the basic structure for them. (I do not mean the term "sub-conscious" in any physiological sense, nor as a preconsciousness.) The "unconscious" may indicate lack of consciousness, and thus belong to the level or sphere of consciousness, in that the functioning cognitions are absent in a state such as deep sleep. The ālaya-cognition differs from this. As will become clear in the following, it is not a name for mere absence or lack of the functioning conscious cognitions, but subliminally stands as the foundation for them, always nourishing them by providing material on the basis of which they function. Hence, it is subconscious (below and supportive of the consciousnesses).

The various characteristics of the ālaya-cognition as the foundation or basis (āśraya) of the other cognitions are investigated minutely and in detail by the Yogācāras. First of all, differing from the six functioning cognitions which often cease to work, as stated above, in a state such as deep sleep, faint, etc. or in a meditation called "attainment of no-mind" (acitta-samāpatti), the ālaya-cognition is postulated to work constantly without interruption from the moment of one's birth until one's death. Perhaps it may even be said that it migrates to the next life.

The fundamental structure of the *ālaya*-cognition is described, by both Asanga and Vasubandhu alike, with two notions: "maturation" and "possessing all seeds."

<sup>9</sup> Vasubandhu's *Trimśikā* and Sthiramati's commentary on it will be taken as the main sources for the Sanskrit terms in the following statements.

## FRAMEWORK OF COGNITION THEORY IN THE YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL



"Maturation" (vipāka) means result or fruition. The ālaya-cognition is considered to be the matured fruit of all the past, or past acts, or past cognitions. On the other hand, the notion of "possessing all seeds" (sarvabījaka) means that the ālaya-cognition is the cause for all of the future. (The word "seed," bīja, is a technical term generally used to denote cause.) That is, the alaya-cognition possesses the potentiality for future events. However, this potentiality or cause, in turn, is none other than the "maturation," the fruition, of the past. No cause for the future is conceivable other than the accumulated result or maturations from the past. The comparison is made to a mango-fruit which is an effect and, at the same time, a cause for the future sprouting of a new tree. Thus the ālayacognition exists as the effect of all of the past, and at the same time, as the cause for all of the future. When the word "alaya" is understood as store or store-house, this may imply the meaning that all harvests are accumulated and deposited in this store-house, and will be taken out from it in due course.

In order to describe the causal relationship between effect and cause, through which the past is linked to the future, a technical term, "perfuming" or "impression"  $(v\bar{a}san\bar{a})$ , is introduced in this school. A flower

perfumes (vāsayati) its fragrance on a cloth, and the residue (vāsanā) thus perfumed (vāsita) on the cloth emits in its turn the same fragrance. In the same way, events in the past, or functioning cognitions in the past, perfume or impress their residue somewhere, and this impressed residue produces anew the same functioning cognitions. All cognitions are instantaneous (kṣanika) but their residue or effect remains somewhere. This "somewhere" is none other than the ālaya-cognition. The ālaya-cognition as "maturation" is associated with "perfuming" and its residue of past cognitions, while the ālaya-cognition as "possessing all seeds" is associated with "producing" the same functioning cognitions anew. The movement of "perfuming" is indicated in the chart by an arrow going down from the functioning cognitions to the ālaya-cognition on the left side, and that of "producing" is indicated by another arrow moving in reverse up the right side.

The above-stated is the fundamental structure of the ālaya-cognition. However, in so far as it is a cognition it must have its own "object" of cognition. It is stated in the śāstras that its object is "appropriation" and "locus" as shown on the right side in the chart. (Here, "representing as" (vijñaptika) simply means to take these two as its object.) There are various difficult problems with regard to these terms, but they can be roughly understood as follows.

"Appropriation" (upādāna) means to grasp, to cling to, to appropriate to one's self and keep, etc. In the context of cognition, it also means to apperceive. Appropriation is divided into two kinds: appropriation of perfumed residues or impressions, and appropriation of one's own physical body. The former means that the ālaya-cognition is perfumed by past events, the latter refers to the cognition and apperception of one's own physical body, not from the outside but from within, by the ālaya-cognition. These objects, perfuming and the body, however, are said to be "hardly perceivable" (asamviditaka), not being clearly brought to consciousness. These are objects which are inwardly perceived.

What is outwardly perceived, on the other hand, is the "locus" (sthāna), which means space or place — actually the surrounding world or vessel-like world (bhājana-loka). The vessel-like world is set in contrast with the world of sentient beings (sattva-loka); the latter abides in the former. The "locus" is also "hardly perceivable." Although it is the outer

<sup>10</sup> The notion of "perfuming" is important in this school. In his *Mahāyāna-samgraha* (I.15, I.23, etc.), Asanga explains its significance in detail, and demonstrates that the place where the perfumed residue remains is none other than the ālaya-cognition.

world, it is not perceived in the same way in which the eye-cognition perceives hills, rivers, and so on. Therefore, this cognition basically refers just to one's "feeling of existence" in some surroundings, to one's feeling of being "located" in some context.

The definition of the object of a cognition as "hardly perceivable" was criticized by other schools as nonsensical and as illogical for a cognition. The Yogācāras in their turn replied to this charge. From the debates exchanged, however, we can realize that "hardly perceivable" directly indicates the "unconscious" character of the ālaya-cognition. In the case of functioning cognitions, objects are cognized clearly and brought to consciousness, but the ālaya-cognition differs from them in that it is subliminal.

The ālaya-cognition, thus characterized as subconscious, is considered to be the basis (āśraya) or sub-structure for all conscious cognitions. The Yogācāras consider all events and cognitions to arise on the foundation of movements in the alaya-cognition from effect to cause and from cause to effect. This relationship between the alaya-cognition and the functioning cognitions is expressed as "simultaneous and mutual causality," as shown in the right hand portion of the chart. This "mutual causality" is indicated by the two arrows, going down and going up. It is further defined as "simultaneous" (samakāla). This idea clearly reveals that the ālayacognition is constantly working, concurrently with and parallel to the functioning cognitions, as the basis for them, affording materials, so to speak, for them. 11 The relationship of sub-structure with super-structure means that the subconscious, potential state transforms to constitute the actual conscious state of the functioning cognitions. These ideas of simultaneity and related notions are important and unique to this school, but it is impossible to explore them in detail here.

I stated earlier that we can live our daily lives for the most part with our six cognitions. In fact, people are apt to believe that their lives can be perfected through conscious control by means of the functioning cognitions. But this is true only in a very limited sense — only with regard to matters of which one is aware consciously. Truly, much more of our life is motivated by the unconscious world, or the subconscious world of the ālaya-cognition, than by the conscious world.

<sup>&</sup>quot;Concurrence" and "parallel" refer to the fact that, for example, while the alaya-cognition unconsciously cognizes the "locus" as stated above, the functioning cognitions cognize the same thing consciously and distinctly, characterizing "This is a river, that is a hill," and so on.

In this connection, I would like to compare the framework of the cognition system to an iceberg floating in the ocean. No matter how big the upper portion of an iceberg appearing above the sea surface may seem to be, it is only a small fraction compared to the lower portion submerged in the sea. In my analogy, the line of the sea surface corresponds to the broken line in the chart that separates the functioning cognitions from the ālaya-cognition and the defiled manas. The portion beneath this broken line is, like the submerged portion of the iceberg, much larger than the sphere of ordinary cognitions above the line. Actually the life of each individual consists to a great extent of the subliminal, subconscious movement of the ālaya-cognition — our life is mostly the life of ālaya-cognition.

Although the ālaya-cognition is working constantly without interruption, it should never be taken as a "self" (ātman). This point is strongly emphasized by the Yogācāras, following the doctrine of "non-self" (anātman, nairātmya), a fundamental principle of Buddhism.

This ātman, according to the Yogācāras, is a product of the defiled manas (klistam manas), 12 the 7th cognition in the chart, but it is a fallacy. The word manas means thinking or minding or considering. Based upon and produced from the ālaya-cognition, the manas takes the ālaya-cognition as a cognitive object and considers it as a real ātman. Thus the manas is a cognition that constantly and subconsciously looks upon the ālaya-cognition and considers it as an ātman, thinking "it is I," "This is mine," and so on. This is exactly what is referred to as the "false view of personality" (satkāya-drsti) or "false view of self" (ātma-drsti). Thus, when the manas thinks falsely of ātman, it is associated with defiled afflictions (kleśa) such as ignorance of self (ātma-moha), love of self and attachment to it (ātma-sneha). For these reasons, it is called "defiled manas," and is regarded as the primal cause for all the sufferings of samsāra.

Like the ālaya-cognition, the manas thinks constantly and subconsciously, but it differs from the former in that its basis is the ālaya-cognition and in that it also functions in the conscious sphere; for this reason the manas is often regarded as one of the functioning cognitions. In order to indicate this difference, another broken line is added in the chart between the manas and the ālaya-cognition.

<sup>12</sup> It is a "cognition" vijnāna as one of the eight cognitions, although it is simply called klistam manas, which is without the name vijnāna but is modified by the word klistam, "defiled." This is probably for the sake of distinguishing it from the manovijnāna, the sixth thought-cognition.

The existence of the "self" or "ego" is taken for granted as an a priori truth all over the world, east and west. Not only that, but it plays an important role in daily life and in scientific concern as well, although there may be a variety of ideas with regard to what and how the self is considered to be. Atman (self) in India, however, implicitly means an existence, primal, highest, permanent, substantive, absolute. These characteristics are negated by Buddhism in terms of "non-self." This negation may ensue naturally from the idea of "dependent co-arising" (pratītya-samutpāda), which means universal relativity, negating any absolute being. At the same time the "self" is denied in Buddhism since it is regarded as the fountainhead of all human sufferings, bewilderment, and illusion.

Now, all the eight cognitions of the Yogācāra are accompanied by various kinds of "mental factors" (caitta, caitasika), mentioned earlier as the main theme of Buddhist psychology. Although I cannot enter here into a detailed explanation, there are five "omnipresent" (sarvatraga) mental factors: 'contact' (sparśa) (of inner and outer worlds), 'attention' (manaskāra), 'sensation' (vedanā), 'perception' (samjñā), and 'volition' (cetanā), which are found in all of the eight cognitions. Apart from these, there are mental factors, morally good, morally bad, and neutral in character, such as: 'faith' (śraddhā), 'shame' (hrī), 'non-violence' (ahimsā); 'doubt' (vicikitsā), 'hatred' (dveṣa), 'pride' (māna); 'memory' (smrti), 'intellect' (dhī), 'investigation' (vicāra) to mention a few. We also find 'mental depression' (styāna) and its opposite 'mental exaltation' (auddhatya) mentioned, which may resemble in some ways so-called manic depression, or neurosis in general. Further, these are said to associate with each other, thereby showing complicated causal relationships between them.

The ālaya-cognition is accompanied only by the first five omnipresent mental factors, which are neutral in character, neither good nor bad; also it is considered not to hinder the path to obtaining final emancipation. The defiled manas is also defined as neutral in its basic character, but is considered as a hindrance on the path to enlightenment due to its defiledness. These mental factors, accompanying the eight cognitions, are all produced from the ālaya-cognition and, in turn, perfume residue back onto it. In this sense, the ālaya-cognition stores up all seeds, morally good or morally bad, of these mental factors. It is actually the foundation in which not only the past is combined with the future, but also elementary factors of both samsāra and nirvāna are stored.

The above is roughly the framework of the eight cognition system. The unique characteristics of this system are: 1) it is constituted of two strata,

upper and lower, or rather, of three strata, with the defiled *manas* in-between; 2) on its lowest stratum, the subconscious *ālaya*-cognition serves as the basis upon which the upper strata cognitions are established; and 3) this basis is not a "self," a constant substantive being which is only falsely conceived by the defiled *manas*, but an existence comparable to a rapid river (ogha) which is day and night continuously flowing.<sup>13</sup>

\* \* \*

Now, as stated earlier, this cognition theory, which has the unconscious or sub-conscious *ālaya*-cognition as its center, can, I think, be regarded as a sort of depth psychology. And I propose to reexamine the theory from this viewpoint, assuming it as a depth psychology.

The term "depth psychology" originally designated the theory of Freudian psychoanalysis, but it is now widely used to denote systems of psychology in which the deeper aspects, the unconscious aspects, of human personality are studied. These systems serve as one of the principal theories upon which psychotherapy is based. Putting aside for the moment the question of its psychotherapeutic character, the Yogācāra cognition theory can also be named a depth psychology insofar as it deals with the deeper aspects of human cognitions or activities. One difference of this theory from Western depth psychology, however, is that this Buddhist system comprises three strata, of which the ālaya-cognition, the lowest stratum, is the substructure functioning as basis and cause for all other functioning cognitions, these constituting the upper structure. Also from the point of view of the structure of the theory with the alaya-cognition as the lowest stratum, which seems to me to be a remarkable feature of the Yogācāra idea, the theory will be properly called a depth psychology. Thus regarding this theory as a sort of depth psychology, I propose that the

It is an important principle in Buddhism that all entities including cognitions are momentary (kṣanika), arising and perishing instantaneously, and the ālaya-cognition is not an exception. Things vanish instantaneously every moment, and yet they appear to be everlastingly unchanging. The word "continuously" (samtānena) here seems to denote a mode in which such momentary beings occur in tight succession without interruption. Continuity is, as it were, an accumulation of infinitesimal moments. For example, a lamp continues to burn the whole night through, but its fuel and flame are changing every moment. Likewise, a river flows and continues to be the same unchanged river, but the flowing waters in it are not the same but change every moment, being replaced by new. The continuity found in these examples is ascribed to the ālaya-cognition, which is not the permanent unchanging "self."

theory should be reexamined from a new perspective, that is, from the viewpoint of depth psychology.

The cognition theory has grown through a long history in India as well as in China and Japan, giving rise to various traditions and schools such as the Shê-lun-tsung and the Fa-hsiang-tsung in China and the Hossō-shū in Japan. A number of Sanskrit originals and much more bulky materials in Chinese and Japanese being at our disposal, minute studies of the theory have been carried out in the past, especially in Japan. To these former Buddhist studies, however, a new aspect will be added by my proposed reexamination of the theory. Through such a reexamination, a new perspective profitable to Buddhist studies may emerge and at the same time, I believe, new information and knowledge useful for the science of psychology also may be expected.

It is quite natural that various similarities are found between the two doctrines, that of modern depth psychology and that of Buddhist cognition theory, because both of them are concerned with the deepest stratum of human mental activities. But there are also quite a number of dissimilarities. The fact that their cultural background, and accordingly, their foundational ways of thinking, are entirely different from each other is one thing that explains such dissimilarities. Therefore, it can be easily anticipated that such a proposed reexamination of the cognition theory with the help of achievements of modern depth psychology will involve many difficulties.

The ālaya-cognition is a product of the ancient India of around the 4th to 5th centuries. The scientific ideas and techniques of that time were radically different from those of the present day. While psychoanalysis is closely related to advanced medical science, pathology, medical treatment, etc., the Yogācāra ideas belong to a completely different world view. Therefore, it is not easy to combine, or even to compare, the cognition theory with modern psychology. It seems very likely that these two will not easily adjust themselves to each other.

The most serious obstacle to this proposed comparative study, however, may be the problem of "self," because in fact modern psychology is established on the self-centered idea, which in virtually all varieties of Buddhism was always eschewed or negated in terms of non-self. C.G. Jung, for instance, uses the notion of "self," giving it cardinal importance. When he distinguishes the unconscious from consciousness, he refers to the two as the greater circle and the smaller circle, respectively, and maintains that consciousness, the smaller circle, surrounded by the unconscious, the greater circle, is like an island surrounded by the sea. Furthermore, he

regards the totality as well as the center of the whole psyche, both unconscious and conscious, as "self," while the center of consciousness itself he regards as "ego." He states:

The term "self" seemed to me a suitable one for this unconscious substrate, whose actual exponent in consciousness is the ego. 15

Jung's "self" is one's own inherent self, or true self, while its appearance in the consciousness of daily life is "ego," an inferior self, so to speak. This reminds me of the relationship between the ālaya-cognition and the defiled manas, the former standing for the "self," the greater circle, and the latter for "ego," the smaller circle. Especially the "collective unconscious," Jung's central concept, seems to be very near to the idea of the ālaya-cognition. Although I cannot do justice to Jung's ideas through only such an isolated quotation, while Jung's "self" is the true self to be realized (Selbstverwirklichung), the ālaya-cognition, not to speak of the defiled manas, is not an object of realization but, in the final analysis, is to be abandoned or "converted" to obtain enlightenment (bodhi) or the Buddha's wisdom.

Thus the self-centered idea and the Buddhist doctrine of non-self (and the ālaya-cognition) are virtually in conflict, or at least in opposition.

In spite of this and other difficulties, or rather, all the more because of such difficulties and conflicts, I think it is worth-while to reexamine the cognition theory, combining it with depth psychology. Such a reexamination necessitates opening a new field of enquiry in Buddhist studies. However, without the close partnership of and collaboration with modern psychological studies, it will not be possible to pursue such a course of research. I do not have enough knowledge in depth psychology to pursue such research myself, but I would like to hear from psychologists, indeed, what they think about the notion of the ālaya-cognition. In this connection, it is our deep regret that, C.G. Jung, though conversant with Buddhist ideas, has left no discussion alluding to the ālaya-cognition, probably having no access to it, and that therefore, we cannot learn from this savant what may have been his reaction to the theory of the ālaya-cognition.

<sup>14</sup> Mokusen Miyuki, Shūkyō to Yungu-Shinnigaku/"Koseika" (Individuation) ni tsuite. Tokyo: Sannō-shuppan, 1987, pp. 58 ff.

<sup>15</sup> C.G. Jung, "Transformation Symbolism in the Mass," quoted by Mokusen Miyuki in his book, op.cit. Miyuki notes that "substrate" in this quotation is Hintergrund in the original text, and he declines to take it as a substantive substratum.

Anyway, if such a reexamination proves to be a cause for newly setting up a so-called "Buddhist depth psychology" or an "Eastern depth psychology" against "Western depth psychology," it will be a great pleasure for me.

Finally, I have to add some words about the relationship between the cognition theory and Buddhist practice and the final goal. The cognition theory is a worldly conventional science (samvrti-satya) in contrast to and viewed from the final ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) of Buddhism, which is found only in the Buddha's wisdom. The Buddha's wisdom (jñāna) differs essentially and qualitatively from the cognitions (vijñāna) of daily life, although both feel alike the summer as hot and the winter as cold. What explains the essential difference between them is the doctrine of āśraya-parāvrtti, "conversion (or revolving, or turning around) of the basis." Although conversions, a kind of awakening, will take place several times in a practitioner's career, when a fundamental conversion occurs to his whole existence (which takes place only after long practice), the cognitions are purified and "converted" to become the "wisdoms." That is, the ālaya-cognition converts into the "mirror-like" wisdom of a Buddha, which is the foundation for all the other Buddha-wisdoms, just as the ālaya-cognition is the basis for all other functioning cognitions.

The relationship in which the eight cognitions convert to the three Buddha-bodies or the four Buddha-wisdoms is explicated in the Yogācāra school.<sup>16</sup> This is summarized in a phrase of the Fa-hsiang-tsung:

Converting the cognitions, the wisdoms (should) be obtained.<sup>17</sup>

In this sense, the cognition theory, although it is a conventional worldly science, has a greater importance, in that it provides a rationale for yoga-practice by clarifying the source materials or stuff — the cognitions — of this conversion. It enables one to obtain an idea of or to peep into, as it were, the Buddha's superworldly wisdom. It is probably for this reason

For this see my paper, "On the Theory of Buddha-Body," The Eastem Buddhist, N.S. Vol. VI-1, 1973: 25-53. The three Buddha-bodies are no other than the four Buddha-wisdoms. The mirror-wisdom (ādarśa-jñāna), the essential body (svābhāvika-kāya), is obtained through conversion of the ālaya-cognition; the equality-wisdom (samatā-jñāna) through that of the defiled manas, the wisdom of intellectual mastery (pratyavekṣā-jñāna) through that of the thought-cognition (mano-vijñāna). These two wisdoms comprise the enjoyment body (sāmbhogika-kāya). Finally, the wisdom of duty-fulfillment (krtyānusthāna-jñāna), or the transformation body (nairmānika-kāya), is obtained through conversion of the five primary cognitions.

<sup>17</sup> The locus classicus of the idea is Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun, T.1585, XXXI, 56a-b.

that the investigation into the cognition theory has been earnestly attempted by the Yogācāras.

By the way, based upon psychoanalysis, various mental diseases such as neurosis, abnormal behaviour, mental derangement, etc. are cured by psychiatrists; this is a great achievement of depth psychology. Such a function is not elucidated in the cognition theory. For the Yogācāra teachers, however, even a normal man, ordinary and healthy, appeared to be a suffering "patient," from the viewpoint of universal and fundamental "ignorance" (avidyā) ascribed to them. Buddhism was a salvific means for such a person. Probably the cognition theory was an object of meditation for bhikṣus in their practice. They applied the theory to their own mind to heal their sufferings; at the same time, based upon the mental experiments of their own, the cognition theory was finally brought to its completion. They tried to realize the conversion of cognition into the Buddha's wisdom.

Thus the final goal of this school is, of course, to obtain the Buddha-wisdom, or to realize the state of so-called "mind-only" (citta-mātra), but not to pursue for its own sake an academic analysis of human cognitions. At the same time, the cognition theory also clarifies implicitly that the ordinary human cognitions, and only human cognitions, are the basis upon which the Buddha-wisdom is obtained. That Buddhahood is not an eternal absolute being from the beginning, but that it must be brought to reality (or realization) by human beings through practice which leads to the conversion of human cognitions — this is the principle of Buddhism.

Post-script. When I had almost finished writing this paper, a friend of mine informed me of the existence of a book: Okano Moriya, Bosatsu no Shinsō-shinrigaku (The Depth Psychology of a Bodhisattva), privately published, 1987. It comprises a Japanese translation of Vasubandhu's Trimśikā and the author's very detailed commentary on it. The commentary is full of information gathered from psychoanalysis, Jung's theory, trans-personal psychology, etc. The author was formerly a Christian pastor, not a scholar of Buddhist studies, although his knowledge of the Yogācāra cognition theory is flawless. It is my great joy to find in this work that a Buddhist śāstra has been interpreted extensively by a scholar deeply devoted to psychological studies. [This book has been revised and published quite recently under the name Yuishiki no Shinrigaku (The Psychology of Cognition-only), Tokyo: Seido-sha, 1990.]