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STHIRAMATI, UDDYOTAKARA AND ARCAṬA ON VYABHICĀRA

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1. Sthiramati

In v. 18 of the *Trimśikā* Vasubandhu talks about *sarvabījam vijñānam* (Cognition containing all seeds). Sthiramati, the commentator, interprets these words as follows¹:

tatra sarvadharmotpādanaśaktyanugamāt sarvabījam. vijñānam ity ālayavijñānam. vijñānam hy asarvabījam apy asīti, atah sarvabījam ity āha. vijñānād anyad api kaiścit pradhānādi sarvabījam kalpyata iti vijñānam ity āha. atha vā, ekapadavyabhicāre 'pi viśeṣanaviśesyatvadarśanān nāyam doṣah.

([It is called] 'Containing all seeds' because [it is] accompanied by capability to produce all things. *vijñāna* stands for the ground cognition (*ālayavijñāna*). As there are cognitions which do not contain all seeds, [the words] 'Containing all seeds' are added. Some scholars conceive somethings such as *pradhāna* (Original source), which are other than cognition, as 'containing all seed'; thus, the word 'cognition' is used. Or rather, as the relation of the qualifier and the qualificand is found even when one term transgresses [the other], this [formation of the words *sarvabījam vijñānam*] has no error).

The last sentence following *atha vā* is translated by S. Lévi²:

Ou bien encore, au cas même où il y aurait une irrégularité portant sur un seul mot (omission du mot *ālaya* "Tréfonds" devant *vijñāna* "Notation"), ce n'est pas une faute, puisqu'il emploie le substantif (*vijñāna*) avec un épithète qui le précise (*sarvabīja*).

Lévi seems not to have consulted the Tibetan translation of Vinītadeva's subcommentary on Sthiramati's *Bhāṣya*. He interpreted *ekapadavyabhicāra* as an irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) concerning the omission of first member *ālaya* of the compound word *ālayavijñāna*, and *viśeṣanaviśesyatva* as the relation between *vijñāna*, the substantive, and *sarvabīja*, the qualifier.

It is correct to understand *viśeṣanaviśesyatva* as the relation of the qualifier and the qualificand existing between *sarvabīja* and *vijñāna*,

1 Sylvain Lévi, ed., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, deux traités de Vasubandhu, Vimśatikā et Trimśikā*, Paris — 1925, p. 36, l. 7-10.

2 Sylvain Lévi, *Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra*, Paris, 1932, p. 108.

although we are not yet certain as to which of the two words is the qualifier and which is the qualificand. On the other hand, *ekapadavyabhicāra* has nothing to do with the omission of *ālaya* of *ālayavijñāna*. Vinītadeva's comments on this part, which, thanks to the Sanskrit edition by P.S. Jaini, are now available to us, say³:

atraiva vyākhyānāntaram kurvann āha, atha vaikapadety ādi. yathā nīlotpalam ity atrobhayapada viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyabhāvo bhavati, naivam sarvatra. kim tarhi? kvacid ekapadavyabhicāre' pi viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyatvam bhavati yathā pṛthvī dravyam iti. atra hy āpo dravyatvam na vyabhicaranti, atha ca dravyam viśeṣaṇam upādīyate. evam ihāpi yady api sarvabījam vijñānatām na vyabhicarati, tathāpi vijñānena viśeṣyate.

(Making another kind of explanation, [Sthiramati] says, "Or rather, when one term transgresses ..." and so forth. For example, in the case of 'blue lotus', the [reciprocal] relation of the qualifier and the qualificand exists between both terms. But the same does not hold in all cases. Then what? The relation of the qualifier and the qualificand is found even when one term transgresses [the other], as when we say, "earth is a substance." In such cases, [earth or] water does not transgress substance-ness, and yet, 'substance' is employed as the qualifier. In the same way, in the present case too, although 'Containing all seeds' does not transgress [, but occupies only a part of] 'cognition' [in general], it is qualified by the term 'cognition'.)

Vinītadeva elucidates: The relation of the qualifier and the qualificand is usually found in two terms transgressing each other, for example, 'blue lotus', in which a part of the members (or extension) of 'blue' coincides only with a part of the members of 'lotus'. This is what Dharmakīrti calls *atyantāyoga – vyavaccheda*. Vinītadeva says, however, that this is not the sole relation of the qualifier and the qualificand, because the relation can occur in other cases. He refers to the case of earth or water being a substance. Substance is of many kinds, including earth, water, fire, air, and others. Thus, the extension of substance is greater than that of earth or water; the latter, therefore, is included in a part of substance. This case is, in Dharmakīrti's terminology, called *ayogavyavaccheda*. The case under question, 'Cognition containing all seeds' (*sarvabījam vijñānam*) comes under the same *vyavaccheda*. According to the *Vijñānavāda* school, cognition is eightfold, and *ālayavijñāna*, which is also called *sarvabīja(-ka)*, is one of them. In other words, the extension of cognition is greater than that of *sarvabīja = ālaya*. In such a case also, 'cognition' can be the qualifier of 'containing all seeds'.

3 Padmanabh S. Jaini, The Sanskrit fragments of Vinītadeva's *Trimsikā-tīkā*, *The Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. XLVIII, Part 3, 1985, p. 490, l. 8-13.

Just before the above passage, Vinītadeva refers to the word *vyavaccheda*⁴:

viśeṣanadvayopādāne prayojanam darśayann āha, vijñānam hītyādi. yasmād asarvabījakam api vijñānam asti pravṛttivijñānākhyātam, tasmāt sarvabījakam ity etad viśeṣanam tadvyavacchedārtham kṛtam. vijñānavyatirekenāpi kaiścit pradhānādikam sarvabījakam parikalpyate, tasmād tadvyavacchedārtham vijñānagrahanam.

(In order to show the purpose of using two qualifiers, [the commentator says, “*vijñānam hy ...*” and so forth. Because there are cognitions not containing all seeds, which are called *pravṛttivijñāna*, or cognitions manifesting themselves, the qualifier *sarvabījaka* is used for excluding them (*tadvyavacchedārtham*). Some people imagine *pradhāna* and others containing all seeds; therefore, in order to exclude (*vyavaccheda*) them, the word *vijñāna* is mentioned).

Vinītadeva here refers at least to two kinds of *vyavaccheda* or ‘exclusion’. The relation of the two terms in *sarvabījaka vijñāna* is *ayogavyavaccheda*, as *vijñāna* is of greater extension than *sarvabījaka*; and *pradhāna* as *sarvabījaka* and *vijñāna* as *sarvabījaka* are related by *atyantāyogavyavaccheda* because the extensions of both terms cross each other. Regarding the former, i.e., *sarvabījakam vijñānam*, Vinītadeva says that the term of greater extension, i.e., *vijñāna* is the qualifier. There is no doubt that Vinītadeva knew the theory of *vyavaccheda* of Dharmakīrti.

In Japan in 1952 Hakuju Ui published a Japanese translation of the *Triṃśikābhāṣya* of Sthiramati together with Dharmapāla’s Commentary extant in Chinese⁵: He translated the part under question as follows:

Or rather, [when in the verse only the word *vijñāna* is mentioned instead of *ālayavijñāna*] there is inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika* = *vyabhicāra*) in the one word. However, this is not a fault, because the qualificand (the subject, i.e., cognition) is understood [to be *ālayavijñāna*] by means of the qualifier (the predicate, i.e., *sarvabīja*).

As Lévi had, Ui took *ekapadavyabhicāra* to mean the omission of the *ālaya* out of *ālayavijñāna*, as a result of which the fault of inconclusiveness may have occurred. Ui comments on his own translation on p. 232-233 of his

4 *ibid.*, p. 409, l. 3-7. Regarding the theory of three kinds of *vyavaccheda*, see Y. Kajiyama, Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Buddhist Philosophy, *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, Rinsen Book Co., Kyoto, p. 155ff; B.S. Gillon and R.P. Hayes, The Role of the Particle *EVA* in (Logical) Quantification in Sanskrit, WZKS., XXVI, 1982, 195ff.

5 Hakuju Ui, *Yuishiki Sanjūju Shakuron*, Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1952, p. 113-114.

book, in which he says that *vyabhicāra* is a logical term meaning *anaikāntika*. But as Sthiramati here is not concerned with inferential errors, it is irrelevant to identify *vyabhicāra* with *anaikāntika*. Ui also spared the trouble of looking into Vinītadeva's subcommentary.

In 1953 Susumu Yamaguchi and Josho Nozawa published "Textual Expositions of Vasubandhu's theory of *Vijñaptimātra*"⁶, including a Japanese translation of the *Trimśikā* with Sthiramati's Commentary and Vinītadeva's Subcommentary. The translators literally rendered the Tibetan text of Vinītadeva's subcommentary (The Sanskrit text had not yet been edited by that time). However, the word *vyabhicāra* is rendered by such an ambiguous word 'zoran' (Chinese: tsa-luan) that, for instance, the sentence : *yady api sarvabījam vijñānatām na vyabhicarati, tathāpi vijñānena viśesyate* is thus translated "Although that which contains all seeds is not confused in (or deviating from) being cognition, it is differentiated by cognition", leaving readers – even those of us native to Japan – wondering whether or not the translators really understand the meaning.

2. Uddyotakara

In the *Nyāyavārttika*, Uddyotakara, while commenting on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5, introduces other philosophers who, defining inference, say that the perception of a thing which is never present apart from [the thing to be proved] is an inference for one who knows that [perception] (*nāntarīyakārthadarśanam tadvido 'numānam*). The other party here proposes the word *nāntarīyakārtha* as a *karmadhāraya* compound meaning 'that which is invariably concomitant [with the property to be proved] and which is a thing (*nāntarīyakaś cāsav arthaś ca*). Uddyotakara, however, examines the word *nāntarīyakārtha* construing it as a genitive *tatpuruṣa*, *bahuvrīhi*, and *karmadhāraya*. We are not concerned here with the first two forms of the compound, but only with the last, of which Uddyotakara says⁷:

6 Yamaguchi Susumu and Josho Nozawa, *Seshin Yuishiki no Genten Kaimei*, Hozokan, Kyoto, p. 340.

7 Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, ed., *Nyāyadarśanam*, Vol. I, Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, Calcutta, 1936, p. 161-163; *Gangānātha Jhā's* English translation is available in: *The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama*, Volume I, Bervedere Steam Printing Works, Allahabad, 1915, p. 184 ff. I am grateful to my colleague, Prof. S. Katsura, Ph.D. for providing the information of the existence of the present portion of Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*. It proved to be a key passage in helping to clarify Vinītadeva's interpretation of *vyabhicāra* and Arcata's views of *sambhava* and *vyabhicāra*.

atha sāmānādhikaranyam nāntarīyakaś cāsav arthaś ceti, tathā 'py asamarthah samāsah, viśesanaviśesyaniyamāsambhavāt. ubhayapadavyabhicāre sati samānādhikarano⁸ bhavati nīlotpalavat. nīlaśabdasyāpy anekārthavṛttivāt utpalaśabdasyāpi tathābhāvāt sāmānādhikaranyam bhavati. na punar iha nāntarīyaka ity ukte asti vyabhicāro 'rtho 'nartha iti, yato 'rthagrahanam samartham syād iti. ekapadavyabhicāre 'pi dr̥ṣṭam sāmānādhikaranyam, yathā pṛthivī dravyam. atrāpi ubhayapadavyabhicārah, pradhānāṅgabhāvabhedenā dravyaśabdenā dravyam ucyate, dravyatvam ca. pṛthivīśabdenāpi pradhānāṅgavivakṣāyām⁹ ucyate pṛthivī pṛthivītvam ceti ubhayapadavyabhicārāt pṛthivī dravyam iti yuktam uktam.

idam punar na yuktam nāntarīyakārthadarśanam iti. kasmāt, arthapratyāyanārthatvāc ca [śabda-]¹⁰ prayogasya, arthapratyāyanārtham hi śabdaprayogam icchanti. nāntarīyakam ity ukte artho gamyate, ato na yukto 'rthaśabda iti. tadvida iti ca na yuktam, naivānyathā nāntarīyaka iti. na hi nārikeladvīpavāsino dhūmadarśane nāntarīyakam iti jñānam asti. atas tadvida ity na vaktavyam. [Irregular euphonic combinations are left as they are in the text. For the sake of abbreviation, I have translated nāntarīyaka as 'invariably concomitant' in the following]. (Even if you [= the opponent] mean) the relation of concurrence (sāmānādhikaranyam, or that 'invariably concomitant' and 'thing' occur in the same hetu) by the words nāntarīyakaś cāsav arthaś ca, the compound (nāntarīyakārtha) cannot be so formed, because there is no necessary relation of the qualifier and the qualificand [between the two words]. When two words transgress each other, the relation of concurrence is possible, as in the case of 'blue lotus' (nīla-utpala). The word 'blue' occurs in many things, and the word 'lotus' also in the same way [occurs in many things]; and from this fact the relation of concurrence becomes possible. In the present case, on the other hand, when you say 'invariably concomitant', there is no transgression as to whether [the invariable concomitance] subsists in a thing or non-thing, although the use of the word 'thing' will be significant because of such [transgression].

The relation of concurrence is found even when only one word [out of the two] transgresses the other, as when we say 'Earth is a substance' (pṛthivī dravyam)¹¹. Even in this case transgression of both terms [from each other] (ubhayapadavyabhicāra) is found [according to our interpretations]: By means of the difference made by the relation of the chief and the subordinate (pradhānāṅgabhāva), the word dravya can mean an individual object and substance-ness (dravyatva); the word pṛthivī also, according as the speaker wishes [to choose] between the chief and the subordinate [meanings], can mean a piece of earth as well as the element of earth (pṛthivītvā). Therefore, because of the transgression of both terms, [the proposition] 'the earth is a substance' is rightly stated.

- 8 Thakur, ed., *Nyāyadarśana of Gautama*, Vol. I, Chap. I, Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text, No. 20, 1967, Darbhanga, p. 300 has *samānādhikarane* instead of *samānādhikarano* in Taranatha's edition. I have followed the latter reading.
- 9 Thakur's edition omits *dravyam* before *ucyate*. This reading is better.
- 10 Thakur's edition has *śabda-prayogasya* for *prayogasya* in Taranatha's edition. I have followed the former.
- 11 Taranatha and Jhā take this sentence beginning with 'The relation ...' to be the opponent's question. I think, however, the sentence can be construed otherwise.

When you say 'the perception of a thing which is invariably concomitant', however, it is not right. Why? Because the employment of words is meant for conveying the meaning; people want to make use of words to make known the meaning. [But in the present case,] when you say 'invariably concomitant', 'a thing' is understood [as a matter of course, because only a thing can be invariably concomitant with the property to be proved]. Thus, the use of the word *artha* is not right. [Your words] 'to one who knows it' (*tadvidah*) is also improper, as otherwise [i.e., unless there is a person who knows it], invariable concomitance is not established. For the inhabitants of Nārikela Islands [who do not know our language¹²] do not have the knowledge of *nāntarīyaka* [e.g., invariable concomitance between smoke and fire] even when they see smoke. Therefore, you do not have to say 'to one who knows it'.)

It is important that Uddyotakara juxtaposes the two terms, *ubhayapada-vyabhicāra* and *ekapadavyabhicāra*. Vinītadeva used the word *ekapadavyabhicāra*, but not the word *ubhayapada-vyabhicāra*, instead of which he referred to *ubhayapada-viśeṣanaviśeṣya-bhāva*. Owing to Uddyotakara's usage, it is now certain that the two terms, *ubhayapada-* and *ekapadavyabhicāra* form a set of technical terms. I do not know whether the theory of *vyabhicāra* had been a traditional one even before Uddyotakara, or it was proposed for the first time by him. Nor do I know if Sthiramati owed the theory to Uddyotakara or vice versa, the latter owed it to the former, as they were contemporary.

According to Ganganātha Jhā, *prthivīva* means the class (*jāti*) of earth, which is distinct from a substance (*dravya*). Thus, when *prthivī* is understood as *prthivīva*, there is a clear incompatibility between both terms in the proposition, 'The earth (= the class of earth) is a substance', because earth here denotes something that is not-substance.¹³

The proposition *prthivī dravyam* is valid when it means that the substance of earth is one of the substances', but invalid when it means that the class of earth is a substance. If Jhā's interpretation is right, the relation of the qualifier and the qualificand is significant only when it is sometimes correct and other times incorrect of the object to which it is applied. In the above discussion of Uddyotakara, the object is *hetu* or the reason of an inference. The compound *nāntarīyakārtha*, or in other words, the

12 Jhā thinks that in Nārikela island there is no fire (*The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama*, Vol. I, p. 188). Nālikera islands appear in Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā*. The inhabitants of the islands are said to be unable to understand the word *agni*, i.e., the Sanskrit language. See Y. Kajiyama. *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 220 (An annotated translation of the *Tarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta, p. 33). The word is variously spelt: *nālikela*, *nālikera*, etc. See V.S. Apte, *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, s.v.

13 Jhā, *The Nyāyasūtras of Gautama*, Vol. I, p. 187.

proposition 'the *hetu* is invariably concomitant with the property to be proved and a thing' does not have any transgression or incompatibility, because that which is invariably concomitant is always a thing, and nothing else. The lack of *vyabhicāra* in this case makes it insignificant. According to B.K. Matilal, it is usual Sanskrit dictum that an adjective is significant provided it is possible for it to be true or false of the object to which it is applied (*sambhave vyabhicāre vā syād viśeṣanam arthavat*).¹⁴

3. *Arcata*

In the last chapter of the *Hetubindu*, Dharmakīrti introduces, for the sake of criticism, three more conditions or forms (*rūpa*) of the inferential reason, proposed by an opponent (or opponents) in addition to the usual three propounded by Dharmakīrti. The extra three are (4) *abādhitaviśayatva*, (5) *vivakṣitaikasamkhyatva*, and (6) *jñātatva*.

The first of these three, *abādhitaviśayatva*, often abbreviated as *abādhā*, means that the property to be proved in an inference should not be annulled by either another perception (*pratyakṣa*) or inference (*anumāna*). If the property to be proved is contradicted by such other cognitions, the reason itself is rejected out of the subject of inference (*sādhyadharmin*), and the proof becomes invalid.

Dharmakīrti refutes the fourth condition, pointing out that annulment (*bādhā*) and necessary concomitance (*avinābhāva*) are mutually contradicting, in other words, non-annulment is contained in necessary concomitance, and that therefore non-annulment cannot be another independent condition of the reason, separate from necessary concomitance. Necessary concomitance means that the reason is definitely present in the property to be proved (*anvaya*), and that the reason must be absent in the contradictory of the property to be proved (*vyatireka*). That is to say, necessary concomitance includes both the second and the third conditions of Dharmakīrti.

The opponent thinks that, even if *avinābhāva* is satisfied, *abādhā* may not be present, and that the latter should be confirmed separately from the former. According to Dharmakīrti, however, the state that even in the presence of the qualifier of a thing its other qualifier is absent is

14 B.K. Matilal, *Awareness and Meaning in Navya-Nyāya*. B.K. Matilal & J.L. Shaw, ed., *Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective*, Synthese Library / Vol. 178, D. Reidel Publ. Co. Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster, 1985, p. 390.

illustrated by the relation between the first condition of the reason, *pakṣadharmatva*, and the second, *sapakṣe bhāvah*. The first condition prescribes that the reason must be a property of the subject of an inference, and the second that the reason must be present in the property to be proved; and these are two qualifiers of the reason different from each other. Even when the first condition is satisfied, the second may not be present. This is the reason why the second is worth accepting as another definition or condition than the first. *Abādhā* as a qualifier of the reason, however, is identical with *avinābhāva*, i.e., the former is not a qualifier other than the latter, and thus is not worthy to be accepted as another definition than *avinābhāva*.

Arcaṭa, the author of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, while commenting on a part (*d.* 12 on p. 87, l. 20 to p. 88, l. 5 in Steinkellner's edition¹⁵) of Chapter 6 of the *Hetubindu*, introduces the concepts of *sambhava* and *vyabhicāra*, which are indeed relevant to the subject of my present paper. Arcaṭa uses the word *sambhava* in the meaning of the coexistence of two terms, and the word *vyabhicāra* in the meaning of transgression of one term from the other or absence of one term in the other. For example, in the inference "Sound is permanent, because of its audibility", audibility, the reason, coexists with sound, the subject, but it is absent in permanency, the property to be proved¹⁶; and in the inference "Sound is impermanent, because of its visibility", visibility, though present in impermanent things, is absent in sound. Thus, in each of the inferences, either the coexistence of the subject and the reason or the presence of the reason in the property to be proved is lacking. And the very discrepancy makes *pakṣadharmatva* and *sapakṣe bhāvah* the two necessary conditions of the reason.

Here I am not concerned with the entire contents of the sixth chapter of the *Hetubindu* and *Hetubinduṭīkā*, but only with the terms, *sambhava* and *vyabhicāra* and their relations to *viśeṣana* and *viśeṣya*. The Tibetan version of the *Hetubindu* and its Sanskrit reconstruction as well as a Ger-

15 Ernst Steinkellner, *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduh*, Teil I, Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text, Hermann Böhlau Nachf., Wien, 1967, p. 89-91.

16 The inference concerned can also be formulated: Sound is impermanent, because of its audibility. Audibility in this inference too is not present in the impermanent things, because audibility, being existent only in sound (*asādhāraṇa*), is not regarded to be present in the impermanent things. Sound, being the subject of inference, is not yet determined to be present or not present in the impermanent things, and the audible thing is none other than sound. That is to say, the above inference says nothing more than 'Sound is impermanent, because it is sound.'

man translation are offered to the scholarly world by E. Steinkellner¹⁷. Sukhlalji Sanghavi published a Sanskrit edition of Arcata's *Hetubinduṭīkā* with Durvekamiśra's Subcommentary¹⁸. As is pointed out by Sukhlalji Sanghavi¹⁹, the Tibetan translation of the *Hetubinduṭīkā* is not of much help, because the translator did not seem to have well understood the meaning of the Sanskrit text. The following, in which I relied solely on the Sanskrit work edited by Sukhlalji Sanghavi, to which I tried to be as faithful as possible, is my translation of a part of the *Hetubinduṭīkā* on *d* of Steinkellner's division (Sukhlalji Sanghavi's Sanskrit edition, p. 211, l. 29 – p. 212, l. 24).

[Opponent:] "Even if annulment (*bādhā*) and necessary concomitance [between the probans and probandum] (*avinābhāva*) do not exist together, and if, therefore, when there is necessary concomitance, non-annulment is understood, why is it [(= non-annulment) not another form (*rūpāntara*) [of the reason (*hetu*)]]?"

[Answer:] [The author] says, "It is indeed ..." and so forth. It might be in reality another qualifier [of the reason than *avinābhāva*], and could be worthy to be accepted by the author of the definitions [of the three forms, viz., Dharmakīrti] as another form [of the reason] that even in the presence of a qualifier of a thing another [qualifier] is absent. For the relation of the qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva*) is possible [only] when coexistence (*sambhava*) [of the terms] and transgression of [one term] from [the other, or one term being absent in the other] (*vyabhicāra*) are both available, and not when coexistence alone is possible. Saying "For instance ..." and so forth, [the author] gives examples [of the reason being a property of the subject of inference (*paksadharmatva*) and the reason being present in things similar to the subject of inference (*sapakṣe bhāvah*)]. [In the inference "Sound is permanent, because of its audibility (*śrāvanatva*)",] the connection of [the reason] "audibility" with the subject [*dharmīn* or "sound"] is available, but its presence in things similar to the subject [*sapakṣa* or permanent things] is not available. [On the other hand, in the inference "Sound is impermanent, because of its visibility (*cāksuṣatva*)",] though "visibility" is present in things similar to the subject [*sapakṣa* or impermanent things], its presence in the subject of inference (*sādhyadharmīn*) or "sound" is unavailable. Thus, by virtue of the presence of coexistence and transgression (*sambhava-vyabhicāra*), the relation of the qualifier and the qualificand becomes possible [between the subject of inference and the

17 Steinkellner, op.cit., and *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ*, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, Wien, 1967.

18 Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Shri Jinavijayaji, ed., *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhatta Arcata with the Sub-commentary entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1949.

19 ibid., Introduction, p.iii: "the mistakes of the original text, of course, found place in the (Tibetan) translations also. The translators knew more of the language than of the meaning. Had they been properly conversant with the meaning as well, they could have translated the proper meaning without allowing the mistakes of the original MS. text to creep into their translations.

reason and between the reason and the property to be proved], and [the latter] is accepted as another definition (*lakṣaṇāntara*) [than the former].

[Opponent:] The situation will be the same also in the present case [i.e., that in the presence of necessary concomitance, non-annulment is present: *avinābhāve abādḥā*].

[Answer:] “It is not applicable, however ...” “It” means what has been said immediately above. It is not applicable as to [your theory of] non-annulment related to the presence of necessary concomitance [*abādḥāyā avinābhāve sati*]. As when there is necessary concomitance non-annulment certainly exists, and the transgression [of the one beyond the other] is not found [*vyabhicārābhāvād*, i.e., necessary concomitance always pervades non-annulment], how can there be the relation of the qualifier and the qualificand, and the merit of accepting [non-annulment] as another definition [of the reason]?

Thus, annulment is never possible regarding the object [*viśaya*, i.e., the property to be proved] of the reason which is necessarily concomitant with the property to be proved (*sādhyāvinābhāvin*), and the contradictory of which is necessarily concomitant with the contradictory of the property to be proved. As has been said, if a valid reason is employed in regard to a contradictory, improper object [*viśaya* = property to be proved], it is called a fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsa*).

“*iti*” means “therefore”. The situation being so, therefore, “its absence”, i.e., non-annulment (*bādḥāviraha*) should not be enumerated as another definition separately from necessary concomitance, when there are both the reason and its contradictory which are of the natures of the positive and negative concomitance (*anvaya-vyatireka*), because it [= non-annulment], having no case of transgression, cannot be another form [*rūpāntara* = *lakṣaṇāntara*, definition of condition of the reason]. Because when there is necessary concomitance annulment is never present, as they are contradictory to each other, hence, when a reason having the afore-said characteristics [i.e., *pakṣadharmatva* and *avinābhāva*] is employed [in an inference], the thesis (*pratijñā*), which is necessarily understood, cannot have fallacies such as contradiction to perception (*pratyakṣaviruddha*), as these [fallacies] are rejected by the characteristics of the reason. Therefore, how is non-annulment (*bādḥāviraha*) called another form [of the probans]? Describing those impossible things is of no use. This is the intention [of the author].