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ON THE *DBU MA SNAṄ BA'I BRJED THO*

Masamichi Ichigō, Kyoto

Preface

This paper consists of two parts: The first is an introduction of the outlines of a Tibetan work, the *Dbu Ma Snaṅ Ba'i Brjed Tho* (hereafter abbreviated MĀS). The MĀS, as its title shows, is a Tibetan commentary written by a Mongolian scholar on the *Madhyamakāloka* (hereafter abbreviated MĀ) of Kamalaśīla. The second part presents a synopsis of the *pūrva-pakṣas* of the MĀ indicating the page references in the sDe dge and Peking editions of the Tibetan texts. This synopsis is one result of my ongoing study of the MĀS.

The MĀ, of which no Sanskrit original has yet been discovered, is preserved only in a Tibetan translation by Śīlendrabodhi and dPal brtsegs. It is very voluminous, amounting to 250 folios or 50 pages in the Peking reprint edition. It is well-known as one of the three most important works of the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, together with Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvaya-vibhaṅga* and Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṁkāra*.[1] But, there are no known commentaries on the MĀ written by Indian or Tibetan scholars. It may be due to the non-existence of any commentary that the study of the MĀ has not made remarkable progress.

Now, the MĀS has been reprinted in the *Śata-piṭaka Series* No. 291.[2] Dr. Lokesh Chandra had already reported the existence of this material in his *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature*, part 2 1963, pp. 358-359. But this commentary seems to have so far received little attention from modern scholars.

I would like to expres my gratitude to Mr. Jonathan Silk who, having read my paper, gave me useful suggestions and corrected the English.

1 F.D. Lessing and A. Wayman, *Mkhas grub rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras*, The Hague-Paris 1968, pp. 90-91.
D.S. Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, A History of Indian Literature*, Wiesbaden 1981, pp. 94-95.

2 I was told about the existence of the MĀS, and encouraged to study it, by Mr. Jonathan Silk, a graduate student at the University of Michigan, to whom I would like to express here my heartfelt thanks. According to Mr. Silk, the MĀS was discovered by E. Gene Smith and it was he who urged Lokesh Chandra to arrange for its publication.

The MĀS, as one can see at a glance, is incomplete and imperfect. The work is even without a colophon. The reason why the entire text is not commented upon is not known. The MĀ, as is known, is composed of one section of the *pūrva-pakṣas* and another of the *uttara-pakṣas*, but the MĀS comments only on the *pūrva-pakṣas* and the first three *uttara-pakṣas*, despite the fact that the commentary itself is very voluminous, consisting of 404 folios, and brief comments are given for each of the 83 *pūrva-pakṣas*. However, the MĀS is very helpful in understanding the contents of the *uttara-pakṣas* because, the *pūrva-pakṣas* being classified into 83 articles, we can easily discern the correspondence between the *pūrva-pakṣas* and the *uttara-pakṣas*. This commentary's division of the *pūrva-pakṣas* seems to me reasonable on the whole.

A. (1) The Author

It is regrettable that we do not have full information about the author of the MĀS, bsTan-dar (1835-1915).[3] I am aware only of the following from Dr. Lokesh Chandra's report:[4]

> Three texts included in this volume of the Śatapiṭaka series are the most important writings of the Khalkha Mongol scholar Bstan-dar Sṅags rams-pa Bśad-sgrub-bstan-dar. This revered master, who flourished during the late 19th and early 20th century and was connected with the Dgaḥ-ldan-theg-chen-gliṅ Monastery in Urga and with the Chin-waṅ Śog Monastery in the territory of Tüsiyetü, belongs to the glorious tradition of Khalkha scholarship which flourished during the late 18th and early 19th century. Other famed luminaries in this lineage of savants are Kyai-rdor Mkan-po Ṅag-dbaṅ-mkhas-grub, Chos-rje Ṅag-dbaṅ-dpal-ldan, and Mkan-zur Chos-rje Ṅag-dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ-don-grub.

bsTan-dar's 63 works of various sizes are enumerated in Dr. Lokesh Chandra's list.[5] The MĀS itself gives us only scanty information as follows:

> The author of the *bden gñis mam bźag* is the teacher of bsTan-dar.[6]

3 I was informed about this dating by Mr. Tetsurō Ikeda, a Mongolian scholar at Kyoto Sangyō University, to whom I express my gratitude.

4 *Śata-piṭaka Series*, vol. 291, preface.

5 Lokesh Chandra, *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature*, part 2, 1963, pp. 463-465.

6 MĀS.f.626,5: *bdag gi bla ma'i bden gñis mam bźag tu yaṅ śin tu go sla bar byaṅ bas de dag tu lta'o.*

(2) The Object of his Salutation

bsTan-dar begins the commentary by expressing his salutation to several saints in 8 verses.[7] Among them are the Buddha, Mañjuśrī, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Tsoṅ kha pa. This suggests to us the academic lineage to which bsTan-dar belongs.

(3) The Organization of the MĀS

The MĀS analyzes the content of the MĀ as follows, commenting on each item.

I. The Significance of the title of the MĀ (*mtshan gyi don*). ff.504.1--521,2
II. The Translator's salutation (*'gyur gyi phyag*). ff. 521,2--522,5
III. The Content of the MĀ (*gzhuṅ gyi don*). ff.522,5--
  (1) The preparation to begin the commentary on what is explained in the MĀ (*bshad pa la 'jug pa'i bya ba*).
    1. The resolution to begin the commentary by identifying the opponents and by describing four items, such as the purpose for which the MĀ was written, and the like (*phyogs sṅa ma la ltos pa'i dgos chos bzhi bstan pa'i sgo nas rtsom par dam bca' ba*). f. 522,6
    2. The resolution to begin the commentary by identifying those who seek liberation in general and by describing four items, such as the purpose for which the MĀ was written and the like (*spyir grol ba don gñer la ltos pa'i dgos sogs chos bzhi bstan pa'i sgo nas rtsom par dam bca' ba*). f.523,2
  (2) The explanation of the statement (*bshad pa ñid ñe bar 'god pa*). f.523,5
    1. The determination of the outline of the MĀ in short (*mdor bstan pa'i tshul gyi gzhuṅ spyi'i bsdu ba rnam par bzhag pa*). ff. 523,6--524,1
      A. brief comments on the opponent's views. ff. 524,1--557,3
      B. the explanation of the brief answers to them. ff. 557,7--559,2
    2. Referring to the statement of the MĀ itself in detail. f. 559,2
      A. The settlement in detail (*rgyas par gtan la 'bebs pa*)
        (i) (a) The opponent's view in detail. ff. 559,4--560,2
          1. The thesis, "All *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature", cannot be proved by Scripture (*āgama*).
            1 The scripture which teaches the thesis and its statement are not applicable to all people.

7 MĀS. ff.502,1-504,1.

(b) The answer in detail. ff. 560,2--581,4

(ii) (a) The opponent's view in detail. ff.581,4--650,3

2 All scriptures have various intentions. For example, the expression of the thesis in the *Saṁdhinirmocana sūtra* means the non-intrinsic nature of the "three natures".

(b) The answer in detail. ff.650,3--760,1

(iii) (a) The opponent's view in detail. ff. 760,1--899,5

3 The non-character of the imagined nature means the non-intrinsic nature of the appearance of the mind as "grasped and grasper".

(b) The answer in detail. ff. 899,6--905,5

B. The content established by the settlement in detail

IV. Postscript (*mjug*[8] *gi don*)

As shown above, the MĀS interprets the MĀ by analyzing it into four items (I-IV). III is, of course, the core of the MĀS. The MĀS ceases without commenting on III(2)2B and IV.

(4) The Title of the MĀ

To begin with, the MĀS gives an explanation of the significance of the title of the MĀ. Above all it comments on the meaning of "Madhyamaka" by quoting many *sūtras* and *darśanas*. It must be understood as the meaning of the Middle-path devoid of the two extremes of existence and non-existence, or as the truth of co-arising dependently (f. 504,2). Then, the MĀ is a work which teaches clearly the deep Middle-path (f. 521,1-2).

(5) The Salutation of the MĀ

A sentence, "Homage to Mañjuśrī-kumārabhūta!" is put at the beginning of the Tibetan translation of the MĀ. This sentence was added by the two translators. Two kinds of etymologies are given to Mañjuśrī-kumārabhūta (f. 521,2.4). Since this book is a philosophical text, "Homage" is given to Mañjuśrī-kumārabhūta.

(6) The Main Theme, the Purpose and the Relationship of the MĀ

Kamalaśīla puts one verse and a short sentence at the beginning of the MĀ. They run:[9]

> Here, we should take the remedy of compassion to drive out the demons of non-scholars who, posessed by great demons of attachment to existence because of

8 *'jug* → *mjug* (MĀS.f.504,1)

9 D.133b5-7, P.143b3-6.

their immature thought, criticize Nāgārjuna, etc., the greatest of great men, because of their poor wisdom, and who are thus completely depressed.

We start to write [this treatise (=the MĀ)] to explain the non-intrinsic nature of all *dharmas* to those who want to attain happy circumstances, and cut off completely attachment to existence, since the attachment to existence is the cause of the net of all afflictions.

These two passages are, according to bsTan-dar, "resolution to begin the commentary on what is explained in the MĀ", where the main theme, the purpose of the treatise and the relationship between the purpose and the treatise are described (f. 523,3-4). According to the MĀS, they are respectively as follows.

The main theme of the MĀ is to explain that all *dharmas* are in reality empty and that there is ultimately only one-vehicle.

As for the purpose, it is the temporal purpose (*gnas skabs kyi dgos pa*) to understand the theme and it is the ultimate one (*mthar thug gi dgos pa*) to cut off all affliction by understanding it.

The MĀS mentions only that the relation between the treatise and its purpose is easy to understand (f. 523,4). From the point view of Kamalaśīla,[10] this means, we can suppose, that the MĀ and the ultimate purpose are in the relationship of proof and what is proved, or of means and what is attained by means. In short, the two purposes are achieved by the work of the MĀ.

In connection with the teaching of the one-vehicle, the *gotra* and *tathāgatagarbha* theories are also referred to in the MĀ. It is comparatively rare that Mādhyamika texts discuss these theories. So the position of the MĀ within the literature of the Mādhyamika is made even more important by their inclusion.[11]

(7) The Opponents and Their Views Presented in the *Pūrva-pakṣas*

Who and whose ideas are assumed in the *pūrva-pakṣas* by Kamalaśīla? I would like to offer here a certain conclusion about this question by putting in order the results of studies made so far and by adding some new material.

First of all, 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa (1648-1722) identifies the *pūrvapakṣas* with the Vijñāna-vādin's view in his GTCM.[12]

10 Ichigō (1985) in Japanese, pp. 2-3.
11 Ruegg, op.cit., p. 95.
12 GTCM, f. 879,5-6.

bsTan-dar (1835-1915) says in his MĀS[13] that the *pūrva-pakṣins* are the Vijñāna-vādins who follow scripture and reasoning.

S. Matsumoto (1982) concludes that the *pūrva-pakṣas* represent basically nothing but Vijñāna-vāda ideas.[14] He contributes to an identification of the *pūrva-pakṣas* by proving, especially in the context of the discussion of the definition of the conventional truth, that *pūrva-pakṣas* **62** and **63** are the views of Devendrabuddhi,[15] **28 29 30 64 65** and **66** are those of Śākyabuddhi,[16] and **68** and **70** are those of Dharmapāla.[17]

The following materials seem to be sufficient to reinforce the above mentioned conclusion. In *pūrva-pakṣa* **17** (f. 530,3) we find the expression "the other[=we] maintains that the example of image (*pratibimba*) is in essence characterized by knowledge." In **66** (f. 544,4) it is said, "What is the difference from our view which holds that the object lies in the inside (of the mind)?" *Pūrva-pakṣa* **77** (f. 550,1) seems to presuppose verse 50 and its commentary in the *Dharmaparyeṣṭyadhikāra* of MSA chap. XI,[18] which mentions how to seek non-intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāvatā*). *Pūrva-pakṣa* **78** (f. 550,4) can be traced back to the idea explained in verse 52 and its commentary in the *Dharmaparyeṣṭyadhikāra* of MSA chap. XI,[19] which mentions how to seek non-production (*anutpatti*). *Pūrva-pakṣas* **79** to **83** discuss the teaching of the one-vehicle (*eka-yāna*). The MSA also discusses this in verse 53 and its commentary in the *Dharmaparyeṣṭyadhikāra*. The correspondence between the two texts' development of the discussion seems to reinforce the above-mentioned conclusion.

However, S. Moriyama (1988), (1989) proved that the view of *pūrva-pakṣa* **32** can be attributed to Dharmakīrti and Śākyabuddhi. It is the causal relationship mentioned in Jñānagarbha's SDVK k. 14 that is criticized in **32**. Verse 14 runs as follows:

> Many do not produce one, many do not produce many, one does not produce many, and one does not produce one.[20]

13 MĀS, f. 524.4.

14 Matsumoto (1982) p. 295, pp. 297-298.

15 Matsumoto (1980) p. 112[35], p. 113[39], p. 114[42], p. 115[48].

16 Matsumoto (1981a) pp. 44-50, p. 40; [1981b], p. 46 below, p. 54 upper.

17 Matsumoto (1978) p. 129, pp. 130-131; [1980] p. 111 [32].

18 MSA xi. 50

svayaṁ svenātmanā 'bhāvāt svabhāve cānavasthiteḥ/
grāhavat tadabhāvāc ca niḥsvabhāvatvam iṣyate //

19 Ibid. xi.52

ādau tattve 'nyatve svalakṣaṇe svayam athānyathābhāve /
saṁkleśe 'tha viśeṣe kṣāntir anutpattidharmoktā //

20 Eckel [1987] p. 80.

According to Moriyama, PV (*svārtha*) k. 73, k. 82a, (*pratyakṣa*) k. 534ab are the target of criticism of k.14a of the SDVK, the causal relationship explained in the HB is the target of k. 14b, PV (*pratyakṣa*) 534cd, (*svārtha*) 83a are the targets of k. 14c, and PV (*pratyakṣa*) 534ab is the target of k. 14d. Then, 32 conversely criticizes k. 14 using Dharmakīrti's idea.

Moriyama [1990], further, identifies *pūrva-pakṣas* 4 and 5 with Dharmakīrti.

On the other hand, R. Matsushita [1987] pointed out that Vaibhāṣika views are included in the *pūrva-pakṣas*. The *pūrva-pakṣa* cites one verse from the LA III.35=X.135,[21] which runs:

> *Ātman* does not exist in the five groups (*skandhas*), the five groups do not exist in *ātman*. Neither do they [*skandhas*] exist as conceptualized, nor are they nothingness.

From this passage, the opponent considers the five groups to be existent, and maintains that the expression contradicts the Mādhyamika view that "All *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature". Then, it is not the Vijñānavādin but the Vaibhāṣika who holds that the *skandhas* are existent. The *pūrva-pakṣa* quotes the *Paramārthaśūnyatā sūtra* (=No. 355 of the Chinese *Saṁyuktāgama*), in which the following passage is found:[22]

> Karma and retribution (*vipāka*) exist, but the doer does not.

The opponent maintains that this expression is opposed to the Mādhyamika view, because when karma and retribution exist in reality, it does not follow that all *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature, and when they exist in conventional truth, the doer also exists. So, one cannot say, "the doer does not [exist]". In short, in this passage the *pūrva-pakṣa* holds in reality the existence of karma and retribution and the non-existence of the doer, while conventionally it upholds the existence of all three. But, in his *Vyākhyā-yukti*, Vasubandhu considers karma and retribution to be non-existent.[23] This means that Vasubandhu, the most representative of the Vijñāna-vādins, is opposed to the idea explained in the *pūrva-pakṣa*. So, this *pūrva-pakṣa* belongs rather to the Vaibhāṣika.

21 LA III.35=X.135
na hy ātmā vidyate skandhe skandhāś caiva hi nātmani /
na te yathā vikalpyante na ca te vai na santi ca //

22 Quoted in AKB p. 129,9.
asti karmāsti vipākaḥ kārakas tu nopalabhyate, corresponding to Chinese T. 355(II)92c18.

23 Yamaguchi (1973) p. 667.

This view of Matsushita's is reinforced by the following material. *Pūrva-pakṣa* 76 is almost the same as a passage appearing in the MAV, which runs:[24]

> How is it possible to gather the pure equipment of merit and wisdom in the system [of the Mādhyamika and the Vijñāna-vāda]? Even if [it is possible] by a gift which is pure with respect to the three points (*trimaṇḍalapariśuddhi*), it is still improper. Because (1) we can have faith not by non-acquisition of the gift, the giver and the receiver, but by making offerings and providing benefits [for others], (2) indeed, is it impossible for us to acquire the gift, etc., (a) because of the non-existence of all *dharmas* or (b) because of the non-objectivity of the gift, etc.? (a) If the former is the case, since it will not happen that someone gives someone something, there will be no merit, either. The effort made by bodhisattvas for the benefit and happiness of sentient beings will be meaningless because of the non-existence of sentient beings. (b) The Tathāgata sees the gift, the giver and the receiver. So, the reason, "non-objectivity of the gift, etc." cannot be established.

The idea in this passage is advocated by the Vaibhāṣika, which is pointed out by Kamalaśīla himself.[25]

Therefore, we can conclude that the *pūrva-pakṣas* contain theories not only of the Vijñāna-vāda but also of Dharmakīrti and the Vaibhāṣika.

(8) The Division of the Contents of the *Pūrva-pakṣa*

bsTan-dar analyzes the *pūrva-pakṣas* into 83 articles and divides them into 4 categories.

1. The theme, "All *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature" cannot be proved by Scripture (*āgama*). (MĀ.D.134a7, P.144a7: MĀS. f.527.3) **1-3**
2. The theme cannot be proved by Reasoning (*yukti*), either. (MĀ.D.134a7, P.144a7: MĀS. f. 527,3) **4-44**
3. The proposition of all *dharmas* having no intrinsic nature is contradictory to Scripture and Reasoning. (MĀ.D.139b4, P.150b4-5: MĀS.f.537,2-3) **45-78**
4. The teaching of one-vehicle is contradictory to Scripture and Reasoning. (MĀ.D.146a4-5, P.158a4-5: MĀS.f.552,1-2) **79-83**

In sum, the essence of the *pūrva-pakṣa* is that the thesis, "all *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature in reality", and the teaching of one-vehicle cannot be proved by Scripture and Reasoning, and that if they are admitted, they are contradictory to Scripture and Reasoning.

As mentioned above, only the first three *pūrva-pakṣas* and the *uttara-pakṣas* corresponding to them are explained in detail in the MĀS. But as for the remaining 80 articles, brief comments are given for the

24 Ichigō (1985) text p. 280, 3-14.
25 Ibid. p. 281,1.

pūrva-pakṣas but no explanation of the *uttara-pakṣas* is given, without mentioning any reason for this absence.

(9) Miscellaneous Useful Points Obtained from the MĀS

Despite the fact that the MĀS comments upon only the first three *uttara-pakṣas*, there are some reasons to point out why the MĀS is so voluminous. This is because (1) there are so many quotations from *sūtras* and *darśanas*, (2) the MĀS comments on the MĀ by quoting the root text paragraphy by paragraph, and (3) in addition to comments on the MĀ, extensive topics are discussed. For example, in the place where the second *pūrva-pakṣa* is explained is found a descriptive "history" of the Svātantrika Mādhyamika. That is, when the commentary mentions Śāntarakṣita's thought (ff. 686,1-701,4), it refers to the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika system by quoting many passages from the MA and the MAV, and moreover introduces the theories of the Sākāra-vāda (ff.693,5-698,5) and the Anirākāra-vāda of the Mādhyamika. When it mentions Bhāvaviveka's thought (ff.701,4-713,2), it refers to the difference between the ideas of Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita. Where the third *pūrva-pakṣa* is explained we find interpretations and comments on the PV (*pratyakṣa*) kk. 200-211 (ff.761,2-764,2), kk. 301-340, kk. 341-353, kk. 354-367 (ff. 765,2-801,2).

Sometimes unintelligible words in the sDe-dge and Peking editions of the MĀ are made clear by referring to the MĀS. For example, in the discussion of the definition of conventional truth, both editions of the MĀ give the expression: *mi rtag pa'i don kun rdzob kyi don yin no* (D. 141b1-2, P. 152b5-6). We can discern the meaning of *ma brtags* to be *ma dpyad pa'i don* by means of the MĀS's comment, although we could also have supposed this by checking the *uttara-pakṣa* which says *ma brtags pa, rtogs pa med pa* (D. 229b5, P.225b6-7).

These are only a few examples of the valuable knowledge to be obtained from the MĀS. Therefore, we can say that the MĀS is not only very helpful in understanding the MĀ, but also gives us a lot of valuable information about Mādhyamika philosophy in general.

B. Synopsis of the *Pūrva-pakṣa* of the MĀ

The method of dividing 83 articles into 4 categories cannot efface somewhat the impression that the articles are merely arranged in a row. I believe we can classify the *pūrva-pakṣas* together into detailed subdivisions as shown in the synopsis below.

There are some *uttara-pakṣas* which do not exactly correspond to the order of the *pūrva-pakṣas* and others for which explanations are missing.

The content of the *uttara-pakṣas* must be analysed in greater detail.[26] I will attempt to make a complete synopsis of the whole MĀ in the future, after the completion of my Japanese translation of the MĀ (in progress).

The numbers in bold type mark the *pūrva-pakṣas* indicated by bsTan-dar. The page references to the *pūrva-pakṣas* and the *uttara-pakṣas* in the sDe-dge and Peking editions are shown at the end of each point.

I. The thesis, "all *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature" cannot be proved by Scripture (*āgama*).
   (1) **1** The Scripture which teaches the thesis and its statement is not applicable to all people. (D.133b7, P.143b7; D.147b6, P.160al)
   (2) **2** Scriptures have various intentions
      (a) For example, the expression of the thesis found in the *Saṁdhinirmocana sūtra* means the non-intrinsic nature of "the three natures (*trisvabhāva*)". (D.134a2, P.144a1; D.149b6, P.162a8)
      (b) **3** The non-character of the imagined nature means the non-intrinsic nature of the appearance of the mind as "grasped and grasper". (D.134a5, P.144a6; D.165b6, P.180b4)

II. The thesis cannot be proved by Reasoning (*yukti*), either.
   (1) Perception (*pratyakṣa*) cannot realize the stillness of all *dharmas*.
      (i) **4** Perception of common people. (D.134a7, P.144a8; D.168al, P.183al)
      (ii) **5** Perception of the yogin. (D.134b4, P.144b5; D.170a5, P.185b5)
   (2) Inference (*anumāna*) cannot realize the stillness of all *dharmas*.
      (i) **6** Inference cannot prove the emptiness of all *dharmas*. (D.134b6, 144b7; D.171a2, P.186b3)
      (ii) **7** The Madhyamaka's own thesis cannot be proved by a logical mark which the opponent affirms. (D.134b7, P.144b8; D.175b7, P.192a6)
      (iii) **8** "The stillness of all *dharmas*" has no necessary relationship with any logical mark. (D.135a3, P.145a4; D.176al, P.192a8)

26 We have already some good, though partial, efforts in this direction. Kobayashi (1986) pp. 20-21, (1989) p. 92; Matsumoto (1981a) p. 54 n(28).

(iv) **9** The thesis can be proved neither by the logical mark of essential identity (*svabhāvahetu*) nor by the logical mark as effect (*kāryahetu*). (D.135a4, P.145a6; D.176a5, P.192b5)

(v) **10** The thesis cannot be proved by the logical mark of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). (D.135a6, P.145a8; D.177a2, P.193b3)

(a) the non-cognition of an entity itself (*svabhāvānupalabdhi*)

(b) **11** perception of something incompatible with the presence [of what is to be negated] (*svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*)

(c) **12** perception of what is pervaded by something incompatible with the existence [of what is to be negated] (*svabhāvaviruddhavyāptopalabdhi*) (D. 135b7, P.146a5)

(d) **13** non-cognition of a pervader (*vyāpakānupalabdhi*) (D.136al, P.146a5; D.178a5, P.195al)

(e) **14** non-cognition of a cause (*kāraṇānupalabdhi*) (D. 136a2, P.146a7; D.178b2, P.195a6)

(3) The thesis cannot be proved by means other than Scripture and Reasoning.

(i) **15** There is no single, absolute reason which proves the thesis. (D.136a3, P.146a8)

(ii) **16** Even the negation of Īśvara (=single reason) is not conducive to proving the thesis (D.136a4, P.146b1)

(4) On non-self (*anātman*) (instead of non-intrinsic nature)

(i) **17** The proof of non-self of all *dharmas* is impossible, because of the absence of an example. (D.136a5, P.146b3)

(ii) The proof of non-self of partial *dharmas* is impossible, too.

(a) **18** negation of primordial matter (*pradhāna*). (D.136a6, P.146b4)

(b) **19** negation of body (*rūpa*). (D.136a7, P.146b5)

(5) **20** Both perception and inference are not non-intrinsic. (D.136a7, P.146b6; D.179a3, P.195b8)

(6) On the reality or non-reality of the logical mark.

(i) **21** In the case of the reality of the logical mark. (D.136b3, P.147a1; D.180a7, P.197a6)

(ii) **22** In the case of the non-reality of the logical mark. (D.136b4, P.147a3; D.180b1, P.197a7)

(iii)**23** In the case that the logical mark has both aspects. (D.136b4, P.147a3; D.180b2, P.197a8)

(7) The thesis cannot be proved by valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) other than perception and inference.

(i) **24** not proved by the statement itself. (D.136b4, P.147a4; D.181a5, P.198a5)

(ii) **25** not proved by the *prasaṅga* method. (D.136b5, P.147a5)

(8) The refutation of reasonings proving non-intrinsic nature.

(i) (a) **26** In the "diamond-splinters" reason (*vajrakaṇahetu*), the negation of "arising from something else" is unreasonable. (D.136b7, P.147a6; D.190a2, P.208a5)

(b) **27** The logical mark "because of something else" presented by Bhāvaviveka to affirm the negation of "arising from something else" has the fallacy of an inconclusive logical mark (*anaikāntika*). (D.137a7, P.147b8; D.198a6, P.218a4)

(c) **28** When the effect arises from the cause in succession, the effect and the cause do not exist simultaneously. (D.137b1, P148a3; D.195b1, P.214b3)

(ii) In the discussion of making the reason refuting production of existence or non-existence (*sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*) unreasonable

(a) **29** the question of the proof which negates the theory of the pre-existence of an effect in its cause. (D.137b5, P.148a8; D.202b3, P.223a8)

(b) **30** The defence of the theory of non-existence of an effect in its cause. (D.137b7, P.148b2; D.203a2, P.223b7)

(iii) **31** Why isn't production in conventional truth refuted? (D.138a2, P.148b5; D.206b2, P.228a2)

(iv) **32** The defect of the negation of the reason which refutes production according to the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭyutpāda-pratiṣedhahetu*). (D.138a4, P.148b7; D.210b3, P.232b4)

(v) (a) **33** The proof based on the reason from dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpādahetu*) has the fallacy of an inconclusive logical mark. (D.138b3, P.149a7; D.215a7; P.238a6)

(b) **34** Nothing in reality does not exist in conventional truth, either. (D.138b4, P.149b2; D.215a7; P.238a7)

(vi)(a) **35** The "neither one nor many" reason (*ekānekaviyogahetu*) has the fallacies of a logical mark whose locus is unreal (*āśrayāsiddha*) and an inconclusive logical mark (*anaikāntika*). (D.138b6, P.149b4; D.215b1, P.238a8)

(b) **36** The relationship between what is to be proved and the proof has a fallacy, whether the relation is one of non-implicative absolute negation or of implicative relative negation. In the former negation, there will be no

relationship between what makes understood and what is understood. Because, (D.139a1, P.149b7; D.219b1, P.243a4)

a. **37** they are devoid of all language. (D.139a3, P.150a1; D.219b2, P.243a5)

b. **38** they have no relationship to each other. (D.139a4, P.150a3; D.219b3, P.243a7)

39 There is no relationship of essential identity. (D.139a5, P.150a4)

c. **40** They are not different, either. (D.139a5, P.150a5; D.219b4, P.243a8)

41 There is no difference between them caused by concomitance in difference (*vyatireka*). (D.139a7, P.150a7; D.221a4, P.245a8)

(c) **42** The "neither one nor many" reason is incompatible. (D.139a7, P.150a7; D.221b6, P.246a1)

(vii) Conclusion

(a) **43** These above-mentioned five reasonings cannot prove the thesis. (D.139b1, P.150b1; D.222b1, P.246b4)

(b) **44** It is a contradiction to admit the yogin's knowledge in conventional truth on the one hand, while maintaining non-intrinsic nature in reality on the other hand. (D.139b3, P.150b3; D.223a7, P.247b7)

III. The proposition that all *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature is contradictory to Scripture and Reasoning.

(1) Contradiction to Reasoning

(i) **45** Contradiction to perception. (D.139b4, P.150b4; D.224a4, P.248b5)

(ii) **46** Refutation by inference. (D.139b5, P.150b6; D.224b3, P.249a7)

(2) Contradiction to Scripture --- [1]

(i) **47** The reality of the *Trāyastriṁśa* which is totally imperceptible is proved by Buddha's knowledge and Scripture. (D.139b7, P.150b8; D.224b7, P.249b3)

(ii) **48** The Blessed One said that entities co-arise dependently because of the existence of intrinsic nature. (D.140a2, P.151a2)

(iii) **49** Contradiction with the Buddha's teaching that a good effect results from good karma and a bad effect results from bad karma. (D.140a3, P.151a4)

(iv) **50** Negation of defilement (*saṁkleśa*). (D.140a4, P.151a5)

(v) **51** Negation of purification (*vyavadāna*). (D.140a4, P.151a6)
(vi)**52** Negation of the four noble truths. (D.140a6, P.151b1; D.225b6, P.250b5)

(3) **53** The opposition to what is established in worldly consensus (*lokaprasiddha*). (D.140a7, P.151b1; D.226a3, P.251a3)

(4) **54** The fallacy of a self-contradicting argument (*svavacanavirodha*). (D.140b1, P.151b2; D.226a5, P.251a6)

(5) Contradiction with Scripture which refers to Reasoning ---[2]

(i) Non-intrinsic nature is opposed to Reasoning.

(a) **55** Existence of blue, etc. is understood by perception. (D.140b1, P.151b3; D.226b1, P.251b2)

(b) **56** Existence of entities is proved by inference. (D.140b3, P.151b5; D.227a1, P.252a4)

57 Existence of fire, etc. is grasped by a logical mark as effect. (D.140b5, P.151b8; D227b4, P.253a3)

(ii) Non-production is opposed to Ābhidhārmika doctrine.

(a) **58** The opposition to the theory of six causes and four conditions. (D.140b6, P.152a1; D.228a2, P.253b2)

(b) **59** all dharmas of *skandhas, dhātus* and *āyatanas* are not non-production, but what co-arises dependently. (D.140b7, P.152a3; D.228a2, P.253b3)

60 No *dharma* other than *skandhas*, etc.. (D.141a1, P.152a4; D.228a5, P.253b7)

(6) On the two-truth theory.

(i) **61** The meaning of existence in conventional truth--different from the existence of the horn of a hare. (D.141a2, P.152a5; D.228a6, P.253b8)

(ii) Definitions of conventional truth.

(a) **62** not total nothingness. (D.141a5, P.152a8; D.228a6, P.254a1)

(b) **63** not characterized by existence, by both existence and non-existence, and by neither existence nor non-existence. (D.141a6, P.152b2; D.229a7, P.255a7)

(c) **64** non-investigation. (D.141b1, P.152b5; D.229b5, P.255b6)

(d) **65** not what is established in worldly consensus. (D.141b4, P.152b8; D.230a2, P.256a5)

(e) **66** not illusion. (D.141b6, P.153a3; D.230a6, P.256b3)

(f) **67** not a mere word itself. (D.141b7, P.153a5; D.230b3, P.257a1)

(g) **68** not the object expressed by a word. (D.142a1, P.153a6; D.231b2, P.258a3)

(h) **69** the explanation that conventional truth is unstable, and that the highest truth is permanent, is nothing but a proof of what is already evident. (D.142a5, P.153b4; D.232a6, P.259a3)

(i) **70** not what is not true. (D.142a7, P.153b6; D.232b2, P.259a7)

(j) **71** not neither valid knowledge nor invalid knowledge. (D.142b1, P.153b8; D.232b6, P.259b5)

(iii) A ground of conventional truth = mind (*vijñāna*).

(a) **72** Mind exists in reality. (D.142b2, P.154a1; D.233a2, P.260a2)

(b) **73** It is impossible to discern the two-truths by means of admitting the existence of mind. (D.142b3, P.154a2; D.233a6, P.260a7)

(iv) On the highest truth.

74 The highest truth is not what is trivial. (D.142b4, P.154a4; D.233b1, P.260b1)

(v) **75** The relationship between the highest truth and conventional truth is neither oneness nor difference. (D.142b7, P.154a7; D.234a3, P.261a7)

(7) **76** It is impossible to gather the pure equipment of merit and wisdom by the theory of *all dharmas* having no intrinsic nature. (D.143a3, P.154b2; D.234b7, P.262b1)

(8) **77** The meaning of the proposition of *all dharmas* having no intrinsic nature. (D143a7, P.154b8; D.235a4, P.264a4)

(9) **78** The meaning of the proposition of non-production of *all dharmas*. (D.143b6, P.155a8; D.236b5, P.265a1)

(10) Contradiction with Scripture ---[3] (D.144a6, P.156a2; D.237a4, P.265b2)

IV. The teaching of the one-vehicle is contradictory to Reasoning and Scripture.

(1) (i) **79** Contradiction with Reasoning. (D.146a4, P.158a4; D.237a4, P.265b3)

(ii) **80** Contradiction with Scripture. (D.146b4, P.158b4; D.237b4, P.266a6)

(2) The expression of the one vehicle has various intentions.

(i) **81** The one vehicle preached in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra* intends equality. (D.146b6, P.158b7; D.238b2, P.267a7)
(ii) It also intends to attract the undetermined *gotra* of Śrāvakas and to maintain the undetermined *gotra* of Bodhisattvas.
(iii)**82** The intention that only a Bodhisattva is able to become a Buddha. (D.147b6, P.159a8; D.239b7, P.269a4)
(iv)**83** The intention of the prophecy that even Śrāvakas can attain enlightenment, which is taught in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra*. (D.147b2, P.159b4; D.241a4, P.270b7)
(v) The intention taught in the *Samādhirāja sūtra*. (D.147b3, P.159b6; D.242b1, P.272b3)
(vi) The intention taught in the *Tathāgatagarbha sūtra*. (D.147b4, P.159b7; D.242b4, P.272b8)

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D = Derge edition. Tibetan Tripiṭaka, *sDe dge* edition, *bsTan 'gyur*, preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo, Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai. dBu ma 1977-79.

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f = folio

GTCM = Grub mtha 'i rnam bśad raṅ gźan grub mtha' kun daṅ zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzaṅ źiṅ gi ñi ma luṅ rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu'i re ba kun skoṅs, written in 1699. The Collected Works of 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa 'i rdo-rje, vol. 14. New Delhi 1973.

HB = *Hetubindu* of Dharmakīrti.

IBK = *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū*.

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LA = *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. Ed. P.L. Vaidya. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 3. Darbhanga 1963.

MA = *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* of Śāntarakṣita, Edited in Ichigō (1985).

MĀ = *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla.

MAP = *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. Edited in Ichigō (1985).

MĀS = *dBu ma snaṅ ba 'i brjed tho* of bsTan-dar. Contained in Śatapiṭaka śeries No. 291.

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MAV = *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* of Śāntarakṣita, Edited in Ichigō (1985).

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MSA = *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* edited by S. Lévi: *Exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule selon le système Yogācāra*, édité et traduit, tome 1.

P = Peking edition, edited by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki. The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking edition. Reprinted under the supervision of the Otani University. Kyoto 168 vols. Tokyo and Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute. 1955-61.

PV = *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti

SDV = *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā* of Jñānagarbha.

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