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hat. Ist er zuerst hart und fürchtet sich dann vor der Truppe, so bedeutet das, daß er von der Kriegskunst nichts versteht.

Befinden sich die Soldaten in Todesgefahr, so fürchten sie nichts; gibt es kein Entrinnen, dann sind sie tapfer; dringen sie tief in feindliches Land ein, so hält sie nichts auf; gibt es keine Rettung, so kämpfen sie todesmutig.

Sorge für das Wohlergehen deiner Soldaten, ermüde sie nicht, stärke ihren Mut und ihre Kraft.

Sorgst du dich um die Soldaten wie um deine Kinder, so kannst du dich mit ihnen auch in die tiefsten Schluchten wagen; behandelst du sie wie deine geliebten Söhne, so werden sie dir sogar in den Tod folgen; bist du gut zu ihnen, verstehst es aber nicht, ihnen zu befehlen, dann entsteht Unordnung; das bedeutet, daß du ungehorsame Kinder hast; sie einzusetzen wird unmöglich sein.

Sun Tsu über die Strategie und Taktik

Kennst du den Gegner und kennst du dich, so magst du hundert Schlachten schlagen, ohne eine Gefahr zu fürchten; kennst du ihn, aber nicht dich selbst, so wirst du auch Niederlagen erleiden; kennst du weder dich noch ihn, so wirst du in jeder Schlacht geschlagen werden.

Man soll sich nie darauf verlassen, daß der Gegner nicht herankommen wird, sondern in steter Bereitschaft sein, ihn zu empfangen. Ebenfalls soll man sich nie darauf verlassen, daß er nicht angreifen wird, sondern alles vorbereiten, daß für ihn ein Angriff auf uns unmöglich wird.

Wer schon vor der Schlacht durch seine Überlegungen siegt, hat viele Chancen für den Sieg.

Wer gut kämpft, der lenkt den Gegner und läßt sich nicht von ihm lenken.

Ein kluger Feldherr verpflegt sich unbedingt auf Kosten des Gegners. Werden im Kampf gegnerische Streitwagen erobert, so wechsle die Fahnen auf den eroberten Wagen durch eigene aus und setze die Wagen zusammen mit den eigenen ein.

Wie soll ich einem Gegner begegnen, der mit starken Kräften und in voller Gefechtsordnung auftritt? Ich antworte: «Raub, was ihm teuer ist; hast du es in Besitz genommen, so wird er sich dir unterwerfen.»

Die Hauptsache im Krieg ist die Schnelligkeit. Nimm das in Besitz, was der Gegner noch nicht erreichen konnte; benütze Wege, an die der Gegner nicht einmal denkt; greife dort an, wo er es nicht vermutet.

Besitzt die Armee keinen Troß, so geht sie zugrunde; sind Proviant und Fourage ausgegangen, geht sie zugrunde; sind keine Vorräte vorhanden, geht sie zugrunde.

Sun Tsu über Spionage und Subversion

Die Tätigkeit der Spione ist von allergrößter Wichtigkeit; sie bildet die Voraussetzung für den richtigen Einsatz der Armee. Bei keinen Unternehmen darfst du auf den Dienst deiner Spione verzichten.

Es werden 5 Arten von Spionen verwendet: die ortsansässigen Spione, die inneren Spione, die zurückkehrenden Spione, die Spione des Todes und des Lebens. Ortsansässige Spione werden aus der Bevölkerung des feindlichen Landes ausgewählt, innere Spione aus den Reihen der gegnerischen Offiziere erworben, zurückkehrende Spione aus den Spionen des Gegners. Spione des Todes überbringen dem Gegner irreführende Nachrichten, Spione des Lebens kehren mit Nachrichten vom Gegner zurück.

Der Krieg ist ein Weg der Täuschung. Zeige dem Feind dich so, als ob du etwas nicht tun könntest obwohl du es kannst;

tue so, als ob du etwas nicht ausnutzen könntest, obwohl du es kannst; bist du nahe, tue als ob du ferne seiest; bist du ferne, tue als ob du nahe seiest; locke den Gegner durch einen Vorteil an; trage Verwirrung in seine Reihen und packe ihn; besitzt er alles in ausreichendem Maße, sei gerüstet; ist er stärker als du, weiche ihm aus; ist der Feind in Wut geraten, so bringe ihn in Verwirrung; stellst du dich ergeben, dann rufst du bei ihm Selbstzufriedenheit hervor; verfügt der Gegner über frische Kräfte, so ermüde ihn; sind seine Kräfte einig, so zersetze sie; überfalle ihn, wo er nicht in Bereitschaft ist; erscheine dort, wo er dich nicht erwartet.

Die höchste Kriegskunst besteht darin, die Pläne des Gegners zu vereiteln, dann seine Bündnisse aufzubrechen, des weitern sein Heer zu vernichten.

Wer es versteht, Krieg zu führen, bezwingt fremde Heere ohne zu kämpfen, nimmt fremde Befestigungen, ohne sie zu belagern, und zerschlägt ein fremdes Reich ohne langwierige Feldzüge. Man kann also Vorteile erringen, ohne die Waffen zu gebrauchen, und zwar durch den Angriff mittels Kriegslist.

Die höchste Kunst besteht darin, den Widerstand des Feindes ohne Kampf auf dem Schlachtfeld zu brechen. Nur auf dem Schlachtfeld ist die direkte Methode des Krieges notwendig; nur die indirekte kann aber einen wirklichen Sieg herbeiführen und festigen. Zersetzt alles, was im Lande des Gegners gut ist. Verwickelt die Vertreter der herrschenden Schichten in verbrecherische Unternehmungen. Unterhöhlt auch sonst ihre Stellungen und ihr Ansehen. Gebt sie der öffentlichen Schande vor ihren Mitbürgern preis. Nutzt die Arbeit der niedrigsten und abscheulichsten Menschen. Stört mit allen Mitteln die Tätigkeiten der Regierungen. Verbreitet Uneinigkeit und Streit unter den Bürgern des feindlichen Landes. Fördert die Jungen gegen die Alten. Zerstört mit allen Mitteln die Ausrüstungen, die Versorgung und die Ordnung der feindlichen Streitkräfte. Entwertet alle Überlieferungen und Götter. Seid großzügig mit Angeboten und Geschenken, um Nachrichten und Komplizen zu kaufen. Bringt überall geheime Kundschafter unter. Spart überhaupt weder mit Geld noch mit Versprechungen, denn es bringt hohe Zinsen ein.

The Draft Has Ended — America's New Volunteer Army

Col. Norman L. Dodd Retd.

It was as far back as October 1968 that the President said: "I say it's time we took a new look at the draft — at the question of permanent conscription in a free society. If we find we can reasonably meet our peacetime manpower needs by other means — then we should prepare for the day when the draft can be phased out of American life." At that time a variety of student and other deferments had undermined confidence in the fairness of the draft system. From the age of nineteen to twenty six young men had to face the uncertainty of an unfair draft system which selected a few amongst the many liable for service. This made the planning of their lives very difficult. The chance of being drafted varied considerably from State to State and by the man's economic status. Many young men entered college to avoid the draft, those who could not afford to do this felt

unfairly treated. Others joined the National Guard or Reserve and so became ineligible for conscription.

The uncertainty was reduced in 1969 when the period of liability was set as one calendar year starting from the 19th birthday. Some of the unfairness was removed in 1970 when occupational and paternity deferments were cancelled. In September 1971 undergraduate deferments were eliminated and a uniform national system of call up instituted.

The Military Project Volunteer Committee appointed by Mr. Laird placed stress on the need to retain members of the career force and to preserve the strength of the National Guard and Reserve Components. They disagreed, however, in the timing of the ending of the draft, the Gates Commission wanted June 30th 1971. This, they considered, was impracticable and recommended July 1st 1973 as the target date. The President accepted their recommendation.

Even the 1973 target provided many difficulties. If the required 2.3 million active duty members of the four armed forces were to be found the most radical changes would have to be made to ensure that the project was successful. And for the safety of the Free World successful it would have to be.

The Army, had, and still has, the largest problem. Service in the ground combat units is never as popular as in the Navy and Air Force and it is not as glamorous as in the US Marine Corps. This problem was quickly recognised by the Army Chief of Staff. With typical American drive many organisations, associations and retired "soldiers Generals" were enlisted in the search for new methods which would attract and retain the 20,000 recruits per month and the estimated 19,000 officers per year required to fill the establishment.

Teams of senior officers and civilians were despatched to the UK to examine the methods used to recruit and train Britain's professional Army and senior officers were asked to comment on The Gates Commission Report. One of the latter, General Bruce C. Clarke Retd., America's recognised expert in man management and command, quickly pointed out that the Report did not adequately define "combat troops" who, because of their closeness to the enemy and on the whole more arduous tasks, needed special consideration to attract recruits. He, and others, stressed that pay does not cover the field; morale and prestige are much more important they said, the Report lacked a proper realisation of this fact. General Clarke and the officers who visited Britain were impressed with the morale and cohesion of the Regiments and Battalions of the British Army inculcated over the years through a highly developed Regimental Spirit, intangible yet vital for efficiency.

After consideration of the various reports General W. C. Westmoreland, then the Army Chief of Staff, produced his Directive. The objective is simple:

"To expedite the development of a capably led, highly competent fighting force which attracts motivated, qualified volunteers."

The measures designed to build such an Army are divided into two related but distinct categories; the first and most important is declared to be "Strengthening Professionalism - to build positive incentives to serve". This, the Chief of Staff is convinced, is the real attraction of soldiering and the source of motivation and pride which will sustain efficient soldiering. The second category is measures to "Improve Army Life - to reduce the sources of dissatisfaction!" This means trying to remove the irritants and aggravations which are deterrents to service and detract from the environment in which the military man and his family live.



'Soldiers must have initiative, be well trained and well motivated' US troops on exercises in the winter.

The first steps on the road to professionalism are designed to get soldiers back to soldiering by releasing them to the largest possible extent from ancillary non-military duties. Cookhouse fatigues, barrack cleaning, grass cutting, vehicle maintenance, rubbish collection and un-necessary guard duties. Such duties detract from unit efficiency and seriously effect morale of the men employed. Military Posts where the experimental VOLAR scheme is in operation were directed to switch their budgets, and were given extra funds to hire civilians for these duties and encouraged to buy modern labour saving equipments - mowers, leaf removers, hydraulic bucket lorries etc. All non-military and administrative jobs were critically examined to see if they were essential, for many had grown up over the years and had become traditional chores; "KP fatigues" etc. The soldiers must be with their own officers and NCOs on military training; not washing floors. The training itself must be interesting, challenging and in the hands of the unit officers and NCOs. It was here that the HumRRO report was valuable for much in post training had become routine, boring and in-essential to the men's requirements. Training in the field had become too stereotyped, head-quarter controlled and carried out according to a "check list" in order to complete the many training records and documents subject to inspection. Working with the Operations and Training Branch at the large post at Fort Ord HumRRO developed the seven EVATP principles:

- Performance Oriented Instruction.
- Learning in a Functional Context.
- Self Pacing in the Learning Process.
- An Insistence on Mastery.
- Feedback to Both Student and Instructor.
- Strict Quality Control.

This teaching process is entirely performance oriented and is designed to let the man learn by handling equipments or carrying out military skills from very beginning. The student then carries on at his own pace, the instructor ensuring that at the end he has reached the necessary standard. The emphasis is on each individual learning those specific skills and knowledges that he will actually need to perform his task under working conditions. Priority is given to essentials relegating fringe information to supplementary instruction periods. The objective of each instruction is specific and therefore each student has a goal to

aim for. No instruction should be given in a vacuum, all skills should be taught in a way which shows their application to the main task. Throughout the instruction the recruit or student and the instructor must exchange views on the efficiency of the methods used and try to improve them; tests are held periodically to be sure that the instruction is "getting through" and a proficiency test is held at the completion of the training. If the man fails he is held back for further instruction in the appropriate skill.

To an outside observer of the US Army over a number of years the most significant change of emphasis is that in unit and field training. Although lip service was paid to the importance of the platoon company and battalion commanders, due to the rapid turnover, their early promotion at least to captain and the heavy control from above they were rarely allowed to make much mark on their units or use much initiative in their training methods. The VOLAR concept alters this; "If", says General Westmoreland, "there is wisdom in the way the Army is structured, then the unit commander – the commander at company and battalion level – is in the best position to judge which things, in fact, are those which demand attention". From 30th June 1971 the policy of specifying certain training subject as mandatory was discontinued.

Commanders are urged to issue mission type training instructions and to evaluate the efficiency of units by periodic exercises and tests and not by the number of hours of instruction which the unit or men have undergone. The pointless boards which hung in most company commanders' offices showing on a check list that EM Bloggs had sat through a lecture on gas or compass or hygiene – not that he was qualified – could disappear! To assist the unit commanders Maintenance Assistance and Instruc-


tion Teams have been organised to replace the somewhat feared Maintenance Management Inspection Teams. The new teams are there to help and not to render frightening Inspection Reports; their advice is only to the unit CO and no "score" is sent to higher HQ. However the bigstick remains in that if the unit fails to follow reasonable advice offered then the higher level commander can order an official inspection.

The new training and leadership methods require efficient and competent officers and NCOs. A Leadership Board has been in operation at Fort Bragg since 1971 and has taken a lead in the modernization of instruction on leadership in officer and NCO schools. Leadership Teams are visiting all Army installations to disseminate ideas and help commanders, officers and NCOs.

An education programme for NCOs has been instituted to further their professional development throughout their careers and the Office of Personnel Operations is centralizing promotions for senior grades and an Efficiency Reporting System is being implemented. The NCO status in the US Forces has suffered badly due to the plethora of sergeants of all grades. Except in the Military Police there are no corporals in the US Army, the first promotion is virtually to sergeant. The new NCO therefore has no time to learn before he is classed as a sergeant. There is no WO and Sergeant Mess; WOs use the Officers Club and are neither "fish nor foul or good red herring" having little "social status", and the Sergeants only have the "NCOs Club" which includes even junior specialists who grade as NCOs. To raise the status of the Senior NCOs is a severe problem.

Efforts are being made to stabilise the command appointments. Brigade and battalion tours are now eighteen months and company command tours a minimum of twelve months. Still too

² Mobility is a requirement for the modern army. Troop carrying aircraft of the USAF.



short for a Regular Army but an improvement on the past when tours seemed to be but a few months. This stabilization is now being extended to NCO ranks, especially to 1st Sergeants. So far the US Army does not appear to have decided to rotate units as a whole as does the British Army or to enlist them on a regional or functional basis. Two important requirements for stability, efficiency and high morale.

New training methods and better professionalism may in the end improve recruiting and improve the re-enlistment rate they will not bring in the many recruits needed immediately.

For this reason the Army is introducing many innovations to improve the conditions of a soldier's life and making sure that these are known throughout the United States by a high pressure advertising campaign in the Press, Radio and TV.

The Recruiting Organisation has been re-vamped for it had become little more than a registration service. A drive to find high class NCOs was started and a series of five weeks Army Recruiter and Career Counsellor Courses are run at the School at Fort Harrison, Indiana. A total of 7000 recruiters are spread over the country and one hundred and five new Recruiting Stations were opened in 1971 and a further 533 in 1972; money has been provided to give these a more congenial atmosphere. Units have been urged to provide part time recruiters from satisfied soldiers and to take part in local and community affairs particularly at schools and junior colleges. For, as General Clarke pointed out in an address to the students at Fort Harrison, it is mainly from these schools that the regular recruits must be drawn. Though the Army does not want the drop outs and ne'er do wells neither do they want all university graduates, somebody must fill the ranks with ordinary reasonably educated men and women. These should come from amongst those who have had a college or school education but do not intend to go to University. These young people can be offered a worthwhile and well paid job with the promise of further education while serving to fit themselves for satisfactory work in civilian life also. The United States Services deprive themselves of many future NCOs and tradesmen by not following the British concept of Junior Leaders and Apprentices Regiments and Junior Battalions for youths who have not reached adult service. They therefore face a gap from when the boy leaves school until he is old enough to enlist as an adult soldier. There do not appear to be any proposals to form such units which are apparently thought of as "un-American"!

It was recognised early in the programme that something immediate and special had to be offered to young men who are probably already in civilian employment to persuade them to sign on. It was here that money can talk; the "first term" men had received no increase of pay between 1952 and 1964 and even after that it was minimal. Other pay rises had been across the board for all arms and services making no distinction between combat and other arms. On November 14th 1971 the rate for a first term man was jumped from \$ 149 a month to \$ 321 and this was followed by a cost of living allowance in 1972. The next move was to institute a system of "focused pay"; this is the use of a flexible arrangement whereby special pay augmentations and reenlistment bonuses can be paid to soldiers serving in important though not particularly attractive fields - usually the combat arms such as the infantry, armour etc. This extra pay recognises the arduous life in these arms and compensates the soldier for their discomfort and maybe danger.

The bonus for enlistment into the combat arms used in the test programme was \$ 1,500, about £ 600 and this seemed to be successful; before the bonus scheme about 3,000 a month joined

these arms but after its introduction the figure went to 5,400. The bonus is tied to a four year enlistment rather than two or three without it and such engagements are more economical from the training and retention point of view.

To encourage the feeling of independence and freedom of choice the recruit is now being offered a chance to select his location or unit of service; these ideas, though reasonably normal in the British Army, are innovations in the States and are proving attractive. They may be difficult to carry out in practice and it is envisaged that options will be limited by availability of vacancies. To attract young leaders Congress has been asked to authorise scholarships for ROTC candidates up to 10% of the total officer strength and to pay a subsistence allowance to them of \$ 100 a month. Enormous bounties are being offered freely. Up to \$ 17,000 a year are suggested as the bonus for a medical officer - a medical Colonel will draw more than a four star general!

The proposals and experiments in improving army life follow the expected lines; better barracks with more trust in the good sense of the soldier. No lights out, signing out, minimum barrack inspections, alcohol allowed in barrack day rooms to bring the single man into line with his comrade in married quarters, cafeteria service with various kinds of "restaurants" in barracks, and purchase of materials to allow soldiers to decorate their rooms as they wish. There is no doubt that some of the measures to improve the single men's barracks were very overdue, often due to lack of funds because of the Vietnamese War, but also because, to the outsider at least, priority always seemed to go to the married officers and soldiers. Many of the US barrack rooms and single officers quarters which I have visited would not be acceptable to the British Army to-day.

The plans for improving on post facilities are gigantic and cover all facets of life; the Health Centres, Post Exchanges, laundries, QM sales stores, clubs, hobby shops, sports all to be greatly improved and more "customer oriented" by their opening hours and service. Free bus services to be provided from barracks and housing to all points of the post. "The Army Post", says the Directive, "represents the soldier's special community, and its quality is a reflection on how the Army cares for its people." Because of this 20% of the total budget for the VOLAR concept is allocated to improving Post Services including medical care and education.

The "attitude of mind" is constantly stressed in the various documents concerned with the Modern Volunteer Army proposals. This can be seen in action at Fort Carson in Colorado which was chosen to carry out tests on the new treatment of soldiers. It is the home of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanised) and this formation has entered wholeheartedly into the spirit of the experiments. Strange new words to the British ear have been coined "customer satisfaction", "think new", and "the high care factor" can be heard around the Post. Serious efforts are being made to see what the soldier wants, to provide as much as possible and then to see if their well being, training, morale and discipline are in fact improved and the retention rate increased.

The methods of instruction have been aligned with the new concepts of participation throughout and the training has been greatly and successfully de-centralised. In barracks an Enlisted Man's Council headed by a specialist fourth class meets with senior officers including the Commanding General and discusses in Post matters. There is a Racial Harmony Council and the General has a special assistant who is an enlisted man. The Inspector General's office, traditionally staffed by officers to whom

most soldiers did not feel able to approach direct, now has three enlisted assistants and they discuss all manner of problems with soldiers who drop in to see them. An "all ranks coffee house", the Inscape, is doing business and officers and EM hold discussion sessions.

Barracks have been much improved, feeding arrangements include pizza parlours and "short order" cafes where soldiers may eat their meals instead of in the mess halls. All single mens' barracks are equipped with telephones and calls within the Post and local area are free. Sports facilities have been built and even sixty horses provided for the use by the soldiers in "range riding".

Does it work? So far it is too early for a conclusive answer but most officers taking part in the experiments believe it does – but with the important proviso that high standards of training and military behaviour must be demanded. It is feared by many that some of the innovations appear to be over permissive and will lead to laxity. It may suit the American mentality of democracy and independence of mind but the officers and NCOs will have to be of very high quality if their authority is not to be undermined by EM Councils etc. However the decentralisation of training must be a breath of fresh air to many young leaders! A similar decentralisation is required in the US staff system which allows no initiative or authority to junior (Grade 1 and 2) staff officers to sign for their Commander! This is being examined at present.

The Reserve Components are not being neglected for it is realised that an all regular army must be backed up by efficient and ready reserve formations. Too often in the past the National Guard and the Reserve have had no specific mobilisation task and therefore little real direction. They had also become a haven for young men who wished to avoid the draft and, as the draft was reduced so was the enlistment rate until in 1972 they were 49,000 below the mandatory requirement of 972,000.

To improve the situation reserve units and formations will be given clear mobilisation tasks and their training and equipment orientated to these tasks.

The new Army Chief of Staff, General Creighton W. Abrams, is an excellent choice to put these many innovations into practice. He is a magnificent leader who commands the respect of the whole Army. He has seen service in World War II, Korea and Vietnam and has gained the reputation of "Planning deliberately and executing violently, a true soldiers General". However even he will have serious problems unless Congress votes the truly vast funds needed for training, the backlog of maintenance and the promised improvements to living conditions. The cost of the 1973 programme alone is \$ 2,7 Billion and is expected to rise in future years. The Services appear to be convinced that the President and Congress are so in agreement that conscription must not be re-introduced that they will provide this amount. A proportion of it will be spent in Germany which must aggravate the already serious balance of payments problem and, in its turn will increase the pressure for the return home of their troops in Europe.

But money alone will not solve the problem of numbers. The Army can do its best but enlistment is a personal matter. When a young man signs on to serve his country he must know that he will receive strong support from congressmen, senators, teachers, the press and TV, clergy, his family and his neighbours. This they will only give if the Army is seen to be a highly professional outfit doing a worthwhile job. The ending of the unpopular Vietnam War has provided the US Army with a real opportunity of making a new start in forming a tight knit Modern Volunteer Army.

Kritik und Anregung

Militärpsychiatrisches

Kürzlich war ich im Wiederholungskurs erstmals fachärztlich-psychiatrisch eingesetzt. Ich konnte von Schulärzten der Rekrutenschule kurzfristig angefordert werden, wenn der Waffenplatzarzt überlastet oder abwesend war. Die Schulen, in denen ich zu tun hatte, liefen seit 2 bis 5 Wochen.

Da ich in der zivilen Praxis rein psychotherapeutisch tätig bin, war mir die Tätigkeit ungewohnt. Ich hatte nach möglichst kurzer Untersuchung eine Beurteilung zu treffen, welche sehr direkte, für den Betroffenen schwerwiegende Folgen hatte. Der Untersuchte war in der Regel *nicht* mein Auftraggeber. Ich meine, ich konnte durch diese Ungewohntheit manches bemerkenswert finden, was durch Routine gewöhnlich wäre. Außerdem sah ich eine Problematik, die heute politisch sehr drängt, aus den verschiedenen Gesichtswinkeln der Rekruten, der Berufs- und Milizkader und der militärischen Dienststelle.

Ich gehe von folgenden Voraussetzungen aus:

1. Psychische Gesundheit kann nicht objektiv festgestellt werden. Außerdem wird militärisch nicht nach psychischer Gesundheit gefragt, sondern nach der Fähigkeit zur Ein- und Unter- und eventuell Überordnung und zur Ausführung derjenigen Tätigkeiten, die von einem Soldaten verlangt werden.

2. Psychiatrisch kann eine Prognose hinsichtlich Kriegstauglichkeit im Einzelfall so gut wie nicht gestellt werden.

3. Die Begriffe RS-tauglich, WK-tauglich, kriegstauglich decken sich nicht.

4. Natürlich gibt es Fälle von eindeutig mangelnder psychischer Eignung. Die Mehrzahl der in der Rekrutenschule zu Beurteilenden gehören aber in das Grenzgebiet, wo charakterliche Eigenheiten, Einstellung zur verlangten Aufgabe und der Wille zur militärischen Einordnung vor allem zu beurteilen sind. Hier fließen weltanschauliche, moralische und staatsbürgerliche persönliche Wertungen des Untersuchers direkt in das Untersuchungsergebnis ein. Auf den Gebieten der Charakterzüge usw. kann jeder Psychiater aus fast jedem Exploranden so viel Fakten herausexplorieren, daß sich je nach der Wortwahl bei der Abfassung des Berichts Tauglichkeit oder Untauglichkeit ergibt. Diese Untersuchungstendenz ist immer vorhanden, bewußt oder nicht. Sie ist auch sehr abhängig von der momentanen Verfassung des Untersuchers.

5. Auf dem Gebiet der Einstellungen fehlt uns die Instanz, die bestimmt, was richtig ist. Dagegen kann in der Regel im groben bestimmt werden, welche Einstellungen *militärisch* richtig sind. Wer mit der Armee identifiziert ist, steht in Gefahr, diese als *allgemein* richtig anzusehen. Unreflektierte Verwechslungen: militäruntauglich-lebensuntauglich, Unsoldat-Unmensch, Fötzelsoldat-Fötzel, sind immer wieder bewußt sorgfältig zu vermeiden.

6. Ob die Schweizer Armee heute *überwiegend* nützt oder schadet, ist eine politische Frage, die nicht mit Sicherheit entschieden werden kann. Sicher ist beides der Fall. Man müßte wissen können, was in absehbarer Zeit wahrscheinlicher sei, ein die Schweiz betreffender begrenzter Krieg oder eine generelle