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Men and Opposites in Heraclitus

By G. S. Kirk, Cambridge (England)

In his article 'L'homme et l'expérience humaine dans les fragments d'Héraclite'¹ Professor André Rivier has given a useful and well-presented survey of the main fragments dealing with this topic. In the course of this survey he has raised one or two points of disagreement with interpretations offered in my book²; at the same time, the greater part of his treatment indicates that on many questions our views are extremely similar. If I take this opportunity of commenting on the divergences it is in the hope of further advancing the study of Heraclitus, as Rivier himself has already done, and not merely of defending views which I am in any event glad to modify where necessary.

I

Professor Rivier was led by an occasional use of the unsatisfactory term 'relativist' in my treatment of certain fragments, together with certain phrases which could, in isolation from their context, appear misleading, to suppose that I was attributing to Heraclitus a kind of *homo mensura* subjectivism³. It is a writer's own fault if he does not make his meaning clear to every one of his readers; and I may say at once that I agree completely with Rivier's contention that Heraclitus did not make his own, or other people's, experience the measure or condition of the truth that he proclaimed.

Nevertheless, even when ambiguous phraseology, misunderstandings and so on have been discounted, it is evident that there is a considerable difference—and one which is not without interest, perhaps, for the interpretation of the Heraclitean view of opposites—between Rivier's assessment and my own. The first question is whether the contrarieties cited in the extant fragments as being connected in an underlying unity are all envisaged as having objective and self-sufficient existence, or whether in certain examples the contrariety depends upon

¹ Mus. Helv. 13 (1956) 144ff.

² *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge 1954).

³ For example, the sentence 'The ἐμβαίνοντες provide the fixed point against which the regularity of the passage of water can alone be measured' (*Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* 378) is quoted by Rivier as an example of my 'relativistic' interpretation (Mus. Helv. l. c. 159 n. 45). In fact this sentence comes at the end of a discussion in which it is made plain that the river is objectively the same, and ever different, because of the measure and regularity of its flow. This flow can only 'be measured', empirically speaking, against a fixed point; the advantage of 'those who step in' is, of course, that they constitute, for graphic purposes, a fixed point which is also an animate, empirical measurer. But naturally the measure was there whether it was being 'measured' or not. See also pp. 161. and 163.

a relation between an object or event and its observer or assessor. Even if this second alternative can be upheld for some cases, it is important to note that there is no question of subjectivism, of the contrarieties simply depending on personal judgements arbitrarily made by individuals or by species. In the opinion of Heraclitus even a name was regarded as somehow substantially connected with the essence of the object to which it was commonly attached (cf. e.g. fr. 48 and Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments 118ff.). It is not unreasonable, therefore, to suppose that the existence of a contrariety in the reactions of, for example, the majority of mankind on the one hand, and some other animal species on the other, to one and the same object, could be regarded by Heraclitus as evidence of a real, naturally-existing contrariety, as well as of a unity indicated by the singleness of the object that stimulated the contrary reactions. Yet this contrariety would inhere in the complex 'object + assessor' rather than in the object itself on the one hand or in any possible assessor on the other. That the contrariety (and the unity) should exist in some segment of the common world-order—rather than in what could be contrary to the world-order and its Logos, for example the *ἴδιον* of an aberrant personal assessment—was perhaps all that Heraclitus' immediate interest required.

For confirmation of this hypothesis one turns to the fragments themselves. The most obvious possible cases are fr. 61, 13 and 9⁴. The first of these begins by asserting that 'Sea is purest and most polluted water', then proceeds to explain that it is 'for fishes drinkable and salutary, but for men undrinkable and destructive'. The conclusion we should draw, according to André Rivier, is that sea is, as a matter of objective fact, both pure and polluted—as is witnessed by its contrary effects. The saying, therefore, is a statement of contrariety in unity. More will be said in section II about this last point; here I consider only the attitude summarized in Rivier's statement (Mus. Helv. I. c. 145, n. 2) that 'La mer ... est saisie directement dans sa double et objective qualification (comme le montre aussi le mouvement du texte); les hommes et les poissons viennent à titre subsidiaire expliciter le contenu de la thèse'. (The same subsidiary role, it is implied, is played by the pigs of fr. 13 and the donkeys of fr. 9.) At first sight this seems obviously true; but on closer examination one may wish to make certain reservations. If it may be assumed (as Rivier seems prepared to accept, initially at least) that frs. 13 and 9 are roughly parallel in sense to fr. 61, and can be used to help in the elucidation of its meaning, then it seems unlikely that men and fishes are merely incidental and subsidiary illustrations of the duality of sea-water. There is some uncertainty

⁴ These I classified (together with the dubious fragments 4 and 37) as a distinguishable group, one of three groups of fragments in which 'opposites are "the same" relatively to different observers' (*Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* 72). The special heading of this particular group is as follows (op. cit. 73): 'The same thing is regarded in opposite ways by different types of observer; and has opposite effects on different subjects. A certain food or activity is good for animals but the opposite for men, and vice versa.' I should not choose precisely these words today, in the light of what Rivier has to say; but they do not entail *homo mensura*.

about the original text of fr. 13, but Clement's version, 'Pigs delight in mire rather than in clean water', probably reproduces the main structure of the saying⁵. Compare this with fr. 9, 'Donkeys would choose rubbish rather than gold': in both cases (as I think most critics would agree) we have to understand some such sense as '<but men prefer clean water (or gold)>'. The formal emphasis is on the assessor as much as on the object of assessment; Heraclitus began with the subjective effect ('delight in', 'choose') produced by a particular object on one class of assessor, and then, we assume, he adduced an opposite effect on a different class⁶. The assessors are not introduced here 'à titre subsidiaire', and their differing reactions seem to be essential parts of the statements. Nor does the 'mouvement du texte' here suggest that the object (mire or clean water, rubbish or gold—in both these fragments, but not in fr. 61, a two-fold object of assessment is introduced) is 'directly grasped in its double and objective qualification'⁷. Far from it: in frs. 9 and 13 any contrariety in the object arises directly out of the contrary reactions, of delight or repulsion, of different kinds of subject. Apart from these reactions no-one would expect any duality whatever in these objects to manifest itself. To apply this analysis to fr. 61, all that should be said is that a contrariety arises from the comparison of a relationship men:sea-water with a relationship fish:sea-water. These relationships are seen to be in some respects opposed; yet a unity between them is supplied by the common factor, sea-water.

Thus it seems to be an exaggeration to assert either (1) that for Heraclitus the contrariety always existed in the object, independently of that object's place in the cosmos and of animate interplay with it; or (2), at the other extreme, that the contrariety in some of Heraclitus' examples is purely a subjective one, imposed by different animate assessors. There was, for Heraclitus, a contrariety inherent in

⁵ Cf. *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* 76ff.

⁶ The first pair of adjectives in fr. 61, *καθαρώτατον* and *μαρώτατον*, neither implies nor necessarily excludes an assessment by an animate subject; but the explanatory epithets *πότιμον* and *ἄποτον* do imply a living subject.

⁷ The form of fr. 61 does not, in fact, necessarily suggest an objective contrariety in sea-water. It is a common practice of Heraclitus to place as first word in a sentence one which delimits the sphere from which a subsequent concrete example is drawn (e.g. *ὕδρς, ὄνονς* in frs. 13 and 9; *οἱ ἱατροὶ* in fr. 58; *γραφέων* in fr. 59; *ὁδός* in fr. 60; *τῷ τόξῳ* in fr. 48), and then to assert an opposition within that sphere. The very fact that sea-water is seen to produce such different reactions would be sufficient justification for Heraclitus to declare outright 'Sea is most pure and most polluted water', and only then to explain how this is so. This would not entail, especially in the light of other fragments, that purity and pollution are asserted of sea-water as self-contained entities independent of all other circumstances. I was myself certainly pressing this possibility too far when I wrote (op. cit. 74f.): '... for both Heraclitus and Anaximander "the opposites" were opposite *things*; hot and cold, salutary and deleterious, had a real, corporeal existence of their own, and were actual components of more complex objects with which they happened to be connected.' It is easy to exaggerate the concreteness of 'qualities' before the distinction had been drawn between existence and concrete bulk. The fact is, I suppose, that a pre-Parmenidean thinker, at least, if asked what made sea-water polluted, might have replied that it was the presence of *τὸ μαρόν*; and if further asked to define *τὸ μαρόν* he would have defined it as a concrete substance, in this case salt. Yet this does not mean that he would carry analysis far enough to envisage all properties as concrete substances, especially when they were asserted in relational statements.

the world-order that was certainly not the invention of men. Men, however, exaggerated its importance at the expense of the less apparent but far more significant unity (cf. e.g. fr. 54); sometimes to the extent of imposing this pattern of contrariety where it did not objectively exist at all in the external world—though anything in Nature, perhaps, may through its share in the Logos be seen in certain circumstances to manifest this contrariety and consequent connexion or unity. To take another specific example: fr. 60, 'Road up and down, one and the same'. This is perhaps another concrete instance of the unity of opposites: the 'road up' and the 'road down' are in fact the same road. Here I commented⁸: 'It may be that Heraclitus noticed the opposition in name and the identity of the thing named, and deduced from this that the opposition was a relative one—relative to observers in different circumstances' (for example, to men standing at the bottom, and at the top, of the same hill). Professor Rivier once more deprecates the suggestion that the opposition depends on a relation: 'Qu'une route parcourue dans un sens et dans l'autre soit 'la même', c'est qu'elle ne saurait être autrement: elle est faite pour être empruntée dans les deux sens, sans attendre que deux promeneurs (ou deux 'observateurs'), ou le même alternativement, aient effectué (ou envisagé) le chemin en sens inverse⁹'. Here it is maintained that the duality is objectively present in any road: it is in the nature of a road that it can be traversed in either direction. This is a subtle and interesting qualification of the kind of view that I expressed. But that view did not imply (except, it may be conceded, by the use of the term 'relative') that the duality, the opposition, had no existence save in the imagination of men. To put the matter in terms that are inevitably too formal, it implied that the opposition was activated when men started using the road and calling it 'road up' and 'road down'. The fragment as we have it is not an abstract statement about the properties of geometrical lengths, but an observation about a particular part of human experience. The opposition depended on the interplay between men and road, but was none the less significant, none the less a part of the structure of the objectively-existing cosmos, for all that. Rivier's qualification, then, seems to me to go beyond the evidence at our disposal here.

On occasion the contrariety in a particular part of the coherent world-order is to be inferred from the reactions of men or other animate creatures rather than from the nature of the object or event itself. Often, indeed, such reactions are determined by a private and unrealistic tendency in the subject, who is out of touch with the common Logos; and the result is an opposite-analysis that has little or no validity. Yet that Heraclitus states an opposition in terms of human experience does not in any way mean that he denies its objective value; and when a critic reproduces this common emphasis on human experience it does not mean that man is regarded as the arbitrary determinant of the opposition. Thus in

⁸ *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* 112.

⁹ *Mus. Helv.* l. c. 155 n. 41.

fr. 10, for example, where Rivier agrees that *συνάψεις* ('things taken together') implies the idea of a personal subject reacting to pairs of opposites, he finds it necessary to insist that the contrariety or unity of things is not simply an analysis imposed by a human assessor, but is implicit in the nature of things themselves. With this I fully agree¹⁰. Heraclitus seems to judge the essential nature of the world partly on the evidence of human reactions to it—both misguided, superficial reactions, which stress only the plural and contrary aspect of things, and the critical reactions of the wise who comprehend the Logos. Both kinds of reaction indicate, in different ways, not only the state of mind of the subject but also the objective nature of the world outside. Sometimes the philosopher finds this nature sufficiently revealed in the animate reaction to it, without going on to decide precisely whether the Logos is working more strongly and more detectably in the object, or in its assessor, or in the combination of the two.

II

Yet another problem arises from the consideration of fr. 61. Was it Heraclitus' purpose to emphasize not only that apparent (by which I mean evident) opposites are really one, but also that evident unities equally contain opposites?

André Rivier's view is that the surviving fragments clearly exemplify the second view as well as the first. Thus, following Karl Reinhardt, he distinguishes three classes of fragment concerned with opposites: a) the many fragments where unity is revealed in evident opposites; b) those where Heraclitus 'révèle la présence de contraires dans l'indistinction initiale d'un objet connu'; c) more rarely, those where unity and contrariety are simultaneously emphasized, as in frs. 10, 51, and (according to Rivier) 90. As examples of (b) Reinhardt¹¹ cited frs. 32 and 49a. The latter, as Rivier agrees, is suspect; the former, according to which 'One thing, the only truly wise, does not and does consent to be called by the name of Zeus', seems to be concerned with stating, in typically paradoxical manner¹², the striking degree both of coincidence and of non-coincidence between the Logos and the Zeus of conventional religion, and not with giving a logical example of any kind¹³. Rivier himself prefers to cite frs. 21, 26 and 61 as instances of this contrariety in

¹⁰ Cf. the closing summary of the discussion of fr. 10 in *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* 179: 'According to this interpretation of fr. 10 there is no inconsistency with fr. 50, where the content of the Logos is said to be the fact that all things are one, *ἐν πάντα εἶναι*. Fr. 10 also implies this; but it describes not the fact itself but the human mind's apprehension of it, and so uses *ἐκ* and *ἐξ* (sc. in the phrase *ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα*) to suggest the mind's change from one aspect of the fact to the other.' This may or may not over-emphasize the literal sense of *συνάψεις* and its application to what follows; but it is not, I think, a relativistic interpretation in the sense of *homo mensura*, as Rivier takes it to be.

¹¹ *Hermes* 77 (1942) 242f.

¹² Heraclitus' obsession with the unity of opposites probably encouraged him to exaggerate the common gnomic tendency to juxtapose contradictory words or descriptions: cf. e.g. the saying quoted in fr. 34, *παρόντας ἀπειναι*. There is no 'opposite-doctrine' here, only a graphic statement; such is the case, probably, with fr. 32, although no doubt the paradoxical form struck Heraclitus as being appropriate to the structure of the world-order.

¹³ Cf. *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* 392ff.

evident unity. Let us examine them and see if they convincingly support his interpretation. Fragments 21 and 26 are unfortunately both very difficult. The first states that 'Death is what we see when waking, what we see when sleeping is sleep': one may strongly question whether this is intended to illustrate the discovery of contrariety (of death and sleep—which are not, however, really opposed, cf. fr. 26) in unity (that is, in 'what we see'). According to fr. 26 'A man in the night kindles a light for himself, when his vision is extinguished; living, he is in contact with the dead, while asleep; while awake, he is in contact with the sleeper.' Here waking life, sleeping life, and death, are related to each other with man as the subject: a primarily biological or psychological assertion, one would say, even while acknowledging that the relation of life and death is used as an example of the underlying connexion of opposites in frr. 15 and 62. In fr. 26, moreover, the unity of the subject, a man, is not sufficiently stressed to allow the statement to be taken as a deliberate example of contrariety in unity. In short, neither in fr. 21 nor in fr. 26 is there any real counterpart to the clear and often explicit instances of the underlying connexion of opposites which we find, for example, in frr. 59, 60, 88, 57, and 67. Turning to fr. 61, we find that this and this alone (with the addition of fr. 12, which is not considered in this connexion by Rivier) has reasonable claims to belong to the category distinguished by Reinhardt and Rivier; but even here the discussion on p. 156–157 above should have thrown considerable doubt on the superficial formal implication that contrariety in unity, rather than vice versa, is being stressed. Here an additional factor may be adduced. Hippolytus, to whom we owe the preservation of this fragment, and who evidently had access to some relatively reliable handbook of Heraclitus, saw fit to quote the saying among other examples of the fact that opposites are really 'the same'. His introductory comment is as follows: 'And he (sc. Heraclitus) says that the polluted and the pure are one and the same thing, and that the drinkable and the undrinkable are one and the same thing.' The emphasis is on the unity of evident contraries, as revealed by the special case of sea-water and its effect on men and fishes, just as the emphasis in fr. 59 is on the coincidence of straight and crooked in another special case: 'Of letters (*or* of writers; *possibly* of fullers) the way is straight and crooked; it is one and the same.' Hippolytus may, of course, have been wrong; but the conclusion seems to be that we cannot be certain of the originally intended emphasis in fr. 61, and that the evidence of nearly all the other fragments introducing concrete instances—and in particular of the very similar frr. 13 and 9—suggests that it was on unity in contrariety rather than the reverse.

Briefly to consider other fragments where the presence of contrariety in unity might conceivably be stressed: in fr. 31, where "of sea the half is earth, the half 'burner' ", there is a contrary tendency operating on different parts of the same cosmos, but the motive is primarily, as is clear, cosmological. In fr. 50 'It is wise to accord with the Logos that *ἐν πάντα εἶναι*'—that all things are one, this means, and not the reverse; for what things appear to be on the surface (and therefore

not what the Logos declares) is precisely *πάντα* or *πολλά*. In the priamel-fragments 79 and 82/83 the intention is not, I submit against Rivier (op. cit. 146), to determine the position of man by relating him to two extremes (child and god or ape and god), but to give some idea of the status of god by asserting a relation (god: man) parallel to a known lower relation (man: child or man: ape); and certainly there is no detectable intention to stress contrary relationships inhering in man, as a logical discovery. The other relevant fragment is fr. 12, where 'the same rivers' (for when one first sees, or imagines, a river it strikes one as single, as 'the same') are observed by those that step into them (more vividly than by others) to be composed of 'different and different waters'. I have argued at length elsewhere that Heraclitus' chief purpose here was to emphasize that it was because the change in the waters of the river is exactly balanced, because there is a *μέτρον* or measure like that in the world-order as a whole; that the river is also, and can legitimately be described as, 'the same'. The question whether rivers are intended to illustrate the behaviour of the world-order (or its main constituent masses), as I have maintained, or of every single thing whatsoever, as Plato implied, is irrelevant here. The fact seems to be that the river-statement is not just another concrete example of contrariety in unity, it is an attempt to relate contrariety ('other') and unity ('same') themselves, in the case of parts and wholes, by means of the concept of *μέτρον* which is allied to that of the Logos. For further consideration of fr. 12 see section III.

I now turn to consider the fragments in which, according to André Rivier, the accent is placed simultaneously on unity and contrariety—that is, frs. 51 and 10—to see if they make the existence of special statements of contrariety in unity more probable¹⁴. In the first part of fr. 51 men are rebuked for failing to understand how 'being carried apart it is brought together with itself'¹⁵. Here it is unity in contrariety that is emphasized: what men do not understand is the coherence (the main verb is *ξυμφέρεται*, or less probably *δμολογέει*) of the evidently divergent world. There is in such divergent complexes a unity, a connexion (*ἄρμονίη*)—so the fragment continues—that is under balanced tension, as in a bow or a lyre. In the word *παλίντροπος*¹⁶, and in the example of simultaneous tension and stability in the string and framework of bow and lyre, there is no special stress either on contrariety or on unity. In fr. 10 the 'things taken together' are pairs of contraries. Such things are either wholes (when presenting themselves as a single continuum) or not-wholes (when presenting themselves as discrete extremes); they are either in or out of tune, tending together or apart—*συμφερόμενον διαφερόμενον*, where

¹⁴ I forego discussion of fr. 90, which Rivier himself, one may perhaps assume, would not choose to consider as evidence for this class of fragment, if no other evidence were forthcoming.

¹⁵ Cf. *Heraclitus, the Cosmic Fragments* 203ff.

¹⁶ For a reply to G. Vlastos' defence of the reading *παλίντροπος*, in *AJP* 76 (1955) 348ff., see p. 193ff. of *The Presocratic Philosophers*, by G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, to be published shortly by the Cambridge University Press.

the terminology resembles that of fr. 51. As in that fragment, the initial emphasis, revealed in the word *συνλλάψεις*, is on the connexion between obvious contraries; though again the other aspect is ultimately given equal status. It was, of course, the unity that was more important for Heraclitus—more positively important, perhaps one should say, since without the contrariety, the war or strife of frs. 53 and 80, the connexion and coherence would inevitably collapse. Yet Rivier's class (c) does little to increase the likelihood that Heraclitus devoted special attention to the demonstration of contrariety in particular concrete instances of an evident initial unity, or to enhance the evidential value in this respect of the somewhat indeterminate fr. 61. The plural and discrete aspect of things needed no emphasis from Heraclitus; it was only too obvious to mankind in general, who failed to comprehend the Logos. Only the river-analogy placed the initial emphasis clearly on unity, and this, it has been suggested, had a special purpose.

III

In the fourth and last section of his paper¹⁷, Professor Rivier considers the case of fr. 12, *ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ*. He finds the mention of the *ἐμβαίνοντες* here inconsistent with other references to men in other fragments, and with the classification that he himself has tried to establish. The point of inconsistency, according to Rivier, is that in fr. 12 the function of those who step into rivers appears to be 'celle de condition ou de mesure dans l'énoncé des applications de la loi de l'union des contraires' (op. cit. 159). This anomaly would not in itself be sufficient to suggest a textual failing (again according to Rivier) were it not that the word *ἐμβαίνουσιν* is open to reproach 'sous le triple rapport du sens littéral, de la syntaxe et du style' (p. 163). Here Rivier refers to his earlier attack on this word (Un emploi archaïque de l'analogie 10ff.), though he admits that his insistence there was perhaps excessive. That earlier attack has already come under fire¹⁸, but its author is not yet persuaded that any parallel can be quoted for what he calls 'l'anomalie, dans la langue pré-classique, du participe isolé, au datif masculin pluriel, avec nuance hypothétique'. To clear up the last point first, there is no reason whatever to take *ἐμβαίνουσιν* as hypothetical. 'Upon those who step into the same rivers different and different water flow': what is necessarily hypothetical about this? Are we to say, for example, that in the sentence 'Those who stand in the rain get wet' the phrase 'those who stand' is hypothetical? Certainly not; and the fact that this kind of general statement can be re-stated in a hypothetical form is strictly beside the point.

Rivier is not, therefore, justified in demanding a parallel for a 'nuance hypothétique' (and in any case I am not convinced that no parallel could be found). Even apart from this, Rivier probably over-states the requirement for a strict parallel when he writes (n. 56 on p. 163 of his article): 'Le participe *ἐμβαίνουσιν*

¹⁷ Mus. Helv. I. c. 157ff.

¹⁸ For references see Mus. Helv. I. c. 163 n. 56.

ne sera 'protégé', s'il peut être, que par des parallèles rigoureux." However, to those partial but cumulative parallels which have already been observed by others (most notably ἐπειγομένοισι δ' ἴκοντο at Iliad 12, 374 and ξὺν νόῳ λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῷ ξυνῶ πάντων in fr. 114 of Heraclitus himself) I will now add the following, discovered after a by no means extensive search: Democritus ('Democrates') fr. 108: διζημένοισι τὰγαθὰ μόλις παραγίνεται, τὰ δὲ κακὰ καὶ μὴ διζημένοισι. Here the dative of διζημένοισι is governed by παραγίνεται, just as that of ἐμβαίνουσιν is governed by ἐπιρρεῖ. This seems to be a singularly close parallel, as good at all events as can reasonably be required; and if 'Democrates' be questioned, the fact remains that the fragments which fall under this lemma in Stobaeus are unlikely in any case to have been composed much later than Democritus, and then in what was intended by a skilful writer to be the gnomic Ionic style. It appears, then, that Rivier would be misguided in persisting any longer in his objections to a word against which no textual, syntactical or stylistic criticism can fairly be brought. These objections should be dropped even if, as Rivier himself assumes, the sense of fr. 12 did not accord with his assessment of Heraclitus' use of human experience. In reality, however, contrary to what Rivier believes, fr. 12, including ἐμβαίνουσιν, seems perfectly to accord with this assessment. For there is no need whatsoever to suppose that the difference of the waters depends on or is conditioned by those who step into them. Those who step into the rivers, as I have already maintained, are mentioned with the main purpose of making the statement more graphic: the flux of rivers does not depend on people standing in them, nor does the measure of this flux depend on people measuring it. I have already referred in n. I on p. 155 above to André Rivier's discovery of a subjective, relativistic, *homo mensura* interpretation, which is simply not there, in my earlier explanation of the fragment—to which I still adhere; but the fact is that he also discovers this meaning in the received text of the fragment itself. What this text indicates, however, is that a river is 'the same' and 'different': its sameness is apparent to anyone at first sight or first thought (so this kind of judge is not specifically mentioned); while its less obvious difference is most notably apparent to anyone who steps into it and feels the waters constantly flowing past. Such a person, I would add, is also in a good position to notice what seems to be implied (cf. also fr. 91), that the passage of the waters is regular. It is this regularity that gives 'sameness', coherence and consistency to the river as a whole.

There is no need to labour this point any further. In short, fr. 12 is not an exception to Rivier's analysis of the fragments mentioning human experience, which for the most part is admirable, because there is no suggestion that different waters flow down only if men step into the rivers. ἐμβαίνουσιν is not objectionable, then, from the point of view of sense—indeed, it is positively helpful; and a closely parallel usage probably from Democritus has been quoted to show, what many will not question, that it is unobjectionable linguistically.